Analysis of Peace and Conflict Potential in Yemen

Report to GTZ / KFW / DED
By Responding to Conflict (RTC)

Submitted by: Dr. Marwan Darweish
Dr. Albrecht Hofheinz

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1 Executive Summary

Yemen is one of the 49 countries designated by the United Nations as “Least Developed Countries” (LDCs), suffering from a very low per capita GDP (280 USD in 1998); a low level of economic diversification (with petroleum-related goods accounting for 90% of export earnings; and a share of manufacturing in GDP standing at 8.1% in 1999 [down from 11.4% in 1998, and falling further in 2000 with an estimated share of 7.5%]); and relatively weak human resources (e.g. life expectancy for males 55, for females 57 years in 1999; high infant (79‰ in 1999, down from 141‰ in 1980) and very high though improving maternal (3.5‰ in 1999, down from 8-10‰ in 1996) mortality rates; very big disparity in the adult literacy rates [1999: male 66.6%, female 23.9% [up from 1995: male 62%, female 18%]]; combined school and higher education enrolment 51% in 1999). Yemen’s position in the UN Human Development Index has slightly improved over the past two decades, bringing the country up from hovering around the 25th lowest rank worldwide to around the 30th. Still, with an HDI of only 44.8% (2000) and an even lower Gender Development Index (38.9%), Yemen remains the only country in the Middle East and North Africa classified as a low human development country.

In the two governorates visited by the mission, common grievances were: a lack of infrastructure and of services; neglect and / or unfair treatment by the central government; and a lack of participation by the communities in decision making processes, matched by a lack of transparency and of accountability on the part of the executive (the heads of which remain unelected at the district and governorate level). Specifically, the local population complained that

1. the central government did not fulfil its obligations and its own promises of providing and maintaining sufficient infrastructure and services (roads, water, health facilities, schools, electricity, etc.);

2. that even where facilities were established, not enough qualified staff was available and sufficiently motivated to run these facilities to their full potential on a permanent basis;

3. and finally, that there were no reliable ways of ensuring that the local populations’ observations of shortcomings and mismanagement were heeded – as one interviewee expressed it, “all we can do is shout, but no one hears us”.

Conflict-related factors contribute to exacerbating these grievances, and some factors negatively reinforce each other:

1. Security: Armed clashes and kidnappings – whatever their actual extent – did and do occur and have led to the areas in question often being considered unsafe by outside actors (not least external development agencies). This puts these regions at a disadvantage when it came to the allocation of development aid.

2. Negative stereotypes: Some (not all) members of the central government regard the tribally organised people of outlying areas as backward, claiming that if they are offered development, they do not properly manage it, or even steal assets; that they are excessive in their demands, trying to extract services through violent means; and that the only language they understand is the language of force. Such stereotypes, when guiding action, tend to reinforce violent confrontation.

3. Lack of participation, transparency and accountability prevent effective control of management of local development projects by the local population.

4. Lack of an independent judiciary: reinforces the antagonism between state and society, prevents effective measures against corruption, and encourages treating public assets as private booty. To an extent, it also means a lack of security for local and outside
investment in sectors not treated as strategic priority areas by the state, thus often preventing such investment and impeding economic diversification.

If one is to address these conflict-related factors that contribute to a lack of development, one has to find ways to reduce negative stereotypes, increase security, increase transparency and accountability, and strengthen the independence of the judiciary. The Yemeni Government has committed itself for some time already to further decentralisation, democratisation, and administrative reform, and donors have agreed to support this reform process. This commitment provides a crucial frame for the success of sectoral aid. In the interest of the sustainability of such aid, and in the interest of the Yemeni people, more must be done to strengthen it and translate its promises into reality on the ground.

Conflicts are multi-levelled and multi-dimensional. The key is to understand the relationship between conflict and the different factors that might increase or reduce tension. It is important to be aware of the possible positive or negative impact. Conflict analysis is a practical process of examining and understanding the reality of the conflict from different perspectives. Analysis can form the basis for developing strategies, intervention and action. Conflict analysts use the term ‘cooperative conflicts’ to highlight the changing patterns and relationships and the linkages between different conflicts. This means understanding vertical linkages between the micro and macro levels, such as the deprivation in Mareb and kidnapping of foreigners and the ‘war against terrorism’, and the horizontal relationships running across areas of conflict, for example the linkage between the Al-Qaeda and the Palestinian/Israeli conflict.

We identified the following main types of conflict during our mission:

- **Inter tribal conflict in Mareb**: This is chiefly about resources (land and water), and secondly about status and blood. It is limited in terms of human cost and geographical extent. The most violent clashes caused the death of about 60 people and were limited to the border areas between the tribes. If the government intervenes at all, it would be as a third party to mediate between the tribes. The impact of the conflict is in terms of restriction of movement, access to services, land, and economic and human cost. This type of conflict exists in Mareb and most of the North Yemen and is limited for the most part to the border areas between tribes but sometimes overspills to the towns.

- **Conflict between Central Government and its citizens**: This exists both in Mareb and al-Dhale and is mainly about allocation of resources and services and access to an equal share of the oil in the Mareb region. The manifestation of the conflict is the abduction of foreigners and the violent confrontations with the army. There is a lack of trust between the government and the citizens, and a feeling that they have been neglected, discriminated against and marginalized and see the government as ‘corrupt and useless’. This fosters frustration, anger and, in some cases, violence. Some strong voices in the government have negative stereotypes about the inhabitants, perceiving them as ‘primitive, backward and only understanding force’. The impacts of the conflict is: refusal of development agencies to work in Mareb; decline in tourism, reluctance of business to invest in the region, attacks on oil pipes and installations.

- **Conflict between government/army and Islamist/secular groups**: The conflict is about the presence of Islamist groups, including Al-Qaeda, in Mareb and other provinces and also about the existence of a military secular group (Mawj) in al Dhale. The conflict escalated after 11th September 2001 and
the subsequent heavy pressure on Yemen to joint the international coalition in the ‘war against terrorism’. Yemen expelled over a hundred ‘suspected’ persons from different nationalities and is now ‘hunting down’ high-ranking Al-Quaeda members in the country (according to Yemeni security sources, about 3 or 4 people). The impacts of conflict are: heavy military presence, tension between army and residents, human cost for both the army and civilians, a decline in tourism and in military and economic aid from European countries and from the US. There are strong anti-American feelings and sympathy for Bin Laden, who is seen as standing up against the ‘mighty US’. There is also condemnation of US support for Israel and the ‘double standards’ of their policy in combating terrorism, as well as criticism of European countries for their lack of a firm stand towards Israel.

- **Party conflicts**: This is about access power rather than ideology. It is mainly between the ruling party (GCP) and opposition parties such Islah and YPS. The tribal allegiances are still stronger than party loyalties, but it possible that the allegiance to the tribe will be questioned in the future. The fact that the opposition parties gained 40% of the vote in the local elections in February 2001 created a strong sense of confidence and enthusiasm about the potential of the Local Administration. However, the elected councils are unclear about their role and responsibilities and most of them are under-qualified for this work.

- **North/ South conflict**: This is about the role of former Southern elites after unification in 1990. Al-Dhale is a new province, created in 1998, bringing together districts from both North and South as a demonstration of the unity. This area use to be the front line of confrontation between to two parts of Yemen and thus many people were employed by the army. There is deep, and mutual, negative stereotyping between North and South. The Southerners have no trust in the government and the army; they feel that they are discriminated against and marginalized. There is, however, a high level of awareness and community participation in this province.

We can conclude, after examination of the above conflicts, that their root causes are about scarcity of resources, poverty and unequal distribution of resources and services, exclusion from decision making, lack of participation, and existing social and political structures, in particular the ‘weak state’). These factors lead to frustration, anger and possibly violent conflicts. These feelings, whether expressed through inter-tribal conflicts, ‘joining terrorism groups’, kidnapping, or conflict with the central government and army, are all symptoms of a much deeper and highly complex context.

To help decrease tensions and prevent violence, we must address the attitudes, behaviour and underlying conditions and structures that cause these conflicts, and find ways to support peacebuilding through institutions and structures.

We recommend the extension of German agencies’ work to Mareb and al Dhale and propose the following areas of intervention:

- Coordination amongst German agencies to develop an overall vision and strategy for intervention and monitoring.
- Support for institutions of popular participation and control.
- Capacity building and training for project directors, field workers, local administration and central government staff.
- Sustainable ways to improve infrastructure and services in key areas of health, education, water and roads.
- Confidence building and dialogue with the government.

Germany is the most important unilateral donor country for Yemen, with around 21 million € in annual aid, and its contribution is critical to the Yemen’s development. German development cooperation with both North and South Yemen is thirty years old, longer than that of any other country.

This commitment has earned Germany a particularly high standing among Yemenis, both on the government and on the popular level. We encountered very warm support for Germany and high praise for their support.

We believe that Germany has an important opportunity in Yemen to play a leadership role in the field of development and in particular to take the lead in adopting a conflict sensitive approach. Germany’s solid relationship with the Yemeni Government is important in enabling open and honest discussions and giving weight to the expression of German support for the proposed changes of decentralisation, good governance and institution and capacity building.

Yemenis are eager to maintain and expand this relationship with the German government and its agencies, which supports our recommendations that their work be extended to Mareb and Al-Dhale.
2 Background of Mission

The security situation in Yemen and Mareb especially were one of the reasons for conducting this study in order to combat the structural causes of abductions of foreigners. After Sep. 11, the “war on terror” added a new dimension, with the wish (chiefly advanced by the US) to “dry out the swamp” of potential support for Islamist terrorists and prevent them from finding easy refuge in remote areas such as Mareb or the Jawf. As it is stated in the TOR “the international community’s interest in conflict prevention and conflict management has risen significantly especially in Islamic and Arab countries” and to try and address the some of the needs of the population in this countries. The Yemeni Government uses this world political constellation to obtain military support (training, hardware) for its army and thus to strengthen its power base, while trying as much as possible to keep the presence of foreign military personnel to a minimum.

German aid must be seen in this context. Following Sep. 11, government-to-government negotiations, resulting in agreement on expansion of German development cooperation to provinces such as Mareb or al-Jawf, were followed by a substantial release of new funds.

The provinces considered for intervention were ‘Amran, al-Jawf, Mareb, Shabwa, al-Dhale, parts of Sana’a, and to an extent also Sa’da, al-Baydha, and Hadhramawt. The selection of Mareb is clearly influenced by political factors because of the abductions and the aftermath of Sep.11, bringing this province to the forefront over other provinces where human development indicators are lower.

Out of the rest of provinces that were considered as a second province Al Dhale were suggested for the following criteria: type of conflict is different form Mareb and bring together areas from the North and former south and essentially different needs. Its proximity to existing projects areas allowing relatively easy extension and access. Concerning security al Dhale is a law security risk region. We recommended a region that has potential for project success acknowledging that it is important to work less violent and less dangerous.

Major donors including, for example, the World Bank, have previously been reluctant to engage in these areas for two main reasons: (1) security concerns; and (2) difficult access, low levels of education, and little economic activity. It was feared that the risk of project failure was higher than elsewhere in the country. Since the lack of provision of services from outside is one of the reasons for the security problems, there is some sort of ‘vicious circle’ here which needs to be broken in order to address the security problems.

2.1 Mission Outline and Methodology

During the Yemeni-German government consultations of October 2001 it was agreed to carry out a study on ‘Conflict Prevention through Development Cooperation’ in one or two remote and least developed governorates.

The mission team consisted of Dr Marwan Darweish, team leader and representative of Responding to Conflict (RTC www.respond.org). RTC is an international, not-for-profit agency providing practical capacity-building programmes to support people working for peace, rights and sustainable development in conflict-affected areas of the world. Dr Albrecht Hofheinz is an independent consultant from the Centre for Modern Oriental Studies, Berlin. In Yemen, Mr Abdulmalik al-Marhabi was responsible for logistics and arrangement of interviews. Thanks for the support of GTZ, DED and KFW in Yemen. Their commitment, support and looking after us made this study possible.
The team visited Yemen twice for two weeks each visit during February and March 2002. The team carried out consultations and meetings with government officials, local experts, international donors and development agencies. We visited both Mareb and al Dhale and met with people representing a cross section of society.

Methods used included formal and informal interviews and questionnaires, (see list of interviewees in Annex 10.9), workshops and briefing to German agencies and Embassy.

The key point is to understand the relationship between the different factors and their impact. Conflict analysts use the term ‘cooperative conflicts’ to highlight the changing patterns and relationships and the linkages between the different conflicts. This means understanding the vertical linkages between the micro and macro levels like the deprivation in Mareb and the kidnapping of foreigners and the ‘war against terrorism’, and the horizontal relationships running across areas of conflict for example the linkage between the al-Qai’da and the Palestinian Israeli conflict.

Responding To Conflict (RTC) had been approached initially by Theo Riedke of DED to carry out a conflict analysis in Yemen. The mission was subsequently sponsored by GTZ, KFW and DED.

During the negotiation of the TOR, RTC expressed a strong wish to include women in the team but unfortunately we were informed that it would be difficult for a woman to travel with the team. This has meant that we were unable to approach many women directly to hear their views. The team’s findings may not, therefore, fully represent the opinions of women about the conflicts affecting them and their needs and interests.

3 Conflict Analysis Mareb

Historical background:

Year 628: Eimam al Hadi Yahia come to Yemen from Najran in Saudi Arabia and establish the Zaydia government in the north enjoying the support of the tribes.

1537: The first Ottoman invasion of Yemen.

1839: British occupation of Aden and later on in 1905 the British signed the border agreement between North and South Yemen with Ottomans.

1918: More than ten years of wars with the Ottomans resulted in the independence of North Yemen and the control of the Eimam.

1962: Since 1948 there were few attempts to put an end to the Eimams rule. The Arab Republic of Yemen was established in September 26th 1962. The British withdrew from South Yemen in 1969.

1978: Ali Abdullah Salih President of Yemen.

1990: Unification of North and South Yemen

1993: First parliamentary election in Yemen.

1994: The war between the North and the South and the victory of the North.


2001: First local elections in Yemen.
The region of Mareb is situated 180 km east of San‘aa and according to the statistics for 2000 there are 224,000 inhabitants. Local people argue that the population is over 350,000 (there was lack of cooperation of local residents with the national census). The society has been transformed in the last few decades from nomadic to settled communities living in permanent localities. Most people live on agriculture and trade. Mareb’s position on the Saudi Arabian border has created strong links between the tribes’ leaders and the Saudi authority and until recently the Saudi regime has supported Mareb tribes financially and politically. Some tribes in Mareb and Saudi Arabia have joined forces against the Yemeni revolution in September 1962 against the Royal family and the establishment of the Arab Republic of Yemen. Only after some years did Saudi Arabia recognise Yemen and for many years it had a strong influence in the region of Mareb. The tribes in Mareb have a history that goes back to the pre-Islamic period. The tribe is a social and political unit and each tribe consists of a few families. The relationship between the tribes is usually peaceful and they have social and trading relationships. However, sometimes there are conflicts over resources such as water and land.

General economic basis in Mareb: livestock farming and agriculture; remittances by expatriates, especially from GCC states; employment by the state mainly in the towns, and in the army and trade.

3.1 Conflict profile

There are many conflicts currently active in Mareb, some of them internal while others have external links, and the dynamics of each of them influence the other. The conflicts in Mareb are characterised as complex, interlinked and multi layered. They are rooted in political, social and economic issues, which are both internal and local as well as external, regional and international.

There are about 40 tribes in Mareb, most of whom belong to 4 large tribal groupings (Murad, ‘Abida, Jahm, Jud‘an); plus the Ashraf (‘non-tribal’ people claiming descent from the Prophet Mohammed’s family) and the Hadad (artisans of low social status, living under the ‘protection’ of the tribes). Mareb town lies in territory originally belonging to ‘Abida, and the market there formerly had a settled population consisting mainly of Ashraf. Today, most inhabitants of Mareb town are civil servants and members of the armed forces hailing from outside the province. There are 13 districts in Mareb. Al-Mahelia, Al-‘Abida, Rahba, Aljeel, Aljoubi and Hreeb are districts belonging to the Murad tribe.

3.1.1 Inter-tribal wars

These are chiefly about land, water and blood (vengeance: thar and ghadr in Arabic). Other factors may include status and honour or obligations according to traditional value systems like the protection of people seeking refuge in the tribe. The armed clashes between the warring tribes are limited in time and place, though they may go on for decades, with extended periods of ceasefire with compensation agreements for excess number of dead, for destroyed houses, and burned fields. Usually the number of dead is limited to 3-30 deaths per ‘hot’ period and the maximum we heard of is 60 fatalities during one confrontation between Murad and Abida tribes. This type of conflict has happened for centuries.

The consequence of the “tribal wars” is restriction of movement on tribes’ members in times of war for fear of leaving their territory. This prevents access of residents to resources such as water and grassland and to health and education and other services that can only be obtained in town. This deters trade and commercial activities and raises personal insecurity and general instability in the region. Every able, adult male carries a gun. The use of resources to acquire weapons and pay for the cost of the conflict on all levels has a direct impact on the life of the residents.
The conflicts between tribes perpetuate inter-tribal hostilities and animosities and tribal systems, norms, obligations, and leadership. This fragmentation and strong tribal loyalty potentially can hinder the development of civil society structures and organisations. It is important that outside donors and development agencies be aware of the conflict and rivalry between tribes and the potential risks in allocation of resources and development projects to them.

These conflicts have gone on for centuries and have been through all phases and stages. Between Murad and Abida the conflict is in the stage of post crisis and at the moment there is a ceasefire. Between Jahm and Al-Jida’an, it is in the post conflict phase, and the conflict over land was resolved few months ago. The sinking water levels may exacerbate or cause new conflicts in the future.

3.1.2 Conflict between tribes in Mareb and the central government

For hundreds of years, tribes in Yemen retained their autonomy from the central government. Tribes formed an independent social, political and economic unit for the tribe members. The demands of the tribes for services and allocation of resources from the central government has been linked in return to cooperation of tribes with the state. Two main reasons for this conflict are the unequal allocation of services and of resources by government to this region especially now that this area has oil, which is considered as the main source of income for Yemen. This situation has lead to a widespread feeling of neglect and marginalisation and anger amongst the Mareb residents. They believe that they have been discriminated against and treated unjustly; they are frustrated because of the constant ‘broken promises’ by the government. The attitudes of some government officials we met have confirmed the feeling voiced by the residents. High officials portrayed a very negative picture of the Mareb population accusing them of being backward and primitive people who don’t deserve services and investment. During our visit to Mareb we became aware of the absence of the state and the security forces in the region.

The prime manifestations of this conflict are the abductions of foreigners in Yemen including diplomats, development workers and tourists, blowing up of oil pipelines, and some direct attacks on army or police. As a consequence there is a polarization between the two sides and negative stereotyping. Some development agencies are reluctant to expand their work to this region, and those already active there are considering withdrawal of their personnel in case of conflict escalation. There is a dramatic decline of tourism in this area. The direct reason for the kidnapping is to exert pressure on the government to provide services and allocate resources for their own tribe. According to an interview we had with the person responsible for the first case of kidnapping in 1992 (of the American cultural attaché), their demands were that the oil company should pay rent for the land to the tribe, that tribe members should be employed in the army and civil service, that there should be grants for students and provision of health and education services. In 1998 after the kidnapping of a group of foreign tourists, the army intervened forcefully and caused the death of four in these clashes. Following this, Yemeni government began a policy of being tough on kidnappers. Some others claim that kidnapping started originally for political reasons in the conflict between GPC and Yemeni Socialist Party (YSP) as an attempt by the latter to embarrass the government.

GPC claims that abduction originally started for political reasons in the conflict between GPC and YSP in Sirwah by Jahm people in an attempt to embarrass the government for its lack of control in Mareb. The YSP denied such claims. At the moment there are more voices critical of the kidnapping amongst ordinary people in Mareb, and they argue that these are individual acts and those responsible need to be brought to justice. There is pressure on the Tribes leaders to condemn abduction and to refuse protection for the kidnappers.
According to some sources in Mareb the Shaykhs have personal interests regarding their honour and status, and sometimes direct material interests to exploit tribal loyalties and resentments to achieve their personal gains. Also we have been told by more than one source that the government “uses” local councils to weaken the influence of the Shaykhs. This may lead in future to conflicts between local administration and Shaykhs. There are also different views between tribes regarding the role played by their Shaykhs. The Shaykhs of Murad tribe took care of their tribe much more than Jahm Shaykhs through negotiation with government to provide services to their tribe.

The conflict between tribes and government covers different areas in Yemen including Sa’da, ‘Amran, Khawlan, al-Jawf, and Mareb. In Mareb, it is generally a non-violent conflict over access to resources and national services such as health, education, water and roads. However, there is violent conflict along the oil pipeline and major roads where abductions occur and sometimes the conflict overspills to the capital.

The tension between tribes and government goes back to the Imam’s time and in 1948 Imam Yahya, then ruler of Yemen, was killed by Ali Nasir al-Qarda’i from Murad tribe. A new dimension of this conflict began with the phenomenon of kidnapping of foreigners in Yemen. This has raised the level of conflict between the parties and the government who have used strong force to put an end to kidnapping. At the moment the extent of the conflict between the government and the tribes is beyond the ‘crisis’ point, and there is an attempt from government to address the conflict, however it is possible to return to escalation and another crisis, this because it isn’t clear what is the ‘outcome’ of this conflict.

Possible indicators: For details on dead and injured etc, see list of security incidents in appendix 8.3. Pipeline blown up 39 times in 1998; this has now decreased since government and tribes talk ‘more reasonably’ to each other (Tenambergen).

3.1.3 Conflict between militant Islamist splinter groups and the US-led “coalition against terror”

This conflict is about the presence of militant Islamist groups in Yemen, affiliated to or members of networks such as ‘Islamic Jihad’ or ‘al-Qa’ida’, and their use of the more remote areas of the country, including mountainous areas of Abyan, Shabwa, Mareb, al-Jawf, and Sa’da, as a base for armed attacks against US and Western interests. In its drive against Southern secessionists in the wake of the 1994 war, the Yemeni government allowed armed Islamist groups, including the Aden-Abyan Army, to operate in the South. These groups turned increasingly virulent, and when the government tried to rein them in, they proclaimed the state un-Islamic and began attacking its army posts and oil installations. Matters came to a head in the only bloody abduction of foreign tourists in Yemen in December 1998, an incident that was linked to the bombing of the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania and to the subsequent US air strikes on Sudan, Afghanistan, and Iraq. The Aden-Abyan Army was chased out of Abyan and Shabwa following this incident, and its leader executed in October 1999. The attack attributed to al-Qa’ida on the US ship Cole in Aden exactly a year later caused tensions between Yemen and the US to rise again, and renewed attention was focused on the Islamist militant networks in Yemen. Allegedly, members of the Aden-Abyan Army and other ‘Jihadis’, including people linked to Osama bin Laden, retreated to al-Jawf and Mareb where they asked for and received shelter and protection from local tribal leaders. After September 11th 2001 more suspected members of al-Qa’ida are said to have escaped and hidden in Yemen. It is alleged that they changed their names, got married to local women and integrated into the community. Security sources in Yemen claim that a few hundred, mostly Arabs, came to Yemen especially because they do not need a visa.
One must make a clear distinction between Yemen as an Islamic traditional society and the political, ideological Islam that might call for the use of violence. During our visit to Mareb we didn’t encounter strong support from residents for al-Qa’ida. However there were a strong anti American feelings and condemnation of the US support to Israel and the double standards of its policy in combating terrorism. In the context of other regional conflicts (Palestine, Afghanistan, etc.) there were widespread anti-US feelings and strong solidarity with the ‘brave few’ who stand up against the mighty US and Bin Laden becomes a symbol of this.

After September 11th 2001 there has been increased international attention to the underlying economic difficulties and poverty facing Yemen, which has led to increased promises of economic development aid. A stronger US military and economic pressure has been applied on Yemen to eradicate members of al-Qa’ida and since then the US increased its military and economic aid. Yemen will receive 35 million USD as military support and 20 million USD as economic aid. In addition the US will train the Yemeni Special Forces and its coastal guards to ‘combat terrorism’. Some argue that the American ‘interventionism’ reached the point at which the FBI are screening visas of applicants to Yemen.

Since September there was international stereotyping of Yemen and Mareb in particular as fundamentalist Islamist strongholds. This brought about a sharp decline in tourism and decrease in foreign investments.

The location of this conflict is mainly in remote areas all over Yemen especially al-Jawf, Mareb and Abyan but also in the capital. The pre conflict phase began in 1980s when Islamist forces have been openly supported against the “evil” of communism in South Yemen and outside in Afghanistan. In the early 1990s Bin Laden turned into an enemy in US eyes after he had been used in Afghanistan.

3.1.4 Party political conflicts

The conflict is about the access to power by opposition political parties, and the attempt of the ruling party to maintain its ultimate control of the centres of power. The conflict is everywhere in Yemen and chiefly between the ruling General People’s Congress Party (GPC) and the opposition Islah (Reform) Party. The Islah represent a moderate Islamist trend and traditional tribe leaders, despite some militant voices in the Party. Therefore, in this stage ideological differences play only a secondary role between the Parties. Violent confrontations have been manifested between the parties during the local election in February 2001. During our meeting in Mareb councillors and ordinary people expressed a passionate enthusiasm about the potential of local councils and their willingness to take part in the development and construction process.

Despite alleged corruption and fraud by GCP the opposition parties obtain about 40% of the votes which is considered a good achievement after the first time ever local election in Yemen. Local councils and heads of councils expressed concern about the government trying to block the functioning of administrative institutions such as local councils and through that preventing them from acting as agents of development and change. This is an impediment to political and legal reform approved by government.

The party conflict began in the 1980s with the start of political groupings in Yemen and the introduction of a multi-party system after unification in 1990. It intensified during the 1993 general elections. The 1994 civil war decisively weakened the YSP that has a solid base in the South. In 1997 the YSP boycotted the parliamentary election and caused it to be marginalised further. During the Presidential elections in 1999 there were only 2 candidates, both from GPC, with 96.3% of votes going to the President, Ali Abdallah Salih.
The current phase of the conflict is that of an early outcome with potential for resumed conflict if the elected councils continue to feel ineffective and hopeless about changing the situation of their residents. There are three members in parliament from Mareb, two Islah and one GPC.

3.1.5 Saudi-Yemeni conflict

This is essentially about the border between Yemen and Saudi Arabia and goes back to Saudi expansion in the early 20th century, the conquest of Asir and Najran and the first border agreement in 1938. It has been exacerbated by conflicts about Royal versus Republican rule in Yemen, Saudi arms supplies to anti-republican forces and the underlying influence of Saudi Arabia against Egypt in the region. It was also a conflict over control of oil in this region and over Saudi stipends to certain Shaykhs and citizens, and to Islamic religious institutions and the Islamic Movement in 1980, with support given to the Wahhabi stream within the Islah Party led by Shaykh Zindani.

Currently, Saudi Arabia gives financial and political support to the Islah party as well as to certain personalities within the party, like Shaykh al-Ahm. Saudi Arabia has a strong influence on the tribes in Mareb especially ‘Abida and al-Jid’an and even supports some personalities within the ruling GPC in Mareb. The tension increased between the parties after unification in 1990 and the Gulf War in 1991. A significant reduction of tensions happened after the signing of the border agreement at the end of 2000 and a reported reduction in Saudi financial support. US-Saudi tension increased after September 11th 2001, and a joint position on Palestine helped improve Saudi Yemeni relations.

During the war between 1962-69 there were violent implications. However, currently the conflict is mostly about precise border demarcation and it seems after the latest border agreement in 2000 the dispute is in a process of resolution.

3.1.6 Implications of regional conflicts

The Gulf War caused an exodus of about 800,000 to 1 million Yemeni workers from the Gulf States with dramatic economic consequences on the Yemeni economy. There was a need for new schools and other services. The relationship between Yemen and the Gulf States reached its worst stage.

After 1998, there was a gradual improvement in relations between Yemen and the Gulf States and by the end of 2001 Yemen acceded to several Gulf Cooperation Council institutions.

Palestine continues to be a symbol of injustices inflicted on the Muslims and Arabs, and of US double standards, feeding anti-US feelings and strengthening solidarity with Islamic resistance against American targets in the Middle East and the world. The defiance of Israel to the UN resolutions and lack of firm European action, have further infuriated the Arab public. The massive street demonstrations in March and April 2002 against Israel’s military assault in the West Bank and Gaza Strip were another indication of the anger towards the USA and Israel.

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1 The extent of Saudi support is a matter of contention. According to some sources, big shaykhs still receive stipends of SAR 50,000 (€ 15,000) per month, and some even twice as much. Although the ‘official’ reason for these payments is mostly given as obligations and traditions from the time when Saudi Arabia supported tribal shaykhs against the royalists, nowadays the effect is rather support for ‘traditional’ leadership and social hierarchy against any growth of democratic and civil society structures. This is also the reason why the Yemeni central government does not mind these Saudi payments. Some also claim that these payments did not decline after the border agreement, for fear of the tribes turning against the Saudis and providing refuge for Saudi opposition.
3.2 Conflict perspectives
In conflict situations, parties have completely different experiences and perspectives. Each party perceives and understands the conflict from their own reality and as a reflection of their historical narrative. The different perspectives presented here are important for the parties involved in the conflict to learn about each other. It is highly important for the government to be aware of its citizens’ views and to take the opportunity to explore possibilities for intervention. Here we will focus on the conflict between tribes in Mareb and central government.

3.2.1 Perspective of Mareb towards the central government
During our visit to Mareb we met with actors from all walks of life and from all levels. We met ordinary people, teachers, health workers, councils, tribes’ leaders and political leaders of many political parties in different localities across Mareb. They expressed a strong feeling that the government ignore and discriminates against them and therefore, doesn’t allocate the resources for this region.

The infrastructure is underdeveloped in the areas of roads, water, health, education, electricity, and other services. They believe that there is an unequal distribution of national resources and power. They claim that oil has been pumped from their area for more than a decade without benefiting from the revenues, so they feel that they have been exploited. They fear that an outside agenda has been imposed on Yemen by US, ignoring the local needs and feelings of the Yemeni people.

Representatives that we met from Mareb expressed a lack of trust in the Government maintaining that they are not honest and only give empty promises to residents of Mareb. They perceive the government as corrupt, with no transparency or accountability. The government, they feel, exploits the tribes’ leaders and uses them against each other in a policy of “divide and rule”. They demand more sensitivity, understanding and consultation with the Mareb residents.

Representatives that we met in Mareb strongly demanded an improvement in services for the population. They feel that they have been discriminated against and ignored by government. They expressed a feeling of anger and frustration towards the government and envy towards other areas in Yemen

3.2.2 Perspective of the government towards Mareb
From the Government side, it blames the tribes and their tradition as an obstacle to development and progress. The Mareb people are perceived to be backward and primitive and therefore treated as such.

During our mission we met with many different high level government officials from the President’s office, Ministers, Security forces and Consultative Council members. We encountered a negative views and lack of sympathy and understanding from some of the government representatives which resulted in delegitimisation of the positions of the residents of Mareb. It is highly disturbing to advocate the use of strong force against the residents. This view, by some, looks down on the social hierarchy and traditional structures of the tribes and sees the tribe members as smugglers and abductors.

Concerning the way the government should deal with the tribes, some officials expressed the view that security can only be achieved by force and that the government must show a strong presence of security forces in the region, because the tribes people have no respect for the government. These officials support military intervention in case of disobedience, kidnapping
or criminal acts by residents, and the full use of government force to hunt down wanted al-Qa’ida members.

However, some officials that we met expressed more cautious views, acknowledging the needs of the province and aware of root causes of this conflict between the government and Mareb. They acknowledge that Mareb is poor, underdeveloped and that there has been no equal distribution of resources from oil. This perspective within government argues that the way to combat terrorism in these areas is by addressing poverty and giving hope to residents and by open dialogue with them. They recognise that the whole country is experiencing a fragile democratic process and the need to address the underdeveloped infrastructure. The head of the Social Fund for Development raised the concern that we might be conveying a message to other areas that “if you make trouble we will give you attention”.

3.2.3 Development agencies’ perspective

This is the outcome of the workshop with GTZ, KFW and DED staff held on 5th Feb 2002 in Yemen. They understand that there is a conflict between the government and tribes in Mareb region but may be less conscious of the inter tribal conflicts. There aren’t basic services such as health, education, water etc. as expected by the population. There is poverty and social injustice in this province.

Their views are that the community plays a minor role in project design and implementation carried out by development agencies. Currently the tribes are going through a change in tribal values and tradition. They feel they are discriminated against and mistrusted by the government. The process of decentralisation and democratisation, which was started by government, has not been fully developed. There are clashes between the military and tribesmen, which causes killing, kidnapping, restriction of access to the residents. The military are not observing rules of engagement and use excessive force against the residents.

3.3 Extent of the conflict

3.3.1 Geographic

The region of Mareb is located east of Sana’a and includes 13 districts (see attached map). The geographic extents of the Mareb conflicts are mostly limited in place to the governorate and geographic locations of the tribes living in the governorate. Inter tribal conflict mainly takes place in Mareb and specifically on the borders between the tribes. However, sometimes it spills over to other districts, namely the towns where residents come for service in the government offices and for business and Islamists moving between several governorates and Yemeni-Saudi cross border tensions. The actual armed clashes between the warring tribes are limited in time but may stay for decades with extended periods of ceasefire. The human costs are between 3-30 dead in some of the clashes and up to 60 from both sides in intensive bloody clashes.

There is tribal war everywhere in Yemen, but most severely in al-Jawf and Mareb governorates, especially in the north, east, and centre of the old North Yemeni highlands. In Mareb it is chiefly on the borders between Murad and Abida and between Jahm and Jud’an tribes. The extent of the “war against terrorism” is nationwide; people accused of links to terrorism are chased in many provinces, including Mareb, Sana’a, Amran, the Jawf, Aden. According to US and Yemeni sources the hunt is for only 3-4 members of al-Qa’ida. Most of the abductions occurred outside Mareb. However, it is alleged that recent kidnappers come from the Al Zaydi family from Sirwah.
3.3.2 Military

Driving from Sana’a to Mareb we were escorted by military vehicles and passed through 13 military checkpoints. We particularly witnessed a heavy army presence in Sirwah district, part of Jahem tribe, with tanks surrounding this area. We observed a number of homes that have been damaged by the military and some destroyed completely during military operations. In this area the army prevented some farmers from working on their land. There was a strong feeling of anger and frustration against the government and the army. However, there was less army presence in Mahellia district, where we did not see any members of the security forces. On December 2001, the army attacked a village, part of Abida tribe in Mareb, searching for a wanted member of al-Qa’ida. The assault caused about 30 deaths and more injury, mainly amongst the army, and the destruction of many homes. This left a great feeling of hatred and anger against the army in Mareb, adding to the already existing dislike of them.

3.4 Impact of the conflict

3.4.1 Inter-tribal wars

Social: perpetuation of tribal animosities, stereotyping of the other side; creation and perpetuation of blood vengeance; social ‘fragmentation’ into tribes. Sometimes particular targeting of educated people and intellectuals. Culture of violence; maintenance of tribal values of honour, manliness, force. Women widowed. Restricted freedom of movement, affecting, for example, access to health services and schools. Economic: preventing freedom of movement, thus access to land, water, services, etc. Finances spent on weapons. Sometimes destruction of houses and property.

Governance: attitudes among some that tribes are backward and they are unfit to govern themselves or run their own affairs; they only understand the language of force. In practice, the state reacts to inter-tribal wars by trying to mediate (sometimes successfully, and sometimes not), not as a law-enforcement agency. The state has no effective monopoly on the use of force. Strength of tribal system of leadership means that civil administration and modern judiciary play only a very limited role.

Human cost: limited in terms of individual battles, but adding up to non-negligible totals.

Security: Restriction of freedom of movement in areas of hostile tribes. Restricted freedom of movement for government employees and members of development agencies.

3.4.2 Tribes vs. Central Government

Social: Tribes feel neglected and ignored and treated unjustly. This perspective is common to all tribes; but it has apparently not yet led to inter-tribal solidarity in the face of the government. Some tribes feel that members of another tribe have better connections with the central government and/or are better represented there.

Economic: Oil fuels conflict; oil companies are seen as exploiting the area’s wealth without paying back a proper share, without giving enough training and employment opportunities; and polluting the environment. This slightly raises security risks and thus costs of investment for the companies. There is destruction of homes of residents during the army assaults, and prevention of farmers access to their fields for work. The army uses checkpoints to extract money from foreigners as a “fee” for their escort.

There is a significant reduction in tourism down to only 5% of the hotels’ capacity and impact on the whole economy which benefits from tourism.
Governance: attitude among some that tribes are backward and unfit to govern. Central government has too often broken its promises. Governance by the power of the gun, when villages are surrounded by tanks.

Human cost: In clashes between army and tribes the number of deaths is limited to tens and sometimes, army has heavier casualties than tribes.

Security: Abductions, attacks on pipeline. Increasing presence of army, and more checkpoints.

On abductions: Not all abductions happen for the same reason, but a very prominent reason is the attempt by tribal people to force the central government to deliver services that have either been promised already or that the tribes see otherwise as their right or due share. Sometimes, these demands are met in order to obtain the release of the abducted persons and the payment will be given to individuals and for the benefit of the community, to release those kidnapped.

For project planning and implementation, there is a certain danger that other tribes in other areas that have so far not engaged in abductions will resort to this means if they perceive it as being successful to obtain services from the government or development projects from international donors. On the other hand, the total number of abductions has decreased for the past two years – at least partly due to forceful government handling of abduction cases. Tribes in Mareb itself are now gradually distancing themselves from the individuals responsible, so that they may lose the protection they have so far enjoyed as members of the tribal solidarity group.

3.4.3 “War on terror”

Social: The US war in Afghanistan, support for Israel, and threat of action against Iraq increases already high anti-American and Western feelings in the population. There is resentment of stigmatisation of Mareb as a terrorist swamp. Tribes and tribe leaders are hard pressed to compromise their traditional values and norms of hospitality by renouncing protection to al-Qa’ida members and to kidnappers.

Economic: Sharp decline of tourism – over 90% of international bookings were cancelled following Sep 11, hotels are operating at 5% of capacity, causing a huge loss of income to the tourism business and related services. Some were forced to close down or lay off employees. On the other hand, Mareb is put on the map of international development attention, even though it is not the poorest province in terms of human development indicators. There is a so-called “butter offensive” by the US through financial support of 25 million USD to “win the hearts and minds of people” and “dry out the swamp where terrorists flourish” according to American diplomats in Yemen. Increased attention is being paid to the region by Germany and other European actors.

Governance: Central government uses its joining the ‘coalition against terror’ to bolster its military capacities and strengthen its grip on the tribal areas (as well as increasing its regional standing [cf. visit of US Vice President; improvement of relations with the Gulf Cooperation Council]. US support for a loyal central government, if need be, in the face of the Yemeni people. On the other hand, some government actors are also aware, or are becoming aware, that legitimate grievances of the local population need to be addressed, and that services in Mareb must be improved. President Saleh has managed to strike a delicate balance between the national feelings and interest and the international pressure and national interests.

Human cost: There have been increased clashes between army and tribes accused of sheltering al-Qa’ida members. It is estimated that about 40 people mostly solders were killed and about the same injured, since September 11th 2001.
Security: Presence of some lieutenants of al-Qa’ida as well as rank and file. They were pursued by Yemeni forces following the attack on the USS Cole. After September 11, presence of US military advisors in Yemen, training special forces, with a budget of 30-35 million USD annually. Efforts to control Yemen’s external borders better and technical equipment at airport.

Immediately after the 11th of September the president of Yemen Ali Abdullah Saleh visited the USA and expressed his support for the war “against terrorism” and the willingness of Yemen to be part of the coalition. The immediate positive impact was that there were no sanctions from the USA and Europe. On the contrary, Yemen has been promised increase in aid and since then has started to receive financial support. This is in addition to military training and support for the Yemeni side from USA and some European countries. It has been reported in Yemen and internationally that the USA is training Yemeni forces against terrorism and preventing anybody from crossing the border illegally. In this context it is important to highlight that Yemen paid a high price during the Gulf war, due to the position it took against the war and the American and European coalition.

The “War against terrorism” has without doubt put the Mareb region in the international headlines as a hiding place and base for al-Qa’ida. This situation caused high tension between the government and the local tribes in Mareb who were accused of giving shelter to al-Qa’ida members wanted by the USA. On the other hand it caused tension between the tribes themselves. According to local people this gave a very bad image of the region and prevented many development agencies from working in the region for security reasons. The World Bank and many other organisation refused to have projects there or to send their staff.

Hunting for the wanted members of al-Qa’ida by the army resulted in attacks on villages and caused the death and injury of tens and the destruction of many homes which were suspected hiding places for al-Qa’ida. During our visit to Sirwah, where many of the kidnapping cases happened, by members of the tribe there, we witnessed a heavy presence of tanks and military forces and saw the scale of destruction. We observed during our meeting with high officials from the Yemeni government that there are some figures close to the president who strongly advocated the only way to deal with Mareb is by force. They regard the people there as primitive and backward.

On the positive side some foreign countries have realised that it is a critical to address the root causes of this conflict acknowledging the needs of this community. Therefore, there are some development agencies like the GTZ, DED and KFW who are seriously considering expanding their activities to this region.

3.4.4 Party conflicts
Social: In Mareb, the general view is that tribal allegiances are much stronger than party allegiances, and that parties design their strategies and choose their candidates so as to reflect tribal allegiances. GPC and Islah compete to choose the right influential candidate to secure the support of the tribe. From the tribe’s perspective, this is also good because whoever wins will be from their tribe and serve the tribe. Parties also try to build up support through support given to the poor through charitable organisations, especially by Islah.

Economic: currently, no strong apparent impact on the economy.

Governance: Yemen is the only state on the Arabian peninsula that has a republican constitution and that has begun to implement a system of local administration. According to many observers, however, the political game is not open to peaceful change of government by political means. Local administration is surrounded by controversies regarding its shortcomings. After years of debate, it was simply imposed from above, thus threatening to be
more of a tool by central government than a voice of the people. The current political deadlock in Mareb Province Local Council is not solved, since members of the executive and heads of Local Councils are not elected but appointed by the central government. The head of Council from GPC and supported by the President decided to freeze the Council. The head of the Council refuses to call the council because there is almost parity in the numbers of council members between GPC and Islah, and the deadlock was over control of the subcommittees. (On composition of LC and party affiliations, see details 4.2.02 Sadiq Abu Ras, and later interview in Mareb). The risk is that if the situation does not improve, faith in and momentum for effective local administration may be lost.

Human cost: violent clashes during local election campaigns, even leading to deaths but not in Mareb. This violence is said to have largely resulted from tribal differences, more than from ideological differences.

3.5 Stakeholder analysis

3.5.1 Yemeni actors

3.5.1.1 National Level

3.5.1.1.1 Government or ruling party
Since September 11th 2001 the government faces strong pressure from the USA and European countries to act against al-Qa’da. Otherwise Yemen will face sanctions and a reduction of foreign aid. The threat of withdrawal of international oil companies, the prime source of foreign income for Yemen’s economy was a serious consideration to the government. The government has an interest in taking part in the “war against terrorism” and Yemen’s President was the first to visit Washington to express Yemeni cooperation. In turn the government exerted pressure on the tribes in Mareb to cooperate with the government plans and in return to benefit from the “goodies”. Yemen sought to avoid confrontation with the USA and to present itself as a safe stable country. This was especially important due to the fact that tourism is the second main source of foreign income. According to Yemeni sources, immediately after September 11th the President had a meeting with the tribes’ leaders and opposition parties and demanded that they “be quiet” during this period.

3.5.1.1.2 Opposition political parties
The Islah party is the second largest party and its interest in share of the political power. It is a mix of Islamist and traditional leaders and was largely allied to the GPC until the local elections of February 2001 where it proved relatively strong, encouraging it to play a more openly opposition role. Nevertheless, President Saleh felt strong enough in 2001 to push through legislation against Islah wishes. A more vocal but smaller opposition comes from the Nasserist Party and the Party. Islah denounced the attack in Afghanistan and is very critical of the US foreign policy in the Middle East.

3.5.1.1.3 Army
The main power is concentrated in the hands of the military, which is the operational arm of the government and its policy, and the source of power for the President. His power also rests on his ability to manage various tribal and political coalitions. The army will be the first to benefit from US and European support in terms of military aid and training. They have a direct interest in demonstrating their control and force. The ordinary solders are benefiting
from the conflict because they have to escort foreigners on their journeys and they ask for payment.

3.5.1.1.4 Tribes

The tribes in Mareb are Murad, Abida, Jahm, al-Jid’an; al-Ashraf and the conflict between them is over land and water.

Murad and Abida: For the last twenty years there has been a war between them, which is still continuing. At the moment there is a ceasefire between the two tribes. The ceasefire has been extended every year and without hostility and violence between the warring parties. This mediation has been undertaken by a group of mediators from Al-Jawf. ‘Abida expressed willingness to continue the dialogue and to abandon use of violence. They expressed their agreement to go to the civil court and their commitment to accept the court judgment. This conflict has inflicted many deaths and injury. According to sources from both tribes 29 people were killed and about 60 were injured in the last clashes apart from the destruction of homes and fields.

Conflict between Jahm and Al-Jida’an: The dispute has been resolved few months ago and the two tribes agreed about the demarcation of the border between the two tribes. Murad played the role of mediator. Many of the recent kidnapping have come from the Zayidi family from Jahm.

Conflict Map

Key: ——— normal relationship  
mixed indicates conflict, discord

3.5.1.1.5 National Civil Society Organisations/ NGOs

The structure of Yemeni civil society includes in the first place the tribe as the social, political and economic unit, political parties, professional bodies, charitable and religious organisations and bodies, NGOs, trade unions, student unions, and women’s and youth organisations. The most active organisations are the religious charities affiliated to the Islah party and the tribe as base of the civil society for hundreds of years. Their activities support poor and needy families, religious schools, and students. Other civil society organizations in Yemen are rather weak; only a dozen or so have any activities reported.
3.5.1.2 District/ Local Level

3.5.1.2.1 Government officials

Local administration: first elections 20 Feb. 2000. Whatever the shortcomings of the Local Administration Law and the electoral process, the principle of local administration is widely recognized as the way to strengthen civil society. Heads of Councils and councillors have an interest in empowering local administration. Only a few oppose it, either because they believe the state is implementing it in such a way as to make the people hate the principle or because they stand to lose from a stronger civil administration at the local level (this is the case for some tribal leaders).

According to the law, the local councils are responsible for all local affairs, including local development. They are thus posed to take up some responsibilities so far taken up by administrative and technical staff of central government ministries. This process is tied to the drawing up of proper budgets for the various sectors at the local level, and is not equally advanced throughout the country. Many local council members need more training and more experience in order properly to understand and fulfil their responsibilities: there is much room for capacity building support here.

3.5.1.2.2 Tribal Shaykhs

Shaykhs are crucial political and social leaders of the tribes. Their interest is to keep their historical role in the Yemeni traditional society especially in situation of wars and mediation. For a long time they were dependent on financial support from Saudi Arabia; recently they rely more on the state resources. Now with the new experience of local administration their role might be undermined and already we observed the tension between the young educated generation and the traditional leadership. The Shaykhs have to balance between the demand of their tribes for services and the government request for them to exercise ‘control over their tribes’. Sometimes they have been criticised as corrupt and being ‘used’ by government. In conclusion, Shaykhs have an interest to maintain their positions and provide services to tribes.

Forces for peace: In February 2002, sponsored by the UN resident coordinator’s office in Yemen, the “Human Solidarity Organisation for Eradicating Revenge and Terrorism” was launched in Sana’a by a number of shaykhs in order to “solve tribal conflicts, put an end to revenge acts, and fight terrorism. It also aims to solve problems which may accrue between individuals and the authorities, stop kidnapping and find suitable solutions.”

3.5.1.2.3 Women

Because of social relations in Yemen which segregate the sexes it was difficult for the (male) team members to approach women directly at the community level and obtain their views on the conflicts which affect them and their own needs and interests. However, we were able to draw some conclusions from the few meeting that we had. The national statistics show a large gender gap in literacy levels. The team was able to establish that the impediments to girls’ education appear to be linked to structural issues (what structural issues? AHH) rather than to community opposition to education for girls. Indeed this girls’ schooling was regarded as desirable, within the parameters of prevailing social norms. We would therefore recommend training of local women teachers and to have separate schools for girls especially high schools to encourage girls to continue education. After reunification there were withdrawal of women from public life Al-Dhale and the South generally.
3.5.1.3 Relationship Between Central Government and Tribes

The government has a good relationship with Murad tribe and employs many of its members in the army and security forces and the state apparatus. On the other hand, it has a very tense relationship with Jahm tribe due to the involvement of the tribe in the kidnapping. During our visit to Jahem we witnessed the army with tanks surrounding the area of this tribe. Also, we saw a number of homes that had been damaged and some destroyed during military operations. The army prevented some farmers from working on their land. There was a strong feeling of anger and frustration against the government and the army. Jahm interest is to improve its status and improve services for its members.

The relationship with al-Jida’an can be defined as weak and they have the lowest number of state employees. Traditionally there is good relationship between ‘Abida and the government because of the oil in the land of this tribe. The government have an interest to keep this tribe ‘happy’. However since September the 11th there is tension because the army raided one village to arrest some members of al-Qa’ida who took shelter in this tribe. As a result of the army raid a violent confrontation happened between the army and gunmen from the tribe which resulted in the death of more than 30 people from both sides.

3.5.2 External Actors:

There are two prime regional actors; Saudi Arabia and the Palestinians. Saudi Arabia has an influence in Mareb and other areas close to the Saudi border and it is most likely that it will have an interest to keep this influence. Now the two countries have completed their negotiations and the geographic coordinates of all border posts have been fixed in writing; all that remains is to complete the physical marking of the border on the ground. Both countries have an interest to reach some agreement. The facilitation role played by Germany is critical.

After September 11th 2001, Yemen and US had a close cooperation in their ‘war against terrorism’. This collaboration might raise the tension between Yemen and Saudi Arabia which has been considered for many years as the strongest ally of the US in the Gulf region. This despite the fact that both countries have a common interest in fighting al-Qa’ida and maintaining a good working relationship with the US, especially for the military, without upsetting their own publics with regard to US ground presence and to the Palestinian issue.

The Palestinian conflict is very dominant actor in the region and has strong and direct impact on the Yemeni society. The anger and unrest in the Arab world over the Israeli assault on the Palestinians have driven over a million of Yemeni, in March and April 2002, to street demonstrations and calls to open training camps for volunteers to join the Palestinians. This might put a strain on the regime and strengthen Islamic radical groups to provoke attacks on US and maybe foreign embassies. At the moment the President is handling this very skilfully by showing solidarity with the Palestinians and with the demands of the demonstrators, even calling for Arab volunteers to be mobilised to fight in Palestine – while at the same time assuring the US that Yemen has been the first victim of Islamist terrorism, and that he is at the forefront of fighting terrorism. He therefore needs more US military hardware and training, but without US military presence on the ground, since the Yemeni forces, if properly equipped and trained, will be handling the situation themselves quite well.

The prime international external actors are the US and Europe. The main interest of the US is to arrest or kill the alleged members of al-Qa’ida and to destroy the structure of terrorism. The leading force is the US supported by European countries. The latter highlight that the ‘war against terrorism’ must address also the underlying causes of the problem.
3.6 Root Causes of the Conflict

To understand the conflicts in Mareb it is important to examine the underlying root causes of the conflicts. We will highlight the mean causes of the conflict in Mareb despite the overlap and similarity of causes between the different conflicts in the province and the fact that they are interlinked and feed one into the other. The following are the priority of these causes:

**Deprivation and poverty:** Poor infrastructure such roads water and electricity. Unequal distribution and access to resources form central government, especially oil revenue. The poor health and educational services, poor capacities and lack of power of local administration, under-qualified staff, and brain drain are vital contributors to conflict. Some tribes of Mareb complaint that they have a small share of employment in the army and state administration.

**Unemployment:** One important reason mentioned by both government and Mareb people is the high rate of unemployment following the expulsion of about 1 million Yemeni workers from the Gulf States after the second Gulf War, which may have hit Mareb particularly hard, since its people used to benefit from work migration and money transfers from abroad, due perhaps to geographic proximity to Saudi-Arabia and tribal / family relationships to the Gulf states. More recently, the settling of the border dispute with Saudi Arabia led to a curbing of smuggling activities, which used to be a major source of income for the people of Mareb.\(^2\)

**Exclusion:** Exclusion of tribes from government decision-making process and priority. Underdevelopment is clearly not the only factor in causing conflict between government and tribes/marginalized people. Mareb is not the most underdeveloped province in Yemen; other provinces, with worse human development indicators, have seen less violent conflict between locals and representatives of the central government. Provinces that have worse indicators in many respects include the Jawf, Shabwa, Saada, Sanaa, and al-Hudayda, and it would be worthwhile to look into why these areas are mostly more ‘peaceful’ than Mareb.

The extraction of oil from ‘under the noses’ of the Mareb people, without them receiving what they believe is their appropriate share of this wealth. The Government dismisses some of these claims as exaggerated.\(^3\) It is not so much the absolute level of poverty, or low development indicators, but rather a noticeable deterioration of material security or a rising, directly observable inequality in the distribution of wealth and the allocation of resources that causes unrest and insecurity.

**Water and land scarcity:** Prime reason for conflict between tribes is the scarcity of water for both drinking and agriculture. The poor water management systems and lack of state policy in this issue only escalate this crisis. For hundreds of years conflict over land is major reason for conflict between the tribes.

**Social structure:** The tribe is the main social, political and economic unit and personal networks continue to be influenced in important ways by tribal affiliation. Tribes’ leaders are not elected; they inherit this title form the family. Tribal structures and tribal autonomy,

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\(^2\) The same is true for Hadhramawt, where smuggling constituted an important source of income prior to the settling of the border dispute with Oman.

\(^3\) When the concessions for the oil companies were negotiated in the 1980s, the Yemeni government obtained only very unfavourable conditions. Still, oil income contributes about 90% of the national budget. About 80-85% of this is used for salaries of public employees, meaning that not much is left for investment in development projects (figures from Deputy Minister of Planning, 4 Feb 2002). The oil companies (Hunt, Canadian Oxy), being commercially oriented, allegedly only spend 100,000 USD per year on social services for the community (mostly for a hospital in Mareb). The Yemeni government is currently trying to pursue the companies to engage more in social development projects.
particularly in remote areas like Mareb, have contributed to the weak state and different expectations from residents. There is a tendency by government to criminalize the abductions and the attacks on army and police in Mareb as in al-Dhale, in order to downplay economic and administrative grievances. However, we should not make the opposite mistake, and ignore reasons for violence linked to tribal value systems, a tradition of carrying and using weapons, and other such cultural factors that may come into play when the society experiences strain.

**Weak state and institutions:** The area of Mareb has been for many years an autonomous region with very little state intervention in all spheres on life. The tribes mostly saw the state penetrations into this area as negative, trying to impose military control, tax collection, imposition of non-local laws and administrators.

**Good governance:** Lack of effective systems of monitoring and control and strong criticism by local residents in Mareb, of corrupt leaders and officials. Lack of power and of experience of local administration.

**Double standard:** The history of the Middle East conflict between Israel and the Arab world created a long-standing hatred towards USA and its unconditional support to Israel. One American diplomat in Yemen put it to us as follow ‘the US can live with the hostility of all the Arab world if need be, but will never give up support for Israel’. The events of the Palestinian Intifada and Israel aggression only strengthened these feelings of USA double standard and hypocrisy. The demonstrations of tens of thousands in the Arab countries, during March and April 2002, including a demonstration of one million in San’aa were clear evidence of the Arab street support to the Palestinians and anti USA and Israel.

### 3.7 Trends and Scenarios

#### 3.7.1 Trends and Current Dynamics

Ground water level will continue to fall. Existing conflicts over water will become more acute. This will continue to fuel inter-tribal conflicts, especially if not enough alternative sources of livelihood and income generation are opened up.

At least in the medium term, the balance of power between government and tribes will rather tilt toward the government: because of increased external support (from the US in its war against terror, from decreased Saudi support to tribes in the wake of settling the border dispute, from increased integration in the GCC), but also because of a structural momentum (the state as such is not regarded as illegitimate or incapable as in many African countries, but is expected to deliver; it thus maintains its fundamental legitimacy; President Saleh and his power system function well).

#### 3.7.2 Scenario

We want to suggest, that it is most likely that no change would occur in the near future re the inter tribal conflict and it would continue to be low level intensity. Our main concerns are:

- that the relationship between the tribes and the government will deteriorate.
- That the external pressure to ‘hunt’ the terrorists, and the calls from some government officials for the use of force, might cause escalation and further violent confrontation between the government and the tribes.
• That the government would misjudge the situation and use excessive force in its ‘war against terrorism’ to ‘satisfie the US and European countries.

• that that would inflict more deaths and injuries, that in turn can trigger other conflicts.

According to Yemeni and American sources the talk of 3-5 members of al-Qa’ida in Yemen. This situation will cause more alienation of the tribes leaders and the population as a whole.

The situation in Palestine is a source of discontent in the whole Middle East and it is fuelling more anti American feelings, and the possibility of attacks on American targets. The lack of firm European action against Israel would also stimulate anger response on the Yemeni street and might also make Europeans a target.

It is possible, that there will be reduction in the number of abductions in the future, due to the accumulation of pressure from the government on one hand, and the society on the other hand.

4 Conflict Analysis al-Dhale

4.1 Conflict Profile

Al-Dhale is a new province created in 1998 for entirely political reasons to include districts from both former south and north Yemen (5 previously in the South, 4 in the North). It was conceived of as a kind of “unity province” or manifestation of the unity between North and South, in 1990. It is located strategically on the main road between Sana’a and Aden, and comprises an area that used to be the main stronghold of the South Yemeni army. The history of the North-South conflict goes back many years (lowland-highland, British-Ottoman-Imam) and the creation of an independent South Yemen in 1967.

Both on the southern and the northern side, the area used to have a high military presence. Apart from the attendant security issues of recurring clashes between the two sides, the military was an important economic factor, providing a direct or indirect source of income for a large segment of the population with around 30,000 people in the former al-Dhale district being employed in the army, meaning that around 20,000 families, or perhaps as much as half of the population, were relying on the army for their income. It is estimated that about 30% of the population, at the moment, are employed as civil servants and in the army.

Many leading officers as well as rank and file of the Southern army used to come from al-Dhale. It is unclear whether or not al-Dhale received a relatively higher share of the national resources. Today, inhabitants mostly claimed that al-Dhale was neglected due to its remote, mountainous location. On the other hand, people with socialist leanings also claim that services used to be much better then than now.

According to statistics of 2000, there are a total of 403,488 inhabitants in al-Dhale (rural 359,894, urban 43,594). Al-Dhale include the following districts: Damt, Jiban, Kataba, Al-Sha’ab, Al-Dhale, Jihaf, al-Azarik and Al-Hassen.

The role of tribes is very marginal, as in most of the rest of the former south, due to the policy of the South in reducing their role and influence.

The wider focus of the conflict in al-Dhale is the tensions and resentments between ‘South’ and ‘North’; it’s between the political parties; and between civil society and the military. All are interlinked, feeding each other, so that the dynamics of one influences the others. North-South is the background; civil society vs. the army is the area for most violent clashes; and the political parties provide a forum for political manifestation of the conflict.
4.1.1 North South Conflict

The North-South conflict is about role of former South Yemeni elites and the failure to integrate both armies in the unified Yemen after 1990 that led to civil war in 1994. Some underlying issues are still simmering after military victory of the North. Al-Dhale suffered in particular from the 1994 defeat since many of the southerners employed in the army or the civil service were retired on meagre pensions. Some left the country for the Gulf States, the UK, or the US, others joined the free market economy and many others are simply sitting at home eating their pensions.

Support for unity outweighs dissatisfaction, but resentment of being relegated to a secondary position and hegemonised by Northerners (“al-dawahisha”) is widespread. Northerners’ perspective is often characterised by the view that the North took the burden of taking care of the bankruptcy of South Yemen with 6 billion USD in foreign debt for a total population of 2 million; while the North, with 6 million inhabitants, only had 900 million USD in foreign debt. However, much of this debt was subsequently cancelled, a fact that has not been absorbed in Northerner’s perception of ‘burden’. Northerners believe that they did not benefit but rather suffer economically from unification (similar to a widespread attitude in Western Germany). Southerners also feel stereotyped by Northerners as ‘separatists’ whenever they raise a criticism against the central government, or even simply because they are Southerners.

The dissatisfaction and marginalisation of the former South Yemeni elites after 1990 unification led to the civil war in 1994. The underlying issues are still simmering even after military victory of the North. But support for unity outweighs dissatisfaction.

As a reaction to ‘communist’ propaganda from the South, the Northern government had strongly supported Islamic education and Islamic language before 1990. At the moment this conflict is mainly expressed through the press.

The situation of women worsened after unification in 1990, and in particular after the civil war of 1994. During the regime of the South women went to schools and universities, were employed by government and participated in political life. In short, women had a more active role in public.

4.1.2 Civil society versus army

After the 1994 military defeat of the South, members of the southern army were either retired or transferred to garrisons in the north. The army stationed in al-Dhale was from then on manned by Northerners who came to ‘hostile’ territory of the ‘separatists. Logically, the army set up positions in strategic locations, often on the top of mountains, and in order to keep a tight control of the area they appear to have penetrated deep and with more manpower than the local population was used to before. The Northern army came into ‘hostile’ territory with certain preconceived ideas about the ‘separatist’ population and with a stronger presence than the locals were accustomed to in the past. For the locals perspective this army suddenly is no longer ‘our’ army, not from our local people but composed of people foreign to the province, who sit on top of the mountains overlooking the fields where local women work. This is without a doubt a recipe for tensions and strife.

Add to this the fact that the army represents the State, which is perceived by the Southerners as short in fulfilling its obligations and providing services, paying salaries, and not fulfilling its promises. The State has been accused of lack of accountability through the judiciary system. All these reasons together have driven some people to take up arms against the army. The most significant violent incident was during Ramadan 2001 (December 2001), when members of the armed group ‘Mawj’ attacked a military convoy and killed five soldiers. The
response of the army was harsh, and as a consequence the army destroyed family homes of the attackers.

It was also suggested by some that the army has an interest to present the area as one of high tension, so as to justify the resources allocated to them or to demand an increase of allocations. Some locals allege that the army for this reason provokes some incidents. The human costs of this conflict appear to be limited incidents and the number of deaths on both sides is perhaps 1-10. Overall figures are not available. We encountered great reluctance on the part of both sides to talk about the military confrontations.

4.1.3 Party conflicts

In the 1993 parliamentary elections, the first after unification, YSP received only 19% of the national vote, while GPC received 29.5% (123 versus 59 parliamentary seats); Islah 63, a-Haqq 2, Ba’ath 7 and Nassierist 1. YSP found it hard to accept that they came out relatively weak overall, and so claimed that the power sharing agreement of 1990 was not properly implemented, and therefore turned attention again to the South as a power base, ultimately leading to the war of separation of 1994. In the 1993 parliamentary elections, all seats in the five southern districts now being part of al-Dhale Province were gained by the YSP. In the 1997 elections, the districts now constituting al-Dhale Province, including the northern ones, elected 6 GPC and 2 Islah members to represent them in parliament. YSP boycotted the national elections and therefore had no representation.

Details on distribution of seats in al-Dhale in the Provincial Local Council were as follow: 9 GPC members and appointed GPC Governor, 6 Islah members, 3 YSP members.

Damt Local Council: 13 Islah, 7 GPC and appointed District Director; Islah provides the deputy head and the heads of the three committees. Al-Sha’ib Local Council: All 17 members are YSP. Al-Dhale District Local Council: 11 GPC and an appointed District Director, 6 YSP, 3 Islah. Jihaf Local Council: 10 Islah and GPC District Director, 4 GPC, 2 independents including the vice-president, who is closer to GPC, 1 YSP, 1 Nasiri Wahdawi. YSP alleges that its representation in elected bodies, mainly local councils, is less than its real popular support, because (1) the (non-local) army vote tipped the balance in favour of GPC; (2) YSP boycotted elections in most districts, leading to Islah success, where otherwise votes would have gone to YSP.

Despite the political differences between the parties, members of local councils where we visited al-Sha’ib. Jihaf and Damt, appear to put local interests before party interests in their daily work. Some people also claim that local affiliation is more important than party affiliation in influencing the distribution of resources within the province.

Clear political and economic preponderance of Northern forces creates obvious resentment which is sometimes expressed in painting a rosy picture of the socialist past, where ‘services were freely and equally provided, where prices were the same all over the country, where the level of education was higher’, etc.

The conflict in the phase of post-conflict: The crisis of the conflict peaked in the war 1994. The outcome of the crisis was the victory of the Central Government in the North over the separatists in the South, with subsequent weakening of the political and at least partly also economic power of southerners. If root causes of conflict are not addressed, there is a danger of the conflict deteriorating again, creating a situation of pre-conflict again.
4.1.4 Extent of Conflict

4.1.4.1 Geographic
Conflicts being more structural issues related to the North-South, they are not clearly confinable locally. Nevertheless, there is a difference between the former southern and the former northern districts. Issues and complaints as described above are particular to the Southern districts. They are said to lead to violent incidents in Jihaf district more than elsewhere. As regards the northern districts, people there sometimes complain that they are worse off now than before, having been thrown together with the poorer Southern districts. We encountered less outspoken hostility towards the Southerners, though. On the Southern side, people told us that even before unification, there were many social links between people on both sides of the border. The districts of Jihaf and al-Azariq are considered to be the most poor and volatile areas. Most of the people we met recommended them for intervention by government and development agencies and to allocate resources to them.

4.1.4.2 Military
There is a strong military presence in the region. Through our journey from and to al-Dhale we were stopped for checking by the army, and during our stay some people claimed that the army harass residents if they go out late at night. The chances of a widespread military confrontation as in 1994 are, however, very remote. It is more a persistent trauma that may continue to lead to occasional violent incidents provoking repressive action by the Central Government. Our concern is the claim that the army provokes inhabitants to create conflicts.

4.1.4.3 Human cost
At the moment the human cost of the conflict in al-Dhale is limited to 1-10 as a result of all conflicts for a period of a year. However, the overall human cost of the war in 1994 was devastating and thousands of people were killed and injured during the war. Add to that the number of displaced people and the obvious economic impact.

Include a paragraph on landmine victims! About a third of the population of al-Dhale’ province lived in mine-infested areas. See http://www.mineaction.org/pdf%20file/Al-Dhale.pdf

4.1.4.4 Impact of the conflict
Al-Dhale is a new province created in 1998. The governor receives a budget for his area and then starts lots of new projects to satisfy people, then after a year or two realises that his budget is not sufficient to complete all these projects. For instance the central government would allocate 1 million Yemeni Rial for each new school to be built (6,600 €), however it is clear that it is impossible to complete the construction of a school with such a budget. The half-finished projects cause frustration and disappointment among the people. In other words, the central government is trying to do the ‘best they can’ to provide some infrastructure and services, but in the process and priority they use, they create more frustration and the impression that they actually neglect people. A better planning and better participation of local community in planning and delegating responsibility to elected representatives would perhaps help to achieve the objectives with less frustration and anger.

As a result of the 1994 war many lost their place of employment and income as a result of the economic deterioration. This included the loss of place of employment for thousands employed by the army. 1994 left hundreds of widows and families without source of income.
The impact of the north south conflict left a deep mutual negative stereotyping about each other. There are deficiencies in government and army legitimacy in the eyes of the population of the south. They reported harassment by soldiers and growing gap between the two sides. In short, the confrontation between the north and the south left the south feeling marginalized. One direct impact is the attacks on soldiers causing death and injury.

Since September the 11th 2001, it is very difficult for Yemenis outside to transfer money to their families. Previously, the region was hit as a result of the Gulf War in 1990 that we discussed earlier.

Perhaps a positive impact is the consolidation of the legitimacy for pluralism and open competition between political parties, wanting to show their commitment and work for their communities. Above all, the reunification of the two parties of Yemen with the vast majority support by both sides is a constructive positive development.

4.2 Stakeholder analysis

4.2.1 Yemeni actors

4.2.1.1 National Level

4.2.1.1.1 Government:
The government has two main interests concerning the al Dhale region:

First, to be in control of the security situation and those challenging the authority of the state. The government have an interest to present al-Dhale as secure peaceful region that illustrate the unity of the country and the need for development and investment their.

Second, to provide basic services and infrastructure for the region, including health, education and water and to encourage other development agencies and donors to join the government in its effort to support this region.

4.2.1.1.2 Political parties

Al-Dhale has a highly politicised and educated community. The ideological differences between the north and south regimes pre 1990 have been reflected into the political parties of region. The opposition political parties are strong and active and in real competition with the ruling GPC. Their main interest is power to work towards the improvement of the standards of services and infrastructure of the region. The active opposition parties according to representation are the Islah, YSP and the Nasserist Party.

The ruling party (GPC) has the political and financial means to support the party in the different regions. Being in power the GPC uses all the methods and the means it has to stay power. GCP activists promise jobs, projects, personal favours and direct payment to ensure support in the election. The appointment of GCP members in charge of the election procedure leaves strong suspicion about the neutrality of the election. Finally, the participation in the democratic process captured the imagination of all political parties and became a source of energy for participation and work towards change.

4.2.1.1.3 Army

During the 1994 ‘war of separation’ there was intense fighting in the area and concentration of military. The situation in the area is still very sensitive although there are very few violent incidents. The heavy handed treatment of the army to the population created a feeling of
detestation towards the army and also created deep distrust between them because the army intervenes in civilian matters of the population, which was unacceptable in the south. Southerners perceive the army as ‘oppression force’ and not as a force to protect them. In the South they had more respect for civil law and authorities. The army have a clear interest in showing that the area is under control, like Mareb. However, some people claim that they ‘construct security incidents’ to prove that there is tension in the region and therefore, there is a need to allocate more resources to the army in the region.

4.2.1.2 District/ Local Level

4.2.1.2.1 Government officials

On the local level we found active and enthusiastic government officials and good contact between the districts and the governorate departments. Despite the criticism from the elected local representatives it seems that they have good and business working relation. We had a chance to meet the governor of al-Dhale, also a parliament member for GPC, who showed strong and serious willingness to co-operate with donors and development agencies. He supported the idea of giving more responsibility for the elected local councils. This was the opposite of the experience we had in Mareb where the governor in fact seen ass uncooperative and he prevented the formation of the governorate council because his party, the GCP, is the minority. It is important to note that the governor’s position is appointed by central government and only his deputy is elected. We have been informed that the governor of Mareb have been changed June 2002.

4.2.1.2.2 Young men and women

In al-Dhale districts of the south members of the YSP had an opportunity to study abroad particularly in the former socialist countries which raised the number of university graduates. About 10% of the al-Dhale population are immigrants in the USA and UK and this opens contact and communication with the outside world. We met young men and women and our impression was that they are interested in their situation, and they expressed motivation to work in their community and to enrol in high schooling and university. Our assessment is that there is a real potential for this sector to play an important role in the process of development of the region.

4.2.1.2.3 Women

Before unification women in the south had a much more active role in society and they didn’t wear head cover. Since then there has been a gradual withdrawal of women from public life. The Islah party had a critical role in that, and organised campaigns calling for ‘the return to Islam’ as a reaction to the years of socialism and the introduction of Sari’aa dressing. According to Director of the Women Development Department in al-Dhale, Islah party will increase its support and more pressure will be exerted on women, despite the increasing number of women participating in the election campaign. In remote villages it is much harder for females students to come to high schools for two reasons: first the long distance of sometimes 2-3 hours’ walk to get to school every morning and back in the afternoon and second, that the schools are gender mixed which discourage parents from sending their daughters.

4.2.1.2.4 Local Civil Society Actors

The southern districts had strong active civil society organisation such as agricultural associations, consumer associations, students and women unions and Islamic charities and
associations for the poor and needy. Parents committees in cooperation with the local council organised demonstrations to protest at the lack of schools and services. There is a great potential for development and strengthening already existing civil society organisations and institutions in al-Dhale. The role they play at the moment in the region is unique in comparison to Mareb.

4.2.2 External Actors
At this stage there is no involvement of international actors in the conflict in al-Dhale however, the impact of US involvement in Yemen has its repercussions. As in Mareb the anti American feelings are high, and there is harsh criticism of the US foreign policy towards the Arab world and the Palestinians and for supporting Israel in its actions almost without limits. The criticism is also strong towards the Yemeni government in its collaboration with the US. The President Saleh managed, until this moment, to strike an acceptable balance to the Yemeni people, between the US interests and the Yemeni interests. However, it is hard to predict for how this deal can hold.

4.3 Root Causes of the Conflict

Poverty: The region generally has poor health services, education service and water management systems. It has poor infrastructure in terms of roads and communication.

Inequality: The feelings of the residents from the south that the state discriminates against them in all spheres of life. They claim that they are not employed in government posts, army and they discriminated against in terms of allocation of government resource.

Weak institutions and poor capacities: Lack of power of local administration and government officials and under qualified staff.

Good governance: There is lack of effective systems of monitoring and control; lack of power and of experience of local administration and very weak management skills.

History of violence: the history of violence and social, political and economic partition has increased prejudiced attitudes and very negative perceptions of the other in this region. The different ideologies in the south versus the north were the fuel to feed these narratives. State penetration into many areas a long history of autonomy has generated mostly negative consequences such as military control, taxes, imposition of non-local laws and administrators.

4.4 Trends and Scenarios

4.4.1 Current Dynamics and Scenarios
Marwan, this is an empty section!! AHH.

5 Portfolio Analysis

5.1 Overall vision and goals of German development cooperation
Germany is the most important unilateral donor country for Yemen. With around 21 million € in annual aid, its absolute contribution is roughly in the same league as that of the other donors (the Netherlands, Japan, and the US). However, German development cooperation with both North and South Yemen is older than that of other countries and has been consistently maintained throughout changing political circumstances over the past thirty years. This has earned Germany a particularly high standing among Yemenis, both on the
Government and on the popular level, and Yemenis are eager to maintain and expand this relationship. This high regard is an important asset that will certainly lead to new German project proposals being favourably considered and that may give Germany a particular leverage with Yemeni partners when it comes to propose changes in programme emphasis that would be necessary to ensure greater sustainability and a better contribution to conflict transformation.

Four major German public development agencies are active in Yemen: Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KfW – German Bank for Reconstruction), Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ – German Technical Cooperation), Deutscher Entwicklungsdiens (DED – German Development Service), and Centrum für internationale Migration und Entwicklung (CIM – Centre for International Migration). All of them are bound, in principle, by a common conceptual framework laid out by the Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ). The ministry’s latest strategy paper of 2000 is currently in the process of being revised. The individual agencies have distinct responsibilities and specialisations within the overall framework. They are required to, and do, coordinate their activities, though this coordination is subject to a variety of factors (i.a., financial, personal) and may be more or less close and effective at times.

Since its inception a quarter century ago, German development cooperation with Yemen has focused on four main areas: Water and sanitation, primary health care, vocational training and primary education, and rural agricultural development. In 2000, overall goals were slightly redrawn. Since then, three focal areas have been defined: The traditional sectors ‘water and sanitation’, and ‘health’ were maintained, while the third sector is now labelled ‘human development and institutional capacity building’. Support for central government planning institutions goes back to the 1970s, but the new title reflects an enhanced emphasis on embedding education, vocational training, and rural development projects in a more efficient and sustainable frame of structural reform and the strengthening of institutional capacities.

- **Water supply, sanitation and solid waste management.** With two thirds of all allocated funds this is by far the largest sector. Efforts have concentrated so far on drinking water supply and sanitation in larger and medium-size towns that already have a water-supply system. For the future, it has been decided to work more to strengthen integrated water resources management, balancing the needs of drinking water supply and industry with those of agriculture which so far consumes 90% of available water, not least for *qat* (see further on page 35).

- **Health and family planning.** GTZ projects focus on advice and training on the policy level, with special attention given to decentralisation. DED aims to support the efficiency of a decentralised public health sector by sending nurses, midwives, and medical technicians to selected districts to provide training as well as curative services. There is a common understanding that sectoral coordination between GTZ and DED should be improved, and that preventive and promotive medical activities should increase.

- **Human development and institutional capacity building.** This area includes projects in primary education (school construction and rehabilitation, health and environmental education curricula development), vocational training and small enterprise promotion, promotion of self-help in rural areas, urban development, technical advisory services for key central government offices (the Presidential Office, the Ministry of Planning and

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4 See the inter-Government agreement of April 2000. DED has a slightly reduced focus within this overall frame. Since 1979, when it started working in Yemen, DED has been active primarily in the health sector. Currently, cooperation in vocational training and small enterprise management is being strengthened to become a second focal area of DED activities in the country.
Development, and the Central Organization for Control and Auditing), and some limited support to local non-governmental organizations. There is a growing emphasis on integrating German development cooperation within the country’s overall poverty reduction strategy. Yemen has been selected as one of four pilot countries for the German action programme for poverty reduction until 2015. There is also growing emphasis on economic sustainability through efficient private sector management.

5.2 Geographic distribution

German development projects are or have been conducted in most parts of the country, though some governorates have clearly seen more activities than others. Governorates that most heavily benefited from German cooperation are Sana’a, Ibb, Amran, and Abyan. Ta’izz, al-Hudayda, Hadhramawt, and Aden come second. Mareb, Mahwit, and Hajja occupy the third rank. Very few or no projects have been implemented in al-Baydha, al-Mahra, al-Jawf, Dhamar, Shabwa, and al-Dhale. For a detailed overview, see appendix 8.4, p. 61.

5.3 Conflict and the German portfolio

Conflict is not directly and specifically addressed as an issue to be worked upon by any of the German development programmes the project documents of which were made available to us. If mentioned at all, conflict so far appears as a security risk that presents an obstacle for development cooperation, and it has at times – not throughout – led to reduced engagement or disengagement.

Nevertheless, project guidelines do address issues that are of vital importance in conflict prevention. With regard to water – the most important sector – the move towards integrated water resource management is certainly the right decision from a conflict transformation perspective, given the heavy overuse of water resources in Yemen where twice as much water is used as renewable sources provide. The past quarter century has seen levels of groundwater falling dramatically. Added to the scarcity of water is a distribution problem. A heavily growing population (2.8% annual growth 1994-2000, with urban growth as much as 8%) uses only 10% of all water for drinking, household, and industrial purposes; 90% is used in agriculture (where the largest share, about 50%-60%, is due to the water-intensive cash crop qat, about the economic and social deterrents and benefits of which there is a huge discussion). This poses a clear threat to drinking water supply for much of Yemen’s population, and we may therefore witness more conflicts over water in the future. Better-integrated water resources management – including, for example, more efficient ways of irrigation – is thus a very important element in reducing possible sources of conflict. Any intervention here needs carefully to study not only the physical side of water supply and distribution, but also the social context and the social structures influencing the regulation of water management at the local level.

DED considers increasing its support for NGOs.


Al-Baydha has seen no intervention at all. In al-Mahra, a water project has been suggested by the Yemeni side. In al-Jawf, a health project was initiated in March 2002. In each of Shabwa and Dhamar, there is only one GTZ water project. Al-Dhale governorate has been marginally touched by German aid (IDAS in XXX district); water and sanitation projects have been suggested there prior to September 2001.
On a more general level, assistance in water, health, and education helps to improve Yemenis’ access to basic services and thereby addresses one of the root causes of conflict.

One must be careful, however, not to equate efforts to improve the provision of services with the fight against poverty that is an important goal guiding German programme design. Greater conflict orientation may partly strengthen and partly conflict with a development cooperation guided by poverty reduction criteria. On the one hand, reducing poverty will reduce one of factors of tension and conflict. On the other hand, poverty alone is only one, and not necessarily the most important cause of conflict (see above). The selection of priority areas for intervention in Yemen will be different depending on whether poverty or conflict criteria are applied. Neither Mareb nor al-Dhale are the poorest provinces in Yemen, and human development indicators regarding standards of health, education, housing, water, transport, etc. are lower in several other provinces. Consequently, several German development workers voiced their concern to the mission that privileging conflict-ridden provinces might dilute the stated political goal of poverty reduction. Similarly, some Yemeni central government officials expressed their fear that by selecting conflict areas as priority areas for an expanded German development engagement, one runs the risk of ‘rewarding’ those who resorted to illegal violence. Inhabitants of other provinces might thus indirectly be encouraged to start using the same violent means to gain attention and extract aid. While there may be ways of contouring this problem, it must be clear to policy makers that the goals of conflict transformation and of poverty reduction are both equally important, but are not immediately congruent. Development cooperation needs to strike a good balance between the two if it is to be successful in the long run. In practical terms, this means that some consideration should be given to the option of expanding German cooperation to a poor non-conflict area at the same time as creating new projects in less poor conflict areas. The reduction of inequality and of exclusion from decision-making processes – important conflict factors – can certainly be justified from a poverty reduction perspective (see below, p. 38).

The German portfolio does contain important elements that can aid in conflict transformation. Improving services such as in health and education helps to contain some of the grievances at the root of conflict. The recently strengthened emphasis on better resource management adds a key dimension to the sustainability of such aid. Examples of this are integrated water supply management, revolving drug funds, greater attention to preventive health, and a renewed emphasis on training, and a sharpened eye for economic viability. Last but by no means least, the redefinition of the third focal area of development cooperation as ‘human and institutional capacity building’ is a vital step from a conflict transformation perspective, but one that needs to be expanded and pursued more forcefully. In order to reduce conflict potential and strengthen forces of peaceful conflict transformation, it is critical that structures of good governance and the rule of law be strengthened. Participation and accountability are slogans that need to be filled with life. On the one hand, the participation of the local population in deciding issues that concern them and in shaping policies must increase. Decentralisation must grow beyond a decentralised implementation of centrally decided policies if it is to be effective in transforming conflict in the long term. On the other hand, institutions must be strengthened that ensure that central government agents act with greater transparency and can effectively be held accountable for their acts.

This is particularly important since other actors in the field of crisis prevention have so far largely concentrated on security issues. The largest such actor is the United States, which in the wake of the Sep. 11, 2001 terrorist attacks included Yemen in its “Antiterrorism Assistance Program”, under which assistance is given in aviation security, airport security, advanced police tactical intervention, physical security, border controls, weapons of mass destruction (WMD) including mail security, customs/immigration inspection, disaster response and urban search and rescue. Military cooperation involves the presence in Yemen
of several hundred US troops, mostly anti-terrorism experts and military advisers. US military cooperation is supplemented by food and development specifically targeting ‘unruly’ areas in order to boost socio-economic stability there and ‘dry out the swamp’ of support for terrorism. So far at least, there are no specific US programmes supporting good governance in Yemen. Recent efforts to improve Yemen’s cooperation with the Gulf Co-operation Council are also aiming at increasing regional stability. Other noticeable activities undertaken under the heading of ‘crisis prevention’ include the Mine Action Programme under which UNDP’s Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery cooperates with several Yemeni central government agencies to clear landmines and unexploded ordinances. Al-Dhale’, where a third of the population are living in mine-infested areas, is the third governorate after Aden and Lahj to benefit from this programme.

In conclusion, beyond improving services and thus addressing material grievances that may lead to violent explosions, German development cooperation should build on its strong relationship with the Yemeni government and civil society to encourage and reinforce human potential and institutional structures that provide lasting mechanisms for dealing constructively with conflict.

6 Conflict Impact Assessment

For 30 years, development efforts by the central government and external actors concentrated on the more ‘stable’, central regions of the country, neglecting more peripheral areas and thus increasing a gap in development infrastructure as well as in the degree people are used to and accept the effective presence of government administration and government security forces. As the government tries to expand its administrative and military presence to outlying areas, it faces a legitimacy problem: It is present first and foremost as military, police, and tax-collecting administration, but not able to live up to its service and development obligations. This gap often translates as a lack of trust by local people in the central government. This situation is not improved by the central government being first and foremost supported militarily by the US following Sep. 11. The US has recognized this, and strives to follow up its military support with development aid, though the overall budget for military aid is still higher than for development.

6.1 Impact of conflict on development

Conflict has so far both hindered and encouraged development cooperation in the provinces concerned. For a long time, agencies have been reluctant to engage in large projects where security risks seemed high. When violent aspects of the conflict appeared to grow out of control, however, development aid was increasingly considered as a possible means to address this threat. What appears is a situation where structural imbalances were too long ignored and only began to be addressed when they violently erupted.

6.1.1 Reluctance to engage due to security risks

The conflicts described above – most importantly, the violent expressions of the conflict between local inhabitants and the central government – have led to a noticeable reluctance of external development actors to invest in these areas. This is in contrast to the oil companies but also to the German Archaeological Institute (DAI). In both cases, clear and urgent

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8 The US pledged 22 million USD in food and development aid, and around 30 million USD for military cooperation.
interests offset possible security risks, and arrangements with the central government as well as with local communities were deemed sufficient to keep these risks within acceptable limits.

Development agencies have so far maintained a different view. The security risk for field staff and assets is of course not the only factor that has prevented much development aid in these areas. Other factors are also adduced – remoteness, bad infrastructure and above all, a lack of sufficient government commitment and local human potential to make a project’s chances of success reasonable. These factors are, however, themselves partly due to the negative impact of the conflict, so that continued unwillingness to engage in these areas risks to create a vicious circle.

Future intervention must, however, carefully study and observe the lessons of past security incidents and of past project failures in these areas. Some agencies (including DED, UNICEF, or USAID) did embark on projects in Mareb, but pulled out again since they found it too difficult to work there. For example, a DED nurse in Juba District was made to abandon her family health project because of pressure from an Egyptian fundamentalist preacher, even though the population was favourable to her. UNICEF started a project in one district, then other districts pressured for aid to be given to them as well, and obstructed the project when they did not receive it.

In order not to give a false impression, however, it must be clear that security risks are far from being limited to Mareb or al-Dhale. Development workers have faced serious problems in other governorates as well. They have been unduly held up at checkpoints, some were shot at, and several nurses complained of various forms of obstruction of family health projects. Intervention by agency heads or even the Embassy with leading Yemeni personalities (e.g. the most important tribal leader, al-Shaykh al-Ahmar) have so far not helped improve this situation in a lasting way.

A detailed analysis of individual cases and of the factors leading to such incidents is vital to future planning. This analysis must examine project design, implementation, monitoring, and micro-level social relations, including social relations between development workers and the various sections of the community.

6.1.2 Recently increased engagement to address causes of security risks

When more and more foreigners fell victim to abductions, foreign embassies (not least the German Embassy) and development agencies began to consider the possibility of addressing some of the grievances commonly raised by the abductors. Following the events of Sept. 11, 2001, discussions on the root causes of ‘terrorism’ added further urgency to these considerations, and the political decision was quickly taken to step up development aid in Mareb and other ‘unruly’ provinces.

6.1.3 Conflict transformation vs. poverty reduction?

This recent emphasis on addressing causes of violent conflict has given rise to concern among many development workers, as well as in some government circles. Critics point out that the provinces that are now in the limelight are not the least developed ones in Yemen, that prioritising them for new projects might actually increase conflict by encouraging people in other governorates to resort to violent means to pressure for development aid, and that the emphasis on conflict risks to compromise the main goal of development cooperation agreed with the Yemeni government, namely, poverty reduction.

So how do we justify the special attention given to conflict transformation in the light of the country’s overall poverty reduction priorities? Yemen’s Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) of November 2000 looks at poverty chiefly in terms of household income and
social security. While it certainly makes sense to give due consideration to these factors, broader definitions of poverty have been proposed to allow for a more comprehensive approach to the multifaceted challenges any country faces. Poverty should not only be measured in terms of levels of income, health, and education, but also in terms of inequality, the unequal distribution of wealth and access to resources. This aspect is already reflected in the PRSP with regard to gender inequality. There are, however, other inequalities in Yemen that need to be addressed, including regional inequalities created through processes of exclusion from effective influence within the central government, and thus from power. These regional inequalities are particularly acute in some governorates, above all in Mareb and al-Dhale. The conflict in Mareb between tribes and the central government has gained a new dynamic after the beginning of oil extraction the benefits of which largely escape the local population. The conflict in al-Dhale feeds on clear inequalities in access to power between Northerners and Southerners in an area that used to be the main home base of Southern elites. Poverty reduction, if understood in this more comprehensive sense, must address these issues of inequality and exclusion from power.

6.1.4 Possible impact of conflict on future projects

In designing future projects, certain factors relating to social imbalances and conflicting interests need to be taken into account.

6.1.4.1 Security and corruption

While direct security threats to development workers cannot be excluded neither in Mareb nor in al-Dhale, they are not, in the view of the mission, on a scale completely unmatched elsewhere in Yemen. Mareb in particular has been associated with abductions and the use of arms by unruly tribes, and the omnipresence of small arms in public there has helped to engrain this image in the minds of many. Without wanting to downplay the dangers of arms proliferation, however, it needs to be recognised that the mere fact of carrying arms in public is simply a symbol of manhood and manliness in Mareb and not a threat in itself. It should also be recalled that the principal type of violent conflict in Mareb, which causes the greatest number of casualties, is inter-tribal and strictly limited to the tribespeople concerned, as explained above. Development workers are not personally threatened by this type of conflict; only projects may be if sites are selected unwisely (see below).

Threats are rather caused by broken promises, expectations raised but not met, and socially unacceptable behaviour or the impression given of such. A carefully planned project, realistic goals, and sensitive staff will go a long way in reducing security risks. Many of our interlocutors, from both the central government and the tribes, expressed the view that the security situation of development agents will be better than that of, for example, tourists passing through, since people will appreciate the services offered to them by the agencies. The German Archaeological Institute (DAI) is often cited as a case in point to show that such well-established projects will not need external ‘guards’.

Nevertheless, it should not be overlooked that the DAI has been operating in Mareb with at least informal security arrangements with both sides: paying the army for armed escorts, and paying tribesmen for various services offered locally. This is not unproblematic. Apart from sustaining corruption, acceptance of armed escorts signals at least tacit recognition of the use of arms, giving it some legitimacy. Being escorted (or not) by one or other party risks compromising an agency’s image of neutrality, giving the impression of being associated with (or not wanting to be associated with) certain parties and not others. Future projects will need to strike a careful balance between ensuring that local financial interests are met in a
transparent way, and setting an example of a corruption-free work relationship with
government representatives in army and administration.

In Mareb as elsewhere, reality on the ground may require compromises to be made between
what is desirable and what is possible. In striking such compromises, however, more attention
needs to be given to the demands of structural change as opposed to the mere smoothing of
the way for current concerns.

6.1.4.2 Site selection and the impact of tribal structure

The selection of precise sites for intervention in the newly covered governorates needs very
careful consideration. This should be a principle everywhere, but is even more necessary in
the Mareb where tribal structures come into play in addition to civil administration. Tribal
borders may or may not coincide with the district borders according to which development
projects are typically organised. Tribal leaders (shaykhs) tend to try to attract projects to their
people – or even to their neighbourhood – without regard to province-wide development
planning. Tribespeople may be directly or indirectly prevented from accessing a school, a
hospital, or a well situated on the land of a neighbouring tribe. On occasion, there may also be
problems associated with conflicts about communal vs. personal land ownership. Finally,
some shaykhs allegedly try to extract bribes from development planners for cooperating.

Significant voices from within the central government, from among traditional tribal elites,
and from within the development agencies agree on the importance of expert technical criteria
in selecting a site, based on a detailed assessment of needs and capabilities for every case. If
an agency is transparent and strict in the application of these criteria and shows that it is not
corrupt, they say, tribespeople will come to accept this and will cooperate.

This emphasis on ‘technical’ criteria does, however, play down the importance of social
factors, and perhaps consciously so. At the preparatory stage, those who want to attract a
project will want to downplay potential difficulties in site selection. Once a site has been
selected, those most immediately benefiting from it will want to justify it in ‘objective’ terms.

Interested parties will always tend to sway development agents in their direction, keep them
within their own territory, dissuade them from collecting too detailed information about other
areas, etc. Thus, both government and tribes claim that security will best be guaranteed if
development workers cooperate. Cooperate with whom? With “us” – meaning, respectively,
the government or the tribes. This would apply to selection of project sites, selection of
housing bases, selection of security guards, etc. A very basic question – where should
development workers live – may already be controversial on social grounds, even though
obvious ‘technical’ criteria could easily be given. This is illustrated by Amer al-Talebi,
member of parliament and son of a shaykhly family of Murad who went to great lengths to
attract us to visit his constituency, to facilitate our visit there, and to follow up on the results
afterwards. He told us that development workers should first contact the tribe, who will find
them a place to live, and then they should implement their project on technical grounds. If,
however, they choose to live in government-controlled Mareb town, problems might occur.

These kinds of questions regarding the selection of project sites cannot be answered in the
abstract. Precise local constellations must be analysed for every specific project. Technical
experts need to be sensitised to the fact that ‘objective’ criteria are never neutral in conflictual
social contexts.
6.2 German-supported projects and the conflict

6.2.1 Impact on existing projects

In Mareb and al-Dhale, only few projects have been implemented so far that can be evaluated. The best-established German project in Mareb is not a development project in the narrow sense of the term, but as a sustained intervention from outside it is instructive nevertheless. The German Archaeological Institute (DAI) has been excavating at various sites in Mareb for a quarter century. Although there have been occasional problems, including a few security incidents, these have never been really serious, and the DAI has been very successful in establishing and maintaining good working relationships with all sides in Mareb. Thorough preparation, clear and transparent project goals, patient negotiations with both government and local communities, involvement of the local population, job creation for as many sections of them as possible, and carefully cultivated local social relationships – these are some of the factors that made the DAI so successful even while working in a conflict area. DAI has offered to help future German cooperation with local contacts.

About ten years ago, a DED nurse was based at Juba Rural Hospital, Mareb governorate, to work on family health and family planning. From what we were told by DED, she had to abandon the project due to opposition from a fundamentalist Egyptian preacher, even though the local community supported her. We did not have an opportunity to investigate this case locally.

A KfW project in 1996 to contribute spare parts for rehabilitation of a power plant in Mareb failed because of a dispute over additional costs that broke out between the Public Electricity Corporation and the German contractor.

GTZ support to Health Centres in Mareb, initiated in 1999 and still ongoing, has progressed slower than planned, partly because of an unsuitable selection of sites, trying to concentrate efforts in a few places rather than spreading them evenly between all district, and partly because the project is largely managed out of the capital, and local problems take time to filter through there.

In al-Dhale province, GTZ supports IDAS activities in one very remote district, al-Azariq, since early 1998 when the district still belonged to Lahj. When al-Azariq was included in the new Dhale governorate, IDAS activities there were maintained. They have been quite successful according to the manager responsible, without experiencing any security problems, and GTZ therefore plans to expand IDAS to other districts in al-Dhale, a suggestion that makes wholly sense in the view of this mission.

6.2.2 Impact of existing projects

None of these German projects targeted or targets conflict directly, nor was violent conflict consciously included in planning and evaluation other than as a security threat. All projects work ‘around conflict’, not ‘on conflict’ (see further p. 44). Currently ongoing projects – district health services in Mareb and IDAS in al-Dhale – do of course address root causes of conflict without consciously positioning themselves as such. As long as interventions remain so limited, however, it will be difficult to establish precisely what effect they have on conflict dynamics.

There may have been be an unintended negative consequence as a result of project reorientation. “After a disastrous flood in June 1996, the German Government decided to finance emergency and rehabilitation activities in Mareb with USD 500,000. Later it was decided that these funds should rather be used for long term measures to improve the health
care system of the whole governorate.” The local population of the flood-affected areas had already been promised these funds, however, and when they did not materialize even after a year of waiting and of petitions, some of them resorted to abductions to press their case, setting in motion a circle of violent reactions between their clan and the government that is still going on. The kidnappers perceive this as due to a broken promise by government; they are not aware of the German implication. Nevertheless, this case serves as a warning to be attentive to unintended possible consequences that might increase tensions and feed into conflict.

German advisory services to the Ministry of Planning and Development (AS-MPD) is the most high level cooperation project and thus ideally placed to influence strategic development orientation. Although conflict is not openly addressed in this project, AS-MPD is conscious of the conflict element specifically with regard to conflict over the allocation of scarce resources in the context of a poor society and a state lacking sufficient financial, technical, and human capacities. AS-MPD believes that such conflicts may best be reduced through reduction of poverty (as one of the most important causes of conflict) and the strengthening of good governance. Means to this effect are: improving human and technical capacities as well as information management systems within the Ministry; improving cooperation with and among international donors; and supporting the decentralisation of the ministry’s regional branches. AS-MPD has long been working to strengthen the ministry’s capacities to establish objective criteria and processes for priority planning. It is concerned about a potential dilution of such criteria by political considerations, including preferential treatment of regions that may not be the poorest in absolute terms, which might disadvantage other areas and lead to frustration and conflict there. This is a very important and necessary concern that is shared by many actors in Yemen. It is therefore vital that definitions of poverty and criteria for intervention be thoroughly discussed with and agreed upon by representatives of the Yemeni government, ministerial advisors, and ideally also representatives of the different regions before imposing new criteria that are not fully accepted by responsible actors but risk being seen as yet another policy fashion.

Development workers not only in planning but also in implementation appear generally very open to including conflict criteria into their thinking. This is well illustrated by the German advisory services in the water and sanitation sector (AS-WS). Although in this project as in others, work in or on conflict is not part of the original project planning, AS-WS did not find it difficult to reflect on their work in conflict terms: Since water is a scarce resource, equal access to it is a potential source of conflict. AS-WS attempts to reduce conflict potential by helping water supply and sanitation to be managed decentrally, on objective, economically sound, and transparent criteria that include special consideration for the poor. Although the project encounters occasional resistance from central bureaucrats and others who stand to lose from decentralisation, general popular acceptance of the necessary changes, including financial contributions, is very high. This is mainly because the project emphasized local participation on all levels: within the water companies, through community advisory councils, and by informing and engaging the local population at large. Institutionalising this participation helps to sustain the achievements and to give the population the necessary feeling of ownership. This leads to greater motivation and encourages self-reliance. The successful decentralisation of the water sector provided an encouraging example of self-management that helped the local councils in those communities where AS-WS was active. Successful practical experience in basing discussions and decisions on transparent criteria, in the view of AS-WS and of this mission, can be transferred to other areas and may thus directly or indirectly lead to reducing conflict potential.

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Overall, the impact of existing German development projects on the conflicts in Yemen is difficult to measure. With the exception of the unintentional provocation of a series of kidnappings mentioned above, a direct link between German interventions and an increase or decrease in levels of violence cannot be established. Support for decentralization, local participation, and a rationalization of procedures have clear potential for helping to reduce conflict. They need to be pursued more vigorously and self-consciously not only as tools for project implementation but as preconditions for a sustained, self-reliant development of Yemeni society.

6.2.3 Risks and Opportunities

GTZ, DED, and KfW development workers jointly worked out the following table of risks and opportunities that development projects could have on the political, economic, social, and security levels.\(^\text{10}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Risks</th>
<th>Opportunities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political</strong></td>
<td>‘neo-colonialism’</td>
<td>Empowerment of local people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Agent of Government</td>
<td>Positive attitude to positive change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Governance</strong></td>
<td>Local Administration used as Central</td>
<td>Strengthening local administration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Government tool</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Corruption / nepotism</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Economic</strong></td>
<td>Destabilise local economic structures,</td>
<td>Creation of jobs, markets, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>create rivalries, raise too high expectations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>**Social and</td>
<td>Alienation / interventionism</td>
<td>Strengthening civil society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cultural**</td>
<td>Challenges to traditions and values (e.g. re</td>
<td>Strengthening opportunities for positive social change, liberation from harmful traditional practices, redressing gender balance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>women’s roles, traditional leaders) may be</td>
<td>Creating space for inter-group communication / mediation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>regarded negatively by some and may</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>provoke conflict within the community</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>and with external agents</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Security</strong></td>
<td>Personal safety</td>
<td>Reduce need to resort to violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>War economy</strong></td>
<td>Saudi stipends</td>
<td>Create civil job opportunities</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6.2.3.1 Risks

The first political risk of concentrating new projects in conflict areas such as Mareb or al-Dhale is that it might be seen as further disfavouring other marginalised areas that are more needy in terms of traditional criteria of poverty reduction / human development indicators. Overemphasizing conflict over poverty was a prominent concern among German development workers as well as central government officials who feared that it might encourage other marginalized people to resort to violence to press for a greater share of resources and services. This is a serious issue that has to be addressed with priority; it has been discussed in section 6.1.3 above as well as on p. 42). The second risk, exemplified in part by the initial difficulties German support for the health sector faced in Mareb, relates to the selection of sites for intervention, and the tensions that

\(^{10}\) Developed at a joint workshop with the mission on 5 February 2002.
may emerge from there regarding the allocation and distribution of resources and of labour opportunities. In a sense, this is the local manifestation of the first risk. It may be more complex and complicated to tackle, however, since it demands close attention to local social structure, and thus a detailed study of this structure for each planned project, as also explained above (section 6.1.4.2). The whole issue of corruption, and of development assets being eyed as spoils, comes into play here in addition to transparent technical and social development criteria: protection money paid to military and tribes, selection of housing and office sites, house rents, cars and other equipment left behind after project end, etc.

Another risk is one always associated with social and political change. The introduction of new rules and new values always poses a threat to entrenched interests. This is as true on the national and local political level as it is on the level of the family. The strengthening of civil administration and civil society; the propagation of family planning; the discussion of the role of women are but three examples. The risk now – and this is important to note – is not that development cooperation might create or intensify conflict, but that it shuns away from it and does not think about it openly because it threatens to jeopardize the project. All meaningful development intervention pursues change, and change creates conflict, about its goals, its implementation, its implications. Some intervention that is necessary for overall sustainability of positive social and economic development necessarily upsets powerful entrenched interests. In the economic realm, it has already been recognized that some painful measures are necessary to bring about lasting structural reform. The same level of awareness needs to strike root with regard to the importance of social and political rights.

6.2.3.2 Opportunities

If these challenges are accepted, there are great opportunities for positive change. A properly functioning, decentrally organized civil administration which provides basic services and infrastructure in a transparent and rational way; elected bodies, from the Local Councils to the National Parliament, that are entitled and capable properly to monitor and control the work of the executive; and an independent judiciary to which citizens can turn to obtain their right – if progress is made in this direction, it will reduce the felt need to resort to violence, will enhance the legitimacy of the state and its organs, will strengthen stability, improve public infrastructure and enhance human capacities for self-reliant, and self-determined, development.

7 Strategic and Political Conclusions and Recommendations

There are different approaches to conflict that development agency and donors adopt in their work.

- **Working around conflict:** treating conflict as an impediment or negative externality that is to be avoided.

- **Working in conflict:** recognizing the links between programmes and conflict and making attempts to minimise conflict-related risks, so that aid ‘does no harm’.

- **Working on conflict:** Conscious attempts to design programmes in such a way that they ‘do good’.

This table summarises the key features assumption and strategies associated with these different approaches.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Approach</th>
<th>Working around conflict</th>
<th>Working in conflict</th>
<th>Working on conflict</th>
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After we highlighted the different approaches to conflict, we believe that GTZ, KFW and DED should take the opportunity and examine where they stand and wish to stand in this field. RTC can assist with this process, if necessary, and support any resulting changes including a move to work on conflict and its transformation. (See annex what is Conflict Transformation)

We recommend that GTZ and DED programmes in Yemen should consciously incorporate the principles of conflict into their work. Goals or activities based on conflict transformation would seek medium and long-term change to both the structures and the pervasive culture of violence that allow and promote inequality and injustice. They would seek to improve long term relationships and attitudes among the conflicting parties and populations and to develop a process and systems that promote empowerment, justice, peace, reconciliation and mutual acceptance and understanding.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Assumptions</th>
<th>Development programmes can be negatively affected by, and have negative impact on, the dynamics of conflict</th>
<th>Development programmes can exploit opportunities to positively affect the dynamics of conflict.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Conflict is disruptive factor’ over which little influence can be exercised. Development programmes can continue without being negatively affected by conflict.</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strategy</th>
<th>Reactive adjustments are mad to programmes in medium and high risk areas. Greater focus on ‘positioning’ i.e. neutrality and impartiality. Cut back on high input programmes</th>
<th>Refocus programmes onto the root causes, e.g. governance, poverty, social exclusion. Attempt to influence the incentives for peace and disincentives for violence. Support for mediation efforts. Focus on protection and human rights.</th>
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<tr>
<td>Withdraw from or keep out of affected areas. Continue to work in law risk areas on mainstream development activities.</td>
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**Source:** Jonathan Goodhand with Philippa Atkinson, Conflict and Aid: Enhancing the peacebuilding impact of international engagement, A synthesis of findings from Afghanistan, Liberia and Suri Lanka, International Alert, 2001.
7.1 Recommended aims and principles

Overall: place greater emphasis on the support of local structures that can help to develop and sustain forms of good governance, with less corruption, more transparency of decision-making processes, institutionalised accountability of decision-makers to judicial and to elected bodies, and better participation of elected bodies in decision making.

We recommend an overall approach that forms the foundation for sustainable intervention in both the long and short-term. These principles will be manifested in the goals and the implementation of the activities. This would include the following principles and aims:

7.1.1 To embody and provide a positive sense of the future.
This is a challenge that is posed to GTZ, KFW and DED as well as its partners to find together new ways of demonstrating and building trust and co-operation within civil society organisations and communities to take responsibility and work for change. We suggest that one way of putting this into practice would by supporting the formation of local groups, NGOs, forums and committees working for peace building.

7.1.2 To adopt an inclusive approach
This is likely to be a two step process of strategy building and joint planning. The German organisations (GTZ, DED and KfW) have their specific programmes of work and different organisational cultures within the overall programme of German assistance. It is suggested that a more integrated approach will enhance the total impact of the different interventions. It is recommended that as a first stage GTZ, DED and KFW co-operate in a joint strategic review to develop a common vision, to look at areas of commonality and difference, and to agree jointly on plans to implement their strategy in the field. It will be important as a further stage in the process to include other Yemeni actors and communities. Activities would be based or focused on issues and areas of interest. Strategies would need to be developed to take account of the interests, needs and fears of all parties.

7.1.3 To commit to long term, sustained projects
The priorities of aid and development organisations change according to the influence of a range of international and domestic factors. This is especially relevant in the current context of Yemen. It would mean an indication of commitment to “the long term and sustainable development”. We believe it is important to demonstrate a practical commitment to the future.

7.1.4 Be realistic
To be realistic what German agencies can do and how much can they change the situation. The people in Yemen have suffered from broken promises and consequently no delivery. This has led to frustration and anger and then to conflict with the central government.

7.1.5 To implement a multi-level approach.
Work needs to take place, in particular, amongst civil society as a whole (grass roots and middle levels), communities and amongst policy makers and shapers, decision makers and leaders at the local, regional, and national levels and including social political and traditional leaders. Additionally communication should, where possible, be actively fostered between these levels.
7.1.6 To promote civil society
Civil society, whatever its defects, is potentially a strong force to promote the rights of the poor, marginalized and oppressed. It can also be an important influence in advocating change and the establishment of democratic institutions. Civil society can provide a voice to hold political and social leaders accountable. Cooperation, moral and financial support for civil society organization is of great asset.

7.1.7 To involve partners in the conceptualising as well as implementation of programmes
It would be relatively easy for GTZ, KFW and DED to develop new programmes and implement them entirely on their own. In our experience this would be a mistake, and miss a promising opportunity to build the capacity of the society and to develop a joint strategy. This process will provide the opportunity for the partners and the communities to have a feeling of ownership of the project. This process of consultation will minimise the risk of mistakes and increase the opportunities for success and will give a feeling of responsibility to all the stakeholders.

7.1.8 Pay consistent attention to the gender dimension.
Because of their different social roles women and men have different experiences, perspectives and priorities. Education and health services and the provision of water are important for both women and men. The voices of women, however, are less easily heard. Explicit attempts should be made to include women in processes of community consultation and programme planning.

7.1.9 Do no harm
There is now a lot of evidence that aid and development programmes can escalate or reduce conflict. So, it is important that by our intervention we will at least not cause harm to the community. We suggest to go a further step and to work towards constructive engagement and peace building.

7.1.10 Good governance
Corruption and lack of transparency and accountability are deep-rooted in Yemeni society. We encountered these problems at every level. There are aspects of bad governance in Mareb and al-Dhale causing non-delivery of services and theft of resources allocated to the local community. We recognise that these problems seem intractable. Nonetheless, we would suggest that the root causes of corruption, and the levels at which it is entrenched should be studied and addressed, and explore ways and means of tackling it at programme level. The issue needs to be addressed in all programmes and through all means available. This will go hand in hand of supporting and strengthening the legal and judicial system.

7.1.11 Cultural sensitivity
Dealing with social and political conflict, culture is often a factor that needs to be recognised and addressed. Therefore, working in a conflict area we must understand the social fabric of the society and in order to be more effective we must understand the social values, norms and social institutions of the parties and to integrated into the panning and activities. However, it is important to be sensitive to the culture and at the same time have an open discussion with the parties when these values and norms become an obstacle to resolving conflict and to
development. Agencies need to take into account both social and normative aspects of society which (re)produce dominant masculinity and femininity. Recognition of traditional approach to conflict resolution. Yemen society has a long tradition of conflict resolution methods. It is important to recognise these traditional approaches and to use them when possible in the process of peace building and development.

7.1.12 Power relations
It is important to be aware of the power relationship between the different parties and the power of development agencies. The relative power relationship between the parties will have a direct effect on the outcome. It is vital to be aware of the power imbalance and its manifestation amongst the parties and within society and to work towards empowering the disadvantaged and to see how they can use power in a peaceful way to advance their interests. On the other hand, it is necessary to have a dialogue with the government so they do not abuse power by resulting to force and coercion.

7.2 Short term recommendations for implementation within one year

7.2.1 Dissemination of report
We recommend holding a meeting with government officials to share the outcome of the report and its implication. To translate the report, or parts of it, into Arabic so it would be accessible to wider readers.

7.2.2 Leading role for Germany
We believe that Germany can play a leading role in the process of change in Yemen amongst the donor countries in the field of development. The strong relationship between the two countries and wide support from Yemeni society to the German role played in Yemen can be the foundation for open dialogue with the government and to voice German support for decentralisation, good governance and institution and capacity building.

German agencies can take up the challenge and lead in integrating conflict component into development work and put new agenda for agencies working in conflict areas.

7.2.3 Coordination amongst German agencies
It is very important in the first place that German agencies active in Yemen coordinate their work, and expertise. It is essential that they develop an overall vision and strategy and policy that will contribute to conflict prevention and ways of intervention in conflict regions, like Mareb and al-Dhale. To develop mechanism of monitoring and evolution, to insure the best chances of impact. To achieve this aim we recommend holding a workshop, for German agencies in Yemen, to examine these issues. Later it will be important to coordinate activities with other international donors and agencies. This without a doubt can be seen as model for the local actors and communi

7.2.4 Training for project directors and field workers
Development and aid aren’t neutral; they have an impact on peace and conflict. It can be an instrument to resolve conflict and influence policy. We recommend holding a short tailor-made course for GTZ, DED and KFW staff both on the level of field workers and project directors. The aim of the workshop is explore the objectives of the agencies; for example is to alleviate poverty or to end the conflict? What should be our strategy when our main partner,
the government, is an integral part of the conflicts? To recognise the development has capacity to ‘do harm’ and occasion to ‘do good’ but to keep a sense of proportion about the magnitude of these impacts. In the course we will develop a greater sensitivity or conflict ‘mindfulness’ in our work and include conflict as a component of development, particularly in our planning and implementation. This course will be the basis for an overall adaptation of the German portfolio in Yemen.

7.2.5 Capacity building for Yemeni central government staff
We recommend a similar course for directors of health, education and other government ministries and directors of services in the district level both in Mareb and al-Dhale. We suggest that both courses could be carried out by RTC.

7.2.6 Capacity building for local government
We learned from our visit that there is enormous enthusiasm and will by local councils to work and contribute to their communities. It seems that this new experience gave hope and inspiration to many people. However, we noticed that they aren’t informed about the legal aspects, operational procedures and their responsibilities. We recommend that the issue of the ‘paralysed’ Governorate Council of Mareb will be brought for discussion on high level with the Yemeni side. We also recommend a workshop/s to strengthen local administration, to include a visit to Germany to learn from the experience of local councils there.

The objective of the workshop will be two-fold:

1) Training on all aspects of local administration so that council can be run efficiently. Yemeni expert will conduct this part.

2) Support in formulating strategies. Integrating conflict perspective into programme planning. RTC could assist with elements of this course.

7.2.7 Security guidelines
Although we didn’t face any security problems during our visit to Mareb and al-Dhale, one should be aware of the potential security risks and the safety of the staff. We recommend drawing up security guidelines for all staff working in Yemen and especially to consider the work of staff in Mareb. Next stage to discus this suggestions with head office and finally with the Yemeni security forces.

7.3 Medium-term recommendations: within two – three years

7.3.1 Confidence building and dialogue with the government:
The relationship between the government and Mareb is very negative and based on mistrust. We suggest forming a group to represent the social, political (parliament and local councils), economic and religious leadership in Mareb to meet with central government to convey their needs and concerns. The aim is to have direct communication and dialogue with the government. This group could provide an opportunity for confidence and trust building measures and start open and honest dialogue with the two parties. The group will meet several times a year with government representatives.
7.3.2 Strategy development group: a resource for DED/KfW/GTZ and for Yemen

In the light of what we understand to be a lack of strategic thinking and direction amongst civil society organisations and donor community especially those directly working in conflict regions in Yemen, we propose to form a strategy development group perhaps up to 20 individuals, some from local NGOs and other active organisations and few from the German agencies. The main objective of such a group would be to provide an opportunity to seek together a new sense of direction and would aim to develop an overall vision and coherent strategy to address both conflict and development. What are the major conflicts being experienced? How can these be analysed and more clearly understood? What part do NGOs and government play? It would move on to look at possible strategic entry-points for existing or new work. In addition, the group would benefit from exposure to experiences of NGOs in different parts of the world.

From GTZ, KFW and DED point of view the motivation for such a group would be to create a forum where important, grounded ideas for new programmes could emerge on which the German agencies could draw when developing its own long-term strategy and programmes. Additionally members would in the future constitute a group of trained resource people and catalysts, able to support any proposed new programmes and to sharpen and hone other conflict-related activities. Our suggestion is that the group be set up for a limited period of 12-15 months. RTC could assist with the facilitation and training of this group using an international team.

A useful resource for this group could be the RTC book entitled “Working with Conflict: Skills and Strategies for Action”. The book is available in English and has been translated into several languages. The translation of the book into Arabic could potentially be an important resource for the Ministry of Education, universities and NGOs and might also prove to be valuable in the rest of the Arabic speaking world.

7.3.3 Local capacity and institution building in key sectors

One of the main problems that we learned about is the unwillingness of professionals to come and work in Mareb remote villages and the lack of incentives from the government. Therefore, we propose to strengthen the qualities, capabilities, skills and resources of individuals and organisations in Mareb and al-Dhale. Namely, more and improved training in the field of health, education and local administration. Empowering local capacity is a guarantee that they will stay where they live and committed to their community. It will create jobs opportunities for locals and further encourage their participation.

7.3.4 Working with Conflict Course (WWC) and Strengthening Policy and Practice(SPP)

We recommend sending participants from Yemen and Germany to both courses. WWC is an international intensive, practical and participatory course for practitioners working for peace and justice in situations of instability and conflict. It is ten weeks course.

SPP is a course for staff of international and national agencies with advisory and management responsibility for relief, development, rights and peace-building programmes. It is particularly relevant for those engaged in the planning and implementation of aid and development programmes and those concerned with developing policies for appropriate responses in complex, political emergencies. It is one week course. (See Annex)
7.3.5 Campaigning, lobbying, advocacy

The need for local leaders from Mareb and al-Dhale to be able to articulate and present the situation from their perspective to the government and international donor community. This will enable this group to campaign for fair share of resources and change of attitude of international development agencies about Mareb being a dangerous region to go to. The perspective and attitude of the government and Mareb residents are destructive about each other. Raising awareness about the situation, mobilise allies and build a coalition to bring presser on the decision makers.

7.4 Sectoral recommendations for German agencies

Following the study by the conflict mission, we recommend that specialised technical experts should prepare sector reports. These reports, with their technical criteria made clear, should provide the basis of project proposals to be submitted transparently not only to central government offices, but to representatives of the local population from the province and the districts concerned. These local representatives must in the first instance include the local councils. In areas with a strong tribal structure such as Mareb province, it will be advisable to also consult with traditional tribal leaders. In many cases, the two categories may overlap. Both central government and local representatives have advised us that traditional tribal leadership should be consulted and relations with tribal leaders cultivated, but that they should not be left to decide on selection of appropriate projects and sites. Projects should be explained in detail taking the necessary time. Issues relating to ownership of the land on which a project is planned need particular attention, so as not to infringe on private or communal rights, and also in order to obtain formal agreement that land title holders forfeit their exclusive rights (tanazul) for the sake of the communal good. In areas with mixed tribal structure, or areas adjacent to tribal borders, particular agreements must be sought regarding access to the project structure by all, and not only by members of one tribe. Inter-tribal councils (majlis) provide an established mechanism for such formal agreements.

To use intervention in key sectors such as water, health, education as an unobtrusive way to build relationships and reduce tension. With effective conflict assessment and integrated planning the most basic assistance such as digging wells or building health clinics can become instruments for conflict prevention. Without this dimension, they can of course, and often do, exacerbate conflict. RTC has wide experience of providing this expertise at policy and practice level in different parts of the world.

7.4.1 Water

We encountered high demands from local people for drinking water and request to supply water for their homes. We recommend an expert study on better water use and management for both drinking and agriculture in Mareb and al-Dhale provinces. This study should take care to consult with women as well as men to establish their respective roles, perceptions, and needs. IDAS would be a good programme to support small water projects in Mareb and al-Dhale. The issue of drinking water has to be addressed within the overall framework of water resource management. Support in this sector, and strategic thinking, should be expanded to include rural areas.
7.4.2 Roads

The insufficiency of the road network in Mareb and al-Dhale has serious negative impacts on many other sectors, including access to health, education and government offices. It generally restricts economic and social development. The mission is aware that road building is currently not a part of the German portfolio, contrary to German cooperation projects in the past. In the light of the significance of improving access to basic services by the local population, of breaking the remoteness of the area so that more doctors and teachers would be willing to go there, and not least to improve access to markets, this restriction should be reconsidered.

7.4.3 Health

The overall objective is the improvement of health services and the projects implicitly addresses one of the root causes of the conflict. In actual implementation, though, it does not seem to have had much tangible effect yet on conflict dynamics.

We recommend to

1. Improve standard of staff through further training
2. Improve standard of training.
3. In the short term to give incentives to professionals to work in remote areas and stay there. However in the long term, we recommend to train local people and to encourage more women to work in this field.
4. Improve general infrastructure and services and use of equipment already exist in the health facilities for many years.
5. Improving monitoring, control, and ownership by the local community, strengthening local administration, local committees and organisations.

7.4.4 Education

1. Rehabilitate existing schools (buildings, classrooms, equipment).11
2. Better qualify more local staff (improve standards, especially in the sciences and in English, increase number of local teachers).12 Concentrate on training local secondary school graduates to become teachers.
3. Pay special attention to qualify local women teachers.
4. In the short term, help to improve the material conditions of outside specialist teachers until a sufficient number of local teachers is trained.
5. Include conflict management as a topic in teachers’ training and in the national curricula (needs to be discussed with the Ministry of Education).

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11 The Department of Education of the Governorate of Mareb gave the mission a list of needs in the governorate. According to this, 72 (named) schools need to be rehabilitated; 460 classrooms are lacking facilities (naqisa), 486 rooms need blackboards, etc. For a copy of the list (in Arabic), see appendix 8.2.1.4.2. The Education Department itself is also clearly under resourced. It recently moved from Governorate Headquarters into a new building; the new site is still very much empty, lacking furniture, computers, etc. for its 52 staff (who work in 17 different sections: education, guidance, monitoring, planning, administrative affairs, financial affairs, legal affairs, training, projects school activities, literacy, women activities, rehabilitation, information, school health, examinations, Qur’an memorization, services).

12 According to above list from the Mareb Dept. of Education, there is a lack of 350 teachers of mathematics, sciences, English, and Arabic for the year 2001/02.
6. Support existing parents and students committees and community participation, and help to establish new ones where they do not exist.

7. Support school management and administration.

8. Strengthen the capacity of local councils to monitor schools’ and teachers’ performance and hold decision-makers accountable.

9. Schools for girls’ namely high schools.

7.4.5 Women

Gender relations are contextual and any activity has to be locally generated and based. In the context of violent conflict its important to examine the social processes in which gender differences are constructed. Although there was no woman member in the team, which made it difficult for us to meet women, we propose some ideas for intervention.

1. Women being part of development work
2. Awareness campaign for schooling for girls
3. Female teachers training for both primary and high schools.
4. Literacy
5. Small enterprises for women
6. Encourage women employment start by development agencies.

7.4.6 Develop small economic sector

To support small enterprises and workshops so more jobs can be generated in the field of traditional manufacturing and agriculture. This could provide income and livelihood to families.

7.4.7 Other

Tourism is the second foreign source of income in Yemen after oil. Local person described the historical archaeological sites in Mareb much more valuable than oil, because oil will finish but tourist sites will stay forever. Tourism development was strongly encouraged by a GTZ expert working in this area in Yemen and in Mareb in particular.
8 Annexes

8.1 Maps
8.2 Infrastructure and services

Roads, water, health, and education are the priority concerns of the local population with regard to infrastructure and services where they expect assistance from the state and outside donors. This was the most common prioritisation the mission encountered in its interviews in Mareb and al-Dhale. It is a fairly logical prioritisation from the local point of view:

8.2.1.1 Roads

The road network in these provinces – particularly in Mareb – is so insufficient that it seriously obstructs access to markets, health facilities, schools, and government offices. This not only restricts economic and social development options for the locals, but also means that institutions such as health offices and schools find it difficult to attract and keep educated Yemeni personnel who do not want to be posted to such ‘remote’ areas and seek the first opportunity to leave. The inadequate state of roads therefore impacts negatively on the other sectors.

8.2.1.2 Water

Water is an obvious priority in Yemen as a whole, given that twice as much water is used as renewable sources provide. In the areas we visited, people are perhaps less aware of the water problem on the national scale, but they suffer from decreased precipitation over the past decade and declining levels of ground water. If more water was made available through the construction of small dams and the deepening of wells, they claim that they could significantly increase their agricultural production. Piped drinking water supply to villages is also an issue frequently mentioned; so far, most drinking water is brought by girls from wells often far away from the houses.

8.2.1.3 Health

Public health facilities have been installed, renovated, or equipped over the past decade in many districts, chiefly through the government’s Social Fund for Development. These facilities, however, do not perform as intended. They suffer from a serious lack of qualified, motivated staff. Even staff on the pay roll are often not actually present. Corruption plays an important role in that unqualified people are appointed. Not uncommonly, people use part of their salary to buy themselves out of the obligation to be actually present on the job; they then go and seek further income elsewhere, even abroad. The lack of motivated staff is probably the main reason why public health facilities are often not well maintained physically. Many also do not regularly open every day. In consequence, patients tend to seek treatment in private clinics and pharmacies that are sometimes run by the same people that are employed in the public health facilities. Representatives of the local population bemoan this state of affairs, but the community does not seem to have a feeling of ownership of the health facilities, since even if they raise complaints, they feel that there is no effective way of making their voice heard.

GTZ has been supporting district level health services in Mareb for the past three years (GTZ TC No. 9; phase 1: 1/1999-12/2001; phase 2: 1/2002-12/2004; and inclusion of Mareb in TC No. 7). German involvement strengthened planning and accounting capacities of the governorate and district Health Offices, introduced cost sharing and a revolving drug fund, and provided some basic equipment. The planned qualification of staff, the training of more female health workers, and the establishment of an effective health education system in facilities and communities emphasising prevention before cure are behind target, however, since training activities were delayed. The project faced serious difficulties in the beginning because instead of spreading activities equally among all thirteen districts, it attempted to
group the districts into four “Medical Regions”. In effect, Health Offices that were supposed to channel assistance to all districts in their Region largely concentrated on their own district, which led to serious imbalances. Consequently, the Medical Regions were abolished for the second phase of the project, which now operates more smoothly on the basis of the administrative districts. Nevertheless, both the GTZ Health Sector Adviser and the Director General of the Mareb Governorate Health Office agreed that training of rural health workers so far has been very basic and needs to be improved. The HO DG stated that trainers sent to Mareb so far have not been the most qualified, and that some of the funds allocated to the Health Offices for local training have been used otherwise because no trainers could be found. In some instances, funds allocated for training were regarded as “easy income”, with actual training sessions being shortened but incentives received for the total planned period. HO DG argued for more involvement and closer follow-up from the German side.

8.2.1.4 Education

Education was not necessarily the first priority local people talked about to the mission, but it is one among other services that the inhabitants expect the government to improve. The Yemeni government has committed 8.5% of the GDP to education – a good percentage, according to the World Bank. But the quality of education is poor throughout the country, for a variety of reasons. Among them are the unequal distribution of allocations, inefficient spending, and corruption. Currently, the government is working on redefining a comprehensive education strategy.

In Mareb, the basic problem in education is similar to that in the health sector. There is not so much a lack of buildings – even though more schools would always be welcome – but of qualified staff. In al-Dhale, we heard more about insufficient or unfinished buildings, but that may be coincidental. From what we observed, many existing school buildings are in need of repair and rehabilitation (windows, roofs, furniture, etc.). Some parents complained that schools are too far away for their children (especially girls) to reach. But it is an open question whether this is due to too few schools or to a lack of transport facilities. Quantitative surveys need to be consulted – or prepared – before deciding on precise intervention in this sector.

The more pressing issue is the problem of finding and keeping sufficiently qualified teachers, particularly in the sciences and the English language. According to general opinion, this problem worsened after many foreign teachers (who had come particularly from Egypt and the Sudan) left Yemen in the 1980s; today, only a few remain. Yemeni teachers have never been able to fill this gap. This is of course a nationwide issue that is not peculiar to Mareb or al-Dhale, but affects these provinces just the same.

Four aspects may be distinguished when analysing the lack of sufficiently qualified teachers: numbers, qualification, appointment, and retention.

**Numbers:** In absolute terms, there are probably more graduates in Yemen who formally qualify for teaching positions than can find employment in the public system. Primary school teachers in Yemen are formed in two-year courses in 14 Teachers’ Training Institutes, one of which is located in Mareb. Secondary school teachers graduate after four years of study in one of the country’s seven universities. Nationwide, there is a large surplus of university graduates from the education and humanities’ departments who cannot be absorbed by the labour
market, while there is a shortage of science graduates. We were not able to obtain precise information on the overall output of the teachers’ training institutes. It may be an indication of the imbalance between the output of teachers and the capacity of the public education system to appoint them that the Mareb Institute, which serves several governorates and currently has 800 students, did not admit any new students this year. The capacity to absorb these graduates does of course not so much reflect the overall need for teachers as it is heavily influenced by financial constraints.

Qualification: Whatever the total number of available teachers, however, it is the quality of the training they receive that is universally held to be very insufficient. Low general standards tend to replicate themselves, and the situation is particularly alarming with regard to capacities in the sciences and in English.

Appointment: Having completed their education, many graduates find it difficult to get appointed. This is due to several factors. Financial constraints of education offices play a role, but as in the health sector, there are serious problems of corruption and a lack of transparency and accountability that lead to the employment of staff on criteria other than qualification. In a corrupt system, positions can be ‘bought’, and positions in remote areas are cheaper than in urban centres. Less qualified applicants who cannot buy themselves an urban job may still be able to afford a rural one, hoping that once they have been appointed as state employees, they would use the first opportunity to be transferred to an urban job.

Retention: The wish to return to one’s hometown, or to live in an amenable urban environment, is one of the reasons why many teachers are not motivated to stay in the rural areas. Another is the search for additional income. As in the health facilities, schools suffer from staff who are on the payroll but have left to work elsewhere, even abroad. The local population believes that if the percentage of teachers from the local community were higher – even if that would mean hiring secondary school graduates – more of them would be willing to stay since they would want to remain with their families.

Many of these shortcomings are made possible by the rampant corruption that is firmly ingrained at all levels of the hierarchy, with no effective and transparent system in place to guarantee democratic control of appointments and performance of staff.

Overall level of education: What does all this mean for overall levels of education? There is a perception by some that overall enrolment as well as standards of education in Mareb are particularly low. People in Mareb make this claim to argue that their province is particularly neglected. People in the central government as well as civil society activists raise it as an important conflict factor, since poor education keeps people ‘backward’ and thus prone to influences inciting violence. It is, however, unclear to what extent this claim is justified. If one looks at the most recent (1999) statistics published by the Ministry of Planning and Development, most figures for Mareb and for al-Dhale hover roughly around the national average, with some surprises such as above average primary school enrolment of rural girls and below average adult illiteracy rates of rural women in both provinces. Although these statistics may not be totally accurate, they should caution against easily accepting the

14 Compare, e.g., internal inconsistencies in table 4/3, where primary school enrolment of poor families in al-Dhale is given as 70.1% for boys, 53.9% for girls, which cannot add up to a combined average of 53.9%; similarly, the figures for the same governorate for non-poor families do not match (boys 81.2%, girls 74.7%, combined total 59.7%) (al-Taqrir al-Ra’isi li-Nata’ij al-Mash al-Watani li-Zahirat al-Faqr 1999). According to this report (table 4/5), rural girls’ primary school enrolment in Mareb in poor families was 32.8%, in al-Dhale 31.2% (national average: 29.3%); in non-poor families the figures were: Mareb 41.2%, al-Dhale 37.3% (national average: 37.4%). Rural female adult illiteracy in poor families was 86.5% in Mareb, 83% in al-Dhale (national average: 84.8%); in non-poor families the figures were: Mareb 83.4%, al-Dhale 79.5% (national average 83.8%) (table 4/11). Statistics for the numbers of female teachers are not available.
stereotype of Mareb or al-Dhale being particularly backward or disadvantaged. Standards there are low, but they are so nationwide. Again, more detailed research is necessary to make sound decisions for intervention in this area.

Also contrary to a common cliché, parents’ attitudes to education, including at least primary education of girls, is largely favourable, provided gender segregation is maintained at least at secondary school level. Promoting girls’ education as such, provided the social mores are kept in mind, will not create an additional conflict element. This should be built upon to bring down the very high disparity in female vs. male literacy rates.

To what extent does the curriculum address conflict-specific issues? “Social education” is a subject matter in grades 4-6, “national education” in grades 7-12. We examined in detail the grade 9 text book for “national education” that is currently in the testing phase. It presents the political system and the structure of the state (i.a., constitution, parties, community-based organisations, human rights, Yemen in the Arab world) with a clear aim of fostering a sense of national identity as Yemenis within the Arab world. It does not directly address social or political conflicts within Yemen. The implicit goal seems to be that by fostering national identity, tribal and political divisions can be downplayed. From talking to several observers, this seems to be the general approach to conflict in Yemen throughout the curriculum.

Issue of dual track educational system: A special issue the dynamics of which should continue to be observed is that of the ‘religious schools’. Until early 2002, primary and secondary education in Yemen was provided, apart from the national public as well as a handful of private schools, by the so-called ‘religious institutes’ (ma’ahid ilmiyya). The latter (which probably catered for 10-20% of the students, according to the World Bank) go back to religious schools established since the 1970s by the Muslim Brothers and later the Islah Party, and supported by the North Yemeni Government in an effort to build up religious support in the ideological confrontation with the socialist south. The religious institutes had some independence in the design of their curriculum and in the selection of their teachers, leading to allegations of an educational ‘dualism’ and of the institutes being used by the Islah Party and radical Islamists to indoctrinate pupils in that particular ideology. By 1996, they were training four times as many teachers as the government’s Teachers Training Institutes, which had an important effect on public discourse. Since at least 1982, the ruling party repeatedly attempted to unify the educational systems. They were not successful, however, since the Islah Party and often apparently also the local population resisted these attempts. The religious institutes received financing from the Government and also additional support from the Islah Party and allegedly also from external sources such as Saudi Arabia. They therefore often tended to attract better teachers because they could pay better (or more regular) salaries; consequently, some hold that the quality of education there was better than in the general national schools. Also, pupils received a stipend from the school, thus providing an additional incentive for poorer families. On the other hand, graduates of the religious institutes found it difficult to find employment in the state sector.

Following Sep. 11, renewed US accusations that these schools produced graduates sympathetic to radical Islamist ideas led to the latest effort at abolishing their independence. The Religious Institutes have now been renamed madaris ilmiyya (religious schools) and lost their independence in designing the curriculum and choosing their teachers. They are now teaching the same curriculum as the general schools, but still offer additional religious and Arabic instruction on the side.

The Ministry of Education is very concerned to prevent a “cultural dualism” and to stop “underdevelopment from spreading to the towns”. In other words, the centre is concerned that if too little is done to assuage the needs of the peripheries, there may be a backlash on the centre itself. Presidential Advisor al-Anisi, on the other hand, denied that there was any
‘cultural dualism’ in Yemen. ‘This country is multi-faceted, like a mosaic’, he said. ‘Cultural factors do not play a role in our security problems. These come from underdevelopment in certain areas: a lack of services, and a lack of employment opportunities. Poverty reduction is the best way to fight insecurity.’

*Vocational training:* While the training of more local teachers, health workers, and doctors was a demand frequently heard by the mission, other specialised technical, vocational or administrative training was much less often requested.\(^{15}\) This may be partly due to the fact that the mission’s field visits concentrated on remote rural areas; but it probably also reflects the relatively low interest in technical and vocational training as opposed to secondary and university education that the 1998 Human Development Report notes for the whole country. This is then a structural problem, leading to a shortage of qualified technical and scientific experts and a surplus of graduates from the humanities. Yemen should think of ways to redress this imbalance and make technical and vocational education more attractive.

### 8.2.1.4.1 Example: Education statistics 2001-2002 for Mareb districts

Statistics for the year 2001-2002 in Mareb governorate according to the Department of Education in Mareb

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Name of the district</th>
<th>No. of male students for all levels</th>
<th>No. of female students for all levels</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>No. of administrator s and workers</th>
<th>Teachers</th>
<th>No. of classes</th>
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<td>413</td>
<td>18</td>
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<td>423</td>
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<td>44</td>
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<td>59</td>
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<td>3985</td>
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<td>Mareb town</td>
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<td>Al-Fuqara</td>
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<td>76</td>
<td>211</td>
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<td>17</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
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<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>20865</strong></td>
<td><strong>11507</strong></td>
<td><strong>31017</strong></td>
<td><strong>456</strong></td>
<td><strong>1597</strong></td>
<td><strong>1864</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{15}\) Mostly, the provision of technical training was an expectation people had of the oil companies in Mareb, which were blamed for not training enough local people for leading engineering positions in the companies.
8.2.1.4.2 List of needs in education prepared by the Department of Education of the Governorate of Mareb

Marwan: You need to fill this in – it is referred to in the text. AHH.

8.3 Security incidents between October 2001 and February 2002

Attach the lists given to us by GTZ.
8.4 Distribution of German projects (by governorate)

8.4.1 Sa’da

8.4.1.1 Sa’da (Sa’da)
Water supply & sanitation (GTZ/KfW)

8.4.2 Hajja

8.4.2.1 Hajja (Hajja)
Distribution system for basic drugs / revolving drug fund (since 1998) (GTZ); family health & family planning (KfW); Health Office (DED, lab-technician for supervision); water supply & sanitation (GTZ/KfW).

8.4.3 ‘Amran

8.4.3.1 Amran (Amran)
District Health Services (GTZ); distribution system for basic drugs / revolving drug fund (since 1998) (GTZ); Health Institute (DED, paediatric nurse); water supply & sanitation (GTZ/KfW); ILGE (GTZ 1999); transferral infrastructure (GTZ 1999)

8.4.3.2 Khamir / Huth
Until 2001: District health services (GTZ); Rural Hospital (DED nurse; withdrawn)

8.4.3.3 Dhi Bin (Amran)
Until 2001: Health Office (DED physician)

8.4.4 Al-Mahwit

8.4.4.1 Al-Mahwit (al-Mahwit)
Distribution system for basic drugs / revolving drug fund (since 1998) (GTZ); Health Institute (DED, paediatric nurse); family health & family planning (KfW)

8.4.4.2 Al-Wasita (al-Mahwit)
Drinking water supply (GTZ)

8.4.5 al-Hudaydah

8.4.5.1 Al-Hudaydah (al-Hudaydah)
Small enterprises (GTZ 1999); water supply and sanitation (GTZ, planned)

8.4.5.2 Bajil & Bayt al-Faqih (al-Hudaydah)
Water supply (GTZ/KfW)
8.4.5.3 Zabid (al-Hudaydah)
Water supply (GTZ/KfW); solid waste management (GTZ)

8.4.5.4 Al-Mansuriyya (Tihama)
Water supply (GTZ/KfW)

8.4.6 Sana’a

8.4.6.1 Sana’a (Sana’a)
Solid waste management (GTZ); District Health Services (GTZ); Distribution system for basic drugs / revolving drug fund (since 1998) (GTZ); Higher Institute for Health Science (DED, midwife & 2 nursing facilitators); HEE (GTZ 1999); Vocational Training (GTZ); beekeeping (GTZ); urban development (GTZ/DED); IDAS (GTZ 1999)

8.4.6.2 Menakha
Until 2002: Rural Hospital (DED, paediatric nurse)

8.4.6.3 Dhabban (Sana’a)
Vocational Training (DED)

8.4.7 Ibb

8.4.7.1 Ibb (Ibb)
Hospital (CIM); distribution system for basic drugs / revolving drug fund (since 1998) (GTZ); family health and family planning (GTZ/KfW); Health Institute (DED, midwife instructor); water supply and sanitation (GTZ); rural drinking water (GTZ/DED); water supply and sanitation (GTZ, planned); construction of primary schools (KfW); HEE (GTZ/DED); IDAS (GTZ/DED)

8.4.7.2 Jibla (Ibb)
Water & sanitation (GTZ/KfW, planned)

8.4.7.3 Al-'Udayn (Ibb)
Rural Hospital (DED paediatric nurse)

8.4.7.4 Yarim (Dhamar)
Water supply & sanitation (GTZ/KfW)

8.4.8 Ta’izz

8.4.8.1 Ta’izz (Ta’izz)
Water loss reduction (KfW); water supply and sanitation (GTZ, planned); distribution system for basic drugs / revolving drug fund (since 1998) (GTZ 1999); Red Crescent HC (DED, midwife); vocational training (GTZ); small enterprises (GTZ: bee-keeping); IDAS (GTZ/DED)
8.4.8.2 Al-Mukha (Ta’izz)
Water supply (GTZ/KfW)

8.4.9 *Al-Dhale*

8.4.9.1 Al-Dhale (al-Dhale)
Yemeni Government suggested including al-Dhale in water supply and sanitation project (see FC 12 KfW)

8.4.10 *Lahej*

8.4.10.1 Lahej (Lahej)
IDAS (GTZ)

8.4.11 *Aden*

8.4.11.1 Aden (Aden)
Sanitation (KfW); Distribution system for basic drugs / revolving drug fund (since 1998) (GTZ 1999); Vocational Training (GTZ & DED); small enterprises (GTZ)

8.4.11.2 Al-Mansura (Aden)
Vocational Training (DED)

8.4.12 *Abyan*

8.4.12.1 Abyan (Abyan)
Sanitation (GTZ 1999); Distribution system for basic drugs / revolving drug fund (since 1998) (GTZ); family health & FP (GTZ/KfW); Health Office (DED, midwife, planned); Construction of primary schools (KfW); HEE (GTZ); IDAS (GTZ)

8.4.12.2 Zinjibar (Abyan)
HEE (DED); Water & sanitation (GTZ/KfW, planned)

8.4.12.3 Al-Koud (Abyan)
Vocational Training (DED)

8.4.12.4 Ja’ar (Abyan)
Water & sanitation (GTZ/KfW, planned)

8.4.13 *Mareb*

8.4.13.1 Mareb
Family planning (DHC Juba District, DED, 15 years ago; halted because of objection by fundamentalist preacher)
Health Sector Advisory Services / District Health Services (GTZ, since 1999) / Distribution system for basic drugs / revolving drug fund (since 1998) (GTZ) (all ca. 2 million DM). DED contribution under consideration already prior to Sep. 11. An additional 2 million DM (originally earmarked for poverty reduction) were made available to HESAS Sep. 2001 to be spent in Mareb (and possibly al-Jawf and Sa’da).

Spare Parts for Diesel Power Plants (KfW) (1996: halted because of dispute between Public Electricity Corporation and the contractor, Deutz. Deutz later postponed rehabilitation in Marib for security reasons) (4 mio. DEM)

Mareb Dam: protection of cultural heritage (GTZ)

Health Institute (DED, initiated March 2002)

Rural Health Centres (GTZ, initiated March 2002)

2 hospitals (GTZ, initiated March 2002)

Mother & child health (GTZ, initiated March 2002)

Teachers’ training institute (GTZ, initiated March 2002)

Literacy campaigns (GTZ, initiated March 2002)

8.4.14 Al-Jawf

Al-Hazm Hospital (GTZ, initiated March 2002)

8.4.15 Hadhramaut

8.4.15.1 Seyoun / Shibam (Hadhramaut)

Solid waste management (GTZ); Urban development (GTZ); vocational training (DED)

8.4.15.2 Ghayl Ba Wazir (Hadhramaut)

Solid waste management (GTZ)

8.4.15.3 Al-Mukalla (Hadhramaut)

Water loss reduction (KfW); Spare Parts for Diesel Power Plants (KfW)

8.4.15.4 Al-Shihr (Hadhramaut)

Water & sanitation (GTZ/KfW, planned)

8.4.16 Soqotra

8.4.16.1 Soqotra (Soqotra)

Boarding School (GTZ)
8.5 Security Related Operating Guidelines

8.6 ToR Mission

8.7 List of interview partners

8.7.1 BMZ
Herbert Sahlmann, Referatsleiter 220: Middle East, Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development, Bonn, Tel. (0228) 535-3490, Sahllmann@bmz.bund.de
Frau Wahlen, Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development, Bonn, Tel. (0228) 535-3488

8.7.2 GTZ
Dr. Uwe Kievelitz, Programme Manager, Crisis Prevention and Conflict Management / Fund for Peace Initiatives, GTZ, Eschborn, Tel. +49-6196-79-1332, Uwe.Kievelitz@gtz.de
Nina Scherg, Programme Officer, Crisis Prevention and Conflict Management, GTZ, Eschborn, Tel. +49-6196-79-1324, Nina.Scherg@gtz.de
Dr. Helmut Großkreutz, Director, GTZ Office Sana’a, Tel. 414111, Mob. 73 212 801, Grosskreutz.GTZ-Jemen@ye.gtz.de
Dr. Ernst Tenambergen, GTZ Health Sector Adviser, Ministry of Public Health, Republic of Yemen, Sana’a, Tel. & Fax 252237, Mob. 73 212 809, Advisor_MoPH@y.net.ye, Doctor_Ten@yahoo.com
Dr. Dagmar Awad-Gladewitz, GTZ expert for Health and Environmental Education, Sana’a, Tel. & Fax 274565, HEE-Sanaa@y.net.ye, D.Awad-GTZ@y.net.ye
E. Wolf, GTZ expert for the water sector, Sana’a, Tel. 251658, Fax 231412, Mob. 73 212 807, EWolf.GTZ@ye.gtz.de
Dr. Theuerkauf, GTZ expert with COCA, Tel. 410846, Fax 421715, Mob. 73 212 821, GTZ-COCA@y.net.ye
Dr. Hadi Eckert, CIM long term expert, Republic of Yemen, General Organisation For Preservation of Historic Cities in Yemen (GOPHCY), Sana’a, Tel. +967-1-276795, Fax 230605, e-mail via: Arabia_Felix@y.net.ye
Dr. Alfred Kraft, Senior Economist, Division 42: State and Economic Reform, Civil Society, GTZ, Eschborn, Tel. +49-6196-79-1666, Alfred.Kraft@gtz.de
Dr. Abdel Rahim A. Belal, Director, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Sudan Office, Khartoum, Tel. +249-11-780557, BelalAbdelRahim@hotmail.com (member of WIRAM mission)

8.7.3 DED
Theo Riedke, Beauftragter, DED Jemen, Tel. +967-1-440395, home 414071, Mob. 71771198, ded-yemen@y.net.ye
Roland Lauckner, DED Small Industries Co-ordinator (Sana’a), Tel. +967-71707094
Ingrid Sobel, DED Health Programme Co-ordinator (Sana’a)
8.7.4 KfW
Carola Rottman, KfW (Frankfurt am Main)
Claudia Arce, Division Chief Middle East, KfW (Frankfurt am Main), Tel. +49-69-7431-3249, Claudia.Arce@kfw.de
Cornelia Dinter, Sector Economist, Social Infrastructure / Social Policies, KfW (Frankfurt am Main), Tel. +49-69-7431-3659, Cornelia.Dinter@kfw.de
Eberhard Knapp, Technical Advisor, Civil Engineering and Transportation Division, KfW (Frankfurt am Main), Tel. +49-69-7431-2659, Eberhard.Knapp@kfw.de
Ali Abduh Kassim Manshalin, Local Expert, Yemen-German Financial Cooperation, KfW, Sana’a, Tel. +967-1-414111, Mob. 7906409, Ali.Kassim@y.net.ye

8.7.5 Central Government of the Republic of Yemen in Sana’a
Abdulaziz Abdulghani, President of the Consultative Council, Sana’a, Tel. +967-1-259861
Sadiq bin Amin Abu Ras, Minister of Local Administration, Sana’a, Tel. +967-1-252532, Fax 250626
Dr. Abdulkarim Ismail al-ARhabi, Minister of Labour and Social Affairs, Republic of Yemen & Managing Director, Social Fund for Development, Sana’a, Tel. +967-1240417, SFD1@y.net.ye
Prof. Dr. Abdul-Aziz Saleh Bin Habtoor, Vice-Minister of Education, Tel. +967-1-274549, Bin.Habtoor@y.net.ye
Ali Mohamed al-Anisi, Director of Presidential Office, Sana’a, Tel. +967-1-276777 & 276865, rypomjan@y.net.ye
Brigadier Ali Mansoor Rashied, Deputy Director, Office of Political Security, Tel. +967-1-443001
Hisham Sharaf Abdalla, Deputy Minister for International Cooperation, Ministry of Planning & Development, Tel. +967-1-250116, M.Abbasi@y.net.ye
Afrah Alawi, Social Fund for Development, Tel. +967-1-240417
Rashida Ali al-Hamdani, Chairperson, Women National Committee of the Republic of Yemen, Sana’a, Tel. +967-1-403118, Fax 276304, Rashida@y.net.ye, http://www.yemeni-women.org.ye

8.7.6 Yemeni Civil Society Actors, Sana’a
Jamal Adimi [Jamal al-Din al-Adimi], Secretary General, Forum for Civil Society, Sana’a, and representative of the Yemeni chapter (in formation) of Transparency International (TI), Tel. 421480 & 207650, FCS@y.net.ye, JAdimi@y.net.ye, http://firms.findlaw.com/jadimi, http://www.TransparencyYemen.org.ye
Dr. Bader Bashir Rashid, Chief of Party, Yemen Family Health and Family Planning Program, The Futures Group, Sana’a, Tel. 413696, Bader-TFGI@y.net.ye
Hassan Saeed al-Zaydi, Head of News Department, Yemen Times, Sana’a; President, Yemeni Human Rights Organization, Mareb Branch; Public Relations Officer, Conference of Middle Region Citizens. Tel. +967-1-268661/2/3, Mob. 73214798, Sat. 008821660000466, alZaydi8@hotmail.com
8.7.7 International Actors

Dr. Werner Zimbrich, Ambassador, German Embassy Sana’a, Tel. 413174, GermEmbaSanaa@y.net.ye

Gudrun Isphording, Chargé d’Affaires, German Embassy Sana’a, Tel. 413174, GerEmbaSanaa@y.net.ye

Dr. Burghard Vogt, Kommission für Allgemeine und Vergleichende Archäologie des Deutschen Archäologischen Instituts, Bonn, tel. +49-1888-7712-0

Dr. Iris Gerlach, Leiterin der Außenstelle Sanaa, Deutsches Archäologisches Institut, Orient-Abteilung, Tel. +967-1-218474, DAI.Sanaa@y.net.ye

Rebekka van Roemburg, First Secretary for Education, Royal Netherlands Embassy, Sana’a, Tel. 421800, Fax 421035, Rebekka-van.Roemburg@minbuza.nl

John McAteer, US Embassy (Sana’a), Economic and Commercial Officer. Tel. 303155-206.

Ousmane Diagana, Senior Operations Officer, Human Development Sector, The World Bank Office in Sana’a, Tel. 418731, ODiagana@worldbank.org

Hashem Awnallah, Operations Officer, Human Development Sector, The World Bank Office, Sana’a, Tel. +967-1-418731, HAwnallah@worldbank.org

Gerd Winkelhane, Project Manager, Strengthening Priority Areas of Vocational Training (SPAVT), Republic of Yemen, Ministry of Technical Education and Vocational Training & European Commission, Sana’a, Tel. & Fax +967-1-217987, SPAVT@y.net.ye (former Beauftragter, DED Jemen)

Jonathan Puddifoot, Country Representative, CARE International in Yemen, Sana’a, Tel. 213640, Mob. 73 742 352, CARE@y.net.ye

Magda M. Elsanousi, Programme Development Officer (Gender), Oxfam GB-Yemen Office, Sana’a, Tel. +967-1-242996, OxfamYemen@y.net.ye

Dr. François Burgat, directeur, Centre Français d’Archéologie et de Sciences Sociales de Sana’a, Tel. +967-1-275417, FBurg@y.net.ye, http://www.univ-aix.fr/cefas

8.7.8 From Mareb

Amer al-Aji Taleb al-Talebi, Member of Parliament, Tel. +967-1-241274 (Sana’a), +967-6-862161 (al-Mahiliyya, Mareb), Mob. Sana’a +967-71103366

Ali Al Fatimi, Wakil al-Muhafiz, Tel. 302380

Dr. Abdrabu Miftah, GD. of the Health Office, Tel. 302254

Yahia Al Makhadi, GD. of Education, Tel. 302214

Aziz Mejidi’a, GD. of Planning Office, Tel. 300337

Dr. Fadl al-Hajj, General Director, Mareb Governorate Health Office, and President, Department of Organisation and Qualification, Yemeni Islah Party, Tel. 302173

Husain Al Khanbashi, Deputy Manager of the Police, Tel. 301354

Saba Al Ammari, Coordinator of the Women National Committee, Tel.302161

Fanda Al Ammari, GPC., Tel. 302161

Manal Al Bahi, teacher, Tel. 71192916

Shaikh Khaled Al Irada, Abeeda tribe, Tel. 302583
Ali Al Baihani, Teacher & Mbr. Of the local Council, Mahelia, Tel. 862151
Naser Al Abdi, Abdia
Yahia al-Makhidhi, General Director of the Education Department in Mareb Province
Many teachers

8.7.9 From al-Dhale
3amiid Dr Husayn Ali Hasan, Member of the Consultative Council (independent, from al-Dhale), Tel. (01) 341804
Ali Muhammad Saleh al-Suraymi, Member of the Consultative Council (independent, from al-Dhale)
Saleh Kasem Al-Gonid [SaaliH qasim al-junayd], Governor of Al-Dalea. Tel. 533015 (office), 533017 (home), fax 533016.
Ahmed Al Kuhlani, GD. Damt destrict
Anas Ali Sinan, Journalist of Al Wahdawi newspaper
Saleh Naser Al Dhubai’a, Damt local Council
Husain Al Kaderi, Damt local Council
Adel Al Awdi, Health center in Damt
Muhsinn Al rabu’l, Mbr. Of the local Council, Al Dhal’I, Tel.330257
Ahmed Al Khaili, GS. Of the local council, Ashea’b destrict, Tel. 534160
Mohamed Husain Abu bakr, Health Center
Dr. Mohamed Sa’id Muthana, Ashea’b Hospital
Abu Bakr Ali Hasan, Officer
Ali Hadi Hasan, GD. Jehaf destrict
Mohamed Muthana Husain, GS. Of the local Council, Jehaf destrict
Mohamed Ali Mohsen, Director of the Health center
Ali Mus’id Ali, Mbr. Of the local Council, Jehaf
Abdulla Asker Ali, Mbr. Of the local Council, Jehaf
Mahmod Al D’iri, GD. of Education in Al Dhal’I, Tel.532246
Mahmud Basha, Manger of the Projects in the Education Office
Mahmud Al Dau’ani, Lawer, Tel. 71135820
Dr. Mohamed Subhi, Lawyer
Dr. Ahmed Ali Naji, GD. of the Health Office, Tel. 532348

8.8

Strengthening Policy and Practice
15– 19 July 2002, Birmingham, UK
Practical Strategies for Agencies Working in Areas of Tension and Conflict
A residential course for staff of international and national agencies with advisory and management responsibility for relief, development, rights and peace-building programmes. It is particularly relevant for those engaged in the planning and implementation of aid and development programmes and those concerned with developing policies for appropriate responses in complex, political emergencies.

Persistent instability and conflict have become “normal” in many parts of the world, forcing many agencies to rethink their strategic planning and policies. This course, held annually, aims to assist participants to find constructive ways of engaging with unpredictable and rapidly changing circumstances. The interaction between policy and practice is a major theme. Some practical sessions on conflict-handling skills are included.

Major topics include:
- Analysing Conflict
- Evaluating Conflict Impact
- Conflict Prevention and Peace-Building
- Mediation Skills and Conflict Transformation
- Integrating a Conflict Perspective into Programme Planning

Method
The workshop will be highly participative and experience-based, including short presentations, case studies and concrete examples, as well as group discussions, role-plays and practical exercises. Full documentation will be provided. The aim is to provide participants with tools and skills which they can adapt and use in their own situations, and structured opportunities to develop new ideas and strategies.

Fees
The fee for the workshop, inclusive of accommodation and food, is £875. Where participants are staying elsewhere and do not need bed and breakfast, the rate is £750.

WORKING WITH CONFLICT (WWC)
22nd April to 28th June 2002
Birmingham, UK

An intensive, practical and participatory course for practitioners working for peace and justice in situations of instability and conflict.

The course is designed for people who:
- work or live in a situation of conflict;
- need time to assess and reflect on their situations and develop new strategies;
- want the opportunity to learn and develop their skills;
- want to draw on the experience of people working in similar situations.

The WWC course is a full-time course, consisting of four modules and lasting ten weeks. Formal certificates are issued to each participant who completes the full course.

The course brings together people of varied and comparable experience to develop their ideas and skills and find fresh motivation for working on political and social conflicts in their own communities, countries and regions.

Specifically the course aims to help participants to:
- Study a wide range of approaches for dealing creatively with conflict and promoting action for change;
-Develop practical methods for increasing the effectiveness of their work and that of their organisation, and for limiting damage caused by social dislocation, violence and trauma;
-Plan and organise more effectively.

Participants will do this by:
-Developing specific objectives for learning from the course through reflecting in depth on their situation;
-Re-examining assumptions and reassessing their approach to handling conflict, in the light of the needs and interests of their community and society;
-Learning and practising new skills and techniques i.e. negotiation, mediation, media skills and other non-violent methods essential to survival and social change;
-Reflecting in depth on their situation and developing specific objectives for learning from the course;
-Building effective and continuing links with other groups and agencies.

Overall objectives for the course group:
-That during the ten weeks together, the course group will develop a model of interaction and coexistence that reflects their vision of the future.
-That during the course each participant will reflect on his/her own attitudes and behaviours and on the role that he/she plays within the group.

8.9 List of people who need to be briefed about the outcome of the mission

8.10 Literature
The International Crisis Group (www.crisisweb.org) is about to prepare a study on “urban and rural unrest in Yemen: underlying causes and implications”). This study, which will be of great interest to development planners, will be prepared by Dr. Iris Glosemeyer (SWP Berlin, Iris.Glosemeyer@swp-berlin.org) by the end of July 2002.

8.10.1 Mission-specific

8.10.2 Yemen


8.10.3 GTZ Yemen


8.10.4 DED Yemen

DED-Mitarbeit in Yemen. Via

8.10.5 KfW Yemen


8.10.6 Other international actors


8.10.7 Conflict transformation general


8.10.8 Background


8.10.9

What is Conflict Transformation?

The definition below was drawn up by an international network of practitioners, engaged in action for Conflict Transformation.

Conflict transformation is a holistic and multifaceted process of engaging with conflict. It aims to reduce violence and to protect and promote social justice and sustainable peace. It requires work in all spheres, at all levels and with all stakeholders.

Conflict Transformation needs to be accountable to those directly affected by conflict but requires networks and linkages to sustain it. Conflict Transformation is an ongoing process of changing relationships, behaviours, attitudes and structures, from the negative to the positive. It requires timely interventions, respect for cultural context, patience and persistence and a comprehensive understanding of the conflict.

As conflict is dynamic and conflict transformation is an ongoing process, learning is a vital component. Most importantly, it begins with ourselves.