It is by now a well established fact that the occurrence of German "wieder" and English "again" may express either that there has been a former event of the type described in the sentence like e.g. the opening of the door, the leaving of a guest in (1a), (2a), or that with the event described in the sentence, a state which has formerly held is restored, like e.g. the door’s being open, the absence of a certain participant in (1b), (2b). These two readings have come to be known as repetitive and restitutive "wieder"/"again", respectively.

(1a) [Jemand öffnete die Tür um neun Uhr.] Eine halbe Stunde später wurde die Tür **wieder** geöffnet.
    Somebody opened the door at nine o’clock.] Half an hour later the door was opened again.

(1b) [Hans schloß langsam die Tür.] Sie wurde jedoch sofort **wieder** geöffnet.
    [Hans slowly shut the door.] But it was immediately **opened again**.

(2a) Heute ist **wieder** ein Teilnehmer abgereist.
    Today again a participant left.

(2b) Heute ist ein Teilnehmer **wieder** ABgereist.
    Today, a participant left again.


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¹ The German preposition *wider* ‘against’ is etymologically identical to the adverb/particle *wieder* ‘again’ (cf. sect. 3).
² Capitals mark main sentence stress (focus accent).
The discussion concentrates on two issues:  
(i) What are the sentence-internal factors determining the interpretation of *wieder* in a given sentence?  
(ii) How to explain the behaviour of *wieder*, in particular, the relationship between the two readings?

As far as the first, empirical question is concerned, there seems to be general agreement that (a) a repetitive reading is obligatory when *wieder* is topicalized, i.e. precedes the finite verb in V2-position, and obligatory or at least strongly preferred, when *wieder* precedes an object, the sentence subject or an adverbial modifier (at least of a higher type) in the so-called middle-field, with some semantically defined exceptions pointed out by von Stechow (1996: 109ff) and Pittner (to appear); (b) that a genuine restitutive interpretation is allowed only with predicates of a specific semantic category; and (c) that stress on *wieder*, indicating narrow focus on *wieder*, blocks the restitutive reading in cases where it is not excluded by (a) and (b). In the examples in (3) the restitutive interpretation is excluded by one or the other of these constraints (underlined).

(3)  
Wieder musste Arnim das Dach reparieren. (a)  
Again had Arnim to repair the roof.  
Arnim hat wieder das Dach repariert. (a)  
Arnim had again to repair the roof.  
Ich bin wieder zu spät aufgestanden. (a)  
I have again got up too late.  
Arnim hat die Kategorialgrammatik wieder kritisiert. (b)  
Arnim has Categorial Grammar again criticized.  
Die Tür wurde eine halbe Stunde später Wieder geöffnet. (c)  
The door was half an hour later again opened.

The question of how to explain the observed ‘distribution’ of repetitive and restitutive *wieder* and how to describe the relationship between the two readings of *wieder/again* has caused considerably more controversy. The majority of the proposals made until now represent what one might call a reductionist (and repetitionist) view: Restitutive *wieder/again* is described as repetitive *wieder/again* having narrow scope, i.e. having scope only over the state resulting from (causation of) the definite change-of-state described by (transitive and intransitive) telic change-of-state predicates (achievements and accomplishments in Vendlerian terms) like ÖFFNEN ‘open’

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5 Under this category I subsume adverbials that are higher than so-called process/state-related adverbials in the adverbial hierarchies outlined by e.g. Frey/Pittner (1999), Haider (1999), Pittner (to appear).
(transitive) and ABREISEN ‘leave’. This involves decomposition of such verbs at least at the level of semantic representation (cf. Dowty 1979): the verb OPEN must be analyzed as something like [CAUSE TO] (BECOME(OPEN)) in order for again to modify the state predicate OPEN in its restitutive reading; cf. fig. 1. 6

Fig. 1

In his papers from 1994, 1995 and 1996, von Stechow has advocated strongly for a reductionist explanation of the repetitive-restitutive ambiguity within a theory of lexical decomposition in syntax. A solution along these lines hinges crucially on the assumption that ambiguity arises only with predicates that call for such (semantic) decomposition; cf. observation (b) above. Conversely, it explains quite nicely why the ambiguity does not seem to arise with other types of predicates (v. Stechow 1996: 105ff).– The main advantages of this approach can be summarized as follows:

"It gives a principled explanation for the repetitive/restitutive ambiguity which is easily incorporated into a general framework of compositional interpretation, it can do so without stipulation of a lexical ambiguity of again, and it is able to account for disambiguating word order effects." (Jäger/Blutner to appear: sect. 3)

Fabricius-Hansen (1975), Egg (2000) and, as far I can judge, Klein (in this volume) represent other variants of a reductionist explanation, taking repetitive wieder with its apparently more simple meaning to be basic; they are all considerably less explicit than von Stechow (1994, 1995, 1996) as far as syntax goes. But Egg and Klein at least try to account for the interaction of scope and focus structure as a factor detmining the interpretation possibilities or preferencies of wieder.

Kamp/Reyle (1994), on the other hand, take a very clear non-reductionist stand; like Fabricius-Hansen (1980), they consider wieder to be genuinely ambiguous

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6 It is a problem for this analysis that evidence for wieder having intermediate scope apparently cannot be found (cf. von Stechow 1996).
or polysemous, having two different meanings that cannot be reduced to one by way of meaning postulates or the like:

“The literature contains a number of efforts to explain the restitutive and the repetitive interpretations of *wieder* on the basis of a single semantics which then yields one or the other interpretation through interaction with other syntactic and semantic processes. While we share the view that such an account of *wieder* would be attractive in principle, we have found no way of formulating a unified analysis of *wieder* along these lines. thus we cannot do better than treat *wieder* as genuinely ambiguous.” (Kamp/Roßdeutscher 1994: 197)

Blutner/Jäger (to appear) and Jäger/Blutner (to appear), finally, allegedly inspired by Fabricius-Hansen (1983\(^7\)), analyze repetitiveness and restitutiveness, understood as repetition of the result state of a telic change-of-state, as inherent interpretation possibilities of one (polysemous or semantically underspecified) lexical item but use an Optimality-Theoretic framework to account for the interplay between surface word order and focus accent as factors determining interpretation preferences in sentences containing telic change-of-state predicates (henceforth also: transition predicates).

I will not exclude that the objections Blutner and Jäger (to appear), Egg (2000) and Pittner (to appear) have raised against von Stechow's theory may eventually be refuted and/or that his theory can refined so as to account for them. That is, I do not deny that it may be possible to explain the distribution of the repetitive and the restitutive reading and relationship between them along these lines. But I am not convinced that it should be done that way, i. e. that it is an adequate type of explanation. This is partly because I adhere to the principle underlying Blutner and Jäger's as well as Egg's approaches (and Optimality Theory in general) that one should not let syntax do more work than absolutely necessary as far as semantic interpretation is concerned but rather seek to place the explanatory burden with semantics and pragmatics, maximising the role of general semantic-pragmatic interpretation principles as suggested by Egg, Blutner and Jäger with respect to *wieder*. But my reservations also have to do with a third question which the repetitive-restitutive ambiguity gives rise to but which solutions taking repetitive *wieder* to be basic do not even try to answer:

(iii) How does it come that *wieder* and *again*, being of different origin, have undergone a parallel semantic development from a preposition/adverb meaning

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\(^7\) See v. Stechow (1995: 89ff) for a brief summary.
‘contra’, ‘against’ or the like into the restitutive-repetitive range of readings illustrated above? And why is a restitutive reading normally not found with other ‘repetitive’ adverbs/particles like English *once more* and German *noch einmal, abermals, erneut*?

In what follows, I shall not try to argue in any detail against von Stechow's decompositional solution to the repetitive-restitutive problem or for any particular polysemist approach. At this stage of a discussion that has been going on for approximately 30 years, by and large neglecting the question asked above and being based primarily on (pairs of) sentences without a natural context, it may seem more rewarding to focus on the ‘nature’ of iteration or repetition and the relation between repetition and contrast on the one hand and the role *wieder* plays in natural discourse on the other hand. The first topic is addressed in sections 2 and 3 which give an account of the semantic contribution of *wieder* that suggests an answer to (iii). Section 4 presents evidence suggesting that although German *wieder* and English *again* are (and probably should be) taken to be semantically equivalent, they differ in interesting ways when it comes to their actual use in discourse. Section 5 contains a brief conclusion.

### 2. Syntactic and semantic aspects of the repetitive-restitutive dichotomy

It is generally agreed upon that the presence of *wieder* does not contribute to the assertoric content of the the sentence in question but triggers a presupposition that is determined by what *wieder* modifies (has in its scope) at the level of semantic representation. And that again is mediated more or less unambiguously by surface word order: material to the right of *wieder*– at least in the preferred readings – enters into the presupposition together with the sentence predicate, whereas constituents to the left of *wieder* belong to the assertoric part (Kamp/Roßdeutscher 1994). This means that quantifiers following *wieder* are copied into the presupposition, so to speak – they cannot bind variables in the presupposition. Quantifiers etc. in a subject

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9 According to von Stechow (1996), scope restrictions prevent them from occurring in the position of restitutive *wieder*. But why should they be restricted in that way, given that they have the repetitive meaning attributed to *wieder* as well?
10 Kamp/Roßdeutscher (1994) are a notable exception to this tendency.
or an object preceding *wieder* in the surface sentence, on the other hand, will normally bind variables in the assertoric and the presuppositional part as well.\(^{12}\) In other words: these constituents normally “have the same referent in assertion and presupposition” (Pittner to appear: 9). Thus, (4) and (5) – both repetitive – may be paraphrased as (4’) and (5’), respectively.

\[(4) \quad \text{In diesem Jahr hat Arnim *wieder* einige Arbeiten über Tempus heftig kritisiert.} \]
\[\text{In this year has Arnim again some studies on tense vehemently critizised..} \]

\[(4’) \quad \text{Ass.: This year, Arnim has vehemently critizised some studies on tense.} \]
\[\text{Pres.: At least once before, Arnim vehemently critizised some studies on tense .} \]

\[(5) \quad \text{Arnim hat einige Arbeiten über Tempus jetzt *wieder* heftig kritisiert.} \]
\[\text{Arnim has some studies on tense now again vehemently critizised.} \]

\[(5’) \quad \text{Ass.: Arnim has vehemently critizised some studies (X) on tense.} \]
\[\text{Pres.: At least once before Arnim vehemently critizised X’.} \]

A restitutive interpretation demands identity between the referent(s) involved in the state resulting from the asserted event – i.e. the ‘theme’, ‘patient’, or ‘holder’ of the state, or whatever one chooses to call such a role\(^ {13}\) – and its (their) counterpart(s) in the presupposition. Consequently, restitutive *wieder* can be expected to follow a quantified subject or object. That is, sentences with preferred restitutive readings pattern with (5) above: (7), with unmarked focus accent, ist restitutive, (6) repetitive.

\[(6) \quad \text{Arnim hat *wieder* ein Haus im Tessin verkauft.} \]
\[\text{Arnim has again a house in Tessin sold.} \]
\[\text{‘Arnim once again has sold a house in Tessin.’} \]

\[(7) \quad \text{Arnim hat ein Haus im Tessin *wieder* verKAUFT.} \]
\[\text{Arnim has a house in Tessin again sold.’} \]
\[\text{There is a house in Tessin that Arnim has sold again.} \]

Upon closer inspection, the correlation between syntactic structure (word order), quantifier scope and interpretation possibilities (or preferences) may, after all, not be as straightforward as outlined here. But the complications mentioned by Blutner/Jäger (to appear), Egg (2000) and Pittner (to appear) do not seem quite pertinent to the question I am primarily interested in. So I shall maintain that quantifiers to the left of *wieder* bind variables in assertion and presupposition as well. And, as mentioned in the preceding section, I also assume that in order for *wieder* to receive a restitutive


\(^{13}\) For one type of apparent exceptions, see Blutner/Jäger (to appear). – Von Stechow (1996: 109) uses the term ‘holder’ for the subject argument of so-called *holder + object result verb* like *verlassen* ‘leave’ where the result state involves both arguments. These are the verbs that allow or prefer a restitutive interpretation even when *wieder* precedes the object; see also Pittner (to appear).
“Wi(e)der” and “again(st)"

reading, it has to follow the subject and object(s) – unless there are good semantic reasons to the opposite (see fn.13).

Von Stechow (1996), among others, represents the presupposition triggered by *wieder*, whether repetitive or restitutive, as indefinite or existential. This follows from the definition given in (8) – von Stechow’s (3-7) – which is inspired by Egg (1994).

(8) Let $P$ be a property of eventualities and let $e$ be an eventuality, $\text{again}(P)(e)$ is defined only if $E e' [\text{MAX}(P)(e') = 1 & e' < e].$ Where defined, $\text{again}(P)(e) = 1$ iff $P(e) = 1.$

The presupposition specified in the first clause lays down that there is an earlier eventuality having the relevant property $P$. Under a restitutive reading, $P$ is the result state property modified by *wieder* having narrow scope – let us say $\neg \text{POSSESS}(a, h)$ in (7) and OPEN$(d)$ in (1b). (7), then, might be paraphrased as shown in (7’).

(7’) Ass.: Arnim has sold a house $(h)$ in Tessin
Pres.: Before the selling event there was a maximal eventuality characterized by Arnim’s not being in the possession of $h$.

Kamp/Roßdeutscher (1994), however, show convincingly that a definition like (8) does not account for the anaphoric nature of the presupposition – a fact which is, after all, also recognized by von Stechow (1996: Note 2, p. 133) – nor can it fully explain the interplay between the presupposition triggered by *wieder* and the inherent semantic (presuppositional) contribution of telic transition predicate modified by restitutive *wieder*. What is inferred from (1b) (repeated below) is not simply that the state characterized by the door being open, which is the result of the asserted event of opening, has hold once before that event.

(1b) Hans schloß langsam die Tür. Sie wurde jedoch sofort wieder geÖFFnet. Hans slowly shut the door. But it was immediately OPENed again.

The contribution of restitutive *wieder* modifying telic change-of-state predicates is more adequately described as follows (cf. also Fabricius-Hansen 1980, 1983):

The central conception conveyed by restitutive *wieder* is that the process which is implicitly or explicitly asserted by the sentence in which it occurs was preceded by an opposite process whose effects the later process undoes, thereby restoring the state of affairs which obtained when the first process began.” (Kamp/Roßdetuscher 1994: 195).

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$^{14}$ MAX$(P)$ holds of $e'$ iff $e'$ is a maximal $P$-eventuality, i.e. iff there is no proper part of $e'$ such that $P(e') = 1$; cf. von Stechow (1996: 96).
Thus, (7) tells us that the asserted selling event (e) the result state of which is that Arnim does not own h (i.e. the house he sold) has been preceded by an event (e’) by which he came into possession of h, i.e. an event which like selling involves a succession of the two complementary states POSSESS(a, h) and ¬POSSESS(a, h) but in the opposite order; and the result state of this event (e’) is identified with the pre-state of the selling event itself (the state characterized by POSSESS(a, h)) with the effect that the result of the latter (e) – ¬POSSESS(a, h)) – is conceived as a restoration of the state holding at the onset of the former (e’): the two states characterized by ¬POSSESS(a, h) are separated by a single (maximal) state of the complementary type (POSSESS(a, h)).

In (1b), then, the pre-state of the event of opening the window which is asserted in the sentence containing wieder is unified with the result state of the closing act asserted in preceding sentence; and in (7’) e’ is identified (unified) with the buying act described in the relative clause; and. In both cases, the interpretation provides a maximally coherent text without ‘gaps’ in the chain of events (or states); cf. fig. 2.

(7’) Arnim hat ein Haus im Tessin, das er vor ein paar Jahren gekauft hatte, schon wieder verkauft.
‘Arnim has a house in Tessin, that he some years ago bought had, already again sold.’ Arnim has already sold a house in Tessin (again) which he had bought a couple of years ago.

This pattern is characteristic of restitutive wieder/again when occurring with telic change-of-state predicates. It can be captured quite accurately if one reconstructs the presupposition triggered by wieder/again as involving the reverse change-of-state so that the result of the presupposed transition is unified with the pre-state of the transition asserted in the wieder-sentence itself. That is what Fabricius-Hansen (1980, 1983) und Kamp/Roßdeutscher (1994) aim at doing. And it is the point of departure of the ‘theory’ outlined by me 1994 – and elaborated in 1995 – which von Stechow
In earlier publications (Fabricius-Hansen 1980, 1983), I proposed the term Kontradirektionalität ‘counterdirectionality’ for the relation holding between ‘inverse’ or ‘opposite’ transitions of the particular type illustrated by e. g. BUY(x, y), SELL(x, y) and BE-CLOSED (y), BE-OPENED(y). The semantic contribution of restitutive wieder modifying a telic transition predicate may now be described as in (9). Following Blutner/Jäger (to appear), I use the slash to separate assertoric and presuppositional conditions; that is, e’ is the presupposed eventuality having the properties specified after the colon.

\[
\text{WIEDER}(P)(e) := P(e) / e' : P_c(e') & e' < e & \text{res}(e') = p_{\text{re}}P(e)
\]

where P and P_c are properties characterizing (causation of) counterdirectional transitions, res(e_p) and pre(e_P) the two successive states which have to obtain in order for P(e) to hold, and < the relation of complete precedence between times /eventualities.15

It could be that an interpretation along these lines does in fact fall out from the pragmatic constraints envisaged by Blutner/Jäger (to appear), Jäger/Blutner (to appear), and Egg (2000) which demand that as little as possible should be accommodated and that the resulting discourse interpretation should be as coherent as possible. In any case, in terms of Discourse Representation Theory the effect of these constraints seems to be that discourse referents established in the sentence being processed should, as far as possible, be unified with referents already in the discourse universe rather than being established as new referents in the universe (cf. Fabricius-Hansen 1999). And that is exactly what happens under the restitutive interpretation of wieder with telic transition predicates.

Other things being equal, a repetitive interpretation of wieder modifying a telic change-of-state predicate demands more material to be accommodated, thus creating ‘gaps’ in the chain of events described in the text if its presuppositions are not justified bey the preceding context. This is seen if we compare (1a) (repeated below) with (1b) discussed above.

(1a) Jemand öffnete die Tür um neun Uhr. Eine halbe Stunde später wurde die Tür wieder geöffnet.
    Someone opened the door at nine o’clock. Half an hour later, the door was opened once more.

15 (9) is somewhat sloppy: P(e) may characterize what Kamp/Roßdeutscher (1994) call a complex event ec, e.g. causation of a change of state rather a simple state of change. But even so, it will have a characteristic result state assigned to it,
Repetitive *wieder* gives rise to the presupposition that an event of the same type as the one asserted in the sentence containing *wieder* – in this case the opening of a door – has happened before. Obviously, there cannot be two succeeding openings involving the same door without the door having been closed in between. So, although the presupposition triggered by *wieder* in the second sentence of (1a) is justified by the first sentence, the discourse is not quite coherent: The listener has to infer a transition (e*) between the two openings e’, e which undoes the result of e’ and establishes the pre-state of e. The gap between the asserted transition e and the presupposed transition e’, to be filled by a reverse transition e*, is illustrated in fig. 3.

Consequently, the sentence sequence (1a’) which has the gap filled in explicitly, is much more felicitous than (1a); and it is more in accordance with what one actually encounters in natural discourse (see sect. 4 and Fabricius-Hansen 1980).

(1a’) Jemand öffnete die Tür um neun Uhr, sie wurde jedoch sofort wieder geschlossen. Eine halbe Stunde später wurde die Tür *wieder* geöffnet.

Someone opened the door at nine o’clock but it was immediately closed again. Half an hour later, the door was opened again.

In (1a) and (7) the position of *wieder* indicates that the asserted and the presupposed telic change-of-state involve the same ‘holder’ of the state. And that is the reason why (1a) seems somewhat odd in the given context, i.e. without the intervening opposite transition made explicit, as in (1a’). That is, given reference identity, the principle “Avoid Accommodation” proposed by Blutner/Jäger (to appear) and Egg (2000) will make the restitutive reading more optimal than a repetitive interpretation. In (6) (repeated below), however, we have a different case.

(6) *Arnim hat* wieder ein Haus im Tessin verkauft.

*Arnim has again a house in Tessin sold.*

‘Arnim once again has sold a house in Tessin.’

Here *wieder* precedes the indefinite object and so takes scope over the existential quantifier (cf. sect. 2) with the effect that the house involved in the asserted and the presupposed selling act need not be the same. Thus, although we have to do with the same telic transition predicate *sell* as in (7), the property P which *WIEDER* modifies
and which must hold of both the asserted and the presupposed eventuality in order for \textsc{wieder}(P)(e) to be true according to (8), is of a different kind from what we have in (7): it is the property that holds of an ‘eventuality’ i iff there is a house x and an event e in i such that \textsc{sell}(a, x) holds of e. And that makes i an entity of a more abstract or complex type – a time interval, a state of affairs, an occasion, or a situation (in a broad sense) or the like rather than a single elementary eventuality located in time and space or being part of a state of affairs an occasion, a situation. In any case, a property of the type we have to do with here evidently may hold of two such ‘eventualities’ i’ < i i without triggering the accommodation of any specific or pertinent eventuality between i’ and i. That is, an ‘eventuality’ (type) like this allows immediate iteration which, as we have seen, is excluded in the case of elementary telic transitions;\textsuperscript{16} i’ and i may stand in the relation of immediate precedence; cf. fig. 4. The maximality condition that (8) states for the presupposed eventuality does not seem relevant in this case, either. What is left is the condition that i’ and i should be different, i.e. not overlap.

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{fig4}
\caption{Fig. 4}
\end{figure}

It appears, then, that (10) might account more adequately for the contribution of repetitive \textit{wieder} than (8) under structural conditions that block a restitutive reading – and these are the conditions under which the repetitive reading is the only possible or at least the unmarked reading.

\[(10) \quad \textsc{wieder}(Q)(i) := Q(i) / i': Q(i') & i'<i\]

, where i, i’ are states of affairs/situations/occasions and Q a property of an appropriate type.

In other words: repetitive \textit{wieder}, when unmarked, is predicated of properties of time spans/occasions/situations (henceforth ‘situations’), restitutive \textit{wieder} of properties of eventualities. Abstracting away from their location in time and space, I take it that ‘situations’ are defined by what populates them, so to speak, in particular the eventualities going on in them, whereas eventualities are characterized primarily by

\textsuperscript{16}Cf. Fabricius-Hansen (1986: 284ff.)
the participants (argument ‘roles’) they involve, properties of these participants and the relations between them.

As far as I can judge, the distinction made here between elementary eventualities on the one hand and ‘situations’ on the other hand corresponds in principle to the distinction Eckhardt (1998) draws between “Little” and “Big” events. Inspired by Diesing (1992), she assumes (Eckhardt 1998: 123f) that the event argument e introduced by the verb inside the VP is bound at VP by unselective existential closure together with other free referential variables inside the VP, i.e. verb arguments (including the subject) that are not bound from outside, quantificational NPs having been raised before existential closure of VP. (Indefinite NPs, however, may remain inside VP.) This verbal event parameter is the “Little” event; it will always have narrower scope than any nominal quantifier. To account for wide scope modification of events – like e.g. Clara carefully picked each worm out of the salad. – she further assumes that “[b]efore existential closure of the verbal event parameter takes place, a clause gets added to the sentence representation reached so far, which states that e is part of another event e*” which is existentially closed at latest at the sentence level and which higher event-related modifiers are applied to. The “Big”-event parameter e* may be introduced optionally in cases where wide scope modification does not actually take place. Essentially, the “Little” e and the “Big” e* seem to correspond to my eventuality e and ‘situation’ i, respectively.

As mentioned in section 1 and at the beginning of this section, restitutive wieder normally follows all nominal arguments whereas repetitive wieder normally precedes at least the object. We can assume that the structural position of an adverbial adjunct reflects its semantic ‘domain’, i.e. the type of entities it is applied to (cf. Frey/Pittner 1999, Haider 1999). So, in view of the observations made above, it seems reasonable to conclude that restitutive wieder operates at VP level before existential closure of the “Little” event e, as understood by Eckhardt (1998), whereas repetitive wieder is a higher modifier, occurring outside the existentially closed e and modifying a property of a “Big” event – or ‘situation’ – i that e is part of or located in.

The conclusion arrived at here fits well with Pittner’s (to appear) observation that repetitive wieder in its syntactic behavior patterns with what she calls event adverbs, which “c-command the base position of all arguments as well as of event-internal adjuncts” and “delimit the domain of existential closure with the effect that indefinite NPs occurring to the left of repetitive wieder receive a [specific] interpretation” whereas restitutive wieder “shares many properties with process adjuncts, minimally c-commanding the final verb” (Pittner, to appear: 10-11).

Let us assume that this is an adequate account of the difference between repetitive and restitutive wieder as far as syntactic structure is concerned and that the
eventuality described by the modified V-projection is existentially closed under/below repetitive *wieder* but above/outside the domain of restitutive *wieder*. Then, abstracting from the time parameter, (6), (1a) and (1b) will have the representations shown below before final existential closure. This gives us the interpretations we want, when the definitions in (7) and (9) are applied to the repetitive cases (6’’), (1a’’) and the restitutive case (1b’’), respectively. But why should it be like that except by pure stipulation – i. e. lexical ambiguity? We still have not explained what connects the repetitive and the restitutive interpretation.

(7’’) WIEDER \[\lambda i'.Ee Ex (\text{HOUSE}(x) \& \text{SELL}(a, x)(e) \& \text{part-of}(e, i'))\](i)

(1a’’) WIEDER \[\lambda i'.Ee (\text{BE-OPENED}(d)(e) \& \text{part-of}(e, i'))\](i)

(1b’’) WIEDER \[\lambda e'. \text{BE-OPENED}(d)(e')\](e)

3. Contrast and iteration: The *wieder* family

The ‘theory’ of *wieder* I have presented on earlier occasions and which is questioned by von Stechow (1996) on the basis of handouts from such spoken presentations, can now be (re)stated as follows:

(i) *Wieder* is polysemous in so far as it occurs in (at least) two different syntactic positions – the positions of a higher modifier and an adjunct at VP level as well – and its meaning contribution varies with the type of the expression it modifies.

(ii) *Wieder* should be regarded as a single lexical item because the different readings it gives rise to can be shown to form a structure of interrelated concepts.

(iii) The counterdirectional-restitutive reading instantiated when *wieder* as a ‘process adjunct’ modifies a telic transition can be viewed as a kind of prototype in that structure:
(a) it represents the richest concept from which the other varieties can be derived by rather natural extensions and abstractions;
(b) it apparently occurs more often in natural discourse than any of the other readings;

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17 In spirit, this solution corresponds to the proposal made in Fabricius-Hansen (1983), only within an event-theoretic framework. – Von Stechow (1996: 98) also assumes two different modifier positions for repetitive and restitutive *wieder*, but in his decomposition approach, restitutive *wieder* is applied to states only and therefore has to be inserted below the BECOME operator, modifying a small clause deepest down in the tree.
(c) it may well be the oldest variety of adverbial *wieder*, and by involving the concepts of contrariness and reverseness, it is the variety that most transparently links the semantics of the adverb or particle *wieder* to the preposition *wider* which apparently carries the ‘original’ meaning of the etymon in question.

As for hypothesis (iiib), I refer to section 4. Hypothesis (iiic) is stated in Grimm’s dictionary:

die lokale bedeutung ‘(ent)gegen’ ist auch die grundlage für die entwicklung innerhalb des germanischen, sie vollzieht sich in zwei richtungen: auf der einen seite führt sie zu verwendungsweisen wie feindlich ‘gegen’ und sachlich ‘entgegengesetzt’ […], auf der anderen seite zur bedeutung ‘zurück’, d.h. ‘der vorher eingeschlagenen richtung entgegen’, dann in organischer weiterentwicklung zum zeitlichen begriff der wiederholung […]. (GW 14.I.2: 868) 18

oft begegnet *wieder* in einer verwendung, die zwischen ‘zurück’ […] und dem jüngeren ‘abermals’ […] steht und entwicklungsgeschichtlich das bindeglied zwischen diesen bedeutungen ist. […] *wieder* kann stehen, wenn man ausdrücken will, dass ein vorgang rückgängig gemacht, ein zustand aufgehoben wird: […] *wieder* kann auch stehen, wenn man ausdrücken will, dass ein früher bestehender – unterbrochener – zustand wiederhergestellt wird: […] aus den voraufgehenden verwendungen konnte leicht der zeitliche begriff der wiederholung sich entwickeln. ahd. lässt er sich neben herrschendem *abur* ‘iterum’ nur vereinzelt und nicht stets sicher nachweisen. (GW 14.I.2: :889f) 19

The rich structure of the counterdirectional-restitutive reading assumed in (iiia) is illustrated in fig. 5:

18 ‘The local meaning ‘(ent)gegen’ [‘against’] is also the basis of the development within the German languages. It takes two directions: On the one hand, it leads to uses like ‘gegen’ [against, towards] in the way of an enemy and objectively ‘opposite’ […], on the other hand to the meaning ‘zurück’ [back], i. e. ‘in the opposite direction’, then developing organically into the temporal notion of repetition/iteration.’ [Translation by CFH]

19 ‘Often, *wieder* is used in a manner lying between ‘zurück’ and the later ‘abermals’ [once again] […] and constituting a evolutionary link between these two meanings. *Wieder* can be used to express that a process [‘Vorgang’] is reversed, a state is relieved […] *wieder* may also occur when one wants to express that a formerly holding – interrupted – state is restored: […] From the above mentioned uses the notion of repetition/iteration in time could easily develop. In Old Hig German it is found very seldom and not always with certainty besides normal *abur* ‘iterum’. [Translation by CFH] – According to the OED (Compact Disc edition), English *again* underwent a similar development.
The counterdirectional transitions $e$ and $e'$ contrast with each other by way of leading to opposite results from opposite pre-states; and so, of course, do the pre-state and the result state of each change of state. $s$ being of the same type as $s''$, the change from $s'$ to $s$ in the context of $\langle s'', s' \rangle$ can be conceived as a restitution (or continuation\textsuperscript{20}) of a state of that type with $s'$ as an intervening interruption, i.e. as a movement back to the point of departure.\textsuperscript{21} On the other hand, given a complex eventuality (or chain of eventualitites) $e$ ‘occupying’ the time interval $i$ and characterized by a set of participants $(e_1, \ldots, e_n)$ being involved in alternating complementary states $\langle s'': P(e_1, \ldots, e_n), s': \neg P(e_1, \ldots, e_n), s: P(e_1, \ldots, e_n) \rangle$ and corresponding reverse transitions between them; then, necessarily, there will be pairs of distinct, non-adjacent subintervals $\langle i'', i' \rangle$ of $i$ having the property that a maximal eventuality of the type $P(e_1, \ldots, e_n)$ is located within them or that they fall under two different maximal eventualities of that type. Considering such two intervals alone, however, thereby in a way abstracting from what happens between them, is what characterizes a repetitive interpretation as opposed to a restitutive interpretation, which is concerned with a continuous chain of eventualities; cf. fig. 6 compared to fig. 3.

\textsuperscript{20} The semantic relationship between restitutive wieder and expressions denoting continuation without interruption (or the opposite of interruption) is discussed more in detail in Fabricius-Hansen (1975). It can be exemplified by the semantic equivalence between Die Tür wurde nicht wieder geöffnet. ‘The door wasn’t opened again.’ and Die Tür blieb geschlossen. ‘The door stayed closed.’ as possible continuations of the first sentence of (1b).

\textsuperscript{21} Correspondingly, restitutive wieder and “again” often co-occur with zurück and back or the prefix re-, respectively; cf. sect. 4.
Obviously, it is not a very big step from the notion of iteration/repetition at the level of elementary eventuality types, involving one and the same ‘theme’ referent, to the notion of iteration/repetition applied at a higher level, with respect to (properties of) entities of a more complex or abstract type, i. e. time spans, ‘situations’ or the like. But it is a step that implies using *wieder* as a higher modifier. And at that level there is no room for a prototypical counterdirectional interpretation: ‘Situations’ can neither be defined by characteristic result states and pre-states assigned to them nor do they seem to fall under the complementarity relation characterizing such states. As we have seen: used overtly as a higher modifier, *wieder* can only be interpreted repetitively.

When *wieder* does not overtly function as a higher modifier, however, it depends on the predicate it modifies to which extent a prototypical interpretation is available and, if not, which aspects of the full-blown counterdirectional-restitutive pattern are exploited.

First, let us consider *wieder* occurring with predicates like STEIGEN ‘rise’, FALLEN ‘go down’; ABNEHMEN ‘lose weight’, ZUNEHMEN ‘put on weight’, ÄLTER/JÜNGER WERDEN ‘grow older/younger’. Such transitions fall under the counterdirectionality relation but differ from the telic transitions by being relative and gradual, and therefore a telic (‘imperfective’); they are activities rather than achievements or accomplishments (or one-state situations rather than two-state situations in the terminology of Klein 1994, in this volume).

(11a, b) is a ‘minimal pair’ comparable to (1a, b), showing that the distinction between a repetitive and a restitutive type of reading is relevant in these contexts, too.

(11a) [Die Preise fielen, als wir 1987 unsere Wohnung kauften.] 1995 [, als wir eine neue Wohnung kauften,] fielen sie **wieder**.

[The prizes went down (were going down) when we bought our flat 1987.] 1995 [when we bought a new flat,] the prizes went (were going) down again.

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(11b) [Die Preise stiegen, als wir 1987 unsere Wohnung kauften.] 1995 fielen sie wieder.
[The prizes rose (were rising) when we bought our flat 1987.] 1995 they went (were going) down again.

(11b) corresponds to the prototype by presupposing a preceding counterdirectional (maximal) change-of-state e' such that the result state of e' is identified with the pre-state of the asserted transition e; cf. fig. 7b; but there may be no restitution/restoration in the absolute sense that the prizes eventually reach the level they were on before starting to rise and (and consequently no iteration in the strict sense, either). So we could call this variety of non-repetitive wieder purely counterdirectional. (11a) corresponds to (1a): We are presented with two probably maximal instantiations of falling prizes, whether the prizes stayed at they level they reached after the first instantiation or went up and down again (!) in the meantime seems irrelevant; cf. fig. 7a. That is a normal repetitive interpretation; but as with telic transitions predicates, wieder must be stressed in order to prevent the natural counterdirectional reading. That the latter can be viewed as an extension of the prototype is evident; cf. fig. 8.

\[\text{Fig. 7}\]

\[
\begin{array}{cc}
\text{e': PRIZES FALL} & \text{e: PRIZES FALL} \\
\end{array}
\]

\[
\begin{array}{cc}
\text{(pre-state of } e_{\text{max}}) & \text{(result state of } e'_{\text{max}}) \\
\end{array}
\]

\[\text{Fig. 8}\]
The prototypical pattern is also easily extended to cases where *wieder* modifies a stative predicate describing a state that can be the characteristic result of a telic change-of-state; cf. (11).

(12a) Weihnachten war Arnim **Wieder** im Tessin.
‘At Christmas, Arnim was (once) again in Tessin.’

(12b) Weihnachten war Arnim **wieder** im Tessin.
‘At Christmas, Arnim was in Tessin again.’

Here, too, we can distinguish a repetitive reading (a), signaled by stressed *wieder*, and the restitutive-like reading (b) that goes with unstressed *wieder* and focus on (a projection of) the predicate. The difference seems subtle but it is essentially of the same nature as in (1): (12a) may be paraphrased as ‘Christmas was another time/situation having the property that Arnim is in Tessin in i”; that is, we are talking about two distinct times having a specific property in common.23 (12b), on the other hand, can be paraphrased as ‘Christmas was a time having the property that Arnim is in Tessin in i after having first been in Tessin and then somewhere else. Thus, the (b)-variant of (12) corresponds exactly to the restitutive variant of (1) apart from the fact that the counterdirectional transitions leading to the asserted and ending the presupposed stay in Tessin, respectively, have to be inferred without the aid of lexical material; cf. fig. 9. I shall call this extension of the prototype of *wieder* purely restitutive.

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23 According to von Stechow (1996: 135f), Arnim may not even have left Tessin in between. If that is correct, the condition that the two ‘situations’ contain or fall into maximal instantiations of the eventuality type in question (Arnim being in Tessin) is not part of the meaning contribution of repetitive, *wieder*, contrary to what von Stechow’s meaning definition (= (8) above) says and what I have assumed above. But that is a discussion I shall take up here.
seems to be reduced to a difference of perspective or focus alone: In (12b) focus is on Arnim alternating between Tessin and some other place, in (12a) focus is on whether a specific time or ‘situation’ does or does not instantiate a state characterized by Arnim being in Tessin, there having been at least one instantiation of that type of state before.

Mutatis mutandis the same holds for ‘minimal pairs’ like (13)-(14) where wieder combines with atelic dynamic predicates, i. e. activities like ARBEITEN ‘work’, SCHNEIEN ‘snow’, GEIGEN ‘play the violin’.

(13a) Gestern schneite es Wieder.  
Yesterday, it snowed (was snowing) AGAIN.

(13b) Gestern SCHNEite es wieder.  
Yesterday, it SNOWed (was snowing) again.

(14a) Jetzt schreibt Arnim WIEDer  
Now Arnim writes (is writing) AGAIN.

(14b) Jetzt SCHREIBT Arnim wieder.  
Now Arnim WRItes (is WRIting) again.

‘Minimal pairs’ with intergressive predicates (Egg 1994) like HUSTEN ‘cough’, WINKEN ‘wave one’s hands’, KLOPFEN ‘knock’, which are in a way inherently quantified, may show a similar contrast. But HUSTEN(x), for instance, may also characterize a single, minimal act of coughing rather than a series of such acts cumulated into one extended coughing eventuality. In that case we have to do with an eventuality of the same type as e. g. AUFLACHEN ‘make a short laugh’ which is neither a change-of-state defined by a characteristic (absolute or relative) result state and standing in the counterdirectionality relation to another type of transition, nor a state or an activity correlated with a transition (including BEGIN(P) and STOP(P)); it is an event without interesting consequences. And in that case, the prototypical (counterdirectional-) restitutive interpretation pattern has reached its limits; iteration/repetition is all what is left for the interpretation to seize upon: It is difficult to imagine specific restitutive-like readings in cases like (15) - (17), for instance.

(15) Arnim hat wieder gehustet.  
Arnim has coughed again.

(16) Plötzlich blitze es wieder.  
Suddenly lightened it again. (‘Suddenly there was (a) lightening again.’)

(17) Wolfgang lachte plötzlich wieder auf.  
Wolfgang laughed-shorlty suddenly again.

What is more: since eventualities of the AUFLACHEN-type are not cumulative (in contradistinction to intergressives), two events of that type can follow each other
directly without being subsumed under one larger eventuality. That is, this eventuality allows immediate iteration in the sense outlined in sect. 2; consequently, the maximality effect which has been characteristic of the repetitive varieties discussed in this section, has no relevance in this case. And as we saw above, that holds for the typical repetitive variety, too, where *wieder* overtly functions as a higher modifier.

Obviously, ‘contrast’ is a central component of the prototypical *wieder*-concept (fig. 5) and the derivations seen in fig. 8 and 9: In each case, we find an individual involved in successive changes with opposite results (in the absolute or relative sense) or being in complementary states at successive times. So it should not surprise that unstressed *wieder* can also indicate contrast in a more general sense, the notion of repetition which is also inherent in the prototype being suppressed or at least strongly downgraded.\(^24\) Thus, the question in (18a) can be adequately answered by (18b); see also (28) in sect. 4.

\[(18a)\text{ Wie komme ich zum Bahnhof?}
\text{How do I get to the station}
\]
\[(18b)\text{ Fahren Sie etwa 200 Meter diese Straße hinunter, biegen Sie dann nach rechts und sofort \textbf{wieder} nach links.}
\text{Go this street ca 200 m, then turn to the right and immediately again to the left.}
\]

Let us summarize: I have argued that the contradiirectional-restitutive variety of *wieder* functions as a process adverb (an adjunct at VP level) and that it can be viewed as kind of prototype, instantiating all possible aspects of the semantic contribution of *wieder* which are found more or less reduced or isolated in other contexts, i. e. contexts where *wieder* (i) occurs with of a type of eventuality different from telic transitions or (ii) functioning overtly as a higher modifier, is predicated of a more abstract type of entity than eventualities (times, ‘situations’). In the first case, the prototypical interpretation scheme involving successive contrasting transitions or successive alternation between complementary states is ‘stretched’ as far as it goes, pure repetition – iteration without contrast, so to speak – being the last resort, to be chosen when no other possibility is left. The second case allows for a purely repetitive interpretation only; it is the typical domain of so-called repetitive *wieder* and might be conceived as a second center in the structure of context-dependent readings that make up the meaning of *wieder*. It is, I think, a matter of minor importance whether *wieder* should be analyzed as a higher modifier also when its position in the surface sentence is structurally ambiguous but a restitutive interpretation is excluded for semantic reasons, as suggested in sect. 2 , or whether

\(^24\) Instead of the *wieder*, one often encounters *wiederum* in this function.
variation over the whole range of interpretation possibilities should be allowed for the process adjunct as opposed to the higher adjunct with its more restricted and more abstract semantic contribution.

Fig. 10 gives a graphical summary of the main varieties of *wieder* viewed as extensions from the prototype.

At first sight, contrast and iteration (repetition) may seem rather different concepts. But iteration implies contrast at some level: That an eventuality or a ‘situation’ is repeated or iterated does not mean that the same individual eventuality or ‘situation’ occurs twice but that two different eventuality or ‘situation’ standing in a precedence relation to each other are characterized by the same properties. And conversely: contrast is conceivable only on the background of similarity or identity in some dimension.

Thus the common denominator of so-called restitutive and repetitive *wieder* as discussed in the literature is not simply “something similar before”, as Klein (in this volume) puts it, but rather “something similar and something different before” as suggested by Christine Dimroth in a paper presented in Nijmegen in April 2000: the same referent involved (in the same ‘role’) in a sequence of contrasting eventualities or a series of different time intervals or ‘situations’ exhibiting the same properties.25 And this leads us to the second topic of this paper.

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25 The example *A Delaware has settled in Detroit again* mentioned by Blutner and Jäger (to appear) shows that the referent in question may be a generic type to be abstracted from an indefinite or plural noun phrase in the *wieder*-sentence rather than an individual. Similarly, from the sentence pair

| NEUNzehn ist **wieder** eine Primzahl ‘**NINE**teen again is a **PRIME** number’ (‘contrastive’ **wieder**) vs. |
| NEUNzehn ist **WIEDer** eine Primzahl ‘**NINE**teen is anOTHER **PRIME** number’ (repetitive **wieder**) i |
4. Wieder and again in natural discourse: some observations

We have observed that in the case of what I have termed ‘minimal pairs’ it is the focus accent in addition to the type of predicate modified by wieder which determines whether wieder can be given a counterdirectional-restitutive(-like) interpretation or not: The predicate itself has to be in focus, otherwise we have to do with the repetitive variety where focus is on the existence of an(other) eventuality (‘situation’) of a type characterizing a preceding eventuality that has already been established in the discourse. On the other hand, if wieder can receive a restitutive(-like) interpretation, it should. In coherent discourse, of course, the focus structure of a sentence is strongly determined by the preceding context. So it seems that in natural discourse, the alleged repetitive-restitutive ambiguity of wieder de facto disappears: In a given context, there will be no choice between one and the other reading; but the presence of wieder may be more or less adequate under one or the other intonation pattern. And here it is confirmed that the ‘restitutive’ variety (in a wider sense) restricts its possible contexts more than does the repetitive one; i. e. it represents the strongest interpretation (cf. Blutner and Jäger, to appear). Thus, switching the contexts preceding the wieder-sentences in (1a) and (1b) without changing the focus accent in the latter has an interesting effect: The restitutive pattern combined with the context licensing repetitive wieder results in a discourse that is clearly and irreparably unacceptable, as shown in (19a): the context violates the presupposition triggered by ExE.wieder(GEÖFFNET-WERDEN(x)(e) – and ExE.GEÖFFNET-WERDEN(x)(e) alone – namely that the relevant pre-state GESCHLOSSEN-SEIN(x)(s) holds at the onset of e; cf. (9) in sect. 2. As it stands, (19b) is not adequate either. But the occurrence of wieder in the second sentence can be licensed by extending the context to left, assuming (accommodating) that another, preceding opening of the door in question has been mentioned before.

(19a) *Jemand öffnete die Tür um neun Uhr. Eine halbe Stunde später wurde sie wieder geöffnet.
    Somebody opened the door at nine o’clock. Half an hour later it was OPENed again.

(19b) ?Hans schloß langsam die Tür, aber sie wurde sofort Wieder geöffnet.
    Hans shut the door slowly, but it was immediately opened AGAIN.

discussed by Klein (in this volume) we learn that further exensions or abstractions from the interpretation patterns I have presented are needed to account for all possible uses of wieder.
That is, in the repetitive case, wieder instructs the reader/listener to seek the preceding context for an eventuality or ‘situation’ prior to the one established in the wieder-sentence which fulfils the description in the scope of wieder (Kamp/Roßdeutscher 1994). It is important, however, that the two referents should not be unified, directly or as subparts of one referent fulfilling the given description; consequently, it may be expected that the sentence motivating the occurrence of ‘repetitive’ wieder, if syntactically independent, normally does not stand in the relation of immediate precedence to the sentence containing wieder. In natural discourse, then, so-called repetitive wieder (and its equivalents) functions as a kind of anti-anaphor for events or ‘situations’, corresponding to e.g. the indefinite article ein- + ander-/zweit-/… ‘another’ or ‘a second/…’ combined with a noun phrase; compare (20a) and (20b) as alternative continuations of (20). And the presence of wieder or a synonymous entity may be more or less obligatory for the same reasons as (other) discourse particles like auch ‘too’ (Sæbø 1988): The sequence (20) + (20c) constitutes a less felicitous discourse than (20) + (20a/b).

(20) Um acht klopfte es an die Tür und ein kleines Mädchen trat herein. …. …
At eight o’clock knocked it on the door and a small girl entered.
(20a) Um neun trat wieder ein kleines Mädchen herein.
At nine entered again a small girl.
(20b) Um neun trat ein zweites kleines Mädchen herein.
At nine entered a second small girl.
(20c) Um neun trat ein kleines Mädchen herein.
At nine entered a small girl.

Wieder with narrow scope, i.e. as a ‘process’ adverb, combined with (unmarked) focus on the main verb (projection) in its scope, on the other hand, is justified if the sentence containing wieder together with its preceding preceding context yields an interpretation corresponding to fig. 5, 8, or 9, depending on the kind of predicate modified by wieder. In this case, since the eventuality asserted in the wieder-sentence and the sequence of eventualities motivating wieder have to abut each other in time, one would expect the relevant sentences (or clauses) to follow each other immediately with significantly higher frequency than in the case of repetitive wieder. Besides, as long as it does not trigger accommodations in order to be justified (see Kamp/Roßdeutscher 1994), one would expect ‘restitutive’ wieder to be redundant since, different from repetitive wieder, its presence is not needed in order to prevent unification of abstract discourse referents fulfilling the same description.

Obviously, the hypotheses stated here call for an empirical investigation of wieder in larger – written

26 Cf. examples in Fabricius-Hansen (1980).
and spoken – electronic text corpora. The fact that *wieder* and *again* have generally been treated as semantically equivalent in the theoretical discussion raises a related question: Do *wieder* and *again* behave in the same way in actual discourse? And if not, what would be consequences – if any – for the semantic description of *again* as opposed to *wieder*?

In order to shed some light on these questions, I have looked at occurrences of *wieder* in the German source and target texts of the Oslo Multilingual Corpus (OMC), which consists of sentence-aligned samples of authentic texts written in English, Norwegian or German and their authorized translations into the other two languages.27

The distribution of ‘restitutive’ and repetitive *wieder* in the German source texts supports the claim that the former occurs more frequently than the latter (see sect. 3): a very clear majority of the examples – around 100 out of 132 occurrences (i. e. more than two thirds) – undisputably instantiate the ‘restitutive’ use in one form or the other; and among those again, the prototypical pattern shown in (21) prevails: *wieder* most frequently modifies a telic change-of-state predicate in a context that explicitly or implicitly has established the presupposed counterdirectional change of state. Also, as expected, ‘restitutive’ *wieder* and the relevant preceding sentence quite often succeed each other immediately or within short distance, as in (21), (22)28, whereas they tend to be separated by more context in the repetitive case.

(21) Elias hörte nicht bloß, er sah das Tönen. Sah, wie sich die Luft unaufhörlich verdichtete und *wieder* dehnte. (ROS1)
Elias not only heard the sounds, he also saw them. He saw the air incessantly contracting and expanding.

As for the supposed equivalence between *wieder* and *again*, *wieder*/*again* is indeed by far the most frequent pair of overt translational counterparts in the text samples I have investigated; cf. the tables below which show how *wieder* in German originals is rendered in the English translations (tab. 1) and what *wieder* in German translations corresponds to in the English source texts (tab. 2). Mostly, the preference for one ‘reading’ or the other is also the same for source- and target-text sentence pairs involving *wieder* and *again* – not very surprisingly in view of the fact that the interpretation is determined by the preceding context. – Examples of such translation pairs are given in (22)-(24) and (25)-(26).

Table 1: Source-text *wieder* → English target text: 132

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28 This and the subsequent examples are all taken from OMC. For references, the reader is referred to the address mentioned above.
Und nun […] bekam ich dieses blasse, zarte, trockene, nach nichts schmeckende Ding auf die Zunge gelegt -- ich war drauf und dran, es wieder auszuspucken! (HEB1) 
And then […] that pale, fragile, dry, tasteless thing was placed on my tongue -- I almost spat it out again!

[…] ja, bei manchen [Korallenfischen] hat man den Eindruck, sie müßten die kampfauslösende Färbung ablegen, um eine friedliche Annäherung der Geschlechter überhaupt möglich zu machen. Ganz sicher gilt letzteres für die bunten, oft scharf schwarzweiß gezeichneten Fischchen einer Gattung von "Demoiselles", die ich mehrmals im Aquarium ablaichen sah und die zu diesem Behufe ihre kontrastreiche Färbung gegen eine einfarbig stumpfgraue vertauschen, um nach Vollzug des Laichaktes alsbald die Kriegsflagge zu hissen. [27]
[...] in some [coral fish], one has the impression that they are obliged to divest themselves of their fight-eliciting colours in order to make friendly contact between the sexes possible. This certainly applies to the demoiselle group; several times I saw a brilliantly black-and-white species spawning in the aquarium; for this purpose changing their striking colouring for a monotonous dull grey, only to hoist the flag again as soon as spawning was over.29

[…] Dann noch einmal. Sie hielt mit dem Singen inne, horchte wieder und wußte jetzt, daß der Klumpen lebte. (ROS1)
[...] Then another. She stopped singing, held her ear to it again, and now she knew that the bundle was alive.

Papas Stimme zitterte. Als er wieder schwieg, begann ich zu weinen. (BO1TD)
[...] Dad's voice quivered. When he was silent again, I started crying.

Er konnte sich an nichts erinnern, nicht einmal daran, daß ich ihn gebeten hatte, sich diese drei Dinge zu merken. Ich wiederholte den Test und ließ ihn diesmal die

29 In (23), the presence of (‘restitutive’) wieder/again in the last sentence establishes (by accommodation) a counterdirectionality relation between die Kriegsflagge hissen/hoist the flag and the preceding italicised predicate, thus triggering metaphorical unification of the prestate of the event asserted in the wieder/again-sentence with the result of the event described in the preceding sentence. Leaving the particle out would undo the metaphorical unification, thus changing the content of the whole passage considerably.
Bezeichnungen der drei Gegenstände aufschreiben; 

**wieder** hatte er sie **vergessen** […]

(OS1TD)

[…] He **remembered none** of them or indeed that I had even asked him to remember.

I repeated the test, this time getting him to write down the names of the three objects; 

**again** he **forgot** […]

(26) illustrates how repetitive **wieder** as an overt higher modifier applies to larger ‘situations’ rather than single events: The act of forgetting/not remembering the names of some specific objects is repeated as part of a larger repeated test situation.

However, the tables above also show very clearly that **wieder** and **again** are not general translation equivalents in the sense that **wieder** in German source or target texts only or predominantly corresponds to **again**. In fact, around 66% of the **wieder**-occurrences do not. In particular, it should be noted that **wieder** remains untranslated or has no overt source in the English texts as often as it is rendered by or translates **again**. Examples are given in (21), (27) – (29) and (30)-(32).

(iiia) **wieder** → **zero**

(27) Der Mann ist **zu Boden getaumelt** […] und dann sofort **wieder** **aufgestanden**, ohne daß ich ihm auch nur die Hand gereicht hätte. (PH1)

The man **fell to the ground** […], then instantly **stood up** without my even offering him a helping hand.

(28) Ich nahm nicht den Heimweg hinunter in die Ebene, sondern verschwand in eine Gasse, so schmal, daß niemand da hätte neben mir gehen können. Die Gasse **beschreibt eine Schleife** und **mündet** nach einem Steilstück **wieder** in den Hauptweg zur Innenstadt. (PH1)

Instead of heading across the plain on my way home, I turned into a street so narrow that no one could have walked beside me. This street **describes a loop** which, after a steep hill, **leads to the main road to the Old City**.

(29) Jedenfalls ging er zum Onkel und sagte ihm, daß die Orgel krank sei, heiser irgendwie, daß die Pfeifen einander bekämpften, sich nicht zum Wohlklang ineinander fügten. **Die eine klinge zu hoch, die andere wieder zu tief**. (ROS1)

Nonetheless, he went to his uncle and told him that the organ was ill, hoarse in some way, that the pipes were fighting among each other, that they could not find harmony together. **One was too high and another too low**.

(iiib) **wieder** ← **zero**

(30) Als ich in die Spalte starrte, hörte ich ein scharfes Geräusch, als ob etwas zerriß, und **schloß** vor Entsetzen die Augen. Als ich sie **wieder** **aufmachte**, war ich irgendwo anders. (BO1TD)

As I stared into the gash I heard a sharp noise, as of something sundering, and I **shut** my eyes in horror, and when I **opened** them I found myself somewhere else.

(31) Cujo drehte sich um, lief zu dem Brocken, **nahm** ihn **ins Maul** und ließ ihn **wieder** **fallen**. (SK1TD)

30 (26) illustrates how repetitive **wieder** as an overt higher modifier applies to larger ‘situations’ rather than single events: The act of forgetting/not remembering the names of some specific objects is repeated as part of a larger repeated test situation.

31 (29) is an example of the more abstract contrastive or adversative use of **wieder** mentioned in sect. 3.
Cujo turned around, went to the biscuit, *picked it up, mouthed* it -- a long string of saliva depending from his mouth -- and then *dropped it*.

(32) [...] **Wieder** wedelte Cujo mit dem Schwanz und kam zu Gary, um sich streicheln zu lassen. (SK1TD)

 [...] Cujo wagged his tail a little bit and came over to Gary to be patted, as if ashamed of his momentary lapse.

Interestingly, the majority of *wieder/zero* pairs (more than 80%) exemplify more or less prototypical restitutive contexts whereas with *wieder/again*, restitutive and repetitive contexts seem to be distributed more evenly. This observation supports the hypothesis that *wieder* may be redundant in its ‘restitutive’ function more frequently than it is as a repetitive discourse particle. As would be expected, *wieder/re- and – in particular – wieder/back* pairs are almost exclusively found in ‘restitutive’ contexts; *wieder/once again, wieder once more* and *wieder/another* pairs, on the other hand, are typically repetitive, the latter being restricted to contexts like (20a) where *wieder* precedes an indefinite noun phrase; cf. (33) (*wieder ← another*).

(33) Er zuckte die Achseln und steckte sich schon **wieder** eine von diesen Boyards an [...] (BO1TD)

He shrugged, and lit **another** of his fat Boyards cigarettes [...] 

In the present context, I must refrain from a more detailed analysis of the distribution of the translational relations *wieder* and *again* enter into. But the observations made above indicate that *wieder* and *again*, although semantically equivalent at least at some abstract level of description, pattern quite differently when it comes to their use in discourse. Partly, this may be due to the fact that the two languages differ with respect to the range and applicability of partially synonymous alternatives to *wieder* and *again*, respectively. But our data – in particular the high frequency of *wieder/again* pairs in ‘restitutive’ contexts – may also reflect regularities of a more general type: Apparently, German and English both tend to mark repetition of situations – the introduction of a new event or ‘situation’ referent fulfilling a condition already given in the context (apart from its temporal location) overtly by way of *wieder/again* or related means. German, however, seems to have a stronger need to mark restitutiveness – counterdirectionality or inversness of succeeding transition events involving the same participant(s) – overtly than English. In case that is true, it fits well with observations made by others (e.g. Christiane von Stutterheim 1997) to the effect that German tends to mark referential movement within the temporal domain more persistantly than is the case e. g. in English.
5. Conclusion

I have argued that *wieder* is a normal polysemous lexical item whose semantic contribution varies with the sentence-internal and sentence-external context over a set of different readings in a way that is predictable or at least explicable given the semantically richest and apparently also most frequent – counterdirectional-restitutive – variety as a prototypical ‘center’ on the one hand and natural interpretational strategies of semantic extension and abstraction (‘type-raising’) on the other hand. Since the purely repetitive variety, functioning as a higher modifier, is more abstract than the ‘restitutive’ varieties, it should take more for a genuinely repetitive adverb/particle to develop ‘restitutive’ or contrastive/adversative varieties than the other way round. That would explain the syntactic-semantic asymmetry between *wieder* and e.g. *abermals, erneut* mentioned by von Stechow (1996).

The semantics of *again* appears to be isomorphic with that of *wieder* in its central parts at least. But the balance between the ‘restitutive’ and the repetitive varieties may be somewhat different due to the fact that English (i) has other alternative means of expressing both ‘restitutivity’ and iteration and (ii) does not seem to demand overt marking of referential movement in the temporal domain to the same degree as German. In the peripheries of their semantic domains, *wieder* and *again* probably differ more substantially: it is an open question to what extent *again* can be used as an equivalent of the contrastive-adversative varieties of *wieder*. This obviously, is a subject for further investigation – like the actual use of *wieder/again* and related items in general.

A structural reductionist approach which reduces ‘restitutive’ varieties to a monosemous repetitive *wieder/again*, as proposed by von Stechow (1994, 1995 and 1996) can hardly account for the whole range of variation displayed by *wieder* and *again* in natural discourse, including the contrastive-adversative variety; and it does not do justice to the interrelation of contrast and iteration manifesting itself in semantic domain covered by these items.

Finally, I hope to have demonstrated that *wieder* and *again* should be viewed and analyzed as discourse particles, on a par with *too, also* and the like (cf. Kamp/Roßdeutscher 1994). They do not modify the truthfunctional content of the

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28 Dalrymple (1994), working from the hypothesis that “[a]n empirically adequate theory of reciprocal meaning […] will have to assign different truth conditions depending on a number of factors, including context dependence”, accounts for the meaning variation found with reciprocals in a related but formalized and much more explicit way. She establishes entailment relations among the different reciprocal meanings known from the literature and argues that “the strongest meaning that is consistent with known facts is the one that will apply” (Dalrymple: 1994: 17).
sentences they occur in; but being used to keep track of discourse referents of the situation or eventuality type – to determine the unification and diversification of such discourse referents –, they may very well contribute to the truthfunctional content of the discourses they occur in.

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