Two Views of Inequality Over the Life-Cycle∗†

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Abstract

Data on the life-cycle profiles of inequality in wages, earnings, hours worked and consumption contains precious information for answering questions about the ability of households to insure labor market risk and about the sources of this risk. This paper demonstrates that the choice of whether to control for cohort effects or for time effects has a drastic impact on the estimated age profiles for inequality and, thus, on the answers to those questions. It also shows that time effects are required to account for the observed trends in inequality in thirty years of US data, whereas there is no evidence that cohort effects have been important.

JEL Classification Codes: C13, D31, D91, J22, J31

Keywords: Wage inequality, Consumption inequality, Cohort effects, Labor supply.

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1 Introduction

This paper measures how inequality in wages, hours worked and consumption varies over the life-
cycle in the United States. The steepness of the age profile of wage inequality is informative about
whether wage dispersion is primarily driven by fixed-effects or life-cycle shocks. Moreover, contrast-
ing the age profile for wage inequality with age profiles for inequality in consumption and labor
supply can help assess the degree to which agents can insure wage shocks and in differentiating
between alternative specifications for preferences (Heathcote et al., 2004a).

The task of documenting how inequality changes with age is complicated by the sharp rise in
cross-sectional inequality in US wages and earnings since 1980. In order to isolate the dynamics of
inequality with age, we need to take a stand on what accounts for these changes over time. Wage
inequality could potentially have increased in recent decades due to either (1) time effects – changes
in the economic environment that have increased wage inequality within every age group, or (2)
cohort effects – younger cohorts were more unequally endowed with labor market skills than older
cohorts. To compute life-cycle facts we must therefore disentangle the relative contributions of
time and cohort effects. This decomposition is of independent interest, since it sheds light on what
factors are behind the observed increases in cross-sectional inequality.

To identify age-effects and disentangle time and cohort effects we must impose restrictions on
how age, time and cohort effects can interact, since these are not independent. We follow Juhn
et al. (1993) and assume that the effects of age, time and cohort are additively separable, and
that only two of the three effects are operative. We then consider two linear regression models:
one in which unrestricted age and cohort effects are present, but no time effects, and one with age
and time effects, but no cohort effects. We find that age-profiles of inequality are quite different
depending on whether one controls for cohort or time effects. These differences lead to very different

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1A third possibility could be that wage inequality increases with age, combined with and ageing population. This
possibility can be ruled out by ensuring that the age composition of our sample is relatively stable over time.
2Examples of time effects include changing return to ability and trade liberalization. Examples of cohort effects
could be the size of the birth cohort, and dispersion of quality of education. Finally, factors such as a changing
return to education, deunionization, and minimum wage (which binds mostly for the young) are examples
of mixtures of cohort and time-effects.
3To see this, let \( a \) denote age, \( t \) denote time, and \( c \) denote cohort birth year. Let the statistic of interest be \( x_{a,t} \)
for agents of age \( a \) at date \( t \). By appropriate substitutions of the identity \( c = t - a \) it is easy to see that any model of
the form \( x_{a,t} = f(a, t, c) \) is equivalent to three other models that are functions of only two of the three arguments.
4In addition to simplicity, this approach has the advantage that collinearity would likely remain a problem in any
approach incorporating all three effects, even if identification were formally achieved.
interpretations of the driving wage process, including the fraction of wage inequality that is “pre-determined” at the time of labor market entrance. We will argue that the picture of life-cycle inequality that arises from the time effects model is consistent with a standard life-cycle model with endogenous labor supply. Moreover, the life-cycle profiles suggest that while some fraction of wage inequality is insurable, insurance markets are incomplete.

We then examine the data more closely to gauge whether the observed trends in cross-sectional inequality are driven by time or cohort effects. According to the cohort effect model, growth in inequality within a cohort should be the same at each date. We find that the cohort model is contradicted by the data; growth in within-cohort inequality varies strongly with time. This holds for wage inequality, earnings inequality, and the covariance between wages and earnings. By contrast, looking at the age profile of inequality in repeated cross-sections, the slope of the age profile is relatively constant, suggesting that cohort effects can safely abstracted from.

Section 2 describes the data, Section 3 discusses cross-sectional inequality over the period 1979-1996, Section 4 estimates inequality over the life-cycle, and Section 5 analyzes the cohort- versus the time-view.

2 Data Description

Our empirical analysis is based on two sources of data: the 1980-1997 waves of the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) for wages, hours worked and earnings, and the 1980-1997 waves of the Consumer Expenditures Surveys (CEX) for consumption.

We use the PSID data sample of Heathcote et al. (2004b, HSV henceforth), and the CEX data sample of Krueger and Perri (2002, KP henceforth) and refer to them for details on sample selection. Most importantly, the sample is restricted to households whose “head” (“head of household” in PSID, the “reference person” in CEX) is aged 20-65 and works $h \in [520, 5096]$ annual hours. Hourly wages are computed as annual labor earnings divided by annual hours worked. KP’s “total consumption” is non-durables plus services from durables.

There are three important data issues that we only briefly mention here:

– **Measurement Error in the PSID**: Several papers based on the PSID Validation Studies argue that in PSID data, hours are measured with error. Since wages are defined as the ratio of earnings
to hours, the absolute magnitude of $\text{cov}(\text{hours}, \text{wages})$ can be underestimated ("division-bias"). If the measurement error is "classical", then it will affect the levels of variances and covariances, but not their slope over time or over the life-cycle, which is the focus here.

- **Measurement Error in the CEX:** While KP and Slesnick and Ulker (2004) focus exclusively on the survey datasets in the CEX, Attanasio et al. (2004) find that CEX diary data suggest a somewhat larger increase in consumption inequality over time.

- **Unit of analysis:** Wages, hours and earnings are recorded at the level of the individual worker, while consumption is measured only at the level of the household. We therefore convert household consumption data into adult equivalents $\hat{c} = \sqrt{#A + 0.5#C}$, where $#A$ and $#C$ are the number of adults and children living in the household (see Slesnick and Ulker, 2004).\(^5\)

### 3 Cross-Sectional Inequality over Time (1967-1996)

Despite the sharp rise in cross-sectional inequality in US wages and earnings since 1980, inequality in consumption and hours worked has been relatively stable. However, the underlying consumption-hours distribution has changed significantly: the covariance between consumption and hours has decreased, while the covariance between wages and hours has increased (see e.g. HSV and KP).

In HSV we use the panel dimension of PSID to estimate individual wage dynamics. We find that a calibrated Bewley-Huggett-Aiyagari incomplete-markets economy with endogenous labor supply and these wage dynamics can account – quantitatively – for all the trends described above: it predicts a minor increase in variability of consumption (because our wage process attributes some of the increase in wage-inequality to transitory shocks that are easy to self-insure). Moreover, it replicates the observed rise in the wage-hours covariance: as the variance of the transitory shocks increases, labor supply tracks wages more closely. Consequently, the model generates the observed evolution of earnings inequality.

In HSV our specification for individual wages allows for time effects but not for cohort effects. If cohort effects were important, a model for wages abstracting from them could give misleading predictions for the dynamics of inequality over time in other variables. However, in the next section

\(^5\)See HSV for a discussion of the pros and cons of focusing on the individual versus the household as the unit of analysis.
we argue, using life-cycle data, that it is reasonable to focus on time effects when modelling changes in the wage-generating process.

4 Cross-Sectional Inequality over the Life Cycle

We start by constructing variances of wages, hours, total and non-durable consumption, and the covariance between hours and wages for observations grouped by year and age. An individual is defined to be of age $a$ if her actual age lies between $a - 2$ and $a + 2$. The typical “cell” contains several hundred observations, although the size range is large. We then estimate the life-cycle profile of inequality, removing year and cohort effects successively. To remove year effects from the typical moment $x_{t,a}$ (e.g., the variance of wages of individuals with age index $a$ at time $t$) we assume away cohort effects and run a linear regression with a full set of year and age dummies. To remove cohort effects from the moment $x_{c,a}$ we assume away time effects and run a linear regression with a full set of cohort and age dummies.

Figure 1 reports the results. For many of the dimensions of inequality we report, the “time view” and the “cohort view” yield very different results for the variance of wages and earnings and the covariance between wages and hours. The rise in wages and earnings inequality over the life cycle is substantially larger when one controls for cohort effects (by a factor of 1.6 for wages and 1.7 for earnings). For the covariance the differences are even more pronounced. When we remove time effects, the covariance falls with age, when we remove cohort effects, it rises slightly. The age profile of the variance of hours and the variance of consumption are instead invariant to the assumptions made about time/cohort effects.

These age-profiles have information about the driving income process (see also Storesletten et al., 2004). For example, assume that log of individuals’ wages can be decomposed into a fixed effect, a persistent autoregressive shock, and a transitory shock, where the conditional variances of these shocks are constant over time. The fact that both age-profiles for wages are linear suggests that the persistent component is close to a unit root. Moreover, the steepness of the profile identifies the conditional variance of the permanent shock. Thus, the time view suggests substantially less life-cycle risk (than the cohort view), implying that a larger fraction of wage and earnings inequality

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6To save space total consumption is omitted from Figure 1. Its age-profile is similar to that of non-durable consumption until age 48, but then it flattens out. Moreover, its age-profiles for time/cohort effects are identical.
is “pre-determined” at age of labor market entrance.

In Heathcote et al. (2004a), we estimate a life-cycle model with endogenous labor supply. That model is quantitatively consistent both with the life-cycle profiles according to the time view, and with the evolution of cross-sectional inequality as described in Section 3. As agents age, accumulated permanent shocks account for a larger fraction of the (within-cohort) cross-sectional variance of wages. When preferences are such that agents increase leisure in response to a permanent wage increase, many of the patterns in Figure 1 emerge: the variance of consumption increases less than the variance of earnings, and the covariance between hours and wages declines with age.  

In contrast to the incomplete markets model proposed in Heathcote et al. (2004a), Figure 1 seems inconsistent with complete markets against wage risk. Complete insurance implies that workers with good (bad) wage shocks supply more (less) hours, irrespectively of their planner-weights (see Heathcote et al., 2004c).  

We view the steep age-profiles of wage inequality as evidence that as agents age, wage shocks are becoming more important, relative to fixed-effects. Consequently, the complete markets model has the following sharp implication: as a cohort grows older, the correlation between wages and hours should approach unity (and hence increase). However, Figure 2 reveals that the wage-hours correlation is around zero throughout.

5 Time or Cohorts Effects?

Given the sharp differences in the cohort-view and the time-view documented above, we now try to measure the relative importance of time and cohort effects in the determination of the dynamics of inequality in the US over the last 30 years.

Consider the general model for the moment $x$ – where we assume separability between age $a$, time $t$ and cohort $c = t - a$, i.e. $x(a, t, t - a) = g_1(a) + g_2(t) + g_3(t - a)$. In the regressions described in the previous section, the functions $g_1$, and $g_2$ and $g_3$ are implemented as full sets of regression dummies.

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7We have not formally estimated the life-cycle model under the assumption that the empirical moments are those arising from the cohort view. However, since (1) the accumulated permanent shocks must account for an even larger fraction of wage-variance than under the time view, and (2) the cohort view implies an increasing empirical age-profile of wage-hours correlation, we conjecture that the life-cycle model of labor supply will be rejected.

8This holds even if preferences were non-separable between consumption and leisure. Such restriction is needed in order to account for the rising age-profile of consumption inequality (Storesletten et al., 2001).
To help identify time and cohort effects, we compute three different measures of changes in inequality:

- The change within age group \( a \) between \( t \) and \( t+1 \):
  \[
  \Delta x^a_{t,t+1} = g_2(t+1) - g_2(t) + g_3(t+1-a) - g_3(t-a) = \Delta g_2(t) + \Delta g_3(t-a),
  \]
  and define the average (across age groups) within-age change as \( \bar{\Delta}x^a_{t,t+1} = \Delta g_2(t) + \bar{\Delta}g_3(t) \).

- The change within cohort \( c = t-a \) between \( t \) and \( t+1 \):
  \[
  \Delta x^c_{t,t+1} = g_1(a+1) - g_1(a) + g_2(t+1) - g_2(t) = \Delta g_1(a) + \Delta g_2(t),
  \]
  and define the average (across cohorts) within-cohort change as \( \bar{\Delta}x^c_{t,t+1} = \Delta g_2(t) + \bar{\Delta}g_1(t) \).

- The within period \( t+1 \) change between age \( a \) and \( a+1 \):
  \[
  \Delta x^t_{a,a+1} = g_1(a+1) - g_1(a) + g_3((t+1) - (a+1)) - g_3((t+1) - a) = \Delta g_1(a) - \Delta g_3(t-a),
  \]
  and define the average (across age groups) within-period change as \( \bar{\Delta}x^t_{a,a+1} = \bar{\Delta}g_1 - \bar{\Delta}g_3(t) \).

Juhn et al. (1993) note that \( \bar{\Delta}x^a_{t,t+1} \) and \( \bar{\Delta}x^c_{t,t+1} \) have a common component, the time effect. Thus, in the presence of important time effects and negligible cohort effects, these two measures should have comparable magnitudes and be strongly correlated. This is the first hypothesis we examine. Table 1 reports for each moment the average within-cohort and within-age-group changes for six periods (four periods for the variance of consumption). First, consider the PSID moments. The correlation coefficient is always high and positive. In particular, note that in the three time periods from 1973-1987, when most of the rise in wage inequality took place, the magnitude of the within-age and within-cohort changes are remarkably similar for all moments.\(^9\)

A positive correlation between within-cohort and within-age changes might occur even in absence of time effects if the age effect \( \bar{\Delta}g_1 \) and the cohort effect \( \bar{\Delta}g_3(t) \) were similar. This hypothesis can be examined in two ways. First, in absence of time effects, the within-cohort change \( \bar{\Delta}x^c_{t,t+1} \) should be similar across time periods. This is rejected in our data: the majority of the within cohort changes for any given variable are statistically different between periods. Second, the within-period between-age change \( \bar{\Delta}x^t_{a,a+1} \) should be zero. In our sample this moment is statistically different from zero in every period.\(^9\)

To go one step further, note that if cohort effects are small, then $\Delta x_{a,a+1}^t$ should be constant across periods. This hypothesis cannot be rejected by the PSID moments. We conclude that the evidence speaks in favor of time effects, rather than cohort effects.

We don’t analyze changes in inequality in consumption between cohorts and age-groups because changes in the variance of log consumption are essentially not significant and are therefore not useful in distinguishing between time and cohort effects.

6 Concluding Remarks

In this paper we have shown that the dynamics of cross-sectional inequality across time and age groups are consistent with the presence of time effects and absence of cohort effects, but inconsistent with the presence of cohort effects and absence of time effects.

Furthermore, attributing rising inequality over time solely to cohort effects can paint a misleading picture of inequality over the life-cycle. Inequality rose dramatically within cohorts during the 1980s, so a model without time effects must attribute this increase in inequality to a very steep age profile for inequality. By contrast, a model with time effects attributes much of the rise in inequality to time effects, implying less steep age-profile of inequality. This might suggest why Deaton and Paxson (1994), who abstracted from time effects, found a dramatic increase in consumption inequality by age using data from the 1980s – a period of sharp rise in wage inequality – while we and Slesnick and Ulker (2004) find a smaller increase when extending the sample to include the 1990s.

References


Slesnick, D. T. and A. Ulker, (2004), Inequality and the life cycle: Age, cohort effects, and consumption, Mimeo, University of Texas, Austin.


Figure 1
Age-profiles of Inequality: Cohort- versus Time-Effects

The figure portrays the 36 age dummies from running linear regressions abstracting from cohort effects and time effects, respectively. Each graph is normalized to match the unconditional average for the corresponding cross-sectional moment over the period 1980-1997.
Table 1

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| **Variance of log non-durable consumption** |           |           |           |           |           |           |             |
| Within cohort         | \(\Delta x_t^{c} \) | -1.9826   | -0.5245   | -0.1804   | 0.4470    | -0.654    |             |             |
| S.E.                  |           | 0.972     | 0.729     | 0.373     | 0.591     |           |             |             |
| Within age group      | \(\Delta x_t^{a} \) | 0.1678    | 0.1790    | -0.0450   | 0.0285    |           |             |             |
| S.E.                  |           | 0.252     | 0.212     | 0.176     | 0.279     |           |             |             |
| Between age group     | \(\Delta x_{a,a+1}^t \) | -0.2117   | -0.0129   | 0.0317    | 0.0348    |           |             |             |
| S.E.                  |           | 0.496     | 0.292     | 0.221     | 0.244     |           |             |             |

**Note:** Average annual change within cohort, within age group and between successive age groups by period. All changes are multiplied by 100. Standard Errors are reported below. The column labelled "Correlation" displays the correlation coefficient between the within-age and the within-cohort changes. The data for consumption in the column labelled "1978-1982" refer to the period 1980-1982.