The Role of Democracy for Peace and Reconstruction
ACEH
THE ROLE OF DEMOCRACY
FOR PEACE AND RECONSTRUCTION
ACEH
THE ROLE OF DEMOCRACY
FOR PEACE AND RECONSTRUCTION

Editors
Olle Törnquist
Stanley Adi Prasetyo
Teresa Birks
Contents

Notes on the Contributors vii
Publisher’s Note ix
Preface xi
Olle Törnquist

Introduction and Conclusions: From Liberal and Social Democratic Peace to Indonesian Normalisation 1
Olle Törnquist

Background and Political Situation in Aceh 47
Stanley Adi Prasetyo and Teresa Birks

Democracy in Aceh Diagnosis and Prognosis 73
Olle Törnquist
With a data appendix by Willy Purna Samadhi

Profitable Peace 171
Stanley Adi Prasetyo and George Aditjondro

From Political Exclusion to Inclusion: The Political Transformation of GAM 215
Gyda Marås Sindre

Regional Election in Aceh 257
The ISAI Aceh Research Group
Team leader Stanley Adi Prasetyo; supervisor and final editing Olle Törnquist with Teresa Birks

Local Political Parties in Aceh:
Engines of Democratisation in Indonesia 301
Murizal Hamzah

Frameless Transition? 333
The Aceh Participatory Research Team

Lost in Transition, Lost in Elections 375
Dara Meutia Uning with Olle Törnquist and the Post Script Analysis Team
NOTES ON THE CONTRIBUTORS

The Aceh Participatory Research Team includes at first hand Affan Ramli, Dara Meutia Uning, Murizal Hamzah and Shadia Marhaban (Coordinator). Supervisor: Olle Törnquist.

George Junus Aditjondro, with a background as investigative journalist, has his PhD from Cornell University and has lectured for several years in Indonesia and Australia. He is currently working as an independent researcher specialising in investigating regional conflicts in the Indonesian archipelago and post-conflict and post-disaster reconstruction in Indonesia, including Aceh, and in East Timor. Currently, Dr. Aditjondro is a guest lecturer at Sanata Dharma University’s Postgraduate Programme in Yogyakarta.

Teresa Birks is an independent researcher. Over the past eighteen years she has worked for national and international organisations in Indonesia, Malaysia, East Timor and the United Kingdom concerned with human rights, education and justice. She has previously co-edited (with Olle Törnquist, Stanley Adi Prasetyo and A.E Priyono), Indonesia’s Post-Soeharto Democracy Movement. Demos and NIAS Press 2003 and (with AE, Priyono, Willy P. Samadhi) Making Democracy Meaningful. Problems and Options in Indonesia, Demos, PCD-Press and ISEAS 2007.

Murizal Hamzah is a democracy campaigner, columnist, and investigative journalist, also working at the Aceh Independent Institute in Banda Aceh.

The ISAI Aceh Research Group was co-ordinated by Stanley Adi Prasetyo and supervised by Olle Törnquist. It included Donni Edwin, Researcher, Wiratmo Probo, Assistant Researcher, Dono Prasetyo, Assistant Researcher, Aris Santoso, Assistant Researcher Irawan Saptono, editor; Murizal Hamzah, co-editor.

Stanley Adi Prasetyo is a leading Indonesian democrat, publisher, educator and investigative journalist and currently a Member of the Indonesian

**Willy P. Samadhi** was the Deputy Director of Research in Demos (the Indonesian Centre for Democracy and Human Rights Studies) and the principal data analyst in its two all-Indonesia democracy surveys, the final reports of which where published (with A.E. Priyono and Olle Törnquist) in *Making Democracy Meaningful. Problems and Options in Indonesia*, Demos, PCD-Press and ISEAS 2007, and (with Nicolaas Warouw) in *Democracy Building on the Sand. Advances and Setbacks in Indonesia. Report from the 2nd Demos’ National Expert-Survey*. Demos and PCD Press, 2008. Samadhi is now doing post graduate studies and works with the research programme at the University of Gadjah Mada on Power Welfare and Democracy that follows up and broadens the democracy surveys.

**Gyda Marås Sindre** has an undergraduate degree from the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, and is currently a PhD candidate at the Department of Political Science, University of Oslo. She has written on the political violence in Indonesia and is currently specialising on conflict resolution and transformation of the separatist movements in Sri Lanka and Aceh in the aftermath of the 2004 tsunami disaster.

**Olle Törnquist** is Professor of Political Science and Development Research, University of Oslo and the author of several works on popular politics and democracy in theoretical and comparative perspective. He was the academic director of the all-Indonesia democracy surveys carried out by Demos, the Indonesian Centre for Democracy and Human Rights Studies. He currently advises the comprehensive follow up project on Power Welfare and Democracy at the Gadjah Mada University (UGM) and co-directs the international Power Conflict and Democracy Programme having initiated the PCD Press of which this book is a part. His most recent books with a focus on comparative perspectives are *Politicising Democracy. The New Local Politics of Democratisation*, (with John Harriss and Kristian Stokke) and *Rethinking Popular Representation* (with Kristian Stokke and Neil Webster), Palgrave 2004 and 2009.
PUBLISHER’S NOTE

This existing publication has been made possible through a number of joint efforts. Its first edition, made available in 2008, was published by PCD Press in collaboration with Indonesia’s Institut Studi Arus Informasi (ISAI). The second and revised edition of this anthology is published by PCD Press which now has affiliation to the Centre of Politics and Government Studies of the Faculty of Social and Political Science, Universitas Gadjah Mada, Indonesia. The affiliation is expected to broaden the area of interest of PCD Press to also include the issue of power, welfare, and democracy, which are currently the main concern of the Centre.
This book is part of a comparative project on ‘Conflict resolution and democratisation in the aftermath of the 2004 tsunami disaster in Sri Lanka and Aceh’. The point of departure was an early January 2005 conversation about the possible consequences of the tsunami. Kristian Stokke (friend, colleague, expert on Sri Lanka and Professor of Political Geography, University of Oslo) argued of Sri Lanka that it was likely to generate additional disputes between the parties over relief and reconstruction. In Indonesia on the other hand, I pointed to new survey data, indicating that decentralisation and fledgling democracy fostered a political system that might provide an opening for political resolution. We agreed to find out, and a year later the Norwegian Research Council provided funds – for which we are most thankful.

The plan for 2006-2009 was that we would both expand our ongoing research in the respective countries by also addressing the post-tsunami politics, including what role, if any, democracy would play. Meanwhile, doctoral student Gyda Sindre and concerned local colleagues would analyse a number of special issues in more details, such as the political economy, the negotiations and the transformation of the separatist movements.

The initial focus proved fruitful and the comparative perspective has been rewarding. It has even provided a joint platform for wider cooperation between colleagues and students at the Universities of Oslo, Colombo and Gadjah Mada (Jogyakarta) within
a South and Southeast Asian post graduate and research programme on Power, Conflict and Democracy (www.pcd.ugm.ac.id). Thus it is only logical that this book is first published by the new electronic PCD Press – controlled by scholars and leading democrats in the regions themselves – which aims to provide high quality analysis of critical topics available at low cost to students and activists. In this context, the book has benefited in particular from the support and advice from Kristian Stokke, Gyda Sindre, Silje Vevatne and Helene Tidemann based in Oslo, the related international network focusing on popular representation, Professor Jayadeva Uyangoda and his colleagues in Sri Lanka and the PCD-team in Jogjakarta (Indonesia) including Mohtar Masoed, Pratikno, Eric Hiariej, Aris Mundayat, Purwo Santoso and Nico Warouw in addition to Budi Irawanto.

Given the initial arguments, the Indonesian side of the research had to focus on what role if any democracy would play. To make sense for practitioners, there was also a need for analyses to be available continuously as well as to publish the first edition of the concluding report on Aceh prior to the 2009 elections.

There were four implications. First, there would also have to be a second edition – this edition – which would also include corrections to the first volume and an analysis of the election results. Second, there should be additional comparisons (beyond Sri Lanka) with the dynamics of peace making in other disturbed parts of Indonesia in order to understand what might happen in Aceh. As no major (academically) critical studies were yet available, the time limitations called for a review analysis. This task was undertaken by Stanley Adi Prasetyo and George Aditjondro based on reports, the experience of actors involved and ongoing studies. Third, as nobody had a specified understanding of the state of democracy, a baseline survey and analysis of the problems and options was essential. Fourth, one would have to trace and analyse (partly by way of participatory observation) the critical turning points in the rapidly changing process.

Fortunately the most challenging tasks, the survey and the analysis of milestones, could be related to two efforts at promoting democratic political capacity in Aceh. These had agreed on an informal division of labour already by early 2005. One was by the Olof Palme Centre and Friedrich Ebert Stiftung and partners in support of the democrats among the Aceh nationalists in GAM and
SIRA. Another was initiated by this author and activists close to Demos, the Indonesian Centre for Democracy and Human Rights Studies, and one year later supported through the Norwegian Embassy to Indonesia (and thanks also to Eva Irene Tuft for valuable insights from Central America). The aim was to foster political capacity towards a ‘third force’ among democratic civil activists by way of local research and follow-up work involving the activists themselves. However, while the former attempt did well and proved decisive for the democratic roadmap and its initial quite positive implementation until 2007, the latter was productive but had problems in building a solid basis in participatory research.

This book has benefitted immensely from joint work with scholars and activists involved in these projects. In the first case I am particularly thankful to Jan Hodann, Erwin Schweishelm and his colleagues, and the team with the School for Peace and Democracy that they funded in Aceh, including Bakhtiar Abdullah, Taufik Abda, M. Nur Djuli, Munawar Liza, Muhammad Nazar and their partners. In the second case, I wish to thank Asmara Nababan, Anton Pradjasto, Agung Widjaja and their colleagues for many insights during the initial period, until disagreements over the importance and quality of the participatory research made fruitful cooperation difficult. Equally important, a number of related scholarly activists have contributed valuable insights and assistance, including Aguswandi, Otto Syamsuddin, Juanda Djamal and many of their partners, in addition to Juha Christensen and the comparative insights of Dr. Joel Rocamora. Similarly and perhaps most decisive, a new team of experts and activist researchers – with Dara Meutia Uning, Affan Ramli, Shadia Marhaban (coordinator) and Murizal Hamzah among others to whom I shall soon return,

The problems of the participatory survey work did not only make some of the original cooperation difficult. First, it proved impossible to extend the survey work to a crucial additional study from below of the first post-peace local elections in December 2006. This challenge was handled through a combined scholar and investigative journalist team from ISAI (the Institute for the Studies on Free Flow of Information), coordinated by Stanley Adi Prasetyo. Second, as the report from the original survey was never concluded by the Demos team, and since the scattered data remained confused, it was necessary to finally make the best possible out of what was
available. In this connection I am particularly thankful to Willy P. Samadhi who helped me by controlling and re-tabulating the raw data with all the eminent skill and commitment that was needed, thus enabling both quality control of my general analysis and also future studies. Third, given that the original survey was not finalised, the originally scheduled follow up seminars came to nothing. This was where political leaders and other activists would have been able to supplement information and develop joint recommendations and modules for democracy education. In this book, the task has been shouldered to the best of our abilities by the Aceh Participatory Research Team. This team, efficiently coordinated by Shadia Marhaban and with Dara Meutia Uning as gifted lead author, has both interviewed a number of leading actors in Aceh that have been crucial to the process of peace and democracy and analysed critically their responses (Chapter 8). Moreover, in the new Chapter 9, the team (and Dara in particular) has solved the herculean task of collecting scattered and confused data from the 2009 elections and to analyse with me the implications of the results for the once so promising democratic roadmap in Aceh.

Finally the much needed scholarly critique, advice and support. In addition to the colleagues in Oslo, Colombo and Jogyakarta within the previously mentioned PCD programme, special thanks go to Ed Aspinall, Damien Kingsbury, Gerry van Klinken, Renate Korber, Joel Rocamora and Klaus Schreiner in addition to the PCD Press reviewer Fachri Ali and participants in the Aceh workshop at the EUROSEAS Naples conference and a number of seminars in Norway, Sri Lanka, India and Indonesia on major arguments in the anthology. Later on, while preparing the second edition of the book, we have also benefitted from comments on the first version and on summary presentations of its main arguments to the international conference on Aceh and Indian Ocean Studies in Banda Aceh in February 2009. This was also when the first edition was launched. Special thanks to Dr. Leena Avonius and Professors Harold Crouch and Anthony Reid.

This is also the appropriate place for a special thanks to Teresa Birks who (as so many times earlier) has not only saved us by making the texts readable and understandable, but has also controlled and improved much of their substance. The final responsibility for all the remaining mistakes in the second edition, however, rest with me
The most important insight however was not provided from a scholarly academic horizon but based on critical reflections during decades of pioneering and crucial support for locally rooted democrats in so many contexts, including Southern Africa, Burma, the Philippines, Indonesia and its rebellious province of Aceh – the insights of Jan Hodann. Thanks Janne for insisting, in spite of my inability to understand until mid-2004, that the Aceh resistance against dominance included a significant democratic potential that would unfold, given that there was some support and better opportunities. There are many in Aceh (and elsewhere) who miss you now that you have retired. But may your skill in ‘the art of resistance’ (carried along from the masterful stories by Peter Weiss of the European anti-fascists that literally shaped you) be joyfully combined with your new passion, the quite related art of circus performance!

February 2009 and January 2010
Olle Törnquist

(Endnotes)
INTRODUCTION AND CONCLUSIONS:
FROM LIBERAL AND SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PEACE TO INDONESIAN NORMALISATION

Olle Törnquist

The democratic transition in Aceh from conflict and disaster to peace and reconstruction - but also new problems of governance and representation, flies in the face of conventional wisdom and theoretical prediction. The major arguments about peace and democracy (to which we shall soon return) are about the importance of liberal democratisation, institution building ahead of democracy and transformative or social democratic oriented politics. But to what extent do they help us understand the contextual dilemmas of democratic development and thus pave the way for advances in Aceh and elsewhere?

The present book addresses this puzzle by confronting the arguments about peace and democratisation with the contextual dynamics in Aceh, as identified by concerned scholars in cooperation with well informed and critically reflecting activists. While standing on the shoulders of existing research, we have tried to add data and analysis that were found missing. In Chapter 2, therefore, Stanley Adi Prasetyo and Teresa Birks begin by sketching out the historical background of the conflict in Aceh to enable those readers who are not Aceh/Indonesia specialists to both contribute comparative insights and benefit from the Aceh experience. In Chapter 3, Olle
Törnquist defines the intrinsic dimensions of democracy and uses indicative survey data on these factors in Aceh in comparison with Indonesia in general in order to establish the main trends of democratisation by late 2006. In Chapter 4, Stanley Adi Prasetyo and George Aditjondro explore the role of big coercive powers and business in disturbed areas of Indonesia in order to better understand the dynamics of the peace-brokering approaches that were guided by the then Vice President Jusuf Kalla in particular. In Chapter 5, Gyda Marås Sindre analyses the transformation of the Free Aceh Movement rebels, GAM, in comparative perspective to characterise the organisation and identify the factors that influence its role in the efforts at democratic peace building. In Chapter 6 a research team led by Stanley Adi Prasetyo and supervised by Törnquist analyse the local elections of December 2006 whilst in Chapter 7, Murizal Hamzah reviews the new local political parties that were established in Aceh thanks to the peace agreement. In Chapter 8 the Aceh Participatory Research Team guided by Törnquist discuss how a number of leading actors of change in Aceh (including the governor of Aceh, his deputy and the head of the reconstruction agency) responded in interviews to the major dilemmas that were identified in the first edition of this book. Finally, in Chapter 9, Dara Meutia Uning with Törnquist and a well informed team of activists analyse the results and political consequences of the 2009 elections.

But first this introductory chapter presents the analytical framework and a summary of how the general arguments about peace and democracy measure up to the major developments in Aceh, especially in view of the findings in the forthcoming chapters.¹

The puzzle: entrenched problems, miraculous peace and ‘normalisation’

The violence in Aceh is rooted in conflict with Jakarta over the governance of the post-independence Indonesia. Aceh called for a federalist system, allowing, control over its natural resources, culture, religion and more. Jakarta resisted, both under populist President Sukarno and despotic President Soeharto. Political and economic liberalisation after the fall of Soeharto in 1998, including swift elections and radical decentralisation under newly appointed President B.J. Habibie, was expected to facilitate positive peace in disturbed areas like Aceh. Formal peace negotiations were to
follow and a ‘humanitarian pause’ was facilitated in 2000 under President Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur) by the Geneva based Henry Dunant Center which led to a ceasefire agreement in late 2002. By 2003 however, the violence intensified again under the new administration of President Megawati Sukarnoputri. The rebels in Aceh and other areas characterised Indonesia as a colonial construct sustained only by authoritarian regimes and which would now crumble thanks to democracy. Nationalists, on the other hand, warned against the balkanisation of the ‘modern state’ whilst most scholars agreed that liberal localisation was fostering conflictual identity politics. It is true that by 2004, newly elected President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) and Vice President Jusuf Kalla tried to counter conflict, both through the rule of law and by expanding business opportunities. But even as late as a few months after the December 2004 tsunami, the best contextual research suggested that progress towards peace and democracy in Aceh was almost impossible given the oppression, exploitation, predatory practices and violence, framed as it was by ethnic, religious and rival national identities; not to mention the natural disaster as well (e.g. Aspinall 2005, Shultze 2005).

The first of four deeply entrenched problems was ethnic nationalism. By the mid-seventies, Acehnese opposing the dominance and ‘colonialism’ of Jakarta had given up on previous ideas of an Indonesian federation. Aceh, it was now argued was a region with its own specific history which had nothing in common with the rest of the archipelago. Seen from this perspective, Aceh had the right to ‘regain’ independence under the old sultanate and to launch an armed struggle for liberation under the leadership of the Free Aceh Movement (GAM - Gerakan Aceh Merdeka). It is true that the student activists in Aceh who grew strong after the fall of Soeharto were primarily motivated by opposition to Indonesian oppression and authoritarian exploitation. Yet they too found no alternative to the idea of ‘regaining’ pre-colonial independence. Identity politics was particularly worrying within Aceh itself where some 20% of the population are non-ethnic Acehnese and 7% Javanese. On the one hand GAM turned at times against the Javanese as part of its strategy to render Aceh ungovernable (Schulze 2004). On the other, the military in particular exploited minorities’ fear of domination as part of its strategy to fight GAM and boost militias.
The second stumbling block was the ingrained preoccupation within the Jakarta administration, military leadership and most members of parliament with a unitary and centrally-led Indonesian nation. For example, the military and its political supporters tried to prevent foreign relief and reconstruction efforts from reducing people’s dependence on military and central state ‘protection’. Militia groups, moreover, had been encouraged, similarly in part as had been the case in East Timor. President Yudhoyono and then Vice President Kalla did have a less hawkish track record and a fresh electoral mandate to professionalise the army, sustain decentralisation and promote peace through negotiations. But even after the tsunami they made it very clear that while much was negotiable, they were not prepared to compromise around what GAM really wanted: independence or (as indicated in the beginning of the Helsinki negotiations) meaningful constitutional change (Merikallio 2006 and Kingsbury 2006). And given that GAM in turn insisted on independence or the nearest thing to it, as well as a ceasefire to reconsolidate and gain credit for facilitating relief and reconstruction, it was easy to predict that there would be deadlock. In fact the starting positions in the new peace negotiations under former Finnish President Maarti Ahtisaari were much the same as during the previous talks facilitated by the Henry Dunant Center (Aspinall and Crouch 2003).

Third, there was a risk that Yudhoyono and Kalla would apply similar conflict management approaches in Aceh as they had in a number of other disturbed areas during their previous periods in office as ministers. In the Moluccas and Poso, peace had been brokered secretly with local elites by promising them development funds and beneficial positions in profitable cooperation with sections of the military and business contractors. This approach resulted in new divisive problems that exacerbated corruption, exploitation and environmental destruction. Thus, if a similar approach were applied in even more disturbed Aceh, the prospects for both peace and reconstruction would be bleak. Corruption was already widespread among politicians and bureaucrats in Aceh (e.g. Sulaiman with Klinken 2007 and McGibbon 2006), and the military in particular, though GAM too were deeply involved in the primitive accumulation of capital through illegal taxation, exploitation and trade of natural resources as well as security rackets and extortion (Schulze 2004, Kingsbury and McCulloch 2006, Aspinall 2008: Chapter 6, Large 2008).
A fourth concern was that GAM and the pro-independence civil society campaigners might see little advantage in entering into negotiations and constructive compromises. Both were in weakened positions and short of alternatives other than intractable resistance. GAM had suffered severe military losses and many of its civilian supporters also suffered during President Megawati’s renewed military campaigns of 2003 and 2004 (ICG 2005) but had not been offered any alternative other than to admit defeat. Civil society activists had experienced a number of setbacks too. The middle class groups that had attempted to extend democratic transformation from Jakarta to Aceh had been unable to alter the predominance of corrupt practices. And the more radical students convened under SIRA (Aceh Referendum Information Center - *Sentral Informasi Referendum Aceh*) that gained initial momentum by calling for a referendum failed to receive the support of the international community in the way that East Timor had. The civil society groups had little success in their attempts to facilitate an end to violence and implement humanitarian measures through the Henry Dunant Center in Geneva (Aspinall and Crouch 2003, Aspinall 2008). As both GAM and their civil society allies were short of alternatives, the risk was that they would either be forced to negotiate with Jakarta in a distinctly disadvantaged position or hold on to the conviction (as was the case in the earlier negotiations) that time was on their side since, they added, Indonesia was in any case a colonial and elitist construct that was about to crumble since the dismantling of Soeharto’s regime (c.f. Schulze 2006:243).

Meanwhile however, Ahtisaari negotiated de-militarisation, basic rights, democratic elections and self-government. Separately moreover, the international community engaged in massive post-tsunami reconstruction. In fact for a couple of years neither peace building nor reconstruction was derailed by Indonesia’s military engagement and infamous corruption, collusion and nepotism as many had expected. On the contrary, reform-oriented ex-combatants and activists won the late 2006 gubernatorial and local political executive elections. In the final account however, much less than what had seemed possible was actually archived and the major tendency from 2008 has seen the adjustment to more usual Indonesian political and economic practices.
So how was peace possible, given all the negative predictions? And what was the actual role of democratisation, and how did it lose momentum, given the differing major theories?

**The challenge and arguments**

How can one best explain these puzzles? Let us return to the general theories and arguments mentioned above. The obvious point of departure is the thesis that liberalisation and democracy is favourable for peace, security and development. This position emerged after World War One and was revitalised with the third wave of democratisation and after the end of the Cold War. In the 1980s there was international support for negotiated transitions from authoritarianism to democracy. This was extended into the field of conflict resolution. Yet many say now that liberalisation and elections often come with more rather than less conflict and abuse of power.\(^3\) There are three major responses to the critique: (i) the ‘liberal argument’ to improve the new democratic institutions, (ii) the opposite ‘institutions first argument’ to build a well functioning state with rule of law and responsible citizen associations ahead of democracy and (iii) the social-democratic oriented ‘transformation argument’ to use the insufficient democratic institutions to foster gradually more favourable relations of power and popular capacity towards substantial democracy.

Much of the discussion about these theses is dominated by quantitative data about supposedly decisive variables in large numbers of trouble-spots. The variables, however, are rarely as clear-cut and crucial as expected (cf. George and Bennett 2005). Thus a study of how the arguments measure up within the contextual dynamics of democratisation and peace in the critical case of Aceh may also contribute to the general discussion.\(^4\)

To move ahead, one needs to know more precisely what these arguments are about and what they would say of crucial processes and critical junctures in Aceh. The current version of the liberal argument dates back to the late 1980s. This was when students and practitioners of peace and conflict resolution picked up on the attempts by internationally supported ‘moderate elites’ to craft transitions from authoritarian rule towards liberal democracy in Southern and Eastern Europe and the Global South. If these ‘shortcuts’ were feasible under even unfavourable circumstances,
it should also be possible to design liberal democratic institutions to build peace. Proponents of this approach include former UN Secretary Generals Boutros Boutros-Ghali and Kofi Annan. The plan according to the jargon is to broker pacts within the elite to ‘not just get the prices but also the civil and political institutions right’, including elections. The better the pacts and the institutions, the better the democracy, peace and development. Indonesia, for instance, has been congratulated on an unusually stable democratisation thanks to the inclusion of the powerful elite in designing the liberties, elections, measures against corruption as well as the decentralisation and reduction of the military powers while mass based participation has been kept at bay (Samadhi and Warouw 2008 and van Klinken 2009, c.f. Aspinall 2010). The broader picture however is one of limited results in emerging democracies that drift back into authoritarianism, especially in relation to the rule of law. Thus the aim is to perfect the deals and the institutions to contain abuse and conflicts (c.f. Jarstad and Sisk 2008). A common recommendation is to assess the standard of the institutions, focus on the deficits such as poor accountability and political parties and then move ahead with ‘realistic’ measures.

For the liberal argument to be supported, it is crucial that the elitist pacts for economic and political liberalisation and best possible civil and democratic institutions in Indonesia and Aceh already initiated by 1998 did not caused more conflict and abuses of power, but may be seen to have promoted peace, including the period since the exit of foreign aid and reconstruction workers.

In contrast to the liberal thesis, the essence of the ‘institutions first argument’ is that well-established democracy is fine and supports peace, but that the very process of liberal economic reforms and the introduction of civil and political freedoms and elections is so contested and open to abuse by ethnic and religious entrepreneurs and ‘bad’ civil society that democratisation must be held back until strong and stable political, judicial and civil institutions have been built. In other words, one cannot assume that sufficiently functioning systems for political, civil and economic governance are on hand to resolve disputes and to regulate debate and competition, especially not in culturally diverse societies (e.g. Paris 2004: 44-51). Just as Samuel Huntington argued in the 1960s on rapid modernisation and popular mobilisation, ‘premature democratisation’ tends to
breed violence and political instability where there are insufficient political institutions (Huntington 1965 and 1968).

As a consequence, strong institutions or what Huntington called ‘political order’ must come ahead of democracy (Paris 2004: 174f). According to the followers of what is now labelled ‘sequencing’, this happened in Britain, South Korea, Taiwan, Brazil and South Africa. Thus they say, the recommendation is to support ‘moderate groups that seek to curtail the power of the old authoritarian elite, but that also fear a rapid descent into the chaos of mass politics’. The mechanisms of sequencing focus on tactics such as the postponement of elections and the development of ‘golden parachutes (...) for old elites (and) amnesties, elite-protecting pacts on property rights, professionalized but not unregulated news media, rule of law-reform that starts with the bureaucracy and the economy, and the internal democratisation of elite institutions such as the ruling party’ (Mansfield and Snyder 2007: 8). As compared to the elitist agreements about rudimentary liberal democracy, these tactics are thus to contain freedoms and elections for all until there is sufficient ‘politics of order’.

For the ‘institutions first’ argument’ to be vindicated, such liberal efforts must rather have caused more conflict and abuse of power. Instead, there should be indications that different efforts to build rule of law and other strong civil, state and economic institutions while holding back ‘premature’ liberalisation and democratisation have been successful as such and have promoted peace and solid foundations for democracy, not the other way around.

The ‘transformation argument’ differs from the first two theses outlined above by combining institution building and agents of change. The focus is on processes where actors and institutions affect each other in attempts to reform rather than adjust to the relations of power and thus advance towards substantial democracy and peace. For example, Thomas Carothers talks of strategies for gradual change even under harsh contextual conditions ‘to create space and mechanisms for true political competition and point the way to an eventual end of the rulers’ monopoly of power’ (Carothers 2007: 26). The transformation argument concurs thus with the institution first thesis that the conditions for democracy in the Global South in particular are poor. But there is strong objection to the
statement that the transition from authoritarian rule to democracy and peace in cases such as South Korea, South Africa, and Brazil was due to moderate rulers. On the contrary it was crucial that ‘vigorous democrats with no fear of “mass politics” pushed for open political competition’ (Carothers 2007a:20). It is true that some few autocrats in East Asia and parts of Europe contributed to change. But this was mainly in response to demands for reform and building strong states in order to gain popular support and fight a competitor or enemy (c.f. Therborn 1983). In most cases autocrats have not fostered ‘good governance‘ and rule of law. Even to increase state capacity and build genuine rule of law there is therefore a need to alter the relations of power. And this is best done by way of democratisation, as it is much less conflictual than popular uprisings.\(^5\)

In addition, this third thesis is critical of elite-negotiated democracy building. The argument is that the elitist liberal model continues to be constrained by the idea that the swift introduction of certain freedoms and institutions will generate substantial results almost irrespective of the context. Moreover, the measures are adjusted to existing relations of power rather than designed to alter them democratically. Comparative analysis points to the importance then of politics against privatisation and communalisation and to the specification of what areas of public affairs the demos (the people) will control. The same applies to the improvement of people’s capacity to participate in organised politics and the state’s capacity to implement democratic decisions impartially (Priyono et.al. 2007, Samadhi et.al. 2008, Harriss et.al 2004, Törnquist et.al. 2009). This seems to require demands from below for public institutions from above; institutions which in turn foster popular organisation and representation and enable demands for general policies and equal rights rather than special favours. Such processes and the logic of using fledgling democracy to both alter the relations of power and improve people’s capacity to use improved democracy to foster their aims are reminiscent of the historical development of the strongest democracies, i.e. the social rather than liberal democracies in Scandinavia. Here social democrats gave up on Kautsky’s thesis that the development and crisis of capitalism would automatically generate socialism. Originally inspired by Bernstein, they propelled instead democratic political transformation of the relations of power to enable a combination of popular welfare and economic growth...
Aceh: The Role of Democracy for Peace and Reconstruction

(c.f. Esping-Andersen 1988; Berman 2006). But similar visions and practices have of course also been shaped in recent attempts at participatory budgeting and planning such as in parts of Brazil and India (c.f. Harriss et.al. 2004 and Törnquist et.al. 2009).

The transformation argument about gradual and combined improvements of institutions and the popular capacity to use them and thus improve conditions may only be validated if such measures have been related to advances in democratic peace building. Meanwhile, there must also be indicators that (i) the liberal roadmap has constrained and adjusted democratic institutions and resources to the prevailing relations of power, undermined representation and thus also peace building, and, (ii) that attempts to build ‘institutions first’ have conserved not altered the problems of governance and peace in addition to having undermined rather than built foundations for democracy.

To what extent do these arguments help us understand the dynamics of democratisation and peace in Aceh? Eleven crucial processes and junctures have been identified on the basis of what most students of Aceh seem to agree on and because they stand out as important in comparison with other disturbed areas in Indonesia and similarly tsunami affected Sri Lanka. The chapter proceeds by discussing them in as straight forward historical sequence as possible.

Insufficient liberalisation

The liberal argument is severely undermined by the lack of positive changes in spite of the immediate freedoms, decentralisation and elections after the fall of Soeharto in 1998. The first new president B.J. Habibie officially apologised to the people of Aceh for the acts of violence perpetrated by the Indonesian Armed Forces, and the regional military status (DOM) was lifted. The second president since the fall of Soeharto, Gus Dur, went even further. There was room of manoeuvre for debate, negotiations and activism. Yet trust in Indonesia’s fledgling democracy was low. There were fewer confrontations between the army and GAM, but they continued nevertheless. Local politicians were elected, but corruption and abuses of power remained. Civil society groups mushroomed, but most of them joined SIRA in calls for a referendum on independence as in East Timor. Extended autonomy
was granted to Aceh, that enabled conservative Muslim leaders to introduce Sharia laws. Peace negotiations produced a humanitarian pause, but this was used by the conflicting parties, not least GAM, to regroup and reconsolidate their positions by extend their control of territories, communities and resources. A Military Emergency was then proclaimed in May 2003 under President Megawati. It may be argued that democratisation did not stand a chance since there was not even basic agreement on territorial issues, even though later on the idea of democracy generated favourable visions and the question is thus why.

About a year and a half after the Helsinki agreement much had changed, but the challenges of democratisation remained huge. In Chapter 3, Törnquist identifies seven major trends in democratisation based on expert-survey data. The first was the rise of ‘a political demos’. Democratic citizenship remained poorly developed, yet empirical evidence suggested that people had turned very fast from the negative impact of civil war and natural disaster to political engagement without large scale abuse of ethnic and religious identities and sustained separatism. The second trend was that politics dominated in Aceh. The military had lost ground. Even businesspeople spent much of their energy engaging in politics and administration. Enormous economic reconstruction was largely separated from organised but not from unorganised politics. Thirdly, the successful introduction of a number of freedoms, elections and even the right to put forward independent candidates and form local political parties had not thus far resulted in similarly substantive improvements of representation. Fourth, there was a tendency therefore to turn directly to various institutions of governance, although it was not facilitated by democratic institutions for direct participation but was largely dominated by patronage and clientelism. Fifth, enormous efforts by foreign donors and their Indonesian counterparts to promote reconstruction whilst containing abuses of power had not fostered sufficient support for legal justice and human rights, the rule of law and accountable governance. Sixth, several of the problems seemed to be particularly serious in the regions where the Aceh nationalists did well in the local elections, which may not be surprising given the previous conflict. However, there were no signs of better political capacity to improve the situation. Finally, most of the stumbling blocks seemed
to be especially hard to fight for the democracy-oriented actors that carried the Helsinki framework and which put Aceh on track, while it was easier for other actors to adjust to ‘normal’ Indonesian political standards and ‘practices’. Thus there was the major risk that the positive developments attained thus far were being undermined. In the Appendix to Chapter 3, Willy Purna Samadhi has re-tabulated relevant parts of the fragmented initial data from the Aceh survey (as well as the Aceh section of Demos’ 2007 all-Indonesia democracy resurvey) that formed part of the analysis. Thus this information can now be used as a basis for supplementary studies and follow-up surveys.

**Territorial control**

During the new military offensive under Megawati, the Indonesian government enhanced its control of the province in comparison to 2002-2003 when GAM dominated some 70% of Aceh’s primarily rural territory (Schulze 2004:35). GAM suffered severe losses and many say that this was the real reason why it engaged more seriously in the post-tsunami negotiations and gave up on full independence (e.g. Aspinall 2005). Moreover, GAM’s attempt to internationalise its struggle and follow East Timor’s path out of Indonesia had not been supported by the international community; although this applied to LTTE (Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam) in Sri Lanka as well. In contrast to the LTTE’s state building in North East Sri Lanka however, GAM was not in command of any major tsunami affected regions where it could have dominated aid delivery (Billon and Waizenegger 2007: 423). While territorial control is a precondition for both the institutions first and transformation arguments, the fact that this control was achieved by the Indonesian military speaks in favour of the institution first thesis’ quest for ‘politics of order’. Yet this should not be overestimated. Rebels and civil activists may continue to fight and cause serious problems for their adversaries even if they have lost in the battlefield. The Indonesian government must have learnt that lesson in East Timor and realised that without a strategic political victory it had to negotiate (c.f. Miller 2009:154f; Schulte 2006: 265). Most importantly, strength was not just a question of arms and combatants but also of political might. It is true that neither the LTTE nor GAM had built genuine political organisations, relying instead on militaristic
command, networks and kinship. But GAM in particular was not alone. On the common issue of independence, SIRA was running its own civil and political campaign outside of the command structure and beyond the exiled GAM leaders in Stockholm.

**State building**

Two other aspects of state building were probably more fundamental: the political definition of the *demos* and the increasing stability of Indonesia’s new decentralised polity. Democracy in the generally accepted terms of popular control of public affairs on the basis of political equality requires that individuals and groups identify themselves as part of a *demos* that agrees on having a number of public affairs in common and to control them in an equal way.\(^6\) Ethnic and religious solidarities as well as common interests based on class may certainly shape the *demos*, but when the identities and interests do not correspond with *de facto* existing economic and political societies, which they very rarely do, some definition and coordination of common affairs of the various communities and other groups is inevitable. Political equality, moreover, presupposes equal human rights and citizenship, which are not compatible with *extensive* special privileges for various communities, classes and other groups.\(^7\) For democracy therefore, the ethnic identity factor as in Sri Lanka (Singhalese versus Tamil) and religious solidarities as in two other disturbed Indonesian areas of the Moluccas and Central Sulawesi (Muslims versus Christians) are indeed problematic. In Aceh though, most scholars agree that although ethnicity, kinship and religion have been instrumental means of legitimacy and mobilisation, they have been subordinated to the prime interest in territorial and political control (c.f. Reid 2006, including Sulaiman 2006; and Aspinall 2008). The first major enemy was the colonial masters and the local landed chiefs, *uleebalang*, through which the Dutch extended their rule. Indeed the rebels were drawing on the network of the Islamic leaders (*ulemma*), and later on this framed the opposition to Sukarno’s unitary constitution too. Yet the focus was not on religion but local autonomy and a federative structure; and this served as a basis for cooperation with dissidents in other provinces. It is true that the regional rebels modified their mobilisation structure to gain American support within the framework of the cold war when Sukarno came to rely
more on the rapidly growing Communist Party. But when the anti-communist and pro-American New Order regime proved similarly centralistic, the basic issue of self-government proved so crucial that the leaders in Aceh even abandoned their previous focus on federalism in favour of ethnic-nationalism. Indeed there were some ugly tendencies then among rebels in particular to pit the Acehnese against Javanese migrants in particular as well as other ethnic minorities, and governance in rebel dominated areas was harsh (Schulze 2004). But generally the constitution of the demos and public affairs in Aceh has been political-territorial, has contained ethnic and religious conflict and has rendered negotiations and democratic peace building less difficult.

This weakens the liberal argument and speaks in favour of the institution first and transformation arguments. In fact, the proponents of the institutions first thesis could even have claimed that the political construction of the demos was thanks to autocratic rebel leaders. But just like the transformation argument would have predicted, the autocratic rebels did indeed not emphasise rule of law and political equality in their areas and their organisations (c.f. Schulze 2004). On the contrary (and as we shall return to), the democratic character of the Acehnese political identity developed only with the Helsinki peace agreement.

The second way in which state-building proved crucial for peace and democracy was with the increasing stability of Indonesia’s decentralisation. Initially the radical post-Soeharto decentralisation process fostered conflict and centrifugal tendencies. This motivated Megawati’s renewed military campaign and vindicated the rebels’ assumption (based on dependency theory) that Indonesia was a colonial construct that was bound to crumble (as in East Timor) as the authoritarian nationalists lost ground. Accordingly the Aceh dissidents would not have to concede but could speed up disintegration by rendering the province ungovernable. By 2004, however, there were signs that Indonesia was no longer about to disintegrate. The first national democracy survey indicated that a comparatively democratic and decentralised yet unified political system was developing, in spite of localised identity politics and remaining conflicts as in Aceh (Demos 2005). Thus, the rationale of the militant activists was undermined and later on the more trustworthy decentralisation proved crucial in finding the openings during the Helsinki peace talks to foster democratic self government.
Once again, the argument for institutions first seems to have been vindicated by these developments, but only if Aceh is analysed in isolation from Indonesia. The favourable decentralisation was not created ahead of democracy by ‘moderate’ autocrats but entirely thanks to the post-Soeharto democratisation. In addition, and as we shall return to, the extended form of decentralisation that was negotiated for Aceh was more democratic than in other provinces and districts by enabling self-government and local political parties.

**Peace negotiating presidents**

While serving as coordinating ministers in the Wahid and Megawati cabinets, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and Jusuf Kalla had negotiated peace agreements in late 2001 and early 2002 in the disturbed provinces of Central Sulawesi (Poso) and the Moluccas. Being elected President and Vice President respectively in mid 2004 they had thus fresh mandates to promote peace. Contacts with individual GAM leaders were resumed through envoys only a few months after the collapse of the Aceh peace accord in mid-2003 (ICG 2005 and Husain 2007). Little happened during the presidential campaign but by late 2004 there was agreement with senior GAM leaders in Stockholm to commence new peace talks under President Ahtisaari. Yudhoyono, a Javanese ‘thinking general,’ was in favour of moderate anti-corruption campaigns, the promotion of the rule of law and the professionalisation of the military. Kalla, a Buginese tycoon, was promoting business and in this case profitable development for warring bosses, military officers and other leaders in the provinces rather than costly military campaigns. The latter approach is discussed extensively by Stanley Adi Prasetyo and George Aditjondro in Chapter 4.

Both Yudhoyono and Kalla pushed for peace negotiations, fostered mutual trust with GAM leaders, honoured agreements and convinced conservative nationalist politicians and military in Jakarta of the need to support their approach (e.g. Aspinall 2008, Miller 2009). An extra bonus was when Kalla become Chair of Golkar (*Golongan Karya*, the Functional Group Party), the major party which had served the Soeharto regime, making it less difficult for them to gain a majority on controversial decisions in parliament.9 This was in sharp contrast to former President Megawati and similarly tsunami affected Sri Lanka’s weak, less committed and much more
compromising political leadership.

Until the negotiations in Helsinki demanded otherwise however, Yudhoyono and Kalla sustained the same military hard line, secret elitist talks, power-sharing agreements and favourable business deals for the conflicting parties in return for peace, as had been brokered in Central Sulawesi and the Moluccas. One major but finally unsuccessful attempt ahead of Helsinki for example, was to attract senior GAM leaders on the ground (Aspinall 2005:13f, ICG 2005: pp 2ff). Kalla was most outspoken in blaming the Indonesian conflicts on premature freedoms and elections. Yudhoyono and Kalla stand out thus as incarnations of a combination of the moderate leaders in a liberal oriented pact to craft ‘realistic’ democratic institutions and the enlightened autocrats who have been overtaken by ‘too early’ democratisation and now try to constrain ‘excesses’ in favour of solid institutions and leader-regulated business opportunities.

Politically active civil society

During the struggle against authoritarianism, civil society organisations (CSOs) remained unable to mobilise the people at large, develop fair representation and later on win elections in Indonesia. Yet the progress that they made was crucial and remains important in the process of democratisation (e.g. Aspinall 2005a, Lane 2008 and Törnquist 2000). With regards to Aceh, CSOs propelled much of the early post-Soeharto attempts at democratisation and peace accords and they were also active in the relief and reconstruction work after the tsunami as well as playing an important part in the follow up to the Helsinki agreement. All agree that CSOs have thus built important foundations for peace and democracy. But the CSOs that have been crucial have been the proactive and strong advocates of freedoms, human rights and other elements of democratisation. Thus much of the institution first argument’s emphasis on moderate civic institutions ahead of broader freedoms and democracy is irrelevant.

Yet, this does not mean that the liberal argument is fully vindicated. Much of the early post-Soeharto emphasis on liberal democratisation and peace building was unsuccessful in Aceh. Many CSOs experienced similar problems as their counterparts in other parts of Indonesia, namely of having an insufficient social

In Aceh in fact, a number of less liberal factors seem to have been critical for the importance of certain CSOs. For instance, the more radical organisations like SIRA benefitted from the new freedoms but did not trust in the fledgling Indonesian democracy and gained momentum by emphasising calls for a referendum and sustained struggle for independence along with GAM. It is true that the myriad of well-funded NGOs that contributed to the post-tsunami relief and reconstruction work often helped containing the hegemony of the Indonesian military. But many were co-opted by de-politicised development work at the expense of citizen rights and democratisation. This resembles the liberal development-oriented peace process in Sri Lanka. In Sri Lanka, post colonial procedural democracy had survived, but rights-oriented efforts to minimise the democratic deficit were not in the forefront. Many civil society organisations focused instead on social and economic issues, including the supposedly development-driven peace process. 11 In Aceh after the initial importance of SIRA in particular, it was instead thanks to the agreement negotiated in Helsinki on a democratic roadmap (to which we shall return) that many of the old citizen rights and political groups (and some of the new development organisations too) became crucial for a few years at least in democratic peace building. In short, the special importance of rights and political oriented CSOs with broad bases in the movement calling for a referendum and the implementation of self-government speaks in favour of the transformation thesis to utilise new liberties to improve gradually the conditions for more substantial democracy and peace building.

The tsunami

Diplomats, aid workers and journalists often claim that the tsunami was an extraordinary event that made everybody realise that peace, democracy and reconstruction must come first. The reputed International Crisis Group stated too that the disaster had ‘brought Aceh into the international spotlight, made it politically desirable for both sides to work toward a settlement, offered ways of linking the reconstruction effort and peace process, and ensured the availability of major donor funding outside the government
budget’ (ICG 2005:1). Aceh would thus have become an exceptional case where none of the general arguments on peace building by democratisation would be valid. Yet a brief comparison with the negative outcome in similarly conflict-torn and tsunami-affected Sri Lanka indicates that the disaster itself can hardly have caused the positive development in Aceh. The effects of the tsunami rarely added to, but rather worked through the factors and actors considered in the mainstream arguments about peace and democracy. Also, few of these factors and actors were so radically affected by the disaster that this could explain the different outcomes. One exception was that the Indonesian military had to give way to international presence in Aceh. But in general conclusion, the tsunami was an albeit critical event that different actors (with varied aims and strategies under diverse conditions) responded to in ways that strengthened or weakened the existing dynamics in ways that call for additional but not radically new analysis.

Economic regulations
A major contrast between the efforts to broker peace in Aceh after the tsunami and the similarly devastated Sri Lanka as well as the other disturbed areas in Indonesia were the economic regulations.

In Sri Lanka liberal economic development was supposed to facilitate negotiations and peace-building but caused popular dissatisfaction and political competition over resources such as the post-tsunami reconstruction funds. This sustained the conflict and was used to mobilise opinion against the peace process by way of ethnic and religious chauvinism. After the tsunami, the dynamics of the peace process were similar to those of the previous attempts at brokering peace between 2001 and 2003. Political analysts suggested that collaboration around the provision of humanitarian relief and rehabilitation could lead to a process of conflict resolution. Early reports of mutual good will during the first weeks after the disaster were soon replaced by competition between the Sri Lankan government, the LTTE and other political actors in order to use tsunami relief to gain political legitimacy. Recognizing these political obstacles to efficient and fair distribution of aid, international actors demanded that a joint mechanism be established between the
government and the LTTE. An agreement between the Sri Lankan government and the LTTE to establish a Post-Tsunami Operational Management Structure (P-TOMS) was, however, firmly resisted by the political opposition in parliament and although it was eventually signed, it could not be implemented due to a Supreme Court ruling that found key elements unconstitutional. Thus, the opportunity that was created by the tsunami for revitalising the peace process by way of humanitarian assistance was missed. (Stokke et.al. 2008, Stokke and Uyangoda 2010)

The peace accords in Central Sulawesi and the Moluccas were secret and (as already mentioned) largely based on the assumption that government support of profitable development for warring bosses, military officers and other leaders in the provinces would be a cheap way to put an end to violence. This logic proved feasible, but at the price of more democratic deficits and primitive accumulation of capital through coercive power and monopolised control of public economic and natural resources. In Chapter 4, Stanley Adi Prasetyo and George Aditjondro explore the role of big coercive powers and business in disturbed areas of Indonesia in order to better understand the dynamics of the peace-brokering approaches that were guided by then Vice President Jusuf Kalla in particular. Initially, similar measures were adopted in Aceh too.

In post-tsunami Aceh however different dynamics were in evidence. Initially conditions were chaotic - the military and orthodox nationalists tried to protect their dominant positions; business entered into the arena and the civil war continued, albeit at a low level. Meanwhile, peace negotiations in Helsinki continued. The main expectation was that they would at least help resolve the ‘security problem’ so that relief and reconstruction work could proceed more effectively. This was an uphill task, however. The prevailing response was to prevent yet another catastrophe. The background was of course the emerging politics of ethnicity, the intractable nationalism on both sides, the potential for the application of the same ‘profitable peace’ approach as in other disturbed areas, the risk that hard-pressed combatants and civil society activists would opt for a waiting game and foster the disintegration of Indonesia, and the new international preference for elitist institution building ahead of popular sovereignty.
What would be the main methods for handling these stumbling blocks? True enough, Indonesia was far from being a failed state like Somalia for example. Even conflict-ridden Aceh had a comparatively strong public administration and of course military organisation. Yet the disaster was of such magnitude, Indonesia’s reputation for abuse of power, corruption and violence so widespread, and previous attempts at peace and development in Aceh so poor, that the immediate reaction was to protect reconstruction and development in Aceh from potential abuses and failures. Moreover, the new regime in Jakarta was keen to manifest good behaviour and attract foreign collaboration and investment. This called for strong international presence, the participation of various NGOs, and cooperation between donors and comparatively disciplined central level administrators, officers and development experts. The outcome was internationally supported regulation of the liberal economic agenda for relief and reconstruction. The main institutions were the World Bank coordinated Multi Donor Fund in cooperation with the Indonesian Aceh-Nias Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Agency (BRR) (c.f. Barron 2008 and Barron and Burke 2008).

In short, this revision of the liberal peace agenda was neither part of the negotiations in Helsinki nor the doctrines of the foreign donors and national technocrats. The regulations were rather rooted in the post-tsunami fear that the foreign donors’ and Indonesian aid workers would be restricted by the military and defrauded within the Indonesia’s infamous ‘KKN system’ of corruption, collusion and nepotism. At the same time the international presence and concerns seem to have made the new regime in Jakarta more interested in displaying better behaviour to attract foreign collaboration and investments.

It is true that the ‘second tsunami’ in the form of massive foreign aid to Aceh has been subject to strong criticism for corruption and insufficient coordination and more besides. But the foreign monitors, donors and experts in tandem with domestic counterparts dismantled the ‘iron curtain’ around Aceh, made people less dependent on the military and most importantly contained, for a few years at least, the quite likely catastrophe of similar but (given the huge funds at stake) much more extensive abuse of public resources, coercive power and corruption as in other
disturbed provinces. Aceh today no doubt suffers from the same type of predatory practices as in many other parts of Indonesia, which we shall return to (e.g. Aspinall 2009; c.f. Chapter 4 in this volume). But the post-tsunami disaster was averted and democratic peace building was made possible.

The positive economic regulations differed from the thesis that market liberalism would be a step towards peace through democracy. On the face of it, it is rather the second thesis about solid institutions ahead of not just rapid political but also economic liberalisation that gain ground. But Jusuf Kalla’s business regulations in the Moluccas and Central Sulawesi stirred conflict and constrained democracy. And the better functioning Aceh regulations were not thanks to incumbent moderates but revised relations of power due to concerned international actors and ‘good governance’ oriented Indonesian counterparts. This speaks more in favour of the transformation argument.

Political inclusion and equality

President Ahtisaari’s roadmap was fundamental to the attainment of peace in Aceh through democratisation. The question is how it happened and how it affects the validity of the major arguments. It is useful to compare Ahtisaari’s roadmap with the less successful Norwegian peace-building efforts in Sri Lanka. Both approaches were inspired by the liberal peace doctrine, but Katri Merikallio’s complimentary review of Ahtisaari’s mediation, Damien Kingsbury’s personal account from GAM’s backbenches, (Merikallio 2006, Kingsbury 2006) and the testimony of other participants in the process, compared with the view of insiders and experts involved in the Sri Lankan process, indicate that Ahtisaari took on a different role and approach to that of Norwegians Erik Solheim and Jon Hanssen Bauer. Ahtisaari adopted the position of an assertive intervening mediator with his own ideas of what might provide fruitful avenues to explore and aim for. In contrast, Solheim and Bauer facilitated structured dialogues on the diverse issues that the actors brought to the fore and which might generate agreement. Ahtisaari framed his straightforward agenda by a next to constitutionally-democratic approach towards a comprehensive agreement, and added issues of justice and reintegration of victims and combatants. Solheim and Bauer on the other hand, focused
more on understanding a complicated web of factors, conflicts and cultures within which development assistance and practices could promote joint initiatives. It is true that Ahtisaari avoided much of the negative effects of the neo-liberal agenda that contributed to the derailing of the Sri Lankan process, and that this was more thanks to the donors’ economic regulations in Aceh than his own roadmap (which is also a reason why it may not have been equally successful in Sri Lanka). But the Helsinki discussions and peace agreement stood out by being more inclusive of the various parties concerned. The elitist and exclusionary character of the Sri Lankan peace talks between the Government and LTTE according to the standards of the liberal crafting of peace and democracy caused opposition among the excluded parties. The process was limited to the warring parties without any parallel process amongst other stakeholders and thus the marginalised political opposition has often undermined the peace process. Moreover, the absence of civil society actors has equally marginalised their recurring focus on social, economic and civil rights. In combination with the critique of the neo-liberal development agenda this enabled the otherwise fragmented political opposition of the negotiations to gather widespread sympathies and to even make the joint post-tsunami relief mechanism between the government and the rebels unconstitutional (Stokke and Uyangoda, 2010 and Stokke et.al. 2008). During the Helsinki talks by contrast, the main negotiating parties anchored their positions in a wider context of actors. GAM for instance consulted with a range of civil society groups. Most importantly, the parties abstained from power-sharing and only agreed on a limited number of major issues regarding the economy, amnesty, security, demilitarisation, monitoring and reintegration. The focus was instead on a strategy towards democratic self-government; a strategy within which all other actors would have a chance to contribute and decide on the future of Aceh on the basis of the principle of political equality. Thus the agreement even opened up the possibility of the democratic transformation of the conflict by providing a space for those who wanted to advance their aims and interests within the new democratic framework. This we shall return to, but first: how was the remarkable inclusion and democratisation possible in the first place and what if any of the general arguments makes sense of the dynamics?
The turning point was when the peace negotiations were about to break down in late February 2005. GAM persisted with its demand for independence. The Indonesian government was entrenched in its insistence on the special autonomy that had already been designated to Aceh. Ahtisaari was supportive of the latter. He also ruled out a ceasefire behind which both parties could have consolidated their positions. GAM’s delegation was thus forced to search for viable alternatives that might enable similar outcomes as that of independence. Thus they listened carefully as GAM’s advisor was alerted by a local scholar that Ahtisaari’s Finnish expression for the administration of the Swedish speaking archipelago of Åland within the framework of the Finnish state was that of ‘self-government’. Ahtisaari agreed reluctantly to the adoption of the term in the negotiations and the Indonesians did not totally reject it. The term was never used in the final document but nevertheless paved the way for the decisive discussions and wider consultation on what would characterise such a de facto self-governed province. (Merikallio 2006: 50ff, Kingsbury 2006: 42ff, fn.15).

But how was it that GAM opted for democratisation on the basis of political equality rather than a favourable power sharing agreement, which Jakarta was more than willing to concede? This was not primarily a question of will and ideology. As a concerned observer put it as late as 2006, ‘GAM neither has nor ever had a functioning party apparatus. GAM’s leadership (…) has no political experience in democratic politics (…and it) lacks any kind of political programme going beyond the demand for Aceh’s independence.’ Possibly the answer is instead that the discussions on self-government made the democracy oriented negotiators more influential because they were able to work out relevant proposals. These were the negotiators associated with the campaigns for a referendum, for human rights and for broad international support for Aceh. They had additional networks in Indonesia and internationally beyond GAM’s structure. And they were part of or related to a younger generation of activists and militant leaders. Ahtisaari supported the arguments about political equality. This implied the opening up for independent candidates in the first elections of political executives and for local political parties in legislative elections at the expense of power sharing arrangements and attempts to rely on NGOs. Thus it was now rational for other GAM leaders too to strengthen their
position within this framework. And since the new initiatives called for meetings with additional actors between the GAM delegation and Acehnese civil society groups, a wider section of stakeholders could support the development of democratic institutions.

Ahtisaari’s contribution and the Helsinki roadmap thus diverge in crucial respects from the liberal argument by being explicitly political, constitutional and quite inclusive. The strong emphasis on basic institutions like independent candidates and political parties ahead of the implementation of the agreement lends some support to the ‘institutions first’ thesis; but this was thanks to and in favour of the inclusion of more rather than less popular forces. In short the politics of crafting institutions in favour of popular participation is in full agreement with the transformation argument.

Democratic opportunities and capacities

The agreement on self-government implied that GAM itself and its allies within civil society must organise more democratically in order not to lose elections. The initiative shifted therefore to the combatants and civilian campaigners on the ground. They had the will and capacity to gain influence and power by mobilising and organising a majority of the population within the emerging democratic polity. This called for political education, training and organisation. The international community was preoccupied with post-tsunami relief and reconstruction and largely ignored the democratic process. Yet a few activists and scholars provided limited though critical support and training to those who wanted to enhance their democratic capacity. Of course, these opportunities and this training did not automatically make them democratic. As those who fought Soeharto in Indonesia, the Aceh reformists could not offer a firm alternative to the autocratic rule. But they were much more capable of making use of the new political opportunities. By way of an historical comparison, they thus acted in exactly the opposite way to the Philippine nationalist revolutionaries who applied their Maoist skills to abstain from taking advantage of the democratic opening in 1986 by abandoning elections, finding themselves on the sidelines of the first of the people-power demonstration and thus swiftly becoming irrelevant (c.f. Törnquist 1990 and Rocamora 1994).
The first of three key factors behind this capacity was the potential for drawing on GAM’s old command structure. This had survived the enforced dismantling of the armed organisation by taking on a civilian mantle in the form of the Aceh Transitional Committee (KPA - *Komite Peralihan Aceh*) founded in December 2005. The KPA was intended to cater to the interests of the ex-combatants and their constituents. This could best be done on the ground in Aceh, not in exile. Thus the local leaders gained control of an increasingly patronage-driven movement, which meant votes in return.

How can we best understand this part of the process? In *Chapter 5*, Gyda Marås Sindre makes a broader analysis of the transformation of GAM in comparative perspective. It is not fruitful to analyse GAM by the conventional concepts that emphasise anti-colonial liberation, separatism, reform efforts or warlordism. One reason is that original grievances and conditions change. Another is GAM’s indistinct social basis and ideology. It is thus more rewarding to focus on the ways in which GAM and its leaders develop diverse mobilisation structures in relation to different political opportunities over time. Viewed in this way, GAM stands out over the years as remarkably unified and consistent – but also as a highly pragmatic and inclusive of parallel tendencies and groups when it comes to mobilisation techniques. In the case of GAM and similar movements that do not have a specific social basis and firm ideology there is therefore a special need for historical and contextual analysis. In short, the more or less democratic orientation of sections of GAM over a number of years from 2005 onwards – as against the temptation to adjust to ‘normal’ favouritism and corruption by returning to the rent-seeking methods of the armed struggle – is less dependent on its own ideas and organisation than on the extent to which the favourable political opportunities could be advanced.

The second factor behind the political capacity of the reformists was that the political activists in SIRA sustained their organisations from the struggle for referendum and other issues by focusing on the implementation of the Helsinki agreement and the new law on governing Aceh (LoGA). Methods included extensive consultation and mass mobilisation.
The final factor was that most of the thus engaged ex-combatants and activists abandoned the idea of cooperating with national political parties and SIRA opted for combining work in civil society and organised politics. Jointly these campaigners collected enough signatures (the minimum requirement was 3% of the population) to make their own candidates eligible to stand in the December 2006 elections for the governor and heads of districts and municipalities. This was the essence of their strategy for democratic self-government in Helsinki and they did not abandon it even in the face of senior GAM leaders in Stockholm’s advice to the contrary. The exiled dignitaries were less able to mobilise people on the ground and opted instead for cooperation with sympathetic Acehnese leaders in the ‘national’ Muslim party with a strong local presence, the United Development Party (PPP, Partai Persatuan Pembangunan). Similarly and much like elsewhere in Indonesia, civil society activists outside SIRA retained their own specific organisations, prepared ideal-parties or linked up with liberal politicians within the existing political machinery.

Remarkably, the power sharing pact of the old leaders and the autonomous civil society leaders were much less successful than the popular oriented alliance. The alliance proved politically resourceful enough to avoid the major mistake of the Indonesian democracy movement by utilising and developing the new democratic space in order to enter into organised politics and, as it transpired, win elections in a majority of districts, including those in areas beyond GAM’s traditional stronghold.

This outcome was much to the surprise of the polling institutes and leading experts. Moreover, the dynamics were an almost perfect (but brief) illustration of the transformation thesis by negating the worries of wide popular political engagement beyond elitist pacts and the idea of politically independent civil societies in the liberal and institution first arguments.

In Chapter 6 a research team led by Stanley Adi Prasetyo and supervised by Törnquist looks at the details of the elections. There were three major clusters of candidates. The first includes the Aceh nationalists, especially GAM. The second, the mainstream powerful elite with links to the military, the militias and of course the Jakarta based political parties whilst the third comprised of civil society based groups and leaders. How did these actors relate
to the elections? What were their internal dynamics? What issues and interests did they prioritise? What mobilisation methods did they use? Remarkably, all of the actors contributed to ensuring that the elections were orderly, free and fair. In addition, there were five major characteristics discernible in the way they related to the political competition.

First, division within GAM between, on the one hand, the old leadership based in Stockholm that opted for cooperation with likeminded politicians within mainstream parties and, on the other hand, those on the ground who put forward independent candidates in cooperation with civilian activists in SIRA. This division may be described in terms of elitist versus more popular oriented politics. While the former group, as mentioned, was not confident of their ability to mobilise sufficient number of voters, the main strengths of the latter were their local roots and consolidated constituencies coupled with their strategic planning, namely to advance by way of independent political representation. Second, the popular politics faction was able to project itself both as the principled nationalist representatives of the peace deal and as independent of the old GAM structure. And the impressive victories were won far beyond most of the old GAM strongholds too. Third, the ‘national’ party-candidates, who ran visibly impressive campaigns emphasising stability, personal qualities, connections and fame, were only able to succeed in their core strongholds. Fourth, the civil society groups other than SIRA failed to establish a sufficient popular base. Thus they followed in the footsteps of their Indonesian counterparts, namely of maintaining their ‘untainted’ civil engagement whilst resorting to similar elitist alliances as the old GAM leaders, though in this case at first hand with those in agreement with liberal politicians critical of GAM. Fifth, no interests and policy agendas were presented by the main candidates. Remarkably, none of the candidates had anything specifically to say on how to extend democracy and use it to direct the world’s largest reconstruction and development project since the Second World War. Instead the elections seem to have served as a referendum which came out in favour of the nationalist-driven peace and democracy agreements in the Helsinki accord and the cluster of actors that had been most positively involved in both Helsinki and thereafter on the ground. In this more limited sense the December 2006 elections were both positive and inconclusive in terms of mandates for future policies.
Ingrained governance

The reformist alliance was more successful in winning than utilising democratic power. Its executives become part of ingrained predatory practices and expected patronage among their own clients. The predominance of politics in business and development was conspicuous. This does not have to be a problem. The most successful late development in the Global North (Germany and Scandinavia) as well the Global South (East Asia) was politically facilitated. But this was not as in Aceh about symbiotic relations towards easy private gains through ‘good contacts’. As exposed in Törnquist’s Chapter 3, all relevant indicators in early democracy surveys were depressing, especially with regard to transparency and accountability.

Well informed activists point to favourable treatment and corruption. Experts and scholars add examples of poor coordination and delayed and inappropriate project implementation. This applied to the regular administration as well as the BRR and the efforts by the Aceh Reintegration Body (BRA) and the elected governors and district and municipal executives to reintegrate former combatants. Improvements such as the fair recruitment of senior government officers in Banda Aceh did not alter the general picture. Meanwhile the design and implementation of the LoGA in accordance with the Helsinki agreement suffered too. All these critical observations were confirmed by experts sympathetic to the newly elected leaders.

A number of qualifications are necessary however. Firstly, the impression that corruption is less crucial than nepotism and that the newly elected political leaders in GAM may have tried at least initially to refrain from the primitive accumulation of capital that was so characteristic of other disturbed Indonesian provinces. But we do not know for sure what the real dynamics are. As with human rights monitoring, it is easy to identify cases of corruption and abuse of power but difficult to measure the scale and analyse the dynamics. The theories about ‘predatory economics’, ‘the criminalisation of the state’ (Bayart 1999), the ‘shadow state’ (Harriss-White 2003), and similar practices in Indonesia (c.f. van Klinken 2007, Nordholt and van Klinken 2007, Aspinall 2009, and Chapter 4 in this volume) are often short of instruments with which to measure the relative importance of such tendencies and to make comparisons beyond illustrative cases. Admittedly however, at the time of revising
this book there was no doubt about the negative tendencies in Aceh. Secondly, that we need theories and concepts to distinguish between different rents and favours. In view of the successful East Asian developmental states and, for instance, preferential treatment of women to foster gender equality, all rents and all favours are not destructive. Previously marginalised civil society activists may be qualified enough to compete for good jobs and projects on the market (including anti-corruption), at least as long as foreign donor offices are around. But former combatants and victims of violence need political measures to improve their capacity and the changes that this calls for. The problem in Aceh, in the view of several senior democracy oriented experts and nationalists, is rather the lack of transparency and clearly defined aims and means. And this deficit in turn is less a question of will than of unclear rules and regulations, insufficient administrative capacity and of alternative powers to change this.23

Quite understandably, because of all these challenges, the reconstruction programmes were relatively insulated from the problems of local politics and regular administration. Also, they were separated from the insufficiently funded reintegration of ex-combatants and the victims of violence. And in many ways this was a positive tactic in order to ensure they could ‘deliver’. Given the lack of a visionary strategy to direct this tactic however, it also meant that the programmes were unable to really engage with and support the new democratic leadership’s (vague) ambitions to reform the administration, regulate the dominant forces on markets and use one of the largest international commitments since the Marshall plan to foster a democratic developmental state. Later on when the role of the donors was reduced, and the infrastructure was reconstructed and expanded, and Aceh’s new political executives had to engage whatever possible investments to display results, the major tendency was instead the development of ‘normal’ Indonesian practices.

In the face of it, the problems of governance thus speak in favour of the second argument about the need for strong institutions ahead of popular participation and elections. Yet, who would have built the institutions? Not even the massive foreign programmes engaged in sustainable institution building beyond temporary relief and reconstruction. It is also not clear to what extent the governance
failure was as inevitable as the institution first thesis would suggest, or if it was due to poor politics. We shall proceed therefore to the political dynamics.

From transformative politics to power sharing

The critical aspects of the Helsinki agreement on inclusive democratisation were political equality with full civil and political freedoms and the right to participate in elections with independent candidates and local parties. The empirical evidence indicates however that although basic rules and regulations to this effect were introduced (with some delay) and have not caused any disruptions they have been insufficient to foster transition towards democratic politics.

In Chapter 7, Murizal Hamzah reviews the second step in the Helsinki agreement on democratic political representation: the right to form local political parties. Out of twenty political parties established by the first half of 2007, only six were deemed eligible to run in the 2009 elections. This was in accordance with a number of criteria, including actual presence in two thirds of the districts, municipalities and sub-districts of Aceh. The party-building process was rather slow given that key leaders and fledgling political organisations already existed. In addition to legislative problems (which were not finalised until March 2007) and then verification, two obvious factors were involved. One was the lack of clear-cut constituencies and ideologies based on broad interest-based movements such as trade unions, farmers and business organisations. Another was the triangular conflict between the elite-political faction of GAM and the more popular oriented groups within the KPA and SIRA.

During the process, many nationalist leaders increasingly prioritised efforts at sustaining and combining the mobilisational capacity of the old GAM networks and the new KPA structures at the expense of ideology, democratisation and priorities related to ‘good governance’ and policy building. As a result the SIRA leaders and their close associates opted to establish their own political party and the concrete plans to constitute an alternative KPA-based party were shelved (c.f. ICG 2008). The latter retreat was in favour of the supposedly unified Aceh Party (Partai Aceh), driven by old GAM and several of the senior KPA leaders. This caused a number of dissident
leaders to take more or less independent positions, including the Head of the Aceh Reintegration Body (BRA – *Badan Reintegrasi Aceh*) Nur Djuli, GAM’s former Head of Information, Bakhtiar Abdullah, and until the weeks before the 2009 elections, Governor Irwandi as well.

Similarly, other parties too seem to have prioritised the consolidation and expansion of their capacity to organise and mobilise. In short, there were intense party-politicised conflicts, not so much over policy as the capacity to ‘deliver’ and thus attract followers. In Murizal Hamzah’s pre-election profile of the six accredited local parties it is thus interesting to note that they were all weak on ideologically rooted policy proposals and in the main concerned with the mobilisation structures that proved crucial in the 2006 local elections. The previous KPA-SIRA alliance that was dismantled in favour of the Aceh Party (PA) combined most sections of the KPA, on the one hand, and the old GAM leaders that allied themselves with the Jakarta based PPP party in 2006, on the other. Meanwhile, SIRA formed its own party which was later however undermined by the predominance of Aceh Party leaders within the KPA and its inability to benefit from its more far sighted democratic principles and policies. Meanwhile, the most party-political oriented sections of the radical students sustained their ideological and organisational aspirations within the small Aceh People’s Party (PRA).

The seemingly most resourceful of the remaining three parties, the Aceh Sovereignty Party (PDA), drew extensively on networks of Muslim leaders and students and sought to benefit from close links with the all-Indonesia Star Reformation Party (PBR). In 2004, the PBR attracted many religiously-oriented voters in Aceh. Similarly, the Safe and Prosperous Aceh Party (PAAS) and the Aceh United Party (PBA) sought to benefit from well known senior leaders and their networks (and perhaps political machines) and the main Muslim oriented ‘national’ parties in Aceh, namely the PPP and PAN (The National Mandate Party).

The all Indonesian Democratic Party under President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and the Golkar Party, at that time under then Vice President Jusuf Kalla were also expected to do well in the 2009 elections, especially in the election of Aceh representatives to Parliament in Jakarta.
In short, the hope after the outstanding election results of political executives in late 2006 was that the new local parties would begin to transform popular aspirations and interests into public policies, select responsive representatives and ensure accountability. However, most elite actors as well as dissident activists and ex-combatants adapted their old organisations to the new system and retained them as vehicles for their special constituencies. Most importantly, the major local Aceh Party was founded on the KPA, and according to former GAM leader and new head of this party, Muzakkir Manaf, ‘the main goal of the KPA is to see that former fighters get jobs’. These problems have been less widespread in the more democracy-oriented parties, but self-critical leaders say these are also affected by similar tendencies. It was hopeful that the early survey data pointed to a high degree of political interest in Aceh as compared to elsewhere in Indonesia, but the indicators of equal civil and political citizenship remain negative. This suggests that most people were being incorporated into politics as subjects of already powerful leaders with access to resources rather than as citizens with their own organisations.

Most importantly, several of the leaders seemed to avoid the challenges. In Chapter 8, the Aceh Participatory Research Team supervised by Törnquist account for and discuss how a number of crucial actors of change, including the Governor of Aceh, his deputy, the head of the BRR and political party leaders, civil society representatives and popular organisations commented in interviews on the major conclusions in the first edition of the book. Most leaders characterised the challenges as more or less unavoidable problems of transition – but no-one was able to identify either the aims of or the timeframe for the transition. This thus raises the question as to whether the framework for transition from conflict to democratic self-governance drafted in the Helsinki accord remains viable. An increasingly common position seemed to be that political transition had been successful and that the main priority was now to address economic issues, and that the MoU framework was not very helpful in that regard. Irrespective of their position, few actors linked the problems they identified with the lack of sufficiently developed democracy and good governance. Remarkably, even those actors who gained political influence by way of popular movements paid but limited attention to the possible importance
of fostering increased accountability and democratic governance by the facilitation of popular organising and participation towards broader interests and common aims amongst wider sections of the population.

Meanwhile, in face of the poorly evolving political representation, many people approached instead ‘good contacts’, ‘friends’ and patrons, or tried to lobby, network and exchange services and various forms of payment, which undermined further efforts at democratic representation based on political equality, clear mandates, responsiveness and accountability. Optimistic plans to utilise the electoral advances in 2006 to introduce participatory planning and budgeting for instance were shelved. In attempts to prevent being marginalised in face of the 2009 elections, many pro-democrats too had to ‘consolidate their constituencies’ by providing ‘access’ and favours, and by relating to the actors with the best chance to win.

As already indicated, the obvious alternative of engaging people in concrete work for building democratic mass organisations and fair public institutions was regarded as too demanding. Organisations such as SIRA and KPA had emerged in opposition to old forms of domination. Others had focused on specific problems like corruption or human rights. Yet others were based on religious and ethnic communities. The aspirations of labourers, farmers, fisher folk, women, business interests or sustainable development had not been nourished and hardly any such movements were important in either the late 2006 elections or the following local party building. Rooted broad solidarities based on citizen’s interests and opinions of public affairs (rather than special interests) remained rare. Recent attempts to form cultural, religious and interest organisations have mainly been from top-down by the Aceh Party to build a solid political constituency within the framework of leader dominated customary institutions.

The 2009 parliamentary and presidential elections provided further support to these conclusions. In the closing Chapter 9, the campaign and the results are analysed by Daria Meutia Uning with Törnquist and a team of local activist researchers. On a superficial level, Aceh may be congratulated for its stability and even for its close cooperation between the major local Aceh Party of the former old GAM leaders and President Yudhoyono and his Democratic
Party. On closer examination however, their joint landslide victory in the provincial elections, the humiliation of the non-GAM local parties (who got nothing aside from one single seat for the *ulemma* based PDA-party, see Ch. 7), and some victories for other Jakarta-based national parties – all this means is the *de facto* return of the kind of power sharing agreement between GAM and the Indonesian government that had been rejected in Helsinki. The rejection at that time was because the reformist GAM negotiators supported by Ahtisaari fostered instead political equality and a fair chance for all to participate via local parties. And this is what paved the way for the peace through democracy.

The return of the predatory economics, the weakened regulations and the lack of joint donor and local government efforts towards a democratic developmental state strategy were largely non-issues in the elections. The weakening of the scattered democratic block of reform-oriented GAM leaders and civil society activists, combined with the strengthening of the Aceh Party, fostered instead a landslide victory of the latter together with its new allies in Jakarta, President Yudhoyono and his Democratic Party. The non-GAM local parties, including the leading reformists and pro-democrats, are now without any representation. The picture is much the same in the district parliaments.

Moreover, the SIRA party (with roots in the student groups, civil society organisations and reformist GAM leaders) and the PRA party (trying to broaden its radical student and civil society constituencies) were both intimidated as student-dissidents undermining the necessary unity behind the only local party. Yet the massive defeat the citizen-action driven parties was also because they themselves were short of affinity with traditional political culture, a viable alternative programme and an organised constituency beyond their own activists. The story is a familiar one in post-colonial settings – including Indonesia in the late 1940s, the 1955 elections and during the dismantling of the Soeharto regime. The problem is that genuine democratic representation calls for more than liberties, parties and elections; it also calls for regulation of business, popular political capacity and institutionalised additional democratic channels for the participation of citizen’s themselves as well as for interest and issue-based organisations.
Remarkably, the idea of a power-sharing agreement between GAM and the Indonesian government that was rejected in Helsinki has thus returned to the forefront. This is at the expense of the basic agreement on political equality and a fair chance for all to participate with local parties. Similarly, hope has faded away among many Indonesian democrats that the space for local parties in Aceh would turn into a showcase for how to build genuine representation from below in the country at large. The winners were operating within the ‘normal’ Indonesian politics of strongman clientelism, culturally based populism and party-politicisation of related groups and movements.

The process continues, however. Some of the remarkable popularity of the KPA and SIRA-backed independent governor candidates beyond the GAM strongholds in the 2006 direct elections could not be repeated by the Aceh Party alone, in spite of the endorsement by governor Irwandi himself. Irwandi needs to consider this should he wish to build a strong and effective executive and stand for a second term.

More generally, the leaders who have now gained political hegemony can no longer put all the blame on others for continuous problems of governance and development. Evolving critique may also generate frustration over the undermining of democratic representation to express it and to foster change. For example, current legislation does not allow independent candidates in the forthcoming elections of political executives. GAM’s Aceh Party is the only local party with a large enough proportion of the vote in the previous elections to nominate candidates. And there is still no supplementary direct citizen and indirect interest and issue group representation. Similarly, Acehnese representation at central Indonesia level remains unresolved. Local parties can only contest in local elections. In order that those local parties which are not affiliated to existing ‘national’ parties do not lose out or have to form a pragmatic alliance (as is currently the case of the Aceh Party with President Yudhoyono) democratic all-Indonesia alliances are necessary.

Finally, how do the general arguments about democracy and peace measure up to an understanding of the problems of democracy building focusing elections, independent candidates and political parties ahead of interest and issue organisations? This
obviously weakens the liberal argument in particular. Yet this in
turn is hardly lending support to the institutions first thesis as it
has nothing to say of how such organisations would have been
feasible in Aceh ahead of the democratic breakthrough. Rather,
the transformation thesis is vindicated, given its emphasis on the
need for democracy-oriented groups and movements to frame the
transition from armed to democratic conflict resolution by wider
participation in public governance. However, as we know, the
reformists in Aceh have gradually abandoned such social democratic
oriented transformative politics.

Conclusion

In view of the empirical evidence and analysis in theoretical
and comparative perspective in this book, none of the major
arguments about peace and democracy seem to be sufficient to
explain, on the one hand, the transition in Aceh from conflict
and disaster to peace and reconstruction by way of consistent
democratisation and, on the other hand, the ensuing problems of
governance. There is an obvious need to combine different insights
in order to arrive at more firm conclusions and thus grounded
contributions to the discussion about possible ways ahead.

The liberal emphasis on early freedoms, elections and an
open party system was vindicated. The dismantling of the autocratic
Indonesian regime, the decentralisation of politics and the wider
space for critique and positive initiatives by reformists, media,
citizen groups and the international community fostered peace. The
problems of abuse of power have returned to the fore, but ethnic,
religious or other conflicts have not. Continuously, however, various
additional factors either helped making liberalisation productive or
fostered peace by constraining or expanding democracy.

Indonesian liberalisation and decentralisation did not prove
very productive for Aceh until it became more institutionalised
under Yudhoyono and Kalla’s politics of peace through economic
and political ‘stability’ and territorial military control. The rebels’
construction of an Acehnese political identity contained ethnic and
religious solidarities. And the widely expected massive corruption
and abuse of power after the tsunami was countered by regulations
rather than neo-liberalism. So even if the Yudhoyono and Kalla
constrained the swift democratisation post-Soeharto that had
enabled the decentralisation and the regulations against corruption in the first place, and even if neither the military victories nor the rebels’ construction of political identity had anything to do with citizenship and the rule of law, these dynamics, in addition to the increasing predatory practices in conjunction with the reduced foreign presence and the electoral victories of former rebels, lend some support to the institution first thesis.

Yet, it is rather the social-democratic oriented transformation argument about improvement of the conditions by expanding democracy that fits best the positive developments in Aceh. It was not a liberal oriented civil society in general but mainly the more political oriented groups that made a difference. The Helsinki negotiations and roadmap were much more inclusive and political-oriented than the elitist and ‘economic carrot driven’ negotiations held in other parts of Indonesia and in Sri Lanka. And the initially successful implementation of the democratic roadmap to peace was largely thanks to the political capacity of many rebels and civil society activists on the ground to engage in organised politics and win elections. This is in sharp contrast to most liberal crafting of democracy and the concrete experiences in other parts of Indonesia.

The peace in Aceh was attained and consolidated not by ‘managing’ or ‘resolving’ the conflict, but by transforming it from the military battlefield to a new arena of public politics based on equal rights and broad rather than narrow participation. Thus peace-building transcended the previous and less successful liberal oriented attempts by employing some elements of ‘social democratic’ politics that were based on political identities and organisation rather than polycentric civil and market initiatives. It combined constitutionalism with popular sovereignty and engagement as a means of transforming the conflict, and it benefitted from the extensive containment and regulation of the strong coercive and economic powers of the market. Most importantly, it fostered the inclusion of all crucial actors and the social and political capacity of potential democrats and related movements. In short, the initial peace and development in Aceh was due to more, not less, democracy.

The major problem for the social democratic oriented transformation argument is the deterioration of governance and democratic politics since the remarkable elections in late 2006. Is
Aceh slipping into problems similar to those in other initially post-colonial societies that initially tried politics of a similar kind such as East Timor? The standard formulation in Aceh when confronted with the dilemmas was that of ‘unavoidable problems in a period of transition’. It is true that preferential treatment of victims of violence and others who have suffered during the long period of conflict and a natural disaster are needed to facilitate political, economic and social inclusion. But are these measures sufficiently solidly structured by a continuously improved democratic framework, as originally visualised and initiated by the peace accord in Helsinki? Is it clear where from and where to the transition is going? Unfortunately some of the transitional measures and practices (and the lack of foreign engagement in these matters) have generated new problems of governance.

If this deterioration was inevitable because of poor conditions, the institutions first thesis gain credibility – even if it has little to suggest on how the institutions related to the rule of law, state capacity and also interest organisations that might have contained the deterioration could be shaped effectively in Aceh by rulers who held back democratisation. If on the other hand the undermining of the reformist project rests less with conditions than with politics, the transformation thesis may point to democratic alternatives. The latter argument is that most efforts at democratisation in Aceh were vested in the institutions agreed upon in Helsinki: the independent candidates in the first elections and then the local political parties. Thus, old command structures and activist groups were geared-up to benefit from these channels of influence. And the election of political executives was not also used to improve governance and to foster additional channels of direct citizen participation and interest and issue representation, in line with the transformation argument. There was simply too little interest in this in Aceh and internationally, but this may change.

Yet who will now propel such transformative politics and how? This calls for further studies in comparative perspective and the debate continues. The recent slide back from political equality to power sharing is most serious. It points to the immediate need of developing and broadening inclusive democratic representation to supplement electoralism and contain the attempts to monopolise it.
Draft versions of this chapter have been written and updated since December 2004 along with the research and support for democracy building in Aceh. Numerous colleagues, reflective activist and friends have contributed assistance, comments and advice. It is impossible to mention everyone by name, and some need to remain anonymous – but warm thanks to all of you! Valuable comments on texts towards the final version were provided by Teresa Birks and Kristian Stokke in addition to Ed Aspinall, Shadia Marhaban, M. Nur Djuli, Gerry van Klinken, Gyda Sindre, as well as the participants in the EUROSEAS Aceh workshop in Naples 2006 and several seminars in Indonesia, Sri Lanka and Norway.

These issues will be discussed further in Chapter 4. For the dynamics of local conflicts see e.g. van Klinken (2007) and Aragon (2007) and for the problems of corruption in Poso e.g. ICG (2008a). I also draw on interviews with local democracy activists in Palu, Poso and Tentena in January 2007 and in the Moluccas in April 2007.

For summaries of the latter, see e.g. Paris 2004 and Jarstad and Sisk 2008

No case is perfect. There were not exceptionally favourable conditions for democracy and peace in Aceh as compared for example to Sri Lanka and other disturbed regions in Indonesia. All the commonly referred to negative factors were in place: weak political and administrative institutions, quick introduction of civil and political freedoms, widespread ethnic and religious identities, and ‘instant’ elections. But the tsunami was of course a particularly important ‘external’ factor. Yet, it did not make Aceh exceptional given, as will be shown, that its major influence was not separate from the dynamics that are basic to the arguments. Moreover, it is true that much of the international research is on the role of democratisation in implementing peace agreements while these periods are not so clear in relation to Aceh’s special cessation of hostilities and peace accords in 2000, 2002 and 2005. Yet, Aceh was and is part of Indonesia; and the entire period after Soeharto may best be seen as a process of democratisation and peace building with its ups and downs. Besides, even early arguments and understandings to build democracy once a peace treaty has been signed may be important for the treaty as such (Jarstad and Sisk 2008 Ch 1 and 241f). Hence Aceh remains a critical case for discussing the validity of the general arguments and recommendations about peace and democratisation in a contextual framework.

The correlations of violence and institutions such as freedoms and elections are mainly in the framework of struggles about the control of a territory or population, which almost by definition must be settled before rule of law and democracy can be developed (Carothers 2007a: 21). The major exception is, as already mentioned, that agreements on rule of law and democracy for what should be applied in the future may be a vital component in negotiations over territorial disputes before peace accords have been signed and implemented (Jarstad and Sisk 2008: Ch 1 and 241 f).

This is not to say that there are no ways of combining the two without undermining the principles of democracy. Communal rights for example may be limited to specific public affairs such as the right of certain minorities to apply their own customary laws in protecting the forest or water resources that are fundamental to their culture and livelihood. And communal groups may also demand the same civil and political rights as others (rather than special privileges), such as the civil rights movement in the USA, the African National Congress in South
Africa and the progressive sections of the subordinated castes in the Indian state of Kerala.

Including by the British Indonesia Human Rights Campaign (TAPOL) and radical Indonesian scholars such as George Aditjondro.

The tough line was that there was no need for parliamentary approval prior to the signing of the MoU since Aceh was part of Indonesia and thus not an international issue (Accord 2008).

For recent statements, see Jakarta Post April 8, 2007 ('Peaceful solution to conflict cheaper: Kalla'), Jan. 17. 2008 ('Prosperity the goal, not democracy’, June 16, 2008 ‘Kalla slams inefficient poll system’, Sept. 2, 2008 ‘Vice President pushes for simplified political system’).

Stokke and Uyangoda 2010

One exception was that the rather widespread support in Indonesia for military measures in Aceh disappeared with the tsunami. Billon and Waizenegger 2007:419

See fn. 10.

Husain 2007 and conversations with Bakhtiar Abdullah, Juha Christensen, M. Nur Djuli and Shadia Marhavan.

I draw on the facilitators’ self reflections in seminar discussions and the insights communicated by Professors Jayadeva Uyangoda and Kristian Stokke.

The course of events discussed in this sub-section is covered in Aspinall 2005, 2008, ICG 2005, 2006, 2007, Kingsbury 2006, Merikallio 2006 and Miezner 2007. The analysis has benefitted from my own notebooks on attempts to promote the pro-democrats in Aceh at the time and conversations with a number of the actors involved (some of whom were mentioned in fn. 15.; others include in particular, Taufiq Abda. Aguswandi, Akhiruddin, Damien Kingsbury (and mail 4/12/2006), Juanda Djamal, Jan Hodann, Munawar Liza, Muhammad Nazar, Erwin Schweissheim, Otto Syamsuddin.


They were assisted in this regard by Damien Kingsbury. C.f. his early assessment in Jakarta Post, January 24, 2005. This caused irritation in the Indonesian delegation which tried to develop trust with senior GAM leaders Malik Mahmud and Zaini Abdullah. Hamid 2007:Ch 16 and 17.

The crucial pioneers included Jan Hodann of the Olof Palme International Centre.


See fn. 21.

Remarkably, even a well reputed Indonesian group (and a well intending international donor) with a project aiming at fostering civil society involvement in organized politics abandoned the democratic block cooperation between reformist GAM leaders and civil society activists in favour of separate party support, thus limiting civil society involvement and supporting the Aceh Party. (This author initiated and advised the project until it changed its initial aims.)

ICG 2006: 3.

See fn.21

For the remaining part of the paragraph, see fn. 21.
References


*Jakarta Post* April 8, 2007 (‘Peaceful solution to conflict cheaper: Kalla’), January 17, 2008 (‘Prosperity the goal, not democracy’), June 16, 2008 (‘Kalla slams inefficient poll system’) and September 2, 2008 (‘Vice President pushes for simplified political system’)


2

BACKGROUND AND POLITICAL SITUATION IN ACEH

Stanley Adi Prasetyo and Teresa Birks

Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam has played a politically and economically strategic role in the Indonesian archipelago since the 16th and 17th centuries. A powerful trading empire located on the sea-lanes between Turkey, the Middle East, India and the Far East, Aceh was also one of Southeast Asia’s first Islamic sultanates.

Rebellion and resistance have been part of the Acehnese way of life ever since the Dutch declared war against the Sultanate of Aceh in 1873. After three decades of war, the Dutch never really succeeded in subjugating Aceh and the strength of anti-Dutch feeling was such that even prior to the Japanese invasion of Indonesia, religious leaders in Aceh established an alliance with Japan. Between 1945 and 1949 the fight for independence unleashed a social revolution against the uleebalang, the traditional leaders through which the Dutch had governed in Aceh, as well as the Dutch themselves.

Aceh’s relationship with Indonesia has been marked by disappointment and dissatisfaction, resistance and rebellion. In 1953, Daud Beureueh established an armed opposition movement,
While the movement called for the formation of an Islamic state, it did not call for independence and although it was defeated, the state granted Aceh ‘Special Region’ status giving the Acehnese direct control over education, religion and customary law.

Increasingly centralised and militaristic government under Soeharto and the discovery of oil and gas in 1971 led to rapid and unequal economic development in Aceh. Social dislocation coupled with grossly unequal distribution of revenue drawn from Aceh’s vast natural resources led, inter alia, to the formation of the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) by Hasan di Tiro in 1976. The government was swift to suppress the movement, killing and imprisoning a number of its leaders and in 1979 di Tiro fled abroad in 1979 and established a government in exile.\(^1\)

Libyan-trained guerrillas returned to Aceh in the late 1980s and took up arms once again, this time receiving more widespread support from ordinary Acehnese people. Once again the military’s response was unequivocal, and in 1990 Aceh was declared a Military Operational Zone (DOM – Daerah Operasi Militer). The fall of Soeharto ushered in a period of reform and the lifting of DOM was announced in August 1998. However, the resurgence of GAM and the intensification of military operations ushered in yet another period of conflict in Aceh, one that heralded the emergence of a number of influential civil society organisations.

A series of failed peace negotiations took place between 2000 and 2004 under three different administrations. It was only after the declaration of two further military and civilian emergencies, yet another change in administration and the devastating tsunami in December 2004 that the Helsinki peace process in 2005 finally gave hope for a lasting peace in Aceh.

### Aceh under Dutch colonialism

On 26 March 1873, the Dutch colonial government declared war on Aceh, ushering in an extended period of war and resistance that lasted until the Japanese invasion in 1942 put an end to Dutch colonial ambition in the region. On 13 October 1880, the Dutch colonial government declared that the war was over, although it was forced to continue spending heavily to maintain control over the areas it occupied, and full-blown war broke out again in 1883.
In 1898 Major J.B. van Heutsz was proclaimed Governor of Aceh and continued the military campaign to subdue the Acehnese in parallel with a policy of co-opting traditional hereditary chiefs, the *uleebalang* who they hoped would support them in the countryside.²

On 14 January 1903, after 30 years of fighting, the Sultan of Aceh, Teungku M. Daudsyah, sent a letter to Van Heutsz setting out his loyalty to the Dutch colonial government. Not satisfied with this he was captured by the Dutch in 1904 and exiled to Java. Although much of Aceh was at least nominally brought under Dutch control by 1904, limited guerrilla resistance continued up until 1910 and Aceh was never subdued by the Dutch in its entirety.

Between 50,000 and 100,000 Acehnese lost their lives and one million were wounded during the Aceh War as this period is known, a war that saw the consolidation of Acehnese identity in terms of their resistance to outside interference in their affairs. However, the Aceh War cost the Dutch dearly too, and in addition to Dutch loss of life, this campaign is said to have contributed to the bankruptcy of the Dutch East India Company which had provided funding for the war.

The Aceh War meant that at least one generation of Acehnese spent their entire lives in a state of war and armed resistance against the Dutch (1873-1942). Many were born, grew up and died as martyrs, including celebrated heroes (male and female) such as T. Nyak Hasan, Cut Meutia, Tengku Cik di Tiro, Cut Nyak Dien, Teuku Umar, Panglima Polem and Mahmud Arifin (figures that have since been appropriated by the Indonesian nation-state project as symbols of anti-colonial resistance).

### Aceh during the Japanese occupation

In 1939, a number of religious scholars under the leadership of Mohammed Daud Beureueh founded an alliance of Muslim religious leaders, the All Aceh Ulemma Union (PUSA). Established in the first instance to promote and protect Islam, PUSA became increasingly anti-Dutch, focussing its opposition in the first instance on the *uleebalang*. PUSA endeavoured to establish an alliance with the Japanese via Acehnese such as Sahid Abu Bakar living in the Malay Peninsula.

In 1941, Major Fujiwara Iwaichi of the Imperial Japanese Army established the Fujiwara Kikan (F-Kikan), a special operations unit that was charged with providing assistance to anti-colonial
movements. F-Kikan made contact with PUSA in Aceh and on 19 February 1942, PUSA and F-Kikan carried out a number of operations to sabotage the Dutch just a few weeks prior to their surrender on 8 March 1942. On 11 March 1942, F-Kikan and PUSA succeeded in capturing Banda Aceh one day ahead of the Japanese army landing in Aceh. This revolt meant that Aceh was the only region in the Dutch East Indies that was actively providing armed support to the Japanese. PUSA’s motivation was not only to oust the Dutch from Aceh, but also to remove the *uleebalang* through which the Dutch facilitated their administration (Santosa 2006).

However, continued unrest coupled with the *ulemma’s* inexperience in administration meant that the Japanese reverted back to the Dutch policy of governing via the *uleebalang*, as was to be the case in other regions such as West Sumatra, North Sumatra and Java where the traditional chiefs and ruling elite were favoured over Islamic leaders.

Just a few months after the Japanese surrendered to the Allied Forces on 15 August 1945, the *ulemma* and their supporters attacked the *uleebalang* in what is sometimes referred to as the Aceh Social Revolution and by 1946 most were either killed or imprisoned. Those that survived were forced to release their traditional rights for good, including property rights as well as socio-political power. Replaced by the *ulemma*, Islam was thus established as the dominant ideology in Aceh.

Additionally, the social revolution that took place in Aceh had encouraged the emergence of non-state armed forces. There were at least three armed forces that were influential in Aceh, including the *Angkatan Pemuda Indonesia* (API/Indonesian Youth Force), the *Laskar Mujahidin* (Fighters in the way of Allah), and the *Barisan Pemuda Indonesia* (BPI/Indonesian Youth Front), the last two of which had been founded by the *ulemma*. These groups used weapons confiscated from or voluntarily handed over by the Japanese.

**Revolution and independence**

Within two days of the Japanese surrender, the Republic of Indonesia was born with the declaration of independence by Sukarno in Jakarta on 17 August 1945. The declaration of independence coupled with Dutch determination to reclaim the
Dutch East Indies led to the period known as the Revolution which lasted from 1945-1950. The Revolution was marked by violent conflict between traditional forces that had collaborated with the Dutch, i.e. traditional rulers and local chiefs, (particularly in Sumatra) and the republican forces – as well as resistance to Dutch re-occupation.

By December 1949 the Dutch had succeeded in wresting control of most Republican towns in Sumatra and Java – with the notable exception of Aceh which remained under the control of PUSA and Daud Beureueh. However, United Nations intervention on 27 December 1949 led the Dutch to formally transfer sovereignty to the Republic of the United States of Indonesia (RUSI). The purges against the *uleebalang* by the *ulemma* and the people of Aceh that was known as the *Cumbok* Revolution cost many lives and tensions remained between the centre and Aceh. The revolution only ended with the appointment of Teuku Mohammad Daudsjah as Resident of Aceh, an *uleebalang* who was also a member of PUSA. Shortly thereafter, another *uleebalang* member of PUSA was appointed Vice-Resident. The same position was also given to Daud Beureueh, who was also head of the department of religious affairs in Aceh. Two years later, Daud Beureueh resigned from both positions when central government appointed him military governor of Aceh, Langkat and Tanah Karo (Santosa 2006). The people of Aceh made a considerable financial contribution to the Republic, funding, *inter alia*, the transfer of government back to Yogyakarta.³ Famously, in 1948 the Acehnese funded the purchase of Indonesia’s first aircraft which went on to form the basis of the national airline, Garuda Indonesia.⁴ In 1949, as part of the newly-independent Republic, Aceh was designated an autonomous province, though the *ulemma* were gradually edged out of political affairs once again and their demands for an Islamic state were not granted. Moreover, by August 1950 Aceh had been amalgamated with North Sumatra, with Medan as the provincial capital.⁵ This decision caused consternation in Aceh and the then governor, Daud Beureueh, spearheaded popular demand for autonomy for Aceh. Several meetings between Acehnese leaders and central government representatives ended in stalemate, but by 22 January 1951 the Acehnese accepted Aceh’s conditional integration into the Province of North Sumatra which was formally announced the following day by Prime Minister Natsir (Saleh 1991).
This arrangement caused a split between the more reformist-oriented PUSA leaders and the hardliners. Nevertheless, PUSA became increasingly powerful and asserted its political and economic dominance over Aceh’s business elite, thus weakening the uleebalang’s relationship with Jakarta (Kell 1995). On 20 September 1953, Daud Beureueh announced that Aceh had joined Kartosuwiryo’s Darul Islam (DI) movement, declaring Aceh and the surrounding area part of the Islamic State of Indonesia (NII – Negara Islam Indonesia). In January, 1955 Kartosuwiryo appointed Daud Beureueh Vice-President of the Islamic State of Indonesia. Other Acehnese leaders were given key positions and one young Acehnese activist, Mohammad Hasan di Tiro, was given responsibility for international relations. Although the DI was a movement engaged in open rebellion against Jakarta, it did not have secessionist intentions, calling instead for a unified, Islamic Indonesia. Daud Beureueh for example referred to the DI/TII (Darul Islam/Islamic Army of Indonesia) and never the Islamic Army of Aceh (Tentara Islam Aceh, TIA). A ceasefire was called in Aceh in 1957 and in May 1959 Aceh was finally granted Special District status (DIA – Daerah Istimewa Aceh), giving the Acehnese regional government jurisdiction over education, customary law and religion. Despite the agreement, Daud Beureueh and his troops did not leave the highlands of Aceh until 1962, after a series of intensive negotiations.

Peace and stability New Order style

The events of 30 September–1 October 1965 (G30S) signalled the drawn out and bloody end to President Sukarno’s administration with the kidnap and murder of six generals by Lieutenant Colonel Untung and a group of soldiers loyal to him. The events are disputed, but the ‘official’ version of events according to Soeharto – and the military in particular, is that they were an attempted coup masterminded by Indonesia’s communist party (PKI - Partai Komunis Indonesia). Others suggest that they represent a power struggle within the military (Robinson 1995) and certainly the aftermath of the G30S ushered in Major General Soeharto’s rise to power - with the support of the USA and other western countries. Soeharto first institutionalised his authority by forming the notorious Command for the Restoration of Security and Public
Order (KOPKAMTIB - Komando Operasional Pemulihan Keamanan dan Ketertiban)\(^9\) on 10 October 1965, directly under his command. By successfully linking these events to the PKI, Soeharto assumed sweeping powers, claiming that President Sukarno had given him authority to take any action he deemed necessary to maintain security and stability.\(^{10}\) Thereafter, the Kopkamtib under Soeharto, ‘...quickly expanded beyond its original purpose of tracking down PKI supporters. The Kopkamtib became the government’s main instrument of political control’ (Crouch 1988)

The wave of violence that followed under Soeharto’s command lasted until March 1966, resulting in the killing of hundreds of thousands of Indonesians accused of being PKI or PKI sympathisers. Hundreds of thousands more lost their jobs, their homes, their land and businesses and in turn the Indonesian military seized land and plantations in the process, much of which now represents part of its controversial business portfolio. In addition to the military, the New Order also consolidated militia groups and gangsters that could be mobilised to provide protection and which functioned as pro-government organisations that were on stand-by to ‘deal’ with anyone with ‘opposing views with those of the government’ (Simanjuntak 2000)

Soeharto instituted a repressive government with authoritarian characteristics. Criticism, revolt and demonstration were met with repression. Moreover, various professional and mass organisations were forced to acknowledge the principle of Pancasila – the state’s founding ideology. If Soeharto’s regime was founded on the demonization of the PKI, the next three decades of repression were justified by the needs of economic development. In 1966, Soeharto pioneered the term ‘Development Trilogy’ (Trilogi Pembangunan, 1966-1998) which emphasised stability in the name of economic development, a policy which was controlled via a highly centralised and militarised system of government.

**Aceh under Soeharto**

From 1959 until 1966 Aceh maintained its Special Region status, but with the implementation of Soeharto’s centralised development policy, Aceh lost its right to manage political and economic development. The New Order took steps to centralise control of Aceh and in line with Soeharto’s security approach, Aceh
was divided into a number of territories with military commands allocated at each administrative level. This paved the way for the New Order’s control of natural resources in Aceh. Originally, Aceh was designated an agricultural region, but the discovery of massive oil and gas reserves in 1971 led to a lucrative agreement between Pertamina – the state-owned oil company, Mobil Oil and Japanese Industrial with the formation in 1974 of the PT Arun LNG company in North Aceh. In a matter of years, Aceh was contributing almost 30% of national export earnings at a total of USD 4 billion a year from LNG. However, only 5% of Aceh’s contribution to Jakarta was returned to Aceh (Barakat, Lume and Silvetti 2000).

In addition to the iniquitous exploitation of Aceh’s natural resources, this period was also marked by the introduction of Soeharto’s mass resettlement programme, transmigration, which had a dual function of both economic and social control. Predominantly Javanese and Madurese farmers were resettled to the ‘Outer Islands,’ and as was the case in many other resource-rich areas of Indonesia, Aceh saw an influx of transmigrants who were re-settled on expropriated land and who competed for jobs in the newly formed industrial areas of Aceh.

Unequal exploitation of Aceh’s natural resources, simmering resentment of the government’s betrayal of its Special Region status coupled with increasing prices, pollution and the weakening of social relations that accompanied the rapid industrialisation of the east coast of Aceh provoked another period of Acehnese rebellion. On 4 December 1976, the Free Aceh Movement (GAM - Gerakan Aceh Merdeka) led by Teungku Hasan di Tiro proclaimed independence for Aceh. In order to eliminate GAM, Jakarta sent troops to Aceh and acted swiftly to suppress the movement, killing and imprisoning a number of its leaders, including Daud Beureueh. Hasan di Tiro managed to escape, first to the USA and then to Sweden where he established a government in exile in 1979. Although rebel action in Aceh declined, many young GAM sympathisers left for Libya where they received military training, particularly in guerrilla warfare.

In 1989 most of those who had received training in Libya returned to Aceh to take up arms. Jakarta’s continued disregard for Acehnese grievances meant that GAM received even more widespread support from ordinary Acehnese. In order to crush the movement and secure its economic interests in Aceh, the
government increased the military’s political power over Aceh by designating Aceh – or more specifically the districts of East Aceh, North Aceh and Pidie, a Military Operation Zone (DOM) in 1990.

It is worth pausing at this juncture to note that the main locus of military repression – the DOM, and rebel action was on the east coast of Aceh where new industrial and investment areas were booming – and the Jakarta elite were profiting. The inauguration of PT Arun in 1979 was swiftly followed by PT Pupuk ASEAN and PT Pupuk Iskandar Muda (massive fertiliser plants), PT Kertas Kraf Aceh (a pulp and paper plant owned by Soeharto crony Bob Hasan) as well as Mobil Oil Indonesia. In 1998 (when DOM was withdrawn), 75% of Aceh’s economic life was concentrated in the districts of North Aceh and East Aceh, with mineral oil/LNG and fertilisers being the first and second-most important economic industrial products in Aceh, followed by forestry in third place. For discussion on the economic benefits of conflict and the ‘profitable peace’ approach promoted by Vice President Jusuf Kalla see Chapter 4 of this volume.

In 1989, 6,000 troops already stationed in Aceh were mobilised to eradicate the insurgents and in 1990, at Governor Ibrahim Hasan’s request, a further 6,000 troops were sent to Aceh (Tapol, 2000). Leading Acehnese figures, including the ullemma who were vociferous in their opposition to Jakarta, village heads and other local leaders were kidnapped and murdered. The military also targeted civilians that it accused of supporting GAM. The military also established anti-GAM militia units, most of which were recruited from the Javanese transmigrants.

Violations perpetrated by the military under DOM include extra-judicial executions, mysterious killings, forced disappearances, arbitrary arrest and detention, rape and torture. In his memoirs, Soeharto confirmed that the mysterious killings (petrus – penembakan misterius) of the mid-1980s were part of a deliberate strategy to secure law and order, a strategy later deployed in Aceh in the early 1990s. According to Soeharto:

The peace was disturbed... We had to apply some treatment to take some stern action. What kind of action? It had to be violence. But this violence did not mean just shooting people, pow! pow! just like that. No! But those who tried to resist, like it or not, had to be shot... Some of
the corpses were left [in public places] just like that. This was for the purpose of Shock Therapy… This was done so that the general public would understand that there was still someone capable of taking action to tackle the problem of criminality.\textsuperscript{18}

Estimates of the loss of life due to military action in Aceh are difficult to verify, not least because of the intensity of repression under DOM itself, as well as the reluctance of all subsequent administrations so far to investigate human rights violations in Aceh and hold perpetrators to account. However, one estimate suggests that 3,000 Acehnese people were killed under various military operations, most of whom were civilians.\textsuperscript{19} As with the labelling and subsequent demonization of the PKI, the stigmatising of the Acehnese as Security Disturbers Group (GPK – \textit{Gerombongan Pengacau Keamanan}) as the government referred to GAM, legitimised repression and intimidation in the name of stability and economic development.

A number of high profile detentions, arrests and trials in contravention of both national and international laws took place and according to Amnesty International, by June 1992 thirty-seven civilians and 12 members of the Indonesian armed forces had been convicted as political prisoners (including Hasbi Abdallah, later to stand in the 2006 gubernatorial elections). Around 200 Acehnese fled to Malaysia, most of whom were arrested and detained by the Malaysian police accusing them of being illegal immigrants. Around 43 detainees managed to escape the police and went to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in Kuala Lumpur to seek asylum. This case then attracted the attention of human rights groups both at home and at international level.

By 1993, GAM’s armed rebellion was quashed but the military stayed, and the people of Aceh remained vulnerable as violent repression and human rights violations continued. In 1996, after three years with little or no GAM activity, Acehnese leaders began to call for the withdrawal of the military and the lifting of DOM, including Banda Aceh’s chief of police and the leader of the military fraction in the provincial parliament (\textit{Serambi Indonesia} 30 and 31 December 1996). Professor Dayan Dawood, Rector of Syah Kuala University, first publicly called for DOM to be lifted.
in November 1996. Major General Sedaryanto, Commander of I/Bukit Barisan Command (based in Medan but with jurisdiction over Aceh) responded by saying that there would need to be, ‘...a written commitment by the people of Aceh that they could guarantee security in the future... If they can give that guarantee, and search for all the weapons that are still in GPK hands, then DOM can be withdrawn’ (*Serambi Indonesia* 3 December 1996). With the general elections looming, and the news of unrest from other parts of Indonesia, no-one took the military up on their offer.

**The fall of Soeharto and the lifting of DOM**

In 1995, Indonesia was marked by a wave of social unrest later compounded by the economic crisis of July 1997. Soeharto began to lose control and authority of the archipelago and although he was able to fix the 1997 election, further unrest spearheaded by students followed. The military’s brutal response could no longer be tolerated and with this Soeharto lost all legitimacy. On 12 June 1998 Soeharto announced he was stepping down and handed over the presidency to his deputy, B.J. Habibie. The fall of Soeharto and its aftermath led to a feverish period of reform known as *reformasi*, aimed at dismantling the New Order regime. *Reformasi* was marked by, *inter alia*, the decentralisation of power to the regions and democratisation in the form of a number of political reforms such as the freedom to form political parties and direct elections.

The fall of Soeharto was greeted in Aceh with almost unanimous calls for the withdrawal of DOM, uniting people from all walks of life and political spectrums. For example, in June 1998 thousands of students and religious teachers clashed in a war of words outside the provincial assembly building in Banda Aceh over the controversial reappointment of Syamsuddin Mahmud as governor of Aceh. The religious teachers supported him whilst the students called for his resignation – yet both sides were united in their calls for the lifting of DOM (*Serambi Indonesia* 7 June 1998). Also in June, PPP member of parliament, Ghazali Abbas Adan, stated that, ‘anyone who does not support the withdrawal of DOM is against any kind of reform. In order words, it is they who are against the rule of law and the upholding of human rights in Indonesia’ (*Serambi Indonesia* 5 June 1998). Thirteen students in Banda Aceh went on hunger strike, receiving support for their demands and their action
from local government officials, NGOs and students from other regions of Indonesia as well as Aceh (Tapol 2000)

Hundreds of widows whose husbands had been killed or disappeared under DOM demanded to know what had happened to their husbands, with delegations travelling to Jakarta to meet with representatives from the National Commission for Human Rights (Komnas HAM), the Department of Justice and the commander of the military police, Major General Syamsu Djalal (Tapol 2000). Numerous victim and student support groups sprung up all over Aceh, particularly in Banda Aceh and Lhokseumawe in North Aceh. As with other parts of Indonesia, the 1997 financial crisis saw protests against the price of fuel and staple goods in Aceh too, followed by calls for political reform and anti-corruption. The fall of Soeharto and the calls for the withdrawal of DOM further consolidated the emergence of a civilian movement in Aceh.

So how did Habibie respond? Habibie, who understood international pressure, acted swiftly. On 16 August 1998, Habibie officially apologised to the people of Aceh for the acts of violence committed by members of the Indonesian Armed Forces, promising that he would investigate cases of human rights violations committed in the region. Furthermore, he also promised to initiate a phased withdrawal of 4,000 non-organic troops that were deployed in Aceh. Habibie established a parliamentary investigation team (TPF-DPR – Tim Pencarian Fakta DPR) that visited Aceh in mid-July, and a month later a delegation from Komnas HAM followed, visiting the sites of a number of mass graves.

Reflecting mounting national and international pressure, commander in chief of the Indonesian armed forces, General Wiranto, announced the lifting of DOM on 7 August 1998, ordering the commander of Kodam I/Bukit Barisan, Major General Ismed Yuzari, to withdraw all non-permanent troops from Aceh within a month. Wiranto also issued a somewhat qualified apology to the people of Aceh, adding that, ‘although human rights violations took place, the soldiers were only doing their job of annihilating the armed security disturbers’ (Serambi Indonesia 8 August 1998).

In order to try and appease the people of Aceh, Habibie announced on 26 September 1998 that Sabang would revert back to its status as a free port and an integrated economic development zone. Habibie also appointed a number of ministers to meet with
community leaders and in October 1998, some ministers to Aceh to hold a dialogue with community leaders and victims of DOM. The Minister for Social Affairs, Yustika Baharsyah, visited Aceh in October 1998 to deliver IDR 2.6 billion in aid for victims of DOM and their families.

It was all to prove too little too late for the people of Aceh. Within a week of Wiranto’s announcement that DOM had been lifted, several acts of intimidation began to take place, including the harassment of people who had identified mass graves, government officials working with NGOs, victims who had reported their ordeals and so forth. Simultaneously, mysterious GAM flag-raising incidents began to be reported, particularly in North Aceh (Sydney Morning Herald 15 August 1998, Waspada 17 August 1998 and Serambi Indonesia 19 August 1998, cited in Tapol 2000). In November, military intimidation was focussed on Kandang, an area close to Lhokseumawe, Indonesia’s LNG capital where a number of GAM activities had been reported. Although it has been suggested that the military had a hand in some of these activities, it was certainly in the military’s interest to encourage and ignore GAM activity in order to both link ensuing unrest and instability with the troop withdrawal and thus justify the return of DOM.21

Certainly a more accurate reflection of the military’s response to calls for the lifting of DOM is evidenced by statements made not long before Wiranto’s announcement in August. In June 1998, the man who was ordered by Wiranto to withdraw his non-organic troops, Major General Ismed Yuzari, said that the withdrawal of DOM was ‘completely out of the question’ (Waspada 11 June 1998). Ominously – and echoing the position of Major General Sedaryanto in 1996, the commander of 012/Teuku Umar battalion Colonel Asril Hamzah Tanjung stated that, ‘If ABRI withdrew all its troops from Aceh, the people of Aceh would have to be responsible for its security,’ adding that, ‘the GPK would then return and the students would have to be given weapons to deal with them’ (Waspada 10 June 1998).

The end of 1998 was marked by mysterious killings of local military informants or *cuak*, the presence *ninja* (professional) hit-men and the ambush of Indonesian troops. The atmosphere in Aceh quickly descended into chaos and violence and on 1 January 1999, the bodies of three soldiers were found in the Arakundo River,
Simpang Ulim, East Aceh. The response by the security forces was swift, and a joint-operation under the command of the police, ‘Operasi Wibawa,’ was launched on 2 January 1999. Rather than end the militarisation of Aceh, the lifting of DOM had led to an increase in the number of troops in Aceh and an increase in violence and repression. The people of Aceh were angry at their betrayal and grass-support for GAM became increasingly widespread.

This period also saw an increase in organised civil society action. Up until December 1998, civilian demands had focused on the investigation of human rights abuses, the withdrawal of non-organic troops, the release of all political prisoners and an amnesty for GAM, a fairer division of Aceh’s natural resource revenues: 80% to Aceh and 20% to central government, and that Aceh’s ‘special status’ be enshrined in legislation. But on 12 December 1998, the issue of a referendum was first raised by the Aceh Students Action Committee for Reform (KARMA - Komite Aksi Reformasi Mahasiswa Aceh) who issued the government with an ultimatum: ‘if the five demands made above are not met within the period of two months (by February 1999) then in the name of the students of Aceh we will call for a referendum’ (SHRWN 1999). On 7 January 1999 a meeting of Acehnese community leaders was convened in Aceh which issued the Declaration of the People of Aceh and which was presented to President Habibie in Jakarta on 8 January 1999, although it didn’t go as far as calling for a referendum.22

However, the idea of a referendum struck a chord with the people of Aceh and on 30 January, students from the State Polytechnic in Lhokseumawe reiterated the KARMA’s calls for a referendum (Waspada 31 January 1999). As many as 106 youth and students groups held a congress in Banda Aceh which climaxed on 4 February 1999 with the declaration of the Aceh Referendum Information Centre (SIRA - Sentral Informasi Referendum Aceh). As well as calling for a referendum on independence for Aceh, the students also called for a boycott of the 1999 general elections.

Increased pressure on the government led Habibie to establish the special Presidential Advisory Team on Aceh on 12 March 1999, which consisted of a number of prominent figures and intellectuals from Aceh charged with making informed input into the development of presidential policy towards the resolution of the Aceh problem. On 17 March 1999, Habibie issued a decree
giving an amnesty to thirty-nine GAM political prisoners. It was the first time that the Indonesian government had granted an amnesty to any armed group that was obviously opposing the state. Then on 26 March 1999, Habibie along with 15 ministers visited Aceh and announced a number of programmes aimed at addressing human rights violations in Aceh as well as undertaking a thorough investigation of the crimes committed by the military during DOM. While the president’s party was in Banda Aceh, they found themselves surrounded by thousands of university students and ordinary people calling for a referendum, just like East Timor.

Despite a number of government initiatives aimed at addressing violations under DOM and peaceful civil society action in Aceh, violent conflict continued. On 3 May 1999 a new military operation called Operasi Sadar Rencong was launched which covered the whole of Aceh (and not just the three districts as had previously been the case) as the arena of conflict broadened, which was aimed at anticipating an increase in violence in Aceh in the run up to the general elections.

The general elections took place on 7 June 1999 and resulted in the defeat of Golkar by the PDI-P led by Megawati Sukarnoputri, albeit by a small margin. A coalition of some Islamic parties and the PDI-P resulted in Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur) and Megawati Sukarnoputri being elected as president and vice president, respectively.

Thus the Habibie administration did not last long, but before handing over to Gus Dur, Habibie established the Independent Commission for the Investigation of Violent Acts in Aceh (KIPTKA - Komisi Independen Pengusutan Tindak Kekerasan di Aceh) on 30 July 1999 in response to recommendations made by Komnas HAM. The Commission was made up of 27 prominent figures who were assigned to investigate evidence of human rights violations in Aceh, as well as making follow-up recommendations to the relevant agencies. Just one week earlier in one of the worst atrocities during this period, at least 70 civilians were killed including Teungku Bantaqiah, a religious teacher, his family and students by members of the security forces in Beutong Ateuh, West Aceh. Many others were arrested and tortured and since disappeared. And on 1 August 1999, another joint-operation was announced, the Sadar Rencong II, which also covered the whole of Aceh (Waspada 2 January 2000).
Referendum, civil society and the negotiations

During Gus Dur’s administration, Acehnese civil society was more dominant than GAM in expressing their demands. Calls for a referendum with the option for an independent Aceh grew stronger within the Acehnese community in addition to demands for broad autonomy. In August, bus drivers went on strike to protest against the dangerous conditions they had to work under, followed by a general strike. On 15 September 1999, a number of ulema from the Association of Aceh Ulema (Himpunan Ulama Dayah Aceh - HUDA) held collective prayers in the courtyard of the Great Baiturrahman Mosque in Banda Aceh. The service was attended by Indonesian politicians including Amin Rais, Gus Dur and Matori Abdul Jalil was drawn to a close with the hoisting of a white flag with ‘referendum’ written on it. Gus Dur accompanied by Amin Rais unveiled a billboard which read, ‘the conflict in Aceh can only be resolved by a referendum’ (Konflik Aceh hanya dapat diselesaikan dengan referendum).

In October, SIRA mobilised a mass meeting in Banda Aceh attended by around 150,000 people who swore an oath to support the referendum. The climax of the pro-referendum movement came on 8 November as over one million people from all over Aceh gathered in Banda Aceh to attend the General Assembly of the Fighters for a Referendum (SU-MPR – Sidang Umum Majelis Pejuang Referendum) once again mobilised by SIRA.

The security forces could not tolerate this formidable assertion of ‘people power,’ particularly the calls for a referendum given what had happened in East Timor. On 2 February 2000, Operasi Sadar Renceng III (OSR III) was launched by Aceh Chief of Police, Brigadier-General Bachrumsyah Kasman. According to Bachrumsyah, the aim of OSR III was to arrest GAM members and their supporters (Indonesian Observer 3 February 2000). He said the security forces would adopt a ‘much more aggressive approach’ which was consistent with the statement he made on 1 January, namely that the police would adopt a more repressive strategy because of the escalation of unrest in Aceh (Waspada 2 January 2000). It comes as no surprise that the new year in 2000 saw a substantial rise in the number of civilian deaths and the targeting of civil society activists and politicians (Tapol 2000).
Gus Dur’s attitude towards the Aceh problem produced a number of initiatives, including efforts to bring the Indonesian government and GAM representatives in Sweden together. The head of Komnas HAM, Baharuddin Lopa, secretly met with GAM Commander in Chief, Teungku Abdullah Syafi’ie, in the interior of Pidie without any security, accompanied only by two university students. Positive signs appeared in the third week of November 1999, when GAM indicated its willingness to negotiate, although the idea was criticised by GAM leader Hasan Tiro in Sweden.

Temporary attempts to attain peace finally materialised at the second meeting between Teungku Dr. Zaini Abdullah and the Indonesian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Hassan Wirayuda, which was followed by a sequence of dialogues in Geneva. The negotiations mediated by the Henry Dunant Centre (HDC) produced an agreement in the form of a Humanitarian Pause on 12 May 2000, which was then extended from 3-27 September 2000. Many people, including UN Secretary General Kofi Anan, welcomed these developments.

It is true that in the beginning the Humanitarian Pause was a successful measure for minimising violence between the two conflicting parties. The time was used to try and find comprehensive political and long-term solutions for resolving the Aceh question. But during the second phase of the Humanitarian Pause, levels of violence increased and HDC representatives and field officers were attacked by militia disguised as local people. The military then carried out limited operations as the oil company, ExxonMobil, stopped production following an attack launched by GAM.

In July 1999, Gus Dur had declared himself ready to authorise the Law on Special Autonomy for Aceh and on 19 July 2001 the government, represented by the minister of internal affairs and ten fractions of the Parliament, agreed on the draft legalisation. However, on 23 July 2001, Gus Dur was impeached due to his role in a corruption scandal involving the state-run Bureau for Logistics (Bulog) and was replaced by Megawati Sukarnoputri. However, on 9 August 2001, Megawati authorised Law No.18 Year 2001 on Special Autonomy for the Province of Special Region of Aceh to be known thereafter as the Province of Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam.

Negotiations between the Indonesian Government and GAM during Gus Dur’s administration were on the point of
collapse due to frequent clashes between the Indonesian military and GAM which were further enflamed by the persistent rumour that the Iskandar Muda Military Command was soon to be restored in Aceh. However, the Indonesian government and GAM through the mediation of HDC and the support of the US and Japanese governments eventually returned to the negotiation table. As President Megawati took over negotiations, she declared that she wasn’t interested in holding negotiations with GAM based overseas and that she only wanted to continue negotiations with GAM based in Aceh.

After an extended process, on 9 December 2002 the Indonesian government represented by Ambassador S.Wiryono and GAM represented by Dr. Zaini Abdullah finally signed the Cessation of Hostilities Framework Agreement (CoHA) and witnessed by Martin Griffiths of the HDC.27 The CoHA provided a framework for negotiations towards conflict resolution that was divided into several phases. In order to monitor the implementation of the CoHA, the Joint Security Committee (JSC) with senior military officers from ASEAN approved by both parties was also established.

**GAM and Mega’s offensive**

With President Megawati in command, a more uncompromising stance was taken. This was partly due to her centralistic-nationalistic position, but also to the fact that GAM had expanded considerably since 1999, both in terms of combatants as well as its areas of operation. It had also won the support of the people of Aceh. It is a common estimate that GAM controlled some 70% of Aceh in 2002-2003, primarily the rural areas. GAM began to collect so-called ‘Aceh taxes’ (*pajak Nanggroe*) and began to establish a parallel administration. Couples wishing to get married for example would go to GAM religious judges and those who wished to travel would go to GAM for a travel permit. Of course people were expected to pay for these services. During this period, the military continued to perpetrate human rights violations against civilians. However, they were also exploited and mistreated by GAM.

The then civilian administration in Aceh was criticised for its corrupt practices and for not providing a viable alternative to GAM. In 2004, then Governor of Aceh Abdullah Puteh was indicted for corruption and later on sentenced to ten years in prison. In fact,
between 2001 and 2004, the people of Aceh found themselves caught between the Indonesian armed forces and GAM. Many people were displaced from their homes and moved to Internally Displaced Peoples (IDP) camps. School buildings and other public facilities were destroyed. The local people were by now used to living in fear and thus tended to obey whoever was in a position of power. This situation is demonstrated in part by the high level of participation in the 2004 general elections, with a polling rate of 97% of those eligible to vote. This is a much higher than national level figures with an average of 75%. It seems illogical that in a conflict region such as Aceh where there was a great deal of disappointment with central government and the military, that people would prove themselves to be so enthusiastic in national political interests.

Initially, the CoHA was reasonably successful. However, tension and suspicion between GAM and the Indonesian Government escalated. Nevertheless, the Indonesian government confirmed its commitment to resolving the Aceh question through a joint council scheduled to take place in Jakarta on 23-25 April 2003. However, GAM refused to attend pointing to a lack of security provisions and in response the Indonesian government suggested a number of alternative meeting places including Malaysia, Thailand and Brunei Darussalam.

GAM insisted that the council take place in Geneva, asking for the council to be postponed to 27 April 2003. The Indonesian government discussed plans for the joint council with GAM in a limited cabinet meeting on politics and security led by President Megawati on 28 April 2003. But a few days later, on 6 May 2003, the Indonesian Government threatened to launch an integrated military operation if the meeting with GAM failed. Eventually it was agreed that the joint council meeting would take place in Tokyo on 17-18 May 2003. However, without warning the Indonesian government gave GAM a deadline of 12 May 2003 to accept the CoHA, otherwise it would declare a state of military emergency in Aceh.

In truth the Indonesian government was nervous about the peace negotiations as there was a feeling inside the country, particularly within military circles, that if they continued to negotiate within the framework of the CoHA it was likely that Aceh would secede from Indonesia. Thus plans to sabotage the Tokyo meeting were drawn up. As a number of senior GAM delegates in Banda Aceh left the Hotel Kuala Tripa for the airport, they were
arrested and taken to local police headquarters and just a few hours later on 18 May 2003, the Indonesian government declared a state of military emergency in Aceh. However, efforts to seek a peaceful solution were not shelved altogether and in February 2004 Jusuf Kalla’s envoy, Farid Husein, made attempts to meet with GAM via his friend Finish businessman-come-peace broker Juha Christiansen.

The six-month military emergency implemented by Megawati was extended for a further six months and it wasn’t until 19 May 2004 that status was reduced to civil emergency for yet another six months and then extended for a further six months. Over a period of two years, there were many more civilian victims and even when the military emergency was reduced to civil emergency, military operations were not scaled down and no troops were withdrawn from the province.

Yudhoyono, Kalla and the tsunami

The results of the 2004 general elections led to unexpected political change. President Megawati, a popular candidate supported by previously election-winning parties, was defeated by former cabinet member, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. Initially, under President Yudhoyono, there was no significant change in the government’s policy on Aceh. However, both President Yhudoyono and Vice President Jusuf Kalla came to power with a track record of successful peace negotiations in Poso, culminating in the Malino I Declaration of 20 December 2001 and in Ambon/Moluccas, culminating in the Malino II Declaration of 12 February 2002.

The problem with their, and particularly Kalla’s approach to conflict resolution was that it involved brokering secret pacts with local elites by promising them development funds and beneficial positions in profitable cooperation with sections of the military and business contractors. Kalla’s argument is that it is more expensive for the state to engage in military campaigns and police operations than it is to use state resources to make peace profitable for all parties involved. However, this approach resulted in new, equally divisive problems which exacerbated corruption, exploitation and environmental destruction. Thus, if a similar approaches are applied in even more disturbed Aceh, the prospects for both peace and reconstruction would be particularly bleak. Indeed, similar measures were initially adopted in Aceh too, although in the first instance GAM negotiators refused to be co-opted and bought off,
opting rather for joint-collaboration with international donors and the implementation of agreements to be negotiated later in Helsinki.

But the situation and political constellation of Aceh was radically changed on the morning of 26 December 2004 when a massive earthquake measuring 8.9 on the Richter scale led only 40 minutes later to the massive tsunami that wiped out much of Aceh and other areas in the region, including the coasts of Thailand, Sri Lanka, India and Malaysia. Around 800 Km of Acehnese coast was pounded by a terrifying wave that killed at least 132,000 people and 37,000 reported missing. The infrastructure in areas struck by the tsunami was totally destroyed. The areas that suffered the most serious damage include Banda Aceh, Aceh Jaya, Aceh Besar, Aceh Barat, Simelue and Singkil. Both GAM and the military also suffered significant losses with many combatants and weapons belonging to both warring parties swallowed up by the tsunami.

While the Indonesian government was still dumbstruck by these events, the international community responded quickly. At least forty-four countries provided assistance directly through their humanitarian missions. During the emergency response phase approximately 16,000 soldiers from countries such as the USA, Australia, Singapore, Malaysia, Germany and the United Kingdom arrived in Aceh. It was the biggest non-combat mission since World War II with nine aircraft carriers, fourteen warships, thirty-one aircraft and seventy-five helicopters. The Indonesian government alone allocated IDR 50 billion for the emergency response period and thousands of Indonesian nationals went to Aceh to work as humanitarian volunteers.

However, many people complained about the civil emergency status because it limited the movement of volunteers and humanitarian workers and their efforts to help the victims and distribute aid. It also hampered journalists’ coverage of the disaster and so two days after the tsunami struck, the vice chair of the Indonesian parliament, AM Fatwa, called on the government to revoke the civilian emergency status in Aceh effective immediately. However, it took a further five months for President Yudhoyono to lift the state of civil emergency on 12 May 2005.

The more recent history and analysis of events that follow the 2005 Helsinki agreement are dealt with elsewhere in this volume.
Aceh: The Role of Democracy for Peace and Reconstruction

(Endnotes)

1 Hasan di Tiro passed away in Aceh on 3rd June 2010.
2 This system of cooptation was proposed by Dr. Christiaan Snouck Hurgronje, of the University of Leiden, a Dutch scholar of Oriental cultures and languages and Advisor on Native Affairs to the colonial government of the Netherlands East Indies.
3 President Sukarno in a speech in Meulaboh, West Aceh, on 4 September 1959, dubbed Aceh as ‘the region of capital’.
4 Two Dakota airplanes
5 Regulation No.21 Year 1950 on 14 August 1950.
6 Kartosuwiryo founded the Darul Islam movement in May 1948 in West Java, proclaiming himself head of the Islamic State of Indonesia
7 Deputy Prime Minister of the Republic, Mr. Hardi, via the Decree No.1/ Missy/1959 Dated 16 May 1959
8 According to Geoffrey Robinson (1995), the events of 30 September 1965 and their aftermath may be viewed as a coup and counter coup in which elements of the military crushed Untung’s action and established dominance of anticommunist military officers under Soeharto’s leadership.
9 Not long after that, Soeharto formed a special service called Operasi Khusus/ Opsus (Special Operation) under the command of Ali Murtopoto. This special service worked with extraordinary powers including ‘black’ intelligence ops. Many people could no longer distinguish between an operation carried out under the command of Kopkamtib and one under the authority of Opsus.
10 The highly contested Supersemar Instruction of 11 March 1966. According to this Instruction, President Sukarno ordered Soeharto to ‘take all steps thought necessary to guarantee security, law and order and stability… and maintain the integrity of the Indonesian nation-state…’ The document, an acronym of “Eleventh March Instruction” (Surat Perintah Sebelas Maret) also makes reference to Semar, a popular character imbued with magical powers from the Javanese wayang or shadow puppet. The original document has never been produced and the only copies in circulation originated directly from Soeharto
11 Koremil (Military Headquarters at sub-district level), Kodim (District Military Command), Korem (Municipal Military Command) and Kodam (Provincial Military Command)
12 Hasan di Tiro was a local businessman who had been given special responsibility for international relations under the Darul Islam movement in the mid-1950s.
13 On 1 May 1978, Daud Bereueh who was already enfeebled and only spent his time giving some lectures was picked up by force by a special team from Jakarta, led by Lieutenant General Sjarif Sjamsoeddin, to be taken to Jakarta. It was likely that the New Order government was worried about Daud’s charisma and influence that was still. The team told Daud and his family that he would be taken to Jakarta to be witness for the trial of a Jihad Movement case in Surabaya court. Daud Beureueh refused to go, saying that he was too old and prefer to give his witness statement from home. He was given a morphine injection, put in a jeep and driven at high speed to a helicopter which took him to Jakarta. The people of Aceh regarded this as kidnapping. The rumour spread quickly and increased the hatred of the Aceh people for Jakarta. See: Kholid O. Santosa (2006) p. 173
During DOM Aceh comprised of only eight districts, two municipalities and two administrative cities. Aceh is now comprised of a total of 21 districts and municipalities.

The year DOM was implemented is often variously given as 1989, 1990 and 1991. The confusion relates to the government’s at least initial de facto rather than de jure imposition of military region status to Aceh.


The Aceh people regarded that the transmigrants from Java to Aceh, mostly former soldiers and civil servants, who were increasing in number, had take benefit form the industrial growth and development expenses of the Government. The local people also considered the behavior of the newcomers from Java as violation of the local custom and belief. Some Aceh people considered that prostitution, gambling and other immoral practices had influenced the life of the locals. Due to this, some leaders of the Independent Aceh Movement accused ‘Javanese imperialists’ had brought an end to the culture of the Aceh people.


GAM sources state that from 1991 to 1998 the number of victims had reached 20,000 lives, while some independent observers in Aceh estimated around 1,000 lives. Amnesty International estimated that around,000 people were killed, Amnesty International (1993) p.24.

Ghazali Abbas Adan stood in the 2006 gubernatorial election in Aceh and is chair of one of six local political parties taking part in the 2009 elections with the Partai Aceh Aman Sejahtera, PAAS, (Safe and Prosperous Aceh Party) of which he is a founder member. See Chapter 7 of this volume for more information.

A report by local NGO Forum Peduli HAM of 6 November 1998 states that a number of people taking part in GAM’s convoys were forced to do so at gunpoint.

This statement of the Aceh people contained four demands for the Central Government to immediately (1) investigate totally Human Rights violations in the era of DOM; (2) rehabilitate the psychology, economic empowerment, and improvement of education quality of DOM victims; (3) grant amnesty, abolition and rehabilitation to political detainees and prisoners in Aceh; (4) give special status and extended autonomy to Aceh, including financial balance of Aceh crop products – 80% for Aceh and 20% for the Central Government. See Hamid (2006) p. 18.

According to the results of the election, Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP) won with the highest number of votes, with 285,014 votes (28.81% or 4 seats in the DPR) from a total of 988,622 legitimated votes cast. Next came the Partai Amanat Nasional (PAN) with 177,069 votes (17.91% or 2 seats), followed by Partai Golkar 154,373 votes (15.61% or 2 votes), PDI Perjuangan 126,038 votes, Partai Bulan Bintang (PBB) 30,628 votes, and Partai Nahdlatul Ummah (PNU) 21,131 votes.

Cordova document (1999). Other massacres during this period include Idi Cut, 3.2.99 in which 28 people were killed and Simpang KKA, 3.5.99 in which at least 46 people were killed and 156 injured

Humanitarian Cessation phase 1 lasted for three months, from 2 June to 2 September 2000. It was then extended, from 3 to 27 September 2000.

This Law grants special status to Aceh, which in general deviates much from what was in effect in the Indonesian local government, among others is the implementation of Islamic law, governor’s authority in the fields of security and
law empowerment, financial balance, position of legislative bodies, management of custom institutions, regulation of emblems and flags, direct election for local leaders, etc..

27 The story about the efforts to build peace at the negotiation table is told informally by Ahmad Farhan Hamid. See: Hamid (2006), pp 59-158. Another narrative about the important role of Coordinating Minister of People Welfare Jusuf Kalla in 2003 can be seen in what Farid Husain said. See Husain (2007).

28 In the case of Poso, Kalla said that the cost of peace – less than USD 108.6 million, was similar to the cost of funding a one-year military operation. Jakarta Post 8 April 2007 ‘peaceful solution to conflict cheaper.’

29 These issues will be discussed further in Chapter 4 of this book.
References


Hamid, Ahmad Farhan 2006. Nanggroe Endatu Road Peace, A Note from Representative Aceh People, Jakarta: Free Voice

Husain, Farid, 2007. To See the Unseen, a Store Behind the Peace in Aceh, Jakarta.

Indonesian Observer, 3 February 2000


SHRWN (1999), From Human Rights Issue to Independence, Some Thoughts, Banda Aceh: SHRWN


Sydney Morning Herald, 15 August 1998
3

**Democracy in Aceh Diagnosis & Prognosis**

*Olle Törnquist*

*Based on Demos’ all-Indonesia and Aceh surveys*¹

---

**Introduction**

The wave of reform in Indonesia after Soeharto did not bring democracy to Aceh. Initial efforts for change as spearheaded by the young democrats calling for a referendum similar to that in East Timor came to a standstill with the deadlocked peace negotiations, a lack of international support for independence, a further period of repression and the fact that the balkanisation of Indonesia (which the insurgents had predicted) did not transpire. Yet these challenges generated new opportunities. By late 2005, draft versions of the Indonesian Centre for Democracy and Human Rights Studies, (Demos) consolidated summary report from the first all-Indonesia survey of problems and options of democracy (Demos 2005) indicated that Aceh was indeed lagging behind but that decentralisation and a fledgling country-wide system of political democracy might serve as a framework for progress within the new Indonesian political system. A few weeks later, the devastating tsunami opened Aceh up to international actors in ways that served to prevent the conflicting parties from exploiting the situation as had previously occurred in other disturbed areas in Indonesia and Sri Lanka. This provided a
much needed boost to the new peace talks that were about to start in Helsinki. Meanwhile, conservative nationalists in Jakarta and Aceh (and Stockholm) were short of political solutions. It was Indonesia’s newly elected President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and then Vice President, Jusuf Kalla on the one hand, and the Acehnese insurgents who had opted for independence less because of ethnic nationalism than resistance against internal colonialism, authoritarianism and repression on the other, who were able to explore a new roadmap within the country’s fledgling framework of decentralisation and democracy.

The formula for moving ahead, as we know from Chapter 1, was not just autonomy and a sufficiently beneficial treaty for GAM, (Free Aceh Movement) which Jakarta had already offered its leaders, but human rights and democratic self-government for all, including civil society activists and the victims of both the conflict and the tsunami and its aftermath. In other words, the conflict itself was neither resolved nor managed but transformed into a democratic political framework.

While the design of this transformation is clear from the Helsinki MoU and reasonably clear from the following more troublesome deliberations on the Law on Governing Aceh (LoGA), the dynamics of the new democratic framework are less well understood. This chapter presents a summary and analysis of survey data on the democratic opportunities and obstacles present in Aceh a year and a half into the peace agreement. The following chapters examine a number of key issues, including the dynamics of the local elections in December 2006 in which former insurgents and dissidents were able to participate; the dubious function of business and patrons such as Jusuf Kalla in disturbed areas; the transformation of separatist movements such as GAM and the emerging local political parties. Finally the concluding two chapters reviews how some of the main actors proposed to address these problems and issues in the lead up to the 2009 elections and their responses to the results thereafter.

Surveying democracy

Two all-Indonesia surveys of the problems and options of democracy have been carried out with Demos since 2003. The work was sponsored primarily by public Norwegian funds and to
lesser degree by Swedish donors and carried out in cooperation with major democracy organisations, the University of Oslo and more recently the University of Gadjah Mada in Yogyakarta. The latter will now continue the surveys within a broader framework of power and democracy studies. One aim was to collate comparatively indisputable facts on the general situation to inform and contextualise specific case studies, anecdotal evidence and statements by powerful national as well as international actors. Another was to enable the evaluation of the various theories about the problems and options of democracy. Ideally, a more detailed survey should have been carried out in Aceh along similar lines and with more local participation. Ambitious attempts were made during late 2006 but could not be sufficiently concluded in terms of consistent and easily comparable data in addition to supplementary comments from senior activists. The analysis below is thus based on partly incomplete and fragmented data. In the process of writing the chapter however, a supplementary comprehensive re-tabulation of the ‘raw-data’ was compiled for this book by Willy P. Samadhi. Thus the main conclusions in this chapter have been controlled thanks to the re-tabulated data. Moreover, the complete re-tabulated data set is available in the appendix and can be used as a point of departure for future re-studies.

Given the imperfect data, the discussion in this chapter is based only on those broad trends identified which are considered reliable. For comparative purposes the chapter also draws on the general as well as Aceh-specific results from the first all-Indonesia survey carried out in 2003-2004 and the all-Indonesia resurvey of 2007. The interviews for the all-Indonesia resurvey were carried out around six months after those for the regional Aceh survey. Some nine hundred informants participated in the resurvey, nineteen of whom were based in Aceh.

Grounded assessment of rights-based democratisation

The surveys are based on a joint analytical framework, the details of which are discussed in the introduction to *Making Democracy Meaningful* and Chapter 2 of *Democracy Building on the Sand*. In summary, there are three points of departure, namely the identification of (i) the aims of democracy, (ii) the means by which democracy is implemented and (iii) the sources required in order to assess the extent to which the means promote the aims.

The first point is the widely accepted theoretical definition (Beetham 1999 and Beetham et al, 2002) of the aim of democracy in terms of popular control of public affairs on the basis of political equality and seven associated principles. The seven principles are: the right and ability to participate and authorise representatives and their executives; representatives (and their executives) who in turn shall represent the main currents of popular opinion and the social composition of the people, be responsive to people’s opinions and interests and accountable to people for what they do – which calls for transparency and solidarity. In addition, while it is obvious that the principles presuppose human rights (including civil, political social, economic and cultural rights), the shaping and practicing of the Rights in turn are also vested with the implementation of the democratic principles.

The second point of departure is the disaggregation of the necessary means by which to implement the aim of democracy. While the general means or institutions are universal (theoretically deduced from what is necessary in order to fulfil the aims), the formal and informal local rules and regulations vary of course. For instance, while free and fair elections are generally crucial, specific election systems vary.

In the framework for assessing democratisation that has been developed for the all-Indonesia surveys, there are four types of formal and informal means of democracy. The first is that there must be a generally accepted definition of what people (*demos*) shall be politically equal and in the control of the public affairs that they have in common.

The second means of democracy refers to the institutional framework. This includes (i) constitutionalism by way of the judiciary (equal citizenship, rule of law, equal justice, an independent judiciary and the full set of human rights); (ii) popular sovereignty
by way of legislative and executive government (democratic elections, representation, and responsive and accountable government and administration); and (iii) civic engagement by way of civil society (free and democratically oriented media, the arts, academia, associational life and other forms of additional popular participation, including consultation and various forms of ‘direct’ democracy). There is a need therefore to investigate the extent to which contextual versions of these general means of democracy actually exist and, most importantly, really promote the aims of democracy. Most assessments only focus on the performance of formal institutions. Demos’ framework undertakes three further steps by also assessing (i) the geographical spread (for instance if the institutions extend to rural areas), (ii) the substantive scope of institutions (the extent to which they cover all vital issues and, for example, with respect to gender equality, whether domestic violence is deemed a matter for private or public concerns) and (iii) various informal institutions (such as more or less supportive everyday practices and customary laws).

The third means of democracy in Demos’ framework is that the main powerful as well as alternative actors genuinely promote and use the instruments of democracy, not just consume and perhaps even abuse or avoid them.

The final and most crucial means of democracy is that various actors (powerful as well as alternative) are not just willing but also capable of promoting and using the democratic institutions. Democracy is not only about introducing a set of more or less functional institutions to regulate the politics of the already powerful actors; it is also about altering the relations of power towards actual political equality and popular control of public affairs. Most importantly, the actors with such aspirations must also be capable of (i) taking part in the essential spheres of political life, (ii) gaining legitimacy and authority, (iii) getting their issues and interests on the political agenda, (iv) organising themselves and mobilising support, and (v) developing democratic strategies for direct and representative ways of influencing the institutions that govern society.

It is critical to remember that we are thus talking of several interrelated dimensions of democracy and of degrees of democracy. It is easy to agree with the argument that advanced social and
economic rights and strong judicial institutions are likely to contribute to high scores on the other dimensions of democracy as well. This does not mean however, that such good foundations must exist \textit{a priori} to the other intrinsic means of democracy – such as equal citizenship and popular representation – being implemented. If this was the case, authoritarian paths to democracy would be necessary, as per the common thesis that enlightened elites must create solid institutions or economic development ahead of popular sovereignty. Aside from the fact that in such scenarios popular sovereignty tends to get ‘postponed’ indefinitely, as in Singapore, the critical point is that even modest democratic opportunities – for instance freedom and ordinary people’s ability to make use of them – may foster improvements to equal justice and socio-economic rights in more promising peaceful and humanitarian ways. It is thus a matter of what kind of specific and concrete \textit{politics of democratisation} that various actors and their international supporters opt for. Thus the growing critique of the liberal democratic emphasis on crafting the institutional procedures of democracy on the basis of pacts between already dominant actors does \textit{not} necessarily imply that all designing of democratic institutions is done in vain. The basic implication is ‘only’ that priority should be given to institutions that open up enhanced capacity of ordinary people to foster additional institutions for more political equality and popular control.

Having reviewed the means of democracy, we return to the points of departure. The \textit{third} and final point concerns the sources for assessing and analysing the extent to which all these means of democracy (the identified \textit{demos}, the institutions and the will and capacity to promote and use them) genuinely promote the aim of democracy in countries and regions such as Indonesia and Aceh. There is a lack of reliable data and shortage of in-depth research. This calls for interviews with experts. However, the assessments should not be made primarily on the basis of statements by cosmopolitan ‘air conditioned experts’ but by reflective and experienced pro-democrats operating along various frontlines of democracy work and in local settings around the country or region.

\textit{The local informants}

In Aceh, therefore, the survey team cooperated with well reputed local associates in selecting around two hundred reflective
and experienced informants active within fourteen frontlines of democracy work in various parts of the province. The frontlines include peasants’ and agricultural labourers’ control of the land that they till (5 informants); the struggle of labour for better conditions (5); the struggle for better lives of the urban poor (24); the promotion of urban rights (18); the fight against corruption (23); the attempts to democratise parties or build new ones (12); the promotion of pluralism and religious and ethnic reconciliation (12); the attempts at educational reform (19), the promotion of professionalism in private and public sectors (5), the promotion of the freedom and quality of the media (5), the fostering of gender equality (13); the efforts to improve alternative local representation (10); the promotion of interest-based mass organisation (41) and support for sustainable development (7). The somewhat uneven distribution of informants is of course not ideal, but reflects in part the actual opportunities and priorities among pro-democrats and the availability of critically reflective and knowledgeable informants. Given that the main priority was to engage with as senior and grounded experts as possible, it is also not difficult to understand that the typical profile of the informants was that of a rather well educated male from an NGO. Only 18% were women, 55% of all informants had more than high school education and almost 50% were from an NGO background. Any follow-up study should ensure that a better gender and occupational balance is attained.

The regional distribution was acceptable, given the challenges faced. Interviews were carried out in Banda Aceh (20% of the informants), Meulaboh on the west coast (14%), Blang Pidie in the north (13%), Kutacane and Takengon in the highlands (12% each), Lhokseumawe (16%) on the north east coast and Langsa (14%) in the south east. In each case, informants from neighbouring districts participated. Moreover, since data analysis began after the local elections in December 2006, it was possible to distinguish between the survey results obtained from districts and municipalities where the non-party, independent gubernatorial candidates, Irwandi Yusuf of KPA² and Muhammad Nazar from SIRA³, the so-called IRNA ticket, won and lost. A similar distinction was also made between the districts and towns where local candidates supported by KPA and SIRA won and lost. These divisions enabled the identification of possible differences that might help explain the results as well as
specific problems and options. The division between the informants from the various clusters was reasonable: about two thirds of the informants were from 15 out of the 21 districts where the IRNA candidates won and about one third were from the 7 districts where local KPA/SIRA candidates won.

Unfortunately however, there are reasons to believe that the unusually frequent instances of ‘no answer’ to questions (especially as compared to the in the all-Indonesia surveys) originate in the regions where it was particularly difficult to carry out the interviews. Where there is any doubt, the specific data has not been considered in the analysis.

The most significant problem relates however, to occasional errors and fragmentation of some of the data, in addition to problems of comparison. Even though the re-tabulation has addressed some of these problems, many remain. Thus references in the text to full sets of specific data have been set aside in favour of identifying the main trends.

**Seven conclusions**

Seven main conclusions stand out from the analysis in theoretical and comparative perspective of the Acehnese informants’ assessment of the indicators of meaningful democracy as listed above. The *first* conclusion refers to the rise of a political definition of what constitute the *demos*, the people of Aceh. While the Aceh *demos* remains far from being based on citizen rights, it is clear that the people and activists have turned remarkably quickly from the suffering, frustrations and distrust of civil war and natural disaster to engage in politics and to refute the common argument that local political freedoms would spur the abuse of ethnic and religious identities and thus sustain separatism. The *second* thesis argues that politics is at the helm in Aceh, with even businesspersons spending most of their energy within polity-related spheres. The military seems to have lost ground and the enormous economic reconstruction and development activities are largely separated from organised – if not *un*organised – politics. The *third* conclusion relates to one of five paradoxes, namely that the successful introduction of liberal democracy with free elections and a number of liberties – and even (in positive contrast to Indonesia at large) genuine freedom to register independent candidates and
then build parties in the local context, has not been accompanied by a similarly outstanding improvement in political representation. The fourth argument (and second paradox) is that while there is a tendency among actors to avoid parties and turn directly to various institutions of governance, there are insufficient democratic institutions and capacities to frame these practices. This is primarily to the benefit of those people with ‘good contacts’. Such practices undermine the democratic space and the actors that prioritise democracy over power-politics. The fifth conclusion is a similar paradox in the sense that the liberal democratic transformation has not yet been accompanied by sufficiently matching efforts towards palpable legal justice, rule of law and accountable and transparent governance, not even by those international donors and their Indonesian counterparts who have highlighted and emphasised the implications of these obstacles. The sixth conclusion is also a challenging paradox, namely that some of the problems seem to be particularly serious where the gubernatorial IRNA ticket was successful and even more clearly where the district candidates supported by KPA and SIRA won – but that there are no signs of increased or higher levels of democratic political capacity to alter the situation. The final conclusion is also a paradox of sorts. Most of the problems that have been identified are particularly difficult for the pro-democratic actors that have been so crucial in Aceh to fight, while others find it easier to adjust to ‘normal’ Indonesian standards and practices. The remarkable achievements in Aceh are not on the brink per se, but the foundations are shaky and the prognosis is poor if the actors in the peace process that pointed to the options for developing and making use of the emerging Indonesian democracy are continuously undermined.

We shall elaborate on the seven characteristics of Aceh one by one. For the substantiation of the estimates and tendencies in the analysis, see the data supplements in the appendix to this chapter, in Priyono, Samadhi and Törnquist et.al. (2007) and in Samadhi and Warouw, eds (2008).

(1) A ‘political demos’

The figures on Aceh in Demos’ first all-Indonesia survey carried out in 2003 and 2004 confirm the common understanding of a disturbed province, especially in terms of human rights and
democratic politics. Moreover, conservative Indonesian nationalists resented a political settlement. During the new peace negotiations their main argument was that conceding the right for the Acehnese to register independent candidates in the local elections – and even worse the right to form local political parties rather than having to join Jakarta based, ‘national’ parties – would sustain separatism and undermine Indonesia’s unity. Furthermore, it would foster local politics based on ethnicity (targeted against the Javanese) and the predominant position of Islam.

Interestingly, the survey data from late 2006 and 2007 on political attitudes and identities as well as methods of organisation and mobilisation largely refutes this position. First, according to the informants, the Acehnese are less cynical and more hopeful about politics and democracy than Indonesians in general. To some extent this may be related to the euphoria over the local elections, just before which our interviews were carried out. Six months later, the Acehnese informants in the all-Indonesia survey suggest that fewer people perceived politics in terms of popular control of public affairs and that more people thought of it in terms of the struggle for power. However, the dominant trend remained intact. Less people in Aceh than in Indonesia in general deemed politics to be the business of public figures or an elite game. Similarly, the informants in the Aceh survey suggested that many more people in Aceh are interested in politics as compared to the informants in other parts of the country. Again, six months down the line (according to Acehnese informants in the all-Indonesia survey) the difference remains, though it is less marked. The picture is not reversed but similar to Indonesia in general if we focus on women, who are frequently assumed to be less politically interested in ‘Islamic Aceh’. In addition, while the informants themselves in the Aceh survey are of course more interested in alternative and local political parties than those in other parts of the country, there are no extreme differences. Similarly, there are few differences between informants in Aceh and Indonesia in general when it comes to ideas of how to increase public participation. The main focus remains the liberal priority of increasing the consciousness of the public in general and women specifically rather than stressing political organising and the struggle for preferential treatment.
Second, it is true however that there are no clear signs of citizen-based constitution of the *demos* in Aceh. The quality of the institutions in favour of equal citizenship, for instance, is not high. The figures on the standard of civil society participation are proportionally more positive though lower than in Indonesia in general. Similarly, the various human rights indices are not overly impressive, aside from cultural and religious freedoms and to some extent the rights of trade unions and children and the right to education. This is in comparison to other dimensions of democracy in Aceh. However, there are also no major tendencies towards identity-based politics. Informants are not too worried about the tendency of political parties to abuse religious and ethnic sentiment and symbols. Also, the assessment of people’s identity in relation to the local elections is not higher for ethnicity and religion than in Indonesia in general. In fact it is much lower where the IRNA ticket was successful in the local elections than where it was not. It is true of course, that IRNA and especially local KPA and SIRA-sponsored candidates won where ethnic human rights Acehnese were dominant (Mietzner 2007:31). But given the survey results, this can hardly be interpreted to mean that there was a deliberate ethnic vote or an attempt to mobilise one – at least not in the areas where the ethnic Acehnese were anyway in a clear majority. The only contradictory indication is that people in regions where KPA and SIRA-based candidates won are deemed to have identified themselves more as Acehnese as opposed to non-Acehnese than elsewhere – but that was during the 2004 national elections. Generally, people identify themselves in similar ways in relation to social conflict and conflicts between different areas and districts. There are no signs of ethnic and religious identity politics, sometimes even the other way around. This is also verified by the assessment in Aceh of the actors’ tendency to draw on ethnicity and religion in organising people and building alliances as compared to Indonesia in general. Generally, all survey figures point instead to territorial-based identity without extreme emphasis on local communities. Where applicable, however, there is even less class identity than in Indonesia in general.

In short, while the Aceh *demos* is till far from being based on citizen rights even with limited liberal rather than social democratic criteria, public engagement and action are not based
primarily on ethnicity and religion but rather on political interest and participation. This is reminiscent of the Indian context in which Partha Chatterjee (2004) and John Harriss (2006) among others emphasise the predominance of politicians and their parties in relation to the majority of the population — a majority that remains unable to make use of their formal civic rights or are even deprived of them, yet engage as followers and voters who may at least turn against abusive incumbents. In other words, the local political freedoms in Aceh have been positive rather than negative for the development of democracy, both in the self-governing province and in Indonesia at large, though equal civic rights are missing.

(2) Politics at the helm, but losing steam

Who has been governing the provinces and who are the most powerful people since the fall of Soeharto? There is broad consensus that the answer is both drastic decentralisation and unorganised localisation to the local elite combined with a persistence of central state control over certain vital sectors of governance. There is additionally a wider spectrum of powerful business actors, politicians and political parties whose ascendancy has come at the expense of Soeharto’s bureaucrats and military leaders, although some of the latter have taken on new identities. This is in addition to increasingly important ethnic and religious community organisations. All these tendencies operate within a framework of persistently self-financed and territorially organised military, a formal framework of democracy with strong elements of patronage, informal cooperation between politicians, bureaucrats, military and business, and similarly informal and deregulated markets (e.g. Aspinall and Fealy 2003, Robison and Hadiz 2004, Nordholt 2004, Nordholt 2006, Nordholt and van Klinken 2007, and van Klinken 2009.)

In the case of Aceh prior to the peace accord, most scholars emphasised the special role of the primitive accumulation of capital by the Indonesian army in cooperation with neo-patrimonial politicians, business and militia groups with GAM also employing similar practices. Workers, peasants, urban poor and other subordinated classes were rarely organised on the basis of their own interests. Middle class professionals, intellectuals and students in various action groups and NGOs were gaining some ground within
the extended public space after Soeharto, but were curbed again under the Megawati regime (e.g. Schulze 2004, 2006, Kingsbury 2006, Sulaiman 2006, and Sulaiman with van Klinken 2007). As discussed in Chapter 1 and further explored in Chapter 4, much of the celebrated efforts at peace in Indonesia’s troubled regions under the subsequent reign of then Vice President Jusuf Kalla were based on the idea that brutal military force should be replaced by political (and military) facilitation of profitable business for all dominant parties involved, including those rebels prepared to compromise.

Thus Kalla’s business-oriented integration of former rebels may have been partially in line with both the old international idea that liberal markets and democracy would foster peace, even though he monopolised much of the first and reduced the latter, and with the more recent argument to contain full democratisation because it is regarded as threat to stability where sufficiently solid institutions are not in place from the outset (e.g. Mansfield and Snyder 2005; c.f. Paris 2004 and Richmond 2007). However, the post-tsunami reconstruction process in Aceh required the disbursement of relief and reconstruction funding by the international aid community for which it had to be accountable to its tax payers. Given the predominance of violence, abuse of power and corruption in Aceh, they were reluctant to work with the dominant groups and governance institutions there and instead opted for direct management in cooperation with technocrats in Jakarta.4

Given this actually existing political economy, what was the fate of the transformation of the conflict from the battlefield to democratic politics? Aside from putting an end to the armed struggle, the only major issues that were resolved by the peace accord were that Aceh would obtain access to more of the income generated by the exploitation of its natural resources, that a broad range of issues within public governance would be decentralised, and that the necessary details would be further deliberated and negotiated. Deliberation referred, *inter alia*, to a special commission on human rights and the drafting of the Law on Governing Aceh (LoGA). Negotiation would take place within a democratic framework where the Acehnese themselves would have the opportunity to elect their own representatives. So what are the results?

The assessment by senior Aceh democrats surveyed is somewhat surprising. Politics is definitely at the helm. Yet there are
few signs of the dominant leaders within the bureaucracy and the military that were so important in Aceh under Soeharto (McGibbon 2006) and are also common in post-conflict situations. The same applies to the business actors who are widespread in other parts of Indonesia and who would have been expected to flood into Aceh given the influx of massive funds and new opportunities after the tsunami.

In answer to the question of which actors are most important in relation to politics in general, the answer the informants give is that role of business groups is significant in Banda Aceh and Lhokseumawe, but that overall they are not as important as compared to Indonesia in general. With regards to the political executives, bureaucrats, military and police, the figures moreover suggest that they are slightly less important than elsewhere. Further, while political parties and politicians are not yet as crucial as they are at the all-Indonesia level, and while academics, experts, lawyers and the media are lagging behind, NGOs and mass organisations (possibly including religious groups and organisations such as the KPA and SIRA) are comparatively more important than elsewhere. Yet there is no clear pattern as to the main actors’ social base, aside from the fact that it is not particularly related to ethnic and religious identity. Nevertheless, there is a minor indication that NGOs were more related to interest-based organisation in those areas where the IRNA ticket was successful than elsewhere. This fits well with McGibbon’s (2006) thesis that there was a power vacuum in Aceh after 1998, resulting in a wider range of powerful local actors as well as more room for manoeuvre to GAM and dissident students.

The data on which parts of the political landscape that the actors have access to and prioritise or are excluded from confirm and expand this picture. All the main actors tend to congregate around lobby groups, interest and mass organisations, political parties, local parliaments and the bureaucracy. Business groups are of course concerned with the business sector – but they seem to spend as much as three quarters of their energy in the other predominant sectors. Similarly, NGOs, customary leaders, academics and other experts prioritise ‘their’ lobby groups, whilst religious leaders and the leaders of interest and mass-based organisations focus on ‘their’ own groups and constituencies as well. But they all seem to spend two thirds of their time in the other critical spheres. The
same applies to the political parties and politicians. Remarkably, the politicians focus less on their main arena, the parliaments, than on lobby groups and the bureaucracy and political and interest-based organisations.

Similarly, the main sources of power within this framework are not economic. Access to coercive powers (political, military, mass demonstrations) and social strength and favourable contacts in particular represent all of the actors’ main sources of power. Even the fourth source of power – culture and knowledge – is more important than economic resources as such.\(^5\)

In short, the experienced informants identify two trends. The first is that although those powerful business actors whose interest in Aceh was driven by the opportunities opened up by the disbursement of massive reconstruction funds, related economic development and improved access to natural resources after the tsunami and the peace accord may well have generated corruption within, for example, the BRR (the Aceh-Nias Agency for Reconstruction and Rehabilitation) they have yet to influence politics to the same extent as is reported in many other Indonesian provinces. This may well be at least in part due to the strategies the international donors deployed in order to avoid the Indonesian military and the notoriously corrupt local administration. Although this strategy may have been good for the independence of politics, it has also prevented people in Aceh from engaging in the decision-making process and the administration of reconstruction and economic development via their elected leaders. At worst, the unique opportunity to rebuild and redirect Aceh’s economy and administration after the tsunami and the peace accord in a socially responsible and democratic way has been undermined.

Secondly, the informants suggest that those business actors who nevertheless involve themselves in politics work very closely with the bureaucracy, military, politicians, political parties, lobby groups and interest organisations. Similarly of course, the latter group of actors also strike deals with business leaders. Generally, the survey results on these symbiotic relations between broadly speaking business and politics vindicate the results from case studies that so-called neo-patrimonial practices have survived and that ‘good contacts and special favours’ are often used by former combatants and their leaders to promote reintegration into
business, especially when they cannot compete as successfully in the open market as many of their main critics, the often – though not exclusively – relatively well paid experts from civil society organisations.

The biggest challenge is if these two trends meet. That is if the powerful business actors that have so far been partially contained will be able to freely influence politics so that Aceh turns to the sorts of practices more evident in other Indonesian provinces – while at the same time politicians and other popular representatives are neither able to gain democratic control of the economic resources and priorities related to reconstruction, nor to contain the symbiotic relations between those business and administrative practices and politics that foster collusion, nepotism and corruption.

Unfortunately this may not be a serious threat to any of the main actors in Aceh, not even to the conservative nationalist leaders and former commanders, as long as they benefit from having good contacts and provide sufficient patronage to their followers. Ironically, they seem to be more able to adjust to ‘normal’ Indonesian standards and practices than the moderate nationalists whose legitimacy is based on the argument that Aceh would benefit from full political participation and democratisation within Indonesia.

(3) Political freedom but constrained political representation

As late as January 2005, very few scholars and activists argued that democracy in Aceh was a viable proposition and a means by which to transform conflict. Thereafter, the most common supposition was that the new democratic institutions would not prove sustainable. This scepticism was based on a number of crucial factors. History indicated that Jakarta was prepared to continue to exploit Aceh’s resources and repress its dissidents even after the fall of Soeharto. Thus most Acehnese democracy activists deemed independence an inevitable first step towards any substantive improvement. Moreover, very few of the structural and institutional preconditions for democracy existed. Finally, conservative Acehnese nationalists had not bought into democracy. Just a few months later however, the introduction of democracy as a prerequisite for genuine self-government became the generally accepted basis for the peace treaty, which in turn has transpired to be remarkably solid. The reasons why this was possible have been
discussed in Chapter 1 and alluded to in the introduction of this chapter. The question that is addressed here concerns the fate of the new democratic framework since its inception.

The assessments given by grounded Aceh democrats in the Demos survey point to four paradoxes that will be discussed in the remaining sections of this chapter. The first paradox is that while liberal democracy and the unique freedom (by Indonesian standards) to register independent political candidates and build local political parties have been remarkably successful, these have yet to impact on poor popular representation.

The most critical factor in the assessment given by the Aceh democrats is the extent to which the crucial actors genuinely support and also use the aims and means of democracy, or whether they only use or even abuse or avoid them. This is a more qualified way of asking the common question in the international literature, namely whether or not democracy has become the only game in town. The results are remarkable, particularly given that the assessments are made by quite critical democracy activists. In fact, the informants state that more than half of the main actors both promote and use the instruments of democracy, that almost another one third only consume them and that only some 10% abuse or avoid them. As compared to the all-Indonesia survey (which puts the question somewhat differently), these are higher figures for the powerful actors and not much lower for the alternative actors. It is true that the Aceh informants in the all-Indonesia survey are more critical of the alternative actors in Aceh. Their willingness to both support and use democracy is deemed to be some 15% below the all-Indonesia average. This is mainly because the popular actors do not seem to find the democratic instruments very useful. Yet the data for the powerful actors in Aceh remains significantly more positive than for the country at large.

Further, the figures for Aceh in both the local and all-Indonesia survey are of course less impressive than for Indonesia in general when we break down the quality of the means of democracy into its major intrinsic dimensions. Yet the degree of positive assessments is remarkably high given the conditions. A detailed comparison with the all-Indonesia figures is difficult due to the fragmented nature of the Aceh data. It is clear however, that a large number of freedoms and rights are deemed to have
the best performance, spread and substance out of all the intrinsic institutions. This is similar to the country at large. The top cluster of such institutions comprises of the freedom of religion, belief, culture and language, elections, media, speech and organisation (including trade unions), civil society organisation as well the rights of children and the right to basic education (including citizen’s rights and duties). In addition, and most significantly, the most positively rated democracy instruments in Aceh also comprise of the freedom to form and run parties and take part in elections, including at local level and temporarily by way of independent candidates. This is a major success that stands out in sharp contrast to the less inclusive regulations in other parts of Indonesia. Although some exceptions have since been made to the Indonesia-wide rules with regard to independent candidates, the opportunity for the building of parties from below that stand any chance of fulfilling the legal requirements to run in the elections remain minuscule.\(^7\)

In spite of the unique possibilities to at least begin to organise politically before late 2006 (when the survey was carried out) and to cluster behind independent candidates, the informants in Aceh (just as their colleagues in Indonesia at large) deemed all the in-depth indicators of political representation quite negatively, namely the extent to which political parties reflect people’s aspirations and concerns, abstention from the abuse of religious and ethnic sentiments, symbols and doctrines, independence from money politics and powerful vested interests, the degree of membership control and responsiveness and accountability to their constituencies, and their ability to form and run government.

One can argue of course, that this critique of the in-depth aspects of political representation is due to the fact that assessments in Aceh were primarily related to the already existing so-called national parties, since it had not yet been possible by late-2006 to build local parties. A possible indicator is that the assessments of the few Acehnese participants in the all-Indonesia survey in the second part of 2007 are more optimistic. However, the basic fact is that preparatory party building had already been delayed, and that this reflected problems on the part of the government as well as the political organisations and leaders of the former combatants. The latter were involved in intractable internal conflicts on how to relate to the upcoming direct elections such as the selection
of candidates and the identification of allies: whether to run independent candidates or link up with established national parties. Most importantly, it was also a question of whether and how more democratic decisions might be made. The crucial factors have been discussed in Chapter 1 and do not need to be repeated here, and further aspects will be identified in Chapters 5 and 6, but the outcome led to a number of significant divisions. It is true that these cleavages in turn spurred an interest in genuine democracy among some groups, but they also constrained democratisation among the more conservative nationalists.

Additionally, the question of how the Acehnese would be represented at the all-Indonesia level has remained unresolved. The initial position of the Aceh nationalists was that they would neither ally themselves with Jakarta driven, all-Indonesia parties nor engage in all-Indonesian electoral and parliamentary politics via their own new local parties since they were now aiming for self-government, if not all out independence. In reality, however, this has resulted in a deficit of democratic Acehnese representation in the post-Helsinki period at both legislative and executive levels in Jakarta. This paves the way for co-optation and non-transparent elitism and renders cooperation with pro-democrats in Indonesia in general quite difficult.

In brief, it is notable that most of the main actors seem to accept the new democracy-oriented rules of the game, and a number of vital freedoms and rights have been assessed positively. Also, the extensive freedom of political participation firstly by way of independent candidates and then by local parties is particularly impressive. However, there are also worrying signs that these positive developments have not yet generated more positive assessments of the relevant in-depth indicators of political representation. The divisions between the former combatants and their civil society allies are quite negative in this respect. Similarly, co-optation and non-transparent elitism are nourished by the fact that there is not yet a way for the Acehnese to be democratically represented within all-Indonesia discussions on the basis of their own organisations.
(4) Direct approaches in an undemocratic framework

What are the chances that the remarkable political freedoms and participation with elected ‘independent’ leaders and the now newly-forming political parties (analysed by Murizal Hamzah in Chapter 7) will foster popular democratic participation? This largely depends on the contexts and tendencies that were assessed in the surveys.

Much as with Indonesia in general and many other contexts around the world, the problems of representation in Aceh have contributed to a tendency amongst important actors as well as the people to approach governance institutions either directly or via supplementary agents such as the media, NGOs, and patrons and fixers rather than the potentially more democratically representative institutions such as political parties and popular-oriented interest-based organisations. This search for alternative routes is not in itself an unhealthy practice. To be productive, however, comparative evidence indicates that people and actors have not just to avoid de facto undemocratic mediators, such as patrons and elitist parties; but also promote instead (as for instance in Brazil and Kerala) more representative organisations and leaders; organisations and leaders who are capable of introducing more democratic arrangements for direct access and participation in public governance and administration. The second paradox that renders the problems in Aceh particularly serious is that positive dynamics such as these do not appear to be in evidence. Rather, direct contacts persist within an insufficiently democratic framework.

First, all the main actors favour a direct approach of some kind. This tendency is almost as dominant as in Indonesia in general where around one third of the actors prioritise this option over a long list of alternatives including mediation via NGOs, peoples organisation, experts and the media, popular figures, patrons and fixers, communal groups, neighbourhood groups, political parties, interest-based organisations and lobby and pressure groups. A slightly more compressed list of alternatives was used in the Aceh-only survey, but the trend remains clear. Representative mediators such as political parties, people’s organisations and more specialised interest-based organisations are a little more significant in Aceh than in Indonesia in general, but less so than the direct approach. Only the bureaucrats, politicians, religious and customary leaders
and business actors used political parties as mediators rather frequently. There are no significant differences between the districts in this regard, even if there is a slight tendency towards more direct approaches where the IRNA ticket was successful than elsewhere. If we turn to the institutions that the actors aspire to use however, it is interesting to note that NGOs seem to have been less insulated from organised politics and engaged more with the executive and administrative governance institutions where IRNA and KPA/SIRA candidates won than where they lost.

In this situation, what do individual people do? The informants suggest that people who wish to address an institution for public governance avoid supposedly representative interest-based organisations, political parties and elected politicians. Moreover, they also do not turn directly to the relevant bureaucrats and only occasionally to the judiciary. In order of preference, people prefer to approach NGOs, the media, single issue groups, informal leaders and lobby groups. Furthermore, specific studies beyond the surveys indicate clearly that even when people do turn to interest organisations and new political parties to voice their demands and aspirations, they either seek out influential individuals within the organisation or if they are supporters of the organisation, expect to be given special privileges over others.12

Why is this? Given comparative historical evidence,13 two key aspects are the quality of the public rules and regulations that are supposed to promote (a) people’s direct access and contact with public services and political representatives and (b) government’s public consultation and (when possible) facilitation of direct participation in policy making and the implementation of public decisions. These rules and regulations may include democratic (i.e. non discretionary) ways of involving interest-based organisations such as trade unions, employers associations, peasant organisations, or women’s groups when it comes to issues and decisions that they are affected by. It may also, for instance, include democratically institutionalised participatory budgeting and planning. Our surveys show quite clearly that such institutions are not common in the first place. And where they do exist, their performance, spread and substance are among the worst in comparison to other intrinsic means of democracy. Furthermore, this is also the case with regard to informal as well as formal arrangements. Traditional
informal institutions do not seem to offer a better solution, as is sometimes indicated by Acehnese nationalists. And the standard of these institutions does not seem to be significantly better where the candidates who won were supported by KPA and SIRA.

What are the chances then that the more recent, free and vibrant political parties will strengthen actors’ capacity and demands in favour of such democratic institutions for direct access and participation? This depends of course on the democratic capacity of the actors, the most crucial dimensions of which are also on the list of the necessary means of rights-based democracy that are subject to review in our surveys. One piece of good news is the comparatively infrequent tendency of the actors to be socially rooted in and building alliances with ethnic and religious groups while connections with community, professional and interest groups are more common. And there are indications that religious, ethnic and community groups are less important where the IRNA ticket and KPA and SIRA candidates were successful than in other areas. However, figures also suggest that professional and interest organisations often have links with powerful established actors, and that class based orientation and identities are rare. Also, one must not forget that the importance of militias remains higher than the all-Indonesia average.

There are also pros and cons to the democratic capacity for mobilisation and raising critical issues. On the positive side, the Acehnese informants in the 2007 all-Indonesia survey suggest that values and ideals rather than, for instance, ethnic and religious identities are particularly important in Aceh. Moreover, the Aceh-only survey (but not so much the Aceh experts in the all-Indonesia survey) indicates that there is less dominant focus on specific issues and interests on the Acehnese agenda than there is in Indonesia in general. Instead, different issues are combined and the public discourse is more characterised by ideas and ideologies. Unfortunately however, there are also signs that the emphasis on general values comes at the expense of the need to address fundamental social and economic problems and perspectives. This is with the possible exception of matters related to economic development which in Aceh not only preoccupy powerful actors, as per Indonesia in general, but alternative actors too.
Perhaps most seriously, the specific capacity to employ democratically oriented means of organisation and mobilisation remains weak. Most actors do not employ very democratically oriented means to transform economic, social, coercive and cultural resources into legitimate and authoritative influence. Receiving a popular mandate and being elected is one of the least appreciated methods – even amongst politicians. The primary means are rather the facilitation of contacts and dialogue with politicians and administrators and the building of networks, contacts and partnership with influential figures and experts. Major differences as compared to Indonesia in general are the less frequent use of discursive activities and the option of gaining legitimacy through the legislative, executive and judicial organs of the state. Moreover, networking in addition to access to popular and charismatic leaders remains the main method used by all actors, while the integration of popular organisations from below is rated low. Making use of clientelism or alternative patronage comes in between. Clientelism is probably regarded as negative and mainly deemed to be employed by bureaucrats and the military as well as by political parties, interest/mass organisations and business actors. Particularly in the case of NGOs, informants say that alternative patronage is used more extensively than clientelism. There are no significant differences between the districts in this respect, except for indications that popular leaders were less crucial where the IRNA ticket and SIRA/KPA candidates were successful. This may reflect the fact that these candidates were somewhat more rooted in organisations and movements, which may in turn go some way to explain why simplified surveys and predictions of who would win the elections (based on the tendencies in other Indonesian provinces) failed miserably.

It is true that the rather low democracy oriented capacity of the actors may now be affected by the rapid rise of the new local parties that are reviewed in Chapter 7. Yet as has been indicated, separate studies point to a number of problems of patronage by leaders and parties. Further, the surveys reveal a lack of public institutions for direct access to and participation in governance and services. Similarly, there are very few broad and reasonably democratic organisations that are built from below on the basis of their members’ issues and concerns. This means that there is a
lack of democratic institutions and practices to frame and direct to
different, but generally likeminded, parties and leaders in similar
ways as popular movements in many other parts of the world have
constituted the framework for, for example, peasants, labour and
green parties.

There are two serious consequences of this. Firstly, party-
politicisation is quite extensive and intensive. Second, the parties
and leaders seem to be forced to compete on how to offer the
most attractive favours and privileges, contacts and ‘alternative
patronage’. This is of course not unique but rather quite normal in
Indonesian provinces. Fortunately however, the situation in Aceh is
most probably not yet as serious. Corruption for instance, seems
to be a less serious problem than ‘alternative patronage’ and to
some extent the same may be said about nepotism. Moreover, there
are only occasional indicators that are similar to, for instance, the
self-governed Kurdish parts of northern Iraq, where previously
warlords captured the institutions of government, combined
them with their own organisations and now run them in line
with textbook neo-patrimonial practices and nepotism (while,
ironically, Washington speaks of ‘democratic advances’). What
does remain a serious problem in Aceh, however, is the limited
space available for transforming the old command structures and
loyalties from the militarised part of the nationalist movement into
a democratic framework. Here there are signs of ‘normalisation’
towards sustained Indonesian practices of corruption, collusion
and nepotism (KKN – Korupsi, Kolusi dan Nepotisme). Unfortunately,
these practices are supported by the fashionable national and
international peace-building strategy of combining liberal
democracy and the market-driven inclusion of powerful actors
as well as former rebels in profitable business. Worse still, even
those Acehnese nationalists who opted for the development of
democracy within the framework of the Indonesian state in order
to foster peace and fair development now find it quite difficult to
compete politically by offering their actual and potential followers
meaningful and genuinely democratic alternatives to the provision
of special privileges and patronage. Insightful democratic partners
both within Indonesia and internationally need to support the
fostering of such alternatives.
(5) **Democracy minus investment in rights, laws and governance**

In Indonesia at large, as highlighted in Demos’ ‘national’ survey reports and in Chapter 1, the initial preoccupation in 1998 and some time thereafter with political equality, popular sovereignty and elections was soon replaced by NGOs, new middle classes and foreign donors’ focus on human rights, rule of law and ‘good governance’. Elections, parties and politicians were often designated particularly ‘dirty’ and corrupt. Ironically therefore, the abandoned issue of representation became even more crucial, at lest if democracy is not to be given up or postponed until undefined enlightened elites have introduced more solid human rights, rule of law and ‘good governance’.

This tendency reflects the growing international frustration with shallow transitions from authoritarian rule. Reports have stressed that liberal democratic elections often serve more as hotbeds for identity politics and intransigent conflict than as vehicles for peace and reconciliation. The new international preference is thus for ‘sequencing democracy’, i.e. that elites should ensure that the right institutions are in place and promote sufficient social and economic development ahead of full freedoms, political equality and elections.\(^\text{19}\)

Aceh however, is an exception. As we know, the fledgling democracy in other parts of the country provided a framework for the negotiated settlement in Helsinki. GAM and dissident civilian nationalists won the right to deliberate the laws on self-government as well as nominating their own candidates, building their own parties and participating on equal terms in local elections. Moreover the candidates supported by KPA and SIRA even succeeded in winning the first free and fair elections - elections which generated less, not more, identity politics and conflict.

Regrettably, the third paradox in the Aceh survey results is that democratic progress has not yet generated similarly remarkable advances with regard to human rights, rule of law and ‘good governance’. Moreover these intrinsic aspects of democracy constitute some of the main problems, together with the dark side of representation, and direct access to and participation in governance.

According to the late 2006 and 2007 surveys, the weakest quality with regard to human rights and justice-related institutions are among those that promote freedom from physical violence, the
rights of victims of conflict and disaster, good corporate governance, subordination of the government and public official to the rule of law, equal and secure access to justice, and the integrity and independence of the judiciary.

Additionally, almost none of the clear cut agreements in the peace accord on various instruments for transitional justice and truth and reconciliation have been implemented, primarily due to the lack of political will on the part of the all-Indonesia authorities to remove the obstacle of contradictory national rules and regulations.

Similarly, the institutions for democratic governance identified with the lowest quality are those that promote transparency and accountability of elected government, the bureaucracies, the military and police. Low but slightly less disturbing figures are associated with the government’s capacity to combat paramilitary groups, hoodlums and organised crime, its independence from strong interest groups and capacity to eliminate corruption and abuse of power and appropriate decentralisation. Furthermore, the criticism of poor decentralisation is possibly primarily related to the complex problems of transforming the principles from Helsinki on self government into clear cut legislation on governing Aceh (LoGA). This took about a year and many matters remain blurred, primarily because the national parliament and ministries have tried their best to retreat from what others had agreed to in Helsinki but also, inter alia, because of inconsistencies in the first drafts submitted by a number of Acehnese stakeholders (May 2008 and Ann Miller 2006 and Chapter 7 in this volume).

Generally all these indicators refer to performance as well as spread and substance of the rules and regulations, and informal institutions do not seem to be in a better shape than the formal.

Do these poor results signal that the critics of full freedoms and elections ahead of solid institutions may be right given that efforts at popular sovereignty do not seem to have substantially improved the situation? Three factors speak against such a conclusion. First, full freedoms and elections have been very positive for democracy and for the capacity to build peace thereby providing a positive framework for reconstruction.

Second, the other main problems identified in the Aceh-only survey: too little and too poor popular representation, direct access to politics and popular participation in public governance,
are not directly related to the problems anticipated by those who view freedoms and elections as counterproductive, namely increased ethnic and religious political identities and abuse of related sentiments, symbols and doctrines.

Third (and this is at the core of the third paradox), interviews and monitoring carried out since the surveys indicate that not even those middle class technocrats and international donors who speak up most vociferously about the problems of the rule of law and ‘good governance’ have prioritised cooperation with and providing support for the newly elected leaders to carry out the necessary reforms. This lack of support is not limited to the deplorably deficient coordination between the well-funded post-tsunami relief and reconstruction work on the one hand and the poorly funded support for the victims of violence, reintegration and employment schemes for ex-combatants and democracy education on the other. It also relates to the meagre levels of support given to foster a functional law on local government in Aceh and improving local administration in the spirit of the Helsinki MoU. Despite their limitations, particularly at local level, the considered attempts by some of the newly elected representatives to counter corruption and promote good governance reform, including for example the transparent appointment of government officials, could have been much better supported.

In short, the major tendency by donors and their partners seems to have been ‘protect’ to their own ventures from ‘dirty’ politics and administration, in the same way many NGOs tend to avoid politics and public governance, yet retaining their own problems of corruption, insufficient accountability and democratic representation.

(6) Challenging victories

The sixth conclusion is also a paradox. Several of the problems identified appear to be particularly acute where the gubernatorial IRNA ticket was successful in the provincial elections, where the local candidates supported by KPA and SIRA won in the district elections, and more generally for those actors whose legitimacy is based on the argument that Aceh will benefit from full political participation and democratisation within the context of the Indonesian state.
Informants from areas where the IRNA ticket was successful and particularly where local KPA and SIRA candidates won suggest that ethnic and religious identities were less crucial in their regions than they were deemed to be by informants elsewhere. But they also suggest that people have a more cynical attitude to politics and are more likely to view politics as a struggle for power rather than the popular control of public affairs than is suggested by informants from areas where the other candidates won. Similarly, it is true that the substance of the existing institutions to promote democracy may be better where the IRNA ticket KPA/SIRA candidates won, but most critically, the basic indicators for the existence, performance and spread of institutions tend to be worse where the IRNA ticket and particularly the KPA and SIRA candidates were successful. Not surprisingly, there are also indications that the districts where the KPA and SIRA candidates won are those that have been most affected by human rights abuses, military repression and violence.

Challenges such as these need not present a major problem as long as there are those who are willing and able to develop their democratic capacity to positively affect change. However, as per the discussion in Chapter 1, there are no signs of a significantly higher capacity to do so where the IRNA ticket and the KPA/SIRA candidates gained majorities.

(7) Contained Democrats

Perhaps most worryingly, the most crucial problems identified are those that the pro-democracy actors find most difficult to address. First, opportunities for access to democratic political control of business activities and the massive reconstruction programme remain limited. Business actors prefer markets and informal contacts and had the sympathy of the then Vice President Jusuf Kalla in particular. Some of the less democracy oriented Acehnese nationalists and ex-combatants are often embraced and seem to adjust. And the donor and central government-led reconstruction and economic development programmes have shied away from local government and administration, conforming to the international tendency of combining shallow liberal democracy and extensive neo-liberal economy.

Second, the divisions between former combatants and their civilian allies have hampered efforts by the latter in particular to
use the extensive freedom of political participation first through independent candidates and subsequently through local parties towards the expansion and deepening of democratic representation.

Third, while there has been a tendency to avoid the problems of representation by turning directly to various institutions of governance through ‘good contacts’ and/or via potentially less representative mediators such as the media and lobby groups, this has not benefitted the genuine pro-democrats who would prefer democratic institutions for equal and fair direct access and participation in public life.

Fourth, the lack of such a framework as an incentive for and privilege of pro-democratic politics also hampers the development of more genuine popular movements that are rooted in basic public ideas and aspirations.

Fifth, the shallow democratic framework in turn fosters extensive and partially destructive party-politicisation of best possible access to ‘good contacts’ and alternative patronage. Again, this serves to sustain the old command structure in sections of the nationalist movement, especially to the extent that it is a useful way of conforming to ‘normal’ Indonesian democracy and KKN. Meanwhile, the pro-democrats have few alternative ways of rallying supporters and building parties due to the weak interest organisations that are formed and controlled by people themselves and the weak public institutions for equal and fair direct access and participation in public life. They even suffer from the mainstream national and international peace-building strategy of combining liberal democracy and market-driven inclusion of powerful actors and former rebels in profitable business.

In short, the facts on the ground in Aceh have proved the critics who claim that more democracy is problematic because there are insufficiently solid institutions to sustain human rights, rule of law and ‘good governance’ wrong. Thanks to the democracy oriented activists and former combatants, the freedoms and elections have instead been instrumental in paving the way for peace and a reduction in identity-based politics. Their strength and legitimacy hinges however on the extent to which it proves possible to build a better Aceh for ordinary people by way of democratisation.
(Endnotes)

1 Special thanks for comments on previous versions of this chapter by participants in the Banda Aceh workshop on the tentative results (28 November 2008), as well as from Teresa Birks, Gerry van Klinken, Willy P. Samadhi, Kristian Stokke and Silje Vevatne.

2 Komite Peralihan Aceh - the Aceh Transition Committee

3 Sentral Informasi Referendum Aceh - Aceh Referendum Information Centre, the original student-led pro-referendum organisation

4 For the early phase in Aceh, see McGibbon 2006, Aspinall 2005 and ICG 2005a.

5 And academicians and experts draw of course at first hand on their access to knowledge.

6 E.g. Aspinall 2007, 2008, 2009 and Barron 2008. I draw also on discussions with most knowledgeable key informants. c.f. Sindre in Chapter 5 of this volume.

7 Legal requirements for ‘national presence’ include that new parties must prove to have substantive branch offices in 60% of the provinces, 50% of the regencies and municipalities, and 25% of the sub districts. This can easily be arranged by parties with money but not by others.

8 For two published reviews, see ICG 2006 and Mietzner 2007:26ff.

9 According to ICG 2005b, GAM itself requested that the local parties would only take part in local not national elections.

10 For theoretical and comparative perspectives on concrete cases in the global South, see Törnquist, Stokke and Webster, forthcoming 2009.

11 See ibid. and Harriss, Stokke, Törnquist 2004


13 See Törnquist 2009, and further references in the same

14 Social resources (or capital) basically mean ‘good contacts’. Cultural resources include privileged knowledge, information, and education.

15 In the latter case, figures are only available from the Aceh parts of the all-Indonesia survey in 2007.

16 See fn 13.

17 Comparisons are difficult since the growing number of studies of the Indonesian “shadow state” and primitive accumulation of capital often generalise from specific instances in a similar way that students of Human Rights who state that from a normative point of view, one proven case will suffice as there must be zero tolerance of any violations.

18 Michal Rubin “Is Iraqi Kurdistan a Good Ally?” http://www.aei.org/publications/pubID.27327/pub_detail.asp (I am indebted to Mustafa Can for spelling out the Kurdish case and pointing to Rubin’s article.)

19 For a critical review of the argument in for instance Mansfield and Snyder 2005, see Carothers 2007a and 2007b.

20 For a general review, see Frödin 2008, Baron 2006 and further references in Chapter 1. Even early constructive critique in this respect (including by this author) in the supposedly open minded Swedish setting was rigidly and sometimes arrogantly ignored or at best negated.

21 The exception is that the informal institutions may be better spread where IRNA won.
References


Harriss, John, 2006. Politics is a dirty river: but is there a ‘new politics’ of civil society. In: John Harriss, ed. *Power matters: essays on institutions, politics and society in India*. Delhi: Oxford University Press.


APPENDIX to Chapter 3

SELECTED re-tabulated data from Demos-Aceh’s democracy survey December 2006, supplemented with data on Aceh from Demos’ all-Indonesia democracy survey 2007-2008.¹

Willy Purna Samadhi

LIST of TABLES

Table 1. Distribution of informants in area and Districts/Kota
Table 2. Distribution of informants in frontlines
Table 3. Age groups of informants in gender
Table 4. Education of informants
Table 5. How the people understand politics
Table 6. How big is the interest of people towards politics
Table 7. How big is the interest of women towards politics
Table 8. Effort to encourage women participation in politics
Table 9. Most appropriate channel to engage in political process
Table 10. Method to improve political participation
Table 11. How people in the area at first hand identify themselves in regional election
Table 12. How people in the area at first hand identify themselves in regional election: Comparison between Irwandi won and lost
Table 13. How people in the area at first hand identify themselves in general elections of legislative on 2004
Table 14. How people in the area at first hand identify themselves in general elections of legislative on 2004: Comparison between Irwandi won and lost
Table 15. How people in the area at first hand identify themselves in responding to local conflicts
Table 16. How people in the area at first hand identify themselves in responding to issues of regional division

Table 17. Main actors
Table 18. Main actors in districts where IRNA won and lost election and KPA-SIRA won/lost election
Table 19. How main actors relate to democracy
Table 20. Situation of the formal rules and regulations
Table 21. Situation of the informal arrangements
Table 22. Political terrain
Table 23. Sources of power
Table 24. Transformation of power
Table 25. Type of issues
Table 26. Mobilisation
Table 27. How actors mobilize support in districts where IRNA won/lost election and KPA-SIRA won/lost election (Aceh survey 2006)
Table 28. Social bases of main actors’ supporter groups (Aceh survey 2006)
Table 29. The actors’ strategies in the political system and related forms of representation
Table 30. The powerful actors’ strategies in the political system and related forms of representation
Table 31. The alternative actors’ strategies in the political system and related forms of representation
Table 32. Where people address their complaints and demands regarding public affairs
Table 1. Distribution of informants in area and Districts/Kota (Aceh survey 2006)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NO</th>
<th>AREA</th>
<th>DISTRICTS/KOTA</th>
<th>NUMBER OF INFORMANTS</th>
<th>INFORMANTS PER AREA (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>(1) Banda Aceh</td>
<td>Aceh Besar</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td>Banda Aceh</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td>Pidie</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td>Sabang</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Informants/area (1)</td>
<td></td>
<td>38</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>(2) Meulaboh</td>
<td>Aceh Barat</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td>Aceh Jaya</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
<td>Nagan Raya</td>
<td>11</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Informants/area (2)</td>
<td></td>
<td>27</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>(3) Blang Pidie</td>
<td>Aceh Barat</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
<td>Daya</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
<td>Aceh Selatan</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Informants/area (3)</td>
<td></td>
<td>25</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>(4) Takengon</td>
<td>Aceh Tengah</td>
<td>13</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
<td>Bener Meriah</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Informants/area (4)</td>
<td></td>
<td>23</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>(5) Kutacane</td>
<td>Aceh Singkil</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td></td>
<td>Aceh Tenggara</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
<td>Gayo Lues</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Informants/area (5)</td>
<td></td>
<td>23</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>(6) Lhokseumawe</td>
<td>Aceh Utara</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td></td>
<td>Bireun</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td></td>
<td>Lhokseumawe</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Informants/area (6)</td>
<td></td>
<td>30</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>(7) Langsa</td>
<td>Aceh Tamiang</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td></td>
<td>Aceh Timur</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td></td>
<td>Kota Langsa</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Informants/area (7)</td>
<td></td>
<td>27</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td></td>
<td>193</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 2. Distribution of informants in frontlines

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NO</th>
<th>FRONTLINES</th>
<th>ACEH SURVEY 2006* (%)</th>
<th>ACEH INFORMANTS IN ALL-INDONESIA SURVEY (2007)** (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Peasants’ and agricultural labourers’ control of the land that they till</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>The struggle of labour for better conditions</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>The struggle for better lives of the urban poor</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>The promotion of human rights</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>The aims to fight corruption</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Attempt to democratise parties or build new</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>The promotion of pluralism and religious and ethnic reconciliation</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>The attempt to reform education</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>The promotion of professionalism in private and public sectors</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>The promotion of the freedom and quality of the media</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>The fostering of gender equality</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>The efforts to improve alternative local representation</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>The promotion of interest-based mass organisation</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Support for sustainable development</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>**Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Number of informants=193; ** Number of informants=19

Table 3. Age groups of informants in gender (Aceh survey 2006)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NO</th>
<th>GENDER</th>
<th>AGE GROUPS</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>&lt; 25</td>
<td>25-35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Female (N=35)</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Male (N=158)</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 4. Education of informants (Aceh survey 2006)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NO</th>
<th>LAST EDUCATION</th>
<th>FREQUENCY</th>
<th>PERCENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>High school or lower</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Bachelor</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Master</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Doctoral</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>193</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5. How the people understand politics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NO</th>
<th>UNDERSTANDING ON POLITICS</th>
<th>ACEH SURVEY (2006)* (%)</th>
<th>ACEH INFORMANTS IN ALL-INDONESIA SURVEY (2007)** (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Struggle for power</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Popular control of public affairs</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>The business of the public figures</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Game of the elites</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Others</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* N=193; ** N= 19

Table 6. How big is the interest of people towards politics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NO</th>
<th>PEOPLE’S INTEREST TOWARDS POLITICS</th>
<th>ACEH SURVEY (2006)* (%)</th>
<th>ACEH INFORMANTS IN ALL-INDONESIA SURVEY (2007)** (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Highly interested</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Interested</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Not interested</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>No answer</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* N=193; ** N= 19
### Table 7. How big is the interest of women towards politics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NO</th>
<th>WOMEN’S INTEREST TOWARDS POLITICS</th>
<th>ACEH SURVEY (2006)* (%)</th>
<th>ACEH INFORMANTS IN ALL-INDONESIA SURVEY (2007)** (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Highly interested</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Interested</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Not interested</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>No answer</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>**TOTAL</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* N=193; ** N= 19

### Table 8. Effort to encourage women participation in politics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NO</th>
<th>TO ENCOURAGE WOMEN PARTICIPATION IN POLITICS</th>
<th>ACEH SURVEY (2006)* (%)</th>
<th>ACEH INFORMANTS IN ALL-INDONESIA SURVEY (2007)** (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Fight for women quota in legislative and executive</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Increase women’s political awareness and capacity</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Support women to gain position in political offices</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Expand the political agenda so that it includes more issues</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Others</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>No answer</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* N=193; ** N= 19
### Table 9. Most appropriate channel to engage in political process

If one is interested in engaging in political process, which channel do you think is most appropriate to be used?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NO</th>
<th>MOST APPROPRIATE CHANNEL TO ENGAGE IN POLITICAL PROCESSES</th>
<th>ACEH SURVEY (2006)* (%)</th>
<th>ACEH INFORMANTS IN ALL-INDONESIA SURVEY (2007)** (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Join a national political party</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Join a local political party</td>
<td>29</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Establish a new local political party</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Congregate non-political party block</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Others</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>No answer</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* N=193; ** N= 19

### Table 10. Method to improve political participation

Which method is effective in building the people’s political capacity and knowledge in your area to improve political participation?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NO</th>
<th>METHOD TO IMPROVE POLITICAL PARTICIPATION</th>
<th>ACEH SURVEY (2006)* (%)</th>
<th>ACEH INFORMANTS IN ALL-INDONESIA SURVEY (2007)** (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Increasing the people’s political awareness</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Political cadre education</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Campaign and public speech</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Mass mobilization</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Mass organization and mobilization</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Others</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* N=193; ** N= 19
Table 11. How people in the area at first hand identify themselves in regional election

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NO</th>
<th>IDENTITY IN REGIONAL ELECTION</th>
<th>ACEH SURVEY (2006)* (%)</th>
<th>ACEH INFORMANTS IN ALL-INDONESIA SURVEY (2007)** (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>As residents of a District/Municipality/Province</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>As residents of a village/hometown</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>As members of an ethnic community</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>As members of a religious community</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>As Acehnese or non-Acehnese</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>As members/supporters of a certain political party</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>As members of a social class (e.g. working class, farmers)</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Others</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>No answer</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* N=193; ** N= 19
Table 12. How people in the area at first hand identify themselves in regional election: Comparison between Irwandi won and lost (Aceh survey 2006)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NO</th>
<th>IDENTITY IN REGIONAL ELECTION</th>
<th>INFORMANTS IN DISTRICTS WHERE IRNA WON PROVINCIAL ELECTION</th>
<th>INFORMANTS IN DISTRICTS WHERE IRNA LOST PROVINCIAL ELECTION</th>
<th>KPA/SIRA CANDIDATES WON REGENCY ELECTION</th>
<th>PARTY’S CANDIDATES WON REGENCY ELECTION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>As residents of a District/ Municipality/ Province</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>As residents of a village/ hometown</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>As members of an ethnic community</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>As members of a religious community</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>As Acehnese or non-Acehnese</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>As members/ supporters of a certain political party</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>As members of a social class (e.g. working class, farmers)</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Others</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>No answer</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 13. How people in the area at first hand identify themselves in general elections of legislative on 2004

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NO</th>
<th>IDENTITY IN GENERAL ELECTION 2004</th>
<th>ACEH SURVEY (2006)* (%)</th>
<th>ACEH INFORMANTS IN ALL-INDONESIA SURVEY (2007)** (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>As residents of a District/Municipality/Province</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>As residents of a village/hometown</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>As members of an ethnic community</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>As members of a religious community</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>As Acehnese or non-Acehnese</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>As members/supporters of a certain political party</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>As members of a social class (e.g. working class, farmers)</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Others</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>As a resident of Indonesia in general</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>No answer</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* N=193; ** N= 19
Table 14. How people in the area at first hand identify themselves in general elections of legislative on 2004: Comparison between Irwandi won and lost (Aceh survey 2006)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NO</th>
<th>IDENTITY IN GENERAL ELECTION 2004</th>
<th>INFORMANTS IN DISTRICTS WHERE...</th>
<th>INFORMANTS IN DISTRICTS WHERE...</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>IRNA WON PROVINCIAL ELECTION</td>
<td>IRNA LOST PROVINCIAL ELECTION</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>As residents of a District/Municipality/Province</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>As residents of a village/hometown</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>As members of an ethnic community</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>As members of a religious community</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>As Acehnese or non-Acehnese</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>As members/supporters of a certain political party</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>As members of a social class (e.g. working class, farmers)</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Others</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>No answer</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 15. How people in the area at first hand identify themselves in responding to local conflicts

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NO</th>
<th>IDENTITY IN RESPONDING TO LOCAL CONFLICTS</th>
<th>ACEH SURVEY (2006)* (%)</th>
<th>ACEH INFORMANTS IN ALL-INDONESIA SURVEY (2007)** (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>As residents of a District/Municipality/Province</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>As residents of a village/hometown</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>As members of an ethnic community</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>As members of a religious community</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>As Acehnese or non-Acehnese</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>As members/supporters of a certain political group</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>As members of a social class (e.g. working class, farmers)</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Others</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>No answer</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* N=193; ** N= 19
Table 16. How people in the area at first hand identify themselves in responding to issues of regional division

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NO</th>
<th>IDENTITY IN RESPONDING TO ISSUES OF DIVISION OF PROVINCES OR REGENCIES</th>
<th>ACEH SURVEY (2006)* (%)</th>
<th>ACEH INFORMANTS IN ALL-INDONESIA SURVEY (2007)** (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>As residents of a District/Municipality/Province</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>As residents of a village/hometown</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>As members of an ethnic community</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>As members of a religious community</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Others</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>No answer</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* N=193; ** N= 19
Table 17. Main actors

Based on your knowledge and experience, which individual or collective actors in the area have currently OR may potentially get most important influence in the local political process? (Hence, please consider both the currently most important actors and those that may become quite important, such as a certain popular organization.)

**Note:** Please specify at least three to maximum ten names including the details.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NO</th>
<th>MAIN ACTOR</th>
<th>ACEH SURVEY (2006) (%)</th>
<th>ACEH INFORMANTS IN ALL-INDONESIA SURVEY (2007) (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>POWERFUL ACTORS</td>
<td>ALTERNATIVE ACTORS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Government/ Bureaucracy (civil and military)</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>NGO activist</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Political party and legislative</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Religious and customary leader</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Academian, Lawyer, Mass media</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Mass organization</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Businessman</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Union, farmers, fisherman</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Informal leader</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Underworld and militia</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 18. Main actors in districts where IRNA won and lost election

Based on your knowledge and experience, which individual or collective actors in the area have currently OR may potentially get most important influence in the local political process? (Hence, please consider both the currently most important actors and those that may become quite important, such as a certain popular organization.)

Note: Please specify at least three to maximum ten names including the details.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NO</th>
<th>MAIN ACTOR</th>
<th>INFORMANTS IN DISTRICTS WHERE IRNA WON PROVINCIAL ELECTION</th>
<th>IRNA LOST PROVINCIAL ELECTION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Government/Bureaucracy (civil and military)</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>NGO activist</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Political party and legislative</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Religious and customary leader</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Academician, Lawyer, Mass media</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Mass organization</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Businessman</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Union, farmers, fisherman</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Informal leader</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 19. How main actors relate to democracy

How do the main actors make use the various rules and regulations, formal as well as non-formal, applied in the area?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NO</th>
<th>MAIN ACTORS’ RELATION TO DEMOCRACY</th>
<th>ACEH SURVEY (2006) (%)</th>
<th>ACEH INFORMANTS IN ALL-INDONESIA SURVEY (2007) (%)</th>
<th>POWERFUL ACTORS</th>
<th>ALTERNATIVE ACTORS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Use and promote</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>50</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Use</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>27</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Abuse</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Avoid</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>No answer</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>RIGHTS AND INSTITUTIONS</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Do the formal rules and regulations exist?</td>
<td>Do the existing formal rules and regulations applied in the area generally tend to hamper or support (rights and institutions)?</td>
<td>Do the existing formal rules and regulations concerning (rights and institutions) apply effectively throughout the region?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----</td>
<td>-------------------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Equal state-citizenship</td>
<td>No exist</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>37 Tend to hamper</td>
<td>99 Yes, broadly applied</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Exist</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>47 Tend to support</td>
<td>49 No, limited</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>No answer</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>16 None or doesn’t exist</td>
<td>19 Nothing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>100 No answer</td>
<td>0 No answer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100 No answer</td>
<td>100 No answer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>The rights of minorities, migrants and refugees</td>
<td>No exist</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>27 Tend to hamper</td>
<td>36 Yes, broadly applied</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Exist</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>51 Tend to support</td>
<td>52 No, limited</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>No answer</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>19 None or doesn’t exist</td>
<td>19 Nothing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>100 No answer</td>
<td>100 No answer</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Legend:
- **Aceh survey 2006 (%)**: Percentage of respondents in the Aceh survey who answered the question.
- **Aceh informants in all-Indonesia survey 2007 (%)**: Percentage of respondents in the Aceh informants in all-Indonesia survey who answered the question.

Note: The table above shows the situation of the formal rules and regulations concerning specific rights and institutions in Aceh and the all-Indonesia survey.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NO</th>
<th>RIGHTS AND INSTITUTIONS</th>
<th><strong>Do the formal rules and regulations exist?</strong></th>
<th><strong>Do the existing formal rules and regulations applied in the area generally tend to hamper or support (rights and institutions)?</strong></th>
<th><strong>Do the existing formal rules and regulations concerning (rights and institutions) apply effectively throughout the region?</strong></th>
<th><strong>Do the existing formal rules and regulations concerning (rights and institutions) really address all aspects that you deem to be public life?</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Aceh survey 2006 (%)</td>
<td>Aceh informants in all-Indonesia survey 2007 (%)</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Aceh survey 2006 (%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>No exist</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>Tend to hamper</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Exist</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>Tend to support</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>No answer</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>None or doesn’t exist</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>No answer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NO</th>
<th>RIGHTS AND INSTITUTIONS</th>
<th><strong>The victim rights (re. conflict and disasters)</strong></th>
<th><strong>Reconciliation of horizontal conflicts</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>No exist</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Exist</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>No answer</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NO</td>
<td>RIGHTS AND INSTITUTIONS</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Aceh survey 2006 (%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----</td>
<td>------------------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>---------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Reintegration</td>
<td>No exist</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Exist</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>No answer</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>International law and UN human rights treaties</td>
<td>No exist</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Exist</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>No answer</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>Rights and Institutions</td>
<td>Do the formal rules and regulations exist?</td>
<td>Do the existing formal rules and regulations applied in the area generally tend to hamper or support (rights and institutions)?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----</td>
<td>--------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Aceh survey 2006 (%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Subordination of the government and public officials to the rule of law</td>
<td>No exist</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Exist</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No answer</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>The equal and secure access to justice</td>
<td>No exist</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Exist</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No answer</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NO</td>
<td>RIGHTS AND INSTITUTIONS</td>
<td>Do the formal rules and regulations exist?</td>
<td>Do the existing formal rules and regulations applied in the area generally tend to hamper or support (rights and institutions)?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----</td>
<td>------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Aceh survey 2006 (%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>The integrity and independence of the judiciary</td>
<td>No exist</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Exist</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No answer</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Freedom from physical violence and the fear of it</td>
<td>No exist</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Exist</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No answer</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>Rights and Institutions</td>
<td>Do the formal rules and regulations exist?</td>
<td>Do the existing formal rules and regulations applied in the area generally tend to hamper or support (rights and institutions)?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----</td>
<td>-------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Aceh survey 2006 (%)</td>
<td>Aceh informants in all-Indonesia survey 2007 (%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Freedom of speech, assembly and organization</td>
<td>No exist</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Exist</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No answer</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Freedom to carry out trade union activity</td>
<td>No exist</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Exist</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No answer</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>Rights and Institutions</td>
<td>Do the formal rules and regulations exist?</td>
<td>Do the existing formal rules and regulations applied in the area generally tend to hamper or support (rights and institutions)?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----</td>
<td>--------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Description (Aceh 2006 %)</td>
<td>Description (Aceh informants in all-Indonesia survey 2007 %)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Freedom of religion and belief</td>
<td>No exist</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Exist</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No answer</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Freedom of language and culture</td>
<td>No exist</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Exist</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No answer</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NO</td>
<td>RIGHTS AND INSTITUTIONS</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Aceh survey 2006 (%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----</td>
<td>------------------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>-------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Gender equality and emancipation</td>
<td>No exist</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Exist</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No answer</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>The rights of children</td>
<td>No exist</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Exist</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No answer</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NO</td>
<td>RIGHTS AND INSTITUTIONS</td>
<td>Do the formal rules and regulations exist?</td>
<td>Do the existing formal rules and regulations applied in the area generally tend to hamper or support (rights and institutions)?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----</td>
<td>-------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Aceh survey 2006 (%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>The right to employment, social security and other basic needs</td>
<td>No exist</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Exist</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No answer</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>The right to basic education, including citizen’s rights and duties</td>
<td>No exist</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Exist</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No answer</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NO</td>
<td>RIGHTS AND INSTITUTIONS</td>
<td>Do the formal rules and regulations exist?</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----</td>
<td>------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Good corporate governance</td>
<td>No exist</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Exist</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No answer</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Free and fair general elections at central, regional and local level</td>
<td>No exist</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Exist</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No answer</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>Rights and Institutions</td>
<td>Do the formal rules and regulations exist?</td>
<td>Do the existing formal rules and regulations applied in the area generally tend to hamper or support (rights and institutions)?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----</td>
<td>-------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Aceh survey 2006 (%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Free and fair separate elections of e.g. governors, mayors and village heads</td>
<td>No exist</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Exist</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No answer</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Freedom to form parties, recruit members, and campaign for office</td>
<td>No exist</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Exist</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No answer</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NO</td>
<td>RIGHTS AND INSTITUTIONS</td>
<td>Do the formal rules and regulations exist?</td>
<td>Do the existing formal rules and regulations applied in the area generally tend to hamper or support (rights and institutions)?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----</td>
<td>-------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Aceh survey 2006 (%)</td>
<td>Aceh informants in all-Indonesia survey 2007 (%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>Reflection of vital issues and interests among people by political parties</td>
<td>No exist  n/a 32</td>
<td>Tend to hamper 27 11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Exist  n/a 47</td>
<td>Tend to support 42 37</td>
<td>No, limited 47 26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No answer n/a 21</td>
<td>None or doesn’t exist 28 -</td>
<td>Nothing 1 -</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total n/a 100</td>
<td>No answer 3 53</td>
<td>No answer 13 53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total 100 100</td>
<td>Total 100 100</td>
<td>Total 100 100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>Abstention from abusing religious or ethnic sentiments, symbols and doctrines by political parties</td>
<td>No exist  n/a 26</td>
<td>Tend to hamper 22 11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Exist  n/a 63</td>
<td>Tend to support 49 53</td>
<td>No, limited 45 32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No answer n/a 11</td>
<td>None or doesn’t exist 25 -</td>
<td>Nothing 1 -</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total n/a 100</td>
<td>No answer 3 37</td>
<td>No answer 14 37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total 100 100</td>
<td>Total 100 100</td>
<td>Total 100 100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NO</td>
<td>RIGHTS AND INSTITUTIONS</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Aceh survey 2006 (%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----</td>
<td>------------------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>----------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Independence of money politics and powerful vested interests by political parties</td>
<td>No exist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Exist</td>
<td>n/a 47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>No answer</td>
<td>n/a 11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>n/a 100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100 100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Membership-based control of parties, and responsiveness and accountability of parties to their constituencies</td>
<td>No exist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Exist</td>
<td>n/a 58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>No answer</td>
<td>n/a 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>n/a 100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100 100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NO</td>
<td>RIGHTS AND INSTITUTIONS</td>
<td>Do the formal rules and regulations exist?</td>
<td>Do the existing formal rules and regulations applied in the area generally tend to hamper or support (rights and institutions)?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----</td>
<td>-------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Aceh survey 2006 (%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>Parties ability to form and run government</td>
<td>No exist</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Exist</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>No answer</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>Transparency and accountability of elected government, at all levels</td>
<td>No exist</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Exist</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>No answer</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Aceh survey 2006 (%)</td>
<td>Aceh informants in all-Indonesia survey 2007 (%)</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transparency and accountability of the executive/public civil servants (bureaucracies), at all levels</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Do the formal rules and regulations exist?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No exist</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>Tend to hamper</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exist</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>Tend to support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No answer</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>None or doesn’t exist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>No answer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic decentralisation of government on the basis of the subsidiarity principle</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Do the formal rules and regulations exist?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No exist</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>Tend to hamper</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exist</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>Tend to support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No answer</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>None or doesn’t exist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>No answer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NO</td>
<td>RIGHTS AND INSTITUTIONS</td>
<td>Do the formal rules and regulations exist?</td>
<td>Do the existing formal rules and regulations applied in the area generally tend to hamper or support (rights and institutions)?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----</td>
<td>-------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>Transparency and accountability of the military and police to elected government and the public</td>
<td>No exist n/a 58</td>
<td>Tend to hamper 34 11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Exist n/a 32</td>
<td>Tend to support 35 21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>No answer n/a 11</td>
<td>None or doesn’t exist 27 -</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Total n/a 100</td>
<td>No answer 4 68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Total 100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>Capacity of the government to combat paramilitary groups, hoodlums and organised crime</td>
<td>No exist n/a 47</td>
<td>Tend to hamper 24 11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Exist n/a 42</td>
<td>Tend to support 40 32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>No answer n/a 11</td>
<td>None or doesn’t exist 33 -</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Total n/a 100</td>
<td>No answer 3 58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Total 100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NO</td>
<td>RIGHTS AND INSTITUTIONS</td>
<td>Do the formal rules and regulations exist?</td>
<td>Do the existing formal rules and regulations applied in the area generally tend to hamper or support (rights and institutions)?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----</td>
<td>-------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Aceh survey 2006 (%)</td>
<td>Aceh informants in all-Indonesia survey 2007 (%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>Government independence from foreign intervention</td>
<td>No exist</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Exist</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No answer</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td>The government’s independence from strong interest groups and capacity to eliminate corruption and abuse of power</td>
<td>No exist</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Exist</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No answer</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NO</td>
<td>RIGHTS AND INSTITUTIONS</td>
<td>Do the formal rules and regulations exist?</td>
<td>Do the existing formal rules and regulations applied in the area generally tend to hamper or support (rights and institutions)?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Aceh survey 2006 (%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>Freedom of the press, art and academic world</td>
<td>No exist</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Exist</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>No answer</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36</td>
<td>Public access to and the reflection of different views within media, art and the academic world</td>
<td>No exist</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Exist</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>No answer</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NO</td>
<td>RIGHTS AND INSTITUTIONS</td>
<td><strong>Do the formal rules and regulations exist?</strong></td>
<td><strong>Do the existing formal rules and regulations applied in the area generally tend to hamper or support (rights and institutions)?</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----</td>
<td>------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Description</strong></td>
<td><strong>Aceh survey 2006 (％)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37</td>
<td>Citizens’ participation in extensive independent civic associations</td>
<td>No exist</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Exist</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No answer</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38</td>
<td>Transparency, accountability and democracy within civic organisations</td>
<td>No exist</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Exist</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No answer</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NO</td>
<td>RIGHTS AND INSTITUTIONS</td>
<td>Do the formal rules and regulations exist?</td>
<td>Do the existing formal rules and regulations applied in the area generally tend to hamper or support (rights and institutions)?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----</td>
<td>------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Aceh survey 2006 (%)</td>
<td>Aceh informants in all-Indonesia survey 2007 (%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39</td>
<td>All social groups’ – including women’s – extensive access to and participation in public life</td>
<td>No exist n/a</td>
<td>32 Tend to hamper 27 16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Exist n/a</td>
<td>47 Tend to support 50 26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>No answer n/a</td>
<td>21 None or doesn’t exist 19 -</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Total n/a</td>
<td>100 No answer 4 58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Total 100</td>
<td>100 Total 100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40</td>
<td>People’s direct access and contact with the public services and political representatives</td>
<td>No exist n/a</td>
<td>42 Tend to hamper 36 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Exist n/a</td>
<td>47 Tend to support 30 42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>No answer n/a</td>
<td>11 None or doesn’t exist 31 -</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Total n/a</td>
<td>100 No answer 3 53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Total 100</td>
<td>100 Total 100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NO</td>
<td>RIGHTS AND INSTITUTIONS</td>
<td>Do the formal rules and regulations exist?</td>
<td>Do the existing formal rules and regulations applied in the area generally tend to hamper or support (rights and institutions)?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----</td>
<td>-------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Description Aceh survey 2006 (%)</td>
<td>Description Aceh informants in all-Indonesia survey 2007 (%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41</td>
<td>The government's consultation of people and when possible facilitation of direct participation in policy making and the execution of</td>
<td>No exist n/a n/a</td>
<td>Tend to hamper 39 n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>rights and institutions</td>
<td>Exist n/a n/a</td>
<td>Tend to support 28 n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>No answer n/a n/a</td>
<td>None or doesn’t exist 30 n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Total n/a n/a</td>
<td>No answer 3 n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Total 100 n/a</td>
<td>Total 100 n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42</td>
<td>ALL RIGHTS AND INSTRUMENTS</td>
<td>No exist n/a 38</td>
<td>Tend to hamper 29 9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Exist n/a 50</td>
<td>Tend to support 48 41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>No answer n/a 12</td>
<td>None or doesn’t exist 20 -</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Total n/a 100</td>
<td>No answer 3 50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Total 100 100</td>
<td>Total 100 100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NO</td>
<td>RIGHTS AND INSTITUTIONS</td>
<td>Do the informal arrangements applied in the area generally tend to hamper or support (rights and institutions)?</td>
<td>Do the informal arrangements concerning (rights and institutions) apply effectively throughout the region?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----</td>
<td>-------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Aceh survey 2006 (%)</td>
<td>Aceh informants in all-Indonesia survey 2007 (%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Equal state-citizenship</td>
<td>Tend to hamper 24</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tend to support</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>None or doesn’t exist</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No answer</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>The rights of minorities, migrants and refugees</td>
<td>Tend to hamper 21</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tend to support</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>None or doesn’t exist</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No answer</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NO</td>
<td>RIGHTS AND INSTITUTIONS</td>
<td>Do the informal arrangements applied in the area generally tend to hamper or support (rights and institutions)?</td>
<td>Do the informal arrangements concerning (rights and institutions) apply effectively throughout the region?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----</td>
<td>-------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Aceh survey 2006 (%)</td>
<td>Aceh informants in all-Indonesia survey 2007 (%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>The victim rights (re. conflict and disasters)</td>
<td>Tend to hamper</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tend to support</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>None or doesn’t exist</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No answer</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Reconciliation of horizontal conflicts</td>
<td>Tend to hamper</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tend to support</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>None or doesn’t exist</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No answer</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Reintegration</td>
<td>Tend to hamper</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tend to support</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>None or doesn’t exist</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No answer</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NO</td>
<td>RIGHTS AND INSTITUTIONS</td>
<td>Do the informal arrangements applied in the area generally tend to hamper or support (rights and institutions)?</td>
<td>Do the informal arrangements concerning (rights and institutions) apply effectively throughout the region?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----</td>
<td>-------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Aceh survey 2006 (%)</td>
<td>Aceh informants in all-Indonesia survey 2007 (%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>International law and UN human rights treaties</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Subordination of the government and public officials to the rule of law</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>The equal and secure access to justice</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NO</td>
<td>RIGHTS AND INSTITUTIONS</td>
<td>Do the informal arrangements applied in the area generally tend to hamper or support (rights and institutions)?</td>
<td>Do the informal arrangements concerning (rights and institutions) apply effectively throughout the region?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----</td>
<td>------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Aceh survey 2006 (%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>The integrity and independence of the judiciary</td>
<td>Tend to hamper</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Tend to support</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>None or doesn’t exist</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>No answer</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Freedom from physical violence and the fear of it</td>
<td>Tend to hamper</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Tend to support</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>None or doesn’t exist</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>No answer</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Freedom of speech, assembly and organization</td>
<td>Tend to hamper</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Tend to support</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>None or doesn’t exist</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>No answer</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>Rights and Institutions</td>
<td>Do the informal arrangements applied in the area generally tend to hamper or support (rights and institutions)?</td>
<td>Do the informal arrangements concerning (rights and institutions) apply effectively throughout the region?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----</td>
<td>--------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Aceh survey 2006 (%)</td>
<td>Aceh informants in all-Indonesia survey 2007 (%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Freedom to carry out trade union activity</td>
<td>Tend to hamper 11 26 Yes, broadly applied 45 47 Yes, regulate all aspects 37 37</td>
<td>Tend to support 59 63 No, limited 33 37 No, limited 40 47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>No answer 9 11 No answer 23 16 No answer 23 16</td>
<td>Total 100 100 Total 100 100 Total 100 100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Freedom of religion and belief</td>
<td>Tend to hamper 11 47 Yes, broadly applied 63 47 Yes, regulate all aspects 53 32</td>
<td>Tend to support 74 42 No, limited 17 42 No, limited 23 58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>No answer 9 11 No answer 20 11 No answer 24 11</td>
<td>Total 100 100 Total 100 100 Total 100 100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Freedom of language and culture</td>
<td>Tend to hamper 11 n/a Yes, broadly applied 55 n/a Yes, regulate all aspects 44 n/a</td>
<td>Tend to support 70 n/a No, limited 23 n/a No, limited 33 n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>No answer 8 n/a No answer 22 n/a No answer 23 n/a</td>
<td>Total 100 n/a Total 100 n/a Total 100 n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NO</td>
<td>RIGHTS AND INSTITUTIONS</td>
<td>Do the informal arrangements applied in the area generally tend to hamper or support (rights and institutions)?</td>
<td>Do the informal arrangements concerning (rights and institutions) apply effectively throughout the region?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----</td>
<td>------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Aceh survey 2006 (%)</td>
<td>Aceh informants in all-Indonesia survey 2007 (%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Gender equality and emancipation</td>
<td>Tend to hamper 21</td>
<td>Yes, broadly applied 34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Tend to support 45</td>
<td>No, limited 42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>None or doesn’t exist 25</td>
<td>Nothing 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>No answer 9</td>
<td>No answer 24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Total 100</td>
<td>Total 100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>The rights of children</td>
<td>Tend to hamper 15</td>
<td>Yes, broadly applied 44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Tend to support 57</td>
<td>No, limited 34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>None or doesn’t exist 20</td>
<td>Nothing 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>No answer 8</td>
<td>No answer 22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Total 100</td>
<td>Total 100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>The right to employment, social security and other basic needs</td>
<td>Tend to hamper 19</td>
<td>Yes, broadly applied 39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Tend to support 48</td>
<td>No, limited 39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>None or doesn’t exist 25</td>
<td>Nothing 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>No answer 8</td>
<td>No answer 22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Total 100</td>
<td>Total 100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NO</td>
<td>RIGHTS AND INSTITUTIONS</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Aceh survey 2006 (%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>The right to basic education, including citizen’s rights and duties</td>
<td>Tend to hamper</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Tend to support</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>None or doesn’t exist</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>No answer</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Good corporate governance</td>
<td>Tend to hamper</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Tend to support</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>None or doesn’t exist</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>No answer</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Free and fair general elections at central, regional and local level</td>
<td>Tend to hamper</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Tend to support</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>None or doesn’t exist</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>No answer</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NO</td>
<td>RIGHTS AND INSTITUTIONS</td>
<td>Do the informal arrangements applied in the area generally tend to hamper or support (rights and institutions)?</td>
<td>Do the informal arrangements concerning (rights and institutions) apply effectively throughout the region?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----</td>
<td>-------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Aceh survey 2006 (%)</td>
<td>Aceh informants in all-Indonesia survey 2007 (%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Free and fair separate elections of e.g. governors, mayors and village heads</td>
<td>Tend to hamper 15 n/a</td>
<td>Yes, broadly applied 49 n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Tend to support 61 n/a</td>
<td>No, limited 31 n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>None or doesn't exist 16 n/a</td>
<td>Nothing 0 n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>No answer 9 n/a</td>
<td>No answer 20 n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Total 100 n/a</td>
<td>Total 100 n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Freedom to form parties, recruit members, and campaign for office</td>
<td>Tend to hamper 18 21</td>
<td>Yes, broadly applied 46 53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Tend to support 51 68</td>
<td>No, limited 31 37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>None or doesn't exist 22 -</td>
<td>Nothing 0 -</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>No answer 9 11</td>
<td>No answer 23 11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Total 100 100</td>
<td>Total 100 100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>Reflection of vital issues and interests among people by political parties</td>
<td>Tend to hamper 20 42</td>
<td>Yes, broadly applied 31 32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Tend to support 40 42</td>
<td>No, limited 48 53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>None or doesn't exist 34 -</td>
<td>Nothing 0 -</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>No answer 6 16</td>
<td>No answer 22 16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Total 100 100</td>
<td>Total 100 100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NO</td>
<td>RIGHTS AND INSTITUTIONS</td>
<td>Do the informal arrangements applied in the area generally tend to hamper or support (rights and institutions)?</td>
<td>Do the informal arrangements concerning (rights and institutions) apply effectively throughout the region?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----</td>
<td>------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Aceh informants in all-Indonesia survey 2007 (%)</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Aceh survey 2006 (%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>Abstention from</td>
<td>Tend to hamper</td>
<td>Yes, broadly applied</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>abusing religious or</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ethnic sentiments,</td>
<td>Tend to support</td>
<td>No, limited</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>symbols and doctrines</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>by political parties</td>
<td>None or doesn't exist</td>
<td>Nothing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>31</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Tend to hamper</td>
<td>Yes, broadly applied</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>26</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>No answer</td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>Independence of</td>
<td>Tend to hamper</td>
<td>Yes, broadly applied</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>money politics and</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>powerful vested</td>
<td>Tend to support</td>
<td>No, limited</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>interests by political</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>parties</td>
<td>None or doesn't exist</td>
<td>Nothing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>31</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>No answer</td>
<td>No answer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>7</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>Membership-based</td>
<td>Tend to hamper</td>
<td>Yes, broadly applied</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>control of parties,</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>and responsiveness</td>
<td>Tend to support</td>
<td>No, limited</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>and accountability</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>of parties to their</td>
<td>None or doesn't exist</td>
<td>Nothing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>constituencies</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Tend to hamper</td>
<td>Yes, broadly applied</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>21</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Tend to support</td>
<td>No, limited</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>68</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>None or doesn't exist</td>
<td>Nothing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>11</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Tend to hamper</td>
<td>Yes, broadly applied</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>11</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>No answer</td>
<td>No answer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NO</td>
<td>RIGHTS AND INSTITUTIONS</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Aceh survey 2006 (%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>Parties ability to form and run government</td>
<td>Tend to hamper</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Tend to support</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>None or doesn’t exist</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>No answer</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>Transparency and accountability of elected government, at all levels</td>
<td>Tend to hamper</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Tend to support</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>None or doesn’t exist</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>No answer</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>Transparency and accountability of the executive/public civil servants (bureaucracies), at all levels</td>
<td>Tend to hamper</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Tend to support</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>None or doesn’t exist</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>No answer</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NO</td>
<td>RIGHTS AND INSTITUTIONS</td>
<td>Do the informal arrangements applied in the area generally tend to hamper or support (rights and institutions)?</td>
<td>Do the informal arrangements concerning (rights and institutions) apply effectively throughout the region?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----</td>
<td>-------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Aceh survey 2006 (%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>Democratic decentralisation of government on the basis of the subsidiarity principle</td>
<td>Tend to hamper</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Tend to support</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>None or doesn’t exist</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>No answer</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>Transparency and accountability of the military and police to elected government and the public</td>
<td>Tend to hamper</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Tend to support</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>None or doesn’t exist</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>No answer</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>Capacity of the government to combat paramilitary groups, hoodlums and organised crime</td>
<td>Tend to hamper</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Tend to support</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>None or doesn’t exist</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>No answer</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>Rights and Institutions</td>
<td>Do the informal arrangements applied in the area generally tend to hamper or support (rights and institutions)?</td>
<td>Do the informal arrangements concerning (rights and institutions) apply effectively throughout the region?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Aceh survey 2006 (%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>Government independence from foreign intervention</td>
<td>Tend to hamper</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Tend to support</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>None or doesn't exist</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>No answer</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td>The government’s independence from strong interest groups and capacity to eliminate corruption and abuse of power</td>
<td>Tend to hamper</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Tend to support</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>None or doesn't exist</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>No answer</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>Freedom of the press, art and academic world</td>
<td>Tend to hamper</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Tend to support</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>None or doesn't exist</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>No answer</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NO</td>
<td>RIGHTS AND INSTITUTIONS</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Aceh survey 2006 (%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>----------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36</td>
<td>Public access to and the reflection of different views within media, art and the academic world</td>
<td>Tend to hamper</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tend to support</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>None or doesn’t exist</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No answer</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37</td>
<td>Citizens' participation in extensive independent civic associations</td>
<td>Tend to hamper</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tend to support</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>None or doesn’t exist</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No answer</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38</td>
<td>Transparency, accountability and democracy within civic organisations</td>
<td>Tend to hamper</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tend to support</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>None or doesn’t exist</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No answer</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>Rights and Institutions</td>
<td>Do the informal arrangements applied in the area generally tend to hamper or support (rights and institutions)?</td>
<td>Do the informal arrangements concerning (rights and institutions) apply effectively throughout the region?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Aceh survey 2006 (%)</td>
<td>Aceh informants in all-Indonesia survey 2007 (%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39</td>
<td>All social groups’ – including women’s – extensive access to and participation in public life</td>
<td>Tend to hamper</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tend to support</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>None or doesn’t exist</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No answer</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40</td>
<td>People’s direct access and contact with the public services and political representatives</td>
<td>Tend to hamper</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tend to support</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>None or doesn’t exist</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No answer</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41</td>
<td>The government’s consultation of people and when possible facilitation of direct participation in policy making and the execution of</td>
<td>Tend to hamper</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tend to support</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>None or doesn’t exist</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No answer</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NO</td>
<td>RIGHTS AND INSTITUTIONS</td>
<td>Do the informal arrangements applied in the area generally tend to hamper or support (rights and institutions)?</td>
<td>Do the informal arrangements concerning (rights and institutions) apply effectively throughout the region?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----</td>
<td>-------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Aceh survey 2006 (%)</td>
<td>Aceh informants in all-Indonesia survey 2007 (%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42</td>
<td>ALL RIGHTS AND INSTITUTIONS</td>
<td>Tend to hamper</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tend to support</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>None or doesn’t exist</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No answer</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table 22. Political terrain

*In the following spheres of the political landscape, in which sphere the main actors possess the positions and influence that are strong and big at the same time?*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NO</th>
<th>POLITICAL TERRAIN</th>
<th>ACEH SURVEY (2006)* (%)</th>
<th>ACEH INFORMANTS IN ALL-INDONESIA SURVEY (2007)** (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>POWERFUL ACTORS</td>
<td>ALTERNATIVE ACTORS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Business and industries</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Small businesses</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Self-managed units</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Lobby groups</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Interest organizations</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Political parties</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Local elected government</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>The bureaucracy</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>The judiciary</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>The military</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 23. Sources of power

*In your assessment, what sources of power do the main actors possess?*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NO</th>
<th>SOURCES OF POWER</th>
<th>ACEH SURVEY (2006)* (%)</th>
<th>ACEH INFORMANTS IN ALL-INDONESIA SURVEY (2007)** (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>POWERFUL ACTORS</td>
<td>ALTERNATIVE ACTORS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Economic resources</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Mass power/ Political/Military coercion</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Social strength and favourable contacts</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Knowledge and information</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 24. Transformation of power

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NO</th>
<th>POLITICAL TERRAIN</th>
<th>ACEH SURVEY (2006)* (%)</th>
<th>ACEH INFORMANTS IN ALL-INDONESIA SURVEY (2007)** (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>POWERFUL ACTORS</td>
<td>ALTERNATIVE ACTORS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Discursive activities</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Contacts and dialogue with politicians and administrators</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Building networks and co-ord for joint activity</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Contacts and partnership with influential figures and experts</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Demonstrate collective and mass-based strength</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Economic self-sufficiency and co-operatives</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Gaining formal legitimacy</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Forceful official authority, coercion/power</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>State budget, pro-market policies</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Patronage</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Organising community base</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Popular mandate or getting elected</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 25. Type of issues

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NO</th>
<th>TYPE OF ISSUES</th>
<th>ACEH SURVEY (2006) (%)</th>
<th>ACEH INFORMANTS IN ALL-INDONESIA SURVEY (2007) (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>POWERFUL ACTORS</td>
<td>ALTERNATIVE ACTORS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Specific issues or interests</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Combination of several issues/interests</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>General concepts or ideas</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table 26. How actors mobilize support

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NO</th>
<th>HOW TO MOBILIZE POPULAR SUPPORT</th>
<th>ACEH SURVEY (2006) (%)</th>
<th>ACEH INFORMANTS IN ALL-INDONESIA SURVEY (2007) (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>POWERFUL ACTORS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Popular and charismatic leaders</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Clientelism</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Alternative patronage</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Networks</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Integration popular organisations</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 27. How actors mobilize support in districts where IRNA won/lost election and KPA-SIRA won/lost election (Aceh survey 2006)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NO</th>
<th>HOW TO MOBILIZE POPULAR SUPPORT</th>
<th>PROVINCIAL ELECTION</th>
<th>REGENCY ELECTIONS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>IRNA won</td>
<td>IRNA lost</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Popular and charismatic leaders</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Clientelism</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Alternative patronage</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Networks</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Integration popular organisations</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TOTAL RESPONSES</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 28. Social bases of main actors’ supporter groups (Aceh survey 2006)

Which societal groups become the supporter or are made to be the support base of the main actors?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NO</th>
<th>MAIN ACTORS</th>
<th>SUPPORTER GROUPS</th>
<th>TOTAL RESPONSES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>COMMUNITY GROUPS</td>
<td>ETHNIC GROUPS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Government/Bureaucracy (civil and military)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Informants in districts where IRNA won provincial election</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>IRNA lost provincial election</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Informants in districts where KPA/SIRA candidates won regency election</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Party’s candidates won regency election</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>NGO activist</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Informants in districts where IRNA won provincial election</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>IRNA lost provincial election</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Informants in districts where KPA/SIRA candidates won regency election</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Party’s candidates won regency election</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NO</td>
<td>MAIN ACTORS</td>
<td>SUPPORTER GROUPS</td>
<td>TOTAL RESPONSES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>COMMUNITY GROUPS</td>
<td>ETHNIC GROUPS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Political party and legislative</td>
<td>IRNA won provincial election</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Informants in districts where...</td>
<td>IRNA lost provincial election</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Informants in districts where...</td>
<td>KPA/SIRA candidates won regency election</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Informants in districts where...</td>
<td>Party’s candidates won regency election</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Religious and customary leader</td>
<td>IRNA won provincial election</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Informants in districts where...</td>
<td>IRNA lost provincial election</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Informants in districts where...</td>
<td>KPA/SIRA candidates won regency election</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Informants in districts where...</td>
<td>Party’s candidates won regency election</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NO</td>
<td>MAIN ACTORS</td>
<td>SUPPORTER GROUPS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----</td>
<td>-----------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>COMMUNITY GROUPS</td>
<td>ETHNIC GROUPS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Academician, Lawyer, Mass media</td>
<td>Informants in districts where... IRNA won provincial election</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>IRNA lost provincial election</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Informants in districts where... KPA/SIRA candidates won regency election</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Party’s candidates won regency election</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Mass organisation</td>
<td>Informants in districts where... IRNA won provincial election</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>IRNA lost provincial election</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Informants in districts where... KPA/SIRA candidates won regency election</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Party’s candidates won regency election</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NO</td>
<td>MAIN ACTORS</td>
<td>SUPPORTER GROUPS</td>
<td>TOTAL RESPONSES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>COMMUNITY GROUPS</td>
<td>ETHNIC GROUPS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Businessman</td>
<td>IRNA won</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>provincial election</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>IRNA lost</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>provincial election</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>KPA/SIRA candidates won</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>regency election</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Party's candidates won</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>regency election</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Union,</td>
<td>IRNA won</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>farmers,</td>
<td>provincial election</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>fisherman</td>
<td>IRNA lost</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>provincial election</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>KPA/SIRA candidates won</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>candidates won regency election</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Party's candidates won regency election</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NO</td>
<td>MAIN ACTORS</td>
<td>SUPPORTER GROUPS</td>
<td>TOTAL RESPONSES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----</td>
<td>----------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Informal leader</td>
<td>Informants in districts where IRNA won provincial election</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>IRNA won provincial election</td>
<td>12 6 17 23 21 17 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>IRNA lost provincial election</td>
<td>23 21 10 10 21 10 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Informants in districts where KPA/SIRA candidates won regency election</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>KPA/SIRA candidates won regency election</td>
<td>10 3 13 22 25 21 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Party’s candidates won regency election</td>
<td>22 18 17 15 15 8 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>TOTAL (ALL MAIN ACTORS)</td>
<td>Informants in districts where IRNA won provincial election</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>IRNA won provincial election</td>
<td>17 6 15 24 16 17 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>IRNA lost provincial election</td>
<td>21 9 14 17 16 19 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Informants in districts where KPA/SIRA candidates won regency election</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>KPA/SIRA candidates won regency election</td>
<td>16 4 15 23 18 19 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Party’s candidates won regency election</td>
<td>21 10 14 20 14 17 3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 29. The actors’ strategies in the political system and related forms of representation (Aceh survey 2006)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NO</th>
<th>GOVERNANCE INSTITUTIONS</th>
<th>FREQUENCY</th>
<th>DIRECT</th>
<th>VIA INTERMEDIARY INSTITUTIONS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>DIRECT</td>
<td>NGOS</td>
<td>EXPERTS, INCL MEDIA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>The judiciary (incl the police)</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>The political executive - (the government)</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>The legislative</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>The bureaucracy and the military</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Institutions for self-management</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Institutions for private management</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 30. The powerful actors’ strategies in the political system and related forms of representation (Aceh informants in all-Indonesia survey 2007)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NO</th>
<th>GOVERNANCE INSTITUTIONS</th>
<th>FREQUENCY</th>
<th>VIA INTERMEDIARY INSTITUTIONS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>DIRECT</td>
<td>NGOS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>The judiciary (incl the police)</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>The political executive - (the</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>government)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>The legislative</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>The bureaucracy</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>The military</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Auxiliary bodies</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Institutions for self-management</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Institutions for private management</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 31. The alternative actors’ strategies in the political system and related forms of representation (Aceh informants in all-Indonesia survey 2007)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NO</th>
<th>GOVERNANCE INSTITUTIONS</th>
<th>FREQUENCY</th>
<th>DIRECT VIA INTERMEDIARY INSTITUTIONS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>NGOS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>The judiciary (incl the police)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>The political executive - (the government)</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>The legislative</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>The bureaucracy</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>The military</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Auxiliary bodies</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Institutions for self-management</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Institutions for private management</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 32. Where people address their complaints and demands regarding public affairs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NO</th>
<th>INSTITUTIONS</th>
<th>ACEH SURVEY (2006) (%)</th>
<th>ACEH INFORMANTS IN ALL-INDONESIA SURVEY (2007) (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Media</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Informal leaders</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Specific issue- and pressure/lobby groups</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>The law enforcement institutions</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Elected politicians in government on various levels</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Semi-government institutions</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>The bureaucrats in charge on various levels</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Political parties</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Interest-based popular organizations</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Introduction
Former Indonesian Vice President Jusuf Kalla, together with President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, has played an important and in many ways positive role in facilitating peace and development in Aceh. Yet there are reasons to look more thoroughly into some of the basic dynamics at work, because the outcome of Kalla’s peace making in other parts of the country, particularly in the Moluccas and Central Sulawesi, have been controversial.

By late 2001, Jusuf Kalla, (then Minister for Welfare), and Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, (then Minister for Politics and Security), fostered efforts to resolve the conflict in Poso, culminating in the Malino I Declaration of 20 December 2001, and in Ambon/Maluku culminating in the Malino II Declaration of 12 February 2002. Three years later, then Vice President Jusuf Kalla and President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono urged the signing of the Helsinki Peace Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on 15 August 2005.
Kalla, originally a successful businessman from South Sulawesi, involved some of his trusted friends and colleagues in the negotiations – many of whom were also from South Sulawesi - such as Dr Farid Husain, his then deputy in charge of health and environmental affairs, and Hamid Awaludin, then member of the National Elections Commission (KPU) and former Minister for Justice and Human Rights. Farid Husain was also a successful businessman whose friendship with Finnish consultant Juha Christensen (who once lived in South Sulawesi), was key to the Aceh peace process.

Although Yudhoyono’s name was frequently mentioned as a candidate for the Nobel Peace prize, and although he did much to professionalise the army, the peace initiatives in Poso, Ambon and Aceh were largely as a result of Jusuf Kalla and his team’s hard work. In many ways, Kalla has shown a great deal of courage and resolve in dealing with the protests and challenges, including those presented by various central level politicians during the peace talks with the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) to resolve the conflict in Aceh.

In contrast to Yudhoyono’s leadership style, which is marked by cautious and sometimes laborious decision-making and a tendency to try and accommodate all parties, Kalla is largely considered to be a bold and resolute decision maker. As an ‘ex’ businessman, he fundamentally understood that time is money. Any second wasted in making a decision may jeopardise the momentum gained and opportunities available.

As Kalla reiterated on numerous occasions, Indonesia’s deteriorating economy could only recover if the government was able to secure political stability and national security, which, he argued, may well be incompatible with full democracy. Many people, bureaucrats in particular, agreed with this position. This approach was first introduced by Soeharto at the outset of his New Order regime. While still in the position of Commander-in-Chief of the Operational Command for the Restoration of Security and Order (Pangkopkamtib), Soeharto pioneered the term ‘Development Trilogy’ (Trilogi Pembangunan, 1966-1998), namely the striving for political stability, economic growth and equality. But many people were alarmed by the approach proposed by Kalla – who up until October 2009 was also chair of the Golkar Party, the party that was used by Soeharto as his main political vehicle for power. They were
not only concerned that Kalla was applying the logic of business, but moreover that he was renewing the New Order paradigm that so clearly failed to build a sustainable and equitable economy.

Kalla’s basic argument was that it is more expensive for the state (and thus the country) to engage in military campaigns and police operations than to use state resources (including the law enforcement agencies) to make peace profitable for all parties involved. That is, for the various contending elements of the powerful local elite and associated community and militia leaders; for the leading politicians in Jakarta and big business, both national and foreign and for the military officers and the rebel commanders. If all these actors can be convinced that they will make more profit out of peace rather than conflict, they will support it.

To facilitate this, Kalla called for restrictions of some freedoms and other aspects of democracy, including elections. Speaking at an event organised by the State Security Institute (National Resilience Institute of the RI - Lemhannas), Kalla told the audience, ‘If there are too many elections, public participation will be low, while the economic cost of the polls will be high. Speaking as a businessman, this is not efficient,’ adding that, ‘Welfare is measured by economic growth, unemployment or per capita income -- not by the number of political parties.’ Indeed he went as far as blaming freedoms and elections for generating the conflict, saying that in the case of Poso, the conflict was catalysed by direct democratic elections which opened the town up and prompted the electoral winner to ‘take all’.

The problem is, what does Kalla’s ‘profitable peace’ approach hold for ordinary people, for the future of democracy in Indonesia and for sustainable development?

According to critics, there are four major problems arising out of Kalla’s approach. First, that the peace deals are limited to the powerful elite, are agreed in secret and at the expense of democracy. The full content of neither of the two Malino agreements has been made publicly available, thus rendering it impossible to hold the leaders and main actors to account. The perception that conflicts have their origins in too quick and too much democracy since the fall of Soeharto is firmly countered by critics who suggest that the reason (for conflict) is that the powerful elite are in a position to abuse democracy and that ordinary people have no opportunity for organising their own political parties in order to represent their
own needs and aspirations. Moreover, it has been proved possible to manipulate and mobilise them according to religious and ethnic identities by leaders recruited to mobilise votes (e.g. van Klinken 2007).

Secondly, that Kalla’s peace-making has been characterised by bribes, ‘pay-offs’ and corruption which have in turn led to new conflicts. Thirdly, that a precondition for the peace has been that the mobilisation of the military to intimidate the people into submitting to those powerful elite that were party to the peace accords.

The fourth and main critique is that the logic behind Kalla’s peacemaking is to foster profitable business for all the main players, from the local combatants, militias and in-fighting elites to the military and big business at the expense of ordinary people and sustainable development. The post-conflict situation opens up opportunities for powerful parties to run their businesses whilst ignoring and even flouting prevailing rules and regulations. These include trading in illegal logging, the corruption of funds for Internally Displaced People (IDP) and refugees, escort businesses and even the illegal trade in weapons and ammunition.

Before he was elected vice president, Kalla was a successful businessman. Thus, when stating that democracy comes second and that foreign investors prefer a stable country to a democracy, he was really expressing his own personal opinion as a businessman and not just as a national political leader. Without neglecting the multi-dimensional and complex situations in the disturbed regions of the Moluccas and Central Sulawesi, this chapter looks into the final fourth argument about the motivation of profits for the few as a major factor in Kalla’s peace strategy – and as a catalyst of the conflict in the first place.

It is thus not the remit of this chapter to discuss the detail of the conflicts themselves. However, we will first look to the case of Ambon in order to analyse the context of the profitable peace approach by highlighting national and regional elite interests and their role in the conflict, including the mobilisation of provocateurs from outside and the role of the military. We will then turn to Poso in Central Sulawesi in order to highlight the impact of the profitable peace approach not only on regional and national elite interests, but also on development and the exploitation of natural resources by foreign-owned trans-national corporations (TNC) since the peace
agreement. An added dimension here of course is Jusuf Kalla himself, his friends and family’s extensive business networks in the area.

Finally, we build on the analysis presented in Chapter 1 of this volume on the reasons why Kalla and Yudhoyono had to abandon the profitable peace approach in Aceh. The profitable peace approach had been partially contained by democracy-oriented actors and the foreign assistance after the tsunami. But in the run up to the 2009 elections and thereafter, the phasing-out of international assistance, and in the face of the Acehnese government’s failure to properly address some of the most serious problems, Aceh remains vulnerable to the elite pacts and business interests that may yet be deployed and presented as being in the best interest of peace and (economic) development in Aceh. Thus we conclude this chapter with an overview of some of the main business interests in Aceh today, with a focus on the main players and their existing and potential alliances and what this might mean for democracy in Aceh.

We begin however with a brief overview of conflict and conflict management in Indonesia during the New Order and the post-Soeharto Reformasi (reform) period.

Conflict under the New Order

Under Soeharto, conflict was largely contained by the repressive measures of the Indonesian armed forces, whose dwifungsi or ‘double function’ gave them control over matters of internal security and social control in addition to external security. With the deployment of troops down to village level, the military was in a strong position to take immediate and invariably brutal action against any dissent, be it directed against the state or against big business such as logging and mining companies, foreign or domestic. Moreover, the military itself had a large portfolio of often illegal or at the very least highly dubious business interests across the archipelago, built up over the decades from Sukarno’s anti-imperialist nationalisation policy to the illegal seizure of land and businesses from alleged PKI sympathisers.¹⁰

The mobilisation of militia groups and reactionary organisations is a modus the military honed and perfected under Soeharto. Indeed it was the organisation and mobilisation of civilian militias and other groups by, inter alia, the elite Red Beret
paratroopers, (RPKAD - Resimen Pasukan Komando Angkatan Darat)\textsuperscript{11} in the aftermath of the events of 30 September 1965 that facilitated Soeharto’s rise to power. Thus civilian-on-civilian violence was provoked and sustained through the mobilisation of groups variously identified as youth, student, nationalist and Muslim-based organisations depending on the local context. RPKAD Commander, Colonel Sarwo Edhie Wibowo, is recorded as saying, ‘We decided to encourage anti-communist civilian groups to assist us in this work... We trained them for two or three days, and then sent them to kill the Communists.’\textsuperscript{12} Telegrams sent by the US Embassy to Washington also confirm the military’s provocation and mobilisation of civilian groups (particularly religious organisations) to perpetrate acts of violence against so-called communists.\textsuperscript{13}

Under Soeharto, this modus was formalised in the establishment of a variety of youth groups using militaristic organisational structures such as territorial control posts and displaying militaristic emblems, dress code etc. These include the Baladika Karya (Baladika Functional Youth), Angkatan Muda Siliwangi (Siliwangi Youth Generation), FKPPI (Communication Forum of Indonesian Veteran’s Children), Ikatan Pemuda Karya (Functional Youths Association), the latter based in Medan under the control of Olo Panggabean and Pemuda Pancasila (Pancasila Youth). The bulk of the membership is made up of petty criminals who are easily mobilised.

These organisations have a dual function. First, they function as an extension of the state security surveillance system. Secondly, they have an income-generating function, controlling both criminal activities such as gambling, prostitution and protection rackets as well as dominating informal economic activities in entertainment centres, recreational sites, bus terminals, train stations and so forth. In many instances they are expected to share their profits with the military. On the eve of the East Timor Referendum in 1999 and on the imposition of Military Emergency in Aceh, the military established numerous of military organisations (militia) assigned to support the state’s policies. Infamously, in the case of East Timor, the militias became in effect part of the military command structure.\textsuperscript{14}

Soeharto’s political control was further facilitated by the amalgamation of the many parties that thrived under Sukarno (with the exception of all the left-leaning parties which were banned)
under three officially sanctioned political parties, the Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (United Development Party), PDI, representing Muslim parties, the Partai Demokrasi Indonesia, (Indonesian Democratic Party), PDI, representing Christian and nationalist parties and Golongan Karya (Golkar), (Functional Groups’ Party), Soeharto’s engine of political mobilisation and control – all of which were obliged to follow the state’s Pancasila ideology. Thus under Soeharto’s New Order regime, there was little room for opposition and dissent, and where it did erupt, it was swiftly and brutally put down by the armed forces.

Transmigration is one the many policies introduced by the New Order, ostensibly to provide people from the populous islands of Java and Madura in particular with new economic opportunities in the ‘Outer Islands.’ Moreover, businesses found it easier to employ transmigrant labour to log forests (legally or illegally) that were traditional sources of income for local people and which often also held spiritual significance. In many areas, transmigration has been the cause of tension and suspicion between indigenous communities and incomers which can easily be provoked. The violent conflict between Madurese, Dayaks and Malays in 1997 and 1999 occurred in West Kalimantan where over half a million people had been resettled, slightly less than the number of official transmigrants that were resettled in the Moluccas and West Papua from 1969 to 1997. (Down to Earth (2000) Transmigration has also been as part of Indonesia’s territorial control policy in conflict areas such as Aceh and West Papua, as a buffer between borders and as an extension of the state security surveillance, and as part of a government drive to resettle ‘backward and isolated communities’ who invariably live in forested and/or other natural resource rich areas.

Reformasi, democratisation and decentralisation

In the mid 1990s, the New Order regime’s control began to weaken and a number of unpopular policies and the excessive use of violence resulted in conflict and resistance.

On 12 November 1991, more than 150 peaceful demonstrators were killed by the Indonesian armed forces in the Santa Cruz tragedy in Dili, East Timor. Although the Indonesian government claimed there were only 12 casualties, the world
condemned this atrocity which resulted in a number of countries withdrawing support for the Indonesian government and an embargo on arms exports to Indonesia.\textsuperscript{15}

Between 1995 and 1997, a wave of unrest was unleashed in a number of cities in Java which spread to Kalimantan, Kupang, Ambon, South Sulawesi (Makassar) and West Papua (Jayapura, Wamena, and Merauke). In addition to persistent vertical conflicts between the state and secessionist movements such as in West Papua and Aceh, this period was also marked by the spread of horizontal conflict that took on an inter-religious and/or inter-ethnic identity.

With the fall of Soeharto on 12 June 1998, existing conflicts intensified and spread to neighbouring areas.\textsuperscript{16} As the process of reform began in Indonesia, it became evident that elements from the military and the police were involved in the on-going conflicts. The impression at the outset of the new era of reform in Indonesia was that conflict was being deliberately left to persist, not least in order to pose a challenge to the new democrats who were planning on sending the military ‘back to barracks’ and putting an end to its dual function.\textsuperscript{17}

Reformasi brought with it two major threats to the status quo – decentralisation and democratisation. Decentralisation further complicated elite dynamics in particular with many local actors, some new, vying for political power and control over natural resources and other business interests. This meant the repositioning and reformulation of new and old alliances at local and/with national level. The New Order’s political hegemony via the three-party system collapsed under democratisation with the freedom to form new (albeit ‘national’) parties that could have been mobilised to represent the aspirations and interests of ordinary people (thus in all likelihood threatening elite interests).\textsuperscript{18}

Characteristics of conflict in Ambon/North Maluku, Poso and Aceh

The three main conflict areas where the state took an active role in brokering peace are Ambon/North Maluku, Poso and Aceh. The conflicts in Poso and Ambon emerged during reformasi as Soeharto stood down after holding on to power for 32 years. Triggered by fights between youth groups, the violence in Ambon/ North Moluccas and Poso soon spread and developed into inter-religious and inter-ethnic conflict. In contrast, the conflict in Aceh can be traced back to general dissatisfaction with the centre in the
1950s to calls for independence in the early 1970s with the forming of GAM. However, with reformasi the conflict spread from the districts designated Military Operational Areas (DOM) from 1989 to 1998 – East Aceh, North Aceh and Pidie – to the rest of Aceh, including areas where GAM had never previously been active. In this regard, the conflict in Aceh during reformasi could be seen as sharing some similarities with newly emerging conflicts in other parts of Indonesia.

The basis and types of the conflict that occurred in Ambon/ Maluku, Poso and Aceh are complicated. However, they all ultimately had their roots in dissatisfaction and resentment over a number of economic and social problems and division of power, and in the case of Aceh in particular, military repression and human rights violations.

Conflict in Ambon, which was manifested as a conflict between Christians and Muslims, actually had its root in social and economic injustice, the politicisation of the bureaucracy, and the weakening of customary laws and associations. Triggered by a brawl when a mini-bus driver refused to hand over protection money in Ambon in January 1999, the conflict was further enflamed and protracted by a number of factors including military intervention, competition between central elite interests as well as local elite interests, influx of youth groups from outside the region, provocation by the local media and competition over natural resources such as gold.

In what is now North Maluku, the conflict was provoked by the recognition of Malifut, a new sub-district in May 1999, occupied by predominantly Muslim Makian settlers who were resettled in the area in 1975 alongside predominantly indigenous Christians of Kao. One month later, Nusa Halmahera Minerals owned by Australia’s largest gold mining company, Newcrest, began mining operations in the Kao and Malifut (ICG 2009; Down to Earth 2004). Tensions between the Makian and the Kao exploded in August, exacerbated by Makian dominance of Nusa Halmahera Mineral’s newly-employed workforce (ICG 2009; Down to Earth 2004). In October North Maluku, previously part of the Moluccas, was declared a separate province.

The conflict in Poso was also manifested as inter-religious conflict but actually had its roots in the simmering political tension between the indigenous mountain-dwelling Christian majority and the predominantly Muslim incomers who began to move to the
area in significant numbers from 1973 onwards under Soeharto’s transmigration programme, eased by the construction of the Trans-Sulawesi Highway and then in 1997 during the financial crisis in Indonesia (Aragon 2002). Issues include conflict over economic development which culminated in intensified competition in the lead up to the 1999 district head elections between Christian and Muslim candidates. The violence that erupted in December 1998 between Muslim and Christian youth groups can be understood in the light of decentralisation and ensuing competition for control over natural resources at regional level. The conflict was further exacerbated by groups of provocateurs and outsiders who had come ‘in solidarity’ to join forces based either on ethnic or religious identities (LIPI 2005).

But the most intractable conflict was the violent repression of GAM and its supporters in Aceh. Although Aceh had been granted Special Region status under President Sukarno, this in reality meant that the Acehnese only had jurisdiction over education, religion and customary law, but not over the exploitation of natural resources and economic development. It was the unequal distribution of revenues and the flight of capital to Jakarta that led to the formation of GAM led by Hasan di Tiro in the mid-1970s. Although the movement was crushed and Hasan di Tiro forced to flee the country, continued dissatisfaction led to the re-emergence of GAM in 1989. The Indonesian government responded by designating East Aceh, North Aceh and Pidie (areas rich in natural resources such as LNG) as a Military Operational Area (DOM) in 1990 which was only withdrawn with the fall of Soeharto. External interventions include support from the Lybian government which provided training camps for GAM and the presence of foreign commercial interests such as Mobil Oil Indonesia (MOI). More details on the background to the conflict and the lead up to peace in Aceh are detailed in Chapter 2 of this volume.

Ambon/North Maluku: conflict, business and politics

One crucial factor behind the conflict in the Maluku was the manifestation of political struggles in Jakarta, particularly Soeharto’s family and business cronies and the military’s attempts to maintain the status quo in the face of reformasi and all that it brought with it. The appointment of a naval officer as Commander in Chief of the Indonesian Military (TNI) infuriated a number of generals who felt
that their powers were being curtailed. By provoking and sustaining conflict in regions like the Moluccas, the military were able to justify the need for territorial command structures and their dual role of maintaining stability in the midst of a society prone to conflict. It would also serve to ‘expose’ the new commander-in-chief was unable to maintain stability in Indonesia.

As mentioned above, the conflict in Ambon was triggered by a dispute between two individuals that turned into a physical fight. But how did the conflict spread and how was it labelled as inter-religious conflict and sustained? Three high-profile provocateurs have been associated with the Ambon case, namely Butje Sarpara, Dicky Watimena and Yorris Raweyai. Sarpara was once a teacher in North Maluku who also served as Head of Agrarian Affairs in Jayapura (now Port Numbay), West Papua. Colonel Dicky Watimena is a former member of the Presidential Security Team (Paswalpres – Pasukan Pengawal Presiden) and a former Mayor of Ambon. Yorris Raweyai was once deputy chair of the Pancasila Youth organisation also alleged to be close to Bambang Trihatmodjo, Soeharto’s second son.\(^{21}\)

Originally known as the Cowok Keren (Cool Boys), the Christian youth group was subsequently referred to as the Cowok Kristen (Christian Boys), alias Coker, who used Maranatha Protestant church as their headquarters. Coker has links with two Moluccan Christian youth leaders, Milton Matuanakota and Ongky Pieters based in Jakarta. Milton and Ongky led gangs of Moluccan Christian youths who controlled the shopping centres, car parks and gambling dens in West Jakarta. In the aftermath of the communal clashes that took place in in Ketapang, Jakarta, in November 1998, hundreds of Milton’s and Ongky’s followers fled to Ambon.\(^{22}\)

In Jakarta, Milton and Ongky’s rivals included Ongen Sangaji, a Pancasila Youth activist and coordinator of a Moluccan Muslim university student organisation. Members of Ongen’s organisation were recruited into the PAM Swakarsa (civilian security troops) that were mobilised by General Wiranto and President Habibie in order to prevent protesting students from reaching parliament in November 1998. Ongen is also alleged to have close ties to Bambang Trihatmodjo, whilst Milton is alleged to be closer to Soeharto’s daughter, Siti Hardiyanti Rukmana (alias Tutut).
In December 1999, after the President and Vice President’s visit to Ambon, 500 troops were sent to the area. However, only some 200 troops made it to their allocated barracks, leaving the remaining 300 having gone AWOL, complete with their weapons. Where did they go? It turns out that they blended into the civilian population, ditching their uniforms in favour of civilian clothing. It was shortly thereafter that the mass killings of late December 1999 erupted. An indicator that the killings were provoked by the military came with the discovery that exactly the same weapons carried by the 200 ‘peace-keeping’ troops were found in the hands of civilians.

But where did the provocateurs receive their ‘operational funds’ from? Behind all the conflict and incidents, the ones who stood to gain most from the upheaval in Moluccas were Soeharto, his family and his business cronies. They clearly benefited from the disturbances of the peace that serve to perpetuate the Armed Forces’ dual function, especially as the Armed Forces, dozens of foundations and pensioned officers are deeply enmeshed in the tentacles of the Soeharto family businesses.

It has been alleged that in addition to receiving financial support from members of Soeharto’s family, the provocateurs were also supported by two of his cronies with significant business interests in North Maluku, Eka Cipta Widjaja and Prajogo Pangestu. Eka Tjipta Widjaja’s family owns the Sinar Mas Group, of which PT Sinar Mas Agro Resources and Technology (SMART) Corporation is a subsidiary. Headed by General Yoga Sugama, both a relative and business partner of the Soeharto family, one of SMART’s subsidiary companies, PT Global Agronusa Indonesia, has managed a banana plantation of some 2,000 hectares in Halmahera in a joint venture operation with the US fruit giant, Del Monte, since December 1991.

Prajogo Pangestu, head of the Barito Pacific group is one of the Soeharto family’s largest contributors. An investigation by the Indonesian Attorney General revealed that in 1990, Indoverbank NV in the Netherlands received USD 225 million in the name of three foundations headed by Soeharto: Supersemar, Dharmais and Dakab Foundations from Prayogo Pangestu, transferred directly from Prajogo’s account with the Singapore branch of Citibank and BDN, Jakarta. Barito Pacific Group’s boss also made a contribution of IDR 80 billion towards Golkar’s political campaign in July 1999, almost a quarter of its total campaign costs of IDR 350 billion.
addition, Prajogo also ‘contributed’ to the All Indonesia Wrestling Association (PGSI) through the personal account of the Attorney General at that time, Andi Ghalib. Prajogo Pangestu’s businesses interests in the Moluccas are enormous. The Barito Pacific Group controls at least eleven predominantly forestry-based companies.

The Cendana clique (meaning the powerful actors related to Soeharto and his family with their extended family headquarters and Cendana street, Menteng, Jakarta) and the extreme right group of generals have yet another supporter with big business in the Maluku, the owner of the Artha Graha Group, Tommy Winata, who is also alleged to be very close to Yorris Raweyai. Tommy Winata is a shareholder in PT Ting Sheen Banda Sejahtera, a fishery company which has an investment portfolio of USD 200 million, which is projected catch 2.5 million tons of fish per year. Its fishing fleet is moored in Ngadi village in Tual, and is a joint venture with Bambang Trihatmodjo and a Taiwanese company.

This is not the place for a comprehensive and in-depth analysis of the conflict in the Moluccas. But irrespective of explanation, it is clear that a number of business and military oriented actors were involved – and profited, from the conflict and the ensuing peace agreement. Although the details of the agreement were never disclosed, the 11-point agreement that was publicly disseminated on 12 February 2002 includes the agreement to strengthen rather than reduce military presence in the region by ‘rebuilding and re-equipment a number of military and police facilities’. Big businesses, domestic and international will continue to be protected by the military and Brimob (police mobile brigade) in the face of numerous conflicts over appropriated land, deforestation and the pollution of rivers and lakes.

Backed by international donors, the peace agreement signalled a major reconstruction and rehabilitation programme which included governance, security and educational reform as well as humanitarian aid. North Maluku alone – a newly created province in 1999, was divided up and further subdivided creating a plethora of new administrative units. In 2003 four more districts and one more municipality were created. Between 2003 and 2007, West Halmahera went from five to nine sub-districts, North Halmahera from nine to 22 and South Halmahera from nine to 30 (ICG 2009). The mushrooming of administrative units created increased
opportunities for local and national elites to control and grab a share of the recovery funding pie and future development programmes.

These administrative subdivisions seem to have little to do with democracy and more with carving up and divvying out local elite interests. In the 2007 election for governor in North Maluku, the Golkar candidate and the Democratic Party - Partai Damai Sejahtera (PDS, Prosperous Peace Party) candidate both claimed victory. Whilst praising the peaceful political process to determine the outcome of the election as a victory for democracy, an authoritative report nevertheless acknowledged that the contest had been ‘all about power and not about policies,’ and that, ‘no one seemed to know or care what the two candidates stood for in terms of delivery of social services or provincial development plans’. Moreover, the report concluded, the issues were rather, ‘access to spoils and which ethnic group would get the more lucrative government position’ (ICG 2009).

**Poso: peace, profit and mega-projects**

There are six main factors that influenced socio-political dynamics in Sulawesi. The first was the dominance of the Golkar Party in alliance with smaller parties, and the influence in a small number of areas of the PDI-P and religious parties such as the Partai Damai Sejahtera (PDS) - which was dominant in Poso, and the Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS, Prosperous Justice Party). The second factor was the expansion of capital from both Jakarta and international sources aimed at exploiting natural resources in Sulawesi. The third was the dominance of Jusuf Kalla, his family, friends and close colleagues’ business interests in Sulawesi. The fourth, the diversity of ethno-linguistics groups that frequently overlap with religious identities which have exacerbated the class-based political-economic conflicts into communal or sectarian conflict. The fifth, the military’s strategy to preserve and conceal communal conflicts so as to fragment and divert indigenous resistance, paving the way for large amounts of capital to flow into the mining, plantation, and forestry businesses, as well as infrastructure projects such as hydro-electric power plants. And sixth, that the political context was aggravated by an unrepresentative election system and political party regulations that hinder the establishment of local parties which would be much more likely to uphold specific civil society aspirations. The people’s
desire for local parties signifies civil society’s distrust of national political party branches in the regions, as they to all intents and purposes serve as subsidiaries of national elites’ best interests.

The announcement of the Malino I peace agreement in Poso on 20 December 2001 was swiftly followed by the promise of USD 10 million for rehabilitation and reconstruction and the deployment of 4,000 military and police officers to the area (Aragon 2002). Malino I failed to signal lasting peace for Poso, but it did succeed in providing a myriad of business opportunities from the commoditisation of conflict and aid to the intensification of lucrative and large scale infrastructural and industrial development projects such as mineral, oil and gas extraction and the construction of massive hydro-electric power stations. The dynamics of powerful elite dominance of business and politics, with military backing, came at the expense of the mobilisation and representation of ordinary people beyond ethnic and religious lines. Having paved the way for the expansion of capital from Jakarta, foreign countries and transnational corporations, it has singularly failed to provide peace and prosperity for the people of Central Sulawesi.

Commoditisation of conflict and humanitarian aid

It is not just big business that has expanded in conflict areas. The outbreak of violent conflict in Ambon and Poso also provided justification for the deployment of the security forces, including the military as well as the police. The non-organic troops – those that have been deployed specifically to ‘deal’ with the conflict, have invariably been happy to remain as their deployment inevitably provides them with a diversity of income-generating opportunities. A report published by the Institute for the Development of Legal Study and Human Rights Advocacy (LPSHAM) in Central Sulawesi in early 2005 suggests that the incidence of violence and intimidation in Poso escalated towards the end of each security operation, thereby justifying a request for an increase in operational funds as well as an extension of the operation itself (Azhar and Agus 2005). The security forces engaged in both legal - such as managing infrastructure projects to rebuild housing and public facilities destroyed by the conflict, and illegal business activities. While the officer classes siphoned off operational funds and embezzled aid intended for IDPs, their subordinates engaged in a diversity
of illegal business activities in Palu, Poso, Moriwali and Banggai ranging from extortion, blackmail, protection rackets as well as the trade in rare and protected wildlife. 32

A perhaps not entirely expected bonus for the military was the US Congress’ response to the presence of Laskar Jihad in Poso, an Islamic militia group based in Java that flooded into the region in July 2000. Following a tour of Southeast Asia in early December 2001, the then US Commander in Chief in the Pacific, Admiral Dennis Blair, expressed his concern that Indonesia may become a haven for Al Qaeda. A few days later Indonesia’s Chief of Military Intelligence, Lieutenant General Hendropriyono, stated that the conflict in Sulawesi was ‘the result of cooperation between international terrorists and radical domestic organisations.’ On 20 December 2001, US Congress announced that it was making USD 318 million available for the training of military officers in Southeast Asia, including Indonesia, effectively overturning a two-year ban on military cooperation between Indonesia and the US (Roberts 2002). The disbursement of rehabilitation and reconstruction aid has not been well regulated and it is not only the military that has profited. Aid money has been embezzled by local business actors in the guise of development projects as well as by unscrupulous religious leaders and government officials. And while many IDPs received little or no aid, some registered and collected aid in a number of different villages. As summed up by anthropologist Lorraine Aragon, ‘… Poso has become simply a big business project that simultaneously exploits and morally damages an already emotionally traumatised population…’ (Aragon 2004).

Expansion of capital

Jusuf Kalla’s family and friends did particularly well out of the peace agreement, as did other Indonesian ‘conglomerates,’ the military and TNCs. Lucrative industries such as mining, oil and gas, and police officers to the area. Their focus has been on exploring and exploiting Sulawesi’s lucrative natural resources, particularly in the mining sector, infrastructural megaprojects and agribusiness. The interests of some of the largest international corporations are being well served in Sulawesi. Mining companies such as Canada’s Vale Inco, the USA’s Newmont Mining Corporation and UK-
Australian Rio Tinto all have extensive interests in Sulawesi, as do oil and gas giants such as Japan’s Mitsubishi Incorporation, Conoco Phillip, the UK’s Premier Oil, Canada’s Talisman Energy Inc, Norway’s Statoil ASA and the USA’s ExxonMobil (Reuters 2007). The Kuwaiti company, Gulf Investment House (GIH), has invested around USD 300 million in Mamuju district, Mamuju, West Sulawesi to process natural resources such as oil and gas, gold, coal, nickel, iron ore and potentials in the forestry as well as plantation sector.33

PT Inco Indonesia has been mining nickel in Sulawesi since 1968 and is currently operating in South, Southeast and Central Sulawesi. In 2007 PT Inco resumed construction of its USD 280 million Karebbe hydro-electric power plant in East Luwu in South Sulawesi (now estimated at USD 410 million)34 which will be completed in 2010, in addition to its existing Larona and Balambano hydro-electric power stations that power its nickel plant in Soroako, also in South Sulawesi. In August 2007, Inco announced that it will build two additional nickel processing plants with an investment of USD 2.5 billion in Soroako and Pomala in Southeast Sulawesi and it is currently making plans to open two further mining operations the Bahodopi block in Morowali, Central Sulawesi, and Pomala in Kendari, Southeast Sulawesi.35

Another major competitor for nickel in Central Sulawesi is Rio Tinto which unveiled USD 2 billion investment on 28 Mary 2008 that would cover 73,000 ha of land in Lasamphala on the border of Morowali and Konawe districts (in Central and Southeast Sulawesi respectively). Although Rio Tinto envisages commencement of production in 2015, it filed a lawsuit against Morowali district administration on 23 May 2008, accusing it of having granted mining rights to local companies in the area.36 According to Rio Tinto, it had been in negotiation with the Central Sulawesi provincial administration since 2006. However, in the wake of the floods in Morowali in June 2007, Rio Tinto committed USD 250,000 to providing relief in the areas affected by the flooding and in November 2008 it announced the USD 50,000 Morowali Scholarship Programme for 50 deserving that were affected by the June 2007 flood and landslides.

Gold is found intermittently throughout Sulawesi, particularly in West Sulawesi, Southeast Minahasa, Northern Toraja, Donggala and Poso. PT Newmont Minahasa Raya (NMR) ceased
its operations in Minahasa, Manado in 2001 having ‘recovered’ all deposits. PT NMR was indicted for the pollution of Buyat Bay with heavy metals, and despite a protracted court case and evidence to the contrary, the courts found in favour of the company on 23 April 2007. In Central Sulawesi, gold deposits have been found in Polewali and Mamasa districts.

The oil and gas mining sector has seen the emergence of domestic corporations such as PT Medco Energi International, Indonesia’s largest publicly-listed oil and gas company owned by Arifin Panigoro and PT Elnusa, a subsidiary of the state-owned oil company Pertamina. Medco has operations in the Senoro field (Senoro and Toili blocks) and the Matindok field (Maleo-Raja and Minahki blocks) and Mitsubishi Incorporation is constructing a refinery in Banggai district, Central Sulawesi, to process Medco’s LNG which will be ready by 2010. It is expected that domestic corporations will soon swarm Tomini bay to explore for oil and gas and offshore West Sulawesi and western coast of Central Sulawesi. Moreover, a gas field has been discovered by Britain-based oil company, British Petroleum (BP), in north east of Tempe Lake, which unlocks the potential for producing ammonia for urea-based fertilizer factory. In the northern part of the area, a concession has been granted to Bosowa group coal mining company owned by Aksa Mahmud, Jusuf Kalla brother-in-law.

*Infrastructure projects and the Kalla family empire*

There has been an expansion in the flow of capital in Sulawesi from business interests based in Jakarta and overseas. But what about Jusuf Kalla and his family, originally based in Makassar, South Sulawesi? The JK Family Corporation has done well out of the allocation of tenders for hydro-electric power plants in particular, including the Extra High Voltage Power Lines (SUTET). Further, since Kalla was inaugurated as the Vice President of the Republic of Indonesia on 20 October 2004 and his appointment as chair of the Golkar Party, PT Bukaka Teknik Utama owned by Kalla and his brothers has been inundated with orders to construct a number of substantial infrastructure projects in Sulawesi (and elsewhere). PT Bukaka was commissioned to build a power plant in Ussu, in East Luwu District, a mid-scale plant in Bantaeng and a small power
plant in Salu Anoa, Mungkutana, in North Luwu District and a three-turbine hydro-electric power plant in Poso River, Central Sulawesi. PT Bukaka is also planning to construct another hydro-electric power plant in Saddang River in Tana Toraja, South Sulawesi, which is worth USD 300 million and which it is expected to complete by 2010. In order to expedite the project, the Provincial Government of South Sulawesi signed an agreement with the Japanese consulting firm, Nippon Koei, on 6 February 2004 in which both the Provincial Government of South Sulawesi and the Regional Government of Tana Toraja are expected to fully support its acquisition of land at the project site known as ‘PLTA Malea’. Aside from the impact this project will have on the communal agro-forestry initiatives include timber, coffee, nutmeg, candlenuts, cocoa, sugar palm, bamboo and vanilla, the damming of the Saddang River will have a social-psychological effect on the people of Tana Toraja who believe the river basin in Randanbatu valley to be the sacred place where the princess Sandabilik, Datu Pamula Tana’s spouse, came into sight (Aditjondro 2006a-e).

PT Bosowa Energy, a subsidiary of the Bosowa Corporation owned by Kalla’s brother-in-law Aksa Mahmud, won the concession for the construction of a coal-fired geothermal power plant in Jeneponto, South Sulawesi, at an estimated cost of USD 195 million which will be completed in 2009. Of the total 200 MW that will be generated by this power station, PT Semen Bosowa in Maros, a subsidiary of the Group, will get 70 MW of power allocation. PT Bosowa Energy is also constructing a diesel fuel power plant which is being developed to support Semen Bosowa production with a total project cost of USD 7 million. The Bosowa Corporation has won concessions to build dozens of roads, including toll roads, throughout Sulawesi. The construction and management of the toll roads are entrusted to PT Nusantara Infrastructure of which the Bosowa Corporation is a majority shareholder. PT Bosowa Agro Industries currently provides training to farmers for the development of varieties of rice and corn plants in Maros, South Sulawesi. PT Bantimurung Indah produce seaweeds for export, and PT Bosowa Isuma are involved in shrimps and fish farming. Further, the Bosowa Corporation also owns shrimp farm of 10 thousand acres in Mamuju Regency (Aditjondro 2006a-e).
Plunder, protest and repression

Despite its wealth of natural resources and the massive industrial development that it has undergone, Central Sulawesi remains one of Indonesia’s poorest provinces. Major industrial development—be it agritourism, mineral extraction or infrastructural development, has not meant economic prosperity for most. Instead it has meant forced evictions and loss of land, loss of homes, loss of livelihood, pollution, environmental degradation, and violation of customary laws, identity and the destruction of a way of life. Local people are rarely compensated—and when they are, never to the true value of their land. Although companies such as Rio Tinto and PT Inco always promise to provide funding for local development projects such as education and health, these serve first and foremost as company’s public relation strategy aimed at wealthy shareholders. But the people of Sulawesi have not taken the plunder of their land and natural resources lying down. Many community groups are well organised, working together with local and national NGOs—and in some cases with international networks, they have taken their protests to local parliament and government officials as well as to the companies themselves.

The history of people’s struggle in Central Sulawesi against government policies that often favour investors was first initiated Seseba, Banggai. The forced eviction of local people from 400 acres of communally owned land met with resistance. However, since 1982, the people of Seseba were individually and gradually ‘seduced’ and intimidated into releasing their land to PT Delta Subur Permai through the involvement of personnel from Batui sub-district Military Command and by exploiting the King of Banggai’s traditional authority.

There have been frequent mass actions against PT Inco’s operations since the 1980s. More recently, between 15-19 September 2005, indigenous people affected by PT Inco in Soroako, mineworkers, students and NGOs who together formed the Mine Victims’ Solidarity Forum (FSMT), occupied the company’s regional office in Makassar, South Sulawesi. On 12 September, the FSMT had protested to the provincial assembly (DPRD) which resulted in DPRD members promising a meeting with Inco on 15th September. However, the assembly was unable to get Inco managers to attend the meeting. Hundreds of disappointed FSMT members went en
to Inco’s office and staged the occupation. On the fifth day, the occupation ended when police forcibly ejected the protesters from the building (Down to Earth 2005). Two weeks later, over five hundred people staged a blockade at the PT Inco mine site in Sorowako. The protesters faced intimidation and provocation by hired thugs and several people were detained by the police for a number of hours before being released.

On the drawing board since the 1980s, the Lore Lindu Hydroelectric Power Project would flood as much as 10,000 hectares of Lore Lindu National Park and displace an estimated 4,000 indigenous people living on ancestral lands. In the 1990s the World Bank decided to back the project, giving it additional momentum. However, in 2002 the people of Lore Lindu National Park organised together with the Free Land Foundation and succeeded in persuading the Central Sulawesi government not to go ahead with the construction of a massive dam in the park (Sherman 2005). Other examples where organised protest has succeeded include the conflict over the introduction of transgenic cotton by US company Monsanto, one of the world’s leading Agribusiness Company, without undergoing the proper Environmental Impact Analysis. The company was eventually fined of USD 1.5 million in its own country, the United States, for having bribed 140 officials in Indonesia between 1997 and 2002. Unlike the transgenic cotton conflict which was resolved in a ‘peaceful’ manner, protests against the expansion of PT London Sumatra’s rubber plantation in Bulukumba was tainted by state violence. On 21 July 2003, the police special forces, Brimob, fired arbitrarily into the amassed farmers who were struggling to retain their land, killing four people, wounding many and arresting 14 others.

These are just a few examples of the considerable potential for the mobilisation of local people, labour organisations and students in Sulawesi in general and Central Sulawesi in particular. In the light of this, it is not surprising that Jusuf Kalla is especially concerned about the impact of democracy and organised, representative politics. If economic development and stability are understood to mean the freedom for large scale, capital intensive industries owned by local, national and international fat cats to ‘aggressively pursue cost and production’ as Jusuf Kalla does, then it is clear that democracy – particularly in an area where local
people are organised, is a serious threat. It is thus also clear what role of the security forces have to play, as the people of Bulukumba found out to their cost.

The security forces – the military and Brimob, are there to provide protection to the business interests and business premises of the business actors and former government officials who have become entrepreneurs in this thriving arena for the exploitation of natural resources and infrastructure development projects. Just as the people in Poso were suffering under the ongoing violent conflict, a number of corporations were able to set up shop in Poso and neighbouring districts under the protection of 711/Raksatama infantry battalion. At first, there was only one battalion deployed in this area, but since the conflict erupted a further battalion, 714/Sintuwu Maroso, was deployed. The original battalion was assigned to protect business investments in the western region of Central Sulawesi, from Toli-Toli to Dongala, while 714/Sintuwu Maroso was based in Poso, and was assigned to protect the wealthy investors from Poso to Banggai (Aditjondro 2005a).

Four business groups that benefited from military protection include Central Cipta Murdaya (CCM) group, owned by Murdaya Widyawimarta and Siti Hartati Tjakra Murdaya; the Medco group, owned by the Arifin Panigoro family; Artha Graha group, led by Tomy Winata and which also involves the Indonesian military’s Kartika Eka Paksi Foundation - whose interests include limestone extraction and palm oil plantations in Morowali Regency; as well as the Kalla family’s own Bukaka group.40

The CCM group has embraced General Ronny Narpatihsuta Hendropriyono - son of Lieutenant General (Ret) A.M. Hendropriyono and the former governor of Central Sulawesi, Azis Lamadjido into its business. Ronny and Azis were both appointed to the board of PT Hardaya Inti Plantations which own a 52 thousand acre palm oil plantation in Buol and Toli-Toli. Additionally, the CCM group has other business interest in Central Sulawesi including the 72,500 acre concession owned by PT Bina Balantak Raya in Lamala Balantak, Banggai and a cement factory in Donggala with an IDR 150 trillion investment under the flag of PT Cipta Central Murdaya Semen (Aditjondro 2006a-e).
Was there a correlation between the deployment of military battalions and the opening up of new business? Indeed there was. In Seseba, Banggai, farmers had staged numerous protests against expropriation of their land and ponds by local entrepreneurs. On 3 October 3 2002, around 35 farmers from Seseba went on hunger strike at the Central Sulawesi provincial parliament in Palu. With the aim of deterring the protests, approximately 125 military and police launched a military exercise in Batui, very near Seseba, which included the Banggai district head, the district military commander, the district chief of police and a number of government official. This exercise was intended to intimidate the people of Seseba who had lost 200 acres of plantations and homes to build Pertamina staff residences. The Bukaka group as also benefited from military protection provided in Poso, particularly since the Tentena bombings, with members of the security forces posted in Saojo village next to Bukaka’s Poso-1 and Poso-2 hydro-electric power plant.

The close relationship between capital and military has come to light after 650 members of the Hydro-electric Power Plant Extra High Voltage Power Lines Advocacy Front (FAPS - *Front Advokasi PLTA & SUTET*) from eleven villages along Poso River went on a protest march in Sulewana village on 18 April 2006. They called for the construction of the hydro-electric power plant to be halted immediately pending PT Bukaka Teknik Utama’s settlement of the land dispute.41 Bukaka requested a period of two weeks in order to consider FAPS’ demands. However, it did not take long for the military to intervene. On 20 April 2006, 714/Sintuwu Maroso battalion engaged in military manoeuvres close to the Poso IDP camp at a former airport in the city of Tentena. On 19 April 2006, the troops were deployed to Tentena, the capital city of North Pamona Sub District, using PT Bukaka vehicles.

**Aceh: Democracy, peace... and profit**

There is ample empirical evidence to suggest that the main logic behind Kalla’s peacemaking is to foster profitable business for all major parties at the expense of democracy (through elitism, lack of accountability, bribes/corruption, subordination, intimidation and exploitation of ordinary people) and sustainable development. Democratically-oriented civil society organisations in the conflict area have largely been excluded from the peace process.
There are good reasons to believe that similar tendencies are at play in relation to Aceh. In fact, as discussed in Chapter 1, Jusuf Kalla and Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono tried at first to apply the same strategy in Aceh that they had in the Moluccas and Poso. However, GAM at that time refused to be co-opted into this elitist pact-making. Then came the tsunami and international involvement which to some extent contained the unmitigated expansion of big business and military exploitation. Moreover, together with a number of other factors as discussed in Chapter 1, this process enabled democratic struggles and solutions. Yet it is also clear from the empirical evidence presented below that there are signs of politically and militarily facilitated business exploitation in the making in Aceh as well. The dynamics of Aceh may soon be more reminiscent of the Maluku and Poso than of efforts to contain undemocratic Indonesian political practices and the dominance of capital.

*Profiting from post-Helsinki reconstruction in Aceh*

In spite of more government and donor control than in the other disturbed areas in Indonesia, the post-tsunami reconstruction in Aceh, since the signing of the Helsinki MoU on 15 August 2005, has consolidated the unholy alliance between foreign and domestic business interests in the territory, the latter of which includes substantial military interests. Much of the relief and reconstruction aid has been siphoned off and the allocation of projects has lacked sufficient transparency. Corruption remains endemic within the government bureaucracy – and moreover as acknowledged by key Acehnese political actors, is seen as an ‘inevitable’ element of the transition to self-government (see Chapter 8 of this volume). Furthermore, international, national and local companies are ready to further exploit natural resources in Aceh such as oil, gas and minerals. Both regional and central government are looking to expand agribusiness, palm oil in particular, with ex-GAM cadres looking to Malaysia in particular. Competition between the centre and regional government is set to intensify as division of responsibility for planning and investment regulation under the Law on Governing Aceh (LoGA) are far from clear.

The structure of business ownership in Aceh may be described as a pyramid, with foreign businesses on the top followed closely by large elite-owned domestic companies, then state-
owned companies, followed by businesses owned by Acehnese entrepreneurs such a Surya Paloh and Muzakir Manaf. Then come the Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (SMEs) owned by local business actors and finally, the small farmers and fisher-folk, many of whom are in danger of being squeezed out by all of the above.

The post-tsunami ‘top dogs’ – minerals, oil and gas

The largest company perched right at the top of the pyramid is ExxonMobil which has been running its LNG operations in Aceh over the last three decades, and which include the offshore Lhok Sukon fields and the PT Arun LNG processing plant together with Pertamina, the Indonesian state oil and gas company. PT Arun exports LNG to Japan and South Korea. Despite having been implicated in the perpetration of human rights violations during DOM – and certainly having enjoyed a cosy relationship with the military, ExxonMobil continues to operate in Aceh.

However, other large US oil and gas mining companies are in the process of bidding for large investment opportunities, by approaching the Aceh provincial government and with the facilitation of USAID. US oil and gas interests in Aceh are also reflected in the recent opening of a brand new polytechnic in Banda Aceh – the Vocational Training Alliance for Aceh, financed jointly by USAID and one of the world’s largest oil companies, ChevronTexaco, to the tune of USD 10 billion (Aditjondro and Purwanto 2008).

Since the signing of the Helsinki MoU, the mining sector has expanded beyond the exploration and extraction of oil and gas. International mining companies have won exploration contracts to mine for gold and copper. The Canadian mining company, East Asia Mineral Corporation, is planning to mine gold and copper in the highlands of Central Aceh, in the sub-districts of Bintang, Linge, Ketol, and Rusep Antara. US company Dutch Phillips, is interested in a mining concession in the district of South West Aceh. It has also been alleged that US mining giant, Freeport McMoRan, the company which mines copper, gold, and silver deposits in West Papua, is in negotiations with Aceh-born politician and businessman, Surya Paloh, Chair of Golkar’s Advisory Board and close friend of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, to explore the gold fields in Beutong Ateuh
Surya Paloh is not a newcomer to the Aceh business scene. His catering company, PT IndoCater which employs more than 3,000 workers has catered for the logistics of many large TNCs such as ExxonMobil in Lhokseumawe and PT Pupuk Kaltim in East Kalimantan. PT IndoCater was able to obtain extensive credit to expand its business interests from Bank Bumi Daya (BBD) due to Paloh’s position as Chair of the Veteran Children’s Communication Forum (FKPPI - Forum Komunikasi Putra-Putri Purnawirawan Indonesia) and his close relationship with Soeharto’s family. But with the reconstruction rush in his home province, many new business opportunities have been opened up for him. Investment capital for Paloh’s new business enterprises in Aceh come partly from the IDR 200 billion donations from viewers of Paloh’s television station, Metro TV, intended to help the victims of the December 2004 earthquake in Aceh. These funds are managed by Paloh’s Sukma Foundation, which is officially financing charity activities, namely the reconstruction of schools in tsunami and earthquake-hit villages.

Rehabilitation, reconstruction … and corruption

In a press conference on 3 May 2007, the then deputy director of Indonesian Corruption Watch (ICW), Ridaya Laodengkower, reported that according to ICW’s investigations, of the more than IDR 847 billion rehabilitation and reconstruction funds managed by the Aceh-Nias Reconstruction Coordination Body (BRR NAD-Nias) about IDR 436 billion was disbursed in variously corrupt ways, including marked-up prices of goods and material that also inflated prices. Aceh anti-corruption activists have criticised the BRR NAD-Nias staff. One example is the manipulation of BRR NAD-Nias funded projects by its own staff in cooperation with fictive publishing companies.

The weaknesses of the BRR NAD-Nias were aggravated by the lack of impartiality of its head, Kuntoro Mangkusubroto, and several members of the steering committee and supervisory body. Kuntoro Mangkusubroto has a comparatively good track record but he is nevertheless a member of PT Holcim Indonesia Tbk’s board – a cement factory based in Java with business interest in the post-tsunami business in Aceh, while Aburizal Bakrie and Surya Paloh, who both sit on the BRR NAD-Nias steering committee, and TB Silalahi, who sits on the supervisory body, are linked to the Bakrie Group, the Media Group, and the Artha Graha Group respectively.
The poor quality of housing built for tsunami victims under the BRR NAD-Nias has led to mass demonstrations and together with the evidence collated by anti-corruption organisations including ICW, President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono was asked to remove Kuntoro Mangkusubroto as head of the BRR NAD-Nias. The problem is further aggravated by corruption within similar projects financed by international NGOs, including Oxfam GB and the Dutch chapter of Terre des Hommes. Corruption within projects funded by those NGOs, however, still dwarf the corruption associated with BRR NAD-Nias, as identified by the ICW.

With procurement particularly vulnerable to corrupt practices, it is interesting to note that both Kalla and Yudhoyono themselves have been accused of manipulating their power to use public funds to import twelve helicopters for use during natural disasters. However, Finance Minister Sri Mulyani refused to allocate state funds for the helicopters which were seized by Indonesian custom officials as the company that owned them owed IDR 2.1 billion in import duty to the government, after some had been used to help flood victims in Aceh Tamiang.

*How much reconstruction aid have the gampong people of Aceh enjoyed?*

In addition to the corruption of aid by BRR NAD-Nias’ network of staff and contractors, the Acehnese people have not benefited as much as is indicated by the budget figures, with at least 60% of the rehabilitation and reconstruction funds allocated to Aceh ‘leaving’ the province each year. According to Nova Iriansyah of the Aceh Construction Services Development Institute, or LPJK (Lembaga Pengembangan Jasa Konstruksi), about thirty trillion rupiah is cumulatively allocated from the national budget, the provincial budget, and from BRR NAD-Nias. Of that amount, about twelve trillion is allocated for actual reconstruction work. Of that amount, only 40% is absorbed by the local economy in Aceh whilst 60% leaves the province again. As observed by LPJK Aceh, this reverse flow of reconstruction aid to Aceh is caused by four factors. Firstly, that most of the project tenders were won by contractors from outside Aceh; secondly, construction work is often further subcontracted to yet more companies from outside Aceh; thirdly, most of the project workers come from outside Aceh; and fourthly, that most building material comes from outside Aceh.
The fact that only 40% percent of the reconstruction budget is spent in Aceh raises the question: how much of the reconstruction aid for Aceh is trickling down to the ordinary Acehnese people in the *gampong*, the Acehnese villages? Or, to put it in a more general way: with all the trillions of rupiahs flowing into Aceh, how much of it will go towards raising the standard of living and improving the lives of the rural Acehnese, who constitute the majority of the population?

*Rebuilding infrastructure*

The reconstruction of major infrastructure projects damaged by the December 2004 tsunami has often been carried out by state-owned civil engineering companies and managed under the umbrella of the Department of Public Works. For example, PT Wijaya Karya, PT PP, PT Waskita Karya, PT Adhi Karya, PT Istaka Karya, PT Hutama Karya and PT Nindya Karya. PT Wijaya Karya is the main or sole contractor of the Buddhist Tzu Chi Foundation that was responsible for building the asbestos-walled houses in Banda Aceh and Meulaboh. PT PP has also been chosen as the contractor to build several buildings financed by donations from readers of *Kompas*, Indonesia’s largest daily newspaper.

Despite the dominant role of state-owned construction companies, a number of private, local enterprises have also won contracts, particularly in road construction. For example, local businessman, H. T. Alaidinsyah, also known as Haji Tito, who is the only local Acehnese contractor who owns heavy equipment for road building and the construction of bridges. However, the roads built by this local businessman are of poor quality, which may be linked to his readiness to ‘serve’ district and provincial politicians and bureaucrats. Meanwhile, the Japanese and US governments have been involved in building the West Coast road from Banda Aceh to Meulaboh.

In another development, according to sources in the Aceh office of WALHI (the Indonesian Environmental Forum), interviewed in Aceh on 9 April 2007, PT Mega Power Mandiri - a member company of the Bukaka Group which is owned by the Kalla brothers, has won the tender to build the first and second Peusangan Hydropower Plants on the Peusangan River.
Moreover, the reconstruction of millions of houses and other buildings has created a lucrative market for several cement producers such as the PT Semen Andalas Indonesia cement factory (PT SAI), which has a wide network of distributors in Aceh. PT SAI, however, is facing tough competition from cement imported from Java from companies such as PT Indocement Tunggal Prakarsa Tbk and PT Holcim Indonesia Tbk (formerly known as PT Semen Cibinong), and from PT Semen Padang, a state-owned company based in West Sumatra. Both Java-based cement factories formerly belonged to members of Soeharto’s extended family. PT Holcim Indonesia has enjoyed an advantage in Aceh and Nias as Kuntoro Mangkusubroto, the head of BRR NAD-Nias, has been a commissioner of PT Holcim Indonesia Tbk since December 2001.

*Supplying the ‘disaster economy’*

The influx of expatriates involved in relief, rehabilitation and reconstruction work has created the demand for hotels, cafes, restaurants, coffee shops, and up-to-date means of communication such as mobile phones. Swiss-Belhotel International, set up its subsidiary in Banda Aceh, which in June 2007 was taken over by Hermes Thamrin, the CEO of Nokia Indonesia, and its name changed to Hermes Hotel. A slightly cheaper hotel is the Oasis which is owned by Todung Mulya Lubis, a well-known Jakarta-based top business lawyer and human rights activist and his business partner, John Sinaga, architect and owner of Hotel Silintong on Samosir Island on Lake Toba. Fast food restaurants such as KFC, A&W, Pizza Hut, Pizza House and Texas Fried Chicken have also appeared in Banda Aceh. Some Acehnese refugees who have returned from Malaysia have opened a Malaysian-style *roti canai mamak* restaurant and a Thai-style *tom yam* restaurant.

Unlike other parts of Indonesia where cars originating from Japan and South Korea dominate the market, in Aceh dealers of cars from Western Europe and North America in particular compete to outsell each other. The relief, rehabilitation and reconstruction boom has also created a flourishing market for a number of airlines including Lion Air, a private airline in which the Kalla’s younger brother, Halim Kalla, was a pioneering chairman and Susi Air owned by Susi, a female entrepreneur who markets shrimps from Pangandaran, West Java.
During the initial emergency phase, the military played an important, and in some places, a decisive role in monopolising relief. During the initial rehabilitation and reconstruction phase, the Indonesian Army was also involved in opening up the road from Teunom to Arongan in West Aceh. Although the military doesn’t seem to have extensive business interests in West Aceh, they provide security for Surya Paloh’s coal and gold mining operations.

Military businesses can be identified as businesses affiliated with military institutions, businesses owned by relatives or family members of top military officials and the renting of military owned properties to private companies. One example is the sawmill in Jalan Kotalintang Bawah in Kota Kuala Simpang in Aceh Tamiang district, where logs from both legal and illegal logging operations are sawn into lumber and sold to the public. Another example is the case of the children of a former regional army commander, just like the children of other powerful elites at provincial and district levels, who benefited from reconstruction funds by using cronies such as Dek Gam and Dek Cut through PT Sinar Desa, and Marzuki Bintang.

As Aryos Nivada has shown in his report for the Research Institute for Democracy and Peace (RIDEP Institute) in Jakarta (2007), the military are still involved in numerous legal and illegal businesses in the territory since the 2004 tsunami ravaged Aceh’s land and people, and even after the Helsinki MoU. For instance, the illegal sale of alcoholic beverages is taking place in Aceh Tamiang, with the military protecting a youth organisation involved in this business. The flood which hit Aceh Tamiang in December 2006 was caused by illegal logging in the Leuser Mountain National Park, carried out by military personnel. Both the military and the police also demand protection money from contractors, through both formal and informal means. Finally one should not forget the companies set up during the Soeharto regime formerly owned by Soeharto’s relatives and cronies, which also include retired military officers. For example, PT Tusam Hutani Lestari, a timber concession in the Gayo Highlands near Takengon, Central Aceh which is owned by (Ret) Lieutenant General Prabowo Subianto and his younger brother, Hasyim Djojohadikusumo (Swasembada 24 Nov.-3 Dec. 2008: 114). This and other companies are threatened by Governor Irwandi’s pledge to implement a moratorium on all logging activities in
Aceh, regardless of whether they are illegal or legal. The decreasing extra-budgetary, and basically illegal income of military-backed, or military-owned companies in Aceh was probably the driving force behind the increasing paramilitary disturbances in Aceh’s eastern coast where most of the huge industrial centres area located. These incidents, supported by factions in the security forces – military as well as police - may be seen as attempts to revive their bargaining power to demand high protection fees from Exxon Mobile.

Business groups of former GAM combatants

Since the signing of the MoU between representatives of the Indonesian state and GAM, former top officials of GAM and its military wing, the TNA (Tentara Negara Aceh) have begun to focus on economic development with a strong emphasis on strengthening economic ties between Aceh and Malaysia. The most prominent of these companies, or company groups, is the Pulo Gadeng Group led by Tengku Muzakkir Manaf, a former TNA commander. At the time of writing, Muzakir Manaf lead the KPA (Komite Peralihan Aceh, or Aceh Transitional Committee), a body created to facilitate the transition of former GAM combatants into civilian life in Aceh.

The Pulo Gadeng Group is using the Sabang free port on the island of Weh, north of the Aceh mainland, to export coconuts, betel nut and cocoa from Sabang and mainland Aceh to Malaysia, and to import used and brand new luxurious cars. In its maiden voyage from Malaysia to Aceh, the Malaysian ship, Jatra III, shipped luxurious cars for use by GAM officials in Aceh. Then, responding to the policy of Governor Irwandi Yusuf, a former GAM leader himself, to open the province to foreign investors, Muzakir Manaf announced new ventures that his Pulo Gadeng Group was planning during a press conference in Lhokseumawe on 8 April 2007. These include a light steel factory in Krueng Raya (Aceh Besar). This factory was intended to supply the needs of the construction of 30,000 houses for tsunami victims in Pidie, Aceh Besar, and in the town of Banda Aceh and its environs. Other ventures in the same industrial complex in Krueng Raya include an animal feed mill and a plastics factory.44

Other companies involving former GAM members include Aceh World Trade Centre (AWTC) Dagang Holding, PT Aneuk Nanggroe Expedition Bireuen, PT Megah Mulia, and PT Halimun Meugah Raya. The director of AWTC is the former head of GAM for
Malaysia and Australia, Nurdin Abdul Rahman. Other former GAM commanders have also set up companies both for their own benefit as well as that of their supporters. The KPA chief for Pase, Tengku Zulkarnaen, is coordinating the formation of trading companies and workshops in the Pase and Lhokseumawe area, asking former TNA combatants to contribute IDR 12 million each. Member companies cover many places in the Pase area such as Matangkuli, Gendong, Pantonlabu, Tanah Jambo Aye and Sawang sub-districts. While Teungku Nashiruddin bin Ahmed, a former GAM negotiator in Helsinki, has set up his own building materials company and is active in multilevel marketing.

The flourishing businesses of former TNA commanders and top GAM officials has created dissatisfaction among the lower ranks of the former guerrilla army, since the ‘trickling down’ effect has been very limited. Many former TNA foot soldiers remain some of the poorest of the poor in Aceh. Most of them are unemployed and many of them also lost their homes in the 2004 tsunami. In former West Aceh district, which has been divided up into the districts of Nagan Raya and Aceh Jaya, former TNA local commanders (panglima sagoe and panglima wilayah) have been recruited as land-clearing and security contractors for mining companies. This is also the case with Surya Paloh’s coal mine in Nagan Raya, where Juragan, the former panglima wilayah and consequently Nagan Raya KPA chief, was employed by Surya Paloh for land clearing and security purposes. While in West Aceh, PT Agrabudi coal mine also employed panglima sagoe for similar purposes.

In Aceh Jaya, however, the role of the former panglima sagoe has not been so blatantly pro-business. Yet former combatants, who are currently members of the local KPA office, have been involved in consultations between PT Boswa Megalopolis and the local government and villagers in the sub-district of Panga. This company practice of employing former GAM commanders as security and land clearing contractors – or brokers – may jeopardise the relations between the former freedom fighters and the grassroots communities who had helped protect GAM members in the past from the Indonesian security forces.

A better policy of assisting the transition of former combatants into peaceful business is the plan of the Aceh Jaya district government to distribute two hectares of oil palm plantations to former combatants who joined the KPA. Apart from this minor
exception, one can say that in general the very pragmatic policy of transforming former guerrilla units and combatants into business units and businessmen seems to completely disregard the lessons that could be learned from the negative history of the Indonesian military and its ‘dual function’ as well as the transition of former guerrillas in Timor Leste (Aditjondro 2007b, 2008).

Oil palm, Aceh’s prima donna?

There seems to be a strong affinity amongst former GAM combatants and the Aceh administration in general towards doing business with Malaysia. Since flights opened up between Banda Aceh and Malaysia, investment from Malaysia has been pioneered by the North Aceh district government by inviting Metro Pajang, a Malaysian company, to build a palm oil factory utilising the Crude Palm Oil (CPO) tank at the Krueng Geukeh port. In addition, according to North Aceh acting district head, Teuku Pribadi, Metro Panjang also plans to develop the district’s fishery potential. Governor Irwandi’s open door policy towards Malaysia has been welcomed by Malaysian palm oil companies which have established the Aceh Plantation Development Authority (APDA) in collaboration with Acehnese businesses. The APDA plans to open up 145,000 hectares of oil palm plantations in the province, supported by the Malaysian Islamic Economic Development Foundation (Yayasan Pembangunan Ekonomi Malaysia). These plantations will supply oil palm kernels to thirteen CPO factories with a total investment of USD 488 million. A visit to Aceh on 31 March 2007 by Malaysia’s Finance Minister Hilmi Bin Haji Yahaya included a helicopter tour of several districts accompanied by Vice Governor Muhammad Nazar which further consolidated Malaysia’s intention to invest in palm oil estates and shrimp farms. At the time of writing, around thirty companies have opened up nearly 130,000 hectares for oil palm plantations. This will certainly threaten the fragile ecological balance of Aceh’s forest cover. These plantations are also Indonesian-owned and include the nearly 7,000 hectares PT Woyla Raya Abadi, owned by former Aceh Governor, Abdullah Puteh; the 7,000 hectares PT Delima Makmur and the more than 3,000 hectares PT Sisirau, owned by Acehnese businessman and former Soeharto loyalist, Ibrahim Risyad; and the more than 8,000 hectares PT Gelora Sawita Makmur owned by the family of General (Ret.) Bustanil Arifin, a Soeharto loyalist who used to manage Soeharto’s most lucrative foundations.
While having declared a moratorium on all forms of logging, Irwandi Yusuf has not seriously considered the implications of further opening up Aceh’s forest oil palm plantations. Similarly the Gayo Highlands are being encroached by oil palm plantations along with rapid expansion of the famous coffee planting too. In addition to coffee, gold and oil palm, foreign interests have been attracted to the Gayo highlands to develop the hydro-electric power potential of the Peusangan River, which flows out from Lake Lot Tawar. This development is likely to have negative social impact as hundreds of local farmers have been farming carp in fish cages, or karamba, for years there.

Conclusion

Much empirical evidence serves to support the argument that the main logic of Kalla’s peacemaking in the Moluccas and Central Sulawesi has been to foster profitable business for all major parties, from the local combatants and infighting elites to the military and big business at the expense of ordinary people and sustainable development. This in turn has generated elitism, lack of accountability, serious democratic deficits, corruption, collusion, nepotism and new conflicts over these privileges.

As is clear from Chapter 1 and other contributions to this volume, the ‘profitable peace’ strategy in Aceh had been somewhat hampered by the international involvement in the post-tsunami relief and reconstruction and the more democratic framework that was outlined in the Helsinki MoU and then applied with comparatively remarkable consistency. Yet, as has also been clear from this chapter, similar dynamics are also at play in Aceh and are likely to expand. Politically and militarily facilitated profitable business ventures proliferate. This tendency is likely to gain further ground as international donors reduce their engagement and as big businesses use the new infrastructure to exploit raw materials and the environment if the framework that was initiated in Helsinki is not further developed so that new democratic leadership, institutions and popular participation can offer an alternative roadmap to sustainable and rights based social and economic development.
Profitable Peace

(Endnotes)
1 The lead writer (SAP) wishes to express his gratitude to several friends in the conflict areas, whose names cannot be mentioned for security reason, who directly or indirectly have helped him to access field and secondary data. SAP specifically wishes to express his most profound gratitude to George Junus Aditjondro who has given the permission to use his papers and research as SAP’s writing material. In fact the Aceh section is based almost entirely on Aditjondro’s writings. Teresa Birks contributed additional data and both Olle Törnquist and Teresa Birks also assisted in the structuring and editing of the text. Needless to say, the final responsibility for the text remains with the lead author.

2 Jusuf Kalla during his visit to the United States, quoted in Media Indonesia, 25 September 2006.

3 Hamid Awaludin was later alleged to have helped Tommy Soeharto secrete around USD 10 million of illegal earnings to a European bank and was removed from the cabinet notwithstanding Jusuf Kalla’s support. Another of Jusuf Kalla’s South Sulawesi friends, Nurdin Halid, was imprisoned for two years for the misuse of USD 18 million of state palm oil funds. One day before sentencing, Jusuf Kalla had appointed Nurdin to sit in Indonesian parliament. Despite the Supreme Court verdict Jusuf Kalla defended Nurdin’s appointment saying that it was not necessary to strip Nurdin of his membership because ‘he had only been sentenced to two years in jail.’ Jakarta Post, ‘Ethnic Patronage’ editorial, 19 September 2007.

4 Kalla’s 2009 bid for presidency failed and since handing over the chair of Golkar to Aburizal Bakrie in October 2009, Jusuf Kalla announced that he was leaving public office and returning to the private sector, Jakarta Post, ‘Jusuf Kalla says farewell to public office’ 20 October 2009.

5 In the case of Poso, Kalla said that the cost of peace – less than USD 108.6 million, is similar to the cost of funding a one-year military operation, Jakarta Post 8 April 2007 ‘peaceful solution to conflict cheaper.’

6 Jakarta Post 9 February 2008, ‘vice president pushes for simplified political system’

7 Jakarta Post 8 April 2007 ‘peaceful solution to conflict cheaper.’ He is not alone in this, with a number of critics at international level arguing that too many freedoms and too much democracy generate more conflict and abuse of power than it resolves and that democracy should thus be ‘sequenced’ (e.g. Mansfield and Snyder 2005). For further discussion see Chapter 1 of this volume.

8 See Aragon (2007), pp 49-86, which was translated from Nordholt and Klinken (2007), Also see ICG (2008a)


10 Famously, it has been estimated that seventy percent of the military’s budget is off-budget, i.e. income derived from their many businesses. The TNI was due to transfer all its businesses to the government 2006-2008 with government undertaking an audit thereof.

11 The RPKAD were the precursors to Indonesia’s notorious Army Special Forces, Kopassus (Komando Pasukan Khasus).


14 See Stanley (n.d) and Sarwono (2001), pp. 57-61.

15 Later this incident initiated long and persistent diplomatic pressure from the world, hence, the President B.J. Habibie endorsed the referendum for the Timor Leste people.

16 The uprisings noted were occurring in Pekalongan, Situbondo, Rengasdengklok, Temanggung, Banyuwangi, Ketapang, Jakarta, Makassar, Sanggau Ledo, Central Kalimantan, Kupang, Wamena, Merauke, and of course the tragedy of May 13-14 1998.

17 There has been an analysis presented that the uprising in Ambon was a manifestation and effect of the insurgence in Ketapang. It was identified as part of the people struggle between the ‘status quo’ group against the pro-reformation group and the President Abdurrahman Wahid government. See LIPI Research Team (2005), pp. 86-87.

18 See e.g. van Klinken (2007) and Nordholt et.al (2007).

19 See LIPI (2005), pp. 86-87 and Salampessy and Husain (2001),

20 This section is based on Aditjondro (2000)


22 HRW (1999) and Klinken (2007)

23 Absence Without Leave – military term

24 See Dr. Indria Samego (1998) and Aditjondro (1998)


26 *Waspada*, May 22 1999. Waspada covered the news quoted from Antara. See Aditjondro (2005a)


28 Barito Pacific Group controls PT Green Delta (HPH or forest concession covering 124,000 hectares, mature in December 2000); PT HBI Buntu Marannu (concession covering 48,000 hectares, mature in July 2007); PT Mangole Timber Producers (concessions covering 191,800 hectares and a plywood plant on the island of Mangole, partly expiring in October 2010, and the rest April 2013); PT Seram Cahaya Timber (concession covering 58,000 hectares on Seram island, until January 2012); PT Taliabu Timber (concessions covering 100,000 hectares and plywood factory in Mangole island, expiring July 2009); PT Trio Maluku Pacific Raya (concessions covering 105,000 hectares until February 2001); PT Tunggal Agathis Indah Wood Industry (concessions covering 125,000 hectares and plywood factory on Jailolo island, until August 2012); PT Tunas Forestra (concessions covering 42,300 hectares, until April 2012); PT Wana Adhi Guna (concessions covering 64,000 hectares, until March 2009); glue factory PT Wiranusa Trisatya on Taliabu island, and PT Yurina Wood Industry plywood factory in Ternate, source: Aditjondro (2005)


31 This section is based on Aditjondro (2008a)

32 Description about the benefits enjoy either by personal or institutional behind the violence happened in Posi can be read in Sangaji (2007)
At Inco’s Investor Summit in Jakarta on 11 November 2008, Director of Investor Relations Indra Ginting said that Inco were, ‘aggressively pursuing cost and production improvements’ and that there was ‘high potential for future expansion’ whilst admitting that they were ‘operating under high socio-economic pressures’

Presentation by PT Inco Director for Investor Relations, Indra Ginting, November 2008, Jakarta http://www.idx.co.id/Portals/0/Repository/Makalah/ISCME%202008/Emiten/20081126_PT-Inco.pdf


Aditjondro (2005a) Also see Muslimun (2007).

When no other sources are mentioned, this section on Aceh are based on Aditjondro (2007b-c) and sources therein.

At the time of writing this chapter, Prabowo Subianto was a presidential candidate, supported by Gerindra (Gerakan Indonesia Raya), the political party he founded. It could be expected that in the 2009 elections, Gerindra would support candidates from the Gayo region, which was known among the Acehnese freedom fighters as a base of military-backed militia groups during the battles between TNA and TNI.

For instance, The Group has built another steel mill in the Arongan Lambalek subdistrict (West Aceh). Its products, using the trade mark Ubong Beusoe, have been used by BRR NAD-Nias since mid March 2007. Then, in the mountain resort of Takengon in Central Aceh, Pulo Gadeng will develop horticulture production, to export potatoes and vegetables to Malaysia, under an MoU recently signed with Malaysian business peoples. To further promote Aceh’s export and import trade, Pulo Gadeng plans to upgrade the facilities of the Malahayati port at the Krueng Raya industrial complex by installing 150 ton cranes at the port, which is hopefully completed at the end of April 2007. Thereby, construction materials could also be uploaded and downloaded from ships at that port. And in the Aceh Jaya district, according to sources in Meulaboh, the group is also expanding its business tentacles. Under Pulo Gadeng’s umbrella are PT Bank Perkreditan Rakyat Syariah (BPRS) Samudera Niaga; PT Matangkuli Perdana; PT Krueng Kureutou; PT Pandu Buana Nusantara; CV Aneuk Piranha, and CV Mawar Sejati. One of the more recent projects of the Pulo Gadeng Group is based on a memorandum of agreement (MoU) between the Group and a younger brother of Surya Paloh, to build eleven gas stations in Aceh. Those eleven gas stations were distributed among eleven ex- Panglima Wilayah, or regional commanders of TNA, whose positions have been transformed into district heads of KPA. (Aditjondro 2007b-c).
References


agraria yang diselenggarakan oleh Perkumpulan Bantaya di Palu, 26 Januari.


Aditjondro, George, Junus & Purwanto, Eddy, 2008. ‘We are baby turtles, who have to be close to the sea’. A case study of Tsunami victims, whose resettlement rights are threatened by a USAID-financed highway in Aceh, Northern Sumatera, Indonesia. Working Paper. Jakarta: INFID.


*Down to Earth* Brutal crackdown at Newcrest’s Halmahera mine leaves one dead. *Down to Earth*. No.60, February 2004.
Down to Earth, Mass protests challenge Inco. Down to Earth. No. 67, November 2005.
Husain, Thamrin, 2001,.. Ketika Semerbak Cengkih Tergusur Asap Mesiu, Tapak Ambon, (When the Scent of Cloves Lost in Gun Powder, Trace of Ambon) Jakarta,
Jakarta Post, ‘Ethnic Patronage’ editorial, 19 September 2007,
Jakarta Post, 8 April, 2007
Jakarta Post, Jusuf Kalla says farewell to public office’, 20 October 2009
Jakarta Post, ‘Peaceful solution to conflict cheaper.’, 8 April 2007
Kompas, 19 April 2006.
Media Indonesia, 25 September 2006
Nivada, Aryos, 200. Kerajaan Bisnis Militer plus Bisnis Militer GAM di Provinsi NAD.


Tempo Magazine Bisnis senjata di jantung Poso., Bisnis senjata di jantung Poso, 5-11 Februari 2007


Tempo, Di bawah lindungan kubah. Tempo, 5-11 Februari 2007


The Jakarta Post, Vice president pushes for simplified political system, The Jakarta Post, 8 April 2008.

Waspada, 22 May,1999.

The Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) signed in Helsinki on August 15th 2005 aimed at ending the long-lasting conflict between the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) and the Indonesian government over the political status of Indonesia’s Aceh province. The provisions of the MoU laid out the political and legal conditions for the establishment of local political parties and thus provided GAM with an opportunity, for the first time, to pursue executive powers through the ballot box. By the end of 2006 Aceh had a legal framework in place for greater autonomy and local elections were held on December 11th 2006. Despite the fact that GAM had failed to mobilise as one political party, former GAM members ran as independent candidates and gained more than 50% of the positions as district heads. Irwandi Yusuf, a senior rebel representative was elected governor of Aceh. The conventional expectation prior to the local elections in Aceh was that GAM would not do particularly well. It was considered too fragmented and too weakly rooted in the social fabric of Aceh to actually win. Another conventional wisdom was that GAM would face great difficulties in transforming itself from a small
and ideologically narrow guerrilla group into a political party with extensive support across Aceh. Despite these concerns, there was genuine hope amongst observers that GAM would overcome the obstacles facing them and in fact do well. This hope can only derive from an overall expectation that without GAM playing centre-stage in Acehnese politics, peace would be a difficult project to maintain in the long run. The victory of GAM’s party, Partai Aceh (PA), in the 2009 election only serves to strengthen these perceptions.

This trend of rebel-group transformation has been identified as one of the key factors for the implementation of successful peace agreements, and much money is invested in building up party organisations and running elections in post-conflict settings. In such war-to-democracy transitions, the acceptance of former insurgency movements as carriers of a legitimate political voice also fulfils the purpose of broadening the democratic base in previously semi-democratic settings. Such transformations have proven significant in the transitions to peace and democracy in diverse settings such as Mozambique (Renamo), Namibia (SWAPO), Cambodia (FUNICINEP) and El Salvador (FMLN) just to mention a few (De Zeeuw 2008, Kovacs 2008).

Despite the fact that inclusion of former rebel groups into the political process has proven necessary in order to end the war through negotiated settlement, it raises several key concerns. First, the conditions for conducting armed struggle are very different from those that encourage democratisation. The hierarchical, militant and undemocratic nature of rebel forces such as GAM may in the end serve to counter the emergence of transparent, democratic and inclusive politics. Second, in order to avoid the return to armed struggle, one crucial factor for the securing of peace is the positioning of former rebels in key executive positions. At the time of negotiating a settlement with provisions for the rebels to run for elections, there is no guarantee that former rebels will in fact gain enough votes.1

The purpose of this chapter is to explain the political transformation of GAM as a central factor for the successful peace agreement. By looking at specific turning points in the course of changing dynamics of power relations within and beyond the insurgency movement, the following discussion highlights a particular set of opportunity structures as significant transformative dynamics. In the following discussion, GAM is treated as a political actor whose
room for maneuver is determined by a number of opportunities available at particular times and in relation to a clearly defined space for action. First, the chapter provides a comparative framework for understanding the transformation of insurgency movements. Second, the historical background for GAM’s mobilization is viewed in relation to a set of initial mobilising structures before moving onto analysing the transformation of GAM in more recent years. The main argument centres attention on the changing dynamics of the Indonesian state combined with parallel shifts in organisational capacity and ideological basis as key explanatory factors for GAM’s transformation. The chapter adopts a comparative historical and sociological perspective in order to understand GAM’s significant transformation. The chapter focuses attention on the structures which determined GAM’s current trajectory by analysing the period of conflict up until the first round of local elections in 2006.

The transformation of armed insurgency movements

Most contemporary peace processes include simultaneous efforts at democratisation. Inclusion of armed insurgency groups into the political party system in post-conflict societies is considered key to securing such transitions (Zartman 1995, 227-338). The complex picture of civil wars is very much defined by the motivations and dynamics of the insurgency movements and thus their relative capacity to mobilise support and funds to carry on the conflict. The central question asked here is what factors determine the manner in which insurgency movements fare in government? Despite the focus in policy circles on the relevance of rebel-to-party transformation in the post-settlement period, the movements themselves have received scant attention by scholars. In the general literature, insurgency movements and rebel groups are most commonly discussed primarily in terms of their expressed goals and ideology related to their demands for secession and establishment of separate statehood, as has been the case with movements such as GAM or the LTTE, or general demands for political reform as exemplified by the Maoist insurgency in Nepal. In a significant body of literature highlights the role of ‘greed’ as a motivational force for rebels that is also increasingly discussed in terms of their illegality in relation to coercion and violence in armed conflict (e.g. Keen 2000, Berdal 2003 and 2005). This body of literature is of significance
for understanding the emergence of insurgency groups, the onset of conflict, and the motivations behind rebellion.

Some recent advances in civil war studies have brought to the forefront issues relating to the agency in conflict. For example, Weinstein (2006) focuses on the internal organisation of rebel movements in his endeavour to understand why some insurgencies are so much more violent than others. Bøås and Dunn (2007) look at the emergence and evolvement of African guerrillas and view them in relation to particular political goals and grievances relevant to the individual cases, whereas De Zeeuw (2008) in a collection of case studies foregrounds the particular issues and problems facing rebel movements in their transformation to political parties in the aftermath of peace processes by looking at some of the opportunities and limitations ingrained in these processes. These studies bring to the forefront the complexities of armed insurgencies and their organisational expression. Motivation varies greatly between, but also within, insurgency movements and thus when tracing their organisational expression, ideology and membership basis during the course of armed conflict, it is obvious that their internal dynamics are altered and changed in correspondence to shifting external environments. In other words, the change mechanisms which encourage such shifts are located both externally and internally to the movements themselves.

Despite this new trend, the above body of literature provides few analytical tools for analysing the movement in its own right. The labels conventionally used to describe and position armed insurgency movements have often served to blur rather than clarify the strengths and political role of such movements. One typology which promises to overcome such obstacles is Clapham’s typology of guerrilla movements which usefully separates between liberation movements, separatist insurgencies, reform movements, and warlord insurgencies (Clapham 1998 and 2007)² providing readymade categories to situate ‘guerrilla groups’ in relation to their goals, specific organisation or ideological foundations. Although derived for convenience rather than from clearly demarcated analytical categories, the typology proves a useful framing tool for tracing GAM’s transformation. As is illustrated by the following discussion, most insurgency movements fall into more than one of these categories.
The original denominator for *liberation movements* was those fighting against colonial powers and white minority rule, although across the colonial world they differed significantly from one another (Clapham 2007). Most armed insurgencies in Asia do characterise themselves as *liberation movements*. GAM is no exception to this, propagating a liberation struggle as part of an ethno-nationalist struggle for an independent Aceh, although as will be illustrated in the next section of this chapter, ethno-nationalism as expressed by GAM’s founder Hasan di Tiro was as much an ideological expression of, and reaction to, increased centralisation following Soeharto’s rise to power. In comparison, communist insurgencies in the Philippines and Nepal also continuously refer to themselves as liberators of the lower classes – with a stated political goal of taking over the state. As such, the label *liberation movement* is mostly an ideologically prescribed label which may serve useful as a category, but not as an analytical demarcation in understanding GAM’s continued existence and transformation.

In contrast, the label *separatist* captures the explicit goal of the movements, but very much in the same manner as the label ‘liberation movements’, serves to blur critical discussion of how the movements change and alter their goals over time. Clearly, the separatist label lends itself most easily to GAM, but again fails to capture change in social capacity and the extent of its local power basis. How for example do we perceive such movements when they modify their separatist demands as has been the case for a number of such movements over the years?

On that note, the so-called *reform insurgencies* have included those groups which profess a new political agenda very different from that which currently governs (Clapham 2007). Classical insurgencies of this kind are most easily found in the African continent such as Museveni’s in Uganda and Kagame’s Rwanda. These insurgencies were welcomed as social forces opposing authoritarian forms of statehood proposing an agenda for democracy and participation. In the Asian context, it has been a rare phenomenon that insurgency movements have evolved as direct responses to authoritarian rule, although clearly some would argue that regime protest lay at the heart of the Maoist insurgencies in Nepal and the Philippines. Despite some rather dispiriting and illiberal efforts at reforming government, the label
is perhaps more useful than the other two as it highlights that new and old insurgency movements tend to incorporate in their political platforms some notions of democracy as governing principles once they are in power, especially as international mediation becomes a viable alternative. Clearly, this has been the case with the Maoist insurgency in Nepal from its inception, whereas movements such as the LTTE and GAM have incorporated it at a later stage, with the caveat that this does not say anything about how these movements will actually fare once they are in power. As already discussed, core aspects of negotiated settlements assume that democratic principles of reform are included into the overall framework of rebel-to-party transformation as part of the peace building package. An intriguing and important question however, is the extent to which increased focus on democratic principles at an early stage will have an impact on the relative success of the post-conflict democratisation process. This will be further elaborated on in relation to GAM and its transformation.

The remaining category which is increasingly used when goals and ideology are not as easily discerned is ‘warlord insurgencies’. Rather than focus on a group’s ideology and goals, the label refers to a particular type of strong, localised and personalised leadership often related to decentralised authority and the lack of strict command (Reno 1998, Clapham 2007). It emphasises the economic benefits of a particular group of political entrepreneurs, gained from insurgent warfare often at high costs to the civilian population. Besides references to brutal wars in Africa, the concept proves useful in the Indonesian context to the extent that it can serve to highlight particular structures of personalised localised power networks which are ingrained with more informal methods of economic extraction. An emphasis on warlordism has been used rather uncritically in studies where the illegality of informal economic extraction is highlighted. Schultze has been perhaps the most outspoken proponent of this perspective in Aceh, arguing that GAM commanders carved out fiefdoms and operated as warlords within their designated areas at times of military expansion (Schultze 2004, see also McCulloch 2003). Compared to classical examples of warlord insurgencies, GAM emerged not from the shadow of one or several strongmen waging war to gain access to particular sources of power, although certain traits of warlordism might have
evolved within the socio-political space of protracted social conflict at particular turning points of GAM’s existence. As such, aspects of this configuration may help shed light on significant structures and dimensions of political economy and localised leadership within armed insurgency movements. In this respect, the combination of a reform agenda and the more problematic basis of coercion in combination with an increasingly illegitimate political economy of an expanding insurgency bring out the complex nature of such movements.

The brief discussion above has served to situate GAM within the broader context of armed insurgency movements and brings to the forefront a twofold categorisation which can now be employed to provide a more systematic account of the emerging and changing structure and basis of GAM. GAM is hereby analysed in relation to the two dimensions (i) reform and democracy, and (ii) political economy. The latter refers to GAM as an insurgency movement, its hegemonic structures of dominance which evolved as a necessary result of its military strategy, while the former highlights the movement in relation to its reform agenda. The chapter analyses GAM in relation to these two categories by looking at the types of mobilising structures and political opportunities that facilitate the existence, persistence as well as the shifting nature of the movement during the course of conflict. A focus on such changing opportunities available to GAM serves to capture the particular mechanisms that have enabled specific transformations of the movement, and to thus view current dynamics and trends in light of these specific opportunities.

**Background: initial mobilising structures in the Aceh conflict**

This section discusses the mobilising structures that have dominated much of the academic discussion of the GAM insurgency. It briefly touches upon the ideological and ideational foundation of the movement and adopts a critical perspective of the notion that the GAM insurgency represents continuity from previous periods, emphasising the role of GAM as a political actor reacting to, and developing in relation with, a set of opportunities available to it.

The Aceh conflict was driven by strong regional interests, but unlike many of its contemporaries elsewhere, this centre-periphery dimension was not enhanced by conflicting lines of
Another significant difference with similar types of nationalist insurgencies such as the ones in the Southern Philippines and Kashmir where insurgency movements are highly fragmented, is that GAM in Aceh has remained impressively cohesive and unified throughout the course of the conflict, at least in the sense that no alternative paramilitary factions evolved.

In the general discourse on nationalism in Aceh there are two dominant and interrelated perspectives which have set the parameters for how the conflict is understood by observers as well as by the actors themselves. These are the image of the past and the reality of the present, perspectives which tend to view the insurgency as emerging automatically from either the pre-modern ethnic community or as a result of social processes (Aspinall 2008). In this respect, the former refers to the dominant role of primordial notions in shaping and reshaping the ideological foundation of the movement whereas the latter refers more clearly to the kinds of mobilising structures that are related to issues of internal colonialism. GAM has based its ideological rationale on both, while it can be argued that internal colonialism is the mobilising structure that has transcended the various phases of the conflict.

The primary ideological foundation of GAM relates to the struggle to define an identity and the attempts at internalising this identity in relation to a political struggle defined in terms of its opposition to the Indonesian central state. For the early GAM ideologues under the leadership of the Acehnese intellectual Hasan di Tiro, Aceh was distinct and incompatible with the Republic of Indonesia, which in their view was merely a Javanese construct with whom the Acehnese had ‘no historic, political, cultural, economic, or geographic relationship’. This incompatibility was further exacerbated by the notion that Aceh had ‘always been a free and independent Sovereign State since the world begun.’ Based on the notion of the pre-modern Acehnese sultanate, GAM’s ideological foundation was based on the proposition that the political goal of the insurgency was to re-establish political structure as the basis for the political organisation of the independent state.

Independence was depicted not as an act of breaking away from the Indonesian state, but in order to restore the sovereignty of Aceh as it had been before the Dutch annexation of the region in 1873, after the Aceh War (Sulaiman 2006). Deducting from this logic,
he also considered the transfer of the region to Indonesia after WWII as illegal, based on the idea that the Dutch East Indies was supposed to be disintegrated with decolonisation, and that Aceh was to regain its independence on the basis of its former status of sultanate. The GAM insurgency thus found opportunities to wage war on the state within the narratives of long-time opposition to outsiders, most notably the Dutch colonial state.  

While both the government of Indonesia and the Acehnese nationalists portray their people and land as natural and permanent entities, historical evidence suggest that they should be understood as relatively recent social and political constructs. In a recent analysis, Aspinall (2008) breaks with previous dominant readings of Aceh’s historical past by emphasising the novelty of Acehnese nationalism, suggesting that notions of separate identities as parameters of statehood only became significant ethno-nationalist markers for an Acehnese nation with centralisation under the New Order regime.  

Politics and power in the Indonesian archipelago in the aftermath of decolonisation was characterised by political instability and high levels of competition between political elites and various social forces. Aceh’s position in the post-colonial state was very much determined by competition and alliance building between an increasingly fragmented Acehnese elite (McGibbon 2006). First, none of the established elite groups managed to impose a stable hegemony over local politics in the years following independence. Despite the implementation of a democratic system of rule in the post-colonial state, the Jakartan elite demonstrated repeated unease with the potential of local religious elites to generate popular support, based on the fear that it would undermine the secular nationalist underpinnings of the state. Thus, while the colonial state had ruled indirectly through aristocratic elites in Aceh, the Indonesian government was far less willing to ally with the popular Islamic leaders, the ulema. Competition between the ulema and secular nationalists loyal to Jakarta exacerbated tensions culminating in the Darul Islam rebellion in 1949.  

Second, the regional autonomy status which was granted to Aceh following the crackdown of the Darul Islam rebellion in the 1950s (McGibbon 2006), contributed to shaping and normalising Acehnese identity in face of an increasingly authoritarian Indonesian state. The special status of regional autonomy was viewed by the intellectual elite in particular
in relation to democratic principles of governance, illustrated by a document written by Hasan di Tiro himself entitled ‘Democracy for Indonesia’ (1958) advocating federalism as a structure for the Indonesian state, including Aceh (Schultze 2003). However, with Sukarno’s Guided Democracy and Soeharto’s consequent raise to power in the aftermath of the 1965-66 massacres, the promise of a special position for Aceh within the parameters of the Indonesian state was never fulfilled.

It was from within this political environment of both vertical dilemmas engrained in the opposition between Aceh in the periphery and the Indonesian centre of Jakarta as well as horizontal competition between factions of elites inside Aceh that GAM emerged and developed an ideology based on a vision of an Acehnese past. Aspinall (2008) finds that Hasan di Tiro’s vision of an ancient Acehnese nation illustrated in the previous paragraphs was above all shaped by the two aims of differentiating Aceh from Indonesia and to qualify into the international system of states. This means that GAM’s category of Acehnese nationalism has been largely constructed in response to, and very much at odds with, the development of the post-colonial Indonesian state.

This basis for GAM’s independence ideology reflects a duality which is significant in carriers of conflict. The vision of Aceh’s historical authenticity and incompatibility with Indonesia has been a significant mobilising structure right up until the end of the conflict. Both young and old members of GAM are well-schooled in the mythical images of the stories of the past and such historical narratives form the basis of the now ex-combatants’ reasoning and ideological basis. These notions of statehood were not moderated or reformulated in GAM’s official documents until a meeting in Stavanger Norway in 2002, where newly formulated principles of democracy and human rights replaced the archaic notions of statehood originally formulated by Hasan di Tiro. This decision was taken at a particularly significant turning point of GAM’s organisation and ideational foundation (Schultze 2003). The reformulation came as a result of both an ongoing internal transformation taking place within GAM as well as GAM’s consistent emphasis on garnering external support and international attention on the Aceh-conflict. The major section of this chapter deals with these transformative dynamics more closely.
Thus, the past worked as a mobilising structure in terms of shaping the very ideological foundation of GAM and its insurgency. It is a contested notion however, to assume that the relative strength of the pre-modern Acehnese state laid the foundations for a strong regional identity. Primordial perceptions of Acehnese grandeur do not by themselves provide sufficient explanation for the radicalisation of Acehnese nationalism in the 1970s, nor how it continued to play a viable role in Acehnese political life. This perspective illustrates that it remains problematic to assert that GAM represents an organic expression of the interests of a primordial Acehnese nation. National identity is an elusive concept and as far as primordial identities go, they are expressed through political projects. In the case of Aceh, the political project was taken on by a small group of nationalists who by the mid-1970s saw an opportunity to draw on the enormous disappointment of the Acehnese people. The ideological underpinnings of GAM represent such a political project, but are nevertheless a limited and highly problematic one.

Another perspective of the underlying causes for armed insurgencies is put forward by political economists in response to the problematic notions that the root of radical nationalism is essentially primordial per se. This analysis identifies internal colonialism, i.e. economic exploitation and political domination amongst majority and minority nations in the centre and peripheral regions as the social basis for nationalist movements (Stokke et.al 1999). Proclaimed internal colonialism has not only been at the heart of GAM’s legitimisation for their social and political struggle, but has also formed essential parts of the scholarly analysis of the conflict. This literature has linked economic exploitation and human rights abuses to the persistence and expansion of GAM since the onset of the insurgency (Siegel 2000, Kell 1995, Nessen 2006). The events and processes that have been presented as evidence for this overall structure of economic oppression and political domination centre around a number of concrete policies. Firstly, it concerns natural resources. The development of the Arun fields into one of the largest sources of natural gas revenues in Indonesia was one important factor in the emergence of GAM. Grievances were generated by land alienation, pollution and general negative effects of enclave development as a direct result of the LNG industry’s presence in
Aceh. Although the government dealt with these issues at various stages, most clearly with the allocation of oil and gas revenues to the provincial government through the special autonomy law in 2002, mismanagement and corruption by the local government continued to ensure that local communities saw very little benefit from the transfers from Jakarta (Aspinall 2005: 4, McGibbon 2006). Second, human rights abuses emerged as a core grievance in the shadow of the conflict. Without direct link to the economic dimensions of internal war, heavy militarisation and increased insecurity for the local population emerged as a result of the presence of the ‘colonial’ powers. The conflict took on a special turn in the period from 1990 to 1998, during the so-called DOM period, when areas of Aceh were assigned the label ‘Military Operation Zone’. Disappearances, rape and torture were common features of Indonesia’s war against GAM in Aceh (Robinson 1998, Sukma 2004). Thirdly, poverty and inequality are a direct result of years of conflict. In the 1970s, Aceh had comparatively low poverty rates as compared to the national average in Indonesia (Aspinall 2005). The continuation of protracted conflict is of course one of the core reasons for the increase in poverty-related grievances in Aceh. GAM for its part, would continuously relate economic hardship to the processes of internal colonialism.

These events and processes add up to multidimensional oppression of a small nation by a dominant nation perpetrated through military powers by the state. According to this view, GAM emerged as a representative for the Acehnese in their fight against illegitimate oppressors. Armed struggle was thus the inevitable outcome of internal colonialism.

Certainly the events and processes referred to above have had negative consequences for specific groups of Acehnese. Nevertheless, to characterise the relations between Jakarta and Aceh in Indonesia as a simple matter of internal colonialism is to overlook the particular processes which shape, reshape and mutually reinforce new conflict lines. Within this context, armed insurgency movements are political actors reacting to and developing along the fault lines of particular social and political stratifications on the ground. Arguments about past structures of statehood and of internal colonialism are better viewed as strategic essentialism deployed by GAM rather than an accurate representation of social and political relations in Aceh.
The political transformation of GAM

The tactics of insurgency movements can generally be classified as either violent or non-violent. Viewing the GAM insurgency in light of its political opportunity structures we can now theorise the patterns of behavioural change wherein insurgency groups evolve both to meet changing threats and to broaden their scope of support. The ideal transformation of groups that have initially adhered to violence would flow from an early emphasis on violence and end up by being co-opted into existing political structures and thus refraining from using violence as a tactic. Yet this is not a linear path. The path normally contains setbacks and even deteriorates before the opportunity of levelling out the playing field on the political arena arises. A combination of internal and external factors determine the speed, temporary setbacks and the degree of success of transition from violence to non-violence. This section analyses GAM in relation to the twofold categorisation outlined above, namely GAM as a reform movement and GAM as a militant insurgency movement determined by its political economy.

Initial mobilising structures and political opportunity structures

GAM’s political strategy from the 1980s until the late 1990s was first and foremost characterised by the maintenance of military pressure against the Indonesian state, its infrastructure and security forces by the means of guerrilla warfare. GAM’s main mobilising structures developed on two fronts.

First, amongst a small and informal network of educated young men who were disappointed with the Indonesian government’s policies on Aceh. During the first phase of military confrontation lasting from 1976-1982, this small group worked politically and militarily to ‘awaken the national consciousness of the population (sic)’, and remained as the official leadership of the movement until the signing of the MoU in 2005, leading GAM’s self-proclaimed exiled government from Sweden for about twenty years.

The second more popular front originated from dissatisfied and politically motivated rural dwellers in the areas stretching along the coast from Sigli to Lokhsumawe. Throughout the 1980s, dissatisfied rural populations in GAM’s stronghold functioned as a prime mobilising structure through a multitude of diverse
informal networks and family relations. This locale has remained the core pool from which GAM fighters and supporters have been recruited throughout the course of conflict. In the earliest years of GAM’s existence, they lived at the boundaries of modernity and industrialisation, feeling excluded from the general development projects taking place within and nearby their near locality (Siegel 2000, Aspinall 2005). These networks were produced and reproduced through traditional religious institutions and the network of family loyalty, geographically situated in the areas along the northern coasts. Some observers have emphasised that this geographical area could function as a primary mobilising site both because of its tradition of resistance against the state\(^{10}\) (Reid 2006, Siegel 2000), and because this area is dominated by suku Aceh, the largest ethnic group in the province (Schultze 2003). It is commonly believed that informal social networks which coincide with this identity functioned as an informal mobilising network in GAM’s early days. It is important to note however, that GAM has been particularly sensitive when it comes to ethnicity, claiming to represent all ethnic groups in Aceh, especially given that the overall territory is not dominated by one ethnic group\(^{11}\).

Importantly, GAM’s basis for mobilisation developed and transformed during the course of the conflict. In this respect, the brutal repression of Soeharto’s New Order regime stands as one central explanation for the development of a broader popular basis for GAM evolving during the 1990s (Kell 1995, Robinson 1998). Thus, military brutality against civilians in Aceh naturally became a key source from which GAM could mobilise support. Within the limited framework of the New Order state in Aceh, GAM was about the only viable voice of opposition to it. Many have characterised the violence unleashed in the 1990s as an overreaction to a guerrilla movement that during those years could only boast a few hundred fighters (Nessen 2006). As such, especially during the period of heavy military oppression from 1989-1998 usually referred to as DOM, GAM mobilised military, popular and financial backing from amongst the families of victims of military violence (Robinson 1998, Aspinall 2006). Within the context of a dysfunctional state apparatus and limited opportunities to advance as a social force, GAM represented a viable alternative for young men.
That said, the primary political opportunity structures that facilitated the maintenance of GAM as an independence movement in the face of repeated military crackdown, were actually located outside Aceh. The ‘shadow government’ in Sweden provided ideological, military and strategic leadership from the late 1970s until the 2006 elections. The lines of command remained clear and communication between commanders on the ground and the leadership in Stockholm seems to have been impressively direct. Hasan di Tiro worked to establish international alliances in support of GAM, the most noted and perhaps the most successful being GAM’s inclusion into Gaddafi’s Libya-based training network against ‘imperialism, Zionism, and racism’ (Rothwell 1998), leading to the onset of GAM’s second major uprising in 1986 (Schultze 2003). This opportunity structure disintegrated with the heavy military crackdown on GAM upon its return to Aceh and the consequent onset of martial law (DOM) which was not revoked until 1998.

One opportunity structure that did not disintegrate and which facilitated GAM’s ability to continue its political opportunity structure and military struggle was to be found amongst the Acehnese diaspora located in Malaysia, which not only provided sanctuary for rebel forces on the run, but significant access to funds and military equipment as well (Schultze 2003). In military terms, it was a political haven and training ground for fighters waiting for an opening to return to Aceh. These opportunity structures meant first and foremost that the separatist organisation had access to arms, training and other material resources. The changing relations between Indonesia and Malaysia in 1996-1997, when Indonesian intelligence in cooperation with Malaysian police started targeting and arresting large numbers of GAM sympathisers who had sought refuge in the country, including Ishak Daud, a key GAM figure who spent most of the 1990s in Malaysia (Miller 2003), altered this picture somewhat. A large number of fighters returned to Aceh during the months prior to May 1998 which meant that by the time events speeded up in Jakarta, GAM had a number of trained men in place inside the province. The kinds of transformations facilitated by these factors will be discussed below.

The combination of mobilising structures which were in essence limited to the particular governance of the New Order rule and external political opportunity structures placed GAM in a
dual position. These particular structures facilitated its survival as a guerrilla movement and even served to facilitate an ideological shift from ethno-nationalist primordial rhetoric to one informed by an international agenda of human rights. Nevertheless, repeated military setbacks did not facilitate a transformation away from a miniscule guerrilla movement. As a political force, GAM remained rather insignificant in 1998. Simultaneously, political legitimacy and accountability amongst Acehnese in Aceh would be determined by a different set of opportunities that would be very much defined by GAM’s ability to broaden its horizons and build alliances with an increasingly active civil society. The next section deals with the significant turning points in the period after 1998, highlighting the changing patterns of opportunity structures and the dilemmas facing GAM as a militant movement.

Up until 1998, GAM had evolved in reaction to the state which it continuously confronted. The fall of Soeharto’s New Order regime in 1998 represents a critical juncture for the independence movement. As the following section illustrates, peace was made possible by the strategic broadening of GAM’s ideological foundation through the building of alliances between individuals within GAM and pro-democracy activists outside GAM. At the same time, GAM maintained much of its hegemonic rural basis.

Transformations facilitated by Indonesia’s transitions to democracy

The opportunity structure which was to facilitate the most significant transformation of GAM’s social, political and military basis was the demise of the New Order regime in 1998. The political shift brought about important reformulations of GAM’s political strategies in parallel with a reformulation of the boundaries for political mobilisation within the Indonesian state. Economic collapse, popular protest and fractionalisation of the Indonesian ruling elite dramatically transformed the Indonesian political context from within which GAM’s political struggle had evolved. The fall of Soeharto opened up the ‘renegotiating of boundaries’ of the state with violent ethnic and religious mobilisation in places such as Maluku, Kalimantan, and Sulawesi (Nordholt and van Klinken 2007). Secessionist sentiments were furthered triggered in East Timor, Papua and Aceh along with weaker mobilisation in Riau and Bali (Aspinall 2008). The referendum regarding East
Timor’s status was seen by many as the proof that Indonesia was on the verge of disintegration. This perception which was shared by many independent observers and human rights activists triggered another set of political motions in Aceh. These trends facilitated important political transformation in Aceh which GAM as a central political actor was forced to react to. The two key mechanisms which facilitated GAM’s transformation evolved in relation to Indonesia’s democratisation process, namely popular movements and institutional change towards decentralisation on the one hand, and the major military and political expansion of GAM on the other which was enabled by the shifting of political boundaries of the Indonesian state. The manner in which key actors reacted to these changing political opportunity structures shaped the trajectory towards the Helsinki peace process and consequent democratisation. In most respects GAM capitalised on its ability to set in motion significant processes of reorientation, remobilisation and reorganisation along the two key categorisations of (i) reform and democracy and (ii) militant insurgency movement.

GAM as a reform movement

The first significant transformation of GAM as a reform movement developed as a result of the manifestation of an active pro-democracy movement drawing on new and more inclusive ideas for popular representation in Aceh, while the second was facilitated by the general move towards decentralisation by Jakarta. As this section illustrates, GAM made a strategic decision to develop the alliance with the student movement which in turn facilitated new constellations and alliances for political reform in Aceh.

The democracy movement consisting of young activists emerged in tandem with the student movement in Jakarta and other urban centres across Indonesia, but with a distinct Acehnese flavour. Within the context of a disintegrating Indonesia, perceived or real, the pro-democracy movement in Aceh also became a pro-independence movement which referred to itself as the new ‘vanguard for Acehnese nationalism’ (Aspinall 2008). This group reframed the notion of independence into concepts of democracy and human rights, arguing that it would be impossible to free themselves of oppression and colonialism within the framework of the Indonesian state. Clearly, the developments of oppression
during the 1990s had brought about new thinking and reformulation of political ideas in Aceh. GAM drew on these new patterns of mobilisation, at first observing from the sideline, before taking the necessary strategic steps to join in.

The lifting of Aceh’s decade-long martial law status in August 1998 represented an initial departure from the New Order regime’s security strategy. President Habibie’s priority of establishing himself as a democratic leader to the Acehnese and his promise to investigate past human rights abuses initially represented a major shift in Jakarta’s dealings with GAM and Aceh. The public apology by the armed forces chief General Wiranto for human rights violations followed the withdrawal of non-organic TNI troops as a strategy to give into the demands of the pro-referendum demonstrators (Schultze 2003). The new president, Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur) who came to power in October 1999, even indicated that Aceh would be allowed to hold a referendum as had been the case in East Timor (Miller 2006). This loose promise provoked panic amongst TNI commanders, but was embraced as a political promise by a growing referendum movement which gathered under the umbrella of the Aceh Referendum Information Center (SIRA).

SIRA was founded in February 1999 and functioned as an umbrella organisation for civil society, human rights and religious groups that supported independence via the means of non-violence and a referendum. Importantly, this pattern of mobilisation emerged not from within the auspices of GAM’s rural power bases, but from the urban centres and educational institutions, while SIRA drew on the momentum by establishing regional offices and encouraging participation and donations from beyond their original support base. Also, in areas where GAM was strong, they received the approval of commanders who encouraged the participation of ordinary people (Aspinall 2008, 109).

GAM’s strategy until 1999 had been military, although as the previous section illustrates, new issues facilitated an ideological shift towards a focus on democracy. The fact that GAM and SIRA were aiming for the same goal brought about a very new type of coalition between the two major political forces in Aceh: the militant guerrilla movement and the more popular civil society movement. In essence, Indonesia’s willingness to accept a referendum on
the status of East Timor provided the GAM leadership with the confidence that such a strategy could be extended to Aceh, despite the fact that they had initially rejected SIRA’s proposal for a referendum (Schultze 2003). Considering the political context of Indonesia at the time, a peaceful process of disintegration actually seemed a viable option to many observers, and thus GAM hoped to legitimise their claim by supporting and promoting demands for a democratic referendum.

During the months of October-November 1999, the streets of Banda Aceh were brought to a standstill by the largest demonstrations yet seen in Aceh. The opening of this space combined with the opportunity to broaden its political basis through alliances with civilian forces facilitated a significant transformation of the independence movement into a broader mass movement and served to increase GAM’s legitimacy, both in the face of the Indonesian government and the international community as well as local communities in Aceh. Nevertheless, as Aspinall has contended, SIRA still represented a more inclusive and civic form of nationalism than the ethno-nationalism portrayed by GAM (Aspinall 2008). Despite the common agenda and goals, the alliance and broadening of the political base did not facilitate a complete transformation of GAM. The GAM leadership saw the activists as ‘children’ who thought they could fight the enemy with their bare hands. The failure of Gus Dur to uphold his promise of a referendum confirmed their distrust of Jakarta and confirmed to them that their original path had been necessary.12 The most significant transformation in those tumultuous months of 1999 was those of ideas facilitated by individuals outside GAM, in particular amongst SIRA activists and leaders such as Muhammad Nazar. But ideational shifts or increased orientation towards democracy within this group could not bring forward an end to the conflict unless the Indonesian state altered its approach to regional politics in Indonesia. The second mechanism which directly impacted on the political transformation of GAM was therefore located at the level of the Indonesian state.

In parallel to the reformulation of ideas, it was the general process of democralisation and decentralisation, implemented at various stages in the period after 1999, which radically changed the political opportunities of militant nationalism. Clearly, despite disputes over the future of the unitary state amongst elites and
the military in Jakarta, the decentralisation of political governing structures offered a completely new set of opportunities to the regions, and eventually also to GAM. The primary political strategy and response from Jakarta came in the form of institutional responses to the demands for separatism through the implementation of a special autonomy law in 1999 which was replaced by the far more comprehensive Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam (NAD) law in 2001. Decentralisation efforts were initially aimed at creating an attractive alternative to secession by granting Aceh as wide ranging powers of autonomy as possible within the unitary state (Miller 2004 and 2006). The expectation was that this would serve to alienate GAM from the political scene in Aceh and appease local elites into settling for the renewed promises of enhanced powers to the regional parliament (McGibbon 2006). The perception that GAM could be sidelined through institutional measures reflected the government’s misinterpretation of GAM’s rapidly increasing strength and basis for social power, which is further discussed in the section below.

In retrospect, the NAD law was strikingly similar to the Law on the Governing of Aceh (LoGA), the formal legislative document arising out of the Helsinki MoU, apart from the significant features of local representation and the political role of GAM. The significant turning point is that Jakarta approached the Aceh problem from a completely different angle, that of accommodating at least some of the demands through the channels of democratic institutions, even with all their limitations and instability.

The efforts to decentralise power to the provinces, including Aceh, lay at the heart of Jakarta’s strategy to bring forward a negotiated solution to the conflict. The peace process was initiated in late 1999 in Geneva and produced two significant turning points: the mid-2000 Humanitarian Pause which only lasted until early 2001, and a more substantial ‘Cessation of Hostilities Agreement’ (CoHA) in December 2002. Yet there is no doubt, as observers have contended, that GAM’s involvement in these first rounds of internationally mediated peace efforts was primarily strategic (Schultze 2003, Aspinall 2005). GAM had internalised SIRA’s original goal of replicating East Timor and eventually building towards UN-backed self-determination. In terms of concrete political agreements, virtually no progress was made in terms of disarmament and the demilitarisation of Acehnese society.
One factor highlighted by observers is that both sides had fundamentally different views and expectations of this first peace process. The Indonesian government assumed that any settlement would have to be within the framework of special autonomy as outlined above, while the GAM leadership saw dialogue not as an end in itself, but as part and parcel of their strategy to internationalise the conflict (Huber 2004, Aspinall 2005, Schultze 2004) and gain support for their cause through these channels. In addition, there are two important factors that denominate an increased focus on reform and democracy, which represent two significant political opportunity structures that would prove important to the trajectory towards the Helsinki MoU. The first relates to the reorientation towards a democratic agenda which had not been manifested within the GAM-leadership until this point. At the same time, internationalisation of the conflict was a strategic move as it brought about unintended shifts in terms of ideology. For the first time, GAM leaders were recognised by major international powers and actors. The Henry Dunant Center (HDC) which offered to mediate between GAM and the Indonesian government, represented a new turn in international diplomacy. Despite their relative inexperience with Aceh, the HDC consisted of experts in the field of conflict resolution and brought with them important knowledge and experience from other conflict zones around the world. In meetings with international actors, activists and peace negotiators, the GAM leadership was forced to reframe their original demands for self determination within the parameters of democratic representation and human rights that was a language the international community could understand. During these contacts the GAM leadership was increasingly socialised into the international jargon of conflict resolution and peace building. Previous international experience had been limited within the auspices of Libya and Latin American guerrilla warfare, whereas they were now relating to a completely different section of international diplomacy.

At a meeting in Stavanger, Norway, in July 2002 GAM released a so-called ‘Stavanger declaration’ where the notion of re-establishing a sultanate in Aceh was replaced by principles of a state based on democracy and human rights. The declaration has primarily been interpreted as a strategic move aimed at drawing support from international NGOs (Schultze 2003). In the light of the
Helsinki MoU, it also represented a significant turning point in terms of ideological reorientation and commitment by moderate sections of the GAM leadership. In the first instance these ideological shifts made it possible to strengthen the alliance between the extended GAM leadership and civilian forces in Aceh such as SIRA. Many of the SIRA activists interviewed for this project point to the fact that it was much easier for them to ally themselves with GAM and criticise their leadership once they had publicly denounced their previously hegemonic and authoritarian vision for Aceh.

Second, the first rounds of peace talks brought the issues of democratic decentralisation and autonomy to the centre of the debate. Despite the limitations, politicking and disagreements within each camp regarding the nature of decentralisation and special autonomy, the parameters for negotiations were set. These were reviewed and reformulated in Helsinki, but were in essence based on the same ideas. The most significant compromise came during the negotiations in 2002 with GAM willing to accept the 2001 special autonomy law as a ‘starting point’ for negotiations (Aspinall 2005). Although later denied by GAM and criticised by many members of the Jakarta bureaucracy and the TNI, institutional arrangements for power-sharing were the key points for negotiation. Events in 2002 meant that GAM was not in a position to change its stand on independence. GAM was still operating under the belief that Indonesia would disintegrate under the combined pressure of localised rebellion and economic recession. The peace envisioned by GAM was still one which would be settled only through separatism. At the same time, the opening up of political space combined with support of SIRA’s demand for independence via democratic institutions represented a critical turning point in terms of GAM’s political foundation. The GAM leadership in Sweden knew better than to alienate the young nationalists and joined them in a united front while maintaining the military wing. At the height of the pro-referendum campaign the pro-democracy activists had the upper hand, but then lost out as room for political action closed down and Indonesia rejected calls for a referendum. GAM thus remained as the leading political voice in Aceh, despite the failure of these first rounds of negotiations. The case rests that nascent alliances and ideas, lack of experience and political will on the side of the Indonesian government and insecurity amongst GAM leaders as to
their best course of action are all factors that help explain the failure of the first peace process in Aceh. That said, in retrospect, the events and turns, strategies and willingness to accommodate new political realities facilitated significant transformation during the immediate years after the fall of Soeharto. Rebellion had partially put on a new suit and accommodated reform.

**GAM’s continued militant insurgency: creating new opportunities**

The second factor that determined the transition from war to peace in Aceh was facilitated by a very different political opportunity structure, one which secured the continuation of GAM as an insurgency movement. This second dimension served to undermine ideas of reform and inclusive democracy and was facilitated by the illegal economy and the expansion of individual commanders’ power bases across the province. This transformation was facilitated by the political opportunity for military and political expansion in the aftermath of the collapse of the New Order and provided important political bargaining chips during the several rounds of peace negotiations from Geneva to Helsinki in the period 1999-2005. This section argues that despite significant transformation in terms of ideas and individual progress towards more inclusive forms of nationalism and governance, the more illiberal dimensions of GAM’s insurgency are a determinant factor in explaining GAM’s electoral success post-conflict. The illiberal nature of GAM’s insurgency has been well documented by a number of observers (e.g. Schultze 2004 and 2005, Aspinall 2002 and 2008, ICG 2001, HRW 2003). Aspinall (2008) in particular has recently analysed the nature of GAM’s insurgent violence and dynamism. A brief discussion follows of some of the key elements as a way to highlight the dualism of GAM’s transformation which is the focus of this analysis.

The fall of the New Order also altered the political opportunities for GAM as a guerrilla movement. The chaos and uncertainty in Jakarta created a certain degree of regional autonomy and a revitalised conviction that independence was within reach. To the GAM leadership and especially the movement’s leaders in Aceh and Malaysia, the available political room meant that a new military strategy of expansion into the remaining sub-districts of Aceh was possible. The popular expansion in favour of the separatist cause
was thus paralleled with a military expansion into the sub-districts of Central, West and East Aceh, Aceh Singkil and Simeleue (Schultze 2004). Furthermore, the cease-fire agreement between the parties also created a certain degree of regional autonomy within the context of a revitalised GAM. Thus, intensified direct warfare between GAM and the security forces took place imminently after the rejection of proposals for a referendum by the Indonesian government.

In this situation new opportunities emerged through clandestine support for GAM’s opposition to a state that had preached security but which had instead provided insecurity, coupled with the continued demands for human rights prosecutions and democracy from the international community.

The opening of political space provided GAM with the opportunity to further disseminate its political programme. During this period its propaganda machinery became very active and with the opening up of the media, press releases were often published in the local newspapers (though often due to coercion rather than the political expression of local journalists), as public sermons and posters proliferated across the province and open recruitment became possible (Aspinall 2008).

Despite the fact that the ideological underpinning of this propaganda remained centred around the notion of internal colonialism and Aceh’s glorious past, there was also an increased focus on the depiction of the struggle for independence as one which would free the people from state sanctioned violence and repression.

In addition, as the political situation in Jakarta became increasingly unstable, the subsequent power vacuum created in the province enabled GAM to resurface and widen its military presence across Aceh. By mid 2001, GAM is reported to have controlled about 80% of Aceh’s villages (Schultze 2004). In terms of political control, it is significant to note that beyond the limited opening of political space that enabled the expansion of GAM both as a guerrilla movement and as a political force in 1999-2003, GAM operated in relation to the ongoing internal war.

GAM’s military expansion meant that there was an urgent increase in the demand for combatants. One significant pool was represented by the very ideologically committed group of combatants who had been forced to return to Aceh from Malaysia
in 1997 as a result of the strengthening of diplomatic ties between Malaysia and Indonesia. This group took the lead in rebuilding GAM’s military organisation during the tumultuous period after 1998. In addition, several hundred combatants were recruited to GAM from inside Aceh. Many of those who formed the core of GAM in the aftermath of the peace agreement joined the movement at this particular point in time. This meant that local commanders were informed by the broader human rights discourse as well as the traditional ethno-nationalism that representing the founding ideology of the nationalist insurgency. They remained loyal to the Swedish leadership when it came to all matters military, but were also slowly developing independent power bases within their respective districts. The Swedish leadership still determined the political stakes, but in terms of the movement’s social and economic basis, local structures proved increasingly more dominant.

Furthermore, insecurities within the armed forces and the onset of renewed military campaigns against GAM meant that formal state structures were weakened and in many places virtually non-existent. Many sub-districts and even some district offices ceased to function (Aspinall 2006). From 2001 onwards the infrastructure of the Indonesian state was especially weak in Aceh’s rural areas where GAM commanders had successfully managed to establish a degree of hegemony. One key strategy was to develop its political platform and establish civilian state structures across the province. Based on the governance structure of the pre-colonial sultanate, GAM divided Aceh into 17 districts (wilayah) and several sub-districts (sagoe) (Schultze 2003). Clearly the functioning of these civilian structures varied widely across the province, in some areas functioning as rather successful shadow structures replacing weak state institutions, while in other areas they existed only to the extent that GAM claimed they did. The local commanders increasingly functioned as patrons, competing for popular support alongside other political elites. In this respect, one of the most significant political opportunity structures that emerged during this period was determined by GAM’s at least partial territorial control and the increased power of local commanders.

The basis for power should be seen in relation to both the general political economy of Aceh and the particular project of GAM as a guerrilla force. In the literature on internal wars there has
been considerable attention given to the idea that wars are as much explained by economic considerations as by inter-group rivalry (Berdal and Keen 1997). Mancur Olson’s analysis of warlords in China has inspired much analysis on profit wars in general and has led to the focus on individual GAM commanders’ interests in sustaining the conflict in order to advance their own economic gain. This position has also been suggested as a significant factor with regards to the war in Aceh. One key analysis for example, centres attention on the notion that the strengthening of local command structures enabled local field commanders to carve out their own fiefdoms and allowed them to become warlords who ‘let their troops run wild’ (Schultze 2003). Certainly local commanders saw opportunities to profit from illegal activities, at times also in collaboration with TNI personnel (McCulloch 2003, Kingsbury 2006). There is undoubtedly some merit in the argument that economic rivalries greatly complicated and perhaps even prolonged the war in Aceh, especially as one report argues (Kingsbury and McCulloch 2006), that the propensity of military business served to make war profitable to individuals within the Indonesian armed forces. The case rests on the fact that the war in Aceh was never a rich man’s business, at least not on the part of the rebels. When compared to the flamboyant war economies of other protracted conflicts, especially in cases where violence is extremely decentralised and dispersed, in terms of its political economy, the war in Aceh clearly stands out for its ad hoc, low key and decentralised system of revenue. Due to limited funds and problematic transfers, the combatants and their commanders could not depend on extensive marketing networks, although the illegal logging business did to some extent provide the opportunity for the exploitation of one valuable commodity.

The intertwined system of the conflict machinery in Aceh did not allow for commanders to actually develop into ‘warlords’. At the same time, systems of localised violence did develop during the period of heightened insurgency. There was an important distinction between GAM’s behaviour in the newly controlled areas and the traditional strongholds. The broadening of recruitment of fighters and the decentralised system of governance within the movement gave rise to an increasingly illiberal element of GAM leaders and combatants. Increased recruitment allowed for petty criminals to join the movement and a lack of middle-level leadership
meant that the process of promotion to regional command posts was speeded up.\textsuperscript{15} Areas where GAM perpetrated the most severe instances of violence against the civilian population took place in Central, Southeast and Western regions of Aceh, i.e. those controlled after 1999. GAM commanders and combatants dispatched to these regions did not have close ties to the local communities (Schultze 2004) and the new conflict system opened up short term opportunity structures for individual commanders. However, in general terms, conflict was fought along the ideological and political dimensions previously discussed.

Most commanders and their soldiers were bound by social ties to the regions and villages where they were based. Several ex-combatants interviewed state that they were rarely far from home and describe how during the more peaceful periods they were able to move between their home village and their military bases. These tight social networks reinforced already existing patrimonial networks between commanders and rural communities and developed new systems of patronage within the auspices of a dual state structure. In a time of war, GAM collected taxes, ensured and sometimes enforced food deliveries, and retained predatory practices.

The coercive nature of such systems of localised patrimonialism, although they varied greatly from region to region, served to reinforce a certain degree of local despotism by the commanders. As analysis of local elites in the face of the expansive processes of political change in Indonesia has illustrated, decentralisation reforms opened a dual space for strengthened local democracy on the one hand, and the development of local despotism on the other (Nordholdt 2004, Crouch and Aspinall 2003). Even with the awakening of GAM in face of the military emergency introduced in 2003, these structures were not replaced by formal state structures. Instead they survived as competitive patronage networks to other official and local elite structures.

In the face of reorganisation into political parties, these networks represent significant mobilising structures within the parameters of an electoral system. These enduring structures of military expansion and reinforcement of local leadership represent the second important opportunity structure shaping the transformation of GAM. The ideational shift at the top-level centred
round an ideational shift towards reform, a dimension that also secured a broadening of GAM’s political basis and alliances with the pro-referendum movement. The discussion above however, has also illustrated GAM’s dualism as an insurgency movement and its hegemonic and more illiberal nature. These two parallel processes of transformation constitute the significant trajectory of GAM as a political actor. Whereas the decision to wage war and end war was taken by trusted senior leaders in Sweden, the parameters within which GAM operates at local level may very well be determined by structures which work counter to inclusive democracy.

Peace: the renegotiation of political opportunities

When the tsunami hit Aceh on 26 December 2004, Aceh was under the status of military emergency. Efforts to broker a peace agreement had stalled with the reimplementaton of civil emergency by President Megawati in 2003. For GAM, the military setback it suffered after the escalation of armed conflict represented a much greater loss of face at this stage than it had before. By the time President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and Vice President Jusuf Kalla took power in Jakarta in 2004, the conflict in Aceh had become an extremely costly project to run in a state where political leaders were increasingly being challenged about their fiscal spending and the use of military force. To them, increased local autonomy seemed like an increasingly better alternative to the drawn-out protracted conflict with GAM. However, as illustrated above, the general context of the conflict had been altered by the political transformations of political actors. The very process of mediation, the frequent set-backs and the long road towards the eventual peace agreement, including the various compromises made, have been well documented by central participants in the peace process (e.g. Kingsbury 2006b). The focus of this next section therefore is on how the political transformation of GAM provided particular opportunities for peace as set out in the Helsinki MoU and beyond.

The Helsinki MoU was more comprehensive than the previous agreements in Aceh. With international eyes on Aceh in the aftermath of the tsunami, the Crisis Management Initiative (CMI) and Martti Ahtisaari had the authority and capacity to mobilise sizeable funding from the European Union and other donors in order to implement and administer programmes for demobilisation,
disarmament and reintegratiom (DDR) of GAM ex-combatants and an extensive peace monitoring mission (AMM). Amnesty provisions and compensation for civilian victims of the conflict were also included in the agreement. In terms of democracy and self-government, the MoU included many clauses from the Special Autonomy Law of 2001, as well as some crucial additional points for political participation which allowed independent candidates to run for executive office and local political parties to compete for seats in the legislative. This is one of the most significant aspects of the agreement, as well as one of the most far reaching reforms for democratisation in Aceh.

In terms of international peace building efforts, the contents of the MoU reflect a conflict transformation approach consistent with the current trend of facilitating political transformation between the warring parties. The international community took on the specific tasks of peace monitoring through the AMM and the facilitation of DDR during its initial phases, in addition to its rather large presence in the form of international NGOs and donor agencies working on post-tsunami reconstruction. The process of the disarmament and demobilisation of GAM was overseen by the AMM and ran smoothly.\textsuperscript{16} The success of this process is in large part due to GAM’s internal cohesion, with its formal military command structure and the commitment of local commanders to inform and persuade their combatants to support the peace agreement.\textsuperscript{17} The ceremonial destruction of GAM’s 840 weapons was very much a symbol of the former guerrilla fighters’ grandeur and sacrifice for the noble goal of peace in Aceh.

The first major point of friction came with the passing of the Law on the Governing of Aceh (LoGA) in July 2006 which was intended to embody the key points of the MoU in a legally binding form. The watering down of some of the central points in the MoU, such as article 235(2) which states that the national government can overrule local regulations, caused rage and disappointment amongst GAM and SIRA activists in particular (Aspinall 2008). The LoGA was passed at a time when GAM was deeply entrenched in the peace process, having disarmed and preparing for the December elections, and the discrepancies between the LoGA and the MoU were perceived as important breaches of trust, albeit ones which could be put right in the event of GAM’s success in the elections.\textsuperscript{18}
While GAM as an insurgency movement had remained loyal to the goals and ideologies of the leadership in Sweden, as a political movement it has struggled to find its identity within the new context. This struggle is linked to the problems of reorienting its political struggle in the time of peace, in particular the dualism of the movement as represented by its ideological focus on reform in parallel with the more complex dynamics of local hegemony serve to enhance the problems of transforming GAM into a democratic force and political party.

Organisationally, GAM adhered to the provisions of the MoU by reformulating its organisational structure away from that of a militaristic movement towards that of a political movement adhering to principles of non-violence. Measures taken by GAM after the signing of the MoU include the disbandment of GAM’s military divisions transforming them into one civilian organisation, the Aceh Transitional Committee (KPA) which was to function under the umbrella of GAM’s National Council (majelis). The KPA was designed to integrate ex-combatants into civilian life, whereas the intention of the Council was to formulate political strategies and programmes and consisted of senior members of the movement, most of whom belong to the group in Sweden (ICG 2006).

The organisational structure of the KPA was very much based on the same military structures that had been more or less institutionalised during the final phases of the conflict and that were to represent GAM in the transitional phase. This was a practical as well as a tactical move. The commanders were appeased by the fact that their organisational framework did not vanish with the onset of peace. The movement would remain integrated and the reintegration programmes could be more easily channelled through one organisational entity. GAM commanders who had previously operated at local level were appointed as heads of KPA’s regional offices, serving to maintain the original organisational structure from regional level to the smallest units at village level. The tasks undertaken by the KPA spanned from economic empowerment and reintegrations of ex-combatants to functioning as a basis for political discussion and organisation. Building on the military structures of GAM, the KPA was able to maintain close contact with and control over the lower levels of GAM command and provided a significant basis for mobilisation prior to the 2006 elections. In the eyes of the
GAM members in the Council as well as the international actors preoccupied with DDR, the KPA was meant to represent a civil society organisation rather than a political one. The office in Banda Aceh served a meeting point for commanders when visiting Banda Aceh and provided office space for receiving donors and other parties involved with the KPA. At the same time it functioned very much as a space for political activism and discussion amongst central figureheads within the movement. Prior to the elections, the KPA was seen as a coordinating unit for ex-military leaders and their soldiers, and not for politicians, and thus served to keep the movement unified whilst upholding the patronage system and links between ex-combatants in the field and their regional commanders.

In terms of political organisation, the Council was originally meant to function as the political unit of GAM, consisting of figureheads such as Zakaria Saman, Muhammad Usman Lamphu Awe, Muzakir Manaf, ‘prime minister’ Malik Mahmood and ‘foreign minister’ Zaini Abdullah. The most obvious split that was to emerge was between the so-called young sections of the leadership that had fought in Aceh and the old guard consisting of the central leadership that had resided in Sweden for most of the conflict (ICG 2006). Clearly, during the months leading up to the elections, the major split inside GAM emerged along the lines of the candidates backed by these figureheads in the Council, Human Hamid and Hasbi Abdullah, and those backed by the ex-military leaders of the KPA, Irwandi Yusuf and Muhammad Nazar. Hamid was not running as an independent, but was in the end nominated by the PPP running with Zaini’s brother Hasbi Abdullah. The pair emerged from the Council as a result of internal politicking that judged it premature for any GAM candidates to run under the banner of GAM, based on the assumption that this would hurt the transition to a political party later on. This was not so much a strategic decision as a realisation that internal disagreements were likely to be further exacerbated.

The Irwandi Yusuf-Muhammad Nazar ticket emerged as representatives of the successful transition of GAM from a militant movement to a political non-violent movement, Irwandi having served as a strategist and propagandist for GAM, and Nazar as the head of SIRA, a well-known public figure from the days of popular mobilisation in 1999 and 2000. The Irwandi-Nazar ticket won a majority of 38% of the vote for governorship, with the
Hamid-Hasbi ticket coming second with 17% (ICG 2007a). The Irwandi-Nazar ticket won the support of the commanders within the KPA, which in a sense was surprising considering the tradition of loyalty towards the Swedish leadership. At the same time, the KPA commanders maintained great trust in Irwandi as a home-grown military commander, while Nazar was a familiar face during their time of crisis. After all, the majority of GAM members had joined the movement during the period 1998-99 in response to the calls for independence made by the local GAM leadership. They were not hardened veterans, but young men who had joined the movement in the hope that Aceh would soon be independent. In the face of serious internal tension, their loyalty remained with their commanders, a significant section of which within the KPA remained personally inclined towards Irwandi and Nazar.

In this respect, the internal division of the rebel movement is as much a personal battle for power between these two factions of GAM as it mirrors the more structural and ideological crisis of a movement in transition struggling to find its foothold within a new political framework. In the months immediately after the signing of the MoU, GAM commanders expressed satisfaction with what they had gained along with the peace. They understood the opportunity to contest elections thereby maintaining a significant position within Acehnese society. ‘We are learning politics’ was a phrase frequently heard, and as exemplified by one commander’s cheerful narration ‘parliament is now our battlefield, we are learning politics so that we can fight for the people from the inside’. Narrations of democracy and the tales of Aceh’s grand past were repeated in the same breath.

In addition, all across Aceh, GAM candidates were victorious in eight out of 22 municipalities and districts, most of which were rural districts where the insurgency had previously been strongest. It is difficult to dissect all the factors to explain their success, but one crucial dimension was the shift in emphasis away from nationalist ideology towards the deliverance of public goods and within it a promise of democracy. A second factor was the emphasis that GAM candidates were the only ones who could ensure lasting peace in Aceh. They were additionally able to capitalise on the widespread dissatisfaction with corruption in the local administration, promising that corruption would be a thing of the past once they were in power (Aspinall 2008, ICG 2007a).
Despite these elements signifying reform within GAM, there is a major disjuncture between campaigning for votes and implementing policy. In view of GAM’s trajectory, there is another more sinister and problematic factor which is ingrained within the many challenges and problems of governance in Aceh, specifically the system of localised patronage the commanders have developed and which were perhaps not so obvious in the mobilisation for votes during the 2006 election campaign, as it was in the parallel structures of governance across Aceh.

After 1998 these structures facilitated the transformation of GAM on two fronts: in relation to a reform agenda of the state and in relation to its ideology of militant nationalism and opposition. The former was facilitated by a broadening of the political base, while the latter through continued armed insurgency. What emerged with the fall of Soeharto was a significant differentiation between the urban pro-democracy movement that had by and large developed into allies with sections of GAM, and rural GAM which mobilised along more hegemonic and traditional lines of support.

The most significant transformation of GAM as a political force should therefore be seen in relation to its relative success in establishing itself as a viable political force beyond its traditional stronghold. In relation to this, the geographical expansion and the relative strengthening of individual commanders’ local power bases facilitated one of the most significant transformations of GAM prior to the Helsinki negotiations. As previously argued, the key opportunity structure of GAM up until 1998 was located outside the province. By 2005, its primary power base was to be found inside Aceh. Peace negotiations and the opened political space had enabled a new group of figureheads to take positions and establish a level of political hegemony across the various sub-districts. The most surprising transformation was that GAM managed to make use of a popular civil agenda for democracy and human rights despite being simultaneously deeply entrenched in the local setting across Aceh.

So within the context of this dualism, the prospects for democratisation in Aceh lay in the hands of the former insurgents and their ability to grapple with the changing nature of politics in this Indonesian province of Aceh and the manner in which they managed to capture the support of the Acehnese constituency. In their struggle to learn politics, reorganise, remobilise and use the
available opportunities of the democratic game, GAM has to an extent completed a transformation towards a political movement that need not depend on the extra-judicial mechanisms of coercion, crime or clientelism. At the same time however, the opportunities that lie within reach of democracy seem elusive and frightening to former rebels, and perhaps too risky, especially in the face of heightened competition and possible failure to capture the support of the broader Acehnese constituency in future local elections. Within this context, it seems too risky to depend on inclusive alliances and democratic reform as a sole political programme. Clearly, the political opportunities for power have shrunk with the tensions and factions within the movement. As a reform movement, GAM is struggling with its failure to actually propose reform for Aceh. Too many of its leaders are choosing to operate within their comfort zone of clientelism and old repetitive ideological claims. Unfortunately, even if efforts to establish a functioning political party are successful, this is likely to be a stop-gap measure that does not resolve the complex issues of Acehnese democracy. It is only if the former rebels accept their political status as one political force amongst many that the future for Aceh’s democracy remains bright.

Postscript

The establishment of the GAM political party, the PA (Partai Aceh) and its subsequent victory in the 2009 parliamentary elections may signify a successful rebel-to-party transformation, albeit only a partial victory for local democracy in Aceh. In the months leading up to the establishment of the PA, it became clear that the inclusive reform agenda that had characterised sections of GAM and upheld the movement as a potential democratic force prior to and during the Helsinki negotiations, had given way to a more entrenched system of patronage politics that developed in the final phases of the conflict. This form of patronage politics is illustrated primarily by internal organisation and individual alliances as well as the obvious economic and political benefits accompanying membership of the PA. Past membership and proximity to GAM has become a clear advantage for any business advancements in Aceh, and there is evidence that the party has, at least in part, replaced the protracted elite structures they fought to oust. In terms of reform alliances, in the year leading up to the 2009 election, the focus was on upholding
the KPA structures in fear that a more open political agenda would diminish the KPA and former GAM commanders’ role in Acehnese politics. This has served to alienate the more reform-minded individuals within and close to the movement. The exact dynamics of power entrenchment in Aceh merit further attention as they will provide insight into the dynamics of local politics in Aceh and Indonesia as well as the trajectories for rebel-party transformation. A closer analysis of the dynamics of the elections and their implications are in the new post script to this book.
1 In a comparative perspective Renamo in Mozambique has never won a majority vote, but in a majoritarian system of government has at least been secured a position of “institutionalised opposition” (Manning 2008). The FMNL in El Salvador remained a small but viable political party in the El Salvadorian Legislative Assembly for the first decade of peace, becoming the largest party in the Legislative Assembly by 2000 (Wade 2008: 33).

2 The typology was created for the purpose of critiquing armed insurgency movements in Africa as a means to highlight the very nature and structure of the numerous movements involved in armed conflict across the continent. The typology was put into focus as a means to distinguish one type of guerrilla movement from another and to create a basis for comparison (Clapham 1998 and 2007).

3 The role of Islam as a part of GAM’s foundational ideology has been discussed at length elsewhere, see for example Aspinall (forthcoming 2008) and Schultze (2003). Although religion played a significant role in terms of ideology, it did not represent similar dividing lines and mobilising structures to be found in communal conflicts elsewhere in the archipelago, or in similar insurgencies such as those of Southern Thailand and the Philippines.

4 Ideological and political factions evolved throughout the course of conflict, as is discussed later in the chapter, but overall this did not result into significant splintering and the development of new armed factions, as is a common feature of internal conflicts globally.

5 This perspective draws inspiration, in general from traditional readings of nationalism and nationalist mobilisation, and in particular from Stokke and Rynpteit’s discussion of the limitations of such a perspective to the understanding of Tamil nationalism in Sri Lanka (2000).


8 For thorough analysis of the Darul Islam rebellion; its origin, development, and role in shaping Acehnese identity see Sulaiman 2006, Morris 1983, Bertrand 2004, and Aspinall (2007). The main significance of the rebellion was not as a precursor to the GAM insurgency, but a battle over the role of Islam in the Indonesian post-colonial state.

9 Based on a personal conversations and formal interviews with former combatants, both leaders and foot soldiers in the period 2006-2008, the author notes that current narrative and ideological reasoning for the Acehnese struggle are similar in form and wording and thus are based on the political texts and ideological writings of GAM’s founder Hasan di Tiro.

10 During the Aceh wars and also the Darul Islam rebellion in the 1950s, also consult Reid 1979 for a more detailed discussion.

11 Ethnicity came to the forefront during attacks on Javanese transmigrants in more recent years, but there is no evidence that this was a systematic pattern of mobilisation.

12 Viewpoint reaffirmed by several of GAM leaders and commanders in interviews carried out after 2006.
These processes of internationalisation have been documented at length by for example Schultze 2003 and Aspinall 2005 and 2008.

Apart from the Libyan training networks of the 1980s, Irwandi Yusuf spent time in Latin America learning strategic guerilla tactics during the 1990s. Many of his skills were significant in the formulation of “psy-warfare” in Aceh and expansion of GAM during the period 1998-2003 discussed below.

Point raised by several of the commanders interviewed, also touched upon by Aspinall (2008) and Schultze (2004).

For a thorough discussion of international involvement in Aceh, see Barron, P. and A. Burke (2008): *Supporting Peace in Aceh: Development Agencies and International Involvement*.

The leadership in Sweden had to spend considerable time and energy informing local commanders in Aceh about the content of the MoU and persuading them to hand over their guns. The commanders retained their strict code of loyalty to the leadership in Sweden in all matters having to do with the formulation of political agenda and propaganda (personal communication with Bachtiar Abdullah, confirmed by several interviews with field commanders in February 2007).

This point was raised and confirmed by several key figures in GAM and SIRA during rounds of interviews carried out in Banda Aceh in August 2006.

The problem of reintegration of former GAM combatants remains one of the most important political challenges in Aceh. For further discussion see for example Barron, P. and Adam Burke (2008): *Supporting Peace in Aceh: Developing Agencies and International Development*.

Personal interviews with GAM commanders and KPA members. Also confirmed by personal correspondence (anonymous) with international staff in the IOM.

Interview with a GAM commander in Banda Aceh, 6 August 2006.
References


Di Tiro, Hasan (1958): Demokrasi untuk Indonesia (Democracy for


Introduction
In December 2006, the new democratic framework designed to support and implement the Helsinki peace agreement was manifested by the first direct regional and district elections to be held in Aceh. In contrast to usual practice in Indonesia, new electoral regulations allowed independent candidates to stand in Aceh, setting a precedent that other provinces have since followed. Thus the 2006 elections were the first test of political transition and reform in Aceh after decades of armed conflict.

Conventional studies on democratisation processes generally emphasise the establishment of procedures and institutions such as free general elections as the main indicators of democracy. Less attention is given to contextual issues such as where the democratic process occurs and how political actors adapt and transform to changing procedures and the new institutional framework. By looking at the candidates and the results of the election, this study will focus therefore on how key actors responded to the new, democratic opportunities that were manifested, inter alia, with the regional and district elections. There are three issues
in particular that require closer examination. Firstly, the internal
dynamics of the political groups and their supporters in the run up
to the elections. Secondly, the issues, programmes and policies that
they prioritised, including the extent to which they considered the
challenges of post-conflict and post-tsunami reconstruction and the
reintegration of ex-combatants and victims; and thirdly, the ways in
which political actors mobilised support.

For the purposes of this research, political actors in Aceh are
categorised into three groups: (1) those growing out of or who were
supportive of the aims of the Free Aceh Movement (GAM); (2) the
dominant groups within Indonesian politics as a whole, including
the national political parties, the Indonesian military (TNI), and the
various militia groups and; (3) the civil society organisations that
were initiated by students and intellectuals.

The data collated is based on field research and a review of
relevant literature. Researchers carried out in-depth interviews with
key informants from political parties, GAM, NGO activists, scholars,
journalists and political observers in Aceh. In addition to ISAI and
Demos partners, informants were selected through a cascading
process i.e. by asking each informant for best possible additional
sources. Key questions were drafted in advance and then expanded
upon during the interviews and discussions. The literature review
was undertaken by analysing relevant newspapers, magazines,
documents and articles.

The local elections – a brief overview

The Province of Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam (NAD) was
previously known as the Special Region of Aceh (DIA). The change
of name came about with the promulgation of the Law on Special
Autonomy under the administration of President Abdurrahman
Wahid (Gus Dur) on 9 August 2001.

The first free direct elections (Pilkada – Pemilihan Kepala
Daerah) were held in Aceh on 11 December 2006. These elections
represent a key point arising out of the Helsinki MoU, manifested in
legal terms with the promulgation of the Law on the Governing of
Aceh (LoGA).² Direct elections were held to elect the provincial and
district heads. And as already mentioned above, Aceh’s regional
elections were innovative in the sense that they allowed independent
candidates. This meant that local leaders who were not affiliated to
(national) political parties were able to stand without first having to form genuine local parties – something which would require a little more time. These innovations in Aceh even set a precedent for the rest of Indonesia and in 2007 the Constitutional Court decided that independent candidates should be allowed to stand in all provinces.\(^3\)

**Election profile**

Elections were held in four municipalities and 17 districts. However, only 15 district-level elections were held in December 2006, as the incumbents’ terms in the districts of Bireuen and South Aceh had yet to expire. Elections there were held in 2007 and early 2008 respectively. By July 2006 some 94% of the electorate had registered and voter turnout was high. According to the figures given below in Table 1, the number of valid votes cast represents 65% of the total population of Aceh.

**Map of the districts and municipalities in Aceh**

![Map of Aceh, Indonesia](source: Internet)
Table 6.1. Voters and voter participation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>District/Municipality</th>
<th>Eligible voters</th>
<th>Polling stations</th>
<th>Voter turnout</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Banda Aceh</td>
<td>115.633</td>
<td>252</td>
<td>56.65%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Sabang</td>
<td>19.303</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>75.91%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Aceh Besar</td>
<td>194.164</td>
<td>660</td>
<td>76.12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Pidie</td>
<td>314.796</td>
<td>995</td>
<td>76.22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Bireuen</td>
<td>239.241</td>
<td>685</td>
<td>80.95%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Bener Meriah</td>
<td>73.133</td>
<td>260</td>
<td>83.61%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Aceh Tengah (Central Aceh)</td>
<td>103.949</td>
<td>380</td>
<td>84.54%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Aceh Utara (North Aceh)</td>
<td>395.652</td>
<td>1.034</td>
<td>79.44%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Lhokseumawe</td>
<td>98.935</td>
<td>214</td>
<td>67.29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Aceh Timur (East Aceh)</td>
<td>201.892</td>
<td>650</td>
<td>72.25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Langsa</td>
<td>88.236</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>64.21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Aceh Tamiang</td>
<td>145.837</td>
<td>431</td>
<td>65.60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Aceh Jaya</td>
<td>44.183</td>
<td>182</td>
<td>78.08%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Aceh Barat (West Aceh)</td>
<td>106.360</td>
<td>461</td>
<td>77.49%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Nagan Raya</td>
<td>84.968</td>
<td>265</td>
<td>84.62%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Aceh Barat Daya (Southwest Aceh)</td>
<td>74.204</td>
<td>198</td>
<td>80.83%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Aceh Selatan (South Aceh)</td>
<td>126.929</td>
<td>349</td>
<td>70.91%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Aceh Singkil</td>
<td>86.658</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>76.30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Aceh Tenggara (Southeast Aceh)</td>
<td>114.880</td>
<td>492</td>
<td>78.37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Gavo Lues</td>
<td>46.681</td>
<td>197</td>
<td>87.85%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Simeuleu</td>
<td>47.301</td>
<td>196</td>
<td>86.70%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total 2,632,935 (total) (65% of the population) 8,471 (total) 76.38%


The Independent Elections Commission

The Aceh Independent Elections Commission (KIP-Aceh) – a subsidiary of the National General Election Commission (KPU) – was established and given the responsibility of overseeing the elections. A political party (or a coalition of parties) that wished to nominate a candidate in the gubernatorial elections was required to hold at least 15% of seats in the regional parliament (as per the previous elections). Only the Golkar Party fulfilled this criterion on its own, and so the other national parties had to combine their share of the vote on a joint-ticket in order to qualify. Additionally, it was also possible for new political groups to participate by way of independent candidates. In order to be eligible, the candidates had to collect and thoroughly document signatures of support from at...
least 3% of the total population in Aceh (over 17 years of age, or younger if already married), which in practice meant a minimum of 120,948 people (LoGA, article 68, point 1). Geographical spread of support was also a criterion, with candidates required to demonstrate support in at least 50% of districts/municipalities and 50% of sub-districts (LoGA, article 68, point 2).

As it turned out, the regional elections in Aceh set the record for the highest number of candidates since direct regional elections were first introduced in Indonesia. Elections were held simultaneously for all regional and district heads (except for the district heads in Bireuen and South Aceh as mentioned above). There were 8 joint tickets standing in the gubernatorial elections and 141 joint tickets standing in the district elections (Tables 6.2 and 6.5 below).

**Gubernatorial elections**

Of the eight gubernatorial joint-tickets, five represented political parties whilst three stood as independents. The gubernatorial candidates were as follows: (See Table 6.2)

Two of the joint-candidates, Malik Raden-Sayed Fuad Zakaria (Golkar, PDIP, PKPI) and Azwar Abubakar-Nasir Djamil (PAN, PKS) were powerful political figures within the local political elite. Malik Raden (Golkar) won the largest number of votes in the 2004 general elections (*Kompas*, 2004) whilst Sayed Fuad Zakaria was the chair of Golkar in Aceh, representing Aceh in the all-Indonesian parliament (DPR) and head of the Aceh Provincial House of Representatives (DPRD Aceh). Azwar Abubakar\(^{17}\) (PAN, PKS) was a former deputy governor of Aceh, appointed acting governor following the imprisonment of Governor Abdullah Puteh for corruption\(^{18}\) whilst Nasir Djamil was a member of the Aceh DPRD. (*Kompas*, 2006)

Ghazali Abbas (independent candidate) and Iskandar Hoesin (PBB and partners) were also part of the existing formal political structure. Hoesin was the former head of the Transmigration Regional Office in Aceh who had recently served as the Director-General of Research and Development in the Ministry of Law and human rights. Ghazali Abbas was a member of the DPR and well-known as an outspoken defender of the victims of violence in Aceh.\(^{19}\)
Table 6.2. Gubernatorial candidates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>Candidates: governor/deputy governor</th>
<th>Political parties/coalition groups</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Malik Raden-Sayed Fuad Zakaria</td>
<td>Golkar(^6), Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan/PDI-P(^7), Partai Demokrat (PD) and Partai Keadilan dan Persatuan Indonesia/PKPI(^8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Humam Hamid-Hasbi Abdullah</td>
<td>Partai Persatuan Pembangunan/PPP(^11) and the ‘old’ GAM leaders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Azwar Abubakar-Nasir Djamil</td>
<td>Partai Amanat Nasional (PAN)(^12) and Partai Keadilan Sejahtera/PKS(^13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Major General [Ret] Djali Yusuf-Syauqas Rahmatillah</td>
<td>Independent(^14) - close to the Democratic Party/PD and a former member of Susilo Bambang Yudohyono’s security team in the presidential elections</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Ghazali Abbas-Salahuddin</td>
<td>Independent - PPP delegate to the all Indonesia parliament Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat (DPR) and supported by e.g. human rights groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Irwandi Yusuf-M. Nazar</td>
<td>Independent, supported by KPA(^15) and SIRA(^16)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Both Lieutenant General (Ret) Tamlicha Ali and Major General (Ret) Djali Yusuf are former high ranking military officers. Unlike Tamlicha Ali who had never been stationed in Aceh, Djali Yusuf was a former Chief of the Aceh Military Command.

Humam Hamid, a former lecturer at Syiah Kuala University, is the son of a highly respected Acehnese Muslim cleric. Both Human and his brother, Farhan Hamid, - a former member of the DPR representing PAN - have always been involved in politics. Humam was appointed as chair of the National Committee of Indonesian Youth for Aceh in the 1980s and was actively engaged in the NGO world. Farhan’s support for Humam comes not as a representative of PAN, but as a close relative. Such dynamics in Indonesian politics are quite usual – confusing sometimes, but a reality.

Of all the gubernatorial candidates, Hasbi Abdullah (on a joint-ticket with Humam Hamid) and Irwandi Yusuf-Muhammad Nazar were the only ones with close links to GAM. Hasbi is Zaini Abdullah, GAM’s Foreign Affairs Minister in Sweden’s younger brother. Irwandi Yusuf had previously been posted as GAM’s intelligence liaison officer in Jakarta, was a member of the GAM delegation in Helsinki, and GAM’s representative to the Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM), the body responsible for the implementation of the MoU, even though his political ascent only began in the early 2000. Both Hasbi and Irwandi have been imprisoned for their activities. Hasbi was sentenced to 17 years imprisonment in 1990 and released with the fall of Soeharto. Irwandi was arrested in May 2003 but managed to escape from prison during the 2004 tsunami.

Muhammad Nazar, standing alongside Irwandi, was the head of SIRA. Born in Ulim Pidie in 1973, he completed his studies at Ar-Raniry State Islamic Institute in 1998 where he also lectured from 1997 to 1999 and organised young intellectuals. In 1998 he became head of the Regional Council of the Crescent Star Youth organisation which was part of the Crescent Star Party (PBB - Partai Bulan Bintang) in Aceh. In 1999-2000, he was arrested and imprisoned in connection with SIRA’s mobilisation of thousands of Acehnese calling for a referendum. Later he was imprisoned again and only released on 31 August 2005 following the implementation of the Helsinki MoU.20
Election predictions

In order to try and predict the outcome of the elections, most observers based their analysis on *politik perkauman*, or political grouping approach, by focusing on factors such as the candidates’ origin, family background, loyalties to significant leaders and personal reputation.

Prior to the regional elections, a number of survey organisations including the International Foundation for Election Systems (IFES) and the Indonesian Survey Circle (LSI- Lingkaran Survey Indonesia)\(^{21}\) made their predictions public. IFES projected that the gubernatorial elections would be held over two rounds. According to the IFES survey, the candidates would find it hard to win more than 25% of the vote in the first round, thus requiring a second round. The IFES survey results were based on 1,189 respondents from all of the districts and municipalities in Aceh apart from Sabang and Simelue.\(^{22}\) Furthermore, IFES research manager, Rakesh Sharma, stated in a press release that ‘under current conditions, it is hard for the gubernatorial candidates in Aceh to secure 25% of the vote unless something spectacular takes place during the campaign period that induces voters to support a particular candidate. However, should this happen, they would still not win more than 26% of the vote.’\(^{23}\)

Meanwhile, the LSI predicted that the candidates with links to GAM would lose and moreover, that candidates from the national parties, Golkar and PAN in particular, would be the most likely winners.\(^{24}\) LSI’s predictions were based on a survey of candidates’ popularity involving 500 field researchers in a number of regions in Aceh.\(^{25}\) Thus, the LSI were predicting likely victories for either Azwar Abubakar-Nasir Djamil (PAN, PKS) or Malik Raden-Sayed Fuad Zakaria (Golkar, PDIP, PPKI) over the GAM-associated candidates. According to LSI analysis, ‘image or popularity will be the biggest determining factors in the outcome of the regional elections, not the support of political parties or other organisations’. Referring to survey results from other elections in Indonesia, the LSI concluded that, ‘60% of the winners of regional elections are either current or previous incumbents, and popular political figures have a bigger chance of success.’\(^{26}\)
**The results**

In stark contrast to most prediction, the gubernatorial elections were dominated by the candidates associated with GAM/KPA and SIRA, with the Irwandi-Nazar ticket securing 38% of the vote. The Humam-Hasbi ticket however only succeeded in securing 16% of the vote, despite receiving the unofficial support of the Stockholm based GAM leaders and their associates in Aceh as well as the PPP. Candidates with links to GAM were particularly successful in those areas that had been under the Military Operation Zone (DOM) from 1989 to 1998 (North Aceh, East Aceh and Pidie). However, candidates associated with GAM also succeeded in areas such as Aceh Jaya, West Aceh and Sabang where GAM had never been dominant, reflecting perhaps the desire for change, particularly in Sabang. Candidates from the dominant parties, Malik Raden-Sayed (Golkar, PDIP, PPKI) only won 13% of the vote whilst Azwar-Nazir (PAN, PKS) managed only 10%.

As well as reflecting popular dissatisfaction with candidates form the national parties, the gubernatorial elections also demonstrated the unpopularity of military candidates, with Tamlicha-Harmen and Djali-Syauqas coming seventh and eighth respectively with less than 4% of the vote. For the full results of the gubernatorial election, see Table 6.3. below:

**Table 6.3. Results of the gubernatorial elections**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>Candidates</th>
<th>Votes</th>
<th>Percentage of votes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Irwandi Yusuf and Muhammad Nazar(^{27}) (Independent, supported by KPA/SIRA)</td>
<td>768,754</td>
<td>38.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Humam Hamid and Hasbi Abdullah, (PPP)</td>
<td>334,484</td>
<td>16.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Malik Raden and Sayed Fuad Zakaria (Golkar Party, PDIP, Democratic Party (P.D) and PKPI(^{28}))</td>
<td>281,174</td>
<td>13.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Azwar Abubakar, and Nasir Djamil, (PAN and PKS)</td>
<td>213,566</td>
<td>10.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Ghazali Abbas Adan and Salahuddin Alfata (Independent, civil society base)</td>
<td>156,978</td>
<td>7.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Iskandar Hoesin and Saleh Manaf (PBB)</td>
<td>111,553</td>
<td>5.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Gen. (Ret) Djali Yusuf and Syauqas Rahmatillah (Independent close to Democratic Party)</td>
<td>65,543</td>
<td>3.26</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total number of votes 2,012,370

Source: KPI-Aceh.
The landslide victory for Irwandi and Nazar is even more clear if the election results are broken down at district and municipal level as per Table 4 below, which indicates the extent of their success not only in previous GAM strongholds, but in other areas as well.

**Table 6.4. Irwandi-Nazar votes at district and municipal level**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>District/Municipality</th>
<th>Result</th>
<th>Votes (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>01</td>
<td>Aceh Besar</td>
<td>Irwandi/Nazar won</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>02</td>
<td>Sabang</td>
<td>Irwandi/Nazar won</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>03</td>
<td>Bireuen</td>
<td>Irwandi/Nazar won</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04</td>
<td>Aceh Utara (North Aceh)</td>
<td>Irwandi/Nazar won</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>05</td>
<td>Lhokseumawe</td>
<td>Irwandi/Nazar won</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>06</td>
<td>Aceh Timur (East Aceh)</td>
<td>Irwandi/Nazar won</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>07</td>
<td>Aceh Tenggara (Southeast Aceh)</td>
<td>Irwandi/Nazar won</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>08</td>
<td>Gayo Lues</td>
<td>Irwandi/Nazar won</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>09</td>
<td>Aceh Selatan (South Aceh)</td>
<td>Irwandi/Nazar won</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Aceh Barat Daya (Southwest Aceh)</td>
<td>Irwandi/Nazar won</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Simeulue</td>
<td>Irwandi/Nazar won</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Nagan Raya</td>
<td>Irwandi/Nazar won</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Aceh Barat (West Aceh)</td>
<td>Irwandi/Nazar won</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Aceh Jaya</td>
<td>Irwandi/Nazar won</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Langsa</td>
<td>Irwandi/Nazar won</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Banda Aceh</td>
<td>Irwandi lost (Humam Hamid won with 22%) (votes for Irwandi/Nazar)</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Pidie</td>
<td>Irwandi lost (Humam Hamid won with 50%) (votes for Irwandi/Nazar)</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Aceh Tamiang</td>
<td>Irwandi lost (Malik Raden won with 20%) (votes for Irwandi/Nazar)</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Bener Meriah</td>
<td>Irwandi lost (Malik Raden won with 33%) (votes for Irwandi/Nazar)</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Aceh Tengah (Central Aceh)</td>
<td>Irwandi lost (Malik Raden won with 33%)</td>
<td>26% (votes for Irwandi/Nazar)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Singkil</td>
<td>Irwandi lost (Malik Raden won with 33%) (votes for Irwandi/Nazar)</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total percentage and number of votes won by Irwandi-Nazar</th>
<th>38.20</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2,012,370 votes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: KIP-Aceh
**District and municipal candidates**

Although the results of the KPA/SIRA candidates in the 2006 district and municipal elections cannot compare with the success of the Irwandi-Nazar gubernatorial ticket, they did nevertheless win a number of significant victories. KPA/SIRA candidates won in seven districts and municipalities, six in the first round and one in the second. The first round victories were won in Sabang, Aceh Jaya, Lhokseumawe, Pidie, East Aceh and North Aceh – the last four of which represent traditional GAM bases. The seventh KPA/SIRA victory was won in the second round by Ramli MS-Fuadri in West Aceh, having secured only 24.6% of the vote in the first round. However, this pair succeeded in winning the second round with a significant 76.2% of the vote. KPA/SIRA candidates Nurdin AR and Busmadar Ismail were later to win the postponed elections in Bireuen in June 2007 with 62.3% of the vote. Nurdin is an ex-GAM leader who was sentenced to 13 years imprisonment in 1990, subsequently moving to Australia some time after his release. Busmadar was a former sub-district official who was sacked because of his association with GAM. Similarly, KPA/SIRA supported Husin Yusuf and Daska Aziz who went on to win the second round of the postponed elections in South Aceh.

The results of the elections at district and municipal level reflect the people of Aceh’s disaffection with national political parties. Golkar, either on its own or in coalition with other parties, was only able to secure five victories at district and municipal level – a considerable fall from grace given that it had been the most successful party in the 2004 parliamentary elections. Candidates from PAN and the PKS who also did well in 2004 only managed to take three districts. Moreover the PPP, which used to have substantial following in Aceh, also run out of steam as it only succeeded in winning the position of Mayor in Banda Aceh, although it was also part of the winning coalition in Gayo Lues.

The district and municipal elections involved a huge number of candidates with different political bases. The complex picture is summarised in Table 6.5. below:
Table 6.5. Results of the district/municipal elections

The winning tickets in the first round of elections are given in bold text. Where two rounds were held, the two pairs of candidates with most votes in the first round are given in bold and the second round winners are identified by the percentage of votes won.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Municipality/District</th>
<th>Candidates</th>
<th>Political base</th>
<th>Votes (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Banda Aceh</td>
<td>Sulaiman Abda &amp; Saifuddin Ishaq</td>
<td>Golkar</td>
<td>15.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Mawardi Nurdin &amp; Illiza Sa’aduddin Djamal</td>
<td>PPP, PBR, PD</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Teuku Alaidinsyah &amp; Anas Bidin Nyak Syech</td>
<td>PAN, PPNUI, PBB, PPDI, PSI</td>
<td>14.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>H. Bachtir Nitura &amp; Nasruddin Daud</td>
<td>Independent (non KPA/SIRA)</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Sayid Fadhill &amp; Nursalis</td>
<td>Independent (non KPA/SIRA)</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>H. Raihan Iskandar &amp; Teuku Surya Darma</td>
<td>PKS</td>
<td>21.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Muhammad Taufik Abda &amp; Akhiruddin Mahjuddin</td>
<td>Independent (Civil Society groups with SIRA/KPA)</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Sabang</td>
<td>T. Zahirsyah &amp; H.M.Amin Nyak Neh</td>
<td>Independent (non KPA/SIRA)</td>
<td>8.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Muhammad Nur &amp; Rusli Is</td>
<td>Independent (non KPA/SIRA)</td>
<td>1.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>H. Husaini &amp; H.Suradji Yunus</td>
<td>Golkar Party</td>
<td>29.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>M. Nasir &amp; Tgk. Azhari</td>
<td>PAN</td>
<td>14.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Munawar Liza Zainal &amp; Islamuddin, ST</td>
<td>Independent (KPA/SIRA)</td>
<td>35.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>H. Hirwan Jack &amp; Muhammad Husin Ali</td>
<td>PPB, PDIP</td>
<td>10.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lhokseumawe</td>
<td>H. T. Fachruddin &amp; H. Armia Ibrahim</td>
<td>PAN</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lhokseumawe</td>
<td>H. Marzuki M. Amin &amp; H. Fatani</td>
<td>PPP, Golkar</td>
<td>21.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lhokseumawe</td>
<td><strong>Munir Usman &amp; Suaidi Yahya</strong></td>
<td>Independent (KPA/SIRA)</td>
<td>38.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lhokseumawe</td>
<td>IH. Kasbani Kasim &amp; Dahlan A. Rahman</td>
<td>Independent (non KPA/SIRA)</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lhokseumawe</td>
<td>H. T. A. Khalid, MM &amp; Tgk. Mursyid Yahya</td>
<td>Partai Patriot Pancasila, PBR, PPNUI, PPD, PKS, PM, PD, PBB, PDIP, PKPI</td>
<td>18.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lhokseumawe</td>
<td>M. Nasir &amp; Nurdin M. Yasir</td>
<td>Independent (non KPA/SIRA)</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Langsa | **Zulkifli Zainon & Saifuddin Razali** | Golkar | 41 |
| Langsa | Ridwan Hanafiah & H Anwar Hasan | PDIP, PBB | 3.5 |
| Langsa | Ali Basyah Tanjung & Tgk. Syech Muhajir Usman | PPP, PKPB | 10.5 |
| Langsa | H. M. Jamil Hasan - Rahmadi Yahya S | PAN | 6.2 |
| Langsa | H. Syahril, & DR. H. Syafriruddin | PD, PKB, P. Merdeka, PPD, PNI Marhaenisme, PP Pancasila, PKPI | 11.1 |
| Langsa | 6Abdullah Gade & Zainal Abidin | Independent (non KPA/SIRA) | 27.7 |
## Aceh: The Role of Democracy for Peace and Reconstruction

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Candidate Name</th>
<th>Party Affiliation</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aceh Besar</td>
<td>Musa Bintang &amp; H. Munir Aziz</td>
<td>PPP</td>
<td>8.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tgk H Bukhari Daud &amp; Anwar Ahmad</td>
<td>PAN, PBR</td>
<td>25.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>H. Mustanir &amp; H. M. Ali Usman</td>
<td>PKS</td>
<td>16.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sayuthi Is &amp; T. Raden Sulaiman</td>
<td>PBB, PPI, PPNU-Demokrat</td>
<td>7.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>H Rusli Muhammad &amp; Muhammad Ali</td>
<td>GOLKAR, PDIP, PKB</td>
<td>15.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Irwansyah &amp; Tgk. Usman Muda</td>
<td>Independent (KPA/SIRA)</td>
<td>19.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>H Zaini Zakaria Alwy &amp; Mahdi</td>
<td>Independent (non KPA/SIRA)</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Zaini Aziz &amp; H. Amiruddin Usman Daroy</td>
<td>Independent (non KPA/SIRA)</td>
<td>7.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aceh Utara</td>
<td>Mirza Ismail &amp; Nazir Adam</td>
<td>Independent (KPA/SIRA)</td>
<td>56.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>H. Jalaluddin Harun &amp; Darul Irfan</td>
<td>PAN, PKS</td>
<td>10.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tgk. H. Gunawan Adnan &amp; H. Abd. Salam Poroh</td>
<td>Independent (non KPA/SIRA)</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>T. Khairul Basyar &amp; Abdullah Daud</td>
<td>PBR, PBB</td>
<td>18.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Faisal Saifuddin &amp; Tgk. Yusri Puteh</td>
<td>Independent (non KPA/SIRA)</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>H. Abdullah Yahya &amp; M. Yusuf Ishaq</td>
<td>Golkar Party, Partai Pelopor</td>
<td>8.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>H. Bustami Usman &amp; Tgk. Anwar Yusuf</td>
<td>Independent (non KPA/SIRA)</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pidie</td>
<td>Mirza Ismail &amp; Nazir Adam</td>
<td>Independent (KPA/SIRA)</td>
<td>56.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aceh Utara</td>
<td>Ilyas Al-Hamid &amp; Syarifuddin</td>
<td>Independent (KPA/SIRA)</td>
<td>67.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>H. Azwir &amp; Abdul Manaf</td>
<td>Independent (non KPA/SIRA)</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tarmizi A. Karim, &amp; Tgk. H. Amirullah</td>
<td>PPP</td>
<td>20.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Gazali Muhammad Syam &amp; Terpiadi A. Madjid</td>
<td>Golkar Party, PAN</td>
<td>9.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>Region</td>
<td>Candidate Names</td>
<td>Party Details</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Aceh Tengah (Central Aceh)</td>
<td>Nasaruddin, H. &amp; Djauhar Ali</td>
<td>PBR, PAN, PKPI, P. Patriot Pancasila</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Mahreje Wahab &amp; H. Ibrahim Idris Gayo</td>
<td>Golkar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>H. Banta Cut &amp; H. M. Amin. R</td>
<td>Independent (non KPA/SIRA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>H Darmo Tapa Gayo &amp; Tgk. Mursyid</td>
<td>Independent (non KPA/SIRA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Abdul Mutholib Bantasyam &amp; H. Moeawiyah Sabdin</td>
<td>PDK, PNBK, PKPB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Syukur Kobath &amp; Kurniadi Nurdin Sufie</td>
<td>PD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Tgk. Ligadinsyah &amp; Tgk. H Mude Hasan</td>
<td>Independent (KPA/SIRA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>H. Mukhlis Gayo &amp; Soewarno</td>
<td>Independent (non KPA/SIRA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Aceh Timur (East Aceh)</td>
<td>Muslim Hasballah &amp; Nasruddin Abu Bakar</td>
<td>Independent (KPA/SIRA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>H. Bahtiar Yusuf &amp; Nurdin. AR</td>
<td>PPP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>H. Zainal Abidin &amp; H. Zubir Ali Basyah</td>
<td>PBR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>H. Azman Usmanuddin &amp; Heldiyansyah Z. Mard</td>
<td>Golkar, PAN, PDIP, PKP, P. Patriot, PBSD, PDK, PNBK, PNIM, PPD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Amhar Abubakar &amp; Syarifuddin S. Malem</td>
<td>Independent (non KPA/SIRA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Sulaiman Ismail GM &amp; Zulkarnaini</td>
<td>Independent (KPA related)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Party</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aceh Tenggara (South East Aceh)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H. Armen Desky &amp; H. M. Salim Fakhry</td>
<td>Golkar</td>
<td>34.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H. Hasan Basri Selian &amp; Tgk. Saribun Selian</td>
<td>Independent (non KPA/SIRA)</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tgk. Appan Husni, JS &amp; H. Abdurrahim Sekedang</td>
<td>Independent (non KPA/SIRA)</td>
<td>17.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>H. Hasanuddin &amp; H. Syamsul Bahri</strong></td>
<td>PKB and PDI-P</td>
<td><strong>36.8</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muhammad Rido &amp; Supri Yunus</td>
<td>Independent (non KPA/SIRA)</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H. Abustian &amp; Djalidun Keruas</td>
<td>Independent (non KPA/SIRA)</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gandhi Bangko &amp; Rajadun Pagan</td>
<td>Independent (non KPA/SIRA)</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H. Damansyah &amp; Kasim Junaidi</td>
<td>Independent (non KPA/SIRA)</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Party</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aceh Barat (West Aceh)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burhanuddin Yasin &amp; Said Rasyidin</td>
<td>Independent (non KPA/SIRA)</td>
<td>6.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daud Manaf &amp; Sofyan. S Sawang</td>
<td>PPP, PBR</td>
<td>16.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zulkarnaini &amp; ITgk. Babussalam Oemar</td>
<td>PPNU, PBB, P.P Pancasila</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suwanto NG &amp; Rosni Idham</td>
<td>Independent (non KPA/SIRA)</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H Nasruddin &amp; Syahbuddin</td>
<td>PAN, Golkar</td>
<td>11.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ibnu Abbas &amp; H. Amran Usman</td>
<td>PD, PKB</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>H. Iskandar &amp; H Chudri Yunus</strong></td>
<td>Independent (non KPA/SIRA)</td>
<td><strong>18.3</strong> 2nd round: <strong>23.8</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H. Nyak Ali Umar &amp; Tjut Suwarni</td>
<td>P. Merdeka, PDIP, PKS, PNBK, PBSD, PPD</td>
<td>9.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burhanuddin Mustafa &amp; Chairuddin</td>
<td>Independent (non KPA/SIRA)</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ramli, MS &amp; Fuadi S. Si</td>
<td>Independent (KPA/SIRA)</td>
<td><strong>25.1</strong> 2nd ound: <strong>76.2</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Simeulue</td>
<td>H. M. Sidiq Fahmi &amp; H. Arya Udin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Erly Hasyim &amp; Saifuddin Samin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Darmili &amp; Ibnu Aban GT. Ulma</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Fachri Kasim &amp; Fajrian Hasan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Mohd. Daud Syah &amp; Hasdian Yasin Sarmadiah</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Mawardi, &amp; Sayuti Abas</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| 13 | Singkil Aceh | H. Maimur Syah Putra & H. Khazali | Golkar | 37.2 |
|    |              | Salmaza & H. Burhanuddin Berkat  | PKPI, PPP | 19.3 |
|    |              | H. Syafriadi Alias Oyon & Ramlan | PBR, PDIP | 30.3 |
|    |              | H. Aliamin Sambo & IAMirtua Bancin | PKK, PBB | 3.7  |
|    |              | H. Syahyuril & Harsoyo           | PAN, P.P Pancasila | 19.3 |

<p>| 14 | Aceh Barat Daya (South West Aceh) | H Musfiai Haridhi &amp; Ridwan Adami | PPP, PKS | 15.0 |
|    |                                  | TB. Herman, SE, MM &amp; Tgk. Zulkifli Dalyan | PKPI | 4.1 |
|    |                                  | Akmal Ibrahim &amp; Syamsul Rizal      | PAN | 21.9 2nd round: 56.6 |
|    |                                  | T. Burhanuddin Sampe &amp; RS. Darmansyah | Golkar, PPNU, PIB, PDIP, PKPI | 7.0  |
|    |                                  | Muhammad Ansar &amp; Zulkifli          | Independent (non KPA/SIRA) | 16.0 |
|    |                                  | Fakhruddin &amp; Rajudin Suak          | PBB, PD. | 15.1 |
|    |                                  | H. Sulaiman Adami &amp; H. Munir H. Ubit | PKB, Partai Merdeka | 20.9 2nd round: 43.4 |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>District</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Gayo Lues</td>
<td>H. Ibnu Hasim &amp; Letkol Inf. Firdaus Karim</td>
<td>PGK, PPP, PAN, PSI, PD</td>
<td>58.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>H. Ramli &amp; Irmawan</td>
<td>PBB, PKB, PDIP, PKPI, PBR</td>
<td>38.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>H. Abdul Gafar &amp; Weri</td>
<td>Independent (non KPA/SIRA)</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Aceh Jaya</td>
<td>H. Azwar Thaib, &amp; T. Banta Syahrizal</td>
<td>PPP</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Malik Musa &amp; Mustafa Ibrahim</td>
<td>PAN</td>
<td>12.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Azhar Abdurrahman &amp; Zamzami A. Rani</td>
<td>Independent (KPA/SIRA)</td>
<td>63.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>H. Zulfian Ahmad &amp; Marwan</td>
<td>Golkar, PD, PIB, PPNUI, PKPI</td>
<td>18.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Nagan Raya</td>
<td>Mohd Alfatah &amp; H. Evendi Ibrahim</td>
<td>PAN, PDIP, PKB, PKS</td>
<td>12.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>T. Asfan &amp; Ika Suhanas Adlim</td>
<td>Independent (non KPA/SIRA)</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Asmadi Syam &amp; Ramli</td>
<td>Independent (non KPA/SIRA)</td>
<td>9.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>T. Zulkarnaini &amp; M. Kasem Ibrahim</td>
<td>Golkar, PP Pancasila, PBB</td>
<td>31.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Bustami Usman, &amp; T. Arsyad</td>
<td>Independent (non KPA/SIRA)</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Said Mustafa Usab &amp; Sayudin</td>
<td>Independent (non KPA/SIRA)</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>H. Tripoli, MT &amp; Fauzi</td>
<td>Independent (KPA/SIRA)</td>
<td>12.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Said Mahdi &amp; Achmad Sachuri</td>
<td>PPNUI, PBR</td>
<td>9.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>H. Azhar Muslem &amp; Syech Marhaban</td>
<td>PPP, PD</td>
<td>11.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No.</td>
<td>District</td>
<td>Name 1</td>
<td>Party 1</td>
<td>Votes 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----</td>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>----------------------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>---------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Aceh Tamiang</td>
<td>H. Abdul Latief &amp; H. Awaluddin</td>
<td>PAN</td>
<td>20.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>H. T. Yusni &amp; Armand Muis</td>
<td>Golkar, PDIP</td>
<td>16.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>H. Mohd. Ilyas. &amp; T. Basyir</td>
<td>PPP, PPDK, PNI Marhaenisme</td>
<td>7.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Rusman &amp; Darsah</td>
<td>Independent (KPA/SIRA)</td>
<td>17.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>H. Helmi Mahera Al-Mujahid &amp; H. Noekman Darsono</td>
<td>Independent (non KPA/SIRA)</td>
<td>7.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>H. Sofyan Efendi &amp; Nurman Syah</td>
<td>Independent (non KPA/SIRA)</td>
<td>9.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Syarifah Chadijah &amp; H. Abul Hayat</td>
<td>Independent (non KPA/SIRA)</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>H. Hamdan Sati, ST &amp; H. Iskandar Zulkarnain</td>
<td>PD, PBR</td>
<td>20.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Bener Meriah</td>
<td>Aldar AB &amp; H. Ridwan Qari</td>
<td>PPP, PD</td>
<td>24.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Tagore Abubakar &amp; Sirwandi Laut Tawar Smik</td>
<td>Golkar</td>
<td>33.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Fauzan Azima &amp; Dawam Gayo</td>
<td>Independent (related to KPA/SIRA)</td>
<td>21.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Misriadi &amp; I Sutrisno</td>
<td>Independent (non KPA/SIRA)</td>
<td>19.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Bireuen (June, 2007)</td>
<td>H. Anwar Idris &amp; H. Syahrizal Saifuddin</td>
<td>PPP and PDK</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>H. Hamdani Raden &amp; H.A. Ridwan M. Dallah</td>
<td>PBB</td>
<td>4.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Tgk. Nurdin Abdurrahman &amp; Tgk. Busmadar Ismail</td>
<td>Independent (KPA/SIRA)</td>
<td>62.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>H. Subami A. Gani &amp; H. Razuardi Ibrahim</td>
<td>Independent (non KPA/SIRA)</td>
<td>20.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Atqia Abubakar &amp; Fakhirrazzi Yusuf</td>
<td>Independent (non KPA/SIRA)</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Mustafa A Glangang &amp; Tgk. H. Abdullah Manaf</td>
<td>Independent (non KPA/SIRA)</td>
<td>7.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Aceh: The Role of Democracy for Peace and Reconstruction

Aceh Selatan (South Aceh) (1st round November 2007; second round January 2008)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Candidate</th>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Votes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yulizar S &amp; Tgk.H.T. Abdul Aziz Syah</td>
<td>Independent (non-KPA/SIRA)</td>
<td>1.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H.T. Lizam Mahmud &amp; Murni Yunan</td>
<td>Independent (non KPA/SIRA)</td>
<td>12.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muddasir Kamil &amp; Munasir Soekardi</td>
<td>Independent (non KPA/SIRA)</td>
<td>5.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elly Sufriadi &amp; Yuli Zualrdi Rais</td>
<td>Independent (non KPA/SIRA)</td>
<td>3.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H. Rabuun &amp; Mawardi Jamal</td>
<td>PKPI</td>
<td>6.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zulkarnaini &amp; H. Havas Adnan</td>
<td>Independent (non KPA/SIRA)</td>
<td>9.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>H. Azwir &amp; H. Abdul Karim</strong></td>
<td><strong>PBB</strong></td>
<td><strong>14.97</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H. Said Idrus &amp; Taufik Hidayat</td>
<td>Independent (non KPA/SIRA)</td>
<td>1.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abdul Kadir &amp; Zurnalis</td>
<td>Independent (non KPA/SIRA)</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H. Darmansyah &amp; Tgk. Marhaban Saidi</td>
<td>Independent (non KPA/SIRA)</td>
<td>8.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tio Achriyat &amp; Tgk. H. Zulkarnain</td>
<td>PAN</td>
<td>7.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harvana Hasan, Mawardy Adami</td>
<td>PPP</td>
<td>6.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Tgk. Husin Yusuf &amp; Daska Aziz</strong></td>
<td>Independent: (KPA-SIRA)</td>
<td><strong>19.1/</strong> 54.29</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: KIP-Aceh, 2006. The figures for South Aceh on the KIP-Aceh website were incorrect and have been adjusted on the basis of media reports quoting KIP. Special thanks to Dara Meutia Uning.
How actors related to the elections

_Actors associated with GAM_

In response to the need for political transition in Aceh, GAM initiated two important aspects of institutional and organisational reform. In the first instance it established the Aceh Transitional Committee (KPA – *Komite Peralihan Aceh*) in the form of a new non-military organisation based on GAM’s military structure and hierarchy, the Nanggroe Aceh Army (*Teuntra Nanggroe Aceh*). Thus, the KPA permeates all the way from the central regional level or _sagoe_, down to the _mukim_, which in turn comprises of a number of _gampong_ or villages. Military commanders at each organisational level were usually (though not always) appointed as the head of the local KPA. Thus one can hardly characterise KPA as a civil society organisation based on rights-bearing citizens. The second initiative was to establish a local political party in order to compete in the 2009 general elections. The party-building process however, proved to be difficult and contentious (see Chapter 7 in this volume for further details).

Civil society activists with a similar nationalist though more democratic orientation sustained their coalition of civil society organisation under SIRA, which was founded on 4 February 1999 in Banda Aceh by more than 100 students and public organisations in Aceh to promote a referendum on independence, similar to the one that had been held in East Timor. Although SIRA and KPA joined forces in the 2006 elections, SIRA was later to establish its own political party.

GAM internal dynamics in the lead up to the municipal and district elections was tainted by internal conflict between ‘old’ GAM based overseas and ‘new’ GAM based in Aceh. Internal conflict led to a split in the nomination of gubernatorial candidates. The first group, ‘old’ GAM (including Malik Raden, Zaini Abdullah, Zakaria Saman, Muhammad Usman Lampoh AW) lent their support to the GAM coalition with the PPP in the gubernatorial election, namely Humam Hamid and Hasbi Adullah, while the second group, ‘new’ GAM (including Bakhtiar Abdullah, M. Nur Djuli and Munawar Liza) backed Irwandi Yusuf and Muhammad Nazar. The origin of the conflict ran deep and reflected more than a difference in strategy. For example, the younger generation with its solid constituencies on the ground did not want to affiliate themselves with national
political parties because they were certain of their own strength and capacity. They argued that if they affiliated with national parties, they would not be independent and would thus fall short of making the most of the opportunities provided under the Helsinki MoU.

Although as an organisation, GAM’s leaders (with Stockholm as a base) had formally withdrawn from the 2006 elections and only backed the coalition with PPP in the gubernatorial race, GAM/KPA and SIRA candidates joined hands as independents and registered in all but three of the 21 districts and municipalities holding elections. A total of 19 KPA/SIRA candidates registered for the district and municipal elections – two competing against one another in East Aceh (with the one with a clear SIRA candidate as the winner).

Standing as independent candidates in the districts meant that they had neither the firm support of ‘old’ GAM (mainly in Stockholm) nor the backing of an alliance with national political parties. The transformation of GAM’s military command structure right down to village level in the form of the demilitarised transitional organisation KPA was particularly important in the mobilisation of votes, especially in rural areas, as was the support of SIRA in more urban electoral districts.

GAM spokesperson Bachtiar Abdullah, supported the approach of the younger generation of GAM activists, stating that, ‘all GAM candidates should register as independents. Any candidates representing a political party should no longer be considered GAM cadres.’

Unlike other candidates, GAM/SIRA candidates campaigned mostly on a ‘Reform for Aceh’ ticket. In the previous gubernatorial elections many of the candidates based their campaigns on the promotion of the Syariah. However the GAM/SIRA candidates chose not focus on the implementation of Islamic law. Largely described by senior GAM officials as a ‘democratic movement’ rather than as an ‘Islamist movement,’ the Irwandi-Nazar ticket thus focused more on structural rather than religious reform. Even more interesting perhaps, Irwandi-Nazar relied much less on the mass media than other candidates, due it is suggested to their limited campaign budget. Instead, the GAM/SIRA candidates’ main campaign strategy was to mobilise mass support at grassroots level via the KPA and SIRA.
Table 6.6. GAM-KPA and SIRA related candidates in 2006-07 gubernatorial & district/municipal elections

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>Pair Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Result</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Irwandi Yusuf &amp; Muhammad Nazar</td>
<td>Governor/Deputy Governor</td>
<td>Aceh Province</td>
<td>Won</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Munawarliza Zein &amp; Islamuddin</td>
<td>Mayor/Deputy Mayor</td>
<td>Sabang</td>
<td>Won</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Munir Usman &amp; Suaidi Yahya</td>
<td>Mayor/Deputy Mayor</td>
<td>Lhokseumawe</td>
<td>Won</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Ramli MS &amp; Fuadri</td>
<td>District/Deputy District Head</td>
<td>Aceh Barat</td>
<td>Won (2nd round)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Azhar Abdurrahman &amp; Zamzami Arani</td>
<td>District/Deputy District Head</td>
<td>Aceh Jaya</td>
<td>Won</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Ilyas Pase &amp; Syarifuddin</td>
<td>District / Deputy District Head</td>
<td>Aceh Utara</td>
<td>Won</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Muslem Hasballah &amp; Nashruddin Abu bakar (and an additional GAM related ticket)</td>
<td>District / Deputy District Head</td>
<td>Aceh Timur</td>
<td>Won</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Mirza Ismail &amp; Nazir Adam</td>
<td>District / Deputy District Head</td>
<td>Pidie</td>
<td>Won</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Tgk. Nurdin Abdurrahman &amp; Tgk. Busmadar Ismail</td>
<td>District / Deputy District Head</td>
<td>Bireuen</td>
<td>Won</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Tgk. Husin Yusuf &amp; Daska Aziz</td>
<td>District / Deputy District Head</td>
<td>Aceh Selatan</td>
<td>Won (2nd round)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Muhammad Taufik Abda / Akhiruddin Mahyudin</td>
<td>Mayor/Deputy Mayor</td>
<td>Banda Aceh</td>
<td>Lost</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Irwansyah alias Tgk. Muchsalmina &amp; Tgk Usman Muda</td>
<td>District / Deputy District Head</td>
<td>Aceh Besar</td>
<td>Lost</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Fauzan Azima &amp; Arhma alias Dawan Gayo</td>
<td>District / Deputy District Head</td>
<td>Bener Meriah</td>
<td>Lost</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Ligadinsyah &amp; Tgk Mude Hasan</td>
<td>District / Deputy District Head</td>
<td>Aceh Tengah</td>
<td>Lost</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Rusman &amp; Muhammad Darsah</td>
<td>District / Deputy District Head</td>
<td>Aceh Tamiang</td>
<td>Lost</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: KIP-Aceh
There is a strong correlation between the areas where GAM/SIRA won and the areas where GAM/SIRA networks were fully functional. Forbes Damai, an organisation which monitored the local election in Aceh, reported that in Pidie, North Aceh, Lhokseumawe and Bireuen, GAM/SIRA campaign teams had much greater success in reaching village communities than the other candidates. Through the KPA and SIRA networks, they implemented an intensive ‘door to door’ approach with which to bring their ‘reform for the people of Aceh’ message to local communities.41

In addition to their mobilisation strategy and the KPA/SIRA networks, the campaign theme itself was a key factor in securing Irwandi-Nazar and other GAM/SIRA candidates’ success. One of Irwandi’s main political reform messages was that Aceh needed inspired leaders with the capacity to make the right changes. Good, affordable – or even free education for the people of Aceh, was one such change. Others include reform in law enforcement, the environment and the economy as well as the eradication of corruption, collusion and nepotism.42

GAM/SIRA candidates benefitted from the people of Aceh’s desire for reform and justice after decades of repression, lack of investment and the flight of capital generated by Aceh’s natural resources to the Jakarta-based politicians and businessmen, something confirmed by Demos’ research According to Demos, ‘the majority of the people of Aceh have high levels of political awareness’ and ‘a great enthusiasm for political reform’ (for more detailed discussion see Chapter 3 of this volume).

Irwandi-Nazar succeeded in tapping into voter psychology and the general opposition to the ‘colonialism of the centre/Jakarta colonialism’ or just ‘Jakarta’. In addition, and in stark contrast to the other candidates who wore western-style suits, Irwandi and Nazar wore traditional Acehnese dress, including the rencong (Acehnese dagger, worn ceremoniously) and the kopiah meuketop (Acehnese traditional headwear). Thus, even in the way they physically presented themselves, Irwandi-Nazar appeared as more ‘genuinely Aceh’ than other candidates. Interestingly, all of the candidates standing in the Bireun district elections held later opted for this approach.

Moreover, in contrast to ‘old GAM’, the KPA/SIRA-backed candidates refused to cooperate with any of the ‘national’ parties,
thus standing out as the candidates that were most consistent with the struggle against Indonesian domination. Irwandi-Nazar were thus able to promote themselves as the candidates who were both ‘true Acehnese’ and ‘the true defenders of Aceh’. They also benefitted from the public perception that anyone who collaborated with a national party was a traitor to the Acehnese struggle. To the Acehnese, the armed struggle spearheaded by GAM in the past was one thing, but the desire to uphold Acehnese dignity and demands for justice in Aceh had become a collective best interest. Irwandi-Nazar thrived on the management of such political psychology, while other candidates still focused on their political strategies and manoeuvrings of Acehnese ‘political grouping,’ namely political preferences influenced by factors such as origin, family background, loyalties to major leaders, religion and reputation.

In other words, the voters who viewed GAM as a viable alternative to initiate and manage reform in Aceh had their aspirations manifested in the form of Irwandi and Nazar. However, Irwandi and Nazar were also not subject to or a part of GAM’s traditional leadership and thus more independent and civil society oriented, similar to Xanana Gusmao and Ramos Horta in East Timor. Irwandi had been openly quarrelling with GAM high command in Sweden. Nazar did not take orders from GAM, but from SIRA. It is thus reasonable to assume that the Irwandi-Nazar ticket was popular amongst a broad section of Acehnese that wanted peaceful, independent and democratic nationalism beyond the dominance of Jakarta and the old guerrilla leaders in Stockholm.43

**Indonesian national interests – political parties**

The strategy of choosing candidates backed by a coalition of political parties in Indonesia’s regional elections is quite usual. The requirement that candidates may only stand with the backing of a party, or a coalition of parties, that won at least 15% of the vote in the previous election has led to this practice. Such coalitions are increasingly based on the pragmatic desire to retain power and influence, and are not bound by specific ideological interests. Moreover, such coalitions are often short-lived, driven as they are by short-term interests.

The coalition between PAN and the PKS was driven by financial interests. According to a reliable source, Azwar Abubakar
of PAN was expected to pay IDR 5 billion in order that M. Nasir Djamil and the PKS join him as his running mate and receive the support of the party. This was in spite of the fact that the PKS has a reputation of being more ‘clean’ than most of the other ‘national’ parties. In fact when Azwar Abubakar was still governor of Aceh, the PKS even refused to account properly for its governance. It is true the PKS won the 2004 local parliamentary elections in Banda Aceh mostly because people saw it as an alternative party. At that juncture, there were no other alternatives and the PKS had successfully targeted the middle classes. Furthermore, in the case of the elections in Aceh, the PKS had refused to form a coalition with Golkar, the political party most associated with the obstruction of democracy and justice in Aceh. However, in the 2006 gubernatorial elections, the PAN-PKS ticket only managed fourth position with just under 11% of the vote. According to Irwanda, a Golkar official, ‘actually, none of the parties’ strategies had changed, including Golkar’s strategy for political transformation in the 2006 elections’.

In the run up to the 2006 elections, the Golkar Party was extremely confident of its gubernatorial candidates. After all, the then national chair of Golkar, former Vice President Jusuf Kalla, had been instrumental on the Indonesian side in fostering peace in Aceh. Golkar candidates Malik Raden and Sayed Fuad Zakaria, also received the backing of the PDI-P, the PKPI and the Democratic Party, all of which represented the desire to maintain the supremacy of the pro-Jakarta Acehnese elite. However, Golkar’s coalition only managed third place in the gubernatorial elections winning just under 14% of the vote, nowhere near its performance in the 2004 general elections and far below Irwandi and Nazar’s 38%.

*Indonesian national interests – the Indonesian armed forces*

Two pairs of gubernatorial candidates included retired military officers. The PKB-backed Lieutenant General (Ret) Tamlicha Ali running with Teungku Harmen Nuriqmar, and Major General (Ret) Djali Yusuf, former Commander of Iskandar Muda (Aceh) Military Regional Command, running with H. RA Syauqas Rahmatilah, who stood as independent candidates. Unlike Djali Yusuf, Tamlicha Ali had never been stationed in Aceh and was not known by the people of Aceh. Neither of these candidates had particularly exemplary military careers and were thus unlikely
to have had the explicit support of the Indonesian armed forces. However, their candidature was quite possibly the military’s way of testing of the political waters in Aceh.

The elections thus indicate that the military no longer engaged as actively and openly in the political arena in Aceh as they did earlier, but had endeavoured to position itself so that it could at least influence it. This means that the military does not need have seats in parliament or hold key posts within the bureaucracy. Rather, it just needs to establish a ‘close relationship’ with the decision makers in the executive and the legislative. The primary goal is to gain access to political power in order to facilitate the military’s access to economic resources.

**Indonesian national interests – the role of militias in three districts**

Between 2000 and 2001, the Indonesian military supplied arms to militia groups and other organisations in Central Aceh that supported the military’s aim to prevent the growth of GAM’s influence in the region. The military’s intervention provoked inter-ethnic communal violence and although the military eventually withdrew, tensions between ethnic groups and public distrust persist.\(^{46}\)

Despite the military and Jakarta’s denials, organised militias were a reality in some parts of Aceh. There were estimated to be at least 21 different militia organisations based and operating in a number of districts, particularly in Aceh Tengah, Aceh Tenggara and Bener Meriah but also Aceh Utara. The militia groups operated under the guise of a variety of organisations such as the Anti-Separatist Front (FSPG - *Front Anti Separatis*) in Aceh Utara and the People’s Fortress Against Separatism (Berantas - *Benteng Rakyat Anti Separatis*) in Bener Meriah and Aceh Tengah. In Bener Meriah, militia leader H. Tagore Abubakar joined forces with the Golkar candidate, Sirwandi Laut Tawar. In Aceh Tengah, Mahreje Wahab-Ibrahim Idris Gayo stood for election, and in Aceh Tenggara prominent militia leader Armen Desky ran with a Golkar candidate.

In the case of Aceh Tenggara district, Armen Desky explicitly stated that in order to fulfil his aim of breaking up Aceh and establishing a separate so-called ALA Province (*Aceh Leuser Antara*), ‘winning the position of district head is a necessary political vehicle. Without a formal position it would be difficult’.\(^ {47}\) In this way, the
regional elections in Aceh were used by the national political party elite as a way to gain more powerful political positions. It seems as if political parties such as Golkar and the PDI-P were pushing for the break up of Aceh into smaller provinces and the establishment of ALA province.

Armen Desky and his Golkar running mate Salim Fakhry, came a very close second with 34% of the votes to a coalition of political parties in Aceh Tenggara with just under 37% of the vote. Consequently, Armen Desky and Salim Fakhry demanded a re-run, although by early 2007 the district heads and mayors in most regions had already been inaugurated, Armen Desky’s influence was such that the Aceh Tenggara Independent Election Commission at first sanctioned a re-run. Additionally, seven out of the eight joint-candidates also called for the annulment of the election results. Eventually however, the winning pair of H. Hasanuddin and H. Syamsul Bahri, backed by the PKB and the PDI-P were officially declared the winners. In addition, the Golkar candidates, including militia leaders, won the election in Bener Meriah, a district that was known as a militia base during the conflict period.

Civil society - political alignment of student organisations

The strategy of mass mobilisation seems to have been overlooked by the second generation of civil society political activists in Aceh. In November 1999 despite succeeded (with the backing of GAM) in mobilising 1 million, and some say as many as 2 million, Acehnese to march in demand of a referendum for Aceh, this direct democracy strategy seems now to have been dropped. For example, Taufik Abda of the SIRA Presidium, who during his student days promoted student action in Aceh to overthrow President Soeharto and who was also the main instigator of the 1999 general strike in Aceh, now questions the effectiveness of mass mobilisation.

According to Taufik Abda, since the signing of the Helsinki MoU and the promulgation of the LoGA, opportunities for political participation and action have been broadened. Since the implementation of the LoGA, Taufik Abda acknowledges that he has tended to follow the pattern of struggle conducted by activists in Jakarta, for example by lobbying or negotiating, or by joining a team of experts. According to Taufik, since the MoU and the LoGA, a new mass movement could only be effective with the participation
of at least 500,000 to 1 million people. Further, he expressed doubt that such numbers could be mobilised today. According to Taufik, alternative opportunities that have opened up since the LoGA, including the possibility for independent candidates to stand for election, should be seized.

Senior and influential activists such as Otto Syamsuddin Ishak have questioned civil society’s role in the elections, asking whether they were just intending to stand by and watch, act as political brokers, or take the plunge and stand as independent candidates. A number of civil society activists decided that the LoGA did offer them an opportunity that should not be passed by and agreed that they should nominate candidates to stand in the Banda Aceh municipal elections.

Civil society - Banda Aceh: a democratic experiment

At a meeting convened by the KMPD (Committee of People Concerned for the Village - Komite Masyarakat Peduli Desa), a number of individuals from a wide range of civil society groups met to agree on suitable candidates. These groups included customary organisations in addition to the Aceh NGO Forum, SIRA, radical student associations and the KPO-PA (Aceh Fraternity Organisational Preparation Committee - Komite Persiapan Organisasi-Persaudaraan Aceh), to which we shall return later.

Around 20 names were put forward based on popularity, credibility and capacity, and after some deliberation they came up with a shortlist of four potential candidates, namely Kautsar, Aguswandi, Taufik Abda and Akhiruddin. However, it transpired that neither Kautsar nor Aguswandi were eligible to stand in the elections as they were both under 30 – the minimum age required for a candidate to be eligible to stand. Thus they settled on Taufik Abda from SIRA and Akhiruddin from the KPO-PA and GERAK (Anti-Corruption Peoples Movement) as their chosen candidates. According to Akhiruddin, or Udin as he is usually called, the KPMD meeting was the first time civil society organisations from diverse backgrounds met and agreed on a common political course of action.

On a personal level, Udin was motivated by his conviction that the only way to eradicate corruption was to reform the bureaucracy from within through the implementation of transparent and participatory budget planning and management.
Taufik on the other hand, having been successfully ‘provoked’ by Otto Syamsuddin, felt that putting himself forward would help to dispel the myth that only wealthy, senior figures could stand in an election.

Despite the ground-breaking agreement, when it came to the reality of Taufik and Udin’s campaign, support from the civil society organisation melted away. The root of the problem seems to have been located in the fact that the agreement was between individuals based on friendships rather than between organisations based on shared strategies, aims and objectives. As it transpired, few of the original supporters took part in the campaign or attended meetings, leaving Udin feeling betrayed by all those activists who, having initially encouraged him to stand, in the end just seemed to leave him out in the cold.

For candidates with limited financial resources, this was a substantial blow to their campaign. They were only able to hold two rallies, one in Ulee Kareeng and the other in Kutaraja. However, the MUTAKHIR ticket as they came to be known, based their campaign on direct dialogue with the people, visiting coffee shops and IDP camps, both deploying their extensive networks including the KPA and budget monitoring groups. They also reached out and received the support of Chinese and Gayo ethnic minority organisations in addition to more ‘traditional’ constituencies such as Islamic students. Udin was used to working with the media to expose corruption cases and MUTAKHIR received extensive coverage of their campaign activities, with papers such as MODUS and Raja Post providing them with free advertising space.

Ultimately, although MUTAKHIR failed to win the prestigious and highly contested Banda Aceh election, Taufik and Udin were proud that they succeeded in winning 6.5% of the vote notwithstanding the challenges they faced, not just from the rich and powerful national parties but from fellow civil society activists as well. Moreover, the KPA was not strong in Banda Aceh and at the very least they nevertheless managed to do better than the only other two independent candidates that took part in the elections – a testimony to their fledgling campaign strategy and extensive networks. Despite failing to make a mark in the municipal election, Taufik went on to take office as a member of the new government in Aceh’s team of experts. He was also involved in SIRA’s preparation
for the establishment its own local political party, a party of which he was later to lead.

_Civil society - from elections to party building_

In the face of the December 2006 elections, the politically oriented civil society groups beyond SIRA largely distanced themselves from GAM-associated candidates, opting instead for alliances with established liberal oriented politicians and preparations for the next step in the building up of Aceh as a self-governed province: the generation of local political parties.

One forum to that effect was the KPO-PA, a working committee formed on 18 January 2006 by a number of well-known activists such as Elly Sufriady, Kautsar, Akhiruddin Mahjuddin, Faisal Saifuddin, Aguswandi, Juanda Djamal, Arie Maulana, Arabayani Abu Bakar, Tarmizi, Banta Syahrial, Roys Vahlefi and Mashudi to prepare the way for political expansion and the involvement of civil society-driven activism and related popular aspirations. Indeed the KPO-PA had been committed to political intervention by promoting independent candidates in three administrative districts, namely Banda Aceh, as we already know, as well as Pidie and East Aceh. However, as illustrated above, concrete and unified support for the candidates ebbed away. One of the KPO-PA leaders, Kautsar, who had once shared a prison cell with Muhammad Nazar, acknowledged that there was a distinct difference between his strategy and that of his SIRA colleagues who opted for an alliance with the KPA. For many years, according to Kautsar, civil society activists tried to strengthen but also moderate GAM’s position through civilian representation. Thus a number of meetings aimed at consolidation between civil society and GAM had been held in Jakarta and Malaysia. Civil society activists aspired to establish a clandestine political front that would fight for the freedom of Aceh. However, according to several of the activists involved, these aspirations were never fully realised as GAM was more interested in enhancing its military capacity and SIRA opted for cooperation with those sections of GAM that fostered the KPA.

In the run up to the gubernatorial elections, several sections of the KPO-PA channelled their political aspirations in support of Humam Hamid and Hasbi Abdullah (or H2O as they were popularly referred to), rather than Irwandi-Nazar, even though
student activist Kautsar had stood hand in hand with Nazar in the struggle for a referendum. This was indeed ironic, as H2O was backed by the GAM leaders behind the traditional command structure. But to Kautsar, H2O represented the perfect political fusion with Humam Hamid representing the middle classes, civil society and the pro-autonomy constituency, and Hasbi Abdullah representing GAM. Such an alliance, he believed, would ensure a victory for the H2O candidates. Following the foundation later on of the Aceh Fraternity Committee (KPA – Komite Persaudaran Aceh) by Kautsar, his engagement in KPO activities petered out. Kautsar’s KPA is now close to the new Aceh Party (PA) formed by core GAM leaders who supported H2O in the gubernatorial elections.

Returning to the December 2006 elections, Faisal Saifuddin, former chair of the KPO-PA, stood as an independent candidate with Yusri Puteh in the Pidie district elections, but gained very few votes (2.4%) losing out to the KPA/SIRA ticket of Mirza Ismail and Nazir Adam who won more than 56% of the votes. In addition to taking advantage of the democratic process, Faisal Saifuddin’s candidature was aimed at reviving the people’s political courage after the conflict. According to Faisal, as victims of the conflict in Aceh, ordinary people should be able to feel equal to GAM and thus empowered to participate in politics, with equal opportunities opened up not just to ex-combatants. Faisal also aimed to provide political education on political ethics, for example by not engaging in money politics at any point in the political process. Although he lost, Faisal says that he gained a practical lesson in political science, namely regional election management.

Well ahead of the elections there were also other groups in the making. On 16 March 2006, a number of radical activists including Thamrin Ananda declared the founding of the Preparatory Committee for the Aceh Peoples Party (KP-PRA - Komite Persiapan-Partai Rakyat Aceh). Thamrin was an activist of SMUR (Student Solidarity for People) and its extended version, the FPDRA (Acehnese People Democratic Struggle Front). Thamrin was later appointed secretary general of the PRA when it was officially declared as a local political party on 3 March 2007. In the run up to the 2006 gubernatorial elections, however, Thamrin Ananda and the KP-PRA threw their support behind the Ghazali Abbas – Salahuddin Alfatta ticket. There were a number of reasons
for this. Ghazali Abbas was a member of the Indonesian parliament who had been persistent in his criticism of the military in Aceh, a stance that was consistent with SMUR’s anti-militarisation position. He was outspoken about human rights violations in Aceh and was appointed to the special parliamentary investigation team (TPF-DPR – Tim Pencarian Fakta DPR) in July 1998 charged with investigating human rights violations during the DOM period from 1989 to 1998. The KP-PRA had another important reason for supporting Ghazali Abbas-Alahuddin Alfatta rather than Irwandi–Nazar. According to Thamrin Ananda, the KP-PRA did not want to be identified with GAM and those elements within civil society that supported it, i.e. SIRA in particular, which the KP-PRA criticised for being conservative and for nourishing chauvinistic forms of nationalism.

Although the KP-PRA came out in support of Ghazali Abbas, they did not declare this a party line, thus not impinging on their members’ freedom of choice. According to Thamrin Anada, the KP-PRA only went as far as identifying a number of criteria that any candidate should fulfil in order to win the vote of a KP-PRA member, namely that candidates must: 1) not represent a political party that has committed transgressions against the people of Aceh; 2) not be part of the military; 3) not be involved in corruption cases, human rights violations and other crimes; 4) be committed to providing economic opportunities for the people of Aceh by developing industry; 5) be committed to the formation of a clean and democratic government and increase the income of soldiers, teachers, civil servants, and other poorly paid workers; 6) be committed to preserving peace in Aceh and expediting the rehabilitation and reconstruction process for the victims of the conflict and the tsunami and; 7) be committed to lowering the price of basic goods.

Commenting on the dissent evident between civil society actors in the run up to the 2006 elections, a leading Acehnese intellectual, Aguswandi, said that disagreement was not based on personal relationships or personalities, but rather on ideological issues around better reform in Aceh. According to the more senior intellectual activist Otto Syamsuddin however, dissension in fact revealed that civil society lacked a strong ideological basis. Instead, civil society activists were demonstrating a pragmatic interest in making political concessions. Their failure to rally behind Taufik
Abda and Akhiruddin’s campaign in Banda Aceh despite the initial, ground-breaking agreement to come together and nominate a joint-candidate supports Otto Syamsuddin’s analysis.

Civil society - voter education

Another, more traditional civil society or cautious social movement building approach to the 2006 general elections was initiated by KPO-PA member Tarmizi, also executive director of the Aceh People’s Forum (FRA-Forum Rakyat Aceh). Founded in February 2001 out of a split within SMUR, the FRA was a cross-sectoral forum representing the agricultural and fishery sector, the poor, women, victims of industrial hazards and victims of human rights violations. The FRA coordinated 24 organisations in 15 districts, reflecting Tarmizi’s belief that political representation and party-building should be mobilised from below. At an earlier stage, Tarmizi held the view that reform in Aceh could only be attained through armed struggle. However, Tarmizi now had more confidence in democracy and political action. In collaboration with other organisations in the FRA, Tarmizi implemented a programme of political education of activists in the lead up to the December 2006 elections, based on the 24 district-level organisations.53

A similar programme of voter education was conducted by Raihana Diana with a number of women’s organisation. Targeting women voters, as many as 600 to 700 women took part in the programme of democracy education and social analysis in a bid to raise awareness of their rights and aspirations. Regarding the potential to engage with the PRA or other local political parties, Raihana Diani suggested at the time that one of the most serious challenges faced by the women’s movement in Aceh would be to raise women’s awareness of their rights, particularly in dealing with the Syariah police. A number of Qanun (regional regulations in Aceh) that have been passed represent an invasion of privacy, whilst failing to address more fundamental issues facing the people of Aceh.

Civil society - the aftermath

The 2006 elections signalled a separation between civil society and GAM. This is evidenced by the fact that several civil society activists, particularly of the second generation, channelled
their political aspirations via different candidates, particularly at provincial level. However, the KPA had been sympathetic to the civil society candidates attempt to contest the Banda Aceh municipal elections. And as emphasised by Otto Syamsuddin, after the elections GAM invited a number of activists to participate in strengthening regional government, particularly in the districts where GAM-associated candidates had won, for example in helping to plan the budget. Even prior to the elections, a number of civil society activists helped GAM-associated candidates draft their vision and mission statements.

**Reconstruction, rehabilitation and reintegration as campaign issues**

What issues did the candidates in the 2006 elections campaign on? Most of the candidates raised general issues such as peace, welfare and economic prosperity, not least the candidates associated with GAM/SIRA. However, these were not translated into concrete policy proposals. An even more interesting question is the extent to which the 2006 elections represented the first step for the people of Aceh themselves to set the post-tsunami and conflict reconstruction, rehabilitation and reintegration agenda by choosing a leader they felt best able to address these issues, particularly in the face of the imminent phasing out of both domestic and foreign-funded initiatives. To what extent were these questions raised during the elections – and thus to what extent were the people of Aceh really given a choice in setting this agenda?

Yet of the eight joint-candidates in the gubernatorial election, only Iskandar Hosein and HM Saleh Manaf (supported by a coalition of small national parties) campaigned on issues of reconstruction and rehabilitation. In their own words, ‘As for the problem of speeding up rehabilitation and reconstruction, there is need for coordination between regional government, the Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Agency (BRR) and central government in the matter of development in Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam, in order to ensure that there is no overlap between programmes.’

It is intriguing that rehabilitation and reconstruction were not seen as key campaign issues by the other seven gubernatorial candidates. The five joint-tickets supported by national parties, particularly those that won the 2004 general elections, may have had
a particular interest in avoiding the issue of who should manage development in Aceh given the funding attached to it. But Irwandi and Nazar also did not pay much attention to the need for democratic leadership of reconstruction and the huge potential to use it for more general further development of Aceh. The same applies for Humam Hamid and Hasbi Abdullah, the ticket supported by the PPP and some elements of GAM. Their failure to properly address rehabilitation and reconstruction for further development is a particularly glaring oversight given that Hamid was on the board of directors of the BRR.\textsuperscript{55}

Political governance of reintegration and reconciliation for further development was not really highlighted by any of the candidates in their vision and mission statements. It seems that rehabilitation and reconstruction along with reintegration and reconciliation were not regarded as major ‘selling points’ in their campaign to win people’s votes. Instead, the focus was on issues such as free education, free healthcare, Syariah law and anti-corruption measures.

In short, the limited socialisation of rehabilitation and reconstruction as well as reintegration and reconciliation issues during the campaign means in effect that most of the gubernatorial candidates paid little or no attention to what are in fact some of the most critical and pressing issues for Aceh. In other words, what are in fact some of the biggest challenges had yet to make it onto the agenda of emerging democratic politics in Aceh. One reason may be that the politicians felt that these were issues that other actors such as donors, experts, big business and, (the ‘national’ parties might add) central government would handle. It might also be that the candidates themselves did not as yet feel sufficiently empowered to address these major problems.

**Conclusion**

The election for regional and district heads that took place throughout Aceh on 11 December 2006 provided a new political framework within which to set the process of democratisation in Aceh. Initially, many people were pessimistic about the elections, fearing that they would be marked by conflict. But they were proved wrong. Although there were some incidents of violence and intimidation in Central and Southeast Aceh, almost the whole of the
election process ran smoothly and was deemed peaceful, fair and democratic.

In general, the 2006 elections pointed to a clear division between local Aceh candidates, spearheaded by the KPA-SIRA alliance for Irwandi-Nazar, against Jakarta. While the combination of elitist ‘old’ GAM leaders and a liberal mainstream Aceh politician (Hamid) within the framework of a ‘national’ party, the PPP, came second, the least successful candidates were those most closely associated with a Jakarta-based agenda. Malik Raden and Fuad Zakaria, supported by Golkar, PDIP and the Democratic Party, were only able to take third place with just under 14% of the vote. Central government had long since lost its legitimacy, with its militaristic and discriminatory policies and exploitation of Aceh’s natural resources. The ‘national’ parties were seen as supporting central government rather than the demands of the people of Aceh. Golkar’s electoral success in Aceh since the 1987 general election may thus be assumed to have been as a result of intimidation and violence as well as the co-optation of local elites rather than an expression of political choice. Governor Ibrahim Hasan’s role in securing the 1992 elections for Golkar by calling for the implementation of DOM did not only consolidate the perception that Golkar was only interested in power, but also that it was not responsive to local interests. Under DOM, the national parties behaved as if they had no eyes with which to see nor ears with which to listen to the plight of the people. It is not surprising therefore that the people began to disregard the national political parties.

Another lesson from the regional elections is how Irwandi Yusuf and Muhammad Nazar (supported by both GAM and SIRA) were able to beat Humam Hamid and Hasbi Abdullah, a well-known politician from the PPP together with an intellectual member of GAM who had been imprisoned from 1990 to 1998, and who had the support of ‘old’ GAM. In essence, the difference between the two tickets may be partly understood in terms of popular versus elitist politics. Irwandi Yusuf and Muhammad Nazar represent ‘new’ GAM and SIRA, based in Aceh and with more popular politics, the capacity to mobilise people at local level and consolidate local constituencies. Humam Hamid and Hasbi Abdullah on the other hand represent elite politics in the form of both national political parties and ‘old’ GAM, largely based at the time in Stockholm.
Irwandi Yusuf and Muhammad Nazar were also better able to project themselves as principled nationalists identified with the peace agreement, yet independent of the ‘old’ GAM structure. In fact, their impressive victories were won beyond most of GAM’s traditional strongholds.

In addition and notwithstanding their image of principled nationalism associated with GAM and SIRA, Irwandi and Nazar may also have benefited from the emergence of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and Jusuf Kalla as a political force in the 2004 national elections. Both pairs seemed to represent a political alternative capable of solving the myriad of problems facing the people of Indonesia. From this perspective, it is possible to suggest that what happened in Aceh represents on a micro level what happened in Jakarta.

Of the civil society organisations, only SIRA succeeded in establishing a sufficient popular base on which to advance in the elections, though it is not clear to what extent it was dependent on close cooperation with the KPA. As has been the case with their Indonesian counterparts, many of the other civil society organisations maintained their ‘untainted’ civic engagement whilst resorting to similar elitist alliances as the ‘old’ GAM leaders, though in this case with liberal politicians critical of GAM.

Overall, the gubernatorial candidates presented little or no specific interests and policy agendas. Remarkably, there was almost no discussion about how democracy could be extended and used to direct the world’s largest reconstruction and development project since WWII. Instead, the elections seem to have served as a referendum which came out in favour of the nationalist-driven peace and democracy agreements of the Helsinki MoU and those with grassroots networks who had taken a positive role in the peace negotiation. Thus, the December 2006 elections were both positive yet inconclusive in terms of providing a mandate for future policies and democratisation in Aceh.

There can be no doubt however that the 2006 elections did, as Faisal Saifuddin suggests, provide lessons in election campaign and organisational management, and shortly after the elections a number of local political parties were founded. In addition to the parties that evolved out of the nationalist and student movement such as Partai Aceh (GAM), Partai SIRA and Partai Rakyat Aceh
(PRA), local parties were also founded by Ghazali Abbas – Partai Aceh Aman Sejahtera (PAAS); and Harmen Nuriqman, who stood in the gubernatorial election with Lieutenant General (Ret) Tamlichen Ali, became Chair of the Partai Daulat Aceh (PDA). Moreover, Farhan Hamid, who at national level remained a member of PAN, also founded the Partai Bersatu Aceh (PBA) in order to compete for seats at both national and local level. More detailed discussion on local political parties in Aceh and how some of the winners and losers of the 2006 elections have prepared themselves for the 2009 local parliamentary elections follows in Chapter 7.
Law on the Governing of Aceh (LoGA) No. 11 Year 2006. Implementation of the LoGA is regulated by the qanun or regional by-laws, specifically qanun No. 2 Year 2006, qanun No. 3 Year 2006 and qanun No. 7 Year 2006. Constitutional Court decision 5/PUU-V/2007

KIP-Aceh differs from the KPU as per the LoGA and qanun No. 2, 3, and 7 Year 2006. KIP-Aceh has 11 members appointed under Aceh Province Decree No. 3 and No. 14 Year 2005 and Aceh Province Decree No. 5 Year 2006. The electoral process and the selection of KIP-Aceh members was undertaken by an ad hoc independent team. The elected members of KIP-Aceh serve a five-year term of office. KIP-Aceh is assisted by district-level branches consisting of 5 members per district. Thus, with 21 districts in Aceh, there was a total of 105 members of the district level KIP. An Election Oversight Committee was also established, with 5 members at provincial at 5 members at district level, again making a total of 105 district members. Additionally, a team of volunteers to oversee the voting process was designated to each polling station, with five members per team covering 8,471 polling stations. Both national and international independent organisations took part in the election monitoring process. These included the European Union Election Observation Mission, ANFREL (Asian Network for Free Election), IRI (International Republican Institute), National Democratic Institute, US-AID, US Consulate General in Medan, Observer Team of The Japanese Government, JPPR (People’s Voter Education Network), AIRP (Aceh International Recovery Program, Aceh NGO Forum, Aceh Strategic Research Centre, KIPP (The Central Independent Election Commission ) and LGSP (Local Governance Support Program).

The PBB is an Islamic party that is relatively popular in Aceh.

Golkar was the political motor of Soeharto’s New Order regime which has adjusted to a limited reform agenda.

PDI-P (led by Sukarno’s daughter Megawati) was the breakaway party of the only nationalist and not explicitly religiously oriented party (PDI) during the reign of Soeharto.

The PKPI is a breakaway party from Golkar, initially with retired top generals holding crucial positions.

The PBR is a more conservative Muslim based party which grew in part out of the PBB.

The PPNU and PKB are primarily based on the traditional oriented and largest socio-religious organisation in Indonesia, the Nahdlatul Ulama; the PKB was founded by former president Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur) and is the more liberal and pluralistic of the two.

The PPP was the only Muslim based party that was allowed under the Soeharto regime. Like Golkar it has adjusted itself to a limited reform agenda.

PAN is an urban and middle class oriented Muslim party, established after the fall of Soeharto.

PKS is a well organised Muslim Brotherhood oriented party. Its initial constituency included students opposing the Soeharto regime.

Djali Jusuf ran as independent even though he may be close to the Democratic Party in Aceh as Djali a member of Susilo Bambang Yudohyono’s security team when he stood in the presidential elections
Regional Election in Aceh

15 KPA (Komite Peralihan Aceh; Aceh Transitional Committee). The KPA structure is relatively analogous to GAM’s military organisation structure (Teuntra Nanggroe Aceh/Nanggroe Aceh Army)

16 (Sentral Informasi Referendum Aceh/Aceh Referendum Information Center). Following the revocation of the Daerah Operasi Militer (DOM) -- Military Operation Area in Aceh on 7 August 1998, SIRA was formed on February 4, 1999 to campaign for a referendum on independence for Aceh. Cooperation between SIRA activists and GAM meant they supported each other. At an event organised by SIRA on 8 November 1999 in Banda Aceh, at least 500,000 Acehnese gathered at the Great Baiturrahman Mosque calling for a referendum with the option of independence. GAM helped to mobilise and facilitate the masses from outside Banda Aceh. The Indonesian Military has accused SIRA as being GAM’s intellectual base, but SIRA was outside of GAM’s command structure.

17 Azwar Abubakar aided Puteh’s prosecution by providing support to anti-corruption activists and the media to expose him. Thus it would give him an image as a clean figure who hated corruption. Puteh was tried on 27 December 2004, a day after the tsunami

18 Azwar Abubakar was the deputy-governor, and became the acting governor of Aceh following Puteh’s arrest. In early 2006, the Indonesian government appointed Mustafa Abubakar as the interim governor until the inauguration of Irwandi Yusuf on 8 February 2007.


20 Interview with Nashruddin Abubakar, a member of SIRA and Aceh Timur deputy district head.

21 Translation taken from The Jakarta Post


23 Suara Karya Online, 7 Desember 2006

24 The LSI was also commissioned by Golkar to carry out a survey of district and municipal candidates in various parts of Aceh


26 Ibid

27 IRNA was supported by the KPA throughout Aceh. Humam Hamid and Hasbi Abdullah who were supported by another section of GAM won in Pidie and Banda Aceh only. Pidie was where GAM Health Minister, Zaini Abdullah, was born, also Hasbi Abdullah’s brother

28 Partai Keadilan dan Persatuan Indonesia (PKPI, or PKP); a breakaway party from Golkar founded by Edi Sudrajat.

29 Most of the party acronyms are spelt out in relation to previous tables 2 and 3.

30 Partai Penegak Demokrasi Indonesia (PPDI); the old Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI) with a new name; a nationalist party remnant from the New Order.

31 Partai Pemudia Indonesia (PPI) Indonesian Youth Party.

32 A breakaway party from the mainstream PDI-P (led by Rachmawati Soekarnoputri).

33 Partai Demokrasi Kebangsaan, (PDK), National Democratic Party. Founded by Ryaas Rasyid – the architect of decentralisation in Indonesia, and Andi Mallarangeng, President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s spokesperson.

34 Partai Nasional Banteng Kerakyatan Indonesia (PNBK), Banteng National Independence Party (the former Nationalist Bung Karno Party); a breakaway party from the mainstream PDI-P (led by Eros Djarot).
Partai Perjuangan Indonesia Baru (PPIB) grew out of the Perhimpunan Indonesia Baru, (PIB); lead by Dr. Sjahrir.

Partai Sarekat Indonesia (PSI) a Muslim party.

Interview with Baharuddin, an NGO activist in Lhokseumawe, and Fachrul Razi, Banda Aceh.

The three districts were Singkil, Simeuleu, and Aceh Tenggara.

Interview on December 5, 2006.

GAM’s representative for Malaysia and Australia stated in an interview with the media that, ‘Islam has become the Acehnese people’s culture, thus no longer need to be structurally implemented’. Nur Djuli has expressed a similar view in an interview with ABC radio, http://www.abc.net.au/pm/content/2006/s1731262.htm. The same concept was as well expressed by Teungku Nashiruddin who said that, ‘actually in Islam, it is not the formality that matters, but to establish an Islamic community through education.’ Aceh Kita, October 03-09 2005.


Irwandi’s speech on his declaration to run for governor candidate, August 27, 2006, in the office of Aceh Transitional Committee (KPA), Banda Aceh.

To some extent this reminds of the triumph of the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) in Banda Aceh in 1999 legislative election. In The General Election 1999, PAN won in Banda Aceh with 39.41% vote. But in The General Election 2004, it was PKS that won in the Banda Aceh with 31.72% vote. However in the regional election in 2006 for the post of Mayor /Deputy Mayor of Banda Aceh, PKS cadres Raihan Iskandar-Teuku Surya (both PKS cadres and were only supported by PKS) beaten by Mawardi Nurandin and Ilza Sa’aduddin that were supported by PPP, PBR and Partai Demokrat.

Interview with Murizal, activist and journalist in Aceh, December 10, 2006.

Interview with Irwanda, the Party of Functional Group official, November 8, 2006.

See ICG (2002) pp 6-8

Interview with Armen Desky, candidate for Regent from the Party of Functional Group, Kutacane, December 5, 2006.

Otto Syamsuddin Ishak is from Tijue, Pidie. A lecturer at the Faculty of Agriculture in Syiah Kuala University in Banda Aceh, he has been vocal on human rights violations and conditions in Aceh since his student days and as a result he was targeted by the military. He founded the Independent Election Monitoring Committee Independent (KIPP - Komite Independen Pemantau Pemilu). With his wife, Dyah Rahmani Purnomowati, a Javanese, Otto founded the Cordova NGO in 1990 in Banda Aceh. He is now a lecturer in sociology at Syiah Kuala University and a researcher with Imparsial, an NGO based in Jakarta.

C.f. the presentation available at http://partairakyataceh.org/

Faisal Saifuddin was SIRA’s representative in Jakarta. He used to organise protest marches in Jakarta calling for the withdrawal of troops from Aceh and calling for a referendum. In 2001 he was arrested at a protest rally in front of the United Nations Office in Jakarta, having been implicated in the bombing of a student dormitory on 10 May 2001 and sentenced to one year’s imprisonment. Faisal Saifuddin has denied any involvement in the bombing, which cause the death of two students, Tempo (2001)
SMUR was founded by Aceh student activists on 18 March 1999 at the Syiah Darussalam University campus. SMUR organised thousands of university and high school students on 25 March 1999 protesting against militarism in Aceh, a day before the President BJ Habibie’s visit to Aceh. Later, the FPDRA was founded by a number of student and youth organisations, such as SMUR (Student Solidarity for People), WAKAMPAS (Communication Media of Student and The Youth Movement of South Aceh), GAMUR (Al-Muslim Student Movement for People), SAMAN (Student Movement Solidarity Aceh Nusantara).

Former secretary general of SMUR and former coordinator of KontraS Aceh

Both prior to and after the elections, Tarmizi and the FRA engaged in intensive discussions with the KP-PRA towards building a local political party, and eventually he joined the PRA.

Taken from H. Iskandar Hoesin and H.M. Saleh Manaf


See Al Chaidar (1998)

In a recent analysis, the Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia – the Indonesian Academy of Science (LIPI), even predicts that when Irwandi-Nazar end their terms in office in 2011. Irwandi, who does not have any strategic position in Aceh and, according to the analysts is only number four in GAM - may come close to Jusuf Kalla and become cabinet minister, while Nazar, has a stronger position in SIRA. The SIRA Party, in its first congress on 10 December 2007 in Banda Aceh, confirmed their efforts to turn Nazar into the main leader in Aceh. See Hasan (2008) pp 186-187.

The LoGA does not allow local parties to contest the seats for regional representation in the Indonesian parliament. However, it does state that a local party can also be a member of a national parties and that members of local party can be members of national party. One concern is that this regulation will promote tactical and pragmatic alliances between local and national parties.
References

Aceh Kita daily with Nashiruddin, 8th edition, October 03-09 2005.


Dominasi elite politik lama dalam pilkada Aceh (Old political elite domination of the Aceh regional election), Kompas Daily, 4 December 2006.


H. Iskandar Hoesin and H.M. Saleh Manaf’s, no date, ‘Aceh Beu Maju Ureung Beu Carong Agama Beu Kong Damee Sejahtera.’


Kompas Daily, 4 December 2006, Dominasi Elite Politik Lama dalam Pilkada Aceh (Old Political Elite Domination of the Aceh Regional Election)

Menelisik kekuatan para petarung’ (Probing the power of the fighters), Aceh Magazine, December 2006.

Menolak riset LSI (Rebuffing LSI research), Aceh Kita Magazine, June 2006..

Nur Djuli, interview withABC radio. Available at: http://www.abc.net.au/pm/content/2006/s1731262.htm


Serambi Indonesia, 2 May, 2006.

Introduction
‘Disaster brought its blessings…’ a phrase often heard from the mouths of aid workers and politicians. It all began with an earthquake measuring 8.9 on the Richter scale swiftly followed by a massive tsunami at 7.58 a.m. on 26 December 2004. The following day, GAM spokesperson Bachtiar Abdullah announced a ceasefire with Indonesia from his office in Sweden. At the time the tsunami struck, Aceh was still under the Second Civil Emergency, enforced from 19 November 2004 to 18 May 2005.

As if in a race against time, Indonesia and GAM - facilitated by the Crisis Management Initiative (CMI) Foundation led by Marti Ahtisaari - agreed to hold a meeting to put an end to the violence in the first week of January 2005. Rescue operations and humanitarian relief could only be deployed effectively if there was no armed contact between GAM and the Indonesian military. In other words, relief, rehabilitation and reconstruction could only be delivered smoothly if peace were to flourish in Aceh. By the same token, effective and appropriate rehabilitation and reconstruction had the potential to enable harmonious and sustainable peace. Although many other actors and interests were also crucial, as elaborated
in Chapter 1, the complementary ambitions of peace, relief and reconstruction contributed to the successful signing of the Helsinki MoU on 15 August 2005.

The Helsinki MoU provided the mandate for drafting new legislation on the governance of Aceh. In the immediate post-tsunami period, the role of governor of Aceh was in the hands of Deputy Governor Azwar Abubakar, as Governor Abdullah Puteh was facing trial for corruption. The Indonesian government then appointed Mustafa Abubakar as acting governor of Aceh on 30 December 2005. Originally, Aceh had been scheduled to hold Indonesia’s first direct elections of regional heads in May 2005, but the tsunami put an end to that plan. Indeed all elections for provincial, district and municipal heads were delayed under the humanitarian emergency.

The Helsinki MoU also represents a compromise on GAM’s part, namely that it would not demand full independence but, and this represents a compromise on the Indonesian government’s part as well, that Aceh would adopt a system of self-government. GAM negotiators put their trust in Indonesia’s commitment to bring about peace by accepting the suggestion that the people of Aceh would form their own government based on the results of local elections. In short, this peace agreement between Indonesia and GAM became the starting point for a period of revival in which the people of Aceh might fulfil their aspirations to democratisation (Sinar Harapan, 13 July 2005).

Article 1.1.1 of the MoU states that new legislation on governing Aceh should be promulgated and implemented as swiftly as possible, by 31 March 2006 at the latest. Article 1.2 on Political Participation states that the Indonesian government should facilitate the formation of local political parties based in Aceh in accordance with national requirements. Having acknowledged the Acehnese people’s aspiration to form local political parties, the Indonesian government was required to develop the political and legal framework for the founding of local political parties in Aceh within a year and a half at the latest from the signing of the MoU, in consultation with the House of Representatives (DPR).

Article 1.2.2 of the MoU also states that the people of Aceh have the right to nominate local candidates for all political positions from April 2006 onwards. The next article, 1.2.3, states that free and
fair local elections should be held under new laws on governance in Aceh to elect Aceh’s heads of regional and district government in April 2006, followed by local members of parliament in 2009.

In accordance with the MoU, draft legislation for the governance of Aceh was drawn up based on input from a number of different sources including GAM, academics and civil society organisations in Aceh, and further deliberated in the DPR. Academics from Syiah Kuala University in Banda Aceh submitted a draft on the economy, academics from Ar-Raniry State Islamic Institute (IAIN) in Banda Aceh submitted a draft on Syariah law and reconciliation, whilst academics from Malikussaleh University in Lhokseumawe, North Aceh submitted a draft on local political parties.

GAM’s draft differed from that of the Acehnese and Indonesian Governments. For example, GAM’s draft stated that there should be no elections of the Wali Nanggroe (the symbolic ‘guardian of the state’ in Aceh) during the preliminary period. GAM Founder Dr Hasan M Tiro was nominated the first Wali Nanggroe, a position he would hold until his death. Elections for his successor would take place thereafter. The GAM delegation, headed by Teuku Kamaruzzaman, submitted a draft made up of 34 chapters containing 147 articles. Draft legislation was also submitted by civil society organisations represented by the Acehnese Civil Society Task Force (ACSTF) in Banda Aceh, consisting of 29 chapters containing 148 articles.

The drafts were submitted to Aceh’s Provincial House of Representatives (DPRD Aceh), where they were combined into a total of 40 chapters containing 209 articles and submitted to the DPR in Jakarta. The Indonesian government, in this case the Department of Home Affairs, further refined the draft legislation to 40 chapters containing 206 articles. After a series of gruelling debates, the DPR officially passed the Law on the Governing of Aceh (LoGA) on 11 July 2006, containing 40 chapters with 273 articles, which was signed by President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono on 1 August 2006.

With the passing of the LoGA, all previous legislation referring to the status and governance of Aceh, namely Law No. 44, 1999 on the Special Status of Aceh, and Law No. 18, 2001 on the Special Autonomy of Nanggrooe Aceh Darussalam, was no longer valid. However, analysis of the LoGA indicates that parts of the new law were taken from these two earlier pieces of legislation.
The process of drafting, promulgating and enforcing of the LoGA was not straightforward. A number of civil society organisations established a monitoring team to ensure that the LoGA was interpreted and implemented in accordance with the MoU. In fact, on the day the law was passed, activists called for an Aceh-wide boycott of the legislation by bringing public transport to a halt in Aceh Besar, Pidie, Lhokseumawe, Aceh Barat and other areas. It is certainly the case that certain parties felt the LoGA remained at odds with the spirit and aims of the MoU, including the Civil Society Alliance for the Salvation of LoGA, backed by the Center for Information on Referendum in Aceh (SIRA).

A member of the Civil Society Alliance for the Salvation of LoGA, Dawan Gayo, stated that the LoGA should not be understood merely as a legal product, but that it should also be closely related to both the Indonesian government and GAM’s commitment to resolving conflict in Aceh in a peaceful, thorough, sustainable and dignified manner for all, as stated in the first paragraph of the MoU. An alliance of around 20 civil society organisations suggested that some of the content and key points in the LoGA contradicted or were inconsistent with the MoU, including that:

1. Under article 7.2 the LoGA broadened the Indonesian government’s jurisdiction over national state affairs in addition to the six areas agreed under article 1.1.2(a) of the MoU.\(^6\)

2. The Indonesian government would continue to intervene in and thereby reduces the authority of the Acehnese government by placing norms, standards, procedures and oversights in place. These regulations and oversights amount to ‘letting go of the head, but keeping a grip on the tail,’ (article 11.1 of the LoGA and article 1.1.2(a) of the MoU).\(^7\)

3. There is no provision for the prosecution of the Indonesian military (TNI) alleged to have perpetrated civil crimes in civil courts, which goes against article 1.4.5 of the MoU (article 203 of the LoGA);

4. Provision for the prosecution of human rights violations is not in accordance with national legislation on human rights Tribunals (Law 26/2000), as it cannot be applied retroactively. In short, all those responsible for human rights violations in the past have been given immunity from prosecution (article 227 of the LoGA and article 2.2 of the Helsinki MoU).
In other words, several articles in the LoGA represent a step backwards from Law No. 18, 2001 on Aceh’s Special Autonomy; Law No. 32, 2004 on Regional Government, and Law No. 26, 2000 on Human Rights Tribunals.\(^8\)

The decisive step ahead for self-government and democracy in Aceh however lay in the provision in the LoGA for the eligibility of independent (non-party) candidates to stand in the elections of regional and districts heads and the establishment of local political parties.\(^9\)

**The legal basis for local political parties**

The Helsinki MoU was only able to outline issues such as the economy, reintegration, governance and other areas that were laid out in more detail in the LoGA. Technically, the LoGA requires specific government regulations that act as guides for implementation. Regulations pertaining to the formation of local political parties are covered under Chapter XI, articles 75-95 of the LoGA, whilst the nomination and registration of candidates for the positions of district/sub-district head, mayor/deputy mayor and governor/deputy governor through independent political means or non-political party means is regulated under article 67.

The main regulations that regulate the foundation of political parties include article 75.2 of the LoGA which states that local political parties must be founded by and have a membership of at least 50 Indonesian citizens of a minimum of 21 years of age, with permanent residence in Aceh, and making sure that women make up at least 30% of representation in parliament. Article 75.8 regulates the registration and legalisation of parties, stating that local political parties must have organisational structures in at least 50% of districts and municipalities, and in 25% of the sub-districts in each of these districts and municipalities.

Central government then drew up Law No. 20, 2007 on local political parties in Aceh. Subsequently in Aceh, the Regional Law (Qanun) on Local Political Parties No. 3, 2008 consisting of 38 articles on elections was drafted and promulgated by the Acehnese House of Representatives (DPRA) on 13 June 2008. This instrument provides the legal basis for the Independent Elections Commission (KIP – Komisi Pemilihan Independen) in Aceh.\(^10\) The qanun includes the condition that a legislative candidate for Aceh’s provincial or
district/municipal parliament must pass a Koran reading test. This was not a new law, as Koran reading tests were already compulsory in the 2006 Aceh regional elections. As a result, several candidates for governor, district head and vice-district head were unable to stand as they had failed the Koran reading test overseen by a panel of examiners consisting of the *ulemma* (Muslim scholars) and other competent persons.

In the 2006 Aceh Regional Elections, analysed in depth in Chapter 6 of this volume, the Helsinki MoU allowed independent nominees to contest the elections for provincial, district and municipal heads. This was the first time independent candidates were allowed to stand in Indonesia, something which is now being duplicated in other regions. For example, North Sulawesi became the first province after Aceh to allow independent nominees to stand in the regional elections where independent candidates stood in three districts, namely Southeast Minahasa, Kotamobagu and Siau-Tagulandang-Biaro.\(^1\) It isn’t an exaggeration to say that Aceh is a political, social, cultural and military laboratory, the results of which are often copied by other provinces. Aceh has become an inspiration for other regions. Special Autonomy, Direct Elections for regional leaders, independent candidates, the implementation of Syariah law, as well as post-conflict and post-disaster management approaches have all been developed in Aceh, later to became models and inspiration for other regions. Ironically however, the LoGA actually prevents independent candidates from standing in the 2012 elections for regional and district heads in Aceh. It is true that by then however, the new, discreet local political parties that have succeeded in gaining more than 5% of the votes in the 2009 general elections will be allowed to nominate candidates for the 2012 elections. Firstly, however, as is spelt out in more detail in Chapter 9, we know by now that only one local political party, the GAM rooted Aceh Party, was successful in the local elections; second, all-Indonesia legislation now allows for independent candidates to stand in other parts of the country.

Having studied the Helsinki MoU, Acehnese politician Ahmad Farhan Hamid, then member of the National Mandate Party (PAN) Faction of the DPR, predicted that the government would be concerned if GAM took control of Aceh. However, Farhan explained that even if GAM were to win again and again, and even if it could
then be said in national and international circles that the Acehnese people want to secede, this fear was completely unfounded because, based on examples in other countries, local political parties rarely win permanently. Local political parties, Farhan said, lack access to the upper echelons of economic and political power (acehkita.com 12 July 2005).

Another who voiced his criticism of local political parties in Aceh was former Iskandar Muda Territory Military Commander Major General (Ret.) Supiadin AS,12 who stated his belief that the Acehnese people did not actually need local parties and that what they really wanted was increased prosperity and welfare. While admitting that the founding of local political parties by elites in Aceh was valid, Supiadin emphasised his assertion that people did not aspire to local political parties, but rather a better and more dignified life. He also pointed to Government Regulation Number 77, 2007 which states that political parties were banned from, among other things, using logos, symbols, emblems or other attributes relating to or identified with banned and separatist organisations (Serambi Indonesia 20 December 2007).

Raihana Diani, spokesperson for the Aceh People’s Party (PRA), responded by criticising Supiadin’s separation of welfare and democratisation. Welfare, she explained, would be better and more sustainably resolved precisely within the framework of a healthy democracy. The emergence of local political parties in Aceh, Diani said, was a reflection of healthy democratisation which would act as a bridge to bring welfare and prosperity to the people. Diani, also a humanitarian worker, explained that local political parties needed to offer policies and programs that were truly able to address welfare issues. This did not thus mean that local parties were not needed, but rather that local parties should have clear programs and solutions to the problems (Suara Pembaruan 22 December 2007).

**Acehnese local political parties**

The LoGA contains more than 20 articles that refer to the formation of local political parties which in turn gave rise to Government Regulation No. 20, 2007 on Local Political Parties in Aceh, passed on 16 March 2007. Article 1 states that local political parties are political organisations formed by a group of Indonesian citizens residing in Aceh voluntarily, on the basis of equal consent,
and with the aim of fighting for the interests of their members, the community, nation and state through elections for membership of the Aceh House of Representatives (DPRA) and the District/ Municipal House of Representatives (DPRK), as well as in the elections of governor/deputy governor, district/sub-district heads, or mayors/deputy mayors.

Thus, there was no longer an excuse not to grapple with the formation of local political parties. Indeed, local political parties sprouted like mushrooms. The legal basis for them was strong. The mandate for the people of Aceh to take part in politics by founding local political parties had been given and was duly taken. Within Indonesia, this was something that had only taken place in Aceh.

Truth be told, the story of the foundation of local political parties in 2007 and 2008 is not a new one (Serambi Indonesia 10 April 2008). The first Indonesian elections in 1955, seen as very democratic, were followed by locally and/or regionally-based political parties, such as the Village Peoples Party, the Free Indonesia Peoples Party, the Sundanese Choice Movement, the Indonesian Farmers Party, the Banten Movement in West Java, the Gerinda Party in Yogyakarta, and the Dayak Unity Party in West Kalimantan. The formation of a Dayak Unity Party even reflected the enthusiasm for a form of ethnocentrism that did not in practice harm democracy. Local political parties such as those found in Aceh are also found in Spain, Canada, Germany, and elsewhere.

Since the local political party floodgates had been opened, the media reported twenty prospective local political parties in Aceh, fourteen of which had registered with the Provincial Office of the Department of Law and Human Rights in order to assess whether they fulfilled required administrative criteria. Among the parties that did not register was the Aceh Leuser Antara Party founded by Iwan Gayo. Gayo finally registered instead as a nominee for Acehnese senator or member of the Regional Representative Council (DPD). Whilst two of the prospective parties failed this first hurdle of the verification process, the remaining 12 were able to proceed to the next stage. The two parties that failed at this stage were the Nahdhatul Ummah Party and the Serambi Persada Nusantara Serikat Party both of which failed to provide documentation proving domicile status and ownership of party offices, as well as failing to
prove existence of the requisite number of party members in 50% of districts/municipalities and 25% of sub-districts.

The remaining 12 parties then registered with the Aceh KIP in Banda Aceh, though after further administrative checks, only 10 underwent factual verification by KIP officials in the field at district and municipal level. At a press conference given at the KIP Aceh Office on 7 July 2008, it was announced that of the 10 parties verified by KIP, 6 had been given the green light to go on and participate in the 2009 Elections. On the same day, the Central KPU announced that 34 national parties and six local political parties would also take part in the 2009 elections. The six local political parties given the right to participate in the ‘celebration of democracy’ are as follows:

1. Partai Aceh Aman Sejahtera (Safe and Prosperous Aceh Party-Number 35)
2. Partai Daulat Aceh (Aceh Sovereignty Party-Number 36)
3. Partai Suara Independen Rakyat Aceh (SIRA-Acehnese People’s Independent Voice Party -Number 37)
4. Partai Rakyat Aceh (Aceh People’s Party-Number 38)
5. Partai Aceh (Aceh Party-Number 39)
6. Partai Bersatu Aceh (Aceh United Party-Number 40)

The parties that failed the factual verification process include the Beusaboh Thaat and Taqwa Aceh Generation Party (Gabthat), the Alliance of Aceh People’s Alliance Party (PARA) for Women’s Concerns, the Aceh Local Party and the Darussalam Party. Factual verification in the field indicated that these four parties had failed to fulfil certain requirements such as having branch offices in at least 15 out of 23 districts/municipalities, as well as the requisite number of members and board members. Similar requirements also apply at subdistrict level and parties had to have offices and board members, and memberships in two-thirds of the sub-districts.

Unhappy with the decision, the PARA for Women’s Concerns, the Gabthat Party and the Aceh Local Party made a formal complaint to KIP on 9 July 2008, contesting the decision and asking KIP to conduct a re-verification. The results of the factual verification, they said, were highly political in nature, unfair, discriminatory and not wholly correct. Thus, they requested that the KIP halt all further processes in the lead up to the election until
such time that a transparent response to their concerns coupled with appropriate course of action was made.

According to the chair of PARA, Zulhafah Luthfi, her party had received threats and were ordered not to put signs and notices with the party name, not to fly the party flag and not to open party offices. This was why, she explained, when the verification team came to the PARA office, they found nothing. She is certain that her party failed the factual verification process because those who conducted the factual verification of the PARA offices at district/municipal level hadn’t done their job properly, and not because PARA was unable to fulfill the conditions.\(^\text{14}\)

PARA was the only local political party to be founded by women. The founding of PARA on 30 May 2007 was one of the outcomes of the Grand Acehwide Women’s Seminar held on 23-24 November 2006, which proposed the formation of a political party that would serve as a political vehicle for women’s aspirations. With a composition of 70% women and 30% men, Zulhafah rejects the suggestion that PARA is a women-only, single-issue party, just that all those involved, regardless of their gender, are expected to fight for and give special attention to women’s concerns and issues.

The Gabthat Party in turn received its support from religious students, the Coalition of Dayah Aceh Ulama (HUDA) as a vehicle for traditional *ulemma*, associated former GAM combatants, members of SIRA and the Inshafuddin and Al Waliyah Islamic boarding schools. The party was declared on 22 March 2007 at the grave of Sultan Iskandar Muda in Banda Aceh in a symbolic commemoration of the glorious days of Aceh which under the leadership of Sultan Iskandar Muda, extended all the way to Melaka, Malaysia. Gabthat’s stated vision and mission is the implementation of the Syariah law and, *inter alia*, the protection of the values of the peace agreement in Aceh under the Helsinki MoU.

A sticking point regarding the representation of local aspirations at national level was that local political parties were neither able to nominate presidential candidates nor candidates for the DPR in Jakarta. Local political parties could only contest the 69 seats in the DPRA and the 645 seats at district/municipal level. In addition, the candidates nominated by the six local political parties had also to compete with the candidates registered and supported by the 34 national parties. Voters in Aceh were thus be able to choose
Local Political Parties in Aceh: Engines of Democratisation in Indonesia

between 40 political parties in the 2009 elections, while voters in other provinces only had 34 to choose from.

All six local political parties cleared to take part in the 2009 elections declared a general commitment to the eradication of corruption, to gender equality and a concern for human rights. Local parties with a specifically religious vision include the Aceh Sovereignty Party (PDA) and the Safe and Prosperous Aceh Party (PAAS). The Aceh People’s Party (PRA), formed by young and progressive pioneers, emphasised the need for a people-led economy whereas the Aceh Party and especially the SIRA Party espoused the need for the virtues of democratic politics, the former based primarily on the old GAM command structure, whilst the later rooted in civil society activist organisations. The Aceh United Party (PAB) was more universal and pluralistic than the others, with its constituency amongst the city-dwelling electorate. All the local political parties were seen by the people of Aceh as the ‘main choice’ and not just as an ‘alternative choice’ as they were more familiar and more representative of local people, as well as more likely to be perceived as being untainted from the ‘dirty’ politics of the national political parties.

As mentioned above, the six local political parties had not only to compete with one another, but also with the 34 national parties. The results of the 2004 legislative elections in Aceh, conducted during a state of war, elected 69 representatives (65 members of parliament and four leaders of the house) as follows: Golkar Party (12), the United Development Party (PPP) (12), the National Mandate Party (PAN) (9), the Star Reform Party (PBR) (8), the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) (8), the Star and Crescent Party (PBB) (8), the Democratic Party (PD) (6), Indonesian Democratic Party in Struggle (PDI-P) (2), Justice and Unity Party (PKPI) (1). Because local parties were not able to contest the national level seats, the 13 seats representing Aceh in the DPR in Jakarta were contested by the 34 national parties only.

So what did the odds look like for local political parties in the lead up to the 2009 elections? Quoting from a survey carried out by the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) published in Banda Aceh on 15 February 2007, IFES Research Manager Rakesh Sharma stated that of 1,203 respondents surveyed...
between 25 January to 4 February 2007 across Aceh, (excluding Sabang and Simeulue), the preference was as follows:

- Local Parties: 39.0%
- National Parties: 11.9%
- Unsure: 39.2%
- Other/unknown: 9.9%

These figures suggest a willingness on the part of the electorate to try something new, meaning that they might well look to local rather than national parties. However, the characterisation of the Aceh Party and the SIRA Party in particular may have been influenced by the work and track record of Aceh Governor Irwandi Yusuf and those district heads and mayors who were supported by GAM and who went on to found the Aceh Party. In turn, the characterisation of the SIRA Party was more likely to be influenced by the performance of Deputy Governor Muhammad Nazar and the mayors supported by SIRA, and who then went on to found the SIRA Party. If their policies and achievements following their inauguration on 7 February 2007 were accepted and understood by the people, then these two parties, it was believed, might well to be seen as local heroes and thus more likely to do well in the 2009 elections.

Nevertheless, the 2009 elections represented an enormous challenge for all political parties in Aceh as there would undoubtedly be a scramble for votes between local and national political parties. There were three democracy competitions at stake, the first being between local and national parties competing to claim the 69 seats in the DPRA and the 256 district and municipal level seats across the whole of Aceh. The second competition was between the local political parties. Finally, there was the competition between the national parties for the 13 seats in the national DPR. Local and national political parties submitted legislative candidates, beginning with a campaign period that commenced simultaneously across Indonesia on 12 July 2008 and which ran until 5 April 2009. The campaign was conducted in two ways: ‘enclosed space’ campaigns without the masses and with restricted meetings, from 12 July 2008 to 16 March 2009, and ‘open space’ or field campaigns mobilising the masses from 17 March to 5 April 2009. These were then followed by a ‘calm’ period where no campaigning was allowed,
culminating in the election itself on 9 April 2009, the first election since the New Order regime in which local parties in Aceh could participate.

Profiles of the six local political parties
This section provides a profile of the six political parties in Aceh as of early 2009, listed according to their electoral numerical order:

1. Partai Aceh Aman Sejahtera, PAAS, (Safe and Prosperous Aceh Party)
Chair : Drs H Ghazali Abbas Adan
Secretary : Drs H Nusri Hamid
Treasurer : Faisal Putra Yusuf
Office : Jalan T. Nyak Arief No 159, Banda Aceh

Ghazali Abbas Adan was one of the founders of PAAS, which was formally declared on 3 June 2007 at Taman Sari, Banda Aceh. The founding of the party was first announced on 18 March 2007 at the Lamnyong Restaurant, Banda Aceh. Ghazali is known as a skillful politician, formally of the national level United Development Party (PPP). This Pidie-born man has sat in the DPR in Jakarta for several periods, from 1992-2004.

Ghazali is known to have been very vocal in raising concerns over human rights issues in the DPR. He was the only house member who called for the perpetrators of human rights violation in Aceh to be tried in court when Aceh was still designated a Military Operational Zone between 1989 and 1998 (DOM). Before founding a local political party, Ghazali also stood as a candidate for governor of Aceh in the 2006 Elections, on a joint-ticket with Shalahuddin al-Fatah. They joined the gubernatorial elections independently and, against expectations, received 7.8% of the votes in fifth place behind Irwandi-Nazar with 38.2%, Humam-Hasbi with 16.6%, Malik-Sayed with 14% and Azwar-Nasir with 10.6%.

Although they only came fifth, the Ghazali-Shalahuddin ticket nevertheless managed to beat the PBB-supported Iskandar Hoesin-Saleh Manaf ticket (5.5%), Tamlicha Ali-Harmen Nuriqman supported by the PBR (4%) and the independent candidates Djali Yusuf-Syauqas Rahmatullah (3%). This was despite the fact that from a financial standpoint, Ghazali-Shalahuddin spent little in
advertising in the press. They only once placed an advertisement in a local daily in which they asked the public to donate to their campaign by contacting their campaign teams in each district/municipality. KIP Aceh data shows that Ghazali’s ticket had the smallest campaign funds during the 2006 Acehnese Elections which amounted to around IDR 920 million. The others candidates had campaign funds of at least IDR 1 billion or more each, for example Djali Yusuf had IDR 9 billion, Malik Raden IDR 7 billion, Azwar Abubakar IDR 8 billion and Tamlicha IDR 1.5 billion.

Who are PAAS’ main constituency? An informed guess by early 2009 suggested former PPP supporters and victims of conflict who see Ghazali as having been consistent in his defence of their rights. Ghazali’s loyal supporters include those who voted for him in the 2006 elections. The party, which adopted a ‘modern Islamic’ theme, was also expected to attract votes from religious students whilst having to compete with the local Aceh Sovereignty Party in particular. Given his experience in the 2006 elections, Ghazali was certain that one way to gain as many votes as possible in the 9 April elections was to meet as frequently as possible with people in the dayah (religious schools also known as pesantren) and villages.

PAAS promotes issues of a safe and prosperous Aceh within the framework of Islamic Syariah, emphasising the combination of a political party model and an Islamic political system in a modern Islamic party. The party, with its emblem showing a map of Aceh with the Koran in the middle, espouses the belief that every activity must be intended as a form of worship, including political activities. Therefore, the kind of politics PAAS was likely to continue to adhere to include the regulations and norms that are in accordance with the Koran and hadith.

Ghazali was without a doubt the party’s icon and vote-winner. There was a chance however, that party secretary Nusri Hamid, who had only recently openly involved himself in politics, would also have some potential ‘pulling power’. The Major – Mutasir Hamid’s nickname whilst chair of the Aceh Regional House of Representatives (DPRD Aceh) – comes from a family of well-known politicians including Ahmad Farhan Hamid and Ahmad Humam Hamid, who was one the gubernatorial candidates in the 2006 elections. Nusri is also related to the former chair of the Banda Aceh DPRD, Muntasir Hamid, as well as to Munadir Hamid, a former member of the Banda Aceh DPRD.
Regions expected to vote for PAAS lie on the eastern coast, such as Pidie where Ghazali originates from. In the 2006 Elections, Ghazali managed to win 32,734 votes in Pidie, while Irwandi-Nazar won 39,246 votes. It was Humam-Hasbi that won the biggest number of votes here with a total of 118,884, due to the support of GAM ex-combatants. PAAS’ main support base lies amongst pious villagers. The main challenge to PAAS was expected to come from the Aceh Sovereignty Party and its main supporters – the religious students.

2. Partai Daulat Aceh (PDA) (Aceh Sovereignty Party)

Chair : Teungku Harmen Nuriqman (formerly Teungku Nurkalis MY)
Secretary : Teungku Muhibbussabri (formerly Teungku Mulyadi M Ramli)
Treasurer : Amiruddahri
Office : Jalan T Iskandar, Lambhuk Village, Banda Aceh

There is no reference to Islam in the name of this party, although the party emblem depicts two minarets flanking the kupiah meukeutob, a traditional Acehnese hat worn by men. Indeed the party was founded by ulema from the dayah (religious schools, also known as pesantren). This party won the right to participate in the 2009 elections while the Gabthat Party, which claimed it had the support of religious students and ulema close to GAM, failed the factual verification process. The Aceh Sovereignty Party (PDA) was founded on the basis of upholding Syariah law in Aceh. According to the PDA’s manifesto, investors would be allowed into Aceh, but only under Syariah law. However, founder and former party chair, Teungku Nurkhalis, stated that the PDA wasn’t just a party for religious students or Koran reading groups. The name of this party might also have reminded voters of the ‘national’ People’s Sovereignty Party formed by Adi Sasono, an NGO worker who was once a leading light in ICMI (the Indonesian Union of Muslim Intellectuals), which received the patronage of Soeharto and was close to Habibie, advocating policies similar to the New Economic Policy of Malaysia that promoted positive discrimination in favour of the indigenous Malay Muslim population.
The PDA was officially founded by *ulemma* and religious scholars on 4 March 2007 at the Grave of Syekh Abdul Rauf Syiah Kuala, Banda Aceh. Syiah Kuala was a *mufti* (religious judge) who was famous in the era of Sultan Iskandar Muda (1607-1637). According to Nurkalis, PDA supporters were to be found throughout the districts and towns of Aceh, particularly amongst those Muslims who hold Islamic teachings dear. He claimed that the Association of Muslim Boarding School Ulama was a big supporter of the PDA. The PDA also received support from religious scholars who follow the Rabithah Thaliban Aceh (Religious Scholars Union of Acehnese Dayah), which has links with HUDA. HUDA’s relationship with the PDA is similar to the relationship between the Nahdatul Ulama (NU), Indonesia and probably the world’s largest traditionally-oriented socio-religious Muslim organisation, and the National Awakening Party (PKB) in Java, even if the PDA’s ideology is more reminiscent of the PKS than the PKB.

Regional support for the PDA was expected to come from the 23 districts/municipalities where party members have emotional ties to fellow religious students and *dayah/pesantren* alumni. This was a potentially major source of power as it transcends the barriers of ethnicity or group identities. The party was also seen to have a loyal base of supporters within 693 *dayah/pesantren*, with 108,468 students and around 700 Koran reading groups across Aceh (*Serambi Indonesia*, 29 March 2008).

Warning that if local parties were to dominate the 2009 elections - Partai Aceh or the SIRA Party in particular - then Aceh would be one step away from a referendum for independence, Lieutenant General (Ret.) Kiki Syahnakri stated that the Aceh Sovereignty Party was the only local party that stood out in support of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia (NKRI). Asked for confirmation of this, Nurkhalis stated that the impetus behind the founding of the PDA was the need to address both the poor state of the economy and Syariah in Aceh. The party’s vision was to return to the system of governance found in the days of Sultan Iskandar Muda, albeit within the framework of the NKRI. According to Nurkhalis, the other local political parties should have more explicitly considered themselves part of the NKRI.¹⁶

According to Nurkhalis, another aim of the PDA was to do away once and for all with the assumption that *ulemma* should
not get involved in politics. The PDA was founded to represent the aspirations of Muslim activist groups who believe that Syariah law should be enforced in Aceh in a *kafah* (comprehensive) way, which is currently not the case.

In the run up to the 2009 elections, the PDA was made up of two assemblies, the Nashid Assembly and the Mustasya Assembly. The Nashid Assembly consisted of *ulemma* that provided advice to party board members. The Mustasya Assembly consisted of *ulemma* with the authority to dismiss board members and to draft policy, and who even have the authority to dismiss elected PDA members of parliament.

It was felt that the PDA’s position might be further enhanced through its close links with the All Indonesia Reformasi Star Party (PBR), of which Nurkhalis was also a member, and politicians such as Harmen Nuriqman, a then member of the Aceh legislative and an *ulemma*. In the 2004 Elections, the PBR was one of the top five parties, winning eight seats in the DPRD Aceh. Again, their main supporters came from amongst the *dayah ulemma* and students, people who are respected by the local people living in the areas surrounding the *dayah*. One advantage this party had was support that was spread equally across Aceh. Harmen Nuriqman stood as deputy governor in the 2006 elections, on a joint ticket with Lieutenant General (Ret.) Tamlicha Ali. Now, Harmen was a member of the DPR in Aceh at this time. In short it was felt that the PDA was in a strong position to break down the walls between legislative nominees from local and national parties.

3. Partai Suara Independen Rakyat Aceh - SIRA (The Acehnese People’s Independent Voice Party)

   Chairperson : M Taufiq Abda
   Secretary : Arhma (Dawan Gayo)
   Treasurer : Faurizal
   Office : Jalan T Nyak Arief No 110, Banda Aceh

In the minds of the people of Aceh, SIRA stands for the Center for Information on Referendum in Aceh. However, the ‘SIRA’ of the SIRA Party stands for the Acehnese People’s Independent Voice (*Suara Independen Rakyat Aceh*). Originally SIRA was an umbrella organisation for NGOs and other civil society organisations in favour
of a referendum on independence for Aceh. Later, SIRA developed into a mass-based organisation which eventually gave birth and lent its name to the SIRA Party in order to spark the memories of voters in the 2009 Election. The SIRA Party Congress held on 10-13 December 2007 chose Deputy Governor Muhammad Nazar as head of the party high assembly, and Muhammad Taufik Abda as head of the party central leaders committee.

A day before they decided on the acronym SIRA, a committee appointed to the task made an inventory of at least 11 possible interpretations of the acronym SIRA, including Seutot Indatu Rakyat Aceh (Following the Ancestors of the Acehnese People), Acehnese People’s Independent Solidarity, Saboh Ikat Rakyat Aceh (One United Acehnese People), Acehnese People’s Islamic Socialism, Acehnese People’s Independent Society and Acehnese People’s Independent Voice. Sira also means ‘salt’ in Acehnese.

The SIRA Party was formally launched in Banda Aceh on 10 December 2007, coinciding with International Human Rights Day. The party’s emblem is blue, with a crescent moon in the middle and 10 red stars. According to the SIRA Party, the emblem reflects its peace loving nature and its commitment to upholding human rights. Just as the Aceh Party had branches in all the districts and municipalities of Aceh, so did the SIRA Party. This was due to the fact that from the time of conflict to the 2006 Aceh general elections, SIRA and GAM members communicated closely with one another and supported each other’s development.

The SIRA name reminds people of 8 November 1999, when SIRA and GAM mobilised about 1 million Acehnese to the courtyard of the great Baiturrahman Mosque in Banda Aceh, in order to take part in the General Session of People Fighting for the Referendum (SU-MPR). The Indonesian government described SIRA as the intellectual support and civilian wing of GAM. SIRA’s Presidium Chair, Muhammad Nazar, was twice imprisoned, accused of ‘sowing the seeds of hatred’ against Indonesia and for calling for a referendum in Aceh on special autonomy and independence.

During the opening of the First Congress of the SIRA Party, Nazar stated that the party was inclusive, and that anyone was allowed to join in accordance with party regulations. He emphasised that the SIRA Party was formed to continue to fight for the aspirations of the Acehnese people, who still faced economic,
political, cultural, and educational hardship. According to Nazar, it had been his ambition to found a political party since 1999, when the issue of a referendum on independence crystallised in Aceh. In fact according to Nazar, the SIRA Party was not something new per se, but only now had the opportunity to communicate in this way to the greater public.

At the time of writing there were tensions between SIRA and sections of the Aceh Party that relate to their different bases, methods of organisation (with the Aceh Party depending more on the old GAM command structure) and differences of opinion over issues of democracy in general and leadership in particular. The conflicts became more intense in face of the 2009 elections. SIRA Party board members and close associates are well-known in Acehnese politics, such as former GAM negotiator Shadia Marhaban who later on also became chair of Liga Inong Aceh (Acehnese Women’s League, or LINA), an organisation of former female GAM combatants and female victims of conflict. Several of the leaders were also well know figures from civil society organisations and former student activists, including party leader Taufiq Abda. Moreover, within the framework of the internal GAM split, the conservative camp has accused several of its critics within GAM such as Nur Djuli and Bakhtiar Abdulah of supporting SIRA. However, neither of them joined either of the parties.

The reason why the SIRA Party was founded rather late in the day was partly because it was waiting for appropriate legal instruments to be set in place, and partly because of the debate as to whether it should form its own political party or join a united GAM Party. Nevertheless, they prepared themselves well from the logistical side of things by involving party board members and members of the SIRA organisation in various businesses, such as house contracting, a field which blossomed during Aceh’s rehabilitation and reconstruction period. Similar business strategies were applied by the Aceh Party, once again drawing on the old command structure. These businesses would become money-making machines for the 2009 elections.

The campaign for votes was also supported through a number of SIRA cadres-turned-bureaucrats who were close to SIRA or not attached to any specific political party such as, at least initially, including the Mayor of Sabang, Munawar Liza Zainal,
Deputy Mayor of Sabang, Islamuddin, Deputy District Head of East Aceh, Nasruddin Abubakar as well as several members of the Acehnese Governor’s Assistance Team and members of the Aceh Reintegration Body (BRA), which manages the rehabilitation of conflict victims and ex-combatants.

From an ideological standpoint, the SIRA Party grounded itself in social justice as well as Islam, with its aspiration for a just and prosperous Aceh. The ability of young people to mobilise the crowds was proven when Irwandi-Nazar were elected as governor and deputy governor of Aceh. That was the work of a campaign team that consisted of the SIRA youth and GAM (now ex-) combatants, who had come out in force on 8 November 1999. SIRA had strong constituencies of followers, particularly on the west and east coasts. It was thought highly likely that in the 2009 election, supporters of this party would come up against supporters of the Aceh Party.

4. Partai Rakyat Aceh (PRA) (The Aceh People’s Party)

Chair : Aguswandi (previously Ridwan H Mukhtar)\textsuperscript{17},
Secretary : Thamrin Ananda
Treasurer : Malahayati
Office : Jalan T Iskandar No 174, Lamgeulumpang
Village, Ulee Kareng, Banda Aceh

The simple two-floor shop-house in Ulee Kareng, Banda Aceh, Aceh Besar does not look like a local political party office. Who would guess that this was the office of the Aceh People’s Party (PRA), which passed the test for admission into the ‘celebration of democracy’ on 9 April 2009.

The PRA was formed by young activists from the Aceh People’s Democratic Resistance Front (FPDRA), whose branch organisations included the Students Solidarity for the People (SMUR), the Organisation of Democratic Acehnese Women (ORPAD), Care Aceh and the Poor People’s Democratic Union (PDRM). SMUR was affiliated to the National Students’ League for Democracy (LMND) when it opposed the Soeharto regime. In turn, the LMND was part of the Democratic People’s Party (PRD) in Jakarta. The average age of PRA members and board members was under 30, much younger than the board members of national and other local parties, who are generally older than 30.
The opportunity provided by the Helsinki MoU to found local political parties was seized upon by these young activists with the declaration of the Preparation Committee for the Aceh People’s Party (KP-PRA) at Lamnyong Restaurant, Banda Aceh, on 16 March 2006. The idea of a local political party coalesced further when the FPDRA held a congress in Saree, Aceh Besar on 27 February 2006. After the promulgation of the LoGA on 11 July 2006, the PRA officially declared itself as a political party on 3 March 2007, the first local party to do so. This was after extensive deliberation on the platform, principles, policies and programmes at the KP-PRA congress held on 27 February to 2 March 2007, as well as the election of the party chair and secretary.

The congress democratically elected Aguswandi as party chair and Thamrin Ananda as secretary general, both of whom had a background as student and NGO activists. A year later, the party chair was transferred to Ridwan H Mukhtar. According to Thamrin, the party was formed by activists from the student movement, urban youth and farmers in the villages who aspire to a just, prosperous and modern Aceh in the future.

One of the PRA’s concerns was how to return control of economic assets to the people of Aceh, such as those controlled by ExxonMobil and PT Arun which extract and refine LNG, and several other economic assets that are mostly the property of transnational corporations. The PRA was obsessed, so to speak, with returning sovereignty over natural resources to the people. At the time of writing the PRA had branches in all the Aceh districts and municipalities as well as in 189 sub-districts, with a share of village supporters including those in Central Aceh, Southeast Aceh and the west coast of Aceh.

The PRA targeted farmers, traders, labourers, professionals, NGO workers, the middle-to-lower classes, as well as villagers from rural areas. At first glance, this party’s flag resembles the GAM flag, with a red background and two black stripes, one at the top and one at the bottom. The difference is that while GAM’s flag includes one white star and crescent moon, the PRA flag has one yellow star.

How would the PRA disseminate its policies and programmes? How would it campaign for votes? By early 2009 the PRA was the only local political party that had published its own newspaper, the Haba Rakyat (the People’s News) published once
a month since 2006. In addition, ORPAD and Care Aceh, whose board members were also PRA members, assisted the people before and after the tsunami and there was thus the possibility that their activities might stir up interest in expanding the party’s network into various villages.

The general weakness of this party was that it had yet to maximise its potential to promote its visibility and identity ahead of the campaign, and that the PRA’s constituency overlapped with those of both the Aceh Party and the SIRA Party. However, the PRA had several well-known legislative nominees who had proven their commitment to upholding the people’s interests. This was expected to be highly effective in campaigning for votes.

5. Partai Aceh (PA) (Aceh Party)
Chair : Muzakkir Manaf
Secretary : M Yahya SH
Treasurer : Hasanuddin
Office : Jalan Sultan Alaidin Mahmud Syah, Banda Aceh

What’s in a name? Ask the board members of the Aceh Party, which has had three names. In the beginning, the Aceh Party was called the Gam Party, so declared on 7 July 2007 in Banda Aceh. Gam Party spokesperson, Teungku Adnan Beuransyah, explained that the word Gam is not an acronym. The party’s flag resembles the GAM flag, with a bright red background, two black stripes, one at the top and one at the bottom, and a white star and crescent in the middle. The main principle of the party formed by ex-combatants is the transition from armed struggle to political struggle, trading bullets for a political voice.

Former GAM Prime Minister, Malik Mahmud, was appointed chair of the Gam Party - a Singaporean citizen living in Sweden. Meutroe – Malik’s given name in GAM circles, said that there was no problem with his leadership of the Gam Party, explaining that Indonesia was not concerned with his citizenship status (acehkita.com 23 November 2007).

Nevertheless, the Indonesian government protested at the name of the party. In fact, only a few hours after a Gam Party signboard was unveiled, the police demanded it be covered up. The government persisted in its requests that Gam clarify what the
acronym stood for. Eventually, the board members of the Gam Party announced on 25 February 2008 that Gam was an acronym for the Independent Aceh Movement. Despite the fact that Gam included the name in full on its flag, Indonesia continued to protest, arguing that the long version of Gam was written in small lettering on the side of the flag, whereas the acronym ‘GAM’ was written in large lettering in the middle of the flag. Additionally, the background colours and emblem held a strong resemblance to the GAM flag. Indeed the name and symbol of the Gam Party formed part of a strategy to rekindle the memories of voters, win over public opinion and encourage the people to choose the Gam Party.

The Indonesian government continued to object to the party name. The debate ended when party elites changed the name from the Independent Aceh Movement Party to the Aceh Party on 22 April 2008. According to party spokesperson Teungku Adnan Beuransyah, his party had tried to keep the ‘GAM Party’ name, but the Indonesians government would not give up its objection to it. In any case, the polemic came to a close, and the party passed administrative verification from the Department of Justice and Human Rights in Jakarta.

In addition to changing its name, the party also had to change its emblem. The changes made were not only part of the political process but also in accordance with legal requirements as per article 1.2.1 of the Helsinki MoU; the LoGA and Government Regulation No. 20, 2007 on Local Political Parties in Aceh, which states under article 6.4 that, ‘The design of regional emblems and flags cannot be similar in particularities or generalities with the design, emblems and flags of a banned organisation, or that of a separatist organisation/group/institution/movement in the Unitary State of the Republic.’

This spurred protests from GAM. On 4 January 2008, Irwandi sent a letter on behalf of the Acehnese government to the Indonesian government requesting that central government withdraw and re-evaluate Government Regulation No. 77, 2007 and redraft the regulation following consultation with the governor.

But Jakarta ignored Irwandi’s protests and GAM opted for compromise. The party’s flag was changed and the crescent moon and star removed, with ‘Aceh’ the only word standing out in the
middle of the flag. Thus the Aceh Party aimed to transform its image amongst the Acehnese people, from a revolutionary party to a party of development.

GAM’s intention to found a local political party was announced at the GAM Ban Sigom Donja meeting (World Congress of the Acehnese People) on the campus of Syiah Kuala University in Banda Aceh, on 20-21 May 2006, and then at the meeting of the final (44th) Aceh Monitoring Mission’s Commission for Security Arrangements (CoSA), on 2 December 2006, Malik announced his support for GAM to found a local political party.

The Aceh Party fully understands the power of the *ulemma*. While the *ulemma* in HUDA gave their support the Aceh Sovereignty Party, the Aceh Party established a new organisation, the Assembly of Nanggroe Aceh Ulama (MUNA), in order to channel *ulemma* and religious student support to the Party. Aceh Party founders Malik Mahmud and Zaini Abdullah celebrated the establishment of MUNA, led by Teungku Ali Basyah, by inaugurating 60 board members on 30 July 2008 at the Syiah Kuala Cemetery Complex in Banda Aceh, the same place the Aceh Sovereignty Party was officially declared. With the founding of MUNA, Malik stated his hope that with the arrival of MUNA, all *ulemma* in Aceh would unite to fight for one cause, namely the interests of the people of Aceh (*Serambi Indonesia* 31 July 2008).

HUDA Secretary General Teungkyu Faisal Ali has suggested that MUNA is an organisation formed by those *ulemma* that support the Aceh Party and that MUNA is thus a vehicle for the mobilisation of votes in support of the Aceh Party in the 2009 elections, a matter later confirmed by Adnan. Undeniably, from a logistical and networking point of view, the Aceh Party has it all. This is why Adnan, who was once given political asylum in Denmark, felt sure that his party would receive 80% of the vote, based on the strengths of the Aceh Party and the weaknesses of other political parties. The strength of his party is that there are few divisions between loyal former GAM members when it comes to channelling political aspirations. It was thought highly likely that the Aceh Party would win votes on the east and west coasts of Aceh, which had larger electorates. Even though the SIRA organisation was also important, the Aceh Transition Committee (KPA) proved itself to be a particularly effective political machine in electing Irwandi
(of the KPA) and Nazar (of SIRA) to highest and second-highest positions in Aceh in the 2006 gubernatorial elections. While SIRA was independent of GAM’s leadership, the KPA is an organisation of veterans of the Aceh State Army (TNA) which was disbanded on 27 December 2005 in Banda Aceh. Now, the KPA is the Aceh Party’s main weapon in the mobilisation of voter support, with the added advantage of having networks in all 23 districts/municipalities in Aceh, all the way down to village level.

However, the unexpected can and does happen in Aceh when it comes to politics, just as it did in the 2006 elections (for in-depth analysis of the regional elections, see Chapter 6 of this volume). Irwandi-Nazar even managed to lead in Southeast Aceh, which had previously been a Golkar Party stronghold. Irwandi won 37,217 votes, beating the Malik A Raden-Sayed Fuad Zakaria ticket, who only managed 22,291 votes. Ironically, this happened despite the fact that Sayed Fuad Zakaria was the chair of the Golkar Party in Aceh. The same thing occurred in the City of Sabang, which during the 2003 Military Emergency was a ‘white zone’, where GAM had no power. Yet Irwandi-Nazar managed to defeat seven other joint-candidates there, including the two military candidates Djali Yusuf and Tamlicha Ali.

Of around 2.1 million voters in Aceh, 50% live on the east coast in areas such Pidie, Pidie Jaya, Bireuen, North Aceh and East Aceh; 20% live in the central regions, such as Central Aceh, Bener Meriah, Gayo Lues and Southeast Aceh with 30% residing on the west coast, such as Aceh Jaya, West Aceh and South Aceh – some of the areas that suffered the biggest human and material losses from the tsunami (Tabloid SIPII Edition 1, 19-29 March 2008). KIP Aceh data from 2006 shows that the greatest number of votes were cast in the east coast: 314,796 votes in Pidie, 239,241 votes in Bireuen, 305,652 votes in North Aceh and 201,892 votes in East Aceh – traditional GAM strongholds and the areas previously under DOM.

In the 2006 elections, former GAM members in Pidie and Bireuen supported the Humam-Hasbi ticket on the instruction of Malik and Zaini, although former GAM Commander Muzakkir Manaf eventually also won their support. Although the electorate was split, most of them gave their support to Irwandi-Nazar. With the conflict within the Aceh Party largely resolved, it would be a force to be reckoned with, particularly with Muzakkir Manaf, major
ex-commander and new businessman, as party head. By the time of writing, the Aceh Party’s only competitors in the villages seemed to be the SIRA Party and the Aceh People’s Party.

The Aceh Party has stated that it genuinely wants to transform itself, with ex-combatants representing around 50% of legislative candidates in addition to academics, community figures and ulema. A former director of a human rights body in Banda Aceh was asked her opinion as to whether or not legislative candidates from the Aceh Party were expected to make financial contributions to the party. Her reply was that what the party needed from figures active in the human rights arena was their intelligence. This seems to correlate with Adnan’s statement that his party would like to control parliament at the provincial and district/municipal level by providing it with trustworthy representatives. Thus, leading members of the Aceh Party reflect the struggle between brawn and brains, from the edge of the sword to the tip of the pen in the Aceh House of Representatives and district/municipal level House of Representatives.

6. Partai Bersatu Aceh (PBA/The Aceh United Party)
   Chair : Dr Ahmad Farhan Hamid MS
   Secretary : Muhammad Saleh SE
   Treasurer : H Ridwan Yusuf SE
   Office : Jalan Gabus No 6 Bandar Baru, Banda Aceh

   It was a move from the academic world to the political world. Ahmad Farhan Hamid was better known as a member of the Indonesian parliament in Jakarta than as a lecturer at Syiah Kuala University in Banda Aceh. During the reformasi era that followed the fall of Soeharto, this academic joined the National Mandate Party (PAN) in Aceh, finally becoming a member of the DPR for two periods, until 2009.

   When the opportunity to form local political parties arose in Aceh, Farhan, a member the PAN Central Leadership Board founded the Aceh United Party (PBA). The party has an emblem with an eight-sided star and a map of Aceh, which symbolises the aim to unite diverse ethnic groups in the province. As with the other five local political parties, the PBA adhered to the principles of pluralism and openness. The PBA’s stated mission was to
educate and to build a democratic and just life for the people. In the beginning PAN members in Aceh protested when Farhan founded a local political party. Their protests came to nothing, and Farhan continued with his plans as his actions did not go against PAN regulations. The PBA was officially declared in Banda Aceh on 27 January 2008 and has branches in 20 districts/municipalities.

Who were the party’s target constituents? As one of the founders of PAN in Aceh, the PBA hoped that PAN sympathisers and city dwellers would vote for this local party for the local seats and vote for PAN for the national ones. However, this would be no easy matter, as voters were being asked to choose between local legislative candidates nominated by the PBA, PAN as well as the Nation’s Sun Party (which broke away from PAN). By early 2009 Farhan was determined to use his party as an engine for the unification of the Acehnese people and to bridge local political aspirations.

While the Aceh People’s Party had its own media outlet through which to campaign, the PBA had media access through one of its leaders to the weekly tabloid, *Modus Aceh*, published in Banda Aceh. The tabloid, headed by the PBA secretary, had been in circulation for six years. As a business-oriented media outlet, it was able to feature PBA campaign adverts, such as that published in the 4 July 2008 edition which featured a full-page advert offering the people the opportunity to stand as PBA candidates for the Aceh DPR and district/municipal DPR in the 2009 Elections.

As founder of the PBA, Farhan nominated himself a candidate for the Aceh DPD and it was likely that the PBA was established as a vehicle with which to introduce himself with voters, as competition for the four DPD seats in Jakarta was sure to be tough, with a total 29 candidates vying for position. The founding of a local political party to act as a lifeboat was also a strategy employed by Aceh DPD member Mediati Hafni Hanum, a supporter of the Darussalam Party in Banda Aceh. However, that party didn’t pass the verification stage. Hafni, one of the candidates of the 2006 gubernatorial election who failed to pass the Koran reading test, registered again as an Acehnese DPD nominee for the 2009-2014 period.
The Future: Aceh’s democratic battle

By early 2009 the six local political parties from Aceh were ready to fight and contest the April 2009 elections in a peaceful, democratic manner. However, it was clear that there would be competition and friction between old and new rivalries, between the local parties themselves, between the national parties and between the local and the national parties. The challenge for Aceh was and is to ensure that political competition takes place within the democratic arena and does not threaten the peace attained after 30 years of conflict. It was important therefore that law enforcement agencies, local and national elites, local bureaucrats and the military would act to support democratic competition, and not to threaten it.

Certainly the 2006 elections confounded the analysis of politicians in Jakarta who predicted that they would be accompanied by widespread unrest, following as they did a period of armed conflict, and with the participation of ex-combatants. However, the European Union monitors deemed the elections democratic, safe and peaceful. All those activities that could have contributed to failure were either contained or eliminated, due to the strong commitment of the people of Aceh to maintain peace, and also no doubt due to the fact that there were international monitors present. Everyone was committed to making the 2006 elections the first step in a peaceful political transition. It is clear that Aceh needs to be understood from the minaret of the Baiturrahman Mosque in Banda Aceh, not from the National Monument (Monas) in Jakarta.

Another problem in face of the elections was that certain crucial issues seemed to be set aside. One such issue was what would happen as the Aceh-Nias Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Body (BRR Aceh-Nias), which had been entrusted with rebuilding Aceh after the tsunami, was due to see its mandate come to an end by around the time of the elections. The Acehnese government had prepared a Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Coordination body (BKRR), that would take over from the BRR. The aim of the BKRR being to continue the BRR’s responsibilities, namely to manage and disburse donor funds, who in turn will pull out of Aceh in 2012. However, issues of reconstruction and rehabilitation were not considered priorities of the democratic political agenda in Aceh. One leading party member, Thamrin Ananda of the PRA, said for example that his party would only address these problems after the elections.
Some of the problems affecting the 2009 ‘celebration of democracy’ included intimidation of national party members by local political party cadres as occurred, for instance, in Pidie Jaya district on 10 July 2008, or the obstruction of local political parties from opening branch offices as occurred, for example, in Singkil, Aceh Singkil on 18 April 2008. According to the Analytical Report on the Potential for Acehnese Conflict in the lead up to the 2009 elections (January-July 2008) a number of cases of intimidation by election candidates were identified, as well incidents of discrimination by the government, police and the military aiming at intimidating citizens into not supporting local political parties in their region. In order to avoid conflict both before and after the 2009 elections, it was essential that it be understood that the price of peace in Aceh was and is dearer than that of a legislative seat.

In the lead up to the 2009 elections, two conclusions seemed obvious. First, that local political parties can play honestly and fairly and that the local party model is likely to form a template for other regions. This is what we mean by the suggestion that local political parties might become Aceh’s democratic engine for Indonesia. Secondly, it was felt highly likely that the Aceh Party would control parliament at the provincial, district and municipals levels while the SIRA Party was likely to come second with either the Aceh People’s Party or the Aceh Sovereignty Party in third place. Interestingly, the actual results in the form of the landslide victory of the Aceh Party, together with the President Yudhoyono’s national level Democratic Party, and no representation in the provincial parliament of the SIRA Party nor the Aceh people’s Party, calls for revision of the optimistic conclusion and a renewed discussion, to which we shall return in Chapter 9.
Aceh: The Role of Democracy for Peace and Reconstruction

(Endnotes)
1 Murizal Hamzah works at the Aceh Independent Institute in Banda Aceh
2 Hasan di Tiro passed away in Aceh on 3rd June 2010
3 Interview with Teuku Kamaruzzaman in Banda Aceh, on 12 November 2005.
5 Eda and Dharma (2007), p. 123
6 According to article 1.1.2 (a) of the MoU, ‘Aceh will exercise authority within all sectors of public affairs… except in the fields of foreign affairs, external defence, national security, monetary and fiscal matters, justice and freedom of religion. Article 7.2 of the LoGA states, ‘Authorities of the central government comprise government functions that are of national character, foreign affairs, defence, security, justice, monetary affairs, national fiscal affairs and certain functions in the field of religion.’
7 Article 11.1 of the LoGA states, ‘The central government sets norms, standards and procedures and conducts the supervision over the implementation of government functions by the Government of Aceh and Kabupaten/Kota governments (elucidations: ‘norms are rules or stipulations that are used as arrangements (tatanan) in implementing regional governance; standards are references (acuan) that are used as directives (patokan) in implementing regional governance; procedures are methods or modes (tata cara) for implementing regional governance.’
8 Interview with Dawan Gayo on 31 October 2006 in Banda Aceh.
9 MoU articles 1.2.1 and 1.2.2 and LoGA, articles 256 and 257
10 In other provinces, the equivalent of KIP is the General Elections Commission (KPU – Komisi Pemilihan Umum)
11 Sulut Pertama Terapkan Calon Perseorangan, Suara Pembaruan, 14 April 2008.
12 Major General Supiadin was replaced by Major General Soenarko on 14 July 2008
14 Interview with the chair of PARA, Zulhafah Luthfi, 10 July 2008.
Golkar is the party of the previous Soeharto regime, having adjusted itself to a limited reform agenda. PPP was the only Muslim based party that was allowed under the Soeharto regime. Like Golkar it has adjusted itself to a limited reform agenda. PAN is a urban and middle class oriented Muslim party, established after the fall of Soeharto. PBR and PBB are more conservative Muslim based parties, partly growing out of PPP. PKS is a well organised Muslim Brotherhood oriented party; it’s initial basis included students opposing the Soeharto regime. PDI-P (led by Sukarno’s daughter Megawati) was the dissident section of the only nationalist and not explicitly religiously oriented party (PDI) during the reign of Soeharto. PKPI is a breakaway party from Golkar and at least initially with retired top generals in crucial positions.

16 Interview with the author on 24 July 2008
17 Ridwan H. Mukhtar passed away on Monday, August 4, 2008 from heart cancer.
18 Interview with the author on 31 July 2008
19 Interview with the author on 31 July 2008
20 This report was drafted by the Aceh Post-Conflict Working Group, which consisted of a number of NGOs and civil society organisations such as GeRAK Aceh, KontraS Aceh, Banda Aceh LBH, Relawan Perempuan Untuk Kemanusiaan, Solidaritas Perempuan Aceh, the Aceh Institute, the Indonesian Women’s Commission, SPKP HAM Aceh, the Aceh Forum of Academics, and Peoples Crisis Centre Aceh.
References

acehkita.com, 23 November 2007, Malik Mahmud tetap pimpin Partai GAM
Serambi Indonesia, 20 December 2007, Pangdam: masyarakat tak butuh partai lokal
Serambi Indonesia, 29 March 2008, Tahun ini semua dayah di Aceh dapat bantuan
Serambi Indonesia, 10 April 2008, Menyusul Aceh, partai lokal bakal merebak
Serambi Indonesia, 31 July 2008, Malik Mahmud: tak ada GAM anti MoU
Sinar Harapan, 13 July 2005, GAM tetap tuntut partai politik lokal
Suara Bebas, July 2007, Baldan, Ferry Mursyidan, Pondasi Menuju Perdamaian Abadi (Catatan Pembahasan RUU Pemerintahan Aceh)
Suara Pembaruan, 22 December 2007, Soal Partai Lokal
Suara Pembaruan, 14 April 2008, Sulut pertama terapkan calon perseorangan
Tabloid SIPII, edition 1, 19-29 March 2008, Yang Berubah dan Yang Bergeser
Introduction
At time of writing, late 2008 and early 2009, the development of democracy in Aceh showed promising results. The high levels of political participation in the 2006 local elections and the enthusiasm for founding local political parties proved that political transformation in this post-conflict and post-tsunami region was running smoothly. However, research initiated by Demos in November-December 2006 and later followed up by the Oslo University study of Aceh and Sri Lanka during 2007 and 2008, identified some significant challenges to the democratic framework in Aceh, which may put the future of both peace and democracy at risk.

To initiate a broader discussion of these conclusions and identify what needs to be done, the Aceh Participatory Research Team of scholars and activist researchers interviewed a number of potential agents of change in late 2008 in order to identify their understanding of and solutions to the main problems that lie ahead.

The first challenge brought to the attention of these actors was the symbiotic connection between regular business, politics and administration. The second, the threats from some powerful vested interests hoping to manage the situation in Aceh in order to fulfil their own economic goals—also known as ‘profitable peace’ (see
Chapter 4 for discussion on this). Although there were at the time limited indications of this happening in Aceh, the potential remains for this phenomenon to emerge at that point when priorities are contested between the enormous reconstruction projects/economic development and the promotion of a democratic self government.

The third challenge was the limited contribution of the international agencies and donor countries in promoting good governance, the rule of law and Human Rights in Aceh. The international agencies and donors seemed more concerned with their own projects and programmes than building sustainable and substantial democracy notwithstanding the on-going problems with the Law on Government of Aceh (LoGA), and the implementation of the Helsinki MoU. Next, the fourth challenge concerns the continuous problems of internal democracy and leadership, transparency, and financing of (even the new) political parties. Also in question in the lead up to the 2009 elections was the political parties’ will and ability to represent popular aspirations and interests. The fifth challenge relates to the minimal participation of mass-based organisations constituted from the aspirations of the people from below. In addition, there was the sixth challenge, namely the threat of nepotism and money politics in relationships between politicians, bureaucrats and business actors that nourish patron client-relations. This might in turn lead to a seventh challenge, namely that even the pro-democrats would ‘adjust’ to this system in order not to lose political influence and provide privileges to their supporters.

The results and challenges identified by the research as outlined above were summarised and presented to a number of actors that were considered to have a broad and deep knowledge of politics in Aceh and the pro-democracy movement, as well as the capacity to reflect on their own experiences. These included political party activists, successful KPA and SIRA activists from the 2006 local elections, journalists, women activists, mass-based organisations, NGO activists, scholars and intellectuals, as well as the head of the Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Body (BRR) which was about to conclude its mandate. These actors were carefully chosen as the capacity and timeframe for the number of interviews carried out was limited. We would have liked to have approached more informants, but time was short and at the very least we hope that we have succeeded in initiating the discussion.
Our study followed on from, firstly, the Demos-Aceh local democracy survey carried out in late-2006 and early 2007 and, secondly, the supplementary studies conducted thereafter under the auspices of the Oslo University project on the role of democracy in post-tsunami Aceh and Sri Lanka. The survey and the studies have been reported on in the previous chapters of this book. While Olle Törnquist initiated the survey and the supplementary studies as well as our supplementary research, he was directing the supplementary studies but only advising the survey and only supervising our otherwise independent team.

The Team faced a number of difficulties when contacting informants, due not least to the sensitivity of political issues in Aceh. Moreover, the delay between on the one hand the late-2006 and early 2007 survey and the supplementary studies thereafter, and on the other hand our interviews in late-2008 meant that some of the issues identified in the survey in particular, which we wanted our informants to comment on, might not have been entirely up to date. There were also time constraints involved as all these actors are very busy and time-poor people. Additionally, it was unfortunate that some political parties, for example the Golkar Party, did not respond to our request for an interview until the day this chapter was first drafted. Most of the interviews were conducted face to face, taking approximately 1-2 hours each. Due to the time constraints, however, a few informants answered questions via e-mail.

This chapter aims to discuss the main challenges as identified by the informants themselves, their responses to the challenges identified by the democracy survey (including whether they agree that these do in fact represent the main challenges to democracy in Aceh today) as well as their proposed solutions and strategies. We also asked them for their predictions on the winners and losers of the forthcoming 2009 elections. Discussion is divided into four main sections. The first section focuses on the actors’ understanding of the transitional period: its definition, its aims and how long it should last for. The next section examines this ‘frameless’ transitional period in the context of the existing democratic framework, including the implementation of the Helsinki MoU, issues of self-government and the LoGA, grassroots aspiration and the relationship between the framework for democracy and economic development. The third section focuses on what is needed in order to further develop the
existing democratic framework, including the need for popular participation whilst the fourth section will present some conclusions and recommendations.

**Recognising the transitional period: challenges, aims and timeframe**

*Existing symbiotic and patron-client relations and the use of special contacts*

According to our informants, the transitional period is crucial to overcoming the challenges to peace and democracy in Aceh. For example, rather than ushering in a new, corruption-free administration, peace – and more crucially self-government in Aceh continues to harbour irregular practices that are no different from the past. Such practices include the symbiotic relationships between regular business, politics and administration that continue to grow; or clientelism, nepotism and corruption that persist in the current bureaucracy, and the privileges given to certain groups by the new administration. Their answers deliberately put former GAM and/or SIRA activists on the spot, which they in turn explain as ‘inevitable’ problems of the transitional period that nevertheless need to be addressed and eradicated.

For example, a number of informants point to the participation of ex-combatants in local infrastructure development projects, questioning whether participation is genuine or whether it has been manipulated in the interest of specific groups and individuals. They argue that ex-combatants were being favoured when it came to allocating contracts in the booming reconstruction business ‘in order to distribute more even economic opportunities. Women’s rights activist and former head of KontraS Aceh Asiah Uzia explained that the high number of ex-combatants involved in reconstruction projects is normal, because peace in effect renders them unemployed, and ‘...being a contractor is one of the quickest ways to generate a lot of money.’ She added however, that Acehnese politicians are perpetuating ‘dirty’ practices in business: ‘businesses and most of those politicians who are ex-combatants win government contracts through the backdoor’.

The other issue raised is the high profile of some KPA members and ex-SIRA activists in the local bureaucracy. These people are usually appointed by fellow ex-combatants or SIRA
activists who have since been elected to lead local government at provincial, district, sub-district and municipal levels. These kinds of appointments are seen as favouritism, nepotism and clientelism. The concern is that the current ex-combatants and SIRA activists have appointed their ‘inner circle’ by design, in order to distribute the benefits that come from positions of power within bureaucracy. Such practices are likely to nourish collusion and corruption in Aceh’s local administration. Fajran Zain from the Aceh Institute expressed his concern about this situation. ‘Indeed, as long as they have the capacity – and only if they do not use intimidation or are rude when they ask for projects – this is acceptable,’ he said. ‘Unfortunately, they often do not have the capacity, and instead, they will eventually turn to abuse their power.’

The lack of requisite skills and professionalism in the current local bureaucracy were also raised by journalists. Ramadhan, the chief editor of Raja Post pointed out that the bureaucracy continued past practices of symbiotic relations. ‘The actors have changed,’ he explained, ‘in the past, the actors were people from political parties, and those who were close to the governor. Now, they consist of GAM. Indeed, they are popular right now…’ The head of the Alliance of Independent Journalists (AJI) Banda Aceh, Muhammad Hamzah, was even more critical. He suggested that leaders forget the importance of professionalism, nourishing instead the opportunity for KKN (an Indonesian acronym for corruption, collusion and nepotism). Muhammad Hamzah stated that, ‘we can see that when Irwandi took up his position, he established a team of assistants that consisted of many GAM people who do not have the requisite skills to carry out their roles’.

Interestingly, even though some informants disagreed with such practices, they accepted the notion that it is only a temporary, fixable and controllable phenomenon. In their understanding these were ‘tolerable’ privileges given to ex-combatants or former GAM and SIRA activists, especially after the 2006 local election. However, they were confident that these problems were resolvable because ‘this is a transitional period,’ which begs the question, what is supposed to be done and achieved during the transitional period?

Those elected leaders of local government who were KPA and SIRA activists offered their own perspective on how to address these challenges during the transitional period. They argue
that existing patterns of favouritism, nepotism and clientelism that nourish corruption and collusion in the bureaucracy, have been inherited from the previous administration, which in turn represented the corrupt regime in Jakarta. Therefore, as the new administration, they were now struggling to re-organise the bureaucracy and minimise opportunities for illicit and corrupt behaviour. They stated unequivocally that they were against the idea of supporting privileges and patrimonial behaviour that could lead to collusion and corruption. In addition, they were striving, they said, to improve recruitment practices and develop healthier relations between administration, regular business and politics.

The current governor, Irwandi Jusuf, for example, confirmed that as a non-partisan individual, he personally disregards special privileges. This GAM ex-combatant, who had been imprisoned by the Indonesian government during the conflict, is the first elected governor who stood as an independent candidate, together with Muhammad Nazar, the vice governor. Irwandi reaffirmed his stance, ‘I do not belong to any political party. I stood as an independent candidate and remain so to this day. I do not have ‘my people’ in the Aceh parliament. I am here entirely because of the people’s support.’ Referring to the huge number of ex-combatants involved in government projects, he argued that they have every right to tender for this work, and most importantly, he pointed out, ‘there are rules that regulate fair competition’. He said:

Is there a law that forbids GAM from becoming contractors? I don’t think so. It is perfectly normal for them to become involved in business, now that they are free to do so. In the field, the competition is open. You could also get involved in business, but you have to be able to compete. The presence of GAM in business has no connection with the fact that some of them have been elected as local heads of government.

The Head of the Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Body (BRR), Kuntoro Mangkusubroto, which concluded its mission in early 2009, emphasised the governor’s point, saying that the Helsinki MoU suggests the inclusion of ex-GAM combatants in the BRR’s work and that in recruiting contractors, the BRR has upheld the same professional standards and requirements for ex-GAM as
anyone else. Moreover he suggested, it was also an indirect way to re-integrate ex-combatants into civilian society in Aceh. As Kuntoro explains:

The MoU suggests that GAM can work in the BRR. So it is with great sincerity that we provide them with the opportunity to work together with this institution. Of course, the recruitment process and the job description are based on professional requirements. Those who do not possess the required skills will not be able to work here. We recruit former GAM [combatants] through a transparent recruitment process and under clear regulations. It is also done to support the reintegration process.

This statement concerning recruitment and job descriptions based on professionalism and capacity by Kuntoro have been questioned by some. For example, Muhammad Hamzah from the Banda Aceh branch of the Independent Journalists Association (AJI) suggests there is evidence that even within the BRR itself, staff have been appointed that do not fulfil the advertised requirements. According to Hamzah, this is a way that bureaucracies are able to maintain power and nurture political networks for particular interests. Hamzah argues that:

There are plenty of activists in Aceh recruited to the BRR and given positions that are not appropriate to their skills. There is a former NGO Human Rights activist who is now employed by the BRR as a librarian. There are anti-corruption activists who are now working in the housing unit. Of course, this is the BRR’s way to embrace people who have been critical of them, and a way of eliciting for the BRR. This is also a part of political networking.

Furthermore, in response to accusations of favouritism, Irwandi has argued that the appointment of some of his closest and trusted friends to his administration is normal for any new government and should not be considered unlawful or undemocratic, particularly as ‘his people ‘ only make up a small number of the bureaucracy as a whole. According to Irwandi:
The meaning of professionalism has to be explained here. Try counting how many GAM people or [my] ‘success team’ are in it [the bureaucracy]. And even those that are there, they’re not in key positions. At most they function as coordinators. And coordinators don’t deal with technical issues. Technical issues are in the hands of those who have the capacity. So we have to first understand what we mean by professional. I appoint my people to particular positions in order to ease communications. But even then there are few of them. This system operates everywhere. When SBY was elected, he also appointed his people in certain positions, but they were chosen with care.

Although the old regime has been replaced along with its corrupt practices (the former Aceh Governor, Abdullah Puteh was charged with corruption offences while still in office), there has been concern that similar corrupt and paternalistic practices might still thrive in the hands of the new, democratically elected leaders: ex-GAM, SIRA, Human Rights and pro-democracy activists. Evidence of these practices are frequently explained and understood in terms of democracy in Aceh still being in transition and that the struggle to improve democracy through democratic institutions is not something that can be achieved overnight. However, at the time the interviews were carried out it was clear that much still needed to be done, particularly with respect to the reorganisation of the bureaucracy in the face of the 2009 legislative and presidential elections.

Transition’s timeframe and aims: the missing common ground

Another characteristic of this transitional period is the lack of quality of the implementation of democracy in Aceh. Vice Governor Muhammad Nazar pointed out that democracy is still in the hands of people who have limited skills and educational background, people who have been deprived of their economic and social rights. As a result, democracy itself provides the potential for violence and conflict. Thus he suggests, there is a need for the current administration to increase skills and political education via the political parties. Admitting that there were weaknesses in the current administration and that challenges remained, Nazar also
suggests that civil society needs to sustain its efforts to expand democracy because if there are signs of military involvement in politics or business, ‘it will harm the future of democracy.’

The politicians have a diverse understanding of the nature of the transition period and its aims. According to Taufik Abda, leader of the SIRA Party, there are two types of transitional period that need to be addressed in the wake of the Helsinki MoU. The first is cultural transition, namely that Aceh faces a number of challenges regarding changes in behaviour as there are some cultural aspects that were nourished during the conflict that have since become irrelevant:

Culturally, Acehnese society has to deal with changes in behaviour, where once social relations were conducted based on transactional means. Within this framework, the calculation between making a profit and avoiding losses become the main reasons for maintaining social interaction. Moreover culturally, Acehnese society has inherited traditions and cultures from the conflict era, such as bad and corrupt governance and development. Previous bad practices in the field of government and development are still considered “the usual way of doing things” that cannot be changed or stopped. These include the culture of clientelism and patron-client relations.

Secondly, there is structural transition, which covers changes in government, law and development budget. This transition, he suggests, is dependent on Aceh’s control over economic production and the implementation of genuine self-government:

During this transition period, we must observe the Acehnese government’s capacity to accelerate development, and reduce Aceh’s dependency on external production and resources, such as food and other basic needs. This structural transitional period may be considered complete once genuine self-government has been implemented.

Acknowledging that clientelism, nepotism and corruption represent ‘the old cultures of bureaucracy,’ Taufik Abda argues that the current government wasn’t making enough effort to prevent
such practices form contaminating the new administration. ‘Even the current government is comfortable with this culture, which means that there are no radical efforts or serious bureaucratic reform.’

In contrast to Taufik Abda’s position, a former public official active in a ‘national’ political party who wished to remain anonymous suggested that Irwandi’s government was countering illegal and corrupt behaviour and that this was evidenced through the clear division of labour between the executive and the legislative. He told us that:

Under Puteh’s administration, the DPRD’s control over government projects was very dominant. The Golkar Party used to claim 2% in [unofficial] taxes from every government project, which was then distributed to the military and the political party. Now, I see that Irwandi is much stricter about this. None of the DPRA members are currently involved in any projects. Although there are a number of ex-GAM activists who have won projects, I don’t see that this is due to (their links to) GAM.

However, this informant also felt that Irwandi does allow some leeway in his response to the potentially dubious practices of former GAM activists. ‘It’s like this,’ he explained, ‘if the person is poor, the governor will look the other way. But, once a person is able to buy a car, he will act [to prevent unlawful practices].’

Both Taufik Abda and the ‘national’ party politician’s comments indicate that Irwandi’s administration has not succeeded – at least at the time of the interviews - in preventing undemocratic and unlawful practices in the bureaucracy. But Irwandi has his own reasons. ‘When I was elected,’ he explained, ‘my first step was to transform a bad bureaucracy into a better one. I was not able to do this as soon as I became governor. I had to observe the situation during my first year; and in the second year, I started to make changes.’

Journalists such as Ramadhan and Muhammad Hamzah both acknowledge that Irwandi’s administration has made efforts to implement change in order to put an end to corrupt practices, for example via the fit and proper test for appointing public officials. However, both felt that this may not be enough.
From the interviews on the nature and aims of the transition and the ensuing discussion, it is apparent that there is no one clear and shared understanding of transition in post-conflict Aceh. This, in turn, created ambiguities amongst Aceh’s key political actors, particularly as to whether they would be capable of controlling such undemocratic behaviour in the future. Moreover, their expectations of the on-going democratic process and the rehabilitation and reconstruction projects were vague and fragmented. This issue was raised during a workshop held by the Aceh Participatory Research Team in cooperation with the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES) on 28 November 2008, aimed at incorporating broader insights from other key actors in contemporary politics in Aceh. Despite agreeing that Aceh was undergoing a transitional period, none of the participants were able to define the aim of the transitional period and how long it should last for.

Very few of the informants interviewed referred to the timeframe of the transitional period. The few estimates given ranged from two to five years and even to ten years, calculated from the signing of the Helsinki MoU. According to a source from a ‘national’ party for example, the transitional period should only last for two years from the signing of the Helsinki MoU. In his view, this would be sufficient time for the ex-combatants to transform the values of conflict and violence into pure political struggle. Fajran Zain and Taufik Abda however, felt that it might take anywhere between five to ten years to ensure a complete transformation of the corrupt and undemocratic practices of the old bureaucracy – both culturally and structurally.

It was clear that many of the informants’ acceptance of certain undemocratic and unlawful behaviour reflected their desire to sustain peace in Aceh. Providing greater economic access to ex-combatants for instance, was understood by some as one way to ensure sustainable peace. The question was, then, whether the ex-combatants were the true beneficiaries rather than the facilitating bureaucrats and politicians.

The next question then had to be whether there was a democratic framework that the key political actors could adhere to during this transitional period?
Transition and the current democratic framework

The implementation of Helsinki MoU: how it continues to expand democracy

At the November 2008 workshop, the Head of the Aceh Reintegration Body (BRA), M. Nur Djuli, stated that the current governor had initiated a process for setting a time frame for the transitional period. Unfortunately, Nur Djuli pointed out, the body which had been set up to do so was not working effectively and had fallen short of fulfilling its objectives. At the very least however, this does demonstrate the idea of setting a timeframe for the transition was not something that had been overlooked since the signing of the MoU.

The starting point for long term peace in Aceh was the signing of the Helsinki MoU, an agreement signed by both GAM and the Government of Indonesia (GOI) consisting of a number of crucial points towards sustainable peace. Implementation of the MoU however, has seen its ups and downs. Demobilisation, disarmament and the reintegration of ex-combatants into civilian society marked the first phase of the MoU implementation, closely followed by political rehabilitation and the release of political prisoners. Economic assistance, distributed via the reintegration and rehabilitations fund, was another aspect of the MoU. Finally, the most significant element of political transformation was the direct local elections of the new governor and vice governor of Aceh, both of whom were able to stand for the first time as independent candidates – a new development in Indonesian politics.

The implementation of the MoU was supposed to give direction to the transitional period in Aceh, outlining certain steps and suggesting timeframes for each phase as well as - implicitly at least -the aims and objectives of each point, particularly the aspects related to political development. For example, the MoU provided the mandate for direct gubernatorial elections to be held by 2006 and legislative elections to be held by 2009 (article 1.2.2 and 1.2.3 of the MoU). According to article 1.1.2 of the MoU, ‘a new Law on the Governing of Aceh (LoGA) would be promulgated and enter into force as soon as possible and not later than 31 March 2006,’ formulated on the basis of four defining principles outlined in the MoU. In fact the LoGA was promulgated on 11 July 2006.
According to Thamren Ananda of the Partai Rakyat Aceh/Aceh People Party (PRA), ‘the MoU and LoGA opened up democracy to the people of Aceh.’ However, he added, there is still much to do in order to open up and improve the economy, particularly in regard to income distribution from the energy sector, 70% of which should go to the Acehnese government (article 181.1b of the LoGA). Moreover, the regulatory instruments for implementation of the LoGA at regional level would be articulated into qanun (bylaws). And as East Aceh Deputy District Head, Nasruddin Abubakar, explained, ‘the LoGA is useless without the qanun which deal with and legislate for agreements in the LoGA. There are some qanun that have to be promulgated by legislators.’

Prior to being formulated into qanun however, the LoGA must be translated into government regulations (PP – Peraturan Pemerintah) and presidential decrees (Perpres – Peraturan Presiden). One government regulation and presidential decree, for example, refers to the formation of local political parties. Actually this was the only government regulation that was promulgated and articulated into qanun at the time of writing. Other regulations then awaiting promulgation include the transfer of authority form the GOI to the Sabang Regulatory Body and the management of oil and gas resources (Serambi Indonesia, 12 December 2008). Clearly the formulation of lower regulations from the LoGA would present further challenges to Aceh’s future of peace and democracy.

Improvement of democracy (politics) vs. economic development

In-spite of the clear victory of the many candidates supported by KPA and SIRA in the late 2006 elections, this was not followed by clear political direction. The results from the democracy survey point to a number of challenges that needed to be met in order to keep the transition on track. These include the latent threats from some powerful actors whose contribution to the peace rested on the promotion of their own vested interests, i.e. ‘profitable peace.’ Although this trend had initially been better contained in Aceh than in other disturbed provinces, the survey and other studies in this book reveal that it came at a price, namely some degree of separation between the massive reconstruction/economic development programme and the priorities of the development of democratic self-government. How did the informants respond to this challenge? How did they view current conditions?
Some of the informants responded defensively to this challenge. Although they believed that both the economic development programmes and the development of democratic self-government should be conducted simultaneously, they nevertheless thought that economic development was the current priority. ‘All the parties should prioritise the interests of the people and their needs. What the people needs most is welfare. Thus, government should put economic development at the top of the agenda,’ argued Ghazali Abbas from *Partai Aceh Aman Sejahtera/The Aceh Peace and Welfare Party (PAAS)*.

Most informants expressed their belief that the process of political transformation had been successfully implemented as demonstrated by the success of the 2006 elections as well as the establishment of a number of local political parties. Latterly, the promulgation of the LoGA was seen by some as further evidence of the progress of democracy in Aceh. According to Wiratmadinata from the NGO Forum, the LoGA had facilitated ‘Aceh’s own style of self government’, because this law ‘regulates the division of authority between central government and local government as well as special autonomy, local political parties etc.’ Thus, those that felt that the political aspects of the MoU had been accommodated by the LoGA suggested that the main focus for the future should be the acceleration of economic development.

The BRR, which also represented the voice of the central government, agreed that political transformation and the promotion of democracy were crucial to ending the conflict. However according to Kuntoro, democracy cannot be sustained without proper economic development. He elaborated further, saying that in the four years since the tsunami approximately USD 72 billion had been donated for the reconstruction of Aceh. Great progress had been made and Aceh had built new infrastructure that would facilitate economic development. However, skilful and expert management was required in order to ensure further economic advancement. According to Kuntoro:

> Now we have new hospitals, new roads, new bridges, new seaports, new airports, everything is new. Our current challenge, and one of the most important things, is how to manage this infrastructure. These assets must be managed properly so that they are not wasted, but serve as the engines of further economic
development. This development should be capable of eradicating poverty and resolving the problems of unemployment, thus taking Aceh in a better direction. Before the tsunami, Aceh was the third poorest province in Indonesia. [Therefore], the most critical aspect now is how to ensure that the USD 72 billion investment can be further invested as the development capital of Aceh.

Emphasising the importance of economic development, Kuntoro added that the most urgent task facing local government was the need to speed up the formulation of the economic-related qanun, as per the MoU and the LoGA. As he explained:

This is still a process, but we are still waiting to see the light at the end of the tunnel. From all recent local regulations or qanun that have been legalised, not a single one touches upon economic issues, just qanun for the application of Islamic law, education, wali nanggroe (local leadership) which don’t have any correlation to economic issues. The local government of Aceh must immediately prepare the economic-related qanun. The Helsinki MoU is a wonderful agreement that needs to be strongly upheld and implemented by the administration with detailed regulation as well as qanun. This task has yet to be implemented.

This worries me, because the remaining 60 qanun that have yet to be discussed are those qanun from the Helsinki Mou and the LoGA. Without these qanun, regulations cannot be enforced. Right know, there is no economic qanun, though we already have democracy related qanun. What the people should do is to demand the promulgation of those qanun.

It had not been made clear however, who would take control of these matters, particularly given the implication that central government still had an interest in a number of the assets. According to Indonesian law, assets built via the BRR reconstruction project would remain under the supervision of Jakarta. This is common practice in other provinces, for example, highways in Jakarta, the capital city, are sometimes listed as assets belonging to the central government. However the administration in Aceh was concerned that this law would be used by Jakarta to restrain them, in violation of the MoU.
For instance, article 1.3.5 of the MoU states that, ‘Aceh conducts the development and administration of all seaports and airports within the territory of Aceh’. However, this article has been translated somewhat confusingly into the LoGA and moreover, the LoGA clearly limits these rights to seaports and airports that have been managed by the central government on its own, and not via a state-owned company (BUMN) of which there are only few in Aceh. It also does not apply to the special free-trade economic region of Sabang, which has come to represent the central government’s authority and interests. The Mayor of Sabang, Munawar Liza, a former GAM activist and a member of GAM’s team of negotiators in Helsinki, was uncertain about his own authority to manage the region. In our workshop, Munawar argued:

Who actually controls the infrastructure of development? Why is it never discussed with the head of the local administration in Sabang? All I can see is that the military is busy building new barracks, new military headquarters and training centres, new military airports, and so on.

Some of the obstacles and confusion may be overcome if central government were to promulgate government regulations (PP) and presidential decrees (Perpres) as required by the LoGA. If the transfer of authority from central to the Aceh government is formally regulated via legislation, it might well resolve, for instance, the issue of infrastructure management and the local government would gain more power and authority over this free trade zone.

It was no surprise that the Aceh legislature had questioned the central government’s delay in promulgating necessary regulations and its commitment to resolving these problems. In an article published on 4 December 2008 in the local newspaper, Serambi, the governor of Aceh complained that the delayed regulations are hampering economic development in Aceh.

The issue of self government and the LoGA

According to the crucial actors, how had Aceh succeeded in implementing the Helsinki agreement on self-government? What should be prioritised - political or economic issues? Irwandi pointed out that there are several points of disjuncture between the
MoU and the LoGA. For example, the concept of self-government is not mentioned in the LoGA. Irwandi said that he had asked Jakarta to revise the LoGA to this end, suggesting that implementation should have followed the spirit of the Helsinki MoU more closely. However, Irwandi also added that despite on-going disputes with central government, it remained a duty of the current government to focus more on improving the people’s welfare:

As well as reiterating our demands for the implementation of self-government, efforts to improve people’s welfare must be continued. The welfare of the people has to be the main concern. People need to eat. The quality of the democratic struggle will be improved if the economic conditions of the people have also been improved. Economic development and the struggle for self-government must be simultaneous.

Similarly, Nazar argued that the concept of self-government was against Indonesian law. ‘Indonesia’s legal system only recognises special autonomy,’ he said. It is thus necessary, he suggested, to focus more on the implementation of the LoGA through local regulations, the qanun. These had still not been formulated by the DPRA. In the meantime, he said, the government must focus more on economic development because, ‘Democracy that grows in poverty will not be as good as a democracy that flourishes within prosperity, such as happened in developed countries in Europe and the United States.’

The view of politicians outside GAM was that any demands for genuine self-government as mandated by the MoU was likely to threaten peace in Aceh. The main problem, they said, was that the signing of the MoU did not involve all of the political stakeholders in Aceh, some of whom were thus resentful and felt that the issue of self-government was only really in the interest of GAM. According to a ‘national’ political party activist from PAN, demands for self-government were unrealistic and might well trigger new conflicts with central government and the military. In the PAN activist’s view, it would be better to accept the current LoGA and then slowly revise the content, particularly during the post-2009 elections period. ‘Calling for genuine implementation of the MoU is tantamount to inviting a new war,’ he said, ‘GAM is now more rational in terms of trying to improve the LoGA, which may slowly fulfil the main points of the MoU.’
Similarly, Farhan Hamid from the Partai Aceh Bersatu/The Aceh Unity Party (PAB) as well as PAN have argued that the Helsinki MoU never really accommodated the concept of self-government, and neither had the LoGA. ‘There is no room [for discussion] about this in any higher law or regulation,’ said this then member of the DPR. ‘I think that if all the points of the LoGA can be fully implemented, this will be close enough to the concept of “self government”, and it will also be easily understood by politicians in Jakarta. So, when this idea is re-submitted [at the national level], the level of tension will be reduced,’ he added.

The general public was also confused about this matter as not everyone fully understood the aims of the MoU. Muhammad Hamzah of AJI criticised the lack of socialisation of the MoU and its aims and objective to the people of Aceh:

The kind of self-government that GAM is demanding has never been communicated to or socialised to the people of Aceh. It seems that only GAM has the right to direct where Aceh must go. They feel that they are the ones that brought peace to Aceh, and they are the ones who have brought change to Aceh. Because of this they seem to have forgotten to socialise the concept of self-government. For many of the people, the promotion of self-government is a struggle between elites, not a grassroots struggle. This explains why people don’t seem to really care [about this issue].

According to Ramadhan however, the struggle for real self-government is the responsibility of the elite and not of the people. Moreover, Ghufron Zainal Abidin from the PKS felt that it was better to avoid the issue of trying to implement the MoU. In his view, people are ignorant about political issues, particularly the details of the implementation of the MoU, because they remain powerless and lack motivation to engage due to their difficult economic circumstances. Similarly, Muhammad Hamzah suggested that, ‘people forget the [importance] of self-government because the most important thing for them is peace and economic prosperity. The people of Aceh are tired of conflict and they need to see an improvement in their economy.’
Grassroots aspirations

Informants from mass-based organisations, also speaking from the perspective of the people’s interests, complained about the lack of genuine grassroots participation. ‘There are things that cannot be recovered through economic development alone,’ said Nazaruddin from PERMATA, a local farmers union. He suggested that it would have been better if the government had facilitated some space for the grassroots movement in order for them to help realise their own aspirations. ‘The government in Aceh is still thinking in the same old ways, for example that building irrigation systems will instantly solve farmers’ problems,’ he added.

Surprisingly, activists from mass-based organisations did not perceive economic development as a priority. They focused instead on corruption within the bureaucracy as well as the symbiotic relationship between business actors, politics and bureaucracy driving reconstruction and other livelihoods programmes which, they claim, result in a lack of professionalism in economic development and the infrastructures required support to support it. ‘Up until recently, it was the case that when a particular group gains power in Aceh, every project is carried out by them, even though they do not necessarily have the capacity to do so,’ said Zainudden, head of Keujreun Blang in Lhoknga sub-district, Aceh Besar. ‘People are afraid to expose these things due to threats and intimidation.’

Suherman, chairperson of the Fish Traders Association (ASPI) blames the government for falling short in ensuring transparency and good governance in the management of reconstruction and other economic development projects. He refers specifically to the failure of micro-credit finance schemes for fisher folk, known as kredit peumakmu nanggroe. The fisher folk, he claims, had not received the credit, yet it had been disbursed to individuals who were not eligible to the funds. Sadly, he said, the majority of the beneficiaries used the money to buy motorcycles and mobile phones rather than use it as seed funding for setting up small businesses.

A democratic framework for economic development

In order to synthesise the discussion above, it is important to reflect on what the Helsinki MoU has offered so far to post-conflict and post-tsunami society in Aceh. Despite the success of the 2006 elections and the enthusiasm for founding local political parties, the
role of the MoU in the expansion of a more inclusive democratic framework in this transitional period has been neglected. Some argue that focussing on the genuine implementation of the MoU only promotes political aspects and neglects economic development. Others criticise it as being one of GAM’s ‘unrealistic’ demands that may threaten the peace. Indeed, the elected government does have a duty to fulfil its obligations to facilitate economic development. Unfortunately however, economic development itself in Aceh is seen as less democratic and none too transparent in that there are still groups that use their ‘special contacts’ or patrons to achieve their own personal economic goals through the bureaucracy, business actors or politics. Corruption and collusion still exist, but people are reluctant to report it because of fears to their own safety. These circumstances have led some people to lose respect for the MoU and what it represents, and it is also seen as irrelevant by others given the current economic challenges. The problem is that the Helsinki MoU does not provide any guidelines as to how economic development and the promotion of self-government should be combined. The only guidance the MoU provides for post-conflict Aceh is the need to balance between economic development, democracy, good governance and Human Rights.

Moreover, Fajran Zain of the Aceh Institute reminds us that the implementation of genuine self-government status as mandated by the MoU is crucial because the transfer of authority from central government to the Aceh government is necessary to ensure sustainable peace in Aceh. He pointed to the considerable presence of military posts in the villages of Aceh ‘over the last few months’. This, he said, is because the government in Aceh has no authority to regulate the military nor its deployment, even though in the MoU clearly states that military forces are required for external defence purposes only. This implies that further discussion by the political actors is needed in order to expand the existing democratic framework towards a broader and more inclusive framework. Otherwise, the future of democracy may be in question, especially if undemocratic powers or alliances take the lead and crush the hope for further peace and development in Aceh.

In conclusion, it may be surmised that there is a lack of direction amongst the informants concerning the development of the democratic framework. Some have even lost sight of the real
essence of the democratic values of the MoU and view economic development and the promotion of political aspects such as democracy and good governance as separate concerns. Yet the MoU is a milestone that needs to be broadened into a more democratic, tangible and inclusive framework for pro-democratic groups in Aceh.

Developing a democratic framework

The bureaucracy

Following on from the discussion on the symbiotic relations between the legislative, executive and business interests, this section will outline some of the solutions our informants proposed in order to address these issues. According to Ghazali Abbas of PAAS, ‘What is currently happening in Indonesia, including Aceh, is an overlap between different jobs and roles. Members of parliament for example become project brokers in the local budgeting (APBD) process.’ No wonder, he added, this eventually leads to unhealthy cooperation between contractors, project managers and parliament in approving certain projects, especially government projects.

It is crucial therefore that government takes preventative action in order to limit such behaviour. Nasruddin Abubakar, East Aceh deputy district head, who stood as an independent candidate – points out that the bottom line is ‘a matter of transparency,’ suggesting that this principle should be implemented in government projects as follows:

Every government project must be advertised as an open invitation to tender, and criteria and project descriptions as well as the appointment process itself must be transparent, with the winning bid announced publicly. Transparency is paramount in order to prevent legislative members, police officers, judges and other individuals and interests from interfering in the bid process. All of these groups have been involved in reconstruction and development project in Aceh, even though organisations such as KADIN (Indonesia’s Business of Chamber) and GAPENSI (Indonesian Merchant Union) and other relevant organisations are the ones who should be involved in and directing development in accordance with specific targets and regulations.
But what about the senior ex-combatants involved in reconstruction projects? The informants recognised that these levels of involvement are questionable, particularly in the recruitment and bidding processes. ‘There are no regulations that exclude particular people from becoming contractors and being awarded government projects,’ said Muhibbusabri of the Partai Daulat Aceh (PDA). ‘The question is whether there are contractors – particularly those who were members of GAM – who are awarded projects through unofficial channels. This is what is happening in Aceh today,’ he added.

Such practices go against the idea of fair competition. How can such practices be prevented in the future? Thamren Ananda of the PRA argues that there are two aspects to resolving this problem. The first concerns each political party’s mechanisms for controlling their cadres:

There needs to be a strict separation between those who run the political party and those who become members of parliament. This is necessary in order to ensure stronger control of the political party over its cadres in local parliament, so that they can optimise their capacity to carry out their duties [as representatives of the people], rather than concentrating on being contractors.

Moreover, according to Thamren, ‘There should be more effort made to facilitate access to employment other than as contractors, in order to improve the livelihoods. This will resolve problems of accessibility to other economic opportunities, as currently such opportunities are only available by becoming a contractor, if you have good links with those in power.’ Similarly, according to Asiah Uzia, ‘Besides cooperating with professional business actors, the government needs to strengthen local business organisations and enterprises whilst promoting the capacity of the ex-combatant politicians so that they are able to do business in a more honest way.’

The role of foreign donors and international organisations

Amidst all the discussion on priorities in terms of economic development and the promotion of democracy, it is interesting to note that very few of the informants referred specifically to Human
Rights and related issues. One of the issues we raised in our questions was that despite the massive presence of international agencies and donors, these organisations had done little to promote issues such as democracy, good governance, transparency and Human Rights. This is somewhat ironic given that they actively advertise their interest in such issues.

The responses were varied. The BRR for example stated that these organisations had made significant contributions to the development of democracy. Kuntoro argued that the donors and international NGOs had funded and/or facilitated a number of capacity building programmes in administrations, democracy and economic development. As he explained:

As far as I know, the international NGOs and donors that came to Aceh [initially] aimed to reconstruct post-tsunami Aceh. They did not have the function to replace local government, though the local government has to admit that these international agencies have helped Aceh, including in building capacity to manage the administration... many donors are now organising educational programmes and training for all [political] parties, including democracy. I see Irwandi as a ‘clean person’ until now. But his capacity to run a clean organisation is limited.

However, the majority of our informants agreed that international agencies and donors have given relatively little attention to certain critical issues such as promoting democracy and Human Rights. Some blame these external organisations for destroying local wisdom and the values of Acehnese society. Donors are also criticised because they focus solely on their own projects which focus more on post-tsunami reconstruction rather than promoting good governance, democracy and Human Rights in collaboration with local partners, particularly the government. According to Wiratmadinata from the NGO Forum:

Usually those programmes that foster democratisation, legal awareness and Human Rights are only short-term programmes, even though these issues are in the public interest. Donors are also reluctant to support those organisation and institutions that are concerned with
these issues. They tend to fund short-term programmes, where they can see the results with their own eyes. They do not understand local issues, because they implement their missions through Western approaches, or may I say westernisation.

The international donors’ reluctance to support programmes that promote democracy is also evidenced by the minimal funding that they provide. Moreover, those programmes that do support the strengthening of democracy, good governance and Human Rights are less well-publicised. According to Asiah Uzia, ‘such issues are rarely discussed or promoted publicly because the donors are afraid of the Indonesian government.’

Asiah explained that the donors will have their activities and movements restricted by the Indonesian government if they demonstrate tangible support for Human Rights and democracy issues adding that a number of donors have no mandate to promote the rule of law, democracy and Human Rights and that their work is limited to assisting reconstruction in post-tsunami Aceh. However, Asiah admitted that ‘the local NGOs do not put pressure on donors to provide support for these issues.’

There were however some organisations that had tried to change their mandate in order to provide assistance for Human Rights and democracy. ‘There is a donor that is conducting an exploratory assessment towards the implementation of a programme to foster democracy,’ she said. It was also clear that there was a lack of local capacity for the promotion of these issues. In many cases local organisations had not persevered in responding to these issues or to the donors’ changing agenda.

One of the problems was that local organisations had become accustomed to the funds that had been pouring into Aceh from the international agencies and donors. This had not only paralysed their idealism, but also their independence and creativity. Informants recalled that local NGOs were a manifestation of local civil society organisations, yet they had turned into industries in which many activists were able to access large funds through donor-driven projects. Moreover, ‘once some organisations received financial support, they betrayed the people and worked for their own purposes,’ said Suherman. As a result, people have become
spoilt and money-oriented. They are not ashamed to ask for money from these project-oriented NGOs, and reluctant to welcome other kind of programmes.

Very few informants talked about the importance of having a grassroots movement that can establish a mass-based organisation for the promotion of the people’s genuine needs and aspirations. According to Asiah Uzia:

There are currently a substantial number of organisations that have been established by the people to change government policy. However, such organisations are not sustainable and they lack the support of other organisations and institutions. Other organisations are leaving them [mass-based organisations] to die. Things could be different if there were a sustainable community group that could be guided in their actions or that had their own capacity to act in the face of policies that harm the people’s interests. [Unfortunately] such movements are rarely seen in Aceh.

Nazaruddin Thaha blamed the donors who are more concerned about spending their money rather than agreeing on longer term programmes aimed at strengthening local governance and local mass-based organisations that represent different interests. ‘It would have been better if donors supported programmes that foster local values and thus, Human Rights and democracy during the transitional period,’ he argues. ‘Such support is necessary from the donors, particularly to ensure that local government and local mass-based organisations are prepared to enter a new phase of Aceh’s post-transitional period.’

The importance of mass-based organisations

Nazaruddin Thaha’s comments trigger an important question about the role of mass-based organisations themselves. Our interviews indicate that the limited support such organisations receive was not only due to the focus on massive donor-driven, project-oriented programmes, but also because of the lack of optimism and self-esteem of some of the key political actors in Aceh. Some politicians and scholars were sceptical of and even undermined ordinary people’s capacity to form influential mass-
based organisations through which to promote their rights. Some scholars suggested that such organisations may be established once educational institutions have been fully restored. According to the Rector of IAIN Ar-Raniry, Yusni Saby, ‘the recovery of these institutions will give rise to a society which owns knowledge, and only those with knowledge will be able to assist their brothers and sisters.’

The head of SIRA Party proposed an alternative approach to building promising mass-based organisations. In his opinion, the sectoral approach such as establishing labour or farmers’ movements had failed. ‘It is impossible to succeed,’ said Taufik Abda. It would be better therefore if a more effective approach was adopted by promoting territorially-based mass organisations. ‘This should be a multi-sectoral territorial approach that can follow administrative boundaries or which may be formed in accordance with a common ethnic and cultural background, for example the cultures from the east coast, the central highlands, the islands and so forth.’ This was an approach that was successfully implemented by SIRA during the conflict.

Nazar, the current vice governor, believes that the key to a solid mass-based organisation is ‘the provision of cadres or members who are committed and qualified, carry out intensive communication with the members and the people and, most importantly, have the ability to generate funding from below, without depending on donors.’ According to Nazar, existing mass-based organisations in Aceh have failed to fulfil the latter requirement. ‘Mass-based organisations such as customary law societies, farmers associations, labour unions, womens organisations and small traders all rely too heavily on external funding or donors,’ said Nazar. Consequently, he argues, it is difficult for these organisations to pursue their own vision and be consistent with their own ideology and interests as were agreed during the initial phase of the organisation. However, he adds, ‘religious mass-based organisations like the Muhammadiya are more solid compared to other progressive-ideology based mass organisations.’

Irwandi, the current governor of Aceh, expressed his belief in the power of genuine public movements. As an independent candidate, Irwandi himself may have seen the power of grassroots movements. A gubernatorial candidate from the 2006 elections
said that Irwandi’s success was based on support from GAM’s grassroots networks. Interestingly, Irwandi talked more about religious-oriented mass-based organisations than the poorer class-based organisations. ‘Mass-based-organisations are currently well organised,’ said Irwandi, ‘For example, there are religiously oriented mass-based organisations such as organisations of *ulemma* (religious scholars) or *dayah* (Islamic boarding schools) as well as Muslim student organisations’. With reference to the women’s movement, -- a movement which is on the rise – Irwandi admitted that, ‘the most astonishing movement is the awakening of the women’s movement in Aceh, whereas during the conflict,’ he adds, ‘this power had been divided and separated.’ Although religious mass-based organisations are strong, Irwandi added that strength of leadership by the *ulemma* had weakened in Aceh.

This view that women’s power had been divided and separated may not be entirely acceptable. However, the ‘awakening’ may be explained like this: women have always been a target during armed conflict and war. However, women also experienced a transformation of their role and social status in Acehnese patriarchal society. The only reason why there appears to be an uprising is because women need to maintain their transformed roles and social status during peacetime as well as conflict. One of the reasons their roles were transformed was the need to survive under difficult economic conditions.

Because of the conflict, women now outnumber the male population in Aceh and so these women bear increased responsibilities as heads of the household, not just responsible for their own children, but also their extended families. There may also be a sense of solidarity between women coupled with the need to strengthen their identity and position in society in a more democratic way. However, the post-conflict situation may have pushed women onto the edges and even prevented them from entering and claiming the public space, as men revert to pre-conflict conditions. Women are realising that they need to be able to voice their own aspirations and that they should thus be able to make their demands and voices heard in the public domain.

So, will there ever be a genuine movement from below in Aceh? Fajran of the Aceh Institute argues that mass-based organisations may be established if there are common goals at the
grassroots level. According to Fajran, the only example of such a grassroots movement in Aceh was SIRA. According to Fajran:

Civil society organisations are quick to respond when there is conflict, crisis, disaster and so forth. However, there is currently no civil society organisation that fosters and struggles on behalf of the people’s interests and aspirations. Once there was SIRA and other such organisations, and it is regretful that SIRA has now become a political party.

Some senior and more conservative scholars have a different point of view. They recognise that religiously-oriented mass-based organisation provide successful examples. Darni Daud from Syiah Kuala University recalled the former ullemma-based mass organisation of the 1950s, PUSA (Persatuan Ulama Seluruh Aceh/The Uleema Union of Aceh). From his perspective, mass-based organisations in Aceh that promote the needs and aspirations from below have traditionally been initiated by the ullemma. Unfortunately, he added, these organisations were crushed during the conflict, and although they are re-emerging in the post-conflict period, ‘they are adopting NGO-style patterns together with the materialistic paradigm resulting from modernisation.’

Overall, the minimal presence of promising mass-based organisations in Aceh is due to the enduring conflict in this province. People may not be familiar with these methods of organising themselves in order to promote their own rights because in the past, any attempt to bring people together was crushed by the military. There was no freedom of association, to form unions or alliances. As result, the majority of people in Aceh became passive and unenthusiastic about grassroots movements, eventually losing the capacity to form their own organisations. According to Thamren of the PRA:

In order to promote the formation of a strong people’s organisation, one should start from lowest level of people’s awareness. This awareness should be encouraged through democracy and political education. As a result, their awareness will become stronger and people will develop more solid visions and interests as
well as consistency. This may contribute to providing them with a more powerful bargaining position with the government.

This may look like a good idea. However, how long will it take for the people to reach sufficient levels of awareness to establish confident and powerful bargaining positions with the government? Might government or parliament support the strengthening of such organisations According to Nasruddin Abubakar:

The government is trying to encourage community-based organisations to prepare capacity building programmes for the public and other organisations in Aceh, so that civil society will be capable of choosing from the options available and identify what do they want doing. Whether they want to become farmers, traders, civil servants etc. In order to be able to do this, the public must be equipped with skills and provided with business support, such as micro-credit finance guaranteed by the government. The government is also trying to raise the standard of living through participative programmes in villages such as the formation of self-help co-operatives, business units, farmers and traders groups and equip them with diverse skills and capacity.

Despite the diversity of the informants’ responses, it is notable that they were unable to identify what types of social movements are suitable for Aceh and how promising mass-based organisation from such movements might be supported. Some were reluctant to admit that GAM and SIRA were once grassroots movements that were able to put up strong resistance during the conflict.

Nevertheless, there were also those who believe that grassroots support is a valuable asset for winning elections. The Aceh Party/Partai Aceh (PA) – the party that claims to be the official representation of GAM’s political transformation – seems to share this perspective. The PA facilitated the establishment of a religiously-oriented mass-based organisation called the Acehnese Assembly of Muslim Clerics (MUNA - Majelis Ulama Nangggroe Aceh), comprised of members from the religious schools or dayah in the villages. ‘It is an independent organisation,’ the party spokesperson, Adnan Beuransah, states, ‘GAM was only the catalyst.’
However, the facilitation of mass-based organisations by a political party that was until recently an armed resistance movement may be dangerous and ultimately threaten democracy if it is interpreted as an attempt to organise support by drawing on previous military command structures. It would be better if mass-based organisations were founded on the aspirations of people from below and as the result of a solid social movement initiated by civil society itself.

The 2009 legislative election: a fulfilling prophecy?
Possible winners and losers

One of the most interesting questions posed in this study concerned the informants’ predictions about the then upcoming 2009 elections. In the midst of a political euphoria, with six local political parties given the green light to stand in these elections, it was fascinating to observe how the informants made their analysis and predictions. Most of the interviewees believed that local parties would, it was suggested, would be contested between the PRA and the PDA.

The reason the Aceh Party and the SIRA Party were perceived as having the biggest chance of winning the 2009 elections was that they both had extensive grassroots networks, particularly in remote villages. These networks proved effective during the 2006 elections that brought Irwandi and Nazar to power. According to Nazaruddin Thaha, there were a number of indicators that pointed to the likely success of a political party as follows:

The political parties that will win the 2009 elections are those that have the most heroic history in Aceh’s struggle; those that invoke nationalist sentiment in Aceh; those that have the largest number of candidates that have never been involved in ‘national’ political parties; and those that have the highest number of elite NGO figures and mass-based organisations.

A member of one of the ‘national’ political parties predicted that the Aceh Party and the SIRA Party would win around 30% of the votes. According to this source, around 15% of the votes would be shared up between the other local political parties. Thus, the other 55% of the votes would be divided out between the ‘national’
political parties. This source also suggested that Aceh still needed representation in the national parliament, the DPR, and that therefore, the ‘national’ political parties were more likely to focus in the competition for a seat in Jakarta. Furthermore, he added that the Acehnese would change their preference of ‘national’ political parties from Golkar, PPP and PAN to the Democratic Party. ‘The Acehnese like SBY as the president,’ he added.

Nasruddin Abubakar predicted that of the ‘national’ political parties, the Acehnese would opt for the Democratic Party and Golkar. ‘These parties are lead by the president and (then) vice president of Indonesia (Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and Jusuf Kalla), who gave their support to ending the conflict in Aceh through dialogue and negotiation in order to achieve peace and mutual commitment in the form of the MoU,’ he explained. Thus, he claimed, the Acehnese people’s expectation of these figures is very high. ‘We don’t want to sacrifice this peace through the actions of foolish people who do not understand the essence of peace,’ he added.

Looking at its considerable chances, the Aceh Party’s response to the researchers’ questions was important. Adnan Beuransah, for instance, was confident that his party would gain majority support from the people of Aceh. He said:

We are very confident, *Insya Allah*, that our party, the Aceh Party, will win the majority of the votes. We predict this from current conditions, especially in the villages. We can see that people support us. That is the reason we believe that PA can win, because this party has received its mandate from GAM leaders. Everyone knows that GAM was the most persistent in its demands for local political parties. Without our fight in the Helsinki negotiations there would be no local political parties in Aceh. Moreover, the PA is a party that has given another colour to Aceh’s politics. The PA was born out of a long revolution. History has recorded how GAM fought for the sake of democracy in Aceh. GAM is identical with the Aceh Party. Just watch how enthusiastic the people were when the *Wali* Nanggroe [Hasan Tiro] visited Aceh, recently. Those hundreds of thousands of people are the supporters of the Aceh Party.
So, how democratic will the Aceh Party be? Remarkably, Adnan Beuransah refused to answer two of our most crucial questions. Firstly, the question on how parties will address the problem of the internal democracy of political parties, including transparency and financing. Secondly, the question about the provision of privileges to certain groups which may in turn harm democracy. Adnan Beuransah avoided the question about the involvement of ex-combatants and activists in the same old corrupt practices in the bureaucracy by saying that he was not competent to answer. He merely stated that:

I don’t fully understand this problem. I am not really involved in Irwandi’s government. I cannot therefore answer questions concerning his administration. The reality is that there are some [of Irwandi’s] close people that were part of his success team that are still present in the inner circle of government. But I don’t know what their involvement in this government really is. Let the people monitor it.

In response to the question about the symbiotic relationships between politicians, bureaucrats and business interests, Adnan promised that:

In order to avoid such practices, we, the Aceh Party, if our cadres and members win seats in the local parliament or are appointed to other positions in government, we will forbid our members from becoming involved in projects. We will give the people of Aceh the opportunity to monitor the behaviour of the Aceh Party members in the DPRA. We will establish detailed mechanisms later, but we will provide society with the opportunity to monitor what happens in parliament, in order to make everything more transparent.

He also suggested that the salary for the local legislative members would be sufficient so that they would no longer need to participate in reconstruction projects. ‘We should pay more attention to the salaries [of the upcoming elected members of parliament],’ he argued. ‘Those who are currently involved in projects are trying to generate additional income. So, in the future, in order to avoid this, we need to provide them with an appropriate salary.’
The general may well be waiting to hear such statements. However, the people may also want to put this party to the test. ‘The people of Aceh want them to prove whether their struggle on behalf of the people’s prosperity is sincere or whether they are just the same as other political parties,’ said Suherman of the Fish Traders Association.

In fact in the lead up to the 2009 elections, many predicted that the Aceh Party would come out as winners. However, the campaign process was marred by some violence and intimidation directed against supporter of the Aceh Party, with five party members killed, and there was growing fear amongst the people of Aceh as to how peace would be maintained after the elections.

As result, there were also increasing anxieties about the fairness of the elections. Fajran Zain of the Aceh Institute expressed his concern that violence might come to dominate and influence the implementation of democracy in post-conflict Aceh. According Fajran, inexperienced ex-combatants would dominate the bureaucracy and government. As result, there was the potential for ‘leadership aggression’, with the ex-combatants wanting to ‘take it all,’ even with force. ‘They have to be the business actors, they have to be in the bureaucracy, they have to be the public officials too, and now they even want to take control of the parliament.’ he said. He was concerned that intimidation and violence might be used to obtain such domination, especially when there was also a shortage of skills and capacity amongst the former combatants.

Thus, Fajran suggested, Aceh needed a balancing power. ‘This is needed in order to prevent the Aceh Party’s [dominance] which is potentially harmful to the development of democracy and the peace process,’ he argued. Abuse of power, he predicted, could only be prevented if the law was strengthened and if civil society remained strong and solid – something that would take a little longer to achieve in Aceh. Yusni Saby of IAIN Ar-Raniry stated that the local politicians’ ‘rules of game’ were not very healthy. ‘Their capacity is in doubt and they are also limited in number,’ he added.

Other local politicians raised similar anxieties. According to Thamren, all local political parties had the same chance of winning, ‘as long there is no intimidation of use of violence in the upcoming elections.’ However, during the campaign period the PRA reported some instances of intimidation. Ghazali Abbas from PAAS was
reluctant to predict the winner, but he seemed to share the same thoughts about GAM supported-party domination. He said:

I am unable to make prophecies in politics. I am not a psychic. We only have the commitment to hold democratic and civilised elections in Aceh, with no preman-ism politics (hoodlum politics), and cukong-ism politics (financial broker politics), because the objective of a political party is to educate the people.

Despite having to compete against the GAM-supported Aceh Party, the SIRA Party remained confident. This would use its image as a pro-independence, non-violent movement (demonstrated by SIRA during the conflict) to their benefit. Deputy Governor, Nazar, one of the heads of the SIRA Party advisory board, argued that:

If the election is fair, then the SIRA Party will win. The reasons are, first, that the 2006 gubernatorial election was an indicator of the people’s support for candidates from the SIRA Party. Second, the SIRA Party and its leaders are popular. Third, the SIRA Party politicians are known as Acehnese freedom fighters, and yet they were never involved in violence. Fourth, people recognise that the SIRA Party has better human resources. And lastly, SIRA possess familiar symbols that are widely recognised by the people of Aceh.

Overall, there was optimism that the people of Aceh would be rational in the use of their vote. ‘The people of Aceh are no longer willing to be coerced. If anyone tries to coerce them, they will fight back,’ said Darni Daud of Syiah Kuala University ‘I believe that the truth will win. If a political party is not telling the truth, then eventually the winner will be the truth itself,’ he added.

**Independent candidates**

Another issue concerned the benefits of having independent candidates in the election. According to Irwandi, it would be difficult for an individual to compete in the election without the support of solid networks at grassroots level. In short, even if it remained possible, an independent candidate in the 2009 elections might not
be as fortunate as he was in the 2006 election. Due to the enormous support he received during his campaign, Irwandi frequently reiterates his position as the ‘people’s governor’, strengthening his position without joining any particular party. However, in face of the 2009 elections he later on came out in support for the Aceh Party.

Interestingly, the challenges faced by independent candidates in an elected government may be great. As East Aceh Deputy District Head Nasruddin explained, the former independent candidates have found it difficult to adapt to the existing system of bureaucracy, neither have they succeeded in placing bureaucratic reform high on their list of priorities. According to Nasruddin:

The problem faced by independent candidates at provincial or district level is the lack of communication between the legislative and the executive. This has caused conflict of interest in budget planning and determining the direction of development in Aceh. In addition to this, independent candidates do not have representatives in parliament. Another problem is the changing political system. Regulations and legislation are changing, but the bureaucrats and actors remain the same. They are established and have become accustomed to the old system. Therefore, we need time to adjust and to professionalise these people.

Sabang Mayor Munawar Liza expressed the same sentiment in our November 2008 workshop, noting that there was a tendency for the legislative and the executive not to work with one another, even trying to sabotage programmes and proposals. ‘It is as if they like to see each other suffering,’ said Munawar Liza. In addition, he admitted that he also found it difficult to handle the legislative. For example, this former GAM activist recounted how he once needed the approval of the legislative for the yearly budget report. ‘Why did they have to wait until a day before the deadline to go and carry out inspections in the field, only to then reject the report,’ he complained. ‘Should they not do this a bit sooner, so that the executive is in a position to address and resolve any problems?’

The frustrations experienced by some of the independent candidates have led to political pragmatism in the lead up to the 2009 elections. Just a few week before the elections for example, Irwandi reconciled with the conservative GAM members, to come out and
support he Aceh Party, becoming one of its most vocal campaigners. Such action may be interpreted as an attempt to survive his last three years as governor. These kinds of political developments made it even more difficult to predict the election results. Overall, the frameless transition entrapped these political actors into short-term political pragmatism that might disrupt efforts to broaden the democratic framework in Aceh. We shall return to the results of the elections in the post-script in Chapter 9.

The need for popular participation

The importance of popular representation from below may have been misunderstood by some informants. Based on their predictions about the winners and losers of the 2009 elections, most claimed that local political parties would dominate, suggesting that the Aceh Party would win the majority of seats, followed by the SIRA Party. The usual reasons for these predictions were that these local political parties were widely known and had large and broad grassroots networks. These answers clearly inferred that the grassroots networks had significant power to influence the outcome of the elections.

Many informants however seemed to underestimate the potential of mass-based organisations’ participation, even though they may prove valuable if they were given the opportunity to take part in designing and monitoring local budgets for example. However, in order to do so, members would need some basic skills as well as practical knowledge of designing participatory budgets. As in successful experiments in other countries, this calls for training members of mass-based organisations.

Yet there were few actors in Aceh who felt that such initiatives would be useful in overcoming conflict or handling certain problems related to governance and administration. This was clear from their answers to a number of questions including what should be done to eradicate corruption and thus promote a cleaner and more transparent government. How to promote democracy and handle the symbiotic relationships between regular business actors, politics and administration? How to prevent the ongoing patron-client favouritism and clientelism patterns of the bureaucracy? Most of the informants referred to law enforcement and strong regulations. Only a few added public monitoring, popular participation and so forth.
Irwandi for example supported the idea of public control whilst Dawan Gayo, who worked for the BRA, suggested that civil society should work together to monitor the democratic institutions such as the executive and the legislative. ‘When society has united, it will be powerful enough to push the government to fulfil its promises.’ Gayo gave the example of the district head in Bener Meriah, Central Aceh, who had failed to fulfil one of his promises, namely to repair the damaged roads if he was elected. As well as failing to repair the road, the budget suffered from a 30% deficit. ‘People can now judge their leader, and therefore, this district head will never be elected again,’ he said Gayo.

According to Kuntoro suggested, it was important to encourage the people to monitor the local budget:

The people must begin to monitor the budget allocation for each sector. This is critical. For example, the governor has said that the current government will improve prosperity. So let us see what percentage of the budget is for education, how much for the health sector and so on. Then we have to oversee the DPRA in order to monitor how this budget is spent, who wins the contracts, how they work, what the reports are like etc. Communities should be monitoring this very closely.

Unfortunately, most of the informants were unable to elaborate how popular participation might be optimised and sustained. One informant from a ‘national’ political party said that his previous position as public official gave him some knowledge about national and local budgetary planning:

We have run internal training for legislative candidates from our party on how to examine budgetary planning and other financial reports. I will conduct the same training for other local political parties and other legislative candidates. I do not feel threatened by this kind of training. Instead, it may benefit me as well. I may gain more support and sympathy since I am also running for the seat in the national level legislative, ha....ha... ha...
Overall, the informants fell short in identifying alternative sources of power that would help finding solutions for particular conflicts or problems. On the one hand, they acknowledged that there was significant potential at the grassroots level. On the other hand, they seemed to deliberately avoid actively encourage this potential as one of the pillars of democracy. In short, they remained confident that the use of formal power through the legislatives and executive institutions alone would offer effective solutions for any of the problems of democracy. However, such power may eventually be used to secure their own positions and favours rather than to develop supplementary democratic forms of popular influence and participation.

And what about the problems between the government in Aceh and central government in Jakarta? As outlined above, of tensions were noted. Frustration was felt by the elected government in Aceh who wished to control their own affairs and have the freedom to decide what is best for the people of Aceh, rather than certain powerful vested interests from outside. Yet they did not seem able to convince their own people that the decisions they made were in Aceh’s interest or explain the aims of their policies. As result, economic development slowed down and the promotion of democratic self-government became increasingly difficult. Moreover, this situation had the potential to open up opportunities to the ‘profitable peace’ approach, as discussed in Chapter 4.

In order to mitigate against this, one might wish that government leaders would realise that opening up broader political space and opportunities for alternative sources of power might well provide the answer to a number of obstacles including, inter alia, conflict resolution. Encouraging more participation in budgeting and planning might enable better understanding and more equitable relations between government and the public.

There was and is thus a need to develop a more extended democratic framework, not only to reorganise the pro-democracy movement in Aceh, but also to encourage grassroots movements to engender more promising popular participation. Such a democratic framework may guide the establishment of mass-based organisations that are able to represent aspirations from below and be involved in participatory development. There are of course certain pre-conditions that need to be fulfilled in order to make this
possible, including government facilitation of necessary institutional arrangements for democratic participation in addition to elections. Such conditions depend in turn on processes that require further investigation in order to identify which formula will be best suited to the people of Aceh and to sustainable peace and democracy.

Conclusion and recommendations

In conclusion, it is clear that the transitional period in Aceh could be characterised as ‘frameless’ both in terms of (not) having a specified timeframe (and thus milestones), real or imagined, and (not) having defined and mutually agreed on aims and objectives as is illustrated, inter alia, by the tension between the need for political development and the need for economic development. It is remarkable that none of the informants could identify the timeframe and aims of this transitional period. All the informants did acknowledge the existence of a transitional period, but in some cases it served to turn a blind eye to and explain, if not condone, some undemocratic practices in the bureaucracy, political parties and reconstruction projects. This lack of knowledge and common understanding about the aims of the transitional period raised questions as to how far the Helsinki MoU provides guidance on the further development of the democratic framework.

The answer is that some informants have turned their attention away from the MoU because, they said, much of it is no longer relevant and the process of political transformation has been successfully completed. In addition, some criticised the MoU as representing the interests of a particular group, namely GAM. Moreover, while the government in Aceh claimed instead that the central government had made it difficult for them to attain genuine self-government as mandated by the MoU, and the majority of the informants maintained that the democratic framework needed to be expanded to encompass economic aspects, there was little indication that these actors either intended or saw the benefits of encouraging mass-based organisation, particularly those based on the representation of people’s aspirations from below, as an alternative source of power for resolving conflicts and other problems.

Importantly however, most informants pointed to the need for common ground or common aims in order to improve
democracy. This may require further investigation as the demos, the people of Aceh, are likely to need to be more united in order to move together towards common aims.

In short, there is a need for the further development of democracy, the aims and methods of which need to be analysed and specified. Without this, the future of peace and democracy in Aceh remains under threat because the transition will become frameless. Accordingly, we recommend that further studies be carried out, particularly on the issue of including aspirations from below.
1 The Aceh Participatory Research Team was commissioned to carry out this study independently by Professor Olle Törnquist in his capacity as one of the leaders of the project financed by the Norwegian research Council on the role of democracy in post-tsunami efforts at peace building in Sri Lanka and Aceh (C.f. the Preface of this book). Members of the team: Affan Ramli, Dara Meutia Uning, Murizal Hamzah, Shadia Marhaban (Coordinator). At the initial stage of this research, Achmady Meuraksa contributed in conducting some interviews. Supervisor: Olle Törnquist.

2 During the interview, all the informants mentioned the members of the KPA — the transitional committee for GAM ex- combatants – as ‘GAM’. In order to be true to their genuine expression, this acronym will also be used in this chapter: ‘GAM’ will mean as the members or supporters of the previous Aceh’s armed movement (The Free Acheh Movement/GAM), who had been transformed into KPA (Komite Peralihan Aceh/Aceh Transitional Committee) after the Helsinki peace agreement. In addition to that SIRA—without the party label following this term will refer to ‘Suara Independen Rakyat Aceh/The Independent Voice of Aceh People’ –the movement who had once campaigning referendum for independence in 1998.

3 The interviewees consisted of Governor Irwandi Jusuf, Vice Governor Muhammad Nazar, Deputy District Head of East Aceh Nasruddin Abubakar, Head of BRR Aceh-Nias Kuntoro Mangkusubroto, Dawan Gayo (Aceh Reintegration Body/BRA), Ghufron Zainal Abidin (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera/ PKS), Thamren Ananda (Partai Rakyat Aceh/PRA), Adnan Beuransah (Partai Aceh/PA), M. Taufik Abda (Partai SIRA/SIRA Party), Ghazali Abbas (Partai Aceh Aman Seujahtera/PAAS), Farhan Hamid (Partai Aceh Bersatu/PAB), Muhibbusabri (Partai Daulat Aceh /PDA), Nazaruddin Thaha (PERMATA), Suherman (Chairman of Fish Traders Association/ASPI), Zainuddin (Head of Keujreun Blang, Lhoknga Sub district, Great Aceh District), Wiratmadinata (Forum LSM/NGO Forum), Asiah Uzia (women activist, former co-ordinator of KontraS Aceh), Raihani Diani, Ramadhan (Chief Editor Rajapost), Muhammad Hamzah (Head of The Alliance of Independent Journalist/AJI Banda Aceh), Fajran Zain (Analysis Manager of the Aceh Institute), Yusni Saby (Rector of IAIN Ar-Raniry), Darni Daud (Rector of Syiah Kuala University). There are also some (ex) public officials who are currently active in other ‘national’ party, whose names must remain anonymous.

4 In face of the 2009 elections, however, Irwandi altered this position and supported the GAM rooted Aceh Party.

5 According to the LoGA, the qanun are equivalent to Regional Regulations (Perda – Peraturan Daerah). They have been interpreted by GAM and others as regulatory instruments that are independent of any other law and regulations other than the LoGA itself.

6 At the time of going to press, the government regulation on the transfer of authority from central government to the Sabang free port authority are still at the discussion and formulation stage.

7 DPRA or Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Aceh is the provincial level parliament, which is usually known with the acronym of DPRD (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah) Propinsi in other provinces of Indonesia. It was known as DPRD Aceh, up until it was changed by the LoGA, following the mandates in the Helsinki MoU.
Keujreun Blang is an organisation concerned with access to water resources and agricultural cultivation. Such organisations have existed since the time of Sultan Iskandar Muda.

With the peace agreement, the number of organic troops in Aceh was reduced and village-level military posts disappeared. Village-level military presence was a key strategy of the New Order regime’s territorial control of Indonesia, and especially so areas of unrest. It is a matter of concern that these posts are beginning to make a come-back.

The LoGA however doesn’t make this distinction.

At the time of going to press, as far as the authors know, little or nothing of these promises has been implemented.
Lost in Transition, Lost in Elections

Dara Meutia Uning with Olle Törnquist
and the post script analysis team

Introduction

The haze of the post-legislative and presidential election celebrations has faded and at the time of writing in late 2009, conditions in Aceh returned to normal. Along with the noisy crowds preparing for the ‘coronation’ of the new local legislators, the excitement and political euphoria have slowly disappeared. However, the election results will have serious consequences, especially for those that lost the battle. The major concern is whether the elections have provided solid enough popular participation and representation of vital groups in society to facilitate further democratisation. Is it possible to sustain the already promising steps made towards meaningful democracy? What do the people really think about the results and what are their expectations now? Will the local political parties that lost out be able to bounce back? How have civil society groups reacted to the results? Will the newly elected legislative foster more accountable and transparent governance in Aceh?

We discussed these issues with key political actors and experts first after the legislative elections, and then also after the presidential election. Some of the actors we approached had already taken part in our previous survey on the core problems of democracy, summarised in Chapter 8. This time many were less
willing to set time aside for discussion and some simply did not respond to our invitation. Governor Irwandi and Vice Governor Muhammad Nazar, who had previously taken part in our research, did not respond. We also contacted GAM/SIRA district heads and mayors, but this time they also did not respond. Their lack of interest in and commitment to a public democratic discourse is disheartening. In addition to our research, some informal group discussions were also held on August and November 2009 in Banda Aceh, in order to analyse results and debate the future of democracy in Aceh.

At the time of writing the winners appeared overwhelmed by their victory, whereas the losers had lost steam. Some of the latter were not able to speak out as much as they had due to an overwhelming sense of disappointment. On the other hand, there were also informants who scolded us during the interviews, for no obvious reason other than they had gained power and, perhaps, were agitated by the then intense competition between the main presidential candidates in the context of Aceh, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and Jusuf Kalla.

This chapter will discuss the results of the 2009 legislative elections in Aceh and their impact on further democratisation in the partially self-governed province. This is an analysis of what has happened following the long road to building and nourishing a new wave of democracy. But it is also an attempt to critically discuss what may happen to Aceh in the future. Is there a future for an extended democratic framework that can sustain peace and reconstruction in Aceh? Or is democracy in Aceh facing serious setbacks?

The Aceh Party and the Democratic Party: The winners take it all

*Results beyond expectations*

As was predicted, the Aceh Party won the 2009 local legislative elections. However, the most surprising outcome was the huge discrepancy between the number of votes for the Aceh Party and the other local political parties which were left trailing far behind. At the final count, the Aceh Party won 33 of the 69 seats in the provincial parliament, (DPRA).

By claiming to be *the* local political party with a mandate born out of the peace negotiations in Helsinki and the MoU, the Aceh Party won landslide victories in its strongholds in North and
East Aceh. In its campaign, the Aceh Party stated that the future of peace rested with its willingness and capacity to implement the 'self-government' of Aceh as had been envisioned in the MoU. Moreover, it would found its struggle for the people on democratic means: by winning seats in parliament. Senior party leader Sofyan Daud stated in one of the Aceh Party’s public rallies that they had been campaigning on these goals for decades, long before the other local political parties. Thus, he added, the current campaign was only to reaffirm its commitment to bringing prosperity to the people of Aceh (Serambi Indonesia 2009e).

The legislative elections had a lower voter turnout than the direct elections in late 2006 of local political executives. Only about 75% of eligible voters participated in 2009 as compared to some 80% percent in 2006, (for detailed figures, see the attached tables with the full results in comparative perspective. Comparisons with Chapter
Yet this decline did not seem to affect the Aceh Party negatively.

In the provincial elections, the Aceh Party was able to dominate 17 of 23 districts. The 17 districts include Banda Aceh, Pidie and Aceh Tamiang, where the gubernatorial candidates Irwandi-Nazar had lost in the 2006 election. However, the victories in Banda Aceh and Pidie were expected as the gubernatorial candidates Humam Hamid-Hasbi Abdullah that won in these districts in 2006 were supported by the then Stockholm based GAM leaders who are now in command of the Aceh Party. Moreover, the Aceh Party won a narrow victory in Aceh Tamiang with just some 3% more votes than the Democratic Party.

The Aceh Party lost in Gayo Lues, Aceh Tenggara (South East Aceh), Aceh Singkil, Subulussalam, Bener Meriah, and Aceh Tengah (Central Aceh). In Gayo Lues and Central Aceh, the Aceh Party lost to the Democratic Party; while in Bener Meriah it came second to PKPI. Furthermore, the Aceh Party came fourth in Subulussalam, fifth in South East Aceh and sixth in Aceh Singkil. In these districts, the National Mandate Party, PAN, and Golkar were the winners.

These figures indicate that even though this time Irwandi linked up with the conservative GAM leaders in the Aceh Party and campaigned for them in Bener Meriah, Central Aceh and Aceh Singkil, the Aceh Party remained unable to gain similarly remarkable support beyond the GAM strongholds as Irwandi-Nazar had in the 2006 elections, particularly in Gayo Lues and South East Aceh. Additionally, the votes for Irwandi-Nazar in 2006 were also higher than the Aceh Party in 2009 in Sabang, Aceh Selatan (South Aceh), Aceh Jaya, Aceh Barat (West Aceh), Nagan Raya, and Aceh Barat Daya (South West Aceh). The Aceh Party’s dominance was thus limited to its old strongholds in Bireuen, Lhokseumawe, Aceh Utara (North Aceh), Aceh Timur (East Aceh), Langsa, and Simeulue.

At district level, the Aceh Party was victorious in 15 districts, winning more than 50% of the seats in the strongholds of the conservative GAM leaders of Pidie, Bireuen, Lhokseumawe, North Aceh and East Aceh. On the other hand, the lowest numbers of votes for the Aceh Party were in Bener Meriah, Central Aceh, Gayo Lues and South East Aceh; although it was only in Aceh Singkil and Subulussalam that it did not gain any seats at all (and here Irwandi-
Nazar had also lost). The local parliaments in these districts are now dominated by national political parties, including Golkar and the PKPI.

The other local political parties were not able to compete and trailed far behind. Other than the Aceh Party, local political parties in general failed, quite contrary to most predictions. The SIRA Party in particular was humiliated. It had been widely predicted to do well and to come second after the Aceh Party, but as the votes came in, the SIRA Party fell short of passing the 5% electoral threshold to gain a single seat in the DPRA. It is true that of the local political parties, the SIRA Party came in second, albeit with very few votes. The local PDA Party with its strong roots among Muslim leaders was the only local party aside from the Aceh Party that succeeded in winning a seat in the DPRA. The PDA also fared the least badly of the non-GAM rooted local parties at district level where it gained seven seats in various local parliaments.

Even at district level the other local political parties only managed to win a few seats. The SIRA Party for example only won 6 seats at district level (DPRK) whereas the PRA won two seats, the PBA three, whilst the PAAS failed to obtain any.

Another albeit lesser surprise was the comeback of the national political parties, the Democratic Party in particular. During the 2006 local elections, voters were apathetic about the national political parties. Thus the independent candidates (some supported by SIRA and GAM activists who did not follow the advice of the ‘old’ GAM leaders and link up with a national party) became the most popular alternatives. Several candidates supported by these progressive GAM and SIRA activists were elected as governor, district head (bupati), and mayor, (walikota). It thus followed that in face of the 2009 legislative elections, many believed that local political parties would once again perform better than national parties. Moreover, some local political parties believed that forging an alliance with a national political party would be a drawback. In reality, this was far from the case. President Yudhoyono’s Democratic Party went on to be the second largest party in the provincial parliament (DPRA). The rest of the votes in Aceh went to other national political parties, such as Golkar, PKS and PAN, but none of them did well as compared to their performance in previous parliamentary elections. Less surprisingly, the Democratic Party
also won 6 of the 13 Aceh seats in the central level parliament in Jakarta (DPR).

However, the surprises continued with Yodhoyono’s phenomenal victory in the presidential elections together with his new running-mate for vice president Professor Boediono, who were supported by a Democratic Party-led coalition. Although participation was modest (76.6% of the electorate), the Democratic Party alliance won 93% of the vote in Aceh, compared to the minimal support given to their closest rival, then Vice President Jusuf Kalla of Golkar and General (Retd) Wiranto and his new HANURA (People’s Conscience) Party (4.3%) and Megawati Soekarnoputri of the PDI-P together with General (Retd) Prabowo Subianto of his new GERINDRA (Great Indonesian Movement) Party with 2.4%.

The victory of the SBY-Boediono team in GAM’s heartland was particularly impressive. The percentage of the votes in Pidie (sub-divided into two districts, 95.11% and 95.24%), Bireuen (96.86%), North Aceh (95.18%), and Lhokseumawe (95.18%). Aceh had never witnessed such dominance by any one party or leader, even during Soeharto’s New Order period when Golkar and the PPP (the Muslim based United Development Party) dominated the province. Equally unexpectedly, SBY-Boediono also did extremely well in some of the districts that used to be strongholds of Golkar, such as in Gayo Lues (90.02%), South East Aceh (97.31%), Aceh Singkil (86.51%), and Subulussalam (90.18%), leaving Kalla-Wiranto far behind.

During the election campaign, SBY and the Democratic Party’s main election promise was their commitment to sustaining peace in Aceh. SBY and the Democratic Party promised that the peace treaty would not be broken, whilst sending out a warning to anyone who had any thoughts about disrupting the peace. However, the success of SBY-Boediono is impossible to explain without considering the support of the Aceh Party activists at grassroots level. Although the Aceh Party said officially that it was neutral in the presidential election, some prominent figures in GAM such as Sofyan Daud, Irwandi Jusuf and Muzakkir Manaf joined the SBY-Boediono ‘success team’, followed by some district heads and mayors as well as Vice Governor Muhammad Nazar, who may have considered the need to protect his own position given the poor performance of ‘his’ SIRA-Party in the local parliamentary elections.
Interestingly, most Muslim political parties that used to be strong in Aceh did not perform very well. The PKS was an exception and gained two seats in the all-Indonesia DPR, and came in fifth position in the provincial DPRA as well as the district DPRK. But the PPP which used to do very well in Aceh proved unable to compete and its supporters were divided; and the other Muslim parties together with a number of small nationalist parties could only manage a few seats here and there in the DPRK. In reality, this means that some local powerful figures with their own clientelist networks were still able to gather support and win seats in their respective local parliament.

The controversies

In general, the 2009 legislative election was a combination of poor administration, political drama, and vote manipulation. The complaints of the political parties and legislative candidates were mostly about unprofessional management of the elections. The National Election Committee (KPU) received harsh criticism and also faced a number of legal charges (which were all later dismissed) from those who felt that they had been victimised. Moreover, the list of eligible voters was unclear and this in turn paved the way additional suspicions of vote manipulation during the counting of votes at all levels, from the very local to the very central level in Jakarta. The slow publication of the final results did not make things better.

Aceh was a case in point. Weeks before the open election campaign took place, the participants and the local political parties had already been intimidated by various elements. Violence erupted sporadically, with the worst attacks directed at the Aceh Party: at least 14 members and/or sympathisers were shot dead. The Aceh Party, however, kept calm, refrained from retaliation and in a one page statement published in the Acehnese daily, Serambi Indonesia, said that it would not take revenge. President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, moreover, visited Aceh in February 2009, and stated that no one should try to turn back the peace in Aceh and go back to the days of conflict and war (Harian Aceh 2009). This statement was also highlighted during the Democratic Party’s campaign in March 2009 (Serambi Indonesia 2009g), with banners quoting his statement ‘Jagalah Perdamaian’ (‘Defend the Peace’) seen in parts of Banda Aceh.
Even though the Aceh Party stated that it was the prime target of violence and intimidation, other parties complained of in turn of receiving threats and intimidation by members and sympathisers of the Aceh Party. The Aceh Party responded diplomatically that this was not being done on the instructions of its party but was basically spontaneous individual actions. (Khaerudin 2009)

Unfortunately however, intimidation of other local political parties continued. Vice Governor Mohammad Nazar openly criticised the prevention of some SIRA Party supporters from attending the SIRA Party’s open campaign in Lhokseumawe. Taufik Abda of the SIRA Party explained that the whole process was not up to the principles of fair and democratic elections. He said:

The very principle of having an election is that it everyone can deliver their vote freely, directly and secretly. But, in reality the past election was full of intimidation and fraud. There were plenty of cases reported to the National Election Monitoring Committee, and reported by the media. However, only a few investigations of such cases of intimidation succeeded in identifying the actors and their motives.

Although Taufik had previously admitted some weaknesses of his party, he had not expected that the result would be so poor. The votes for the SIRA Party were far below beyond its own prediction. We have not had access to the detailed official figures, but some sources suggest that representatives of the SIRA Party only gained one or two votes in the polling stations next to their own residences, for example in Pidie, Bireuen, and East Aceh; which of course points to irregularities. In other cases, there were threats made against the political parties’ witnesses during the counting process. The witnesses -- usually young men in the village who were anxious of their own and their families’ safety. In Pidie, the witness for the SIRA Party having been threatened thus voted for the Aceh Party. According to Taufik Abda, intimidation influenced people’s choices which contributed to the poor results of the SIRA Party.

In addition, Taufik Abda doubts that the military and police that were supposed to guarantee security were really neutral. ‘They seemed to allow the intimidation and fraud (...) especially close to and on the very day of the elections’. Similarly, Thamren Ananda
of the Aceh People’s Party (PRA) said that the security forces also seem to have taken part in the election fraud.

It was very strange that the Aceh Party won the election even in the military’s own barracks. I think everybody knows that the families of the military usually do not vote for a particular political party without being directed [to do so]. So, how come the Aceh Party could win in military’s barracks? I am very concerned about the machinations that must have taken place behind the scenes.

The chaotic list of eligible voters and the dubious vote counting process were subject to numerous complaints. Marini of the National Awakening Party (PKB) suggests that the organisers of the election were negligent, adding that the organisers in the field would always excuse themselves by saying: ‘we don’t know’ when there were any questions from the political parties. According to Marini, there were no forms filled in to prove the results when the votes were transferred from the lowest to the highest level, from the polling stations at the sub-district (kecamatan) level to the KPU in Jakarta. Moreover, the latter was suspected of being complicit in the manipulation of votes. As Marini explains,

I was offered the option of increasing the numbers of votes for me, and I had been given a telephone number. So, it is like buying a fish. First, I was offered the price of 1,000 rupiahs and then 5,000 rupiahs. If I wanted to take it [the increasing number] to KPUD level, the price would be Rp 10,000. So, if I wanted to gather 10,000 votes, it would have been possible.

Muhammad Jaffar from Syiah Kuala University argues that the manipulation of votes was both systemic and non-systemic. He says that the systemic fraud was limited to some areas only and mainly concerned distortion and lack of confirmation of the counting of the votes. Only some of these issues could be settled through the filing of complaints. Jaffar explains:

The cases where it happened systematically were in South East Aceh district, Gayo Luwes, and Bener Meriah. In those areas, the election officers did not
submit any copies of the votes from the polling stations to the witnesses of the political parties. As a result, the election participants did not have any data to compare results with if and when they wanted to protest against the aggregated official count. The more unsystematic manipulation was perpetrated by election organisers in sub-districts of East Aceh. In these cases, the legislative candidate or the political party could file complaints because they had copies of the data from the election organisers at the lowest level.

Although protests were made, it was only one national political party, the PKS, and one local party, the SIRA Party that filed complaints to the Constitutional Court, but without success.³

**Behind the Aceh Party victory**

In addition to the irregularities, however, the massive victory of Aceh Party calls for more qualified explanation. As we know, the Aceh Party had many strengths and advantages as compared to its competitors; competitors who in turn had neglected their weaknesses. Let us discuss the major dimensions in somewhat more detail.

*Re-instating Aceh’s cultural identity and nationalism*

In Chapter 8 of this volume, Nazaruddin Thaha of PERMATA (a mass based farmers’ organisation) stated that

The winners of the 2009 legislative election will be those that have the most heroic history in Aceh’s struggle; those that invoke nationalist sentiment in Aceh; those that have the largest number of candidates that have never been involved in ‘national politics’; and those that have the highest number of elite figures from NGOs and mass-based organisations.

This of course implied that Aceh Party would be the winner. Its leaders claimed that it was the true representative of Aceh nationalism that would give due recognition to Aceh’s customary values (*adat*) and dignity. The Aceh Party’s campaign also emphasised the fact that its leaders had suffered together with the people of Aceh during the conflict and that the party represented
the Acehnese people in general, especially those who had been marginalised during the conflict.

Although it may sound like a cliché, many clearly believed it was true. The Aceh Party was considered widely to be an integral part of the Aceh’s history. As stated by Farid Wajdi from IAIN: ‘The society is satisfied because the Aceh Party is their child.’ The ‘child’ terminology refers to the abandoned Acehnese who had been deprived by outsiders of equal access to politics and business as well as the expression of their cultural identity. In the minds of many, this was illustrated by the terror attacks against members and sympathisers of the party; attacks which were used skilfully by the party to talk of attempts to exclude the ‘chosen one’. And rather than retaliate, the Aceh Party used the attacks to legitimise their ‘heroic history’ and to remind people that there were outsiders who wanted to prevent them from taking part in an equal way in the elections and thus constituted a threat to Aceh’s pride and identity.

Moreover, the Aceh Party always responded to accusations that it had been responsible for the intimidation perpetrated against other political parties such as the SIRA Party by referring to the suffering of its own members and supporters. Both the Aceh Party’s secretary general, Yahya Muaz, and one of its high profile members, Hasbi Abdullah, claimed that, ‘it wasn’t the Aceh Party that terrorised other parties. On the contrary, we were the ones who were terrorised. Fourteen Aceh Party cadres, supporters and legislative candidates were shot dead.’ Such statements were also used at the party’s meetings during the campaign period. In short, the message was that the Aceh Party was being viciously targeted because it was the ‘chosen party’, the only party that had rightly been mandated in the MoU in Helsinki. As Dahlan, deputy secretary of the party’s ‘success team’, elaborated, 4

The Aceh Party is the only party with a genuine nationalist ideology that is rooted in decades of struggle. The SIRA Party is just a youth and student offspring that functioned as a legal tool when GAM could not form a party but then lost its importance when it possible to form the Aceh Party. The other parties have separate ideologies, Muslim, socialist and so on.
So, how was the Aceh Party able to invoke this nationalist sentiment? The party sustained its old strategy of influencing the broad mass of subordinated and uneducated people in rural Aceh, claiming that there were no other firmly rooted representatives that were loyal to GAM and trusted by GAM. Many people believed that the Aceh Party would lead Aceh towards independence through parliamentary means and via the United Nations. There was also a widespread belief that the victory of the Aceh Party would be a symbol of recognition of the reinvention of Aceh in local politics and economy, after 32 years of conflict and alienation. Thus there are huge expectations that the victory of the Aceh party would lead to political and economic inclusion of the marginalised and poor in particular with more attention given to human rights issues. As Zubaidah Djojar, a researcher and woman activist, stated,

We hope that this victory will mean that some previous weaknesses in the law as well as the marginalisation of ordinary villagers and the minority groups can be overcome; and we hope that this will make the peace more meaningful to the society — both for men and women; and finally; we hope that it may contribute to a new government system that is rooted in Aceh’s cultural values.

In addition to the Aceh Party’s successful promotion of an image as the only party that had been mandated by the Helsinki MoU, it also succeeded in maintaining the trust of traditional GAM supporters. Moreover, the Aceh Party broadened its support through affiliated mass-based organisations among fisher folk, farmers and religious scholars. In short, the Aceh Party was successful in projecting itself as a one-way solution for most voters without their own access to public resources and alternative patronage. For example, Raden Samsul, the leader of the Confederation of Workers Unions of Indonesia (KSPSI) in Aceh, and the head of the Federation of Transportation Workers of Indonesia (FSPTI) in Aceh, expects that the victory of the Aceh Party will mean better defence of the rights of the workers, including more employment opportunities, improvements of the working conditions, and increasing minimum wage rates.
I think that the interests of the workers’ unions are already represented [by them], especially since we do not have our own political party’ (...) In any case, the victory of the Aceh Party as a local and new party in Aceh means more hope for changes to the better. We do hope that they will be able to implement their promises during the campaign.

In a more cynical expression, Said Kamaruzzaman, journalist with *Serambi Indonesia*, says that people in Aceh opted for the least worst candidates. They preferred ‘their own’ candidates instead of outsiders. He explains,

Before the election, I interviewed some people who were not former combatants, and they admitted that they were not supporters of the Aceh Party. However, one of them told me that he would choose an Aceh Party candidate anyway because “*Daripada dipajoh le gob, gent dipajoh le saudara droe teuh* (rather than being eaten by other people, it is better to be eaten by our own brother)”. Obviously voters like him were frustrated, because from their point of view, they could not find a political party or candidate that represented their own aspirations, only a ‘brother/sister of their own’.

In addition, the party was also widely thought of as an organisation of former GAM combatants who had turned into influential business contractors and were *de facto* already in power given that most of the independent candidates in the 2006 governor and district election supported it. Thus, quite a few pragmatic voters might have supported the Aceh Party because of their belief that they would have access to public resources.

*Organising support: the combination of clientelism and populism*

The Aceh Party was better prepared than other local parties. According to Said Kamaruzzaman of *Serambi Indonesia*, ‘Most of the leaders of the Aceh Party and their supporters were ex-combatants who had been very well prepared for the competition.’ Moreover, he adds, ‘The Aceh Party was the only local party that had well functioning offices all around Aceh.’

Muhammad Jaffar from Law Faculty of Syiah Kuala University emphasises that ‘aside from the Aceh Party, no other local party was quite ready to participate in the 2009 election.'
Specifically, other parties were less able to form local units and to present a convincing number of legislative candidates.’ However, this former Head of KIP Aceh (Aceh Election Committee) added that the Aceh Party was not able to provide the best and most trusted people as the legislative candidates.

Another indicator of weak preparation was the limited number of rallies held by local parties other than the Aceh Party. Some national political parties avoided holding rallies for security reasons; and Irwandi-Nazar did not emphasise big gatherings when winning the 2006 election but rather personal and organisational contacts and door to door campaigning. The weaker local parties may also have considered the risks, including that their mobilisation might be blocked by their political opponents. This would not just undermine confidence but it would also send an unfavourable message to potential voters about who really had the capacity to mobilise large numbers of people and resources in order to take advantage of the political opportunities. We shall return to this weakness on part of the pro-democratic groups in particular.

Finally, the parties’ poor capacity to organise and mobilise was particularly important given that most of the voters were also not well prepared in terms of their ability to judge critically the various issues and party programmes as well as the candidates’ track record. As Jaffar points out, ‘the voters were not very critical, and very little information was available about the legislative candidates.’ Likewise, Fardi Wajdi from IAIN Ar-Raniry Banda Aceh argues that people would rather consider the general characteristics of the different parties rather than their policies as well as the individual candidates themselves. Thus, their vote could be swayed easily by local sentiment and simplistic political propaganda.

Another factor that worked to the advantage of the Aceh Party was the argument that local parliaments should be reformed so that they could work in tandem with and not obstruct the already elected local executives. Farid Wajdi of IAIN suggests that the victory of the Aceh Party represents a ‘new spirit’ that will be positive for the current administration lead by Irwandi-Nazar. He explains:

That these people (GAM) now dominate [the parliament], is alhamdulillah, thanks to God. Now they have sufficient representation in parliament to support [their GAM
executive]. If they are willing to support [the executive’s] programmes, the outcome will be better. Executives and legislators can work together without conflict.

The likely positive effects of a secure and stable administration should the Aceh Party win was also argued most intensely by Governor Irwandi Yusuf as well as most of the independent candidates in the previous that had been supported by KPA/SIRA. In Chapter 8 district heads and mayors complained about the problems of running an efficient administration and of implementing their programs, not least due to the lack of support of the local parliaments.

However, in several cases this was also an easy excuse for poor performance on the part of the political executives themselves. For example, the performance of Governor Irwandi himself has not been satisfactory and his administration has been criticised for its low achievement in improving public infrastructure, the provision of affordable and accessible health service, improving education and the generation of more employment opportunities. Despite the enormous size of Aceh’s local budget compared to that during the conflict, the rate of implementation of various government supported projects that had been approved has declined from 91% in 2006 to only 67% in 2008 (Serambi Indonesia, 2009f). Consequently many people have begun to question Irwandi’s commitment to bringing prosperity to the province; and the criticism increased with his frequent overseas trips to invite foreign investors which, moreover, have not proved fruitful.

In addition, corruption and collusion remained the main issues within the bureaucracy and government development projects with allegations that the governor might have been involved, although nothing has been substantiated. The special privileges given to ex-combatants in government construction projects and the bureaucracy, however, were beyond doubt.

In face of declining popularity, the risk of resistance from the new parliament that was about to be elected and the fact that, at least according to the present rules and regulations, the candidates for the next gubernatorial election have to be nominated by political parties, Irwandi most probably simply opted for a pragmatic solution. Although Irwandi was labelled a ‘traitor’ by GAM’s
conservative group when he ran as an independent candidate in the 2006 elections and obstructed to the ‘old’ leaders’ decision to link up with the national PPP party, and although there was widespread expectation that he would foster progressive democratic programmes and despite efforts to include progressive GAM and SIRA leaders in his various teams, he clearly concluded that it was only the Aceh Party that could accept him in a fair trade. In short, Irwandi realised that he needed a political party to maintain his popularity, to secure his policies and improve his standing in the next gubernatorial elections.

Officially Irwandi explained his new position as a ‘moral connection with the Aceh Party’ (Rakyat Aceh Online 2009) and that a victory for the Aceh Party would make his programmes easier to implement (Serambi Indonesia 2009a). Irwandi was not alone. Many of the independent candidates who had stood in the 2006 elections gave up their criticisms of the conservative GAM leaders and turned to the newly formed Aceh Party. The mayor in Sabang, Munawar Liza, for example, stated that the Aceh Party was more institutionalised and open than the previous more personalised rule of the conservative GAM leaders and that, most importantly, there had not been a strong enough support from the progressive alliance that was built in face of the 2006 elections between KPA and SIRA to implement an alternative programme once their candidates had been elected. From its perspective, the Aceh Party gave its commitment to protect Irwandi’s government if they won the election.

Interestingly, the Aceh Party made special note of the need to find a solution for those of its leaders who might get elected as legislative members to maintain their previous sources of income so that they could sustain and possible also expand the special privileges that they had provided to their supporters before the election. In other words, the Aceh Party would continue to be able to deliver patronage to its supporters all the way down to the grassroots level rather than use political power to alter this system in favour of democratically decided and impartially implemented welfare reforms in particular. Further, the Aceh Party’s sent clear signals to the political and business elite that they could expect sustained cooperation within the bureaucracy. Possibly, the Aceh Party would expect something in return, including the support of the top level administrators who are in close contact with important
actors within as well as outside the bureaucracy, especially when it comes to government projects and tenders.

In short, it seems as if the Aceh Party had been able to develop into the kind of nationalist political machine that is so typical of Indonesia and many other countries in the Global South. These are political machines that typically gather support from, firstly, its loyalists by way of populist nationalism and distribution of patronage and, secondly, from a wide range of political, business people, and informal leaders by sustaining clientelism within the public administration. The Aceh Party thus pooled a number of vested interests without changing the system of governance. This, as Harriss, Stokke, and Törnquist (2004) have pointed out, is how the local political actors often try to mobilise support: elitist incorporation of people in politics as against integration of people based on their own aspirations and organisations from below.

The Aceh Party versus the SIRA Party: isolating the dissidents

Of all the local political parties, the Aceh Party was particularly concerned with its previous closest allies who once came together in the demand for a referendum on independence for Aceh, then took the MoU agreement of political freedom seriously and finally formed their own SIRA Party. In fact, the group of democracy oriented SIRA and GAM leaders who gained the initiative in the Helsinki negotiations and fostered much of the unique agreement about peace through democracy (see Chapter 1) even opposed the conservative GAM leaders in Stockholm. This was followed up by supporting a number of independent candidates supported by KPA and SIRA in the 2006 elections in such a successful way that these candidates were even able to win in districts where the Aceh Party did not make it in 2009. One reason may have been the popularity of the then SIRA leader and later Vice Governor Muhammad Nazar in the southern areas of Aceh; another was most probably that Irwandi-Nazar combined nationalist aspirations with political independence from elitist command structures in favour of citizen based development.

The conflict between the previous partners in SIRA, KPA and GAM is well illustrated by Dahlan, who explained that, ‘there is only one genuine nationalist party, the Aceh Party; and the SIRA Party is only like a rebellious child in relation to its parents’.
It is interesting to note that ‘these children’ must have caused quite a lot of worry to the ‘parents’ given all the efforts of the Aceh Party made to contain advances on the part of the SIRA Party. But the Aceh Party’s efforts to thwart its former ally’s aspirations is not sufficient explanation for the SIRA Party’s very poor performance of the SIRA. One major factor was that the SIRA Party’s leaders seemed to forget their own previously successful strategy of combining citizen action and innovative proposals such as related to the Law on Local Governance and development policies with mass based alliances and electoral campaigning. Most importantly perhaps, the SIRA Party neglected GAM’s ability to embrace traditional networks at grassroots level, especially in the rural areas and villages. GAM’s style was quite similar to that of the NU (Nahdlatul Ulama), the religious mass-based organization in Java. Both the NU and GAM/Aceh Party used communal solidarities in villages rather than rallies as the pivotal base for social, political and religious matters. Such roots in local communities contributed extensively to the victory of Irwandi-Nazar in 2006 too, even if SIRA’s old civil society networks and GAM command structures also played important roles.

Seasoned leaders now say that SIRA activists did not recall the need to combine its modern democratic aspirations with this old strategy. In short, the SIRA Party miscalculated the culture of the majority of the Aceh people and prioritised instead a modern and perhaps more progressive yet non-adapted Western-style campaign, workshop training sessions, publishing articles in journals and so on. Moreover, the SIRA Party fell short of communicating in concrete terms its ideas on democracy and reform through the elected executives, let alone promoting and implementing its alternative programmes in some pilot cases. These weaknesses in turn were used by the Aceh Party to label SIRA Party members and followers as *others,* which among people in rural Aceh is expressed with the term *awaknyan* (them) in contrast to *geutanyo* (us).

In addition to the characterisation of the SIRA Party as the child of the Aceh Party parents, Dahlan also illustrates how SIRA was deemed to be a ‘student wing’ of the main nationalist movement, headed, by the Aceh Party, and thus neither having a separate identity and ideology nor the same capacity as the elders. The bottom line was that the Aceh Party had adjusted to some crucial yet insufficient aspects of democracy in terms of elections.
in particular while also sustaining its legitimacy and authority, especially in rural Aceh by relating to customary rules and the capacity to deliver patronage in cooperation with businessmen and bureaucrats; while the SIRA Party wanted to build an alternative by basing itself more on ideas than on the very conflicts in the old system that called for new solutions. According to Dahlan:

There may be one Indonesian state but with room for two systems. And in the Aceh system the Aceh Party will be inclusive of all groups and aspirations similar to what Sukarno envisioned in his nation of ordinary people (*marhaens*), including farmers, fisher folk, intellectuals, religious scholars and so on.

The Party even succeeded in dividing Muslim communalities by supporting separate religious mass organisations. This may also explain some of the poor results for the local Muslim parties.

Meanwhile the SIRA Party failed to reinvent and re-orientate its origins as a coalition of NGOs that turned into a social movement for peaceful facilitation of what was referred to as socially egalitarian nationalism. The SIRA Party and its networks were fragile, divided and unfocused. For example, some SIRA Party members and supporter even had one foot in the SIRA Party and another in the Aceh Party. During the campaign, this became an obstacle for the SIRA Party. For example, the SIRA Party was reluctant to respond to any intimidations exclusions, and blockings in ways that might have been negative for the major party and thus have trigged the division of the SIRA-party itself. In other words, the SIRA Party had fallen short of transforming a student-based social movement that engaged and tried to influence various political leaders and pressure group into a well-structured political party that was based on the movement.

In addition, the SIRA Party did not really explore the political possibilities for promoting further democratisation as a roadmap in order to provide support for the victims of violence as well as farmers, fisher folks, businessmen and other interest groups in an impartial rather than clientilist way. The SIRA Party was not really able to articulate its ideology to the wider public in a specific and concrete way, beyond general statements that were not too different from those of the Aceh Party. Perhaps most remarkable of
all, the SIRA activists and GAM dissidents who had helped winning the 2006 elections were not able to optimise their positions as experts and administrators in office, as well as civil society activists, to strive for reform. Such endeavours could have developed more democratic access for ordinary people and other interest groups to public resources — as an alternative to the selected patronage that was offered by the conservative oriented GAM leaders and the Aceh Party. A particularly frustrating reason for this neglect was that the SIRA Party itself could be accused of some favouritism given the criticisms of Vice Governor Muhammad Nazar’s performance and his business related activities.

There were also few attempts by the GAM reformist leaders and SIRA affiliates to expose their role in the development of the democracy for peace roadmap that resulted in the MoU in Helsinki (c.f. Chapter 1 in this book).

As a result, the SIRA Party that was initially deemed to be a strong competitor to the Aceh Party was unable to present a viable alternative programme with concrete policy proposals and reach out widely. The SIRA Party continued to act in a quite passive and some would say careful way; explaining it with the aim of fostering some kind of reconciliation with the reform-oriented GAM leaders in particular and their followers on the same basis as in the 2006 elections. The reform oriented GAM leaders rejected, however, the idea of an independent political formation and many of them opted instead for reconciliation with the old GAM leaders and Aceh Party. In the process, the SIRA Party was even unable to reconsolidate and mobilise support from within the civil society movement. The SIRA Party and maybe other local parties too may have ignored the fact that the Aceh Party was working hard to compensate for its own weaknesses in this movement by incorporating a number of leaders and groups into its patronage system and become an effective political machine.

In the end, sections of the SIRA Party could not even accept these weaknesses but gave priority instead to complaints about fraud and intimidation during the election. Taufik Abda of the SIRA Party did not mention any other reason for the electoral debacle in our interview. ‘The SIRA Party had a better political infrastructure as compared to the other local parties except the Aceh Party (but) shockingly, we sometimes got even fewer votes than they did.’ Yet he
admitted that ‘The SIRA Party did not prepare for any contingency plan to deal with the bad implementation of the election system.’

In contrast to the Muslim-nationalist and vaguely social democratically oriented SIRA Party, the more radical socialist oriented Aceh People’s Party (PRA) did better than expected. Indeed as Dahlan pointed out, the PRA’s ideology was distinctively different from that of his own party and more clear cut than that of the SIRA Party. In the 2009 elections its performance was very close to that of the SIRA Party. At provincial level, the PRA won 1.70% of the vote, while SIRA fared only marginally better with 1.78%. It remains to be seen if these parties can work out a joint agenda and action plan in the future when the legal framework (of a 5% threshold for a party to participate in the next election) in any case forces them to alter their parties and restart under new names in face of new elections.

**Links to national parties**

The Aceh Party’s decision to enter into a secret ‘understanding’ with a national political party, the Democratic Party was surprising. It was only a few weeks before the election that it was widely known that senior Aceh Party leader Sofyan Dawood supported the Democratic Party’s campaign team in Aceh. Yet when we asked the Aceh Party’s secretary general, Yahya Muaz, about a secret alliance with the Democratic Party, he refuted this by saying that ‘this was the people’s business. We, from the Aceh Party had nothing to do with it. It was people’s business. As I have told you, the Aceh Party will never enter into a coalition with any other political parties.’

Answering our question about an understanding between the Aceh Party and the Democratic Party, at least after the elections, senior Aceh Party member Hasbi Abdullah gave a more diplomatic answer. He explained:

Not yet, but individually, members of our party have already conducted some lobbying with the members of the Democratic Party. They [the Democratic Party] will help us, especially with regard to people’s economic empowerment. Our consensus with the Democratic Party will be beneficial for both parties.
Furthermore, during the presidential election, a number of district heads and mayors close to the Aceh Party demonstrated their support for the Yudhoyono-Boediono candidates. Some even joined their campaign team, as did Governor Irwandi Yusuf (Serambi Indonesia, 2009b). Meanwhile the SIRA Party was split. Vice Governor Muhammad Nazar joined the Yudhoyono-Boediono team while others linked up with the Kalla-Wiranto team – and thus lost out once again.

There was of course no official support from the Aceh Party, as the party’s spokesperson Adnan Beuransah emphasised when talking to media (Serambi Indonesia, 2009c). And SIRA Party leader Taufik Abda said that the same applied for his party. ‘SIRA allows each of its members to be involved in any of the presidential candidates’ success teams.’ Possibly the Democratic Party gained most support because SBY was the most likely winner. For the Aceh Party there was no doubt about the main sympathies. When we asked whether or not there were some kind of political contract between the Aceh Party and the SBY team, Hasbi Abdullah stated:

*Insya Allah*, there is. SBY is the person who gave the permission to the Vice President to go ahead with the MoU in Helsinki. I think that is the point [of having political contract with Yudhoyono]. [That is] something people of Aceh have realised. (...) The people in Aceh only look at Yudhoyono, not the Democratic Party. The fact that Yudhoyono was behind the Democratic Party was enough. So, people consider Yudhoyono more because he was the leader behind the efforts for Aceh, even though Jusuf Kalla was also important. Also, when Kalla involved retired General Wiranto [with a bad reputation for the repression of Aceh] as his running mate for the next President-Vice President election, his image degraded.

On a more general level, Muhariadi from PKS said that it is important for the local political parties to maintain good and harmonious communication with Jakarta. According to Muhariadi, there are people in Jakarta as well as in Aceh who do not fully understand the points in the MoU and this must be sorted out otherwise, ‘this may trigger [bad] developments’. According to good communication within the elites such issues and such contacts can be facilitated ‘through other national parties who are represented in the DPR as well, including PKS’.
Thus, it seems that the efforts by the Aceh Party to link up with Jakarta are part of its attempts to secure its leadership in Aceh with central-level support. The Democratic Party as the national patron was the best possible choice. By being able to display close ties with the incumbent national level party that also supported the peace process, the signal to voters in Aceh was that the Aceh Party was ‘the safest option. In return, Irwandi and the Aceh Party delivered support as good clients of the Democratic Party. Jusuf Kalla, in contrast, was not deemed to be a sufficiently viable patron, given his poor results in the pre-election polls.

Perhaps equally important, the Aceh Party must have given major importance to the fact that SBY was the candidate with control over the police and the army. A few months before the election, there were concerns amongst Aceh Party supporters in particular due to the increase of terrorism in the province. This gave rise to fears that the peace might be at stake (ICG 2009). Unexpectedly however, on 19 February 2009, the Aceh chief of police was replaced, even though he had only served for one and a half years (Adhar 2009). Some presume that this rotation was due to the unsolved cases of terror and similar attacks in Aceh. This decision was obviously deemed very positively by the Aceh Party.

**Single local political party: a success or a failure?**

The Aceh Party was the only local party that survived the ‘natural selection’ within the formal democratic process together with President Yudhoyono and his Democratic Party. In addition, a number of other national political parties also won some seats in the local parliaments (DPRA/DPRK). In short, nothing was left for the non-GAM driven local parties at the provincial level, except a single seat from *ulemma* based PDA.

Remarkably, the current situation is thus close to the power sharing agreement between GAM and the Indonesian government that the latter offered in connection with the Helsinki negotiations but which at that point was declined by the reformists in the GAM delegation as well as by Ahtisaari (See Chapter 1.) The end result, therefore, was instead a democratic roadmap with free local elections where everybody would have to chance to participate, first with independent candidates and then local parties in addition to all-Indonesia national parties.
Initially reformist GAM and SIRA leaders expected that there would be a fair chance for all to form more than one local party and to compete in the elections – given that the concept of a multiparty system was to avoid power arrangement between elites, and ignore the genuine voice from below. According to Dahlan however, the Aceh Party is the only one that represents the nationalist aspirations of the Acehnese. There may well by other parties, especially ‘national parties’ but there is no space for additional local nationalist Aceh parties. Within the Aceh Party, however, according to Dahlan, there will be space for different interests and groups such as student activists, intellectuals, ulemma, fisher folk, farmers and so on.

One may wonder how this hegemonic ambition will affect the development of democracy in Aceh.

Responses to the Aceh Party’s landslide victory

Although there was neither consensus nor a clear understanding of Aceh’s transition from war to democratic peace and self government, the 2009 national election in Aceh was the final formal step that was prescribed in the Helsinki agreement. Thus many informants applauded the elections and the victory of the Aceh Party as ‘independence’ in another form that would prevent further disruptions to the peace process.

Accordingly, several informants argue also that the victory of the Aceh Party represents the voice of the Aceh people. Prof Fardi Wajdi from IAIN Ar-Raniry Banda Aceh explains:

In general, the Acehnese are very independent people. Having their own independency to choose whoever they want is part of their personality. This applies not only by those who live in the city, but also the ordinary villagers. The Acehnese are clever and know who deserves their votes.

Zubaidah Djohar, a researcher and woman activist, claims that the phenomenal Aceh Party victory is a point of departure for democratisation in Aceh, as anticipated by the Helsinki peace agreement. ‘This is the victory of the people, and it will be a huge icon of change for the Aceh government in the future’. She adds
that the victory sends a strong message to the central Indonesian government about how autonomous the people in the province really are:

Today, every province and district can decide its leader, its legislative member, and their future. So, the victory of the Aceh Party is not only a symbol of change for the Aceh people, but also for Indonesia in general, which should be noted by the central government. Thus there are no more reasons to delay the current process.

Activists in the national political parties say that the victory of the Aceh Party was expected. Fraud and intimidation, many suggest, are common in elections in any transitional society. ‘The result is quite good for a society in transition,’ says Muhariadi from the PKS. Moreover, the main representative of the PKB in Aceh, Marini, (who failed to be re-elected), says that the victory has revealed people’s aspirations. ‘Today, the people choose the Aceh Party. They have trusted in this party.’ Therefore, she adds, it is the obligation of the Aceh Party to fulfil their promises. ‘This victory which was claimed as the victory of the people of Aceh should be proved through various policies’. Similarly, Muhariadi points out that the dominance of the Aceh Party will bring hardship to the party itself in the future, if it fails to keep its promises.

The national parties that were successful in Aceh will of course also have to fulfil their promises during the elections to avoid criticism, but the main question is how legitimate and reliable the provincial parliament will be when the Aceh Party has become the only major local political party in the parliament.

The domination and its implications

Some of our informants note that the hegemonic position of the Aceh Party will make the government of Irwandi-Nazar more influential. Given that Irwandi has become a member of the party, some predict that it will be easier for him in particular to further his policies. Said Kamaruzzaman, argues that the relationship between executive and legislative will be less troublesome:
As for Governor Irwandi, who was also a GAM ex combatant, the Aceh Party’s victory will bring no difficulties to the executive in any policy formulation. There will be 33 members in DPRA, who came from Aceh Party. Irwandi’s vision and mission, thus the programmes that are people-oriented will be much easier to be implemented because they were having the same ‘ideology’.

It is important to recall, however, that Irwandi’s strong support for the Aceh Party did not generate a better result than his extraordinary achievement together with Nazar of the SIRA Party in the 2006 election. It will be interesting therefore, to see if Irwandi will rely only on the support of the Aceh Party if he plans to run and win the upcoming gubernatorial elections and local executives elections which begin in December 2011 and continue in 2012. Moreover, at the time of writing Irwandi’s popularity was decreasing and criticism of his administration increasing. Recently, for example, Tempo reported that the Aceh government had signed a deal with an airline business group with links to infamous business tycoon Tommy Winata (Tempo 12-18 October 2009. In short, Irwandi may either have to supplement his base in the Aceh Party with support from a Jakarta based party to withstand the criticism or reconsider his decision to abandon the progressive movement outside the Aceh Party to thus be able to improve his performance.

Some popular rooted interest groups have also expressed their worries that the Aceh Party will be unchallenged, and thus become overly powerful. Raden Samsul from the workers union stated his hope that the Aceh Party would deliver on its promises, but that he is also concerned about its domination in parliament. He explains:

We have great expectations [in terms of positive results] because of the victory of the Aceh Party. However, we are also worried that their dominant numbers in parliament may erode the quality of democracy. For example, the Aceh Party may think that there will be no need to develop intensive relations with the people who had voted for them, or they may undermine others because the people of Aceh have supported them so massively.
As discussed in Chapter 8 of this book, the local hegemony of the Aceh Party calls for some balancing powers to sustain and develop democracy. One special case in point is that the current regulation for next local elections in Aceh prohibits independent candidates, despite the fact that they are now permitted in other provinces. This means that only political parties with substantial representation in the provincial parliament can nominate candidates, which at worst paves the way for power sharing agreements between the Aceh Party and dominant national level parties, at the expense of all other local actors in Aceh. If the regulations are not altered there will be no alternative for pro-democracy organisations to re-emerge and foster the process of democratisation in this post-conflict society.

What is the response from the Aceh Party on the problem of political domination? In our interview, Hasbi Abdullah, states, ‘Since the Aceh Party dominates the DPRA, there is no need to have any coalition with any other parties, whenever we want to make decisions.’ Similarly, Yahya Muaz says, ‘The Aceh Party will not form a coalition with any other political parties.’ This is of course quite natural practice in a democracy based on majority decisions, but the problem is that dissidents and political minorities may not be given the opportunity to have their voices heard, either at present or in coming elections.

The New Order era was quite devastating in this respect. The majority (identified in formal elections) was represented by the Golkar Party, which in turn incorporated from above selected and screened representatives from various interest groups, ultimately following the patron. By now it is generally accepted that this system was a disaster for Aceh in particular by securing special privileges for the rulings groups and ignoring genuine aspirations from below. Therefore, the present majority that has won much more fair elections must still be balanced and controlled by effective opposition parties and dissidents in civil society, interest organisations and in the public discourse at large.

Unfortunately however, up until now, democratisation in Indonesia - including Aceh, has merely been about freedom and institutionalisation of electoral democracy, neglecting and often even negating basic values and rights in addition to supplementary forms of popular control over public affairs on the basis of political
equality, to quote the most common definition among scholars of the aim of democracy.

Given Indonesia’s past experience during the New Order era, there is thus a valid concern that the combination of a strong and not quite democratised executive and a ‘yes man’ legislative may foster the re-emergence of authoritarian tendencies. The obvious risk is that the executive and legislative may jointly neglect and perhaps even legitimate the already quite worrying practices of corruption, collusion and nepotism. Most seriously, ordinary people may be tempted to conform if there are no or few chances to voice their criticisms and promote their aspirations in an independent way.

Unfortunately there are already signs of this. For example, there was a huge demonstration supporting Irwandi’s leadership as the governor on 8 February 2010 to commemorate Irwandi-Nazar’s third year in office (Serambi Indonesia 2010b; Tempo Interaktif 2010). As reported by (Serambi Indonesia, 2010b), the masses called for support for Irwandi (without mentioning Nazar) as the governor of Aceh, and pleaded the same for the Aceh Party executives when visiting the party’s office. The party leaders confirmed their agreement to this demand. Reliable reports that the demonstration included subsidised participants suggests that Irwandi and the Aceh Party have began to influence the people by using their unchallenged domination (Serambi Indonesia 2010a, 2010b; Tempo Interaktif 2010).

Hasbi Abdullah brushed aside such concerns stating that the Aceh Party will put the public’s interest to the forefront, rather than defending the party’s interest.

We do not intend to be like that, because we are still thinking of the people’s interest. By having seats in parliament, we can figure out the fate of the Aceh people. We can try to change, and leave the authoritarian attitude. We sit in parliament solely for the sake of people’s interests.

Parallel to this statement, Yahya Muaz, reacts abruptly to any questions on possible Aceh Party plans to cooperate with other parties. ‘What a stupid question you have there’, he scolded, ‘everyone in the parliament will think only for the sake of Aceh—not thinking of the party.’ Any legislative members from the Aceh
Party will face consequences from the party if they break the law, or fall into corrupt practices. Both Yahya and Hasbi explain that there will be three warnings to any legislative member if there are any such practices. In the end, ‘the member might be replaced by others—if he/she does not change,’ Yahya confirmed.

These are encouraging statements, which anyway call for independent critics and a viable opposition to disclose irregular practices and oversee the implementation of corrective measures. Meanwhile, and similarly encouraging, Dahlan states that the Aceh Party may accept that the present rules and regulations for participation in the upcoming local elections of political executives need to be altered so that independent candidates can take part, which would prevent the total dominance of one local party only. It is immensely important that this positive statement is followed up by committed pro-democrats.

_The executive-legislative coalition: the endless KKN⁶_

Regardless of the promises from the Aceh Party, it is inevitable that the dynamics between the legislative and the political executive will now shift. The pattern of patronage will be altered and the issues of transparency and accountability must be considered. The Aceh Party has emphasised its strong support for the Irwandi government given that he has returned to his old roots. Yahya Muaz confirmed that the Aceh Party and the parliament will back the Irwandi government:

[The decision and policy making] will be faster. [Irwandi] will be very pleased, because as the executive, he can discuss [his programmes] with a legislative [dominated by] the same party that he has now joined (...) Up until recently, the Aceh parliament was very late in approving the local budget, which caused the delay of some programmes. We hope that we can cooperate with Irwandi’s government to improve this.

How will the governor respond to this support? While the governor still cannot control the old practices of favouritism and clientelism in his bureaucracy, of which he has been a staunch critic, it may now be even more difficult to contain the vested interests related to various public projects among businessmen-come-former combatants and activists.
Similarly it will be unfortunate if the new legislative is unable to accommodate the issues of improving the institutions for justice, human rights, gender equality and healthcare. There are widespread concerns that the legislators will be more eager to pursue their own economic and political agendas, including by providing special business and employment opportunities for supportive ex-combatants or improving their relations with Jakarta. If so, ordinary people may not be able to differentiate between the new and the old legislative. On the contrary, the favouritism that continues to provide economic and political privileges to particular interest groups may generate additional social problems related to the empowerment of the new elite in each district, lack of accountability and cooperation with independent civil society organisations and reluctance to public discourse, through media and otherwise.

In reality, as mentioned in Chapter 8 of this volume, the GAM/SIRA government did not shown any strong attempts or efforts to eradicate such practices in the bureaucracy. The old bureaucrats and the old corrupt practices are still there, new vested interests on the part of the ex-combatants in particular added to this, as well as the booming reconstruction businesses after the tsunami. And even if there may now be some improvements, the division of labour and co-operation between the executive and the former legislative was quite poor. This caused widespread dissatisfaction. As Said Kamaruzzaman recalls, the low performance has been serious:

Although GAM ex-combatants [and SIRA activists] won 9 out of 23 districts in the 2006 local elections, there were no significant achievements made during their leadership. Their communication was awful, including with the journalists. For example, the media often highlighted some imbalances [in budgeting and its implementation], which lead to the suspicion that corruption had played a role. The management of local budgeting was also considered as not legally correct. The internal monitoring was low. Those peculiarities were also found by the state budget monitoring institution (BPKP). This is the general picture of the performance from those who were elected as independent candidates.
So, what does the massive victory of one local party in alliance with the governor actually mean for the future of Aceh? Thamren Ananda of the PRA predicts that even if the Aceh Party’s domination may put pressure on Vice Governor Muhammad Nazar from the SIRA Party, the pressure will not be permanent. Thamren explains:

The victory of the Aceh Party might disrupt the vice governor a little bit, since he was from the SIRA Party -- the one that was really hated by the Aceh Party, especially during the campaign in face of the last legislative election. However, this will only by temporary, since the parties will not fight for their ideology and programmes. Instead, the leaders will only be interested in pragmatic distribution of power and resources, to ‘split the pie’ between the political elites, both in the executive and the legislative. The reason is that political relations are developed on the basis of such pragmatism, irrespective of opinions and ideology. As a result, the relationship will eventually turn out well. Although there will be conflict, this will not be because of different programmes and ideas but because of the uneven distribution of the pie. And that can be settled among the elite.

In addition, Dahlan confidently predicts that the SIRA Party will fall apart when it is no longer sharing power. In his view, ‘the SIRA Party has no distinct ideology other than the nationalism of its original mother party, the Aceh Party. So when the leaders lose access to resources they will disintegrate’. Obviously it is now up the SIRA Party activists to prove if he is wrong.

**Aceh local parties: the uncertain future**

When Governor Irwandi, who had often previously emphasised his neutral position, endorsed the Aceh Party as the only legitimate local party, democratisation in Aceh faced a serious challenge. Irwandi’s action sent mixed messages to former supporters of the joint Irwandi-Nazar ticket from 2006. This in turn carried the democracy-oriented ideas from the Helsinki negotiations, which had brought together SIRA activists, reform-oriented GAM members and ex-combatants in the ground who
wanted to build alternative governance beyond cooperation with national Indonesian parties (Chapter 1). Of course, Irwandi’s decision to join the Aceh Party was not entirely surprising, given that an earlier attempt to form a democracy-oriented GAM-based party, with which SIRA might have linked up, had been set aside and that the performance of the Irwandi-Nazar government was so poor that Irwandi in particular had to search for alternative backing. Yet his final decision was a major blow for the GAM reformists and SIRA activists whose general basis was the democratic roadmap from the MoU in general and the idea of political equality and fair competition between several local parties in particular.

Will there be a second chance for local political parties? Marini of the PKB emphasises the problem that even though the local Aceh Party won a massive victory in the elections for the provincial and district and city parliaments, that is not a victory for the other local parties. The defeated local parties, including the SIRA Party and the PRA won so few votes that they are no longer able nominate candidates for the 2011 elections. Also, due to the 5% threshold regulating the minimum share of votes for parties to be able to participate in new elections, they have to restart their parties with a new name to run in the next parliamentary elections.

Moreover, the successful informal alliance between a strong party local (the Aceh Party) and a ruling national party (the Democratic Party) means that other local parties and interests groups are likely to be neglected, and that the power sharing formula will be utilised in future negotiations on contentious issues such as the oil and gas revenue, the invitation of investors and the authorisation of customary laws (adat).

The political elimination of non-GAM driven local parties was shocking in an all-Indonesia framework too. There has been a widespread argument in favour of democratising the party system and to enable better political representation from below by allowing the growth of local political parties and not demand that poor people and activists must be able to mobilise enough funds to build national parties all around the vast country. Aceh in many ways was the test case. And in one sense the outcome was positive. Those who said that local parties would rely on ethnic and religious identities to such an extent that there would be more conflicts proved generally wrong. However, as we know it was only the Aceh Party
that succeeded, in a harsh campaign against local competitors, the SIRA Party in particular, and in what very much looks like a power sharing agreement with President Yudhoyono in Jakarta and his Democratic Party.

Regrettably, such arrangements were accepted and passively supported even by some foreign donors with the argument that stable peace called for at first hand political and economic inclusion of the former combatants whilst ignoring the prime idea of the MoU, namely that inclusion would be based on democracy rooted in political equality.

As already indicated, the failure of non-GAM driven parties may disqualify them form participation in future elections. Taufik Abda of the SIRA Party says that his party will try to file a judicial review to the Constitutional Court about the Electoral Threshold regulation for the local political parties.

We are going to review the rule of the electoral threshold for local political parties, regulated under Law No 11/2006, and compare it with the national parties who failed to meet the threshold, but could participate anyway in the 2009 election. (...) If we cannot review that regulation, we will prepare a new party based on the SIRA Party.

The other local political parties are equally upset about the different regulations on electoral threshold that allow a party to participate in the future elections. The limit for local parties is 5% of the votes while the limit for national parties is 2.5%. As also indicated, this is not only a matter of whether or not the small local parties can participate in the next parliamentary elections but also whether they will have the opportunity to nominate candidates in the next elections of local political executives due in 2011 – or if the Aceh Party will be the one and only local political force that can make nominations.

Thamren Ananda of the PRA even suspects there is a hidden master plan. ‘The central state tries to win over one local political party only’. With only one local party that matters in the provincial parliament, it will be easier to domesticate it, he argues. This was the reason, he adds, why the PRA party did not file further complaints about the election result. ‘We think more about saving the peace and continue the existence of local political parties.’
On the legal front, the small local parties thus seem to be opting for waiting and seeing what their fate will be, but what of their own plans for the future? Taufik Abda of the SIRA Party, for example, says that his political party will continue with their existing political training programme and try to contest future elections.

We will reconsolidate our party and give more emphasis to political education of our cadres, members and the people of Aceh (...) We will try to obtain most of the executive positions in the next local election in 2011-2012 and we also will try to win as many seats as possible in the next legislative elections in 2014.

The plans of the PRA are slightly different. At the time of writing, Thamren from the PRA said the party was looking to a plan to form an alliance with those other parties who had failed to pass the electoral threshold and in the process try find out if there is a possibility to form a new political party. ‘If we combine all of the votes won by those local political parties, we will be able to fulfil the electoral threshold and we can thus win a free ticket to fight in 2014 election.’ Moreover, the PRA also wants to initiate an extra parliamentary block, based on the losing local political parties. As PRA leader Thamren argued:

We will build political block outside parliament based on a joint programme involving local political parties besides the Aceh Party. This block will balance the parliamentary work, and provide alternative options for the people of Aceh. For example, we will suggest better alternative regulations than those put forward and passed in parliament, even when it comes to budgeting and monitoring. The main point is that the block will balance the parliament and challenge them to work better for the people of Aceh. At the same time, the people themselves will become more politically conscious.

While the SIRA Party’s plan seems to be less confident and somehow unrealistic, the idea of the extra-parliamentary block is innovative and opens up new necessary fields for democratic work, but the problem is that it may also foster undemocratic tendencies. It is important to consolidate the progressive ideas from pro-democracy
actors and enhance their capability as an alternative power. Yet, it will be counterproductive and only serve individual parties’ own aspirations if a broader political block is led by a political party or a coalition of political parties. This may eventually result in the same practices as those fostered by the Aceh Party, which subordinate (like old communist parties or Golkar) grassroots organisations to their own political aims and vested interests.

What of the future of the Aceh Party itself? What will happen if the Aceh Party fails to deliver on the expectations of its voters? Would that be the end for GAM-driven politics? Even though it is the hegemonic local political party, the Aceh Party is unlikely to fade away because of insufficient skills and inability to fulfil all its promises. Just like many similar nationalist parties in new post-colonial societies, the Aceh Party may survive as a populist and elite-centred party that can provide special privileges and general patronage to related professionals and experts in addition to business actors, informal communal leaders and, for a few years, ex-combatants. The Aceh Party is likely to maintain close relations with the Democratic Party as long as President Yudhoyono continues to serve as a leading patron of peace and business opportunities for the Aceh Party and its associates. In short, the Aceh Party seems likely to stand and fall with its populism and ability to distribute patronage as long as there are no viable chances for ordinary people to develop alternative and more democratic ways to influence public affairs and access public resources.

Meanwhile, however, the Aceh Party (as well as the small local parties) may also face internal divisions. Most parties are elite-driven with intense competition and poor internal representation by grassroots level supporters. Unfortunately, it is difficult to see in what way the Aceh Party may be reformed from within when the progressive faction has been weakened and disintegrated.

In short it is clear that the democratic dynamics related to local parties have petered out. One reason is quite clearly the difficulties of combining old ideological and mobilisational strength with electoral democracy. One of the most important issues here is that the progressive leaders in civil society have been scattered and divided during the last five years. There is also insufficient capacity to improve and develop their initial ideas, which seem to have been lost in the transition. And they have clearly failed to broaden the
political avenues and provide alternatives for democratisation. This is what produced the tragic loss of all local parties but the Aceh Party in the election. And while many activists have not just to pay back debts incurred to finance lost electoral battles, they also have to rethink and reorganise while the winners take it all within the safe haven of the kind of power sharing agreement that was resisted in Helsinki. For example, Irwandi may no longer resist pressures and demands from the Aceh Party as he is now servings as its loyal governor. As this chapter was being drafted, Irwandi decided, for example, to replace the head of the Aceh Reintegration Body (BRA) due to pressure from the Aceh Party. Ironically the head of BRA, M. Nur Djuli, had just succeeded in obtaining more funding from the central government for the rehabilitation of victims of violence, but as one of the progressive GAM leaders, who propelled the democracy agreement in Helsinki and defended its implementation without compromises he was of course highly disliked by the Aceh Party. Such decisions are likely to increase.

**Conclusion and recommendations**

Democracy in Aceh may be congratulated for the comparatively peaceful elections but has suffered a serious setback with the return of power sharing agreements. Some key players such as the governor changed their priorities and progressive groups proved unable to build an alternative to the hegemony of the Aceh Party.

Clearly, this calls for efforts to extend democracy beyond political parties and elections. In the interviews and analysis outlined in Chapter 8 - written ahead of the 2009 elections, most of the key political actors suggested that transition was limited to the formalities of electoral democracy. There were few if any ideas of how to foster democratic popular participation to overcome challenges such as patronage and clientelism. In this chapter we have analysed some of the negative consequences of this neglect.

The most obvious conclusion therefore is the importance to strengthen the basis for popular democratic representation through the establishment of people’s organisations, developed from below and nurtured with their own strength. This is not something that the people themselves and even less the political parties with their obvious special interests can do alone. Rather, the historical
experience of other cases such as Latin America, the south western Indian state of Kerala and Scandinavia is that demands from below for the introduction from above (i.e. from the local parliaments and governments) of institutional and reasonably democratic channels with which people can influence public decisions and hold the administration and politicians accountable have not just enabled people to have a say without relying to patrons but have also given clear incentives for popular-oriented movements to organise in relation to these channels rather than to turn to lobbying, local strongmen and political bosses.

The necessary demands from below call for the reconsolidation of democracy-oriented civil society organisations and of course the reformist agents of change from the GAM era. These alone cannot build popular movements, but they can help fostering the institutional arrangements which in turn may provide sufficient opportunities and incentives for people to engage rather than seek solutions as clients to patrons on various levels.

The extent to which leaders on the top such as Governor Irwandi or some of the district heads may provide space for such initiatives depends less on their ideological orientations unfortunately, than on how important they deem popular dissatisfaction and alternatives as compared to pragmatic cooperation with dominating local and national level actors.

In any case it is important to remember that democratic citizen-activists and reformists in the nationalist movement should not lose the momentum once again, and not overestimate their power. There are no shortcuts any more as was the case during the Helsinki negotiations. The democratic agents of change have to focus on alternative channels of popular influence and support for progressive policies.

This calls for a combination of effort among the progressive elite, experts and progressive leaders of citizen action groups. One of several possible approaches may be the re-fostering of innovative studies and training of alternative popular participation and inclusion in governance in cooperation between, on the one hand, experts as well as academicians and on the other hand, citizen activists and leaders of popular movements.

Another crucial task for civil society groups, academics and investigative journalists is to critically monitor and analyse
parliament and government, to counter the new hegemonic powers of the Aceh Party and the Democratic Party, foster alternative policies and increase public awareness.

Broad alliances between reformist leaders, experts and academics and of course civil society organisations towards alternative channels of democratic popular participation (rather than political party lead coalitions) should be able to focus on critical issues and reformulate alternative solutions, such as fighting corruption and fair access to public resources; more equal chances for women and vulnerable sections of the population; equal access to health and education; planning and budgeting priorities; the fostering of civil and human rights as well as democratic pacts to combine social welfare and economic growth. In the end, such efforts are unlikely to be sustainable if there is no attempt to build a supporting network based on like-minded people, both in Aceh and in Indonesia in general. This might be a balancing element, an alternative to the current trend of power sharing and patron-client relations with presidents and mainstream national political parties.
1 The Post-Script Analysis team consists of Dara Meutia Uning (lead author), Shadia Marhaban (coordinator), Afan Ramli, Murizal Hamzah and Olle Törnquist (contributor, supervisor and editor). The team is also grateful for fruitful insights and discussions with a number of Acehnese leaders and experts, especially M. Nur Djuli, and for comments by Teresa Birks.

2 General Wiranto is the former Minister of Defence during the Habibie era, who was condemned for human rights violations in East Timor, although it did not come up during the human rights trial in Jakarta. General Prabowo Subianto is the former son-in-law of Soeharto who was expelled from the army due to his involvement in the kidnapping, torture and possible murder of pro-democrat activists in 1997.

3 However, some political parties and individuals appealed through the courts regarding the results announced by the National Election Committee (KPU). In the end, the courts decided on several changes of seats distributions, both at provincial and district level. At the provincial level, the PDIP had to give up one seat to the PPP, which represents votes cast East Aceh, Langsa and Aceh Tamiang (Aceh 6 electorate districts). Changing in seats distribution at district level also took place in: (1), North Aceh: the Democratic Party had to give up one seat to the PPD; (2) Lhokseumawe: one seat of the PDA was given to the PBA; and (3) Nagan Raya: one seat of the PBR was given to the Aceh Party (Serambi Indonesia, 2009d).

4 The separate interview/discussion with Dahlan, referred to here and also later on in this chapter, was held in Banda Aceh on 22 November 2009.

5 According to media reports, the coordinator claimed that almost 29,000 people participated in the action, which was dominated by women (Serambi Indonesia, 2010b; Tempo Interaktif, 2010). Most of the participants came from Bireuen Regency, which is Irwandi’s hometown. On 9 February 2010, Serambi Indonesia reported that the coordinator of the demonstration who was known as a female former combatant declined the rumors that she was paid Rp 1.3 billion (approximately US$ 130,000) by Irwandi to organise the masses and the demonstration. She told that the funds were coming instead from Irwandi’s supporters in Thailand, the Philippines, and other countries (Serambi Indonesia, 2010b). Media reported that numbers of participants told that they just came for the money and free food, thus they had no idea of what the demonstration was aiming for (Serambi Indonesia, 2010b; Tempo Interaktif, 2010). Some of the female participants from West Aceh Regency were reported of being ‘fooled’ by their coordinator, because they were told that they are going to attend dzikir (mass prayer) to commemorate Irwandi-Nazar third year in the office. ‘We did not know that we are going to use to attend this demonstration’, these women said to the press – before they were forbidden to talk to the media (Serambi Indonesia, 2010a). Serambi Indonesia describes that albeit that these women were being paid and provided transport from West Aceh, they expressed regret to attend the event (2010a).

6 KKN stands for korupsi, kolusi dan nepotisme (corruption, collusion, and nepotism). It was widely used as to define the rotten practices of cooperation between politicians, bureaucrats, military and business leaders during the New Order and it continues to be used as a shorthand for similar tendencies even after Soeharto, though not with less elements of militarism and centralism, and with more powers to elected politicians.
References


Serambi Indonesia (2009f, 8 May) *Pansus DPRA: Kabinet Irwandi Minim Prestasi.*


Appendix

The tables (compiled by Dara Meutia Uning, guided by Olle Törnquist) may be also be read and used together with Chapter 6 ‘Regional Election in Aceh’.

Table 1
Election Results: Aceh Seats in DPR (2009)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Electoral District</th>
<th>National Political Party</th>
<th>Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Aceh I</strong> (Sabang, Banda Aceh, Aceh Besar, Pidie, Pidie Jaya, Aceh Jaya, West Aceh, Nagan Raya, Gayo Lues, South East Aceh, Aceh Singkil, Subulussalam, South West Aceh, South Aceh, Simeulue)</td>
<td>Democratic Party</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Golkar</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PKS</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PAN</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PPP</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Aceh II</strong> (Bireuen, Bener Meriah, Central Aceh, Lhokseumawe, North Aceh, East Aceh, Langsa, Aceh Tamiang)</td>
<td>Democratic Party</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Golkar</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PKS</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PAN</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: KIP Aceh, 2009
Table 2
Election Results and Seat Distribution for DPR-A (2009)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Electoral District</th>
<th>National Political Party</th>
<th>Local Political Party</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Party</td>
<td>Votes (%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aceh 1 (Sabang, Banda Aceh, Aceh Besar)</td>
<td>Democratic Party</td>
<td>15.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Golkar</td>
<td>9.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PKS</td>
<td>7.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PAN</td>
<td>5.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aceh 2 (Pidie, Pidie Jaya)</td>
<td>Democratic Party</td>
<td>4.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Golkar</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aceh 3 (Aceh Jaya, West Aceh, Nagan Raya)</td>
<td>Democratic Party</td>
<td>12.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Golkar</td>
<td>6.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PPP</td>
<td>5.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PAN</td>
<td>5.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PKS</td>
<td>4.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aceh 4 (Bireuen, Bener Meriah, Central Aceh)</td>
<td>Democratic Party</td>
<td>9.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Golkar</td>
<td>5.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PPP</td>
<td>4.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PKPI</td>
<td>4.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aceh 5 (Lhokseumawe, North Aceh)</td>
<td>Democratic Party</td>
<td>7.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PKS</td>
<td>2.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Golkar</td>
<td>2.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aceh 6 (East Aceh, Langsa, Aceh Tamiang)</td>
<td>Democratic Party</td>
<td>17.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PKS</td>
<td>3.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Golkar</td>
<td>3.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PPP</td>
<td>2.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party</td>
<td>Aceh 7 (Gayo Lues, South East Aceh, Aceh Singkil, Subulussalam)</td>
<td>Aceh 8 (South West Aceh, South Aceh, Simeulue)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Golkar</td>
<td>23.95</td>
<td>10.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Party</td>
<td>8.36</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAN</td>
<td>8.10</td>
<td>5.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PKB</td>
<td>7.35</td>
<td>4.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patriot</td>
<td>4.82</td>
<td>4.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pa</td>
<td>8.33</td>
<td>40.39</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: KIP Aceh, 2009
Table 3
Seat Distribution for DPR-K (2009)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Electoral District</th>
<th>National Political Party</th>
<th>Seats</th>
<th>Local Political Party</th>
<th>Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sabang</td>
<td>Golkar</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>PA</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Democratic Party, PKS, PAN, PBB</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PDK, PBR</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Banda Aceh</td>
<td>Democratic Party</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>PA</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PKS</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>PDA</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Golkar</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>SIRA</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PBB</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aceh Besar</td>
<td>Democratic Party, PAN</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>PA</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PKS, Golkar</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>PDA</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PBB</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pidie</td>
<td>Demokrat</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>PA</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PKS, Golkar</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>PDA, SIRA</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PBR</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pidie Jaya</td>
<td>PAN</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>PA</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PPP</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PDK, Democratic Party, PKNU</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aceh Jaya</td>
<td>Democratic Party, PPP</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>PA</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Golkar</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>PDA</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Aceh</td>
<td>Democratic Party, PKS</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>PA</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PAN, Golkar</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>PDA, PRA, PBA</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PKPI, PKB, PPP, PDI-P, Patriot, Buruh</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Party</td>
<td>Seats</td>
<td>PA Seats</td>
<td>Total Seats</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nagan Raya</td>
<td>Democratic Party, PBB</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>PA 5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PAN, Golkar, PDI-P</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PBR, Hanura, PKPB, PKPI, PKS, PKB, PPP, Patriot</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bireuen</td>
<td>Democratic Party</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>PA 25</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PAN, PPP</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>PBA 1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PKS</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bener Meriah</td>
<td>Golkar</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>PA 3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Democratic Party</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hanura, PKPI, PAN, PDI-P, PBR</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>PDA 1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PKPB, Gerindra</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Aceh</td>
<td>Democratic Party</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>PA 3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Golkar</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hanura, PPD, PKPI, PAN, PPP, Patriot, PKNU</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PKPB, Gerindra, PKS, PBB, PDI-P, PSI</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lhokseumawe</td>
<td>Democratic Party</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>PA 14</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PKS, PAN</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>PBA 1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Golkar, PPP</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Aceh</td>
<td>Democratic Party</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>PA 32</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PKS, PAN, Golkar, PPP, PBB, PDI-P, PSI, PPD</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>SIRA 1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Aceh</td>
<td>Democratic Party</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>PA 25</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PKPI, Golkar</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>PDA, SIRA, PBA</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region</td>
<td>Party</td>
<td>Seats</td>
<td>Alliances</td>
<td>Seats</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Langsa</td>
<td>Democratic Party</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>PA</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Golkar</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hanura, PKS, PAN</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>SIRA</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Gerindra, PPP, PDI-P, PBR, PKNU</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aceh Tamiang</td>
<td>Democratic Party</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>PA</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PAN, PPP, PDI-P</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PKS, Golkar</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>PBA</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PKPI, PNBKI, PBR, PBA</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gayo Lues</td>
<td>Golkar</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>PA</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PAN, Kedaulatan, Democratic Party</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hanura, PPRN, PKPI, PKS, PPD, PKB, PDK, PPP, PNBKI, PIS</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South East Aceh</td>
<td>Golkar</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>PA</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PKS, PKPI, PPD, PPPI, PNI Marhaenisme, PDP</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hanura, Gerindra, PAN, PDK, PNBKI, Patriot, PKNU, PSI</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aceh Singkil</td>
<td>Golkar</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PKPI</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PKB, PPI, PBR, Democratic Party</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hanura, PPRN, Gerindra, PAN, PPD, PMB, PBB, PDI-P</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subulussalam</td>
<td>Golkar, PKPI</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hanura, PAN, PBB, Kedaulatan</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PKB, PPP, PDI-P, PBR, PKPB, Democratic Party</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South West Aceh</td>
<td>Democratic Party, PAN</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>PA</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Golkar, PPP</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PKPB, PKPI, PDP, PMB, PBB, PDK</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Aceh</td>
<td>Democratic Party, PKPI</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>PA</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Golkar, PKPB</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PAN</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>SIRA, PRA</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PPRN, PPP</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Simeulue</td>
<td>Democratic Party, Golkar, PDI-P, PBR</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>PA</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PKPB, PPRN, PKS, PAN, PPI, PMB, PDK, PPP, PBB, PIS</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: KIP Aceh, 2009
## Table 4
Comparison of Election Results
(DPR-A, Governor-Vice Governor, District Head/Mayor)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PA</td>
<td>Votes (%)</td>
<td>Irwandi-Nazar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sabang</td>
<td>Win</td>
<td>33.98</td>
<td>Win</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Banda Aceh</td>
<td>Win</td>
<td>21.47</td>
<td>Lose</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aceh Besar</td>
<td>Win</td>
<td>35.57</td>
<td>Win</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pidie</td>
<td>Win</td>
<td>75.85</td>
<td>Lose</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pidie Jaya</td>
<td>Win</td>
<td>70.81</td>
<td>N/A)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aceh Jaya</td>
<td>Win</td>
<td>61.40</td>
<td>Win</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Aceh</td>
<td>Win</td>
<td>31.77</td>
<td>Win</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nagan Raya</td>
<td>Win</td>
<td>30.18</td>
<td>Win</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bireuen</td>
<td>Win</td>
<td>71.38</td>
<td>Win</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bener Meriah</td>
<td>Lose</td>
<td>12.63</td>
<td>Lose</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Aceh</td>
<td>Lose</td>
<td>11.68</td>
<td>Lose</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lhokseumawe</td>
<td>Win</td>
<td>58.62</td>
<td>Win</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District</td>
<td>Winner Outcome</td>
<td>1st Round</td>
<td>Winner Percentage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>-------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Aceh</td>
<td>Win</td>
<td>72.37</td>
<td>Win</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Aceh</td>
<td>Win</td>
<td>69.84</td>
<td>Win</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Langsa</td>
<td>Win</td>
<td>31.35</td>
<td>Win</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aceh Tamiang</td>
<td>Win</td>
<td>28.19</td>
<td>Lose</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gayo Lues</td>
<td>Lose</td>
<td>14.45</td>
<td>Win</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South East Aceh</td>
<td>Lose</td>
<td>6.92</td>
<td>Win</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aceh Singkil</td>
<td>Lose</td>
<td>5.44</td>
<td>Lose</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subulussalam</td>
<td>Lose</td>
<td>8.63</td>
<td>N/A)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South West Aceh</td>
<td>Win</td>
<td>45.91</td>
<td>Win</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Aceh</td>
<td>Win</td>
<td>39.08</td>
<td>Win</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Simeulue</td>
<td>Win</td>
<td>35.03</td>
<td>Win</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:**

*During the election, the district was not established yet.

** There was no independent KPA/SIRA candidate.
Table 5
Presidential Election Results by District (2009)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Electoral District</th>
<th>Eligible Voters</th>
<th>Votes counted (%)</th>
<th>Megawati-Prabowo</th>
<th>SBY-Boediono</th>
<th>Jk-Wiranto</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Votes (%)</td>
<td>Votes (%)</td>
<td>Votes (%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sabang</td>
<td>22,455</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>976 (6.6%)</td>
<td>13,607 (92%)</td>
<td>976 (6.6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Banda Aceh</td>
<td>143,148</td>
<td>91,105 (63.64%)</td>
<td>1,176 (1.29%)</td>
<td>82,608 (90.67%)</td>
<td>7,321 (8.04%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aceh Besar</td>
<td>230,980</td>
<td>176,219 (76.29%)</td>
<td>1,704 (0.97%)</td>
<td>166,778 (94.64%)</td>
<td>7,737 (4.39%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pidie</td>
<td>266,021</td>
<td>200,043 (75.20%)</td>
<td>1,691 (0.85%)</td>
<td>190,264 (95.11%)</td>
<td>8,088 (4.04%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pidie Jaya</td>
<td>94,401</td>
<td>68,086 (72.12%)</td>
<td>518 (0.76%)</td>
<td>64,845 (95.24%)</td>
<td>2,723 (4.00%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aceh Jaya</td>
<td>51,756</td>
<td>36,391 (70.13%)</td>
<td>355 (0.98%)</td>
<td>34,767 (95.54%)</td>
<td>1,269 (3.49%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Aceh</td>
<td>115,167</td>
<td>33,938 (29.47%)</td>
<td>468 (1.38%)</td>
<td>32,394 (95.45%)</td>
<td>1,076 (3.17%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nagan Raya</td>
<td>95,278</td>
<td>77,321 (81.15%)</td>
<td>1,633 (2.11%)</td>
<td>70,792 (91.56%)</td>
<td>4,896 (6.33%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bireuen</td>
<td>265,758</td>
<td>143,266 (53.89%)</td>
<td>865 (53.89%)</td>
<td>138,727 (96.86%)</td>
<td>3,634 (2.54%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bener Meriah</td>
<td>78,972</td>
<td>66,654 (84.40%)</td>
<td>4,657 (6.99%)</td>
<td>58,946 (88.44%)</td>
<td>3,051 (4.58%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Aceh</td>
<td>115,431</td>
<td>72,012 (62.39%)</td>
<td>3,714 (5.16%)</td>
<td>63,814 (88.62%)</td>
<td>4,484 (6.23%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lhokseumawe</td>
<td>118,880</td>
<td>9,195 (7.73%)</td>
<td>62 (0.67%)</td>
<td>8,752 (95.18%)</td>
<td>381 (4.14%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Aceh</td>
<td>351,992</td>
<td>13,061 (3.71%)</td>
<td>155 (1.19%)</td>
<td>12,431 (95.18%)</td>
<td>475 (3.64%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Aceh</td>
<td>234,936</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>157,152 (93.36%)</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Langsa</td>
<td>97,618</td>
<td>70,795 (72.52%)</td>
<td>2,133 (3.01%)</td>
<td>64,954 (91.75%)</td>
<td>3,708 (5.24%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Votes</td>
<td>(Percentage)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aceh Tamiang</td>
<td>170,731</td>
<td>(71.69%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>122,395</td>
<td>(71.69%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9,040</td>
<td>(7.39%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>108,102</td>
<td>(88.32%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5,253</td>
<td>(4.29%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gayo Lues</td>
<td>51,427</td>
<td>(71.69%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>43,347</td>
<td>(71.69%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2,030</td>
<td>(7.39%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>39,022</td>
<td>(71.69%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2,295</td>
<td>(4.29%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South East Aceh</td>
<td>122,428</td>
<td>(71.69%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6,503</td>
<td>(71.69%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>56</td>
<td>(7.39%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6,328</td>
<td>(71.69%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>119</td>
<td>(4.29%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aceh Singkil</td>
<td>62,299</td>
<td>(71.69%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>26,415</td>
<td>(71.69%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1,819</td>
<td>(71.69%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>22,851</td>
<td>(71.69%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1,745</td>
<td>(71.69%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subulussalam</td>
<td>37,638</td>
<td>(71.69%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>27,544</td>
<td>(71.69%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1,065</td>
<td>(71.69%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>24,840</td>
<td>(71.69%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1,639</td>
<td>(71.69%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South West Aceh</td>
<td>89,779</td>
<td>(71.69%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>42,424</td>
<td>(71.69%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>401</td>
<td>(71.69%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>40,467</td>
<td>(71.69%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1,556</td>
<td>(71.69%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Aceh</td>
<td>140,195</td>
<td>(71.69%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>81,902</td>
<td>(71.69%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>752</td>
<td>(71.69%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>78,744</td>
<td>(71.69%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2,406</td>
<td>(71.69%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Simeulue</td>
<td>50,945</td>
<td>(71.69%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>41,179</td>
<td>(71.69%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>753</td>
<td>(71.69%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>37,600</td>
<td>(71.69%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2,826</td>
<td>(71.69%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes:
1. These figures are based on the data available from KIP Aceh. However, due to the time constraints and the limited data, some figures in the detailed result in each electoral districts cannot be completed. Some of them are unavailable, thus they are marked as “N/A” (stands for “not available”).
2. Total of eligible voters for the presidential election are 3,008,235. The voters turn out are 2,309,256. The detailed results of the presidential election for each electoral district reflect only 1,449,755 votes that had been counted up until 8 July 2009 by 10 AM. However, only for Sabang and Aceh Timur, the figures were extracted from media reports quoting KIP Aceh. They were serambinews.com (8 July 2009) and analisadaily.com (9 July 2009) respectively.
Table 6
Legislative Election Results by District

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ELECTORAL DISTRICT</th>
<th>Voter turnout</th>
<th>National Party</th>
<th>Votes</th>
<th>Percentage (%)</th>
<th>Local Party</th>
<th>Votes</th>
<th>Percentage (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sabang</td>
<td>16,413</td>
<td>Golkar</td>
<td>1,939</td>
<td>13.39</td>
<td>PA</td>
<td>4,920</td>
<td>33.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Democratic Party</td>
<td>1,933</td>
<td>13.35</td>
<td>SIRA</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>1.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>PKPI</td>
<td>1,508</td>
<td>10.42</td>
<td>PDA</td>
<td>207</td>
<td>1.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>PKS</td>
<td>779</td>
<td>5.38</td>
<td>PRA</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>0.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>PBB</td>
<td>583</td>
<td>4.03</td>
<td>PAAS</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>0.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>PPP</td>
<td>348</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>PBA</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>0.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Banda Aceh</td>
<td>78,591</td>
<td>Democratic Party</td>
<td>17,008</td>
<td>23.44</td>
<td>PA</td>
<td>15,578</td>
<td>21.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>PKS</td>
<td>9,346</td>
<td>12.88</td>
<td>PDA</td>
<td>2,792</td>
<td>3.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Golkar</td>
<td>8,850</td>
<td>12.19</td>
<td>SIRA</td>
<td>1,643</td>
<td>2.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>PAN</td>
<td>3,345</td>
<td>4.61</td>
<td>PRA</td>
<td>1,041</td>
<td>1.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>PPP</td>
<td>2,895</td>
<td>3.99</td>
<td>PBA</td>
<td>295</td>
<td>0.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>PAAS</td>
<td>203</td>
<td>0.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aceh Besar</td>
<td>176,103</td>
<td>Democratic Party</td>
<td>19,849</td>
<td>12.28</td>
<td>PA</td>
<td>57,606</td>
<td>35.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Golkar</td>
<td>13,446</td>
<td>8.30</td>
<td>PDA</td>
<td>10,247</td>
<td>6.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>PAN</td>
<td>10,628</td>
<td>6.56</td>
<td>PRA</td>
<td>4,622</td>
<td>2.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>PKS</td>
<td>9,256</td>
<td>5.71</td>
<td>SIRA</td>
<td>2,617</td>
<td>1.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>PPP</td>
<td>7,815</td>
<td>4.82</td>
<td>PBA</td>
<td>915</td>
<td>0.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>PBB</td>
<td>5,739</td>
<td>3.54</td>
<td>PAAS</td>
<td>618</td>
<td>0.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pidie</td>
<td>205,871</td>
<td>Democratic Party</td>
<td>9,036</td>
<td>4.51</td>
<td>PA</td>
<td>152,048</td>
<td>75.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Golkar</td>
<td>5,023</td>
<td>2.50</td>
<td>PDA</td>
<td>5,187</td>
<td>2.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>PKS</td>
<td>4,610</td>
<td>2.29</td>
<td>SIRA</td>
<td>3,551</td>
<td>1.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>PPP</td>
<td>3,162</td>
<td>1.57</td>
<td>PRA</td>
<td>2,899</td>
<td>1.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>PAN</td>
<td>2,865</td>
<td>1.43</td>
<td>PBA</td>
<td>825</td>
<td>0.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>PAAS</td>
<td>713</td>
<td>0.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area</td>
<td>Votes</td>
<td>Democratic Party</td>
<td>Vote %</td>
<td>PA</td>
<td>Vote %</td>
<td>PPP</td>
<td>Vote %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>--------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pidie Jaya</td>
<td>75,090</td>
<td>2,470</td>
<td>3.51</td>
<td>3,164</td>
<td>4.50</td>
<td>49,759</td>
<td>70.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1,896</td>
<td>2.69</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1,242</td>
<td>1.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1,697</td>
<td>2.41</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1,043</td>
<td>1.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1,023</td>
<td>1.46</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>248</td>
<td>0.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aceh Jaya</td>
<td>40,948</td>
<td>3,411</td>
<td>9.31</td>
<td>22,483</td>
<td>56.14</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1,874</td>
<td>5.11</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>881</td>
<td>2.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1,554</td>
<td>4.24</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>859</td>
<td>2.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>701</td>
<td>1.79</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>709</td>
<td>1.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>671</td>
<td>1.67</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>147</td>
<td>0.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Aceh</td>
<td>88,471</td>
<td>9,036</td>
<td>11.34</td>
<td>25,300</td>
<td>28.88</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5,023</td>
<td>6.30</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2,578</td>
<td>2.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4,730</td>
<td>5.94</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1,892</td>
<td>2.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4,036</td>
<td>5.07</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1,437</td>
<td>1.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3,164</td>
<td>3.97</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1,182</td>
<td>1.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nagan Raya</td>
<td>78,684</td>
<td>9,005</td>
<td>12.72</td>
<td>21,374</td>
<td>27.45</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5,382</td>
<td>7.60</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1,520</td>
<td>1.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4,672</td>
<td>6.59</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1,285</td>
<td>1.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3,836</td>
<td>5.42</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>946</td>
<td>1.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2,195</td>
<td>3.09</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>868</td>
<td>1.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bireuen</td>
<td>216,842</td>
<td>12,527</td>
<td>6.14</td>
<td>145,552</td>
<td>67.38</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>6,871</td>
<td>3.37</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5,077</td>
<td>2.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5,483</td>
<td>2.69</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2,330</td>
<td>1.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4,852</td>
<td>2.38</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2,074</td>
<td>1.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3,536</td>
<td>1.73</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2,018</td>
<td>0.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>950</td>
<td>0.46</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>544</td>
<td>0.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Votes</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Votes</td>
<td>%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PKPI</td>
<td>12,093</td>
<td>16.72</td>
<td>PA</td>
<td>9,137</td>
<td>12.63</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Golkar</td>
<td>8,792</td>
<td>12.15</td>
<td>SIRA</td>
<td>1,406</td>
<td>1.94</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bener Meriah</td>
<td>Democratic Party</td>
<td>7,578</td>
<td>10.47</td>
<td>PDA</td>
<td>969</td>
<td>1.34</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PAN</td>
<td>7,157</td>
<td>9.89</td>
<td>PAAS</td>
<td>528</td>
<td>0.73</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PBR</td>
<td>5,761</td>
<td>7.96</td>
<td>PRA</td>
<td>471</td>
<td>0.65</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PKS</td>
<td>3,975</td>
<td>5.49</td>
<td>PBA</td>
<td>278</td>
<td>0.38</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PPP</td>
<td>3,782</td>
<td>5.22</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Aceh</td>
<td>Democratic Party</td>
<td>14,967</td>
<td>17.2</td>
<td>PA</td>
<td>10,166</td>
<td>11.68</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Golkar</td>
<td>8,075</td>
<td>9.28</td>
<td>SIRA</td>
<td>973</td>
<td>1.12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PBR</td>
<td>7,632</td>
<td>8.77</td>
<td>PBA</td>
<td>801</td>
<td>0.92</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PPP</td>
<td>7,354</td>
<td>8.45</td>
<td>PAAS</td>
<td>725</td>
<td>0.83</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PKPI</td>
<td>4,810</td>
<td>5.53</td>
<td>PRA</td>
<td>489</td>
<td>0.56</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PDA</td>
<td>435</td>
<td>0.49</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lhokseumawe</td>
<td>Democratic Party</td>
<td>9,871</td>
<td>13.38</td>
<td>PA</td>
<td>43,229</td>
<td>58.62</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PKS</td>
<td>4,123</td>
<td>5.59</td>
<td>PDA</td>
<td>1,894</td>
<td>2.57</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Golkar</td>
<td>2,626</td>
<td>3.56</td>
<td>SIRA</td>
<td>1,668</td>
<td>2.26</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PAN</td>
<td>2,080</td>
<td>2.82</td>
<td>PRA</td>
<td>1,138</td>
<td>1.54</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PPP</td>
<td>1,267</td>
<td>1.72</td>
<td>PAAS</td>
<td>514</td>
<td>0.69</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PBA</td>
<td>499</td>
<td>0.68</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Aceh</td>
<td>Democratic Party</td>
<td>16,646</td>
<td>6.58</td>
<td>PA</td>
<td>182,945</td>
<td>72.37</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Golkar</td>
<td>5,297</td>
<td>2.09</td>
<td>PRA</td>
<td>3,939</td>
<td>1.56</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PPP</td>
<td>4,590</td>
<td>1.81</td>
<td>SIRA</td>
<td>3,929</td>
<td>1.55</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PKS</td>
<td>3,813</td>
<td>1.50%</td>
<td>PDA</td>
<td>3,479</td>
<td>1.38</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PAN</td>
<td>2,763</td>
<td>1.09</td>
<td>PBA</td>
<td>2,223</td>
<td>0.88</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PAAS</td>
<td>1,601</td>
<td>0.63</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Aceh</td>
<td>Democratic Party</td>
<td>15,179</td>
<td>8.89</td>
<td>PA</td>
<td>119,280</td>
<td>69.84</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Golkar</td>
<td>3,773</td>
<td>2.20</td>
<td>PDA</td>
<td>3,046</td>
<td>1.78</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PPP</td>
<td>3,621</td>
<td>2.12</td>
<td>PRA</td>
<td>2,629</td>
<td>1.54</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Gerindra</td>
<td>2,064</td>
<td>1.20</td>
<td>PBA</td>
<td>1,647</td>
<td>0.96</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PKS</td>
<td>1,844</td>
<td>1.08</td>
<td>SIRA</td>
<td>1,547</td>
<td>0.90</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PAAS</td>
<td>816</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area</td>
<td>Votes</td>
<td>Democratic Party</td>
<td>Party A</td>
<td>Party B</td>
<td>Party C</td>
<td>Party D</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Langsa</td>
<td>70,996</td>
<td>16,053</td>
<td>24.99</td>
<td>PA</td>
<td>20,130</td>
<td>31.35</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5,039</td>
<td>7.85</td>
<td>PRA</td>
<td>1,048</td>
<td>1.63</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3,885</td>
<td>6.05</td>
<td>SIRA</td>
<td>990</td>
<td>1.54</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2,589</td>
<td>4.03</td>
<td>PDA</td>
<td>780</td>
<td>1.21</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1,871</td>
<td>2.91</td>
<td>PAAS</td>
<td>601</td>
<td>0.94</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1,488</td>
<td>2.32</td>
<td>PBA</td>
<td>329</td>
<td>0.51</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aceh Tamiang</td>
<td>126,461</td>
<td>27,671</td>
<td>25.08</td>
<td>PA</td>
<td>31,098</td>
<td>28.19</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>7,826</td>
<td>6.60</td>
<td>PRA</td>
<td>2,736</td>
<td>2.48</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5,029</td>
<td>4.56</td>
<td>PBA</td>
<td>1,877</td>
<td>1.70</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4,315</td>
<td>3.91</td>
<td>SIRA</td>
<td>1,594</td>
<td>1.44</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4,162</td>
<td>3.77</td>
<td>PAAS</td>
<td>543</td>
<td>0.49</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3,258</td>
<td>2.95</td>
<td>PDA</td>
<td>362</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gayo Lues</td>
<td>45,950</td>
<td>9,056</td>
<td>22.27</td>
<td>PA</td>
<td>5,876</td>
<td>14.45</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4,191</td>
<td>10.30</td>
<td>PDA</td>
<td>796</td>
<td>1.96</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3,144</td>
<td>7.73</td>
<td>SIRA</td>
<td>452</td>
<td>1.11</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2,504</td>
<td>6.16</td>
<td>PRA</td>
<td>356</td>
<td>0.88</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1,984</td>
<td>4.88</td>
<td>PAAS</td>
<td>338</td>
<td>0.83</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1,274</td>
<td>3.13</td>
<td>PBA</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>682</td>
<td>1.68</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South East</td>
<td>112,708</td>
<td>32,924</td>
<td>32.69</td>
<td>PA</td>
<td>6,974</td>
<td>6.92</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aceh</td>
<td></td>
<td>9,319</td>
<td>9.25</td>
<td>SIRA</td>
<td>1,688</td>
<td>1.68</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>8,438</td>
<td>8.38</td>
<td>PRA</td>
<td>1,109</td>
<td>1.10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>7,330</td>
<td>7.28</td>
<td>PDA</td>
<td>255</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4,625</td>
<td>4.59</td>
<td>PAAS</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>PBA</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aceh Singkil</td>
<td>47,740</td>
<td>10,160</td>
<td>25.22</td>
<td>PA</td>
<td>2,191</td>
<td>5.44</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3,169</td>
<td>7.87</td>
<td>PRA</td>
<td>667</td>
<td>1.65</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3,168</td>
<td>7.86</td>
<td>SIRA</td>
<td>189</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2,562</td>
<td>6.36</td>
<td>PBA</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2,221</td>
<td>5.51</td>
<td>PAAS</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>50</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>PDA</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Subulussalam

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Votes</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Votes</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PAN</td>
<td>5,769</td>
<td>21.12</td>
<td>PA</td>
<td>2,358</td>
<td>8.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Golkar</td>
<td>2,785</td>
<td>10.19</td>
<td>PRA</td>
<td>235</td>
<td>0.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Party</td>
<td>3,364</td>
<td>12.31</td>
<td>SIRA</td>
<td>169</td>
<td>0.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PBB</td>
<td>1,539</td>
<td>5.63</td>
<td>PBA</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>0.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PKS</td>
<td>1,361</td>
<td>4.98</td>
<td>PDA</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>0.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patriot</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>PAAS</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>0.06</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### South West Aceh

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Votes</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Votes</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Party</td>
<td>5,838</td>
<td>9.56</td>
<td>PA</td>
<td>28,048</td>
<td>45.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAN</td>
<td>3,119</td>
<td>5.10</td>
<td>PRA</td>
<td>2,318</td>
<td>3.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPP</td>
<td>2,731</td>
<td>4.47</td>
<td>SIRA</td>
<td>722</td>
<td>1.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PKB</td>
<td>1,851</td>
<td>3.03</td>
<td>PDA</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>0.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PKS</td>
<td>1,844</td>
<td>3.02</td>
<td>PAAS</td>
<td>351</td>
<td>0.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PBB</td>
<td>1,142</td>
<td>1.87</td>
<td>PBA</td>
<td>247</td>
<td>0.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>PBA</td>
<td>247</td>
<td>0.40</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### South Aceh

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Votes</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Votes</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Party</td>
<td>11,904</td>
<td>12.48</td>
<td>PA</td>
<td>37,274</td>
<td>39.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAN</td>
<td>5,306</td>
<td>5.56</td>
<td>SIRA</td>
<td>3,159</td>
<td>3.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPP</td>
<td>4,633</td>
<td>4.85</td>
<td>PRA</td>
<td>2,532</td>
<td>2.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PBR</td>
<td>3,320</td>
<td>3.48</td>
<td>PDA</td>
<td>1,371</td>
<td>1.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Golkar</td>
<td>3,044</td>
<td>3.19</td>
<td>PBA</td>
<td>1,008</td>
<td>1.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PBB</td>
<td>1,575</td>
<td>1.65</td>
<td>PAAS</td>
<td>649</td>
<td>0.68</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Simeulue

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Votes</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Votes</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PBB</td>
<td>5,922</td>
<td>14.98</td>
<td>PA</td>
<td>13,847</td>
<td>35.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Party</td>
<td>3,139</td>
<td>7.94</td>
<td>SIRA</td>
<td>449</td>
<td>1.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Golkar</td>
<td>2,191</td>
<td>5.54</td>
<td>PRA</td>
<td>419</td>
<td>1.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PKS</td>
<td>1,744</td>
<td>4.41</td>
<td>PBA</td>
<td>337</td>
<td>0.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAN</td>
<td>1,571</td>
<td>3.97</td>
<td>PDA</td>
<td>222</td>
<td>0.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>PAAS</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>0.24</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: KIP Aceh*

**Notes:**

1. Total of eligible voters for the legislative election: 3,009,965. Voter turnout: 2,266,713.
Post script: Political vendetta or a democratic alternative?*  
(By Post Script Analysis Team)

As demonstrated in this book, the inclusive democratic framework that was drafted in the Helsinki peace agreement and upheld by the winning coalition in the 2006 elections was crucial for peace and reconstruction in Aceh. As also shown however, their aspiration to further develop and use democracy as a basis for social and economic welfare in Aceh has proved impossible to sustain. There are many factors behind this, including resistance from Jakarta, as well as the drawbacks of international support for reconstruction and so called good governance. But here we highlight four of the main reasons that stand out because they call for immediate action from the actors in Aceh themselves.

The first and primary reason is the top down character of the political groups in Aceh. In order to advance politically, to build new political vehicles, to mobilise supporters and to lobby and network, these groups often use old command structures (especially the KPA) and links to traditional loyalties on the one hand and middle class and student civil society action groups on the other. In this process they also utilise political positions and contacts to promote their own interests as well as those of their supporters.

Second and most importantly, there is no viable alternative to this top down command and action group politics adaptation of the supposedly democratic framework. There are still no popular organisations or for a based on interests and ideas about social and economic change that could keep politicians accountable and constitute the basis for alternative politics, improved governance

---

1 This text is inserted as post cript in Törnquist, Olle, Stanley Adi Prasetyo, and Teresa Birks (2009, eds.). *Aceh: the Role of Democracy for Peace and Reconstruction*, Yogyakarta: PCD Press and ISAI
and development coalitions.

The third reason is the unfortunate retreat by many influential actors to the ideas of elitist power sharing. Power sharing was recommended by Indonesian actors during the peace negotiations but it was resisted by the Aceh negotiators. The return to this Indonesian practice was decisive in the 2009 elections. Thus vital actors of change were marginalised, in sharp contrast to the inclusive democracy that was visualised in Helsinki accord. Those who were best placed to use the old command structures, the related traditional loyalties and various political positions and contacts to gain resources and supporters won the day. And the pro-democracy oriented actors lost out.

Fourthly, given the results of the 2009 parliamentary elections and in accordance with the Law on Governing Aceh (LoGA), it looked as if the nomination of candidates for the following elections of local political executives (Pilkada) would be monopolised by the leaders of the only major local political party, the Aceh Party, and a few big Jakarta based parties. Fortunately, Aceh pro-democrats associated with the small SIRA and PRA parties managed to convince the Indonesian constitutional court to decide in December 2010 that independent candidates should also be allowed.

Ironically, however, it may not be the pro-democracy groups that make best use of the opportunity for independents to run in the elections of political executives. One reason is that the Aceh Party decided to nominate GAM’s conservative former foreign minister Zaini Abdullah and its party leader Muzakir Manaf, who is also the head of the KPA and a successful businessman, as governor and vice governor respectively. Separately moreover, these leaders and their followers want to promote GAM’s conservative ex-prime minister Malik Mahmud as *Wali Nanggroe*, the cultural head of Aceh, and to bestow him with sultan-like powers.

Thus both incumbent Governor Irwandi Yusuf and Vice Governor Muhammad Nazar, among other competing Aceh leaders, have decided to run as independents – though on separate tickets of course as they have nourished different set of powerful allies since 2006 to compensate for the widespread popular dissatisfaction with
their own not so very successful policies. And given that Irwandi gave up his previous independent position and his cooperation with pro-democracy oriented activists in the 2009 elections in favour of the Aceh Party, he now feels rejected by the old GAM autocrats who did not nominate him for a second period and thus wants to prove his case as ‘the real popular leader’, both to the old leaders that abandoned him and to the progressive actors that he set aside.

This is partially reminiscent of the conflicts within GAM in 2005 that paved the way for the successful alliance between the KPA network with Irwandi as a major actor and the SIRA related activists with Nazar as their main figure in the 2006 local elections in opposition to the conservative leaders. At this particular point in time however the conflicts between the senior leaders are rather likely to reduce the space for progressive activists and democratic development. Irwandi, for instance is likely to use his access to resources in his attempt at regaining command of the KPA structure and consolidate his influence within the Aceh Party. And in contrast to the 2006 elections there is a need for much greater campaign funds, which calls for donations from business. Similar logic applies of course to Nazar and other major candidates too.

The options for pro-democrats who remain short of both funding and organised popular and interests based support are thus quite narrow. Most probably, ordinary people and citizen organisations will not be able to influence much of the elitist political vendettas.

One of the few opportunities that might emerge is if Governor Irwandi and a number of candidates in the district head elections conclude that they can not win without additional support from pro-democratic groups and their assistance in developing a progressive programme for the future of Aceh – to thus gain an international reputation and to foster an as broad as possible political movement of people from all walks of life behind an innovative agenda. This is only a possibility, but we know from elsewhere in Indonesia (such Solo in Central Java) as well as scattered constituencies in India for example, that mainstream political leaders can no longer rely on clientelism, bossism and huge financial resources only. To win elections they also need additional means of mobilisation. Thus
many try to include populist measures and identity politics. Yet a few others who want to build a reputation for being more modern and democratic also try to link with progressive leaders and activists in order to gain extra votes. This may well end up in the cooption of activist groups, but there are also examples of well-prepared progressives who manage to develop transformative politics and make gradual advances.

Given the current balance of forces in Aceh this is not impossible, though it is unlikely. Let us recall, however, that such an agenda and such a movement could be initiated and democratisation restarted by way of preferential treatment for the initiation and democratic inclusion of genuine interest-based organisations in public governance – with the long term aim of facilitating local and central level coalitions for sustainable and welfare-based economic development. This takes time but it is a way of engaging in politics without getting lost down the tempting shortcuts and instead facilitating consolidation and gradual advances. This has been done before in other contexts and under similarly difficult conditions; from Scandinavia in the past to parts of Brazil and India today – and in the emerging practices of innovative Aceh activists too.
Revised and extended version including new introduction and full analysis of the 2009 election

While the aftermath of the December 2004 tsunami added to the problems of civil war in Sri Lanka, a miraculous transition from conflict and disaster to peace and new development evolved in Aceh, the rebellious Indonesian province on the northern tip of Sumatra. Most remarkably, as shown in this book, the miracle was largely due to democratisation. For once, the combination of international intervention and local popular engagement paid off. Why was this possible? How can the process be sustained? In this book, senior scholars and grounded researchers provide answers in comparative and theoretical perspectives.

The promising changes in Aceh fly in the face of conventional wisdom and theoretical predictions. The dynamics refute the increasingly common conclusion by experts, donors and politicians such as the former Indonesian vice president Jusuf Kalla, that there is a need to constrain democracy because ‘too many freedoms and elections’ are likely to generate more conflict and abuses of power. Yet this does not mean that Aceh provides unconditional support for the converse idea of peace by liberal democracy and markets. This book shows instead that peace was ‘social democratic’ in character, based as it was on strong politics, regulation of big business, the transformation of conflict within a democratic framework and people’s capacity to use and improve the new institutions.

The book also shows, however, that it is difficult to sustain these positive dynamics. As in so many other post-colonial processes, the ‘transitional arrangements’ often breed special privileges for the well connected rather than democratic control of public affairs. Profitable instead of democratic peace is thus gaining ground. And the 2009 elections have de facto fostered a power sharing agreement between Jakarta and the old rebel leaders at the expense of the inclusive democracy that was negotiated by Ahtisaari. Can the latter be resurrected?

This is a book for scholars, students and practitioners alike, wishing to learn about the problems and options of promoting peace and development by way of democracy.

Olle Törnquist is Professor of Political Science and Development Research, University of Oslo. He is the author of several works on popular politics and democracy. He was the academic director of the all-Indonesia democracy surveys, advises the comprehensive follow up project on Power, Welfare and Democracy at the University of Gadjah and co-directs the international education and research programme Power, Conflict and Democracy Programme. His most recent book is Rethinking Popular Representation (Palgrave).

Stanley Adi Prasetyo is a leading Indonesian democrat, publisher, educator and investigative journalist and currently a member of the Indonesian National Commission for Human Rights. He is the former Executive Director of ISA (the Institute for the Studies on Free Flow of Information), and Chair of Demos, the Indonesian Centre for Democracy and Human Rights Studies.

Teresa Birks is an independent researcher and consultant. Over the past eighteen years she has worked for both national and international organisations in Indonesia, Malaysia, East Timor and the United Kingdom concerned with human rights, education and justice.

Törnquist, Prasetyo and Birks have previously co-edited (with A.E Priyono), Indonesia’s Post-Soeharto Democracy Movement, Demos and NIAS Press, 2003.

Image Cover: Irwandi Yusuf, former GAM leader now Governor of Aceh, campaigns for local election in Blang Padang Square, Aceh, December 2006. Photographer: Muniral Hamzah

PCD Press © 2010
www.pcd.ugm.ac.id