Institutions and Armed Conflict:
Is the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict Unique?

By Idunn Kristiansen

UNIVERSITY OF BERGEN

Faculty of Social Sciences
Department of Comparative Politics

June 2013
Abstract

This thesis questions the uniqueness of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and challenges the assumption that the reasons for its long duration are exceptional. Focus is set on political institutional arrangements and how these affect conflict duration in general and the endurance of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in particular. I challenge Lijphart’s claim that consensus-building institutions are always the best to promote peace. A mixed-method strategy is used, involving a quantitative survival data analysis of all internal armed conflicts in the period 1946-2008, and a qualitative analysis based on in-depth interviews with Israeli and Palestinian experts and politicians. Results obtained indicate, first, that it is not the level of democracy that generally matters for conflict duration, but rather the degree of political exclusion. Second, proportional elections and parliamentarism generally prolong conflicts, while federalism tends to shorten them. Furthermore, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict does not appear to be unique when it comes to political institutional arrangements. Israel’s large share of excluded population, proportional electoral system, parliamentarism, and power centralization, also seem to be more relevant to understand the conflict’s endurance than usually recognized. This points in a direction of further research on domestic political institutions in relation to civil conflicts and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in particular.
Acknowledgements

First of all, I would like to thank my supervisor at the Department of Comparative Politics, Professor Tor Midtbø, for excellent advice, and my supervisor at the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO), Research Professor Håvard Hegre, for believing in the project and including me in the very inspiring PRIO environment. Your guidance and encouragement have been invaluable. I am very grateful to PRIO for the master student scholarship.

I owe great gratitude to my respondents in Israel and Palestine, Dr. Menachem Klein, Daniel Sherman, Dr. George Giacaman, Khalil Shaheen, Noam Sheizaf, Lior Amihai, Ilan Baruch, Moshe Arens, Yoni Eshpar, Dr. Basem Ezbidi, Betty Herschman, Prof. Gideon Rahat, Gideon Levy, and Dr. Yair Hirschfeld. Thanks also to Ambassador Svein Sevje, Turid Bernstrøm, and Hassan, at the Norwegian Embassy in Tel Aviv, for valuable assistance.

I am thankful to the PRIO Governance research group for useful comments on a draft version of the thesis. Special thanks to Helga Malmin Binningsbø, Nils Petter Gleditsch, Halvard Buhaug, Tore Wig, Julia Strasheim, Nic Marsh, Jonas Nordkvelle, and Øyvind Stiansen, for good advice. I would also like to thank Carl Henrik Knudsen, Tore Wig, and the rest of the Conceptualization and Measurement of Democracy group at University of Oslo, for including me in seminars and for much appreciated feedback.

I would further like to express my gratitude to Lars Svåsand, Svein-Erik Helle, Frode Løvlie, Lise Rakner, Terje Mikal Espedal, Vincent Mrimba, Lars Gunnar Christiansen, and Maria Sørhus, at the Democracy and Development group at the Institute of Comparative Politics (University of Bergen), for helpful comments. Special thanks to Frode Løvlie for assistance concerning Palestinian interviewees as well as literature recommendations.

Thanks also to my father, Stein Kristiansen, for advice and encouragement. I am grateful to Mor Karen, Malin, Alexander, and Fredrik, for shelter and hospitality during my stays in Oslo. I would also like to thank Jannike Gottschalk Ballo for great company and motivation during the process. Thanks also to Kristian Espelid for kindness and support. Remaining errors are my responsibility alone.

Idunn Kristiansen, 3. June 2013
Table of Contents

1. Introduction ......................................................................................................................1
2. A Brief Background: The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict and Israeli Institutions ..........6
   2.1. The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict .................................................................................6
   2.2. Israeli Institutional Arrangements .........................................................................10
   2.3. Summary ..................................................................................................................13
3. Theoretical Background ..............................................................................................14
   3.1. Previous Studies: Causes of Civil Conflict .............................................................14
   3.2. Theoretical Framework and Hypotheses ................................................................18
   3.2.1. Democratic Quality ............................................................................................19
   3.2.2. Consociational Institutions ..............................................................................20
   Proportional Representation and Parliamentary Systems ...........................................22
   Centrifugal Powers ......................................................................................................23
   Government Inertia ..........................................................................................................25
   Federalism ......................................................................................................................27
   3.3. Summary ..................................................................................................................28
4. Methodology and Data ....................................................................................................30
   4.1. Quantitative Method and Data ...............................................................................31
   4.1.1. Dataset and Unit of Analysis ............................................................................33
   4.1.2. Dependent and Independent Variables .............................................................37
   4.1.3. Control Variables ...............................................................................................41
   4.2. Qualitative Method and Data ..................................................................................43
   4.3. Summary ..................................................................................................................51
5. Quantitative Empirical Analysis: The Duration of Internal Armed Conflicts ..........52
   5.1. Results from the Cox Proportional Hazard Model ................................................52
   5.2. Israel in the General Model ....................................................................................57
   5.2.1. Israel’s Values on the Independent Variables .....................................................58
   5.2.2. Israel’s Deviance from the General Model ........................................................61
   5.2.3. Israel’s Influence on Coefficients .....................................................................63
   5.3. Summary ..................................................................................................................67
6. Qualitative Empirical Analysis: The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict ................................68
   6.1. Democratic Quality ..................................................................................................69
   6.2. Proportional Representation and Parliamentary System .......................................74
   6.3. Federalism ...............................................................................................................81
   6.4. Broader Perspectives of the Interviewees ...............................................................85
   6.5. Summary ..................................................................................................................87
7. Conclusion .......................................................................................................................89
References .............................................................................................................................92
Appendix ...............................................................................................................................104
List of Tables

Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of Variables in the Analysis.........................................................42
Table 2: Interviews Conducted in Israel and Palestine (West Bank) in February 2013 .............47
Table 3: Cox Regression of the Duration of Internal Armed Conflicts: 1946-2008 ...............53
Table 4: Cox Regression without Israel.........................................................................................66

List of Figures

Figure 1: Overview of the Core Empirical Relationships to be Explored in the Thesis...........2
Figure 2: Map of Israel and the Occupied Territories.................................................................10
Figure 3: Countries with the Longest-Lasting Conflicts in the Dataset.................................36
Figure 4: Deviance Residuals ......................................................................................................62
Figure 5: DFBETA Scores of Influence on the Coefficients.......................................................64
1. Introduction

Civil conflict is the most frequent form of armed conflict (Mason et al. 2011: 171). It has killed 900 people on average per day since the end of World War II (World Bank 2006). Scholars, diplomats and politicians have been actively involved in trying to resolve, prevent, and reduce the intensity of such conflicts in order to ease human suffering and improve human rights and dignity. Shortening conflicts is perhaps especially crucial in this regard, since the number of ongoing conflicts is considerably higher than the number of new conflicts every year (Hegre 2004).

International efforts of conflict resolution have also been particularly strong when it comes to the longest-lasting conflict in the post-World War II period, namely the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Despite numerous attempts to put an end to it, violent clashes between Israelis and Palestinians have persisted until this day. The causes of conflict endurance remain uncertain, both in general and for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict specifically. Many claim that its “uniqueness” explains its long duration (e.g. Yehoshua 2011), but no previous studies have systematically compared general causes of conflict endurance to the specific obstacles to Israeli-Palestinian peace.

In this master’s thesis, I investigate how political institutions affect the duration of internal armed conflicts and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in particular. I focus on four institutional aspects. These include the overall democratic quality as well as the three core consociational institutions, namely proportional electoral systems, parliamentarism, and federalism. I question if these institutional aspects are important to conflict duration in general, and if so, how this relates to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

I argue against Lijphart (e.g. 1977, 1999) and suggest that power-sharing and consensus-building institutions do not moderate conflict and promote peace in the context of ongoing conflicts. Proportional electoral systems and parliamentarism can empower small and extreme parties and make it difficult to change the status quo due to many veto players in coalition governments (e.g. Tsebelis 1995). Federalism can also theoretically increase segmental divisions and encourage demands for greater autonomy and secession. These institutions can thereby possibly prolong conflicts instead of promoting peace.
The research question of this thesis is twofold: *How do certain political institutional arrangements affect conflict duration in general, and can the endurance of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict be explained by these general factors?* I thereby also ask if the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is unique when it comes to causes of conflict endurance. The core empirical relationships to be investigated are shown in Figure 1.

**Figure 1: Overview of the Core Empirical Relationships to be Explored in the Thesis**

Previous studies of conflict endurance, both generally and in relation to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, have mostly focused on other aspects than political institutions. However, as Tsebelis (1995: 289) points out, “[t]here is general agreement in contemporary political science that ‘institutions matter’.” Institutions are indeed “the rules and constraints which shape human interaction and, as a consequence, behavioral incentives” (Reilly 1999: 5). They can affect the gains and costs of armed rebellion and thereby rebels’ incentives to sustain fighting. They also structure political competition and frame government strategies and outputs related to ongoing conflicts. Political institutions are therefore likely to influence conflict duration.

The focus on political institutions appears to be especially relevant in relation to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The highly proportional Israeli electoral system, in combination with the parliamentary system, has resulted in great party fractionalization and large, unstable and frequently shifting coalition governments. No single party has ever won an absolute majority in the Israeli parliament, the Knesset, and all governments have been coalitions with an average of six parties (Knesset 2011).
A particularly curious fact is also that a considerable majority of Israelis actually supports peace and a two-state solution.¹ This is also true for the Palestinian side,² suggesting that something is systematically blocking for conflict resolution. Can the very proportional Israeli electoral system, in combination with the parliamentary system, have strengthened the power of extremist and anti-peace parties on behalf of more centrist groups and even provided them with veto power in the government? Can their resistance to peace and territorial concessions then have created political inertia and contributed to prolonging the conflict?

The empirical analysis is divided into two parts: one quantitative and one qualitative. The first part is a quantitative survival data analysis of the duration of all internal armed conflicts in the period 1946-2008. Since I concentrate on internal and not interstate armed conflicts, and on country-level causes of conflict duration, the units of analysis are countries with conflict, rather than conflict dyads. The analysis includes 102 countries with one to seven conflict episodes lasting from one to 60 years. I here investigate the general causes of conflict endurance and how political institutional aspects affect the probability of conflict termination.


When it comes to political aspects, most attention has been concentrated on democracy (e.g. Hegre et al. 2001, Hegre 2003, Gleditsch et al. 2009, Muller and Weede 1990, Walter 2004, Collier and Rohner 2008, Reynal-Querol 2002, Vreeland 2008, Regan and Bell 2009, Collier and Hoeffler 2004, Lyall 2010). Considerably less attention has been drawn to institutional arrangements such as electoral systems, the legislative-executive relation such as parliamentarism and presidentialism, and the degree of territorial decentralization such as

¹ This is shown in polls such as those from S. Daniel Abraham Center for Middle East Peace (2012), University of Maryland (2011), Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (2012), Gallup (2013), and the Peace Index (2012).
² See e.g. Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (2012) and Gallup (2013).
federal or unitary states. Most previous studies also deal with the causes of conflict incidence and onset, instead of conflict duration.

The second part of the empirical analysis is a case study of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which is the most extreme case when it comes to conflict duration in the post-World War II period (DeRouen and Bercovitch 2008). In addition to being regarded as extreme, it is also regularly considered as a deviant, influential, as well as a crucial case in the existing literature (see e.g. Bercovitch and Kadayifci 2002, Milanovic 2007, Cohen 2005). However, is it really such a special case? To answer this, I first use the results from the quantitative analysis to answer how the general effects of institutions relate to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. I investigate how Israel is placed in the general model and in comparison to other cases. Then, I use 14 qualitative in-depth interviews with Israeli and Palestinian politicians and experts to get a better understanding of how Israeli political institutions can have contributed to hinder peace. These were conducted during fieldwork in Israel and Palestine in February 2013.

Although the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is one of the most studied conflicts in the world, little has been done to systematically compare the causes of the conflict’s duration to more general causes of armed conflict continuation. More has been done on the specific and idiosyncratic hinders to Israeli-Palestinian peace (see e.g. Klein 2010, Gerner 1994, Levine 2009, Amit and Levit 2011). Few have also studied the role of Israeli institutional arrangements in prolonging the conflict, although some aspects related to the institutions have been pointed to by e.g. Smooha (1978, 2002), Davis (2003), Avishai (2002, 2008), Shalaim (1990), Haklai (2007, 2003), and Spruyt (2005).

Armed conflict is here defined in accordance with UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset as “contested incompatibilities between two or more parties concerning the government and/or territory, where one of the parties is the government of a state” (Gleditsch et al. 2002). In internal armed conflicts, which are in focus here, the government of a state is on one side of the conflict, while internal opposition groups are on the other. Conflict terminations can result from peace agreements, cease fires, victories or other causes such as a truce with ceasefire but without a settlement (Kreutz 2010, DeRouen Jr. and Sobek 2004: 309).

---

3 This constitutes many of the case types described by Gerring (2007).
The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is obviously a special case of an internal armed conflict since it involves an occupation, where the occupied territories also have state-like institutions of their own and were recognized as an independent state by a majority of UN members in November 2012.\(^4\) Israel nevertheless has de facto control over most of the Palestinian territories, and the Palestinian institutions have only very limited power. Many have compared the power of the Palestinian Authority to that of local authorities such as municipalities, or even Bantustans, rather than states (see e.g. Farsakh 2005, Abourahme 2009). Before 1967, the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians also took place inside Israel proper.\(^5\) It is separated from the interstate conflicts between Israel and Arab states. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is therefore categorized as an internal conflict, where the Israeli government is on one side and Palestinian rebel groups on the other. Dominant Israeli political institutions are therefore also in focus, and Palestinian institutions are left out of the analysis. Dyads and the rebel side of conflicts have received considerable attention in previous theory and research (see e.g Cunningham 2006 and Cunningham et al. 2009) and are not of primary interest here.

The structure of this thesis is as follows. Chapter 2 includes a brief and by no means exhaustive background on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and Israeli institutional arrangements. This is necessary to set the stage for later chapters. Chapter 3 consists of a short introduction to previous research and a theoretical framework on the relationship between the political institutional arrangements and conflict duration. In the fourth chapter, I describe the methodologies and data used for both the quantitative and qualitative part. Chapter 5 includes presentation and discussion of the general quantitative results from the survival data analysis and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in the general model. In Chapter 6, I discuss the findings from the qualitative interviews. In the conclusion, I mention the contributions of the thesis, summarize the main findings, and suggest topics for further research.

\(^4\) The United Nations General Assembly adopted resolution 67/19 on 29. November 2012. This upgraded Palestine from a non-state observer entity to a non-member observer state. It has been considered as symbolic recognition of a Palestinian state.

\(^5\) This term “Israel proper” is commonly used about Israel within the armistice borders of 1949. After Israel started the occupation of the West Bank and Gaza in 1967, the Israeli-Palestinian internal armed conflict has also involved these territories.
2. A Brief Background: The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict and Israeli Institutions

Starting in the late 19th century, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has involved various stages and conflict issues, as well as numerous attempts of conflict resolution. Israeli political institutions have from the very establishment of the state in 1948 been quite distinctive. In this background chapter, I first summarize the history of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the main attempts of conflict resolution. Thereafter, I describe some Israeli political institutional arrangements that are central to the analysis of the continuation of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

2.1. The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict can be divided into three stages. The first is the period from the late 1800s, when political Zionism emerged as a response to pogroms and anti-Semitism in Europe. Theodor Herzl, the father of Zionism, proposed in 1897 the establishment of an independent Jewish state in Palestine, the Biblical homeland of the Jewish people. The World Zionist Organization subsequently committed to the creation of a Jewish home in Palestine, and the Jewish National Fund (JNF) began to purchase land in Palestine “for the purpose of settling Jews” in 1907 (Davis 2003: 85). This started the Jewish immigration to Palestine, which was said to be “a land without people for a people without land”.

The second stage started after the Holocaust in November 1947, when the United Nations General Assembly adopted the Partition Plan (Resolution 181). This recommended partition of the Mandatory Palestine, which had been under British rule since 1917, and the establishment of a Jewish state on about 55 percent of the territory, as well as a UN administered regime in the city of Jerusalem, holy for Jews, Muslims, and Christians. In May 1948, David Ben Gurion and the Jewish People’s Council unilaterally declared the establishment of Israel, “the Jewish State in Palestine”, while leaving Israel’s borders unspecified (Mayer 2008: 218, Davis 2003: 61).

Since Jewish leaders understood that a Jewish state would not survive with a large and hostile Arab minority, Palestinian land was consequently expropriated and 700 000 Palestinians uprooted (Morris 2004, 2009: 109, Gordon 2008: 5-6). Egypt, Syria, Lebanon and Transjordan then initiated a war against Israel over the Palestinian issue. Israel won and
seized control over the Negev and the Galilee, while Jordan annexed the West Bank, and Egypt occupied Gaza. Armistice agreements were signed in 1949, and the borders agreed upon here are the only recognized borders of Israel. These borders are known as the Green Line.

The third period of the conflict started in June 1967 after Israel’s victory in the Six-Day War. Israel then annexed East Jerusalem and began the occupation of the West Bank and Gaza, Golan and Sinai, adding about 1.5 million Arabs to the area under its control (Morris 2009: 70). Despite religious, security and economically based support for a Greater Israel in the Jewish biblical homeland, the demographic question made Israel’s position towards the occupied territories dual. Israel wanted to expand its territory, but avoid annexing the Palestinian population (i.e. the Allon Plan, see Morris 2009: 84, Peace Now 2012).

Israeli settlements and “facts on the ground” have been constructed in the occupied territories since September 1967. In 2012, about 500 000 Israeli settlers were living in the West Bank and East Jerusalem (Peace Now 2012). However, under Prime Minister Ariel Sharon’s rule in 2005, Israel withdrew both its civilian and military presence from the Gaza Strip, but kept its control over the airspace and coastal line. Following the seizure of power in Gaza by Hamas in 2007, Israel blockaded the area.

In the period since 1967, there have been two violent Palestinian uprisings against the occupation: the First Intifada (1987-1993) and the Second Intifada (2000-2005), leading to severe material and human damages on both sides. Israel started the construction of the Separation barrier in 2002, dividing the Israeli population from the Palestinians in the West Bank. Throughout this period, the United States has provided Israel with substantial military and economic support (see e.g. Mark 2005). Israel has been the largest annual receiver of U.S. foreign assistance since 1976, receiving 3 billion dollars in grants annually since 1985

---

6 Sinai was returned to Egypt in 1982.
7 Hamas emerged from the Muslim Brotherhood in the late 1970s in the Gaza Strip (Mayer 2008: 315). It is opposed to an Israeli state and has regularly called for destruction of Israel (Mishal and Sela 2006: 175, 181-182). Hamas boycotted the first elections to the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) in 1996, but participated and won a majority of seats in the second elections of 2006. It formed a government in 2006 that was boycotted internationally and contested by the opposing party Fatah. A National Unity Government was formed in March 2007, but this collapsed after a few months. Hamas then took control over the Gaza Strip and separated from the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) of the West Bank. Israel then reacted with blockading the Gaza Strip. (See descriptions of the PNA and PLC in footnote 11 below.)
Both Israelis and Palestinians have also received extensive support from their respective diasporas (see e.g. Shain and Sherman 2001). There have also been several attempts of advancing peace and solving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. These can be separated into three periods, where the first involves the period before negotiations, the second contains negotiations over an interim agreement, and the third involves final status negotiations.

The first sign of progress started with the Camp David Accords in 1978, when Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin signed a peace arrangement with Egyptian president Anwar Sedat. Israel then recognized the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and committed to take part in future two-stage peace negotiations on “the Palestinian problem” (Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2008), including negotiations on an interim agreement and a permanent status agreement. In 1988, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and the Palestine National Council (PNC) followed with the acknowledgement of the state of Israel (Falk 2010: 613).

The next period started with direct negotiations over an interim agreement at the Madrid Conference in 1991 and the Oslo Accords (Oslo I) in 1993, where Israel and the PLO agreed on the Declaration of Principles (DOP). Both parties then explicitly recognized the other and committed to “achieve a just, lasting and comprehensive peace settlement and historic reconciliation” (Warschawski 2010: 1045, 1047). Israel and the PLO also agreed on the creation of a gradually installed self-governing Palestinian authority, the Palestinian National Authority (PNA), for the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, from which Israeli forces would withdraw in phases. The West Bank was divided into areas A, B, and C, where the

---

8 In 2000, almost 2.9 million Palestinians (45 percent of the total Palestinian population) lived outside historic Palestine, while over 8 million Jews (60 percent) lived outside Israel (Rabinowitz 2000: 771).
9 The PLO is a confederation of Palestinian liberation movements, established in 1964. Recognized as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, the PLO has held a permanent observer seat in the United Nations General Assembly since 1974. The center-left Fatah movement has dominated the PLO since 1967/1968.
10 The PNC is PLO’s parliament-in-exile, run by the Palestinian diaspora (Rubenberg 2010: 1076). It also elects the Palestinian government-in-exile, the Executive Committee (EC).
11 The mandate of the PNA (also called PA) was to function as a quasi-governmental administration during the interim period and partly manage social, political, and security issues (Levine 2010: 1099). It was to consist of a president with executive authority as well as a legislative council with power to approve the cabinet and create laws to be ratified and implemented by the president (Ezbidi and Amundsen 2004: 141). Yasser Arafat was the president until his death in November 2004. Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen) then took over after winning the presidential elections in 2005. The legislative assembly, the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC), held its first elections in 1996 based on a majority system. The second elections were held in 2006, based on a mixed system (Levine 2010: 1100). The PNA lost control over the Gaza Strip in 2007 when Hamas’ seized power.
Palestinian National Authority attained civilian powers over A and B, about 40 percent of the area (Cavanaugh 2002: 942). In Washington in 1995, Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and PLO leader Yasser Arafat signed the Interim Agreement (Oslo II), which build on the Declaration of Principles (Oslo I) but also include several other agreements. One month later, Rabin was shot and killed by an Israeli right-wing religious activist. The right-wing government of Benjamin Netanyahu then took over in 1996.

The major conflict issues such as borders, security, Jerusalem, settlements, and refugees, were left for the third phase, the final status talks. According to the interim agreement, these would begin immediately and result in a final status agreement within five years. The talks started in 2000 at Camp David. They included Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak and Palestinian chairman Arafat and were hosted by U.S. President Bill Clinton. The negotiations lasted for thirteen days and were finished without any agreement.

Since then, international diplomatic efforts have nevertheless continued (e.g. the Clinton Parameters in 2000, the Arab Peace Initiative in 2002, the Road Map in 2003, and the Annapolis Conference in 2007), and several peace initiatives have been promoted by Israelis and Palestinians (e.g. the People's Voice in 2002 and the Geneva Accord in 2003). However, little progress has been made, and the interim arrangements from the Oslo Accords are still operating. Israel still controls the vast majority of the West Bank, and the Gaza Strip is also still defined as occupied territory by the United Nations (2012). When I refer to the occupied territories throughout this thesis, I therefore refer to the West Bank and Gaza, occupied by Israel in 1967, as well as East Jerusalem, annexed by Israel in 1967.

A map of Israel and the occupied territories is displayed in Figure 2. The dark areas in the West Bank show areas A and B that are under Palestinian control. The international boundaries are marked between the Israeli-Palestinian territory and the neighboring states Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, and Egypt. Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza are treated as one national entity due to the Israeli occupation and control over the territory. In this thesis, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is therefore also treated as an internal armed conflict, although it also takes place in the occupied territories from 1967.
2.2. Israeli Institutional Arrangements

The Israeli parliament, the Knesset, was established in 1949. Although a Constituent Assembly was assigned to prepare a constitution in 1948, this was hindered by disagreement between Jewish groups on whether it should be secular or based on Jewish religious law (Halacha). Israel does therefore not have a written constitution, but instead a set of Basic Laws that determine some fundamental “rules of the game”. The Law of Return, passed in 1950, is also a central Israeli law. This gives Jews from all over the world the right to Israeli citizenship.
For the Knesset elections, Israel adopted a very proportional system with a one percent threshold, where the whole nation serves as one electoral district of 120 seats. This electoral threshold was raised to 1.5 percent in 1992 and to two percent in 2003 (Knesset 2009). It has been called the most extreme proportional electoral system in the world (see e.g. Shugart 2011: 4). Israel also has a system of closed lists, where voters must accept or reject the whole lists as they are.

The parliamentary system in Israel empowers the Knesset on behalf of the government, first, by requiring a formal “investiture” vote, where a majority of the Knesset must vote to approve new governments (Shugart 2011: 19). Second, as the only parliament in the world, the Knesset has the ability to dissolve itself and call for early elections by a majority vote (Shugart 2011: 25). These arrangements were intentionally adopted to enable maximal representation of the heterogeneous Jewish groups (Knesset 2009). Israel also experimented with direct election of prime minister in 1996, 1999, and 2001, but the Knesset nevertheless upheld its powers throughout this period (Longely and Hazan 1999).

These institutional arrangements have resulted in one of the most fragmented party systems in the world (Shugart 2011: 17-18). The Knesset has on average included over 12 parties, and Israeli coalition governments have consisted of an average of six parties (Knesset 2011). Some of these are also electoral coalitions consisting of several parties. Religious ultra-orthodox parties have participated in most governments since 1977, and settler parties have also been represented. These have held substantial power in the political system (see e.g. Rynhold 2005). However, no Arab parties have ever been included in Israeli coalition

---

12 The electoral threshold defines the minimum percentage of the national vote share that parties must receive in order to gain representation in the parliament.

13 In comparison to open lists, where voters can rank their preferences of candidates within party lists, the system of closed lists increases the distance between candidates and voters (Shugart 2011).

14 This places the “burden of proof” on the new prime minister who needs to win the investiture vote, instead of on the opposition that would have to show a lack confidence in the new government.

15 There was a dual ballot system in place for the 1996 and 1999 elections, while the 2001 election was a special election only for the prime minister (Rynhold 2005: 378-379).

16 These include parties such as Agudat Yisrael, Shas, Degel HaTorah, and United Torah Judaism.

17 These include the The Jewish Home (Habayit Hayehudi) and the National Religious Party (NRP - Mafdal) (see e.g. Newman 2005, Diskin 1999, Hazan and Rahat 2010). Settler activists have also represented other parties such as the Likud and the National Union (Newman 2005).

18 The religious parties have mostly had hawkish approaches towards the peace process (Rynhold 2005). None of them voted in favor of the Oslo Accords in 1993, and all voted against the 1995 Interim Agreement (Oslo II) (Rynhold 2005). The NRP also helped bring down the Netanyahu government over the Wye Agreement, and the NRP and Shas left the government in protest over the Final Status Agreement in 2000 (Rynhold 2005). The NRP also left government following the Gaza disengagement plan in 2004. However, they supported the 1978 Camp David Accords the 1994 peace treaty with Jordan (Rynhold 2005).
governments. Very few governments have lasted out their term. Ten out of the 18 elected Knessets have dissolved before their four year periods have been over (Knesset 2009)\textsuperscript{19}.

In the period until 1966, Arab\textsuperscript{20} areas in Israel were governed by military administration. Many of their basic civil rights were then suspended (Smooha 1997: 216).\textsuperscript{21} This included limitation of movement, as well as surveillance and administrative arrests (Forman and Kedar 2004: 825). Although this rule was abolished in 1966, several laws and practices have continued to favor the Jewish majority and discriminate against Palestinian citizens (see e.g. Smooha 1997, Forman and Kedar 2004, Rouhana and Ghanem 1998, and Kook 2002: Chapter 5). This includes land regulations, national and local budget allocations, as well as exclusion from the army and much of the civil service. Due to alienation towards the state and a “feeling of non-influence”, many Palestinian citizens in Israel have also boycotted Knesset elections (Ganim and Mustafa 2007).

Two separate systems of laws were also introduced in the occupied territories in 1967, with military rule applying to Palestinians, and civilian law to Israelis. Palestinians there have not been granted political or social rights by Israel, except for the right to petition the Israeli Supreme Court.\textsuperscript{22} Hajjar (2001: 22) states that Israel has “never claimed nor sought the right to represent the Palestinians in the territories, only the right to rule them as long as the occupation continues”. Israeli military commanders have been given the “governmental, legislative, appointative, and administrative power” (Israeli Defense Force Military Proclamation 2(3), cited in Cavanaugh 2002: 942). Although a non-sovereign form of self-rule was introduced by the Oslo Accords, the military rule over the West Bank is still in effect (Hajjar 2001: 28). Palestinians in East Jerusalem, annexed in 1967, have status as Jerusalem residents and not as Israeli citizens. They do not have the same political and social rights as Israelis, and are not allowed to vote in Knesset elections (Lustick 1993).

\textsuperscript{19} Early elections include those for the second, fifth, tenth, eleventh, thirteenth, fourteenth, fifteenth, sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth Knessets. The nineteenth Knesset was installed in January 2013.

\textsuperscript{20} I use the term Arab and Palestinian interchangeably throughout this thesis.

\textsuperscript{21} Arabs that remained in Israel in 1948 were given citizenship and granted with civil liberties, including freedoms of expression, movement, assembly, and worship, as well as rights to vote and stand for elections (Smooha 1997: 216).

\textsuperscript{22} Jewish residents in the occupied Palestinian territories get Israeli citizenship and full political and social rights.
2.3. Summary

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict has a long and complex history. Several peace initiatives have been forwarded throughout the last couple of decades, but few clear signs of progress have been made. Israeli political institutional arrangements have from the establishment of the state in 1948 encouraged the inclusion of various Jewish groups in the central decision-making process. On the other hand, Palestinians have been largely excluded from power. In the next chapter of this thesis, I proceed to present general theory on how institutional arrangements such as democratic quality, proportional elections, parliamentarism, and federalism, affect conflict duration. This will later be tested on all internal armed conflicts in the period 1946-2008, and then discussed in relation to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
3. Theoretical Background

In this chapter, I first present a short overview of previous empirical studies of the causes of civil war. The focus is on causes of armed conflict in general because, as Bleaney and Dimico (2011: 146) argue, “there is no clear-cut reason for believing the correlates of onset and continuation of civil conflict to be radically different”. Much of the existing literature also uses the same factors to explain the onset, incidence, as well as duration, of armed conflict, and relatively little specific theorizing has been done on the causes of conflict endurance.

In the second part of the chapter, I introduce the theoretical framework and suggest hypotheses that will be tested and discussed in the empirical analyses. First, I deal with the overall democratic quality, and second, I concentrate on the three core consociational institutions defended by Lijphart (e.g. 1977, 1999), including proportional elections, parliamentarism, and federalism. In the part about consociational institutional arrangements, I first shortly present Lijphart’s theory. Then, I jointly discuss proportional electoral systems and parliamentarism in relation to conflict endurance, and at last federalism.

3.1. Previous Studies: Causes of Civil Conflict

Formal studies and systematic and empirical research devoted to disclosing the causes of war and peace firstly took off in the 1960s. The focus was then primarily concentrated on interstate wars, but gradually shifted to civil conflicts towards the end of the Cold War (Kurtz and Turpin 1999: xxxi). The study of armed conflict is a mixed field of political science, economics, and humanities.

A large part of the existing literature on the causes of civil conflict involves discussions of the circumstances causing rebel motivation and willingness to support and take part in conflict in order to achieve secession or government power. This motivation is commonly assumed to be caused by greed or grievances. Gurr (1971) was one of the first to highlight grievances, due to relative deprivation, as a main source of rebellion, while Grossman (1991, 1999) early emphasized greed. Collier and Hoefler (2004) have criticized the exclusive focus on motivation and largely introduced a new topic, arguing that rebellion needs not only motive, but perhaps more importantly the opportunity in order to occur. This opportunity depends on circumstances such as the costs of coordination and expenses of rebellion, rebels’ availability...
of financial and military resources, and states’ capacity to defend themselves (Collier and Hoeffler 2004, 1998).

Economic causes of civil conflict, such as economic development and poverty, have received extensive focus in previous quantitative studies (see e.g. Fearon and Laitin 2003, Collier and Hoeffler 1998, 2004, Hegre 2003, Elbadawi and Sambanis 2002, Collier et al. 2004, 2008). Higher economic development level is commonly expected to lead to less armed conflict by reducing the opportunity of rebellion through government strength and its capacity to contain violent uprisings, and the costs of rebellion in terms of labor and economic disruption. It is also assumed to affect rebel motivation through grievances due to deprivation, and greed through state revenue.

Natural resource abundance is also much studied in relation to conflict (see e.g. Ross 2004a, 2004b, Le Billon 2001, Buhaug and Gates 2002, Buhaug et al. 2009, Lujala et al. 2005, Fearon 2004, Collier and Hoeffler 1998, 2004, 2005, Humphreys 2005, see also Ballentine and Sherman 2003, Ikelegbe 2006 and De Koning 2008 for case studies). This is theorized to affect the opportunity of rebellion both through rebel group financing and the capacity of the state to avoid insurgencies. It is also commonly expected to lead to greed and loot-seeking motivation through expected gains and profits of rebellion. This is also claimed to be more important than justice-seeking motivation, since it also provides rebels with financial means (see Collier and Hoeffler 2004).

Additionally, ethnic and religious composition in the society has received substantial focus (see e.g. Ellingsen 2000, Cederman and Girardin 2007, Cederman et al. 2010, Vanhanen 1999, Fearon and Laitin 2003, Elbadawi and Sambanis 2002, Sambanis 2001, Collier et al. 2004, Fearon 2004, Montalvo and Reynal-Querol 2010). This is frequently expected to affect grievances through inter-group hatred. It has also been projected to have an impact on rebel opportunity through the costs of coordination and collective action.

When it comes to political causes of armed conflict, regime type and democracy has received the most attention (see e.g. Hegre et al 2001, Hegre 2003, Gleditsch et al. 2009, Muller and Weede 1990, Walter 2004, Collier and Rohner 2008, Reynal-Querol 2002, Vreeland 2008, Regan and Bell 2009, Collier and Hoeffler 2004, Lyall 2010). Much of this literature concentrates on grievances as derived from repression and unequal distribution of power as a
cause of conflict. However, attention has increasingly focused on opportunities for rebellion, which are higher in mid-range hybrid regimes than in pure dictatorships because of their weaker coercive abilities (see e.g. Hegre et al 2001, Muller and Weede 1990) and increased mobilization over identity issues.

Much less empirical research has been done when it comes to specific political institutions, such as the electoral system, parliamentarism, and federalism. This is despite the claim made by constitutional engineers that institutional arrangements are crucial for conflict management in plural societies (Schneider and Wiesehomeier 2008), and the agreement among political scientists that institutions generally matter. As Wegenast (2010: 10) points out, researchers have only recently “begun to open the black box of democracy” and started looking at political institutional arrangements. Empirical work on how political institutions affect civil wars is indeed scarce (Reynal-Querol 2002: 36).

Lijphart (e.g. 1977, 1999) is the leading theorist on the field of political institutions and conflict, focusing on power-sharing and consensus stimulating institutions in relation to conflict moderation. Nordlinger (1972) also theorizes about these institutions in relation to conflict regulation, and Horowitz (1985) with respect to ethnic conflicts. These mostly theoretical accounts have been followed by comparative studies and case studies, such as Reilly (2001) on electoral engineering for conflict management, Sisk and Reynolds (1998) on elections and conflict in Africa, and Reynolds (2002) on institutional arrangements, conflict management and democracy.


Most studies of the causes of conflict nevertheless deal with the incidence and onset of violence, instead of conflict continuation which is the focus here. This is also so for the institutional accounts, although more recent work has concentrated on the ability of new institutions to reassure security and sustain post-conflict peace. Very little research and
theorizing have been done on the specific relation between political institutions and conflict duration. The empirical studies of Gleditsch et al. (2009) and Thyne (2012) are exceptions.

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is probably the most studied conflict in the world, and hundreds of new books and articles on the conflict are produced every year. The Encyclopedia of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, edited by Rubenberg (2010), provides an extensive overview of all conflict related themes, and various historical accounts are written by e.g. Morris (2004, 2009), Gordon (2008), Tyler (2012), Pappe (2006a, 2006b), Milton-Edwards (2008), and Giacaman and Lønning (1998). Studies of Palestinian resistance and rebellion also include Said (1994), Quandt and Lesch (1973), and Shalev (1991).


Despite this large amount of studies on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, little systematic research has been done on the causes of the conflict’s endurance in relation to more general and universal causes of conflict continuation. This is especially so when it comes to political institutions like the electoral system, the executive-legislative relation, and the territorial centralization, which have not been connected to the continuation of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict previously. One interesting study, nevertheless, includes Spruyt (2005) which analyses the effect of political institutions on the willingness of empires to give up territories, where Israel is included as a case among European colonial powers. It is clear that much remains in order to understand the general effects of political institutions on conflict duration and on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict’s endurance specifically.
3.2. Theoretical Framework and Hypotheses

In this section, I develop a theoretical framework on how political institutions affect conflict duration. This is separated into two main parts. The first involves the overall democratic quality, which is much discussed in the literature and a central part of the political system. The second part involves Lijphart’s three core consociational and consensus-promoting institutions, namely electoral systems based on proportional representation (PR), parliamentarism, and federalism, which diverge from majoritarian elections, presidentialism, and unitary, centralized states. I challenge Lijphart’s (e.g. 1977, 1999) assumption that these institutional arrangements are always the best to promote peace and present theories and hypotheses on how they can have the opposite effect in the context of ongoing violent conflicts. This will later be tested quantitatively on all internal armed conflicts in the period 1946-2008 and then be compared to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

I assume that many of the mechanisms sustaining conflict are the same as those creating and intensifying violence, so that factors providing rebels with incentives and opportunities to take up arms also can affect their willingness to continue fighting. This corresponds to Bleaney and Dimico’s (2011) theoretical claim that the causes of conflict continuation and onset can be the same. Some theories on the general pacifying effects of democratic systems, and on the conflict promoting effects of PR, parliamentarism, and federalism, are therefore applied.

Related to PR and parliamentarism, I also include theories that, as far as I know, have not been applied in relation to conflict previously, concerning governments’ ability to change existing policy. Although government inertia does not create or intensify conflict, it can indeed prolong them. This point exceeds the existing literature, introducing another element into the causes of conflict and conflict duration, which does not relate to either rebel motivation or opportunity. This involves states’ institutional constraints to change strategy and policy towards the ongoing conflict. I first discuss democratic quality and then the three consociational institutions. The effects of parliamentarism and PR are discussed jointly. These institutional arrangements will also receive the most focus.

Before proceeding to the theoretical discussion, it must be noted that some scholars claim that political institutions are endogenous and largely an epiphenomenon, and that “their form and their functioning” depend on the society they operate in (Przeworski 2004: 527). Lipset and
Rokkan (1967), for example, maintain that institutions reflect social cleavages.\textsuperscript{23} However, as stated in the introduction, political scientists agree that institutions generally matter for political outcomes. They are regularly regarded as systemic structures that have long-term impact on norms, beliefs, and actions, and consequently shape political outcomes (Przeworski 2004: 527). Therefore, they are treated as explanatory factors in this thesis.

\subsection*{3.2.1. Democratic Quality}

Democracy is a system of government established “by the people, for the people”. It is based on broad civil and political liberties, competition for political power, and inclusive participation in free and fair elections (Diamond et al. 1995: xvi, based on Dahl 1971). This involves the opportunity of citizens to formulate and express policy preferences, as well as to have their policy preferences “weighted equally in conduct of government” (Dahl 1971: 3). Citizenship should be universal and a basic human right for permanent residents (Yifachel 2010: 691) and everyone born in the territory of democratic states (Cohen 1999: 253–4). Liberal democracy should also involve protection from “tyranny of the majority” (Yifachel 2010: 691) and disallow representation of particular preferences such as racial discrimination and confiscatory government takings (Strøm 2000: 268).

Many refer to democracy as a system for peaceful resolution of conflicts. Galtung (2008: 25) argues that this is promoted by the focus on “voting, negotiation and dialogue”. Since democracies allow expression of dissatisfaction and grievances, and have institutional mechanisms to handle discontent, peaceful negotiation is feasible and less costly, and armed rebellion less beneficial, than in undemocratic systems (Hegre 2003: 10). Democratic institutions can also facilitate genuine commitments to negotiated agreements (Fearon 2004: 288), perhaps because of the guarantee of individual and minority rights. The accountability that is characteristic for democratic regimes, can also contribute to reduce incentives for armed rebellion, because it forces governments to exercise politics in a good way (Collier 2009). It is probable that grievances and motivations to continue fighting also will end more quickly in democratic, equal and fair systems.

\textsuperscript{23} As Przeworski (2004: 527) highlights, if this “endogeneity is strong, then institutions cannot have a causal efficacy of their own”. In that case, “[c]onditions shape institutions and institutions only transmit the causal effects of these conditions” (Przeworski 2004: 527).
On the other hand, repression and lack of political rights can create grievances that encourage group mobilization and rebel activity (Hegre et al. 2001). This is especially so for groups that are excluded from the political system and discriminated against by the state (Gurr 2000, Stewart 2008, Fearon and Laitin 2004: 79, Cederman and Girardin 2007, Cederman et al. 2010: 95). Such resentment can also easily be turned into successive collective action and support for armed groups challenging the government (Cederman et al. 2010: 95). Excluded groups have incentives to overturn the political system in order to gain fair representation in the central government, better access to jobs and services, and legal advantages such as full citizenship rights (Cederman et al. 2010: 94-95). It is also likely that such grievances and armed opposition will persist if claims for inclusion and self-determination are not addressed by the government, and if exclusion and discrimination remain.

Rothchild and Hartzell (2007: 257) also state that “exclusion from seats of influence at the political center also creates unease, real or imagined, over the likelihood of aggressive intentions on the part of adversary interests”, undermining confidence in the dominant state elite. Additionally, in exclusionary systems, “knowledge about adversary elite purposes is tightly controlled and misrepresents reality”, so that “political minorities are likely to be distrustful of an adversary, causing them to be wary of making commitments and cooperating in joint problem-solving activities” (Rothchild and Hartzell 2007: 257). This can serve to create and sustain conflict.

Exclusion and discrimination are indeed reflections of unequal societies and systems (Stewart et al. 2005). Based on these theoretical mechanisms, I propose the first hypothesis on the effect of the political system on conflict duration:

H1: Exclusionary and undemocratic systems increase the probability of conflict continuation.

3.2.2. Consociational Institutions

According to Lijphart (1977, 1999), consociationalism and consensus institutions are the best to promote peace and manage conflicts in plural societies divided by segmental cleavages such as culture, religion, region, and ethnicity. This claim has been recognized by scholars and constitutional engineers all over the world, and it has become one of the most basic theories of political science.
Consociationalism is based on principles of proportionality, grand coalition, mutual veto, and segmental autonomy (Lijphart 1977: 50), and consensus institutions include PR, multiparty systems, parliamentarism, coalition governments, and decentralization of power (Lijphart 1999). Although consociationalism focuses less on formal institutions than the consensus model (Lijphart 1989), parliamentarism, PR, and federalism are superior institutional arrangements to enhance consociational principles, according to Lijphart (1977: 224). This deviates from majoritarianism with majority elections, two-party systems, one-party governments, presidentialism, and centralized and unitary states.

The crucial characteristic of both consociationalism and the consensus model is the non-concentration of authority, where power is shared, dispersed, and limited in a variety of ways, and the inclusiveness, bargaining, and compromise that are promoted (Lijphart 1977: 36, 1999: 2, 34, 185). This is in contrast to majoritarian systems that are exclusive, competitive, and confrontational, and which concentrate power in the hands of a bare majority or plurality (Lijphart 1999: 2).

The integration of all groups into the political system makes it easier to resolve disagreements between the segments, according to Lijphart (1977: 228). In plural societies with separate and potentially aggressive population segments, there is also a need for broad agreements if violent conflict is to be avoided. This is because “virtually all decisions are perceived as entailing high stakes” (p. 28). Consociational arrangements may also create mutual trust among both elites and masses, according to Lijphart (1977: 228). Sharing of power in government coalitions can bring a guarantee of political security to the groups involved and thereby enhance trust among parties that are principally skeptical to each other. Additionally, “the prospect of participating in the government” reduces the risk of being betrayed by other parties (p. 31). It is therefore “a powerful stimulus to moderation and compromise”, Lijphart argues (1977: 31).

Vertical or territorial power sharing between the central and regional governments, which is provided by federalism, can also reduce conflict and grievances, according to Lijphart. It offers minority groups control and self-determination over matters that are important to their interests and identities, providing them with institutional channels for voicing their demands and deciding policy outcomes.
Lijphart (1999: 29-33) also argues that the flexibility that is necessary for majoritarian systems to work, such as the regular shift of government power where minorities become majorities, is likely to be absent in plural societies. He states that in plural societies “majority rule is not only undemocratic but also dangerous, because minorities that are continually denied access to power will feel excluded and discriminated against and may lose their allegiance to the regime” (Lijphart 1999: 32-33). Pressure from majoritarian rules to replace segmental and primordial loyalties by a national allegiance can also encourage segmental cohesion and violence and become extremely dangerous, according to Lijphart (1977: 24).

However, Lijphart admits from his own studies that “it is not proven that consensus democracies are actually better at governing” or in maintaining civil peace (1999: 274, 301). The next sections provide counter arguments to Lijphart, proposing that core consensual and consensus-building institutions can enhance conflict and prolong ongoing conflicts. PR and parliamentarism are discussed first and federalism second.

**Proportional Representation and Parliamentary Systems**

Electoral systems decide how preferences are expressed as votes and how votes are translated into legislative seats (Rae 1967: 14). Based on this, electoral systems can crudely be separated into proportional and majoritarian systems (Sartori 1994: 3-5). PR systems use multi-member constituencies and convert votes into seats in a relatively proportional way. Majoritarian systems are generally less proportional and exaggerate the power of the largest parties using winner-takes-all (first-past-the-post) principles, usually in single-member districts (Sartori 1994: 4, Lijphart 1994, 1999: 144). People usually vote for candidates in majoritarian systems and party lists in proportional systems.

The electoral system is a powerful instrument for shaping the political system and determining political outcomes (Lijphart 1991: 90, Saideman et al. 2002). By defining what is needed in order to achieve electoral success, it structures political competition and sets the strategic context for political organization, expression, and representation (Mozaffar 1998: 91). It offers incentives to voters and political parties to behave in certain ways and sets the boundaries of what is “acceptable” political discourse (Reilly and Reynolds 1999: 6-7).
The impact of the electoral system in determining political outcomes is also stronger in parliamentary systems than in presidential systems, since the government derives from, and is accountable to, the legislature. The government is dependent on the legislature’s confidence in order to remain in office (Lijphart 1999: 117). The electoral system then not only determines who gets represented in the legislature, but indirectly also who gets to govern, and for how long (Sartori 1994: 59). Proportional elections tend to produce multiparty systems and coalition governments, while majoritarian systems favor two-party systems and one-party governments (Duverger 1959, Rae 1967, Sartori 1994: 59, Dow 2001: 111).

**Centrifugal Powers**

Party systems and the degree of political fragmentation are not the “natural, spontaneous, or inevitable mirroring of social cleavages”, but heavily dependent on electoral arrangements, according to Dahl (1971: 223). Since the threshold for gaining legislative seats is low in PR systems, the minimum amount of support required to keep parties going is considerably smaller than in plurality systems (Downs 1957: 124). This tends to produce multiparty systems with many small parties, as well as excessive party fragmentation (Sartori 1994: 59, Downs 1957).

A larger number of parties in the political system limits the spatial mobility of each party, which encourage movement away from the center and the median voter and closer towards the periphery of the electoral space (Dow 2001: 111). In systems with many competitors, politicians have to “carve out a niche” in order to maximize their votes and seats and appeal to voters in a narrow way (Cox 1990: 922). PR and multiparty systems can thereby create centrifugal instead of centripetal incentives, and extreme instead of center-oriented policies (Cox 1990, Merrill and Adams 2007). Even very small and extreme parties can get access to legislative and government power in PR systems (Dow 2001: 111).

In his original spatial model, Downs (1957) shows that PR and multiparty systems can motivate parties to shift away from the median voter in order to gain votes. He argues that it is likely that parties in such systems “will strive to distinguish themselves ideologically from each other and maintain the purity of their positions” (Downs 1957: 126-127). Duverger (1959: 387) also claims that PR has “the serious defect of completely obliterating the basic cleavage in opinion and over-emphasizing divisions on points of detail”. Parties emphasize
differences that distinguish them from rivals so that political divisions are aggravated (Duverger 1959: 388). This also causes “extremization” of public opinion, according to Duverger (1959: 388).

Multiparty systems and coalition governments can also increase rationality problems among voters and parties (Downs 1957: 157). It can also give moderate and rational voters incentives to support more extreme parties than they actually prefer (Kedar 2005). Since voters care about policy outcomes, they adjust their voting behavior to the institutional rules (Kedar 2005: 185). When coalition bargaining between various parties is frequent, and “votes are watered down by power-sharing”, voters often compensate by supporting parties that have more extreme positions than their own (Kedar 2005: 185). This can in turn strengthen the extremism in the system and make politics more dangerous.

These tendencies can also result in extreme and unrepresentative government policy outputs, diverging from the general public opinion (Duverger 1959: 391). Merrill and Adams (2007: 420) state that consensual institutions can do this by motivating parties “to stake out extreme policy positions – perhaps in an effort to “pull” the eventual compromise policy in the party’s preferred direction”. Since parties that only win a small share of the vote can join coalition governments in parliamentary systems with PR, they can also more easily influence government and determine government outputs (Downs 1957: 124, Horowitz 2003: 125). Small parties that “can make or break governments” (Horowitz 2003: 125) can thus get critical and decisive roles as “kingmakers” (Norris 1997: 310). This can also be the case, as Duverger (1959: 389) points out, since the most extreme party always tends to dominate allegiances. As Olson (1965) also argues, it can be easier for small groups with special interests to achieve their will, than for large and less cohesive groups.

The natural tendency towards extremism also tends to be especially strong in countries with ongoing conflicts (Horowitz 1990, McCulloch 2012: 1). Centrifugal forces, extremism and lack of incentives to “make moderation pay” can then be especially dangerous here, causing intensified and prolonged conflict instead of conflict moderation. The inclusion of extremists and hard-liners in coalitions can then also work to hinder peace negotiations.
Incentives to approach a “moderate middle” could then be better to avoid extended conflict (McCulloch 2012: 2). Majoritarian elections could make it easier for candidates to win “by broadening rather than narrowing and intensifying their appeal” (Meisburger 2012: 158-159). Parties then “try to resemble its opponent as closely as possible” and take a position close to the median voter (Downs 1957: 127). They decrease political divisions and make politics and the public opinion more moderate (Duverger 1959: 387-389). This can also be said about presidential systems (Horowitz 2008: 1217).

**Government Inertia**

Party system proliferation and grand coalition governments, which are often the result of PR and parliamentarism, can also easily produce weak and unstable governments (Reilly and Reynolds 1999: 22, Meisburger 2012: 158). Coalitions with many parties involved can thereby become “conductive to ineffective, or incoherent, or gridlocked government” (Sartori 1994: 60). Government weakness, instability and ineffectiveness can indeed make it hard for governments to make bold decisions and change the status quo. This can increase the duration of ongoing conflicts.

Lijphart (1977: 51-52) himself admits that a “serious and fundamental criticism” to consociational systems is that they can become unstable, indecisive, and inefficient. It is harder to reach agreements in large coalitions with a wider range of policies, and the formal or informal mutual veto power in consociational systems can increase the danger of immobilizing the decision-making process, he states (Lijphart 1977: 50-51). Furthermore, he acknowledges that this may “produce the very stagnation and instability that consociational democracy is designed to avoid” (Lijphart 1977: 51).

The potential for policy changes in a political system also decreases with the number of partisan veto players, as well as larger political divergence between them, according to Tsebelis (1995: 289). Veto players can be defined as “individual or collective actors whose agreement (by majority rule for collective actors) is required for a change of the status quo”, and partisan veto players constitute the parties in government coalitions (Tsebelis 1995: 289, 302). The existence of many partisan veto players decreases the possibility for changing the status quo, “even when such changes are necessary or desirable”, Tsebelis argues (1995: 324).
Since PR and parliamentary systems promote large coalition governments, such systems also have more partisan veto players than others (Tsebelis 1995). This makes it harder to change the status quo because more parties are required to approve new policy proposals. The differences between policy positions of the parties in government are also higher in such systems, since PR encourages parties to stress their distance to other parties in order to win votes (Tsebelis 1995: 309). This also makes it more difficult to achieve sufficient agreement to change existing policy (Tsebelis 1995).

Spruyt (2005: 31) supports this line of argument and claims that “electoral rules that lead to multiparty coalitions create not only more actors whose consent is necessary for policy change; they also increase the likelihood that the preferences of the political actors will diverge. Policy change will thus be unlikely.” He adds that if institutional arrangements motivate “politicians to give voice to the preferences of niche clienteles, that very articulation may fortify the position of narrowly defined interest groups. There is no reason to bring one’s position in line with the mainstream in order to be heard.” Empires with fragmented decision-making processes have also been more resistant to decolonialism and changes in the territorial policy because of multiple veto opportunities, Spruyt (2005) argues.

Downs (1957: 157) contends that some parties and citizens that oppose policies would rather see the government “operate inefficiently so that its policies never have any effect”. He further states that “if such desires are widespread, democracy cannot produce effective governments: it degenerates into a stalemate which merely preserves the status quo” (Downs 1957: 157). With many divergent parties in governments, it is more likely that parties that oppose changes in the status quo are represented. They are thereby also better able to hinder policy change.

Proportional elections and parliamentarism also work to postpone policy decisions, Lijphart states (1977). This is in contrast to the majority model, where “the basic decision is made by majority rule [already] at the electoral level” (Lijphart 1977: 40). On the other hand, PR translates votes into parliamentary seats without requiring policy decisions, and the formation of coalition governments postpones such policy decisions further (Lijphart 1977: 40). This slowness in the system can also make it harder to introduce new policies and change the status quo.
Governments’ actions and strategies clearly affect the development of internal armed conflicts, since they are the main parties in them. If governments have difficulties changing their policies, this could result in longer conflicts. Proportional elections and parliamentarism can cause government inertia, thereby resulting in conflict continuation. This leads to the second hypothesis on the impact of institutions on conflict duration:

H2: Proportional representation and parliamentary systems increase the probability that conflicts will endure.

Federalism

Federalism is an institutional arrangement that involves constitutionally guaranteed power division between central and regional governments (Lijphart 1999: 186). It allows for regional self-determination and some degree of sub-state autonomy for territorially concentrated minorities, where regional governments have a considerable share of the total power (Rothchild and Hartzell 2007: 261, Lijphart 1999: 186). The two levels of government have separate responsibilities and authority fields, and both make autonomous and final decisions on some policy areas (Riker 1975: 101, Rothchild and Hartzell 2007: 261). Federal systems are also characterized by bicameral legislatures and usually written constitutions (Rothchild and Hartzell 2007: 261).

In unitary and centralized systems, however, division of power is one-sided and the central government controls the regional governments (Lijphart 1999: 185-186). As Lijphart (1985: 5) states “regional governments’ share of power in a federation is relatively large compared with that of regional governments in unitary states”. Federalism differs from decentralization and devolution in that the power division is permanent and secured in the constitution, and that regional governments in decentralized states are more dependent on the “goodwill” of the central government (Basta 1999: 39).

Despite Lijphart’s claims that decentralization and federalism promote peace, this is not obvious, and there are reasons to believe that federalism can encourage and prolong conflicts.

---

24 In practice, the distinction between federalism, decentralization, and unitary and centralized states is often less clear.
Consociational democracy and federalism are intentionally designed “to make plural societies more thoroughly plural”, as Lijphart highlights (1977: 42).

This can increase divisions between segments, and empower local elites at the expense of the central government (Barma 2006: 137). It can also encourage demands for greater autonomy, and in turn increase the willingness to fight for secession (Nordlinger 1972: 32). Federalism can also legitimize claims made by regionally concentrated groups that they are different from the larger state and provide them with financial resources that can be used for fighting (Selway and Templeman 2012: 1548-1549). Additionally, the ability to influence and participate in regional governments can facilitate collective action (Saideman et al. 2002: 112).

Regional parties are also strengthened by federalism (Brancati 2006: 656). Brancati (2006: 657-658) argues that these often serve to increase conflict by “reinforcing ethnic identities, passing legislation that is harmful to regional minorities, and mobilizing groups to engage in ethnic conflict while using the resources decentralization provides them to do so”. They strengthen ethnic and regional identities “by making people who possess certain physical characteristics or live in certain locales think of themselves as a group with shared needs and goals” (Brancati 2006: 658). Additionally, where regional and ethnic boundaries overlap, regional electoral competition can facilitate ethnic outbidding, “because regional parties competing for the same electorate may adopt increasingly extreme views to attract votes away from other regional parties” (Brancati 2006: 658). This leads to the third hypothesis, which is in contrast to Lijphart’s claim:

\[ H3: \text{Federalism increases the probability of conflict endurance.} \]

3.3. Summary

Previous studies on the causes of conflict have mostly dealt with other factors than political institutions. This is especially so when it comes to research on conflict duration. There are, however, good reasons to believe that institutions also affect the duration of conflicts. I present three hypotheses on how democratic quality, PR and parliamentarism, and federalism, affect conflict continuation.
First, I propose that exclusionary and undemocratic systems increase the probability of conflict persistence. This is based on mechanisms such as grievances and resentment, and thereby the willingness to rebel, lack of confidence in the state, as well as lack of institutional mechanisms to handle discontent and solve conflicts. Thereafter, I argue against Lijphart’s claim that consociational institutions are the best to promote peace. I propose that in the context of ongoing conflicts, PR and parliamentary systems increase the probability of conflict endurance. This is based on centrifugalism, empowerment of small and extreme parties, and government inertia due to many veto players in governments. Lastly, I suggest that federalism increases the probability of conflict endurance because of increased divisions between segments and encouraged demands for greater autonomy and secession.
4. Methodology and Data

Based on the theoretical framework presented above, I now proceed to discuss the methods and data that are used to analyze the effects of political institutions on conflict duration, both generally and in relation to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. A so-called “mixed-method strategy”, indicating a combination of qualitative and quantitative methods, is applied. This combination of methods is used in order to place the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in a comparative context and get information on both general and specific effects of political institutions on conflict endurance. As Bennett (2002) and Lieberman (2005: 435-436) also point out, there is a need for new and improved ways to combine such methods.

As Gerring (2007) highlights, both large-N cross-country studies and case studies have strengths and weaknesses. Studying only a single case makes it difficult to get reliable estimates of general causal effects for a larger population of cases. At the same time, quantitative cross-case studies are less informative when it comes to understanding the more specific causal mechanisms, since correlations between variables are not explained (Gerring 2007). Combining methods makes it possible to use the strengths of both the large-N cross-country study and the case study, and avoiding the “classic trade-off” between the two (Gerring 2007: 48).

The quantitative part consists of survival data analysis of the general causes of conflict endurance, involving all internal armed conflicts in the period 1946-2008. I use the semi-parametric Cox proportional hazard (PH) model. The qualitative part is a case study of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. To see if the causes of the conflict’s continuation are unique with regards to political institutions, the conflict is first compared to the results in the general model. Fourteen in-depth interviews with Israeli and Palestinian experts and politicians then serve to expand the understanding of the uniqueness of the conflict and how political institutions have affected its duration. The quantitative method and data are discussed first, and the qualitative method and data second.
4.1. Quantitative Method and Data

Survival data analysis, also known as event history analysis, is a statistical regression method used to study events, the time before their occurrence, and how covariates affect the timing of when events happen (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004: 1). Said in another way, it is a method used “to explain why things (war, peace, cabinets, and so on) survive or endure” (Golub 2009: 2). The dependent variable is the duration of some condition until an event occurs. Survival analysis is much applied in medical studies to test the effects of medications and treatments. Political science has also increasingly adopted the method, and it is used in studies of e.g. coalition survival, regime survival, as well as the endurance of conflicts and post-conflict peace. In studies of conflict duration, the termination of conflict is the event of interest, and the time from start to end of conflict is the dependent variable.

Compared to other statistical methods, survival models have a considerable advantage in that they can account for right-censored observations, i.e. events that have not yet occurred at the end of the study period (Balch-Lindsay and Enterline 2000: 629). They include both censored and uncensored events in estimations without biasing the results (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004: 18-19).

There are several types of survival models, where parametric and semi-parametric models are the most usual. Parametric models, such as Weibull, exponential, Gompertz, and log-logistic models, make assumptions about the shape of the baseline hazard, i.e. the underlying effect of the passage of time on the occurrence of the event when all covariates are zero (Golub 2009: 2). This can be appropriate when there are strong theoretical and empirical guidance concerning the hazard function. However, such strong evidence is often difficult to find in political science (Golub 2009: 5-6). As Box-Steffensmeier (2001: 974) states, political science theories “usually do not allow us to specify a priori what distribution should be used, and in many cases the parameterization chosen can have a large impact on the substantive conclusions drawn”.

Semi-parametric models, like the Cox proportional hazard model, do not make assumptions about the baseline hazard. They nevertheless assume that the relative risk of event occurrence is independent of time (i.e. the proportional hazard assumption). Violations to this assumption can be tested and handled by interacting time-dependent variables with time (Singer and
Willett 2003: 451-460, Golub 2009). Semi-parametric models are less efficient than parametric models, which can reduce the precision of estimates (Golub 2009: 11). They are also less able to handle ties (i.e. conflicts that last for the same number of years) (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones, 2004: 54), although there are several ways to deal with this also in the Cox model.

Golub (2009: 11-12) nevertheless argues that “even if the parametric estimates are slightly more precise, they might be totally wrong if the chosen form is incorrect”, and this is “likely to be the case in most situations”. He strongly recommends the Cox model, arguing that “there is little to lose and much to gain by employing Cox models instead of parametric models” (Golub 2009: 1). The Cox model is also much used in studies of conflict duration, where there are no clear theoretical expectation of the effect of time (see e.g. Balch-Lindsay and Enterline 2000, Cunningham et al. 2007, Cunningham 2011). I here follow the advice of Golub (2009) and Box-Steffensmeier and Jones (2004) and apply the Cox proportional hazard model. Since the baseline hazard is not estimated, and only a part of the available information is utilized, partial likelihood estimation is used instead of maximum likelihood.

To account for unmeasured heterogeneity and reduce the risk of biased estimates, I include control variables, which are discussed later in this chapter.\(^{25}\) Additionally, I use a variance corrected model with robust standard errors, clustered on country.\(^{26}\) This is “a robust and cluster-consistent estimator for the standard deviation of the parameters” (Montalvo and Reynal-Querol 2010: 135-136). It deals with the potential problem of unobserved country-specific effects and accounts for correlation between repeated events. To handle ties, I use the Breslow method.\(^{27}\)

---

\(^{25}\) Unmeasured heterogeneity is a common problem in quantitative methods. It implies model misspecification due to omitted variables that are correlated with the explanatory variables. This can lead to biased parameter estimates for the covariates and hide spurious effects (Strand 2006: 171-172, Collier et al. 2004).

\(^{26}\) The frailty approach can usually also be applied to deal with the potential problem of unobserved country-specific effects in survival models. This is a random effects model, where each country is given its own random parameter that picks up the association between omitted variables and survival time (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004: 142). However, I am not able to estimate a frailty model here. This is not necessarily problematic. Strand (2006: 173), for example, shows that frailty models do not change the results substantially, and that the likelihood test does not improve the baseline model. Henderson and Oman (1999) show that regression coefficients are biased towards zero when frailty is present, but not accounted for. This bias is nevertheless reduced when censoring is present. The variance corrected model should nevertheless account for much of the potential unobserved heterogeneity.

\(^{27}\) This assumes that the size of the risk set remains identical regardless of the order of events (Jones and Branton 2005: 425).
In survival data analyses, coefficients show the change in the hazard rate, i.e. the risk that a country will experience the end of conflict in a year, given that it has not ended previously, with a one unit increase in the explanatory variables. This is when holding the other covariates fixed. A negative coefficient implies that the risk of ending conflict is lower and the chance of conflict continuation is higher, while a positive coefficient implies that there is a greater chance of conflict termination.

Hazard ratios are the exponentiated coefficients. Values less than one imply a conflict-prolonging effect, while values over one signify a conflict-decreasing effect. The deviation from one can be interpreted as the proportionate changes in the hazard rate, or risk of conflict termination in a given year, with a one unit change in the explanatory variables. A hazard ratio of 2 would denote that the risk of conflict termination is twice as high as for the reference group. Since the Cox model leaves the baseline hazard unspecified, the model is only able to estimate relative, and not absolute, risks. Both coefficients and hazard ratios are displayed in the Cox regression model on page 53. This interpretation of the parameter estimates should therefore be kept in mind.

### 4.1.1. Dataset and Unit of Analysis

The survival data analysis includes countries in years with internal armed conflict in the period 1946-2008. The definition of armed conflict is based on the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset developed by Gleditsch et al. (2002). This involves at least 25 battle-related deaths in a year, resulting from contested incompatibilities between two or more parties concerning the government and/or territory, where one of the parties is the government of a state. Both internal and internationalized armed conflicts are included. Internal conflicts involve the government of a state and one or more internal opposition groups, and internationalized conflicts additionally involve intervention from other states on one or both sides of conflict (UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Codebook 2012). Interstate and extra-systemic conflicts are excluded from the dataset.

---

28 States are defined as internationally recognized sovereign governments that control a specific territory, or a government that is not recognized internationally, but whose sovereignty is not disputed by another recognized sovereign government that previously has controlled the territory (Strand 2006: 63).

29 Interstate conflict is conflict between two or more states, and extra-systemic conflict is between a state and some non-state group outside the state’s own territory, i.e. colonial conflicts.
The battle-related deaths threshold is problematic because counting of fatalities in conflict is difficult, and casualty measures are often highly unreliable (Strand 2006: 137). Civilian losses not caused by direct warfare between government and rebels are also excluded from the measure. Some information about conflict occurrence can thereby also be lost. This is nevertheless done to separate armed conflicts from catastrophes and other kinds of violence (Strand 2006: 135). Compared to other death thresholds, such as 1000 deaths in a year (based on the Correlates of War [COW] project of Singer and Small 1994), the low threshold of 25 battle-related deaths generally also reduces the probability of selection biases due to uncertain information. It also includes more conflicts, which provides more observations in the dataset. This threshold, as well as the conflicts in general, has also been verified by two independent sources to ensure validity, which is better than many other measures (Strand 2006: 137). In lack of any other superior conflict definition, it is therefore used despite its weaknesses.

Data on start year and end year of conflict is gathered from the UCDP Conflict Termination Dataset (Kreutz 2010). However, the units of analysis are recoded based on the Location variable in the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset, defined as the country where territory or government is disputed. Countries with internal conflict, instead of conflicts in countries, are then used as entities for the analysis. Countries have only one observation per year with conflict, regardless of having one or many conflicts ongoing simultaneously, and irrespective of types of incompatibilities and the opposition side of the conflict. Israel, for example, is recoded from having four overlapping conflicts (1949-1996, 1990-1999, 2000-ongoing, 2006-2006) to having only one (1949-ongoing).30

Since the central research question here is why some countries experience longer civil conflict than others, and how political institutions affect duration, the recoding of the units of analysis appears appropriate. This recoding follows Cunningham’s (2011: 25) recommendation that the units of analysis should be based on the research question and theory of the study. He argues that “[i]f the question a researcher is interested in is why certain countries have longer-running civil wars than others, then lumping all conflicts together may be appropriate”, while

30 All of these conflicts are coded as internal conflicts in Israel. The conflicts 1949-1996 and 2000-ongoing are between the Israeli government and Palestinian opposition groups (e.g. PLO groups, Rejectionist Front, PFLP, PFLP-GC, Fatah, Hamas, PIJ, PNA), taking place in Israel within the armistice borders of 1949 until 1967, and involving the occupied Palestinian territories after 1967. The conflicts 1990-1999 and 2006-2006 are between the Israeli government and Hizbollah. Although Hizbollah also concentrates on other matters, their “ultimate objective is to destroy Israel and to liberate Palestine” (Norton 1998: 89). The Palestinian issue has therefore been central in all of the internal conflicts in Israel coded in the UCDP/PRIO dataset.
“if the researcher is interested in understanding how the attributes of groups affect their ability to fight long insurgencies, then dividing into individual state-rebel-group dyads is appropriate” (Cunningham 2011: 25). Characteristics of rebel groups are not the primary focus in this thesis.31

Conflict periods are considered terminated and separated from subsequent conflict episodes whenever there is a minimum of one year without conflict. This involves less than 25 deaths in a year and can result from peace agreements, cease fires, victories, or other causes such as a truce with ceasefire but without a settlement (Kreutz 2010). As noted, it is hard to determine the number of fatalities in civil conflicts, and defining start and end dates of conflicts can be even more problematic. Periods of several years can pass by with few or no battle-related deaths, although no peace treaty or ceasefire is agreed upon (Fearon 2004: 279).

However, as Fearon (2004: 279) states, no coding rule appears to be particularly better than others, and “any parsimonious rule will generate some start- and end-date codings that are debatable”. Strand (2006: 166) also finds that differences between such definitions mostly are “a matter of the magnitude of coefficients and standard errors rather than direction”. The coding of conflict termination must nevertheless be taken into consideration when drawing conclusions based on the empirical results. Robustness tests with other conflict thresholds and termination definitions are not conducted here because the design of this analysis, where the units of analysis are recoded to conflicts within countries, makes reorganization to other thresholds and definitions complicated and time-consuming. It must therefore be left for further research to test whether the results found here hold when other conflict thresholds and conflict termination definitions are used.

The dataset includes 102 countries, 1261 country-years, 233 conflict periods, and 210 conflict terminations (events/failures). Missing data on key variables, however, reduce the sample somewhat. 15 percent of the countries, 16 percent of the observations, and 19 percent of the events fall out.32 This results in 87 countries, 1057 observations, and 170 events. The median

31 In the analysis, states’ relationship to the internal opposition is nevertheless captured by a country-level variable that measures the degree of exclusion from the political system and discrimination with the intention of keeping groups away from national and regional power.
32 I have not used multiple imputation here. Multiple imputation is a simulation technique that replaces missing data with a set of plausible values (see e.g. Cleves et al. 2010: 169-175). I have rather coded some variables independently and used variables with as few missing values as possible. Imputation does not appear to be critical in this context of less than 20 percent omitted observations.
duration of conflict is six years and the mean 12, while the minimum and maximum conflict duration is one and 60 years, respectively. The number of conflict terminations varies from zero (right-censored) to seven, and both the median and mean is two. Right-censoring occurs when survival time is unknown and conflicts have not yet ended in 2008. These are nevertheless still considered in the analysis. This includes 23 countries, although eight of them drop out of the analysis due to missing data.33

Figure 3 shows the countries that have the longest uninterrupted conflict periods in the dataset covering the period 1946-2008. The vertical axis shows the number of years with continuous conflict. Israel is the country with the longest conflict of 60 years (1949-ongoing). Myanmar, Colombia, the Philippines, Guatemala, India, Ethiopia, Angola, Sudan, and Turkey follow with conflict periods lasting from 25 to 56 years.34 16 percent of the conflict episodes in the sample have lasted ten years or more, while as much as 41 percent went on for only one year.35

![Graph showing countries with the longest-lasting conflicts](image)

**Figure 3: Countries with the Longest-Lasting Conflicts in the Dataset**

33 The 23 countries with censored conflict periods include Afghanistan, Algeria, Chad, Colombia, Ethiopia, India, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Mali, Myanmar, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Russia, Rwanda, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Thailand, Turkey, Uganda and the United States of America. The 15 included in the analysis are Algeria, Chad, Colombia, India, Israel, Mali, Myanmar, Philippines, Russia, Rwanda, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Turkey, and Uganda.

34 Myanmar has had 56 years of constant conflict (1948-2003), but less than 25 deaths in 2004 divides it from the next conflict period starting in 2005. Colombia has had 45 years of non-stop conflict (1964-ongoing), the Philippines 40 years (1969-ongoing), Guatemala 31 years (1965-1995), India 30 years (1979-ongoing), Ethiopia 29 years (1964-1992), Angola 28 years (1975-2002), Sudan 26 years (1983-ongoing), and Turkey has had 25 years of continuous conflict (1984-ongoing). Ongoing means that the conflicts have not ended in 2008.

35 As previously mentioned, the fact that many conflicts have lasted for the same amount of time, i.e. that there are ties in the dataset, constitutes a potential problem in the Cox model. This is because it makes it difficult to determine the ranking of events and the structure of the risk set. However, there are methods to deal with this problem, such as the Breslow method, which is used here.
4.1.2. Dependent and Independent Variables

An important challenge in quantitative studies is how to operationalize concepts and ideas to observations and facts in a meaningful way. The central question in this process is: “Do the observations meaningfully capture the ideas contained in the concepts?” (Adcock and Collier 2001: 529). In order to draw valid conclusions about theoretical relationships based on empirical analyses, it is important that variables measure what they are supposed to measure (King et al. 1994: 25, Adcock and Collier 2001: 529-530). The variables operationalized here are chosen in order to maximize this link between concepts and observations. This is, however, not to say that they do not have any weaknesses.

The dependent variable in the survival analysis is the duration of internal armed conflict, or the time from conflict onset until conflict termination, measured in years. The definition of internal armed conflict and conflict termination is discussed on page 33-35. The hazard rate, which is estimated on the basis of survival time as well as the predictors, then shows the probability that conflicts will end in a specific year, given that they have not ended previously.

The concept of democracy is extensively discussed in the literature. As Kimmerling (1999) argues, it has no “conclusive theoretical definition or even agreed upon set of empirical characteristics”. Democratic quality is here investigated using two variables. The first is the revised and combined Polity index (Polity2), taken from the Polity IV dataset of Marshall and Jaggers (2002). This ranges from -10 to 10, where -10 is the lowest and 10 the highest democracy score. Included in this measure are components such as the openness of executive recruitment, constraints on chief executive, competitiveness of executive recruitment, and regulation and competitiveness of popular participation.

This democracy index is a much applied measure of democratic quality. Gerring et al. (2012: 6) argue that it is likely to be better than most other measures of democracy. It has less missing values than others, and it has a continuous scale, which is mostly considered to be superior to dichotomies (see e.g. Bollen and Jackman 1989). However, the index has been

36 To enable the use of the measure in time-series analyses, cases of foreign interruption (-66) have been recoded to missing values, interregnum or anarchy cases (-77) have been recoded to 0, and transitions (-88) have been prorated throughout the transition period (see Marshall et al. 2011).
criticized for endogeneity problems in relation to conflict (see e.g. Strand 2006, Vreeland 2008). In robustness tests, Polity2 is therefore replaced with the SIP index, taken from Strand et al. (2012) based on Gates et al. (2006), and Vanhanen’s index of democratization (2000, 2005). These are both continuous variables with relatively little missing data. None of these variables, however, take the territories occupied by Israel in 1967 into account.

The second measure of democratic quality is a joint measure of the excluded and discriminated population variables from the Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) dataset of Cederman et al. (2009). The excluded population variable measures the share of the politically relevant population that is excluded from central power on a scale from 0 to 1. Discriminated population measures the proportion of the population that is not only excluded from the central government, but also subject to “active, intentional, and targeted discrimination with the intent of excluding them from both regional and national power” (Cederman et al. 2009). Both of these variables are interesting in this study. Since they are quite strongly correlated (0.51), and the difference between them is very far from significant, they are merged into one joint variable. Where values are missing on these variables, and the Polity2 index does not change with more than three values from one year to another, data from previous or following years are spread out. This applies to 63 observations for discriminated population and 71 for excluded population.

This measure of exclusion and discrimination also captures how the conflict opposition is treated in the political system. It is included in addition to the democracy index because, as Collier and Hoeflfler (2004: 571) state, groups may be excluded from the political system even in democracies. Yifachel (2010: 692) also argue that since “no state fulfills its principles completely and thus no state is a perfect democracy, it is preferable to measure the democratic state of affairs by asserting key issues such as civil equality, minority and gender rights, theocratic impositions, and legal inequalities”. Reynal-Querol (2005: 446) also claims that

---

37 Groups are considered politically relevant “if at least one significant political actor claims to represent the interests of that group in the national political arena, or if members of an ethnic category are systematically and intentionally discriminated against in the domain of public politics” (Cederman et al. 2009).

38 This can be both formally and informally: “Formal discrimination legally limits access to government positions to citizens who speak a certain mother tongue, display certain phenotypical features, or are members of certain religious groups. Informal discrimination actively and intentionally inhibits individuals with certain ethnic backgrounds from rising within the ranks of government.” (Cederman et al. 2009).

39 This was tested by first running the model in Table 3 (page 53) with the two distinct exclusion and discrimination variables, and then testing if exclusion – discrimination = 0. The coefficient for exclusion (-0.507) – discrimination (-0.673) = -0.166. The lincom test conducted in Stata shows that this difference between the coefficients is not significant (p = 0.830).
democracy is just one dimension of the concept of political inclusion or exclusion. The exclusion-discrimination variable can also be a better measure of political inclusion than the electoral system proxy used by Reynal-Querol (2002). Certain groups can be excluded from central government power even though the electoral system is generally inclusive. In the data for Israel, the exclusion and discrimination variables also take the occupied Palestinian territories into account in the period after 1967.40

The type of electoral system is a time-varying variable that I have complied for the thesis, using a wide variety of sources, primarily Nohlen et al. (1999 and 2001), but also Lundell (2005), Golder (2005), Wills-Otero (2009), Carr (2011), African Elections Database (2012), CIA World Factbook (2012), and Colomer (2004).41 This data collection required approximately three weeks of work and resulted in complete information regarding all 102 countries and 1261 country-years in the dataset. The variable is a categorical variable with three categories and no intrinsic ordering between them. Electoral systems with majoritarian elements, including plurality, majoritarian and mixed systems are coded as 0 and serves as the reference category. The two other categories are PR systems and no institutionalized elections. The category of no institutionalized elections includes cases with no elections for central legislative councils and no mentioning of any electoral system in the constitution.

It must be noted that being coded as having majoritarian or PR electoral systems does not necessarily mean that they are democratic and arrange free and fair elections. The coding rather follows from the formal electoral rules written in the constitution. Various degrees of proportionality and majoritarianism are not captured by this variable. This is difficult to measure, and the distinction between proportional and majoritarian electoral systems is common both theoretically and empirically. It is therefore also used here.

To investigate the effect of presidential versus parliamentary systems, Banks’ Cross-National Time-Series Data Archive (2010) is applied. The variable measures the selection of the effective executive, which is defined as “the individual who exercises primary influence in the shaping of most major decisions affecting the nation’s internal and external affairs” (Banks

---

40 This information was received by personal contact with Lars-Erik Cederman (12.03.2013).
41 This was necessary in order to get a reliable and complete measure for countries’ electoral systems in the whole period 1946–2008, as the variables of the Institutions and Elections Project (IAEP) (Regan and Clark 2010), Norris’ Democracy Time-Series Dataset (2009), and the Database of Political Institutions (DPI) (Beck et al. 2001), among others, are incomplete and inconsistent. References for each particular country are available upon request.
2010). It is divided into three categories. The reference category is direct election of the effective executive by popular vote or committed delegates, as in presidential systems. The other categories are indirect elections of the executive, including selection by an elected assembly such as in parliamentary systems, and non-elective executive, implying that the executive does not have either direct or indirect mandate from the people.

Systems with direct election of the executive, but where the parliament nevertheless has power to approve and remove the executive, are coded as having indirect elections. Israel, which had direct elections of prime minister in 1996, 1999, and 2001, is for example coded as having indirect election of the effective executive for the whole period of study. This is because the parliament still had the ability to remove the prime minister, and had to approve its installation (Longely and Hazan 1999). This is also a time-varying variable. In countries with missing observations, values are spread from previous or following years if the Polity2 index does not change with more than three values from one year to the next. This goes for 40 observations.

The variable for federalism is a time-varying dummy variable with the value 1 for constitutional federal states and the value 0 for unitary or non-federal states. This is also coded independently based on information from the United Cities and Local Governments (2009) and the Forum of Federations. Since it is difficult to measure the degree of decentralization, this dichotomous measure is used. 15 countries and 12 percent of the observations constitute federal states.

---

42 This also includes the book “Federalism: An Introduction” written by Anderson (2008).
4.1.3. Control Variables

Five additional variables are included as controls. The first is the logarithm of population size, created by Strand et al. (2012). Since the definition of conflict depends on the death threshold, populous countries are more likely to experience civil conflict and must be controlled for (Hegre and Sambanis 2006). The second control variable is the number of previous conflict episodes that have occurred in the country. This ranges from 0 to 6 and is included to account for the repeatability of events, as recommended by Box-Steffensmeier and Jones (2004). Unobserved heterogeneity among conflict episodes is thereby accounted for.


The fourth control variable is the logarithm of constant dollar GDP per capita. This variable is taken from Strand et al. (2012) and involves a combination of data from Madddison (2007), World Bank (2011), and Gleditsch (2002). It is theorized that high-income populations have more to lose and less general dissatisfaction and grievance than low-income populations, and that governments in economically developed countries have higher state capacity and are better able to counter insurgencies (e.g. Collier and Hoeffler 1998, 2004, Fearon and Laitin 2003, Buhaug 2006). People in high-income countries might therefore be less willing to support sustained armed conflict, and the governments might be able to stop rebellion more quickly, leading to shorter wars. Collier et al. (2004: 262) also state that conflicts last longer where average income is low. This must therefore be controlled for.

---

It must be noted here that several additional control variables have been tested for. These include various functions and measures of ethnic, religious, and linguistic heterogeneity. However, since these are very far from significant and do not change the results, they are not included in the thesis. Good cross-country measures of aspects such as external financial support and military capacity do currently not exist and can therefore not be included.
Lastly, natural resource production is a time-constant dummy variable based on the various variables of Lujala (2010). It gives the value 1 to countries that have had production of diamonds, gemstone, oil, or hydrocarbon, in the period 1946-2003. Countries with natural resource production can be expected to have longer conflicts, due to stronger financial incentives to engage in conflict, more at stake, and increased value of controlling the government (Fearon 2004, Ross 2004a, Le Billon 2001).

In the data for Israel, the GDP per capita as well as the population variables do not include information on the Palestinian territories occupied in 1967. If these territories were included, GDP per capita would have been lower and population size larger than they are in the measures used here (UN Data 2011). These variables are nevertheless used because they ensure comparable data. The incomplete measures for Israel on these variables are nevertheless taken into consideration in the analysis of Israel in the quantitative model.

Descriptive statistics for the explanatory and control variables are shown in Table 1. I now continue to discuss the qualitative method and data used in the thesis.

Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of Variables in the Analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Obs.</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Dev.</th>
<th>Min</th>
<th>Max</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Democracy index</td>
<td>1220</td>
<td>-0.098</td>
<td>6.520</td>
<td>-10</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Excluded and discriminated population</td>
<td>1225</td>
<td>0.188</td>
<td>0.190</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electoral system</td>
<td>1261</td>
<td>0.684</td>
<td>0.873</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Selection of the effective executive</td>
<td>1139</td>
<td>1.951</td>
<td>0.824</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federal state</td>
<td>1261</td>
<td>0.124</td>
<td>0.329</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ln(Population)</td>
<td>1260</td>
<td>16.769</td>
<td>1.411</td>
<td>12.835</td>
<td>20.861</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Previous conflicts</td>
<td>1261</td>
<td>1.075</td>
<td>1.314</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East</td>
<td>1261</td>
<td>0.158</td>
<td>0.365</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ln(GDP per capita)</td>
<td>1244</td>
<td>7.444</td>
<td>0.988</td>
<td>5.330</td>
<td>10.353</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natural resource production</td>
<td>1244</td>
<td>0.818</td>
<td>0.386</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

45 More information about the coding rules used for the natural resource variables is found in Lujala (2010).
4.2. Qualitative Method and Data

Following the quantitative analysis of the general causes of conflict duration, a case study of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is conducted. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is the most extreme case when it comes to conflict duration in the post-World War II period. In addition to being extreme in its duration, it is also regularly regarded as being a deviant, influential, as well as a crucial case in the existing literature (see e.g. Bercovitch and Kadayifci 2002, Milanovic 2007, Cohen 2005). This involves many of the case types described by Gerring (2007). However, is it really such a special case? This is to be explored in both the qualitative as well as the second part of the quantitative analyses.

Expert, or elite, interviews are here used in the qualitative part to examine how general causes of conflict endurance affect the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This is a special type of interviewing that is employed when interpretive knowledge, “know why”, or procedural knowledge, “know-how”, is central to the research (Littig 2009, Bogner and Menz 2009). It is not the experts themselves that are the research objects, but rather their knowledge and interpretations (Bogner and Menz 2009: 72).

Fourteen in-depth interviews with Israeli and Palestinian politicians and experts are used. These were conducted during fieldwork in Israel and Palestine in February 2013. The interviewees were purposely selected based on their knowledge of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

---

46 According to Gerring (2007: Chapter 5), extreme cases are those with extreme or unusual values on dependent or independent variables. Deviant cases are poorly explained and deviate from some general cross-case relationship. Influential cases have influential configurations on the explanatory variables and often also appear to invalidate or cast doubt on theory. Crucial cases are those that are most or least likely to fulfill some theoretical prediction. From a theoretical perspective, all of these types of cases appear to fit the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

47 Many have, however, warned against such case selection on the dependent variable (see e.g. Geddes 1990, King et al. 1994) and “cherry picking” a case instead of random selection (see e.g. Fearon and Laitin 2008). The main argument is that this can lead to biased conclusions about general causal effects and mechanisms. However, the purpose of this case study is not to draw universal, generalizable and representative conclusions about the whole range of conflicts. This is done in the preceding quantitative analysis, where the full range of variation of internal armed conflicts is taken into consideration. The case study is rather intended to increase the understanding of the uniqueness of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and reveal case-specific mechanisms that hinder peace.

48 Elites are often defined as the “influential, the prominent, and the well-informed” (Dexter 2006), and experts as people with “technical, process and interpretive knowledge that refers to a specific field of action” (Bogner and Menz 1999).
conflict and the Israeli political system.\textsuperscript{49} These include both Israelis and Palestinians, actors from different sides of the political spectrum, people who are (or have been) involved in politics and the peace process, as well as people who analyze politics and the conflict from a more distant perspective.

All of the interviews are semi-structured. This diverges from structured and unstructured interviews in that it provides for flexibility, but still has some fixed topics to be discussed and questions to be asked. Richards (1996) and Littig (2009) argue that the flexibility that is allowed in semi-structured interviews is particularly important when interviewing experts. Experts have varying time available for interviews, as well as different fields of expertise, which require questions to be adjusted (Richards 1996: 202-203, Littig 2009: 105). I therefore also approached the interviews with a number of broad themes instead of “a rigid set of formal questions”, as recommended by Richards (1996: 202).

Open-ended questions were also primarily asked in the interviews. This provides the interviewees with adequate space to express their views and lets them introduce topics that they consider to be relevant. It also makes it easier to avoid the concern of putting “words in the mouth of respondents” (Rathbun 2008: 693). The interviewees were asked to share their perspectives on the causes of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict’s endurance, and if and how Israeli political institutions have contributed to prolonging it. More specific statements were also inquired when necessary.

The interviews were held in English and were mostly about one hour long. Tape recorder was deliberately not used to let the respondents speak more freely and make the interview situation more natural. This was also done because of the delicacy of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, where nearly all words and topics are regarded as political and controversial. Detailed notes were nevertheless taken during the interviews, and these have been transcribed systematically afterwards in order to ensure reliability. The transcribed material consists of about 1000-2000 words per interview. This material is available upon request.

\textsuperscript{49} The selection of respondents is based on a non-probability sampling basis, as recommended by Tansey (2007: 765) and Littig (2009: 103). Elite or expert sampling “does not adhere to quantitative conceptions of representativity, since there is no clearly defined pool of experts and members of the elite from which a sample might be chosen” (Littig 2009: 103). In elite and expert interviews, samples are rather set by the research field and research goals (Littig 2009).
In-depth interviews were chosen over other qualitative methods such as surveys and studies of secondary sources, archives, and memoirs, because few available sources deal with the specific topic that is relevant to this study. Interviews are superior in that they allow direct questions to be asked to people with essential knowledge about the theme of study. As Rathbun (2008: 691) also states, other methods require more “interpretation, raising the reliability issue to a greater degree than in interviewing. Interviewing has the advantage of being perhaps the most directed and targeted method in the qualitative arsenal”.

As King et al. (1994: 112) highlight, answers from interviews “must be interpreted as the interviewee’s response to the researcher’s question, not necessarily as the correct answer”. Richards (1996: 201) also stresses that the information which interviewees supply is often very subjective, and that elite interviews, by their nature, provide subjective accounts. This does not harm this study, however, as opinions and perspectives, not facts or correct answers, are of primary interest. The interviews serve to support or weaken, illustrate, and nuance, the findings in the general quantitative analysis. They are not intended to establish “the objective truth” or to prove any causal relationship. Since subjects’ points of view are of interest, the potential problem of not getting totally neutral facts “doesn’t loom as large” (Berry 2002: 680). Elite members’ opinions, perspectives, and understandings, are perhaps especially valuable since these might also have influenced political developments to some extent.

Interviews have also been criticized for being dependent on, and distorted by, communication and so-called interaction effects (see e.g. Meuser and Nagel 1991, Vogel 1995, Krafft and Ulich 1995, in Bogner and Menz 2009: 56). As Bogner and Menz (2009: 57) highlight, statements that are made in interviews are not, and cannot be, completely independent of context. They are “also a function of the communication structure” (Bogner and Menz 2009: 57). Dexter (2006: 115) also states that “interviewing is a social relationship and the interviewer is part of the relationship”. It is therefore not given that interviewees will give the same statements to different interviewers or even to the same interviewer at a different time (Berry 2002: 681).

As Bogner and Menz (2009: 73) argue, however, we must abandon the idea that there is a perfect communication situation with a minimum degree distortion. Data cannot be produced in “laboratory-like conditions”. Communication should rather be regarded as “constructive and even productive components” of interviews (Bogner and Menz 2009: 70). In the
interpretation of interviews, “we need to reflect that the data cannot be understood as an expression of abstract, general “expert knowledge” but also as a variable produced by the interaction, and that the interviewee’s statements are responses to a person seen as having concrete competences and interests – and thus as statements that would have been different had the interviewee had a different perception of the interviewer” (Bogner and Menz 2009: 70).

A list of respondents is shown in Table 2, and a short description of each of the interviewees, and why they are relevant to this study, is given in the following text. This information is useful to keep in mind when turning to the qualitative analysis in Chapter 6. All respondents were aware of the purpose of the interviews and accepted that their statements would be used in the master’s thesis. It must be noted that Yoni Eshpar, public director of Gisha, and Daniel Sherman, public director of B’Tselem, share their own personal perspectives and not necessarily their organizations’. Following professional codes of ethics (see e.g. King and Horrocks 2010: 108), all interviewees will be sent a copy of the finished thesis.

The first respondent, Dr. Menachem Klein, is a senior lecturer in political science at Ban Ilan University. He is a signatory and negotiator of the Geneva Accord, a draft Final Status Agreement developed by Israelis and Palestinians in 2003. He has worked as an advisor to the Israeli President, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and the Prime Minister’s Office, and has published the books “The Shift: Israel-Palestine from Border Struggle to Ethnic Conflict” (2010) and “A Possible Peace Between Israel & Palestine: An Insider’s Account of the Geneva Initiative” (2007).

The second interviewee, Daniel Sherman, is public director at B’Tselem, the Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories. B’Tselem distributes information and analyses to the Israeli public and government institutions in order to change Israeli policy in the Occupied Territories and ensure protection of human rights in accordance with international law (B’Tselem 2010).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Menachem Klein</td>
<td>Bar Ilan University/ Geneva Initiative</td>
<td>Negotiator and signatory of the Geneva Accord, political advisor to President Ehud Barak, external expert adviser for Jerusalem Affairs and Israel-PLO Final Status Talks to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, member of the political advisory team operating in Prime Minister's Office, Senior Lecturer in Political Science</td>
<td>7.02.13</td>
<td>Jerusalem</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daniel Sherman</td>
<td>B’Tselem</td>
<td>Public director</td>
<td>10.02.13</td>
<td>Jerusalem</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr. George Giacaman</td>
<td>Muwatin (Palestinian Institute for the Study of Democracy)</td>
<td>Director</td>
<td>12.02.13</td>
<td>Ramallah</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khalil Shaheen</td>
<td>Masarat (The Palestinian Center for Policy Research &amp; Strategic Studies)</td>
<td>Editor, journalist, political analyst, research director at Masarat</td>
<td>14.02.13</td>
<td>Al-Bireh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Noam Sheizaf</td>
<td>+972 magazine</td>
<td>Journalist and editor</td>
<td>18.02.13</td>
<td>Tel Aviv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lior Amihai</td>
<td>Peace Now Settlement Watch</td>
<td>Spokesman</td>
<td>19.02.13</td>
<td>Tel Aviv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ilan Baruch</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs</td>
<td>Ambassador</td>
<td>19.02.13</td>
<td>Tel Aviv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yoni Eshpar</td>
<td>Gisha</td>
<td>Public director</td>
<td>20.02.13</td>
<td>Tel Aviv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Basem Ezbidi</td>
<td>Birzeit University</td>
<td>Assistant professor in political science</td>
<td>25.02.13</td>
<td>Birzeit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Betty Herschman</td>
<td>Ir-Amim</td>
<td>Director of international relations and advocacy</td>
<td>25.02.13</td>
<td>Jerusalem</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prof. Gideon Rahat</td>
<td>Hebrew University</td>
<td>Professor in political science</td>
<td>26.02.13</td>
<td>Jerusalem</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gideon Levy</td>
<td>Haaretz</td>
<td>Journalist/columnist/commentator</td>
<td>27.02.13</td>
<td>Tel Aviv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Yair Hirschfeld</td>
<td>Economic Cooperation Foundation (ECF)/ Haifa University</td>
<td>Key architect and negotiator of the Oslo process and the Beilin-Abu Mazen agreement, Co-founder and Director General of ECF, Senior Lecturer at the Department of Middle East Studies at Haifa University</td>
<td>28.02.13</td>
<td>Netanya</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The third respondent, Dr. George Giacaman, is director at Muwatin, the Palestinian Institute for the Study of Democracy, in Ramallah. Muwatin seeks to contribute to democratic transformation and reform in Palestine through policy directed research, networking and activism, and by arranging training workshops, seminars, and public education campaigns. Dr. Giacaman has edited the book “After Oslo: New Realities, Old Problems” (1998).  

The fourth interviewee, Khalil Shaheen, is research director at Masarat, the Palestinian Center for Policy Research & Strategic Studies, in Al-Bireh in the West Bank. He is the editor of the Palestinian Supplement in the Lebanese newspaper As Safir, and edits and writes for several other Arabic-language periodicals and newspapers on political, social, and other issues related to Palestine and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The fifth respondent, Noam Sheizaf, is an Israeli journalist and editor of the +972 Magazine. He writes on political and conflict-related issues, and has previously worked for the Israeli newspapers Ynet and Maariv, and served in the Israel Defense Forces (IDF).

The sixth interviewee, Loir Amihai, is spokesman for Peace Now’s Settlement Watch. Peace Now works to promote peace and a viable solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict through public campaigns, distribution of educational materials, and by arranging conferences, surveys, dialogue groups, and demonstrations. They are well-known for the Settlement Watch project, which monitors and protests settlement building in the West Bank and East Jerusalem by distributing data and maps on the developments on the ground. The seventh interviewee, Ilan Baruch, is a retired Israeli Ambassador with a 36 year long diplomatic career. He has served as Ambassador to countries such as South Africa and the Philippines, and was a part of the Israeli delegation to the Oslo Accords. He now works as an independent diplomat and as a policy advisor to the Israeli political party the Meretz.

Moshe Arens, the eighth respondent, was a Member of the Knesset for Likud in the period 1974-1982, and served as Ambassador to the United States from 1982 to 1983. He has been Israel’s Minister of Foreign Affairs (1988-1990) as well as the country’s Minister of Defense (1983-1984, 1990-1992, and 1999). He has also served as Minister without Portfolio (1984-1988). He now regularly writes op-eds for the Israeli newspaper the Haaretz, which also has an English edition.

50 Written together with Dag Jørund Lønning.
The ninth respondent, Yoni Eshpar, is the public director at Gisha, the Legal Center for Freedom and Movement. They work to protect the freedom of movement of Palestinians, particularly Gaza residents, and to promote rights that are guaranteed by international and Israeli law. Privately, he runs a blog in Hebrew and has written the critical article “It’s Time to Bury Peace Studies” (09.05.2012).\textsuperscript{51}

Dr. Basem Ezbidi, the tenth interviewee, is assistant professor in political science at the Birzeit University in the West Bank. He has written book chapters such as “PNA Political Institutions and the Future State Formation” (2004) and “Hamas and Palestinian Statehood” (2007).\textsuperscript{52} Betty Herschman is the eleventh respondent. She is the director of international relations and advocacy at Ir-Amim (City of Nations). The organization focuses on Jerusalem in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and works to make the city more viable and equitable for its Israeli and Palestinian residents.

Professor Gideon Rahat is the twelfth interviewee. He is professor in political science at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem, director of research at the Political Reform Project at Israel Democracy Institute (IDI), and leads Israel Democracy Institute’s research team of the Forum for Political Reform in Israel. Professor Rahat is an expert on comparative politics, electoral systems, and electoral reform, and has written the book “Reforming Israel’s Political System” (2013),\textsuperscript{53} the book chapter “Israel: The Politics of an Extreme Electoral System” (2005),\textsuperscript{54} and the article “Israeli Political Parties and Settlements” (2010).\textsuperscript{55}

The thirteenth interview candidate is Gideon Levy, a well-known Israeli journalist writing for the Israeli newspaper the Haaretz. He writes on Israeli politics and issues related to the

\textsuperscript{51} In the article, Eshpar criticizes the simplistic and naïve Galtungian school of conflict resolution: “Those of us who live in conflict-ridden societies would benefit the most from an end to this era of Galtungian conflict resolution. We rarely gained anything from those distant university courses in conflict resolution and peace building. Perhaps we will at last be free of Galtung’s theories, which only nurture false notions of peace as a harmonious, justice-dripping Nirvana, of federalism as a magic solution for every problem, and of nonviolent resistance as a substitute for the political art of negotiation and compromise.”

\textsuperscript{52} The first is written with Inge Amundsen in the book “State Formation in Palestine: Viability and Governance During a Social Transformation”, edited by Mushtaq Husain Khan. The second is written with Are Knudsen in the book “Where Now for Palestine?: The Demise of the Two State Solution”, edited by Jamil Hilal.

\textsuperscript{53} Written with Shlomit Barnea, Chen Friedberg and Ofer Kening.


\textsuperscript{55} Written with Reuven Y. Hazan, in the Encyclopedia of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, edited by Cheryl A. Rubenberg.
occupation and the conflict. Dr. Yair Hirschfeld, the fourteenth and last respondent, is a key architect of the Oslo process. He was a member of the Israeli team that prepared and negotiated the Declaration of Principles (DOP) of 1993 and the Beilin-Abu Mazen agreement in 1995, a draft and not-binding Permanent Status Agreement. Dr. Hirschfeld is also co-founder and Director General of the Economic Cooperation Foundation (ECF), an Israeli think-tank devoted to promote peace and a two-state solution. He is a senior lecturer at the department of Middle East Studies at Haifa University and currently works on a new book titled “Israel and Palestine Between Violence and Peace-Making: Thirty Years of Multi-Track Diplomacy”.

These interviewees involve a relatively mixed group of people. Dr. Giacaman, Shaheen, and Dr. Ezbidi represent the Palestinians, while the rest of the respondents are Israelis. The Israeli interviewees also constitute a quite heterogeneous sample, including a right-wing politician and previous minister in the government (Arens), a career diplomat and civil servant (Baruch), representatives of peace and human rights organizations (Sherman, Amihai, Eshpar and Hershman), academics (Prof. Rahat, Dr. Klein, Dr. Hirschfeld), journalists (Levi and Sheizaf), and peace negotiators (Dr. Hirschfeld and Dr. Klein).

As previously mentioned, these interviewees were selected due to their expertise and knowledge of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as well as the Israeli political system. The interviews analyzed in Chapter 6 serve to broaden the understanding of how general causes of conflict endurance apply to the Israeli-Palestinian context. Are political institutional arrangements such as democratic quality, PR and parliamentarism, and federalism, relevant in order to understand the conflict’s duration? If they are, how have they worked to affect its continuation? These are central questions to be answered.

---

4.3. Summary

This thesis uses a “mixed-method strategy”, combining quantitative and qualitative methods. The first part of the analysis is a survival data analysis. The quantitative model reveals the general effects of political institutions, as well as of control variables, on conflict duration for internal armed conflicts in the period 1946-2008. Two measures of democratic quality are used, namely the Polity2 democracy index and the proportion of excluded and discriminated population. The effect of PR is compared to majoritarian elections, and systems with indirect election of the effective executive, which usually are parliamentary systems, are compared to direct elections, i.e. presidentialism. The federal state variable is a dummy that separates federal states from non-federal states.

The second part of the analysis is a case study of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. After studying the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in the general model, in-depth interviews with 14 Israeli and Palestinian experts and politicians are used to broaden the understanding of its uniqueness. The next section of the thesis deals with the results from the quantitative analysis. Thereafter follows the empirical results from the qualitative interviews.
5. Quantitative Empirical Analysis: The Duration of Internal Armed Conflicts

In this chapter, the general results from the quantitative analysis of political institutions and conflict endurance are studied. First, the results from the Cox proportional hazard model are shown and discussed. Thereafter, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is studied in the general model. Israel’s values on the independent variables, its deviance from the model, as well as its influence on the results, are then discussed. Since countries with internal conflict, rather than conflict dyads, are the units of analysis in this study, I refer to Israel rather than to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict when discussing the case in this section.57

5.1. Results from the Cox Proportional Hazard Model

The results from the Cox proportional hazard model of the duration of internal armed conflicts are displayed in Table 3.58 A description of how to interpret coefficients and hazard ratios in survival data analyses is given on page 33. Robust standard errors are clustered on country, and significance levels are shown for two-tailed tests.

When it comes to the first measure of democratic quality, namely the level of democracy, the results show that the effect of democracy level is not significant (p=0.35) and therefore difficult to separate from zero. The coefficient is nevertheless marginally negative, implying that conflicts last longer in countries with higher levels of democracy. This is surprising and goes against the first hypothesis that conflicts are prolonged in undemocratic systems. The other measures of democracy, such as SIP (Strand et al. 2012) and Vanhanen’s index (2005), produce approximately the same results.59 The democracy index coefficient remains negative and not significant when the other institutional variables are taken out of the analysis, and when Israel is removed. There are no signs of a curvilinear effect of democracy on conflict duration.60

57 This nevertheless denotes to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, as opposition groups in Israel, involving the occupied territories since 1967, have been engaged in, and fought over, the Palestinian issue. As already emphasized, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is a special case of an internal armed conflict since it involves an occupation. Nevertheless, because Israel has had de facto control over the Palestinian territories occupied in 1967, these areas are regarded as a part of an internal armed conflict in Israel from then on.
58 Interaction terms are not included here because they do not reveal any significant and theoretically interesting effects. An Israel-dummy has also been tested, both with and without censored conflict termination. The results from including the Israel-dummy are nevertheless not plausible and are therefore not included here.
59 See Table A-1 in the Appendix (page 104).
60 See Figure A-1 in the Appendix (page 105).
Table 3: Cox Regression of the Duration of Internal Armed Conflicts: 1946-2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>S.E.</th>
<th>P-value</th>
<th>Hazard ratio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Democracy index</strong></td>
<td>-0.011</td>
<td>0.012</td>
<td>0.354</td>
<td>0.989</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Excluded and discriminated population</strong></td>
<td>-1.101</td>
<td>0.472</td>
<td>0.020</td>
<td>0.333</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Electoral system</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Majoritarian (Ref. cat.)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportional representation</td>
<td>-0.448</td>
<td>0.192</td>
<td>0.019</td>
<td>0.639</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No institutionalized elections</td>
<td>-0.136</td>
<td>0.263</td>
<td>0.605</td>
<td>0.873</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Selection of the effective executive</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Direct election (Ref. cat.)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indirect election</td>
<td>-0.475</td>
<td>0.186</td>
<td>0.011</td>
<td>0.622</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-elective</td>
<td>-0.102</td>
<td>0.159</td>
<td>0.520</td>
<td>0.903</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Federal state</strong></td>
<td>0.574</td>
<td>0.215</td>
<td>0.007</td>
<td>1.776</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In (Population)</td>
<td>-0.165</td>
<td>0.082</td>
<td>0.044</td>
<td>0.848</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Previous conflicts</td>
<td>0.205</td>
<td>0.082</td>
<td>0.013</td>
<td>1.228</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East</td>
<td>-0.416</td>
<td>0.221</td>
<td>0.060</td>
<td>0.660</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In (GDP per capita)</td>
<td>0.063</td>
<td>0.081</td>
<td>0.441</td>
<td>1.065</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natural resource production</td>
<td>-0.156</td>
<td>0.154</td>
<td>0.312</td>
<td>0.855</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Time at risk (years)</strong></td>
<td>1057</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Number of countries</strong></td>
<td>87</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Number of failures</strong></td>
<td>170</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log pseudo-likelihood null model</td>
<td>-653.674</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log pseudo-likelihood model</td>
<td>-634.888</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>AIC</strong></td>
<td>1293.776</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: All significance values are for two-tailed tests. S.E. shows robust standard errors, clustered on country.

Despite the non-significant result, the conflict-prolonging effect of democracy is nevertheless in correspondence with much previous research, such as Gleditsch et al. (2009), Lyall (2010), Fearon (2004), and Buhaug et al. (2009). Collier et al. (2004), however, also find a non-significant conflict-shortening effect. The conflict-extending effect can be explained by higher “audience costs” in democracies that can increase governments’ incentives to continue fighting since they can “suffer domestic consequences for making a threat and then not carrying it out” (Weeks 2008: 37). Additionally, “audience costs” can make it harder for governments to totally crush rebels and declare a decisive victory, since incumbent regimes fear punishment by the public for potential consequences such as large-scale civilian losses.

Another reason can be the fact that democracies have more separatist conflicts (Buhaug 2006), since these tend to last longer (see e.g. Balch-Lindsay and Enterline 2000). The costs of continuing fighting can also be smaller in democracies because they usually have fewer
battle-related deaths than dictatorships (Lacina 2006, Gleditsch et al. 2009). Lastly, the estimate can be due to endogeneity problems since democracies typically reveal more information about conflict occurrences and the number of battle-related deaths than authoritarian regimes (Strand 2006: 148-149). Authoritarian states can therefore appear more peaceful in comparison to democracies than they actually are.

Related to the second measure of democratic quality, namely exclusion and discrimination, the second coefficient in the model shows that higher proportions of discriminated and excluded people increase the probability of sustained conflict. This is in accordance with the first hypothesis. This indicates that it is not the general level of democracy that mainly matters for grievances and rebels’ willingness to continue fighting, but rather the degree to which significant groups are excluded from political power as well as discriminated against. The hazard ratio shows that with a one percent increase in the proportion of excluded and discriminated population, the probability of conflict termination is reduced by 67 percent. This is significant at the five percent level with a two-tailed test (p=0.02). This also indicates that it is not democracy per se that has a peaceful and conflict-moderating effect, but rather the absence of political exclusion and systematic discrimination.

The democracy index and the exclusion and discrimination variable are negatively correlated, but only weakly (-0.17). 

61 This implies that although groups have formal political rights and are usually represented in parliaments in democratic states, they can still be excluded from government power. Exclusion of groups from central power can also occur in democracies (see e.g. Taylor 1998, Horowitz 1993).

When it comes to the second hypothesis about the conflict-extending effect of proportional electoral systems and parliamentarism, the results show that PR and indirect election of the effective executive significantly decrease the probability of conflict termination as compared to majoritarian systems and direct election of the executive. Systems with indirect elections of the effective executive are mostly parliamentary systems, while systems with direct elections are presidential systems. This is also in line with Thyne (2012), who finds that civil wars in parliamentary systems last significantly longer than in presidential systems. These variables are significant at the five percent level (p=0.02 and p=0.01). 62

61 See correlation matrix in Table A-2, Appendix (page 106).
62 The effects of these institutional arrangements do not vary significantly between democracy levels.
This supports the second hypothesis that proportional representation and parliamentary systems increase the probability that conflicts will endure. It also strengthens the theoretical argument that PR and parliamentarism increase the presence of extreme parties in the political system and the number of, and distance between, veto players in coalition governments. This can in turn produce extreme policies, government inertia, and problems changing the status quo, as stated in the theory chapter. In the specific context of ongoing violent conflicts, these institutions therefore appear to have the opposite effect of what Lijphart projects.63

Contrary to the third hypothesis that federalism extends conflict, the Cox regression model shows that federalism rather increases the probability of conflict termination as compared to unitary states. This is in accordance with Lijphart’s arguments that federalism promotes peace. It is also in line with the findings of Gleditsch et al. (2009). The coefficient is significant at the one percent level. The hazard ratio shows that conflicts in federal states have 78 percent higher chance of ending than conflicts in unitary states.

In opposition to the theoretical mechanisms discussed previously, federal arrangements can reduce grievances and the willingness to rebel by providing sub-national groups with institutional channels for voicing their demands. It can also give them better control over policy outcomes and important matters for their interests and identities (Bakke and Wibbles 2006: 2, Saideman et al. 2002, Rothchild and Hartzell 2007: 259). Additionally, less is at stake “when determining who controls the state” in federal systems than in centralized systems (Stewart 2008: 20-21). This can reduce the willingness to fight over the central government as well as for secession. Federalism can thereby also ease incentives for continued rebellion, which can lead to shorter conflicts.

The security concerns of minority groups can also be smaller in federal states than in centralized systems. Identification with the state and regional institutions are reinforced (Rothchild and Hartzell 2007: 261), and their control over policy outcomes is bigger. This can in turn make rebel groups more willing to sign peace agreements in federal states. The division of power can also produce stable inter-group relations and strengthen incentives for cooperation with the central state (Rothchild and Hartzell 2007: 254). Additionally, regional

---

63 It must be emphasized that PR and parliamentarism can have other and perhaps more peaceful effects in other contexts, such as in countries without violent incompatibilities or countries in post-conflict stages.
elites in federal systems can benefit from maintaining the existing state instead of seceding (Bakke and Wibbles 2006: 4). In separatist conflicts, this can make elites less supportive of continued conflict.

The first control variable, population, has the expected negative effect on the probability of conflict termination, in line with e.g. Collier et al. (2004). Larger countries with conflict have lower probability of experiencing conflict termination than countries with smaller populations. This is also significant at the five percent level (p=0.04). The coefficient for previous conflicts, the second control variable, shows that preceding conflict episodes increase the probability of conflict termination. This is significant at the five percent level. The third control variable shows that being situated in the Middle East reduces the likelihood of ending conflict, as compared to countries being located in other geographical areas. This is also in accordance with the expectations. The Middle East coefficient is significant at the ten percent level (p=0.06).

The coefficient for GDP per capita shows that conflicts in countries with higher development levels have a better chance of ending than conflicts in low-income countries, as expected, but this effect is not significant (p=0.44). This conflict-shortening effect is in accordance with e.g. Fearon (2004), Buhaug et al. (2009) and Collier et al. (2004). Production of natural resources also has a non-significant conflict-prolonging effect (p=0.31). This is also as anticipated. A conflict-extending effect of natural resources is also found by e.g. Fearon (2004) and Buhaug et al. (2009).

Global tests of the proportional hazard assumption indicate that this assumption is not violated in the model. Individual tests of the proportionality of various covariates also reveal that all covariates except for the electoral system variable fulfill the proportional hazard assumption. When electoral system is interacted with the natural logarithm of time, and

---

64 Fearon (2004) and Buhaug et al. (2009) also find non-significant effects, while Collier et al. (2004) obtain a stronger and significant effect.
65 The link test and Schoenfeld residuals are used for global tests (see e.g. Cleves et al. 2010: 203-209). The test based on Schoenfeld residuals examines if the log hazard ratio function is constant over time. This is here not disconfirmed.
66 These individual tests are conducted with Schoenfeld residuals, interactions with time, as well as with graphical plots.
several other functions of time, the problem of non-proportionality nevertheless appears to be solved.\footnote{Variables that are significant when interacted with some function of time imply that the PH assumption is broken. It is normal to consider p-values lower than 0.05 as indications of violations to the proportional hazards assumption (see e.g. Keele 2010: 194). Interaction with the natural logarithm of time is most often used, but “any other functions of time that can occur to you” should also be tested, according to Cleves et al. (2010: 205). When interacted with the log of time, the p-value of electoral system is 0.09. With other functions of time, such as time$^3$, the p-value increases to 0.26. These interactions do not change the results. Graphically, the hazard also looks proportional. The PH assumption does therefore not appear to be broken when it comes to the electoral system variable either.} This does not change the results in any considerable way.

Figure 4 (page 62) and Figure 5 (page 64) display deviant and influential cases. Algeria, Colombia, Myanmar, and the Philippines are the most deviant cases in the dataset, as shown in Figure 4. When these cases are removed, the core results remain highly similar (see Table A-3 in the Appendix).\footnote{The federal state coefficient is here reduced from 0.574 to 0.387, and the p-value increases from 0.007 to 0.061. The coefficient for the population and previous conflicts variables are also weakened and lose significance.} Figure 5 shows that Nicaragua and Indonesia, in addition to several of the abovementioned cases, are quite influential on several of the variables. Removing these in addition to Algeria, Colombia, Myanmar and the Philippines, does not change the main results of considerably (see Table A-4 in the Appendix).\footnote{The federal state coefficient increases to about its original level (0.599) and the significance is normalized (p=0.009). This is also the case for the population coefficient. The previous conflicts coefficient, however, is weak and very far from significant. The negative natural resource production coefficient is strengthened from the original model and the p-value decreases (0.312 to 0.092).} Table 4 below (page 66) also shows the results when Israel is removed.

5.2. Israel in the General Model

I now turn to the analysis of Israel in the general Cox model to investigate how unique the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is. This analysis is divided into three parts. First, to answer how unique and special the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is in relation to the general results described above, as well as in relation to other conflicts, I study Israel’s values on independent variables and compare these to other cases. Second, in order to reveal how well Israel, i.e. the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, fits the general model, and how good the model is to explain its long duration, I investigate deviance residuals. The third section deals with something quite different from the first two. It concerns how important Israel is, and if the general results and the literature can be affected by this particular case. To answer this, I study DFBETA scores, also called score residuals.
5.2.1. Israel’s Values on the Independent Variables

Israel’s values on the democracy index are 9 and 10 for the whole conflict period,\textsuperscript{70} and the average proportion of excluded and discriminated population in Israel, including the occupied territories after 1967, is 30 percent (Cederman et al. 2009). Israel has a proportional electoral system, indirect elections of the effective executive throughout the conflict period 1949-2008, and it is not a federal state.\textsuperscript{71} On the control variables, the average log of population is of 15.1 for Israel. It has not had any previous conflicts in the time period of the study. The case is also located in the Middle East, has an average log of GDP per capita of 9.1, and has some natural resource production.

According to the general results in Table 3, high levels of democracy, like Israel’s values of 9 and 10, also marginally prolong conflict, although this effect is not significant. Israel is far from the only case with high democracy levels (scores of 7-10) and long continuous conflict periods. Other countries include Colombia (45 years), India (30 years), Turkey (25 years), and the United Kingdom (21 years). Myanmar also had a high democracy score for 13 of the 55 years of continuous conflict,\textsuperscript{72} and the Philippines for 21 of the 40 years of conflict.

On the second variable, the proportion of excluded and discriminated population, Israel has quite high scores for most of the conflict period. The proportion was 14 percent in the period 1949-1966, but increased to 38 in 1967 when Israel annexed Jerusalem and started the occupation of the West Bank and Gaza. Since then, it has been between 35 and 38 percent. In comparison, the overall sample mean is 19 percent. This high average score indicates that Israel is not atypical on this variable. According to the general model, higher values also strongly and significantly extend conflicts.

Exclusion and discrimination appears to be relevant for other cases as well. Other countries with long continuous conflicts and high proportions of exclusion and discrimination include Colombia (45 years of non-stop conflict and 20 percent excluded and discriminated

\textsuperscript{70} These democracy values do not take the occupied Palestinian territories into account.

\textsuperscript{71} As previously mentioned, Israel is coded as having indirect election of the effective executive also for 1996, 1999 and 2001, when the prime minister was elected in direct elections. This is because the legislature still had to approve the prime minister and maintained the power to call for new elections.

\textsuperscript{72} Myanmar is coded as having high democracy scores in the period 1948-1961. The conflict period lasts from 1948 to 2003.
population), Guatemala (31 years, 20-39 percent), Ethiopia (29 years, 59 percent), Angola (28 years, 55 percent), Sudan (26 years, 43 percent), Iraq (24 years, 40-72 percent), South Africa (23 years, 35 percent), Peru (18 years, 28 percent), Uganda (14 and 15 years, and 24-54 percent), and Rwanda (12 years, 42-84 percent). Since this seems to be generally important for conflicts’ duration, it is also likely that it has affected the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

The average democracy score for countries with exclusion and discrimination above the sample mean (19 percent) is -1.12. This is far below Israel’s democracy scores of 9 and 10. This indicates that the combination of a high democracy level as well as a large proportion of excluded and discriminated population is quite special for Israel. However, Colombia, Peru, Sudan and Myanmar also have democracy scores over 7, as well as above-average proportions of excluded and discriminated population, for many of the years in conflict.

Proportional electoral systems and indirect elections of the effective executive generally increase the probability of conflict continuation in comparison to majoritarian elections and direct elections of the executive. In addition to Israel, countries with PR and long continuous conflict include Colombia (45 years), Turkey (25 years), Sri Lanka (18 years), Algeria (18 years), Peru (18 years), Indonesia (18 years), Burundi (13 years), El Salvador (13 years), and Rwanda (12 years). Countries with indirect election of the effective executive and long conflicts include India (30 years), Turkey (25 years), the United Kingdom (21 years), South Africa (23 years), Indonesia (18 years), and Myanmar.\(^7^3\) Turkey and Indonesia have also, along with Israel, both PR and parliamentarism, as well as relatively long-lasting conflicts. Considering the general and significant conflict-prolonging effects of these institutional arrangements, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict’s endurance is not particularly surprising.

When it comes to federalism, Israel is not a federal state, as already mentioned. It rather has centralized control over most of the area between the Mediterranean Sea and the Jordan River. Compared to federal states, unitary and centralized arrangements also significantly prolong conflicts, according to the general results. Most of the long-lasting conflicts in the dataset are indeed unitary states. Again, this indicates that the causes of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict’s endurance are not unique.

\(^7^3\) Myanmar is coded as having indirect election of the effective executive for 26 of 55 years of conflict. This includes the years 1948-1961 and 1974-1987. The executive was non-elective for the rest of the period.
Israel is also situated in the Middle East, along with countries like Turkey with 25 years of continuous conflict and Iraq with 24 years of non-stop conflict. Being located in the Middle East also increases the probability of conflict continuation, according to the general model. Israel does not have previous internal conflicts either, although this is hardly possible in the time period of this study, starting in 1946. It must be noted here that the Israeli-Palestinian area has a long history of conflict that is not captured in the analysis due to the restricted time period. If the time period of the study was extended, previous conflicts in Israel/Palestine would probably have been revealed. Israel also has some natural resource production, which also prolongs conflicts, according to the model.

The only aspect that, according to the model, is untypical for the enduring Israeli-Palestinian conflict is the high level of economic development in Israel. The mean of the logarithm of GDP per capita is 9.1 for Israel as compared to the overall mean of 7.4. Israel’s values vary from 7.8 to 9.8 in the period 1949-2008. However, the occupied Palestinian territories are not included in this measure, and if they were, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict would be more typical here as well. The effect of GDP per capita on conflict duration is nevertheless not significant. From the last variable in the model, the natural logarithm of population, one would expect a somewhat neutral effect on conflict duration for Israel. Israel has an average of 15.1, as compared to the overall mean of 16.8, excluding Palestinians in the occupied territories. If the Palestinian territories were added to the measure, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict would be more typical here too.

When taking Israel’s values on the independent variables into consideration, it is not surprising that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has lasted for a long time. Israel’s high democracy levels, large proportion of exclusion and discrimination, PR, indirect election of the effective executive, non-federalism, no previous conflict periods, location in the Middle East, and natural resource production, are in fact typical for long-lasting conflicts. Additionally, if the GDP per capita and population variables also had included the occupied Palestinian territories after 1967, Israel’s values would be even more typical.

The combination of so many conflict-prolonging values is nevertheless quite special to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. For example, Israel in the period 1967-2008, and Rwanda from 2000 to 2003, are the only cases that are unitary states with PR, parliamentarism, and
discrimination and exclusion above the sample average.\textsuperscript{74} Given this combination of many conflict-prolonging values, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict could be expected to be lengthy. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is therefore not unique with regards to the variables in the model.

### 5.2.2. Israel’s Deviance from the General Model

Given all of these conflict-prolonging values, I now turn to the question of how well the general model is able to predict the duration of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. To answer this, deviance residuals are studied.\textsuperscript{75} These are rescaled martingale residuals, symmetric around zero (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004: 30). When censoring is light, which is the case here, deviance residuals follow a standard normal distribution (Singer and Willett 2003: 575).\textsuperscript{76}

Figure 4 below shows the deviance residuals plotted against subject number (country ID).\textsuperscript{77} Israel is marked with a circle. Negative residuals imply that the estimated hazard rate is overestimated and that conflicts last longer than they should according to the model. Positive residuals mean that the hazard rate is underestimated, and that conflicts end sooner than expected given the Cox estimates (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004: 130, Therneau et al. 1990: 153). Residual values of zero indicate no deviance from the estimated hazard rate. For well-fitted models, plots of deviance residuals look like white noise and are randomly scattered around zero (StataCorp 2009: 180, Wan et al. 2013: 10).\textsuperscript{78}

\textsuperscript{74} In Bank’s dataset (2010), Rwanda is coded as changing from a non-elective effective executive to indirect elections of the effective executive in 2000, and then again to direct elections in 2003. Rwanda had a Transitional National Assembly in the transitional period 1994-2003, which elected the president in special elections in 2000 (Loyle and Davenport 2008: 14). The assembly then also had considerable powers to oversee the executive branch (Teschner 2002: 9). The new constitution of 2003 introduced direct election of the president.

\textsuperscript{75} Deviance residuals are rescaled martingale residuals, symmetric around zero (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004: 30). Martingale residuals are largely skewed and range from plus one to minus infinitely. Rescaling makes the residuals easier to interpret.

\textsuperscript{76} Less than 25 percent censoring is often regarded as light (see e.g. Therneau et al. 1990).

\textsuperscript{77} Only one value per country is calculated, based on its last record (Cleves et al. 2010: 285).

\textsuperscript{78} This is when censoring is relatively minimal, i.e. less than about 25 percent, which is the case here (Therneau et al. 1990: 154).
The deviance residuals show that Israel has a negative value of about -1.8. This implies that although the Israeli-Palestinian conflict could be expected to last for a long time due to Israel's values on the independent variables, it has continued for even longer than the general Cox model predicts. Israel is also among the six most deviant cases in the sample, along with Algeria, Colombia, Myanmar, the Philippines, and Russia, all of which have negative values. This deviance from the model can be explained in two ways. First, it can be caused by factors that are central and relevant to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict’s duration, which are omitted from the model. Second, the variables included in the model, such as political institutional arrangements, can have affected the conflict in a particularly strong way that the general model does not catch. In other words, the operationalization of the variables in the model can be inadequate.

However, a usual threshold for detecting outliers is the absolute value of 2 (see e.g. Long and Freese 2003 and Luetgert and Dannwolf 2009). According to this measure, Israel’s deviance of -1.8 is not particularly strong or outlying. The probability of being deviant and “too long lasting” is generally also high for countries with long censoring time, such as Israel, as well as the more deviant cases of Myanmar, Colombia, and the Philippines (Nardi and Schemper 1999: 525).
Although Israel’s deviance from the general model might not be particularly strong, the deviance residuals nevertheless indicate that there is a need for a more thorough study of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Further qualitative analysis can therefore be fruitful for the two reasons mentioned above. Various aspects that are not included in the model can have affected the underestimation of the conflict’s duration, and the conflict can have lasted for longer than expected because the independent variables do not capture all characteristics of the phenomena they measure. The operationalization of the variables can be too simple. Before proceeding with the qualitative analysis, the importance of Israel in the quantitative model must be discussed.

5.2.3. Israel’s Influence on Coefficients

As shown above, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict appears to be a typical long-lasting case, for example with the high proportions of excluded and discriminated population, a proportional electoral system, parliamentarism, and non-federalism. However, can the conflict be so special that it affects the whole model and the general results?

To answer this question, I study Israel’s influence on the estimated coefficients in the model. DFBETA scores, also called score residuals, are used for this purpose.79 These DFBETA scores, plotted against conflict duration years, for the covariates in the model are shown in Figure 5 below.80 Israel is marked with circles. For each of the variables, these scores show how coefficients would change if countries were removed from the model (Box-Steppensmeier and Jones 2004: 128). The vertical line is the reference line of 0, which implies no change. Positive values reflect that the observation has a positive effect on the coefficients, meaning that removal leads to a decrease in the coefficients. Large absolute values also indicate high leverage. The DFBETA scores cannot, however, be interpreted as the exact changes in the parameter estimates of deleting cases (Singer and Willett 2003: 582). Table 4 is therefore also included on page 66 below to see the precise changes in the estimates, as well as the significance levels, when Israel is actually removed from the Cox model.

---

79 DFBETA values are based on the first partial derivative of the log-likelihood (Box-Steppensmeier and Jones 2004: 128).
80 All countries only have one observation per covariate.
Figure 5: DFBETA Scores of Influence on the Coefficients
The upper left graph in Figure 5 shows Israel’s influence on the democracy coefficient. This is negative, and removal of Israel would lead to an increase in the coefficient of about 20 percent (0.002). This would make the marginal negative effect of democracy even weaker and closer to zero, but it would still be negative. Quite many other countries have negative influence and the same level of leverage as Israel. Seven countries also have stronger effects on this variable. The upper right graph shows that Israel does not have a great impact on the negative excluded and discriminated population coefficient. Removing Israel would only lead to a marginal reduction in its strength of about one percent (0.017).

As shown in the left graph on the second row in Figure 5, Israel contributes relatively strongly to the conflict-lengthening effect of PR elections as compared to majoritarian elections. PR’s negative coefficient of 0.448 would be weakened by about 10 percent (0.043) if Israel was removed. Actually removing Israel from the model also reveals that the p-value increases from 0.02 to 0.04, as shown in Table 4 below. The negative effect, significant at the five percent level, nevertheless remains. The right graph on the second row shows that Israel’s effect on the coefficient for indirect election of the effective executive is also negative and relatively strong as compared to many other countries. Omitting Israel would lead to a seven percent weakening in the negative coefficient of -0.475 (0.033). Israel does not have a substantial effect on the federal state coefficient, as shown in the third row to the left.

When it comes to the control variables, Israel has a positive effect on population, which is opposite to the general negative effect. Removing Israel would strengthen the negative coefficient of population with about ten percent (-0.016). However, as previously mentioned, the estimates for Israel do not include the Palestinian territories. If they had involved the Palestinian population, Israel’s leverage would probably have been weaker. Israel has a marginal positive effect on the coefficient for previous conflicts, as displayed in the fourth row to the left. Removing Israel would reduce the positive coefficient of 0.205 with three percent (-0.007).

Israel has a very strong and negative effect on the Middle East coefficient. If removed, the coefficient of -0.416 would be weakened with 29 percent (0.120). Although the coefficient is still negative, it is no longer significant under the ten percent level when Israel is omitted (see Table 4). The effect of the Middle East is in other words largely driven by Israel.
The lower left graph shows that Israel has a positive but relatively weak influence on GDP per capita. Removing Israel would lead to a reduction in the coefficient (0.063) of about six percent (0.004). This is a small effect compared to the other countries. However, since Israel’s GDP per capita does not include the Palestinian territories, this leverage estimate is not completely correct. Israel’s influence would probably have been reduced here as well if the Palestinian territories were included. When it comes to the last variable, natural resource production, Israel has a negative and relatively strong impact. As shown in the lower right graph, the coefficient of -0.156 would be weakened with 23 percent (0.036) if Israel was removed. This is one of the six strongest effects in the sample.

Table 4 displayed below largely confirms the information shown by the DFBETA scores, although the effect of removing Israel generally is slightly stronger than the DFBETA scores reveal.

**Table 4: Cox Regression without Israel**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>S.E.</th>
<th>P-value</th>
<th>Hazard ratio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Democracy index</td>
<td>-0.008</td>
<td>0.012</td>
<td>0.503</td>
<td>0.992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Excluded and discriminated population</td>
<td>-1.074</td>
<td>0.468</td>
<td>0.022</td>
<td>0.341</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Electoral system</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Majority</td>
<td>(Ref.cat.)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportional representation</td>
<td>-0.389</td>
<td>0.188</td>
<td>0.039</td>
<td>0.678</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No institutionalized elections</td>
<td>-0.166</td>
<td>0.271</td>
<td>0.539</td>
<td>0.847</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Selection of the effective executive</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Direct election</td>
<td>(Ref.cat.)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indirect election</td>
<td>-0.430</td>
<td>0.183</td>
<td>0.019</td>
<td>0.651</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-elective</td>
<td>-0.095</td>
<td>0.161</td>
<td>0.554</td>
<td>0.909</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federal state</td>
<td>0.582</td>
<td>0.214</td>
<td>0.006</td>
<td>1.790</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ln (Population)</td>
<td>-0.187</td>
<td>0.085</td>
<td>0.029</td>
<td>0.830</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Previous conflicts</td>
<td>0.196</td>
<td>0.084</td>
<td>0.019</td>
<td>1.216</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East</td>
<td>-0.257</td>
<td>0.199</td>
<td>0.198</td>
<td>0.774</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ln (GDP per capita)</td>
<td>0.058</td>
<td>0.082</td>
<td>0.481</td>
<td>1.059</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natural resource production</td>
<td>-0.108</td>
<td>0.152</td>
<td>0.478</td>
<td>0.898</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Time at risk (years)</strong></td>
<td>997</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Number of countries</strong></td>
<td>86</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Number of failures</strong></td>
<td>170</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log pseudo-likelihood null model</td>
<td>-648.625</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log pseudo-likelihood model</td>
<td>-632.870</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIC</td>
<td>1289.741</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
This shows that the results in the general model largely remain the same when Israel is removed from the sample, implying that the results are not driven by Israel alone. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is therefore not as special as one might assume. Israel nevertheless has a quite substantial impact on several of the covariates. Omitting Israel would result in over ten percent change for the coefficients for democracy, PR, population, Middle East, and natural resource production. Israel’s influence is strongest when it comes to the Middle East variable. If Israel was excluded from the sample, the conflict-prolonging effect of this covariate would be substantially weakened, and no longer significant at the ten percent level.

5.3. Summary

The quantitative analysis has indicated, first, that higher levels of democracy prolong conflicts, although this effect is not significant. Additionally, larger proportions of exclusion and discrimination strongly and significantly extend conflicts. This implies that in the context of ongoing conflicts, it is not high levels of democracy that promote peace, but rather low shares of excluded and discriminated population. PR and indirect elections of the effective executive, which in most cases are parliamentary systems, also significantly extend conflicts. This is in line with the second hypothesis. It indicates that Lijphart’s claim that these institutions moderate conflicts does not hold in this context of ongoing armed conflicts. Federalism, however, shortens conflicts in line with Lijphart’s theory and in contrast to the third hypothesis.

Israel’s values on the independent variables are typical for long-lasting conflicts. Israel has a high democracy level and a large share of excluded and discriminated population. It also has a proportional electoral system, parliamentarism, and a non-federal arrangement. On most of the control variables, Israel also has values that would indicate extended conflict. The deviance residuals nevertheless reveal that the model does not fully predict the conflict’s duration. This motivates the qualitative analysis even stronger. Lastly, Israel also has a relatively solid influence on several of the variables in the model. However, the results remain the same when Israel is omitted from the sample, with the exception of the Middle East dummy which loses significance. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is therefore not as unique as one might expect. It rather appears to be a quite typical case.
6. Qualitative Empirical Analysis: The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

The results from the quantitative analysis show that the causes of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict’s endurance are not unique with regards to political institutional arrangements. With a large proportion of excluded and discriminated population, a proportional electoral system, parliamentarism, as well as lack of federalism (i.e. centralized Israeli control over most of the area between the Mediterranean Sea and the Jordan River), the Israeli-Palestinian conflict could in fact be expected to last for a long time.

The general quantitative model is nevertheless not able to predict the full duration of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This indicates that further qualitative analysis is fruitful. First, various aspects that are not included in the quantitative model can have affected the conflict’s duration, and second, it can have lasted for longer than expected because of inadequate operationalization of variables. As mentioned in the background chapter, the Israeli electoral system is not only proportional, but the most extreme PR system in the world. The parliamentary system also empowers the legislature on behalf of the executive to a greater extent than most other countries. Additionally, the system of occupation as well as separation is not captured by the simple measures of democratic quality and federalism.

In this qualitative analysis, I seek to broaden the understanding of if and how Israeli political institutions can have affected the continuation of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, drawing on interviews with Israeli and Palestinian politicians and experts. As previously mentioned, this aspect has been neglected in previous research on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, although political scientists agree that institutions generally matter for political outcomes.

The list of respondents, together with a description of each of them, is provided in Table 2 (page 47) and in the last part of Chapter 4 (page 46-50). In the following sections, I refer to the interviewees by name and discuss their statements in relation to the previously cited theory and the quantitative results. I first discuss democratic quality, then PR and parliamentarism, and at last the lack of federalism or substantial and systematic decentralization of political power. Before summarizing the main findings, I shortly highlight some other aspects that were emphasized by the interviewees as central to the conflict’s endurance to give a more correct picture of their full understanding of the conflict. Other studies must be referred to for in-depth analyses of these and additional explanations.
6.1. Democratic Quality

In order to answer the questions of if and how democratic quality has affected the continuation of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, statements from the interviews are discussed in relation to theory and the results from the quantitative analysis. This discussion is divided into two parts. The first concentrates on Israel’s level of democracy. The second focuses on discrimination and exclusion from the Israeli political system. This is again divided into three sections, where the first deals with Israel proper, the second takes the annexed East Jerusalem into account, and the third also includes the occupied Palestinian territories. In the end of the discussion of political exclusion and discrimination, I also point to social exclusion as an additional aspect that is not captured in the quantitative analysis.

First, related to the democracy level, the quantitative analysis indicates that conflicts can be harder to solve in democratic than non-democratic states. Israel is also coded as having high democracy scores throughout the whole conflict period. One of the 14 interviewees, Professor Gideon Rahat, also supports the link between democracy and conflict continuation, and argues that the Israeli democratic system has increased the trust in, and the connection to, the state, and therefore made people more willing to serve in the army. Since this enables Israel to maintain a strong military force, it has also strengthened Israel’s ability to continue fighting, Rahat argues.\(^81\) Democracy can thereby have contributed to prolong the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Apart from Professor Rahat, however, none of the interviewees emphasize the democratic system in Israel as relevant to the conflict’s endurance. This is in line with the statistical finding that democracy makes no difference for conflict duration.

Many of the interviewees rather underline the system of exclusion and discrimination as central to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict’s continuation.\(^82\) The quantitative analysis also reveals that this is generally important for the duration of internal armed conflicts. This effect is also significant and quite strong, and it does not change when Israel is removed from the model. As shown in the background chapter and the discussion of Israel’s values on the independent variables, the exclusion and discrimination in the area under Israel’s control is also profound.

---

\(^{81}\) Rahat states that “democracy might actually be the reason for the military success of Israel. The strong military in Israel could not have been sustained without democracy. The semi-democracy that was in place in 1948 made people more ready to be recruited already then”.

\(^{82}\) The interviewees were asked open-ended questions about the causes of the conflict’s duration.
Because of the exclusion and discrimination, several of the interviewees also disagree that Israel, even within the armistice borders of 1949, is a liberal democracy. Shaheen argues that “Israel is a democracy only for Jews, a Jewish democracy”, and Dr. Menachem Klein states that “the Israeli political system is not fair. Israel is not a liberal democracy. It is an ethnic democracy. The state is based on militarism and ethnicity, but in a democratic style.”

While referring to the political situation in Israel, Gideon Levi highlights that although Palestinian citizens in Israel currently constitute over 20 percent of the Israeli population, Arab parties only maintain ten out of 120 seats in the Knesset.\(^{83}\) They are not considered a coalition partner for any of the parties because of Zionism and the definition of Israel as a Jewish state, he argues. Therefore, “Arab citizens in Israel vote and participate, but have no real power or influence. For the Arabs, democracy has no real meaning”, Levi maintains. Furthermore, he states that Arab parties, together with the radical left, are the only ones that really care about ending the occupation and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.\(^{84}\) Since they do not have political power, it is difficult for them to change Israeli policies related to the conflict, Levi emphasizes.

Similarly, Khalil Shaheen claims that the right to vote does not make much sense for Palestinian citizens in Israel. He states that “Zionism and its racist implications”, involving the exclusion of non-Jews from power, have forced many Palestinians to boycott elections. This is also connected to the broader exclusion and discrimination of Palestinians in the Israeli society, according to him. “Why should they participate when they don’t have equal rights outside, in the civil life”, Shaheen questions. He furthermore argues that “Palestinians are discriminated against, deprived, and not equal”, and that this is apparent in Israel within the armistice borders of 1949 in budgets, education, services, water, land building plans, evictions, as well as the exclusion of Palestinians from the army and much of the civil service. Palestinians must therefore go other ways than through the institutional channels in order to achieve things, according to Shaheen.

---

\(^{83}\) As mentioned in Chapter 2, many Palestinian citizens in Israel boycott elections because of alienation towards the state and a feeling of not being able to influence politics (Ganim and Mustafa 2007).

\(^{84}\) The radical left refers to the political parties Meretz and Hadash, which gained ten out of 120 Knesset seats in the January 2013 elections. Meretz attained six and Hadash four. Hadash is a mixed Jewish-Arab party, while Meretz is a Zionist party. Arab parties include Balad with three seats in the current Knesset and the United Arab List-Ta’al with four.
When it comes to the situation in Jerusalem, including East Jerusalem that was annexed by Israel in 1967, Betty Herschman also states that Israel’s unequal treatment of the Palestinians is “dangerous”. This is not only apparent in relation to political matters, but also social issues, she argues. As mentioned in the background chapter, most Palestinians in East Jerusalem have status as residents and not as citizens in Israel. They are therefore totally excluded from the central Israeli political system. Herschman highlights that Palestinian residents constitute about 40 percent of the city’s population, but Palestinian neighborhoods only receive 8-10 percent of the municipality budget and have poverty rates of about 70 percent. “There is a profound idea that this is apartheid”, she states, and adds that Jerusalem is in many ways representative for the conflict as a whole.

Furthermore, Shaheen maintains that Israel has established a very complex system of control throughout both Israel and the occupied territories, which separates Palestinians from Jews, and also divides the Palestinian people internally. “What else is it than apartheid”, he questions, and adds that Israel has developed its own system that is unique and different from that of South Africa. Dr. George Giacaman similarly argues that “it is problematic that faith determines nationality. It is a joke that Israel is a democratic state. It is an apartheid state, and democratic in the same way as South Africa was democratic”. Shaheen also emphasizes that the problem is the separation of people instead of states.

Dr. Giacaman also contends that the main cause of the conflict is the Zionist project to establish a Jewish state in Palestine, and that the continuing Zionist project remains the main reason for the continuation of the conflict. The Israeli government declines peace because it wants to develop the Zionist project further, he argues. Dr. Basem Ezbidi similarly upholds that Zionism, which he calls a colonial project with colonial aspirations, is a central reason for the continuation of the conflict. He argues that Zionists only achieved a small part of their goal in 1947, with the UN Partition Plan: “The Zionist colonialist project, which is still ongoing, has no defined goal. It is still an open project.”

---

85 Shaheen argues that this started already in 1948 with the military rule and the fences around Palestinian villages in Israel, and now includes the separation of Palestinians with green ID cards (West Bank citizens), blue ID cards (Jerusalem residents), Palestinians from the Wall-area, and Palestinians with Israeli citizenship. The Wall-area refers to Palestinian villages that have been encircled by the Separation Barrier (e.g. Qalqilya).

86 Both Giacaman and Ezbidi were asked open-ended questions on the main reasons for the conflict’s continuation.
The statements from the interviews indicate that the exclusion and discrimination of Palestinians can have affected the continuation of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, in line with the theories of e.g. Gurr (2000), Stewart (2008), and Cederman et al. (2010). Although Palestinian citizens in Israel have the right to vote and stand for elections, they have little real political power. Palestinian residents in Jerusalem and the occupied territories are excluded from the Israeli political system altogether. Peaceful negotiations between Israelis and Palestinians are therefore difficult, and the Palestinians can do little to affect political outcomes through institutional channels.

According to the theory of Cederman et al. (2010: 94-95), armed rebellion to overturn the political system can also appear tempting and feasible in such circumstances in order to achieve fair representation in the central government as well as better access to jobs and services. This also appears to be in line with the statement of Herschman, who mentions that the unequal situation for Israelis and Palestinians is dangerous, and Shaheen who highlights that Palestinians have to use other channels than the institutional in order to achieve things. This system of exclusion and discrimination can therefore have motivated continued rebellion among Palestinians.

However, in the Israeli-Palestinian context, the political exclusion and discrimination appears to be connected to social exclusion and separation, as indicated by the references above to unequal rights in the civil life, uneven budget allocations, as well as apartheid. Shaheen and Levi highlight that this social exclusion was increased with the intifadas and the building of the Separation Barrier. The exclusion and discrimination variable in the quantitative analysis does not capture this aspect of social exclusion, but rather measures the degree of exclusion from the central government and the discrimination with the intention of excluding groups from regional as well as national political power. Levi, Shaheen, Baruch and Amihai nevertheless point to social separation as a main cause of the conflict’s continuation, where the mechanisms are somewhat different from political exclusion and discrimination.

Levi highlights that most people do not really know anyone from the other side and do not want to either, due to the system of separation and exclusion. “This enables negative images of the other party”, he argues, where Israelis have the impression of Palestinians as terrorists, and Palestinians only know Israeli soldiers. Shaheen similarly states that young Palestinians have only seen Israeli settlers and soldiers, and that even Israeli journalists do not go to the
West Bank. Therefore, “Israelis don’t care”, Shaheen argues: “It’s not only that they don’t listen, they don’t hear. They don’t think the Palestinian situation affects them”. He further maintains that “Israel has succeeded in isolating Palestinians and isolating themselves”, so that both parties have negative impressions of the other, and neither want to live with the other people.

Ilan Baruch also states that “most Israelis don’t know and don’t care about the Palestinian issue”. Since there is no interaction between Israelis and Palestinians, and the quality of life in Israel is like in Europe, Israelis have become apathetic, he argues. Loir Amihai adds that “Israelis don’t feel the occupation and don’t take the Palestinian side into consideration”. They are distant and unaware that Palestinians are suffering because they do not interact with them, do not learn about them at school, and do not read about them in newspapers, he argues. Even in Jerusalem, Jews and Palestinians live totally separated, Amihai highlights. There are almost no meeting points for Jews and Arabs there, and even the transportation system is different for Jews and Palestinians, he states.

The statements from the interviews suggest that the combination of social and political exclusion have extended the Israeli-Palestinian conflict also by strengthening negative images of the other party, and increasing the apathy towards the conflict among Israelis, who are distant from the suffering on the Palestinian side. As mentioned in the discussion of Israel in the quantitative analysis, the general model is not able to predict the full duration of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This additional aspect of social, and not only political, exclusion and discrimination can be part of the explanation to this underestimation of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict’s length.

---

87 Shaheen also emphasizes that before the intifadas and the building of the Wall, it was possible for all Palestinians to go to Israel, see the sunset from Jaffa, and get to know regular Israelis. Now, most Palestinians have never left the West Bank, he states.

88 When describing this situation, Baruch refers to a joke about a guy jumping from a skyscraper in New York. On the way down, someone asks him how he is doing, and he answers “so far, so good”. “This is the situation for Israelis”, Baruch states. Israelis don’t know what is going on among Palestinians and in the occupied territories, he highlights.

89 Amihai argues that the situation can be compared to the current situation in Tel Aviv, where “people are getting angry because their cars are always full of prostitution flyers. They don’t really care about the problem of prostitution itself, but once they are directly affected, they start to care. It’s the same with the Palestinian situation and the occupation”.


To sum up, this analysis indicates that exclusion and discrimination have not only prolonged conflicts in general, as shown in the quantitative analysis, but also contributed to extend the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Since Palestinians are excluded from government power, negotiation and dialogue between Israelis and Palestinians are difficult within the Israeli political system. Additionally, because Palestinians in the West Bank and Jerusalem are excluded from the central Israeli political system altogether, there is little the Palestinians can do to change the situation from within political institutions. Grievances and motivation to carry on fighting can therefore have persisted. Overturning the political system can have appeared as the most feasible way to achieve better representation and self-determination, as well as better access to jobs and services, in line with theory.

The extensive system of exclusion and discrimination, which also involves social exclusion and separation, can additionally have increased the hostility on both sides, and made Israelis more indifferent to the Palestinians’ situation. This can have contributed to prolong the conflict further. In line with the quantitative analysis, these findings also indicate that it is not the level of democracy that primarily matters for conflict continuation, but rather the degree of exclusion and discrimination. I now turn to the discussion of Israel’s proportional electoral system and parliamentarism in relation to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict’s duration.

6.2. Proportional Representation and Parliamentary System

As stated in the theory chapter, proportional electoral systems and parliamentarism can strengthen the power of small and extreme parties, install many veto players in coalition governments, and thereby make it difficult to change the status quo and stop ongoing conflicts. The quantitative analysis also shows that PR and parliamentarism significantly extend conflicts, in line with theory and the second hypothesis. These general effects are reduced when Israel is removed from the model, but the basic results remain the same.

The Israeli electoral system is one of the most proportional in the world, as mentioned in Chapter 2, and the parliamentary system empowers the legislative majority on behalf of the government to a larger extent than most other parliamentary systems. This is through the system of formal “investiture” vote and the Knesset’s ability to call for early elections. The Knesset has on average included 12 parties, and Israeli coalition governments have had a
mean of six parties. Religious and settler parties have also regularly been represented. In this section, I analyze the statements from the interviews in order to answer if and how these arrangements have affected the continuation of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Related to the theory cited on page 25, which states that party system fragmentation and grand coalitions produce unstable and therefore ineffective governments, Ilan Baruch similarly maintains that “the electoral system and the electoral formula does not allow for effective and stable governments”. ⁹⁰ No government in Israel has lasted out its term, except for the last one, he highlights. This instability has also affected Israeli policies towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, according to him. In order to preserve stability and avoid reelectons, many Israeli governments have chosen not to deal with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Baruch argues. He contends that “Israeli governments are investing a large share of assets in order to preserve stability”, and “stability comes at the expense of policy and effectiveness”. The last government was stable, but had no external policy and no policy related to peace and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict at all, Baruch states.

Similarly, Yoni Eshpar claims that Israeli governments are extremely concerned with coalition survival, which makes the political system ineffective and unstable. He states that “partly because of this, Israel has not had any government policy on terrorism and the occupation”, and that the government rather has been politically paralyzed for longer periods. Dr. Giacaman also states that “Israel has no long-term perspective and no strategy of how to solve the conflict”. He claims that “the dark, dark tunnel of Israeli politics” is rather dominated by short-term and electoral interests.

In the same way, Levi claims that “we have no strategy, no long-term goals” and that the political system enables this by letting coalition talks continue for weeks and even months, depending on unimportant subjects instead of the big issue. Dr. Yair Hirschfeld also maintains that the fragmentation in the political system makes it difficult to manage the conflict, and that this also affected the failure of the Final Status Talks at Camp David in 2000. However, he regards other aspects, which I will return to later on, as more central hinders to peace. Arens also highlights that the direct election of prime minister with the dual ballot system in

---

⁹⁰ Stable governments here refers durable governments. As mentioned in the background chapter, few Israeli governments have lasted out their term.
1996 and 1999 increased the party fragmentation and destabilized the Israeli political system further, and that this has made coalition formation more difficult.\textsuperscript{91}

In accordance with the theoretical mechanisms presented in the theory chapter, these statements indicate that the Israeli system of PR and parliamentarism, through the party system proliferation and grand coalition governments, has created unstable as well as ineffective and gridlocked governments. As highlighted in the theory chapter, more parties must agree to policy changes in multiparty coalitions, which increase the probability that preferences depart. In order to preserve government stability and avoid reelectons due to disagreements, the issue concerning the Israeli-Palestinian conflict can have been eluded. Although a majority of Israelis want peace and a two-state solution,\textsuperscript{92} this concern with government survival, as well as the difficulty of reaching agreements with many parties in coalitions, can then have contributed to the lack of progress in the peace process.

Coalition negotiations, that are necessary to form Israeli governments, are also time consuming, and regularly depend on other issues than the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, as Levi highlights above. In contrast to majoritarian systems where “the basic decision is made by majority rule [already] at the electoral level” (Lijphart 1977: 40), PR and parliamentarism can therefore have contributed to postpone policy decisions towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This can in turn also have affected the conflict’s endurance.

Furthermore, Shaheen highlights that the system of PR and parliamentarism also has developed many small and powerful parties that strongly affect government decisions. “They are the egg that determines the outcome”, he states. Amihai conveys that the settlers, especially, are very influential although they only constitute a small share of the Israeli population: “The political system is owned by them. They only constitute about 4-6 percent of the population, but their power and representation is much stronger.”\textsuperscript{93} Dr. Ezbidi also adds that the religious parties, including the ultra-orthodox and settler parties, are very powerful. “In Israel, nobody can form a coalition without religious groups”, because many parties are required for government formation, he states.

\textsuperscript{91} Arens nevertheless does not consider this to be an obstacle to peace. It is the Palestinian side that is responsible for the conflict’s continuation, according to him.

\textsuperscript{92} This is according to polls (see footnote 1, page 3).

\textsuperscript{93} This goes together with settlers parties’ inclusion in governments as well as their influence on other parties, Amihai argues. Additionally, “the settlers are smart and well organized”, and the “mix of general security concerns, scars of terror, and national-religious ideological concerns” has also strengthened them.
Sheizaf also maintains that the ultra-orthodox parties have operated as veto players in the Israeli political system, and that the settlers are “strong and stronger than ever”. The ultra-orthodox are strong because they are regularly represented in government coalitions, and threaten to dissolve governments if they do not get their will, according to him. This threat is also realistic, since they can join both right- and left-wing governments, Sheizaf states. Arens also maintains that the religious parties have been very influential when it comes to issues such as the ultra-orthodox’ exception from military service and the funding of religious institutions, although he does not consider them to be general veto players.

Professor Rahat argues that the settlers have been empowered by the fragmentation in Israeli politics and party system, and thereby the lack of a coherent opposition, as well as the policy vacuum that has been created under the grand coalitions. Under these circumstances, it is easy for small organizations, especially if they are united and mobilized, to get a strong foothold, Rahat states. This has been especially easy for the settlers, who only concentrate on a single case, and who have been willing to topple government coalitions that have not supported their case, he further argues. Levi similarly argues that while the settlers are coherent and have a well-defined goal, the rest of the parties are fragmented and more indifferent. “In this vacuum it is easy for them to gain power and get their will”, he contends.

As Dow (2001), Downs (1957), and Horowitz (2003) highlight, even very small and extreme parties can get access to legislative and government power in PR systems and thereby determine government outputs. In line with these theories, the statements above suggest that the Israeli system of PR and parliamentarism has provided small parties that “can make or break governments” with decisive power over policy outputs. As Duverger (1959) argues, this can also result in extreme policy outputs that diverge from the general public opinion. Downs (1957: 157) also emphasizes that some parties and citizens that oppose policies would rather see the government “operate inefficiently so that its policies never have any effect”. He

---

94 The settlers, however, are not veto players in the same way as the ultra-orthodox, Sheizaf argues. The reason, according to him, is that unlike the ultra-orthodox parties, the settler parties are restricted to right-wing governments.

95 The ultra-orthodox do not have to serve in the Israel Defence Forces (IDF), and they receive extensive financial support from the state. One of the main issues of the 2013 Knesset election was the issue of “sharing the burden” and reducing their privileges.

96 Arens states that “there are no veto players in the Israeli system”. This is because only half of the Knesset members are required to adopt policy decisions, he argues.

97 As a response to a question, Professor Rahat refers to his article “Israeli Political Parties and Settlements” (2010), written together with Hazan. Rahat’s arguments cited in this paragraph are stated in the article.
further states that “if such desires are widespread, democracy cannot produce effective governments: it degenerates into a stalemate which merely preserves the status quo” (Downs 1957: 157). The party system fragmentation, and thereby the lack of a coherent opposition, can also have strengthened the power of such small and extreme parties.

In Israel, where many divergent parties are represented in governments, including parties that oppose changes in the status quo, this appears to have contributed to hinder policy change related to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Ultra-orthodox and settler parties, which have regularly been included in coalition governments, can have contributed to immobilize the decision-making process related to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and thereby also to hinder peace.98 These parties have religious and ideological reasons to avoid territorial concessions, and as mentioned in the background chapter. They have also voted against peace proposals and departed from government coalitions in order to prevent progress in the peace process.99

Additionally, some of the interviewees also highlight that the more centrist parties, such as Likud, have adopted some extreme policies that are similar to the settlers’. Professor Rahat and Amihai argue that several parties, and not just the extreme, have been influenced by settler policies. By influencing the parties in the middle, the settlers have indeed attained additional power, Rahat states. This also appears to be in line with theory that PR and parliamentarism promote centrifugal forces and a lack of incentives to “make moderation pay”, driving even centrist parties towards the extremes in order to catch votes.

However, some of the interviewees also emphasize that Israeli politics are not just reflections of the political system, but that there are also some endogeneity issues involved. Shaheen highlights that the Israeli electoral system was established to connect all the different Jewish sects from the various countries and cultures. Due to the internal division in Israel, Ben Gurion wanted to represent all in the parliament, Shaheen states. Dr. Klein maintains that “the political system per se does not block a peace agreement, but it can work against compromise”. This is nevertheless mainly due to the composition of the Israeli Jewish society, he argues: “Israel is a society of immigrants, and each group has their own agents

98 However, these groups were not able to hinder the disengagement from Gaza in 2005. It is nevertheless commonly assumed that they did not care about Gaza as much as they care about the West Bank, which is the core Biblical homeland, and where the number of settlements is substantially higher than it was in Gaza. It must nevertheless also be noted that these parties have not always been strictly against peace, as mentioned in footnote 18 (page 11).
99 See footnote 18, page 11.
and political parties. They must build coalitions, which often are compositions of small groups.” Since Israeli politics reflect this diverse and fragmented Jewish society, it has made it difficult for the various groups to agree on policy changes, and thereby contributed to prolong the conflict, he states.

Dr. Klein furthermore highlights that the fear of civil war among Jewish groups hinders peace with the Palestinians. Israeli politicians are afraid of being assassinated by other Jews if they change the status quo, he states. This fear was intensified after the assassination of Rabin following the Oslo Accords, Dr. Klein argues. “This was probably also the intention of the killing”, he maintains, and adds that “once there is an agreement with Palestine, there will be civil war among Jews in Israel”.

Sheizaf similarly argues that although most Israelis probably want peace, “they are not willing to pay the price and face the internal confrontation this would lead to”. He emphasizes that the internal opposition to ending the occupation is very strong among some Jewish Israeli groups, and that many are against evacuation of the settlements, especially the settlers themselves. Under these circumstances, “the rational choice for politicians is not doing anything. Negotiations for the sake of negotiations could be okay, but more meaningful negotiations with compromises and progress are not rational”, Sheizaf further claims. He maintains that there is a big price to pay even with a majority in the Knesset. “This price is related to the internal situation and the fear of a civil war between the Jewish fragments, and a situation similar to what Rabin experienced”, he states.

According to these arguments, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict also continues because Israeli politicians want to avoid confrontation and violent conflict within the Jewish society in Israel. This also suggests that the proportional electoral system, in combination with the parliamentary system, not only contributes to prolong the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, but also serves to maintain peace among the Jewish groups within the system. Since the groups that oppose peace and territorial concessions are given a strong voice, perhaps also power to

100 Dr. Klein also highlights that many of these groups have invested in the occupation project, settlements, and security, and that many have ideological interests in this. He also highlights that the strong connection with the diaspora makes the Israeli Jewish society even more fragmented since it involves even more parties
101 Therefore, “Israel lacks the political will to confront the situation, and the public debate is rather framed by Israeli politicians who avoid talking about solving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict”, Sheizaf states.
102 Levi similarly argues that the settlers are extra strong because they use, and threaten to use, violence, if they do not get their will.
hinder a change in the status quo, the onset of violent conflict among the Jewish groups can have been avoided. This appears to be in accordance with Lijphart’s theory that PR and parliamentarism promote peace and moderate conflict. However, in ongoing conflicts, such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, PR and parliamentarism seem to hinder peace and conflict resolution.

Professor Rahat argues that the Israeli electoral system should be reformed to a less proportional system with about 12 electoral districts and 10 members of the Knesset per district on average. Such a change would increase efficiency and responsiveness, strengthen the large parties, lead to better representation, and still ensure representation by Arabs and the ultra-orthodox, according to him. However, he does not think this would be sufficient to end the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.103 Dr. Giacaman highlights that the Israeli electoral system can have contributed to prolong the conflict, but that it is not clear if a change in the system would lead to a solution.104

To sum up, the statements from the interviewees suggest that the proportional Israeli electoral system, in combination with the parliamentary system, has contributed to the continuation of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This is in accordance with the second hypothesis and the general findings in the quantitative analysis, showing that PR and parliamentarism generally extend conflicts. These institutional arrangements appear to have strengthened the power of small and extreme parties that are opposed to peace, and made it harder for government coalitions to adopt consistent and effective strategies to end the conflict. This suggests that in the context of ongoing internal armed conflicts, Lijphart’s theory about the peace promoting effect of these institutions is not appropriate.

However, following the arguments of Dr. Klein and Sheizaf, this analysis also indicates that the fragmentation among the various Jewish groups in Israel, and the fear of a civil war between them, has affected the lack of progress in the peace process. The institutional arrangements of PR and parliamentarism, which empower these various Jewish groups, can nevertheless have contributed to reduce the probability that violent conflict will erupt among

103 Rahat regards the division among the Palestinians to be a crucial hinder to peace. I will return to this in section 6.4.
104 He argues that the electoral system is always relevant for the composition of parliaments and policy outcomes. If the system would change, the voting pattern would change, and this would in turn change the composition of the Knesset and influence policy, he reasons. A less proportional electoral system would harm small parties both on the right and left, but it is not currently clear in which direction this would go, he reasons.
them. This appears to be in line with Lijphart’s arguments. In the context of already ongoing conflicts, however, these institutional arrangements rather appear to prolong internal armed conflicts, such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. I now proceed to discuss the last political institutional aspect in focus, namely federalism.

6.3. Federalism

As shown in the quantitative analysis, non-federal states are significantly more prone to lengthened conflict than federal states, and this does not change when Israel is removed from the model. This is contrary to the third hypothesis and in accordance with Lijphart’s theory. As described in the theory chapter, federalism involves guaranteed power division between central and regional governments, where regional governments have a considerable share of power and make autonomous decisions on some policy areas. In unitary states, on the other hand, division of power is one-sided, and the central government controls the regional.

In the quantitative analysis, Israel is also coded as a non-federal state. However, as indicated in the background chapter, the territorial arrangement for the Israeli-Palestinian area is more complicated. Since 1967, Israel has occupied the West Bank and Gaza and maintained superior power and control over these territories. Despite this special situation, the territorial organization of the Israeli-Palestinian territory can be compared to an extreme form of non-federalism, where the division of power is particularly one-sided and concentrated in the Israeli central government, which controls and substantially limits the power of the regional Palestinian governments.

In this section, I first discuss if and how the centralized Israeli control over the area between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea has contributed to prolong the conflict, and if a change to a federal arrangement, with a larger degree of Palestinian self-determination, could contribute to end the conflict. I continue by presenting the respondents’ perspectives on the realism of a federal arrangement.

As mentioned in Chapter 2, Israel annexed East Jerusalem and started the occupation of the West Bank and Gaza in June 1967. It withdrew from Gaza Strip in 2005, but then blockaded the area in 2007. The Israeli occupation of the West Bank is still in effect, and the United Nations (2012) also still regards Gaza as occupied territory. The Palestinian National Authority (PNA), established under the Oslo Accords, has only had limited powers.
The theoretical mechanisms presented in the discussion of the quantitative results suggest that federal arrangements can contribute to shorten conflicts by providing sub-national groups with institutional channels for voicing their demands, and giving them better control over policy outcomes and matters that are important to their interests and identities. This can reduce security concerns, produce stable inter-group relations, and strengthen incentives for cooperation with the central state. It can also reduce grievances and the willingness to continue with rebellion, much in the same way as the absence of exclusion and discrimination.

However, in contrast to this theory, Arens does not think the Israeli control over the Palestinian territories has prolonged the conflict. An end to the occupation, either with a federal or two-state arrangement, would not reduce the opposition towards Israel or end the conflict, he maintains: “Look at what happened when we withdrew from Gaza. Hamas came to power and they fire rockets on Israel.” Furthermore, “I’m not sure if the Palestinians would be better off if Israel withdrew from of the area”, Arens states. He considers the basic problem to be that Palestinians have no voice in determining their future, but argues that this is not because of Israel. Israel does not hinder Palestinians’ self-determination, according to him: “They don’t have a democracy like we do. It’s a dictatorship. They want to participate. We want them to participate as well.”

As opposed to Arens, many of the interviewees, including Shaheen, Dr. Giacaman, Dr. Klein, and Sheizaf, consider the strong and centralized Israeli control over most of the Israeli-Palestinian area to be a main cause of the conflict’s endurance. They maintain that the Palestinian people need to get real political rights and improved control over their own situation and territory if the conflict is to end. Sheizaf upholds that the distinction between a two-state and a one-state federal solution is not important, and that the crucial issue is that the Palestinians must gain self-determination and control over their own lives: “It is the Israeli occupation that is the problem, and a solution entails an end to the occupation”.

Shaheen, Dr. Giacaman and Dr. Klein also highlight that conflict resolution could possibly be achieved through a federal arrangement. Dr. Giacaman also suggests that the Palestinians should shift the focus away from a two-state solution towards a one-state federal solution: “If

---

106 The Palestinians should develop their own democratic institutions, and this is possible within the current framework, Arens maintains.
we focused on a one-state solution, concrete demands could be forwarded, such as equal
ingenuity, for instance to use roads, water, electricity, to plant land, and to work in Israel.” This
could have improved the situation and reduced grievances among Palestinians, he argues.

Shaheen furthermore regards a federal one-state arrangement as a feasible as well as the only
realistic way out of the conflict. He maintains that “the Palestinian West Bank is turned into
cantons and ghettos, just look at the map. This cannot become a Palestinian state”. Dr. Klein
similarly states that a two-state solution is today impossible with all the “facts on the ground”,
i.e. the Israeli settlements that have been created in the West Bank. However, a federal
arrangement could constitute a solution to the conflict, he maintains.

A change to a federal arrangement with meaningful decentralization of power could indeed be a
potential solution to the conflict, according to Dr. Giacaman, Shaheen and Dr. Klein.
However, many of the interviewees cited below highlight that it is very difficult to alter the
current situation of centralized Israeli control over the whole Israeli-Palestinian area to a
federal arrangement. The reason is that both Israelis and Palestinians have exclusive demands
and claim the entire territory, and that none of them really want to share power, either in a
federal or a two-state arrangement, according to them.

Connected to these exclusive demands, Dr. Hirschfeld maintains that the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict has lasted for so long because both Israelis and Palestinians want the same land and
view their existence as dependent on this, and because both believe that they can win. “Both
parties have demanded everything or nothing, which leads to nothing”, Hirschfeld argues.
Levi similarly states that “the core issue of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is land and real
estate, with two people struggling for the same land”, where nobody wants the other people
there.107 He highlights that “we thought we came to a land without people, but this was
wrong, there were people here! We took the land and have no intention of giving it up”.
Furthermore, Levi emphasizes that the Palestinians are now willing to give up some of the
land, but that Israel still wants as much land as possible: “The problem is that Israel is strictly
against one state”. Baruch also highlights that Hamas still has maximalist and exclusive
attitudes, and that it gains support on this stand, and Dr. Ezbidi states that “a one-state
solution would not be pleasing to any side”.

107 “This was core issue in the beginning and it still is today”, Levi states.
These exclusive demands, which make a federal arrangement difficult and contribute to prolong the conflict, are driven by identity, religion, ideology, and security, according to the interviewees. Related to identity and religion on the Israeli side, Shaheen argues that “the only thing Jews from all over the world have in common is the old Hebrew Biblical history”. This makes it crucial for Israel to keep control over the whole territory, which they perceive to be their Biblical homeland, Shaheen maintains. Dr. Klein also states that many Israelis perceive the occupied territories to be their historical roots, and that “they can’t give it up because of their identity”. Furthermore, he argues that there will be an identity crisis on both sides if the exclusive demands are abandoned.

Related to religion and ideology, Levi also adds that the Israelis justify the occupation by “the Biblical idea that we are the chosen people and therefore have the right to do whatever we want”. Zionism is central in order to understand this, he argues, because “its goal is to conquer this world”. Dr. Ezbidi also highlights that religion and ideology have contributed to the exclusive demands on both sides: “On the Israeli side, the belief is that God has given them the land. On the Palestinian side, the claim is that the land is an entity of the Arab world.” He also states that a one-state federal arrangement “would be a fiasco to Herzl”. 108

Regarding Israel’s security concerns, many Israelis insist that Israel needs to control all the land in order to be secure, and that Palestinians otherwise will delegitimize Israel and become a military threat, according to Baruch. 109 Dr. Ezbidi also states that Israelis are very concerned with security and survival, and that this has contributed to hinder an end to the occupation and a potential federal or two-state solution. 110 He maintains that this is “a psychological and emotional problem” that goes back hundreds of years. Levi argues that Israel is the only occupier that has ever conceived itself as the victim, and that the Holocaust has affected this perception. Arens also argues that the Israeli presence and control over the West Bank is crucial for Israeli security, and that it therefore must be upheld. “The 1949 armistice borders

---

108 As mentioned in the background chapter, Herzl is known as the father of Zionism.
109 However, Baruch highlights that there is also another school of thought, which he himself belongs to, that “maintains that we cannot govern another country, Palestine, with the animosity this leads to and the apartheid system that develops”. “This will create our own failure”, he argues.
110 However, the solution to this security issue is not territorial, Ezbidi argues; “The Israelis cannot define what they want and what they need, or what security inhibits. Therefore, it cannot be delivered.” Dr. Ezbidi adds that “being a non-Jew doesn’t equal a threat. However, this is the way Israel perceives it.”
are not defendable borders”, he maintains, and adds that “Israel needs to be strong. It would not have existed otherwise”.

These statements from the interviews indicate that the centralized Israeli control over the whole Israeli-Palestinian territory has contributed to prolong the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Much in the same way as exclusion and discrimination, the lack of substantial decentralization of power can have increased grievances and the willingness to continue rebellion. This appears to be partly in accordance with the quantitative finding that conflicts last longer in non-federal states than in federal states, although the Israeli occupation makes the Israeli-Palestinian case special. According to several of the interviewees, a change to a federal arrangement, with increased Palestinian self-determination, can also constitute a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. However, such a change appears to be difficult to achieve due to the exclusive demands on both sides, based on identity, religion, ideology, and security.

### 6.4. Broader Perspectives of the Interviewees

The findings from the analysis of Israel in the general quantitative model and the qualitative discussion above indicate that the causes of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict’s continuation are not unique with regards to political institutions. Israeli political institutional arrangements appear to be quite relevant in order to understand the endurance of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

However, it must be emphasized that some of the interviewees also regard other factors than those already discussed as central to understand the conflict’s duration. This has also been mentioned in relation to some of the statements above. These additional aspects include the division among Palestinians, the lack of sincere foreign pressure, especially from the United States, the Israeli settlement building, as well as personal characteristics of Israeli and Palestinian leaders. Some of the respondent’s arguments on these issues are shortly presented below to give a more correct picture of their full understanding of the conflict.

---

111 Arens states that “our country is so small, and the 1949 borders are too dangerous. We don’t want rockets to be shot at Tel Aviv.” He also maintains that the Holocaust indirectly matters to Israel’s policies towards the Palestinian territories because “we need to make sure that it will never happen again.”
First, related to Palestinian division, Professor Rahat argues that the main obstacle to Israeli-Palestinian peace is the division on the Palestinian side. “Even if the prime minister of Israel was Mahatma Gandhi, he would not be able to make peace here. With whom can we sign a deal?”, he states. Arens also states that “the problem lies with the Palestinians”, because they are fragmented and difficult to negotiate and make agreements with. Dr. Ezbidi similarly contends that “if I was in Netanyahu’s spot, I would do like him. It’s working for him. The Palestinian side is so divided, weak, and unable to resist”. Sheizaf also adds that a more coherent Palestinian movement could have put more pressure on Israel, which could have made it easier to change the status quo.

Second, regarding the lack of sincere foreign pressure, especially from the United States, Levi argues that “peace can be imposed by the United States” and that “this is the only solution. By putting real pressure on Israel, it could have solved the conflict a long time ago. Israel is so dependent of the US and would have been lost without its support”. Sheizaf also maintains that although the key to a solution lies in Israel’s hands, hard international pressure could have forced Israel to change its actions. He states that the unchecked US support to Israel is “the ultimate facilitator” of the continued conflict and occupation. Klein also adds that a problem is that “there is no common Western voice” to put pressure on Israel.

Third, when it comes to Israeli settlement building, Herschman argues that the Israeli construction and expanding of settlements as well as national parks and roads on Palestinian land outside the Green Line puts “nails in the coffin of a two-state solution”, “It makes a two-state solution impossible”, and negotiations under these circumstances are impossible as well, according to her. This is a claim that is supported by many of the other interviewees.

Fourth, related to personal characteristics of Israeli and Palestinian leaders, Hirschfeld maintains that one of Israel’s previous top leaders has carried out “the most effective mismanagement of negotiations”, which has contributed to prolong the conflict. “If I was to teach how not to negotiate, I would not be able to reach his brilliance”, he states. Hirschfeld adds that this leader has low social intelligence and no understanding of people. Additionally, he was not prepared, Hirschfeld argues: “He jumped out of a plane without a parachute”.

112 Levi furthermore maintains that “it is a mystery why the U.S. continues to support Israel and the occupation. It has no logic explanation. One part of it is the Jewish lobby, but this is far from sufficient”.
113 Dr. Klein here also points to the split among European countries.
Eshpar also highlights that “a real solution requires big leadership”, and that Netanyahu and other recent leaders have lacked the will and vision to change the situation. Arens also adds that Arafat has hindered peace; “Arafat did not want peace. He was a terrorist.”

It is clear from these statements, as well as from previous research, that many aspects, and not only Israeli political institutions, have affected the duration of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Dr. Klein also highlights that “there is no magic stick, not one simple element that can solve the conflict. There are many ingredients”. The very long duration of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict nevertheless indicates that some deep and long-term structures have been central hinders to peace. Although Israeli political institutions only constitute one component, this seems to be more central than regularly presumed in relation to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict’s endurance.

6.5. Summary

This qualitative analysis shows that political institutional arrangements matter, not only for the duration of conflicts in general, but also for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Although several other aspects are clearly relevant to understand the conflict’s endurance, Israeli political institutional arrangements appear to be more important than often assumed.

First, related to democratic quality, the analysis indicates that it is not the high level of democracy in Israel that primarily affects the conflict’s continuation, but rather the large share of Palestinians that are excluded from central government power and discriminated against. The lack of political power among Palestinians has made it hard for them to change the status quo within the institutional framework. Negotiations and dialogue between Israelis and Palestinians have also been difficult within the system. Continued Palestinian rebellion can have been motivated to achieve better representation and improved access to jobs and services. The social, and not only political, exclusion can additionally have increased negative images of the other and made Israelis more distant from the conflict situation. This aspect of social separation, which is not captured by the quantitative analysis, can also be part of the explanation to the general model’s underestimation of the conflict’s duration.
Second, the Israeli system of proportional elections and parliamentarism seems to have contributed to prolong the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The political power of small and extreme parties, such as the settlers and the ultra-orthodox, has been strengthened by the proportional electoral system and the need to take in many parties in coalition governments. This inclusion of numerous parties in governments seems to have made it hard for Israeli coalitions to agree on, and to adopt, consistent and effective strategies to end the conflict. Especially with the regular inclusion of settler and ultra-orthodox parties that are opposed to peace and territorial concessions, the Israeli system of PR and parliamentarism appears to have affected the conflict’s continuation.

Third, the centralized Israeli control over the Israeli-Palestinian territory, and the lack of Palestinian self-determination, appears to have hindered conflict resolution. A change to a federal arrangement, with increased Palestinian self-determination, can constitute a solution to the conflict, according to several of the interviewees, although this appears to be difficult to achieve. I now turn to the conclusion of the thesis.
7. Conclusion

In this thesis, I have investigated how certain political institutional arrangements affect conflict duration in general, and if the endurance of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict can be explained by these general factors. I have thereby also sought to answer if the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is unique when it comes to causes of conflict continuation. The focus has been concentrated on four political institutional aspects, including the overall democratic quality as well as the three core consociational institutional arrangements, namely proportional electoral systems, parliamentarism, and federalism.

I have argued against Lijphart’s claim that consociational institutions are the best to promote peace and suggested that in the context of ongoing conflicts, power-sharing and consensus-building institutions rather contribute to extend conflicts. Related to PR and parliamentarism, I have included theories that, as far as I know, have not been applied in relation to conflict endurance previously. This concerns governments’ ability to change existing strategies and policies towards ongoing conflicts. This point exceeds the existing conflict literature and introduces a new element that does not relate to either rebel motivation or opportunity.

A mixed-method strategy has been applied to study if the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is unique. This has involved a quantitative survival data analysis of all internal armed conflicts, where I have studied the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in the model and compared it to the general results and to other cases. To further understand the Israeli-Palestinian case, qualitative in-depth interviews with Israeli and Palestinian experts and politicians have also been conducted and analyzed. This way of mixing methods constitutes a new way of doing case studies that has not been commonly utilized previously. The thesis therefore contributes to the existing literature both theoretically and methodologically.

The findings from the quantitative analysis show that political institutions are relevant in order to understand the duration of internal armed conflicts. First, related to democratic quality, the results indicate that it is not the level of democracy that primarily matters for conflict duration, but rather the degree of political exclusion and discrimination. Second, the findings imply that proportional electoral systems and parliamentary systems prolong conflicts, in contrast to Lijphart’s theory. Third, the results reveal that federal arrangements shorten conflict duration, in line with Lijphart’s arguments.
Studying Israel in the general model indicates that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is not as unique as the literature leads us to expect. From Israel’s large share of excluded and discriminated population, the proportional electoral system, the parliamentary system, as well as the non-federal arrangement, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict could be expected to last for a long time. The duration of the conflict is shown to be somewhat underestimated by the model, but less than could be anticipated from the longest-lasting conflict in the sample. Additionally, the case is not particularly important to the general results.

The qualitative analysis also implies that Israeli political institutional arrangements are more relevant in order to understand the conflict’s endurance than usually recognized. Exclusion of Palestinians from political power appears to have strengthened Palestinians’ grievances and willingness to continue with rebellion. The very proportional Israeli electoral system, in combination with the parliamentary system, seems to have strengthened the influence of small and extreme parties, such as the ultra-orthodox and the settlers. The need to include many parties in government coalitions can have made it hard to achieve sufficient agreement to change the existing policies towards the ongoing conflict. Lastly, the lack of substantial decentralization of power can also have contributed to uphold Palestinian insurgence. Although federalism has been pointed to as a potential solution by some of the interviewees, such an arrangement appears to be difficult to achieve.

To conclude, this thesis has shown that political institutions matter for conflict duration both in general and for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict specifically. When it comes to PR and parliamentarism, the results are contra-intuitive and in contrast to Lijphart’s well-established theory. This indicates that Lijphart’s theory cannot be generalized over contexts, and that PR and parliamentarism are not always the best institutional arrangements to promote peace. More research should nevertheless be done to investigate if the general results found here are robust to other conflict thresholds, such as 100 and 1000 battle-related deaths in a year, as well as to other conflict termination definitions. In relation to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the results of this thesis also suggest that there is no need to treat the conflict as totally unique and incomparable to other internal armed conflicts.

These findings also raise interesting questions for further research. Some of the focus on international aspects, which dominate current research and policy discussions on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, could be shifted to internal matters such as political institutions.
Additional research is needed in order to understand how the political institutional aspects studied here have affected the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and to give a more accurate and complete picture of the mechanisms in play.

Furthermore, it would be interesting to investigate how Israeli political institutional arrangements could be altered in order to change the status quo. As mentioned in the introduction, a majority of Israelis want peace and a two-state solution. Relevant questions for further research are therefore: Would a change to a less proportional electoral system or a strict presidential system represent these opinions in a better way, and could this contribute to change Israeli policy towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict? Other interesting questions are also: Could more political power and self-determination of the Palestinians put an end to the conflict, and could a federal arrangement constitute a possible solution?

Moreover, as there are two sides of the conflict, the corresponding role of Palestinian institutions, as well as Palestinian opposition groups, should also be offered more serious research. Although little cross-country data is currently available on formal or informal political institutional arrangements of opposition groups in conflicts, this could be an interesting project for further quantitative research. The effects of other political institutional aspects, such as courts and lobbyism, could also be studied with regard to conflict duration, both generally and in relation to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. As mentioned throughout the thesis, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is also a special case of an internal armed conflict. Further research could therefore place it in a context of interstate, instead of civil, conflicts to investigate if this is a more appropriate basis for comparison.
References


B’Tselem (2010): About B’Tselem. URL: [http://www.btselem.org/about_btselem](http://www.btselem.org/about_btselem) [25.05.2013].


URL: http://www.knesset.gov.il/deSCRIPTion/eng/eng_mimshal_beh.htm#1 [25.05.2013].

URL: http://www.knesset.gov.il/govt/eng/GovtByNumber_eng.asp [25.05.2013.]


Regan, Patrick and Clark, David (2010): The Institutions and Elections Project. URL: http://www2.binghamton.edu/political-science/institutions-and-elections-project.html [25.05.2013].


### Table A-1: Robustness Test with Other Democracy Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Democracy</th>
<th>Polity2</th>
<th>Vanhanen</th>
<th>SIP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Polity2</td>
<td>-0.011</td>
<td>0.013</td>
<td>-0.311</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.012)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.010)</td>
<td>(0.293)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vanhanen</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.010)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIP</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Excluded and discriminated population</td>
<td>-1.101**</td>
<td>-0.920*</td>
<td>-1.067**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.472)</td>
<td>(0.471)</td>
<td>(0.504)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electoral system</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Majoritarian (Ref.cat.)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportional representation</td>
<td>-0.448**</td>
<td>-0.555***</td>
<td>-0.391*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.192)</td>
<td>(0.199)</td>
<td>(0.232)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No institutionalized elections</td>
<td>-0.136</td>
<td>-0.111</td>
<td>-0.206</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.263)</td>
<td>(0.265)</td>
<td>(0.336)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Selection of the effective executive</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Direct election (Ref.cat.)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indirect election (Ref.cat.)</td>
<td>-0.475**</td>
<td>-0.553***</td>
<td>-0.483**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.186)</td>
<td>(0.191)</td>
<td>(0.206)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-elective</td>
<td>-0.104</td>
<td>-0.263</td>
<td>-0.127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.159)</td>
<td>(0.187)</td>
<td>(0.177)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federal state</td>
<td>0.574***</td>
<td>0.792***</td>
<td>0.618***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.215)</td>
<td>(0.206)</td>
<td>(0.237)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ln (Population)</td>
<td>-0.165**</td>
<td>-0.176**</td>
<td>-0.161*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.082)</td>
<td>(0.084)</td>
<td>(0.092)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Previous conflicts</td>
<td>0.205**</td>
<td>0.177**</td>
<td>0.185**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.082)</td>
<td>(0.089)</td>
<td>(0.095)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East</td>
<td>-0.416*</td>
<td>-0.411*</td>
<td>-0.436*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.221)</td>
<td>(0.229)</td>
<td>(0.253)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ln (GDP per capita)</td>
<td>0.063</td>
<td>0.106</td>
<td>0.080</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.081)</td>
<td>(0.092)</td>
<td>(0.095)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natural resource production</td>
<td>-0.156</td>
<td>-0.191</td>
<td>-0.203</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.154)</td>
<td>(0.159)</td>
<td>(0.204)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time at risk (years)</td>
<td>1057</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>963</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of countries</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of failures</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>164</td>
<td>148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log pseudo-likelihood null model</td>
<td>-653.674</td>
<td>-631.778</td>
<td>-549.641</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log pseudo-likelihood model</td>
<td>-634.888</td>
<td>-611.721</td>
<td>-531.667</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIC</td>
<td>1293.776</td>
<td>1247.441</td>
<td>1087.334</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. All significance values are for two-tailed tests. Coefficients are displayed and robust standard errors, clustered on country, are shown in parenthesis.
Figure A-1: The Functional Form of Democracy

Figure A-1 shows martingale residuals versus the democracy index (Polity2). This was constructed after running the general Cox model (Table 3, page 53) with the democracy index included. The figure shows that there is almost no effect of democracy. Since no non-linear pattern is revealed on the plot, the chosen linear form of the variable is not inappropriate (Singer and Willett 2003: 572). Plotting martingale residuals versus the democracy index after running an empty model reveals about identical results.
Table A-2: Correlation Matrix

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Democracy index</th>
<th>Excluded and discriminated population</th>
<th>Electoral system</th>
<th>Selection of the effective executive</th>
<th>Federal state</th>
<th>ln (Population)</th>
<th>Previous conflicts</th>
<th>Middle East</th>
<th>ln (GDP per capita)</th>
<th>Natural resource production</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Democracy index</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Excluded and discriminated population</td>
<td>-0.165</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electoral system</td>
<td>0.216</td>
<td>0.027</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Selection of the effective executive</td>
<td>-0.335</td>
<td>0.113</td>
<td>-0.069</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federal state</td>
<td>0.266</td>
<td>-0.190</td>
<td>-0.120</td>
<td>-0.036</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ln (Population)</td>
<td>0.173</td>
<td>-0.164</td>
<td>-0.180</td>
<td>-0.089</td>
<td>0.463</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Previous conflicts</td>
<td>-0.054</td>
<td>-0.063</td>
<td>-0.130</td>
<td>-0.067</td>
<td>0.215</td>
<td>0.341</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East</td>
<td>0.056</td>
<td>0.104</td>
<td>0.162</td>
<td>0.169</td>
<td>-0.136</td>
<td>-0.189</td>
<td>-0.035</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ln (GDP per capita)</td>
<td>0.438</td>
<td>-0.068</td>
<td>0.272</td>
<td>-0.259</td>
<td>0.076</td>
<td>0.041</td>
<td>-0.067</td>
<td>0.417</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natural resource production</td>
<td>0.145</td>
<td>-0.036</td>
<td>-0.019</td>
<td>-0.022</td>
<td>0.053</td>
<td>0.250</td>
<td>-0.027</td>
<td>0.070</td>
<td>0.322</td>
<td>1.000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table A-3: Cox Regression without Algeria, Colombia, Myanmar and the Philippines

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Democracy index</th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>S.E.</th>
<th>P-value</th>
<th>Hazard ratio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Excluded and discriminated population</td>
<td>-1.249</td>
<td>0.482</td>
<td>0.010</td>
<td>0.287</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Electoral system

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>S.E.</th>
<th>P-value</th>
<th>Hazard ratio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Majoritarian</td>
<td>-0.007</td>
<td>0.012</td>
<td>0.543</td>
<td>0.993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportional representation</td>
<td>-0.405</td>
<td>0.188</td>
<td>0.031</td>
<td>0.667</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No institutionalized elections</td>
<td>-0.199</td>
<td>0.269</td>
<td>0.460</td>
<td>0.820</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Selection of the effective executive

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>S.E.</th>
<th>P-value</th>
<th>Hazard ratio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Majoritarian</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportional representation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No institutionalized elections</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Federal state

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>S.E.</th>
<th>P-value</th>
<th>Hazard ratio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Majoritarian</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportional representation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No institutionalized elections</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ln (Population)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>S.E.</th>
<th>P-value</th>
<th>Hazard ratio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Majoritarian</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportional representation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No institutionalized elections</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Previous conflicts

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>S.E.</th>
<th>P-value</th>
<th>Hazard ratio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Majoritarian</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportional representation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No institutionalized elections</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ln (GDP per capita)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>S.E.</th>
<th>P-value</th>
<th>Hazard ratio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Majoritarian</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportional representation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No institutionalized elections</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Natural resource production

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>S.E.</th>
<th>P-value</th>
<th>Hazard ratio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Majoritarian</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportional representation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No institutionalized elections</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Time at risk (years)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>S.E.</th>
<th>P-value</th>
<th>Hazard ratio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Majoritarian</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportional representation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No institutionalized elections</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Number of countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>S.E.</th>
<th>P-value</th>
<th>Hazard ratio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Majoritarian</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportional representation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No institutionalized elections</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Number of failures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>S.E.</th>
<th>P-value</th>
<th>Hazard ratio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Majoritarian</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportional representation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No institutionalized elections</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Log pseudo-likelihood null model

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>S.E.</th>
<th>P-value</th>
<th>Hazard ratio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Majoritarian</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportional representation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No institutionalized elections</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Log pseudo-likelihood model

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>S.E.</th>
<th>P-value</th>
<th>Hazard ratio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Majoritarian</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportional representation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No institutionalized elections</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

AIC

Note: All significance values are for two-tailed tests. S.E. shows robust standard errors, clustered on country.

---

These are the most outlying cases (see Figure 4, page 62). Table 3 (page 53) shows the original results.
Table A-4: Cox Regression without Indonesia, Nicaragua, Algeria, Colombia, Myanmar and the Philippines

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>S.E.</th>
<th>P-value</th>
<th>Hazard ratio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Democracy index</td>
<td>-0.011</td>
<td>0.012</td>
<td>0.389</td>
<td>0.989</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Excluded and discriminated population</td>
<td>-1.309</td>
<td>0.488</td>
<td>0.007</td>
<td>0.270</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Electoral system</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Majoritarian</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportional representation</td>
<td>-0.611</td>
<td>0.202</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.543</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No institutionalized elections</td>
<td>-0.379</td>
<td>0.286</td>
<td>0.185</td>
<td>0.684</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Selection of the effective executive</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Direct election</td>
<td>Ref. cat</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indirect election</td>
<td>-0.708</td>
<td>0.188</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.492</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-elective</td>
<td>-0.220</td>
<td>0.160</td>
<td>0.168</td>
<td>0.803</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Federal state</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In (Population)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Previous conflicts</td>
<td>-0.007</td>
<td>0.107</td>
<td>0.945</td>
<td>0.993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In (GDP per capita)</td>
<td>0.113</td>
<td>0.080</td>
<td>0.157</td>
<td>1.120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natural resource production</td>
<td>-0.266</td>
<td>0.158</td>
<td>0.092</td>
<td>0.766</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Time at risk (years)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>837</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Number of countries</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>81</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Number of failures</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>159</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Log pseudo-likelihood null model</strong></td>
<td>-595.013</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Log pseudo-likelihood model</strong></td>
<td>-576.017</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>AIC</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>1176.033</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note:* All significance values are for two-tailed tests. S.E. shows robust standard errors, clustered on country.

---

116 These include the four most outlying cases plus two influential cases (see Figure 4, page 62, and Figure 5, page 64). Table 3 (page 53) shows the original results.