Dynamics of peace and democratization. The Aceh lessons

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The viability of the thesis that liberalization and democracy foster peace, security and development is at stake. The main critique is that more liberties and elections lead to more conflict and abuses of power. There are three principal responses to this critique. The liberal argument calls for improving the democratic institutions; the institutions first thesis prioritizes strengthening the rule of law and state capacity over democracy; whilst the transformation argument proposes using fledgling democracy to foster gradually more favourable relations of power and popular capacity towards more substantial democracy. This article analyses the relevance of these theses to the remarkable dynamics of peace-building in Aceh, from the introduction of Indonesian democracy in 1998, the impact of the tsunami in 2004 and the Helsinki peace agreement in 2005 to the general elections in 2009. The study concludes that the liberal argument is congruous with the democratic opportunities for peace, while the institutions first and the transformation arguments give prominence to the dynamics that made peace-building possible but also difficult. While the institutions first argument responds to these difficulties by resorting to power sharing, the transformation thesis proposes more citizen participation coupled with interest and issue group representation.

Keywords: Aceh; peace; democratization; security; elections

Introduction

The thesis that liberalization and democracy are favourable for peace, security and development emerged in the aftermath of World War One and was revitalized with the third wave of democratization. Furthermore, international support for negotiated transitions from authoritarianism to democracy which drew favour during the 1980s saw the thesis extended into the field of conflict resolution. Yet many now say that liberalization and elections often lead to more rather than less conflict and abuses of power.1 There are three principal responses to this critique and the jury is still out: (i) the liberal argument which calls for improving the new democratic institutions, (ii) the institutions first argument which prioritizes a well

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functioning state with rule of law and responsible citizen associations ahead of democracy, and (iii) the transformation argument which proposes the fostering of gradually more favourable relations of power and popular capacity towards substantial democracy.

Much of this critique and discussion is dominated by mass data relating to a number of supposedly decisive variables collected in various trouble-spots. These variables however, are rarely as clear-cut and pivotal as expected. Thus the contextual dynamics need to be considered. This may be done by analysing how the arguments measure up to critical cases of democratization and peace such as the recent remarkable transitions in the rebellious and tsunami affected Indonesian province of Aceh.2

Following a brief presentation of the three principal arguments and an outline of democratization and peace-building in Aceh, the article will proceed by comparing the different types of development expected according to each argument and the crucial processes identified within contextually informed research from the early 1990s up to and including the results of the 2009 elections. The article focuses on identifying which actual changes refute or support which particular aspects of the three main arguments whilst identifying what aspects call for greater attention.3

In summary, as will be demonstrated, the liberal argument is congruous with the democratic opportunities for peace in Aceh while the institutions first and the transformation arguments shed light on dynamics that made peace-building possible but also difficult. While the institution first argument responds to these difficulties by resorting to power sharing, the transformation thesis suggests more citizen participation and interest and issue group representation.

The arguments
The current liberal argument dates back to the late 1980s when students and practitioners of peace and conflict resolution turned their attention to attempts by internationally supported ‘moderate elites’ to craft transitions from authoritarian rule towards liberal democracy in Southern and Eastern Europe as well as the Global South. If such ‘shortcuts’ were feasible under even unfavourable circumstances, then it would follow that liberal democratic institutions could be designed to build peace too. Proponents of this approach include former UN Secretaries Generals, Boutros Boutros-Ghali and Kofi Annan. The plan was to broker pacts within the elite to not just get the prices but also the civil and political institutions right, including elections. The better the pacts and institutions, the better the democracy, peace and development. The common outcome however is one of limited results in emerging democracies that drift back into authoritarianism and thus the general aim now is to perfect the deals and improve the institutions towards containing abuses and conflict.4 Indonesia, for instance, has won plaudits for its stable democratization thanks to the inclusion of the powerful elite in the designing of liberties, elections and anti-corruption measures as well as
decentralization and the reduction of military powers while mass-based participation has been kept at bay.\textsuperscript{5}

In contrast to the liberal argument, the essence of the institutions first thesis is that although well-established democracies tend to support peace, the very process of liberal economic reforms and the introduction of civil and political freedoms and elections is so contested and open to abuse by ethnic and religious entrepreneurs and ‘bad’ civil society that democratization must be restrained until strong and stable political, judicial and civil institutions have been built, especially those that relate to the rule of law. In other words, one cannot assume that sufficiently functioning systems for political, civil and economic governance are available with which to resolve disputes and to regulate debate and competition, particularly in culturally diverse societies.\textsuperscript{6} In a similar way that Samuel Huntington argued in the 1960s for rapid modernization and popular mobilization, the new argument proposes that ‘premature democratisation’ tends to breed violence and political instability where there are insufficient political institutions.\textsuperscript{7}

As a consequence, strong institutions or what Huntington called ‘political order’ must be established ahead of democracy.\textsuperscript{8} According to the followers of what is now labelled sequencing, this happened in Britain, South Korea, Taiwan, Brazil and South Africa. They thus recommend the support of ‘moderate groups that seek to curtail the power of the old authoritarian elite, but that also fear a rapid descent into the chaos of mass politics’. The mechanisms of sequencing focus on tactics such as the postponement of elections and the development of ‘golden parachutes (…) for old elites (and) amnesties, elite-protecting pacts on property rights, professionalized but not unregulated news media, rule of law reform that starts with the bureaucracy and the economy, and the internal democratization of elite institutions such as the ruling party’.\textsuperscript{9}

The transformation argument differs from the first two theses outlined above by combining institution building and agents of change, focusing on processes where actors and institutions affect each other in attempts to reform rather than adjust to the relations of power, thus advancing towards substantial democracy and peace. Thomas Carothers for example talks of strategies for gradual change even under harsh contextual conditions ‘to create space and mechanisms for true political competition and point the way to an eventual end of the rulers’ monopoly of power’.\textsuperscript{10}

The transformation argument thus concurs with the institution first thesis that the conditions for democracy in the Global South in particular are poor. But the suggestion that transition from authoritarian rule to democracy and peace in cases such as South Korea, South Africa and Brazil was due to moderate rulers is strongly contested. On the contrary, it was crucial that ‘vigorous democrats with no fear of “mass politics” pushed for open political competition’.\textsuperscript{11} It is true that a small number of autocrats in East Asia and in parts of Europe contributed to change, but this was mainly in response to demands for reform and building strong states in order to gain popular support and fight a competitor or enemy.\textsuperscript{12} In most cases autocrats have not fostered ‘good governance’ and rule of law. Even to increase state capacity and build genuine rule of law there is a need to alter
the relations of power. And this is best done by way of democratization, as it is much less conflictual than popular uprisings. In addition, this third thesis is critical of elite-negotiated democracy building. Proponents argue that the elitist liberal model continues to be constrained by the idea that the swift introduction of certain liberties and institutions will generate substantial results almost irrespective of the contexts. These measures are also adjusted to existing relations of power rather than designed to alter them democratically. Alternative comparative analysis points instead to the importance of politics against privatization and communalization as well as to the specification of what areas of public affairs will be controlled by what people (demos). The same applies to the improvement of people’s capacity to participate in organized politics and the state’s capacity to implement democratic decisions impartially. This would require demands from below for public institutions from above; institutions which in turn foster popular organization and representation and enable demands for general policies and equal rights rather than special favours. Such processes are reminiscent of the historical development of the strongest democracies, that is, the social rather than liberal democracies in Scandinavia, but also of recent attempts at participatory budgeting and planning that occur in parts of Brazil and India.

The case of Aceh

The dynamics of peace and democracy in Aceh constitute a critical case in the sense that it is important for all the arguments to be able to explain the developments in order that not to be fully or partially refuted. The violence was rooted in conflicts with Jakarta over the governance of post-independence Indonesia. Aceh called for a federalist system which would allow local control over its natural resources, culture, religion and more. Jakarta resisted, both under populist President Sukarno and despotic President Suharto; and from 1976 The Free Aceh Movement (GAM) went further to demand full independence. Optimists expected that the political and economic liberalization after the fall of Suharto in 1998, which included swift elections and the initiation of radical decentralization under newly appointed President B.J. Habibie, would facilitate positive peace in disturbed areas like Aceh. Formal peace negotiations were to follow and a ‘humanitarian pause’ was facilitated in 2000 under President Abdurrahman Wahid by the Geneva-based Henry Dunant Center, which led to a ceasefire agreement in late 2002. By 2003 however the violence intensified yet again under the new administration of President Megawati Sukarnoputri. The rebels in Aceh and other areas characterized Indonesia as a colonial construct sustained only by authoritarian regimes and which would now crumble thanks to democracy. Nationalists, on the other hand, warned against balkanization of the ‘modern state’, whilst many scholars agreed that liberal localization was fostering conflictual politics. It is true that by 2004 newly elected President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and Vice President Jusuf Kalla tried to counter conflict both through rule of law and business opportunities. But even as late as a few months after the December 2004 tsunami,
widely respected contextual research suggested that progress towards peace and democracy in Aceh was almost impossible given the oppression, exploitation, predatory practices and violence – framed as it was by ethnic, religious and rival national identities; not to mention the natural disaster.\(^\text{18}\) Meanwhile however the former Finnish President Matti Ahtisaari managed to mediate negotiation and agreement on demilitarization, basic rights, democratic elections and self-government. Separately, the international community engaged in a massive post-tsunami reconstruction operation. In fact for a couple of years neither the peace-building nor the reconstruction process was derailed by either military intervention or massive corruption, collusion and nepotism as many had expected. Moreover, reform-oriented ex-combatants and activists won the late 2006 gubernatorial and local executive elections. Yet, in the final account, much less than what had initially seemed possible was implemented and achieved by the newly elected executives and the predominant tendency from 2008 onwards has seen an adjustment to the more ‘usual’ Indonesian political and economic practices.

Few critical cases are perfect. The tsunami was a particularly important external factor. Yet the influence of the tsunami was related to rather than independent of the dynamics that are basic to the three arguments under review. Moreover, it is true that much of the international research focuses on the role of democratization in implementing peace agreements. But the dynamics of reaching and implementing such agreements are difficult to separate. Aceh was and is part of Indonesia; and the entire post-Suharto period may best be viewed as one process of democratization and peace-building with all its ups and downs. Besides, even early arguments on how to build democracy once a peace treaty has been signed may be important in the promotion of the treaty itself.\(^\text{19}\) Thus Aceh remains a critical case for discussing the validity of the general arguments and recommendations about peace and democratization in a contextual framework.

How do the three main arguments correspond, then, to the developments in Aceh? For the liberal argument to be supported, it is crucial that the elitist pacts for economic and political liberalization and best possible civil and democratic institutions in Indonesia and Aceh already initiated by 1998 did not cause more conflict and abuses of power, but can be seen to have promoted peace even after the exodus of foreign assistance.

Conversely, for the institutions first argument to be vindicated, such liberal efforts must rather have caused more conflict and abuses of power. Instead, there should be indications that diverse efforts at building rule of law and other strong civil, state and economic institutions alongside the restraint of ‘premature’ liberalization and democratization have been successful and have promoted peace and solid foundations for democracy, not the other way around.

The transformation argument calling for gradual and combined improvement of the institutions and the popular capacity to use them and thus improve conditions may only be validated if such measures have contributed to democratic peace-building. Additionally there must also be indicators that (i) the liberal thesis has constrained and adjusted democratic institutions and resources to the prevailing
relations of power, undermined representation and thus also peace-building, and, (ii) that attempts to build ‘institutions first’ have preserved and not altered the problems of governance and peace in addition to having undermined rather than built foundations for democracy.

According to the contextual research, to what extent are these hypothetical tendencies negated or confirmed by the crucial junctures in the dynamics of democratization and peace in Aceh? Eleven such critical moments have been identified on the basis of what most students of Aceh seem to agree on and because they stand out as important in comparison with other disturbed areas in Indonesia and similarly tsunami affected Sri Lanka. These critical junctures are outlined and discussed below as chronologically as possible.

**Liberalisation and institution-building before the tsunami**

**The failure of liberal reform**

The liberal argument is severely undermined by the lack of positive changes in spite of the immediate freedoms, decentralization and elections after the fall of Suharto in 1998. The first new president, B.J. Habibie, officially apologised to the people of Aceh for the acts of violence perpetrated by the Indonesian Armed Forces, and the regional military status was lifted. The second new president, Abdurrahman Wahid, went even further by providing room for debate, negotiations and activism. Yet trust in Indonesia’s fledgling democracy was low. Initially there may have been fewer confrontations between the army and GAM, but after 1999 conflict escalated. Local politicians were elected, but voting was often done at gunpoint and corruption and abuses of power continued. Civil society groups mushroomed, but most of them joined SIRA (Aceh Referendum information center) the main civilian organization which spearheaded calls for a referendum on independence as in East Timor. Provincial autonomy was granted to Aceh, albeit mainly on article only, and was accompanied by the right to implement Islamic law, making conservative Muslim leaders more influential. Peace negotiations produced a humanitarian pause, but this was used by the conflicting parties, not least GAM, to regroup and reconsolidate their position and thereafter a Military Emergency was once again proclaimed in May 2003. It may be thus argued that democratization stood little or no chance since even the most basic agreement on territorial issues was lacking. Yet, only a few years later the idea of democracy was crucial to the peace agreement, so the question is why?

**Territorial control**

During the new military offensive of 2003, the Indonesian government enhanced its control of the province, reducing GAM’s dominance in rural areas. Many suggest that this is the real reason why GAM engaged more seriously in the post-tsunami negotiations and relinquished its demands of full independence. In contrast to the LTTE’s (Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam) state building in
the North East of Sri Lanka, GAM was not in control of any of the major tsunami affected regions where it could have dominated aid delivery. While territorial control is a precondition for both the institutions first and transformation arguments, the fact that this control was achieved by the Indonesian military speaks in favour of the institution first thesis’ quest for ‘politics of order’. Yet this should not be overestimated. Rebels and civil activists may continue to fight and cause serious problems for their adversaries even if they have lost in the battlefield. The Indonesian government must have learnt that lesson in East Timor and realized that without a strategic political victory it had to negotiate.

**State building**

Two other aspects of state building were probably more fundamental: the political definition of the *demos* and the increasing stability of Indonesia’s new decentralized polity in most other parts of the country. Democracy in the generally accepted terms of popular control of public affairs on the basis of political equality requires that individuals and groups identify themselves as part of a *demos* that agree on having a number of public affairs in common and to control them in an equal way. Ethnic and religious solidarities as well as common interests based on class may certainly shape the *demos*, but when the identities and interests do not correspond with *de facto* existing economic and political societies, which they do not always do, some definition and coordination of common affairs of the various communities and other groups is inevitable. Political equality, moreover, presupposes equal human rights and citizenship, which are not compatible with extensive special privileges for various communities, classes and other groups. For democracy therefore, the ethnic identity factor as in Sri Lanka (Singhalese versus Tamil) and religious solidarities as in two other disturbed Indonesian areas of the Moluccas and Central Sulawesi (Muslim versus Christian) are indeed problematic. In Aceh however, most scholars agree that although ethnicity, kinship and religion have been instrumental means of legitimacy and mobilization, they have been subordinated to the interest in territorial and political control. The first major enemies were the colonial masters and the local landed chiefs, *uléébalang*, through which the Dutch extended their rule. Indeed, the rebels drew on the network of Islamic leaders (*ulama*), which was later to frame the opposition to Sukarno’s unitary constitution too. Yet the focus was not on religion but local autonomy and a federative structure; and this served as a basis for cooperation with dissidents in other provinces. Regional rebels modified their mobilization structure to gain American support within the framework of the Cold War when Sukarno came to rely more on the rapidly growing Communist Party. But when the anti-communist and pro-American New Order regime proved similarly centralistic, the basic issue of self-government was so crucial that the leaders in Aceh even abandoned their previous focus on federalism in favour of ethnic-nationalism. Indeed there were some ugly tendencies then among rebels to pit the Acehnese against Javanese migrants in particular and governance in rebel dominated areas
was harsh. But generally the constitution of the demos and public affairs in Aceh has been political-territorial, has contained ethnic and religious conflicts and has made negotiations and democratic peace-building less difficult.

This weakens the liberal argument and speaks in favour of the institution first and transformation arguments. In fact, the proponents of the institutions first thesis could even claim that the political construction of the demos was thanks to autocratic rebel leaders. But just as the transformation argument would have predicted, the autocratic rebels did not emphasize rule of law and political equality in the territories under their control and their organizations. On the contrary, the democratic character of the Acehnese political identity developed only with the Helsinki peace agreement.

The second way in which state-building proved crucial for peace and democracy was with the increasing stability of Indonesia’s decentralization. Initially the radical post-Suharto decentralization process fostered conflict and centrifugal tendencies. This motivated Megawati’s renewed military campaign and vindicated the rebels’ assumption (based on dependency theory) that Indonesia was a colonial construct that was bound to crumble (like East Timor) as the authoritarian nationalists lost ground. Accordingly the Aceh dissidents would not have to concede but could speed up disintegration by rendering the province ungovernable. By 2004, however, there were signs that Indonesia was no longer about to disintegrate. The first national democracy survey indicated that a comparatively democratic and decentralized yet unified political system was developing, in spite of localized identity politics and remaining conflicts as in Aceh. Thus the rationale of the militant activists was undermined and later on the by then stabilized decentralization in the country as a whole proved crucial in identifying opportunities during the Helsinki peace talks to foster democratic self-government.

Once again, the argument for institutions first seems to have been vindicated, but only if Aceh is analysed in isolation from Indonesia. The favourable decentralization was not created ahead of democracy by ‘moderate’ autocrats but entirely thanks to the post- Suharto democratization. In addition, the extended form of decentralization that was negotiated for Aceh was more democratic than in other provinces and districts in that it enabled self government and local political parties.

Presidential support for peace

While serving as Coordinating Minister for Social Welfare in both the Wahid and Megawati cabinets, Jusuf Kalla negotiated peace agreements in late 2001 and early 2002 in the disturbed provinces of Central Sulawesi (Poso) and the Moluccas with the consent of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, the then Coordinating Minister of Political and Security Affairs. Elected Vice President and President respectively in mid-2004 they both thus had fresh mandates to promote peace. Attempts to make contact with individual GAM leaders were resumed through envoys only a few months after the collapse of the Aceh peace accord in mid 2003. Little happened during the presidential campaign but by late 2004 there was agreement with
the senior GAM leaders in Stockholm to commence new peace talks under former Finnish President Ahtisaari. Yudhoyono, a Javanese ‘thinking general’, was in favour of moderate anti-corruption campaigns, the promotion of the rule of law and the professionalization of the military. Kalla, a Buginese tycoon, was promoting business and in this case profitable development for warring bosses, military officers and other leaders in the provinces over costly military campaigns. Both pushed for peace negotiations, fostered mutual trust with GAM leaders, honoured agreements and convinced conservative nationalist politicians and the military in Jakarta of the need to support their approach. This was in sharp contrast to former President Megawati and similarly tsunami-affected Sri Lanka’s weak, less committed and much more compromising political leadership. Until the negotiations in Helsinki demanded otherwise however, Yudhoyono and Kalla sustained the same military hard line, secret elitist talks, power sharing agreements and favourable business deals for the conflicting parties in return for peace, as had been brokered in Central Sulawesi and the Moluccas. One major but ultimately unsuccessful attempt ahead of Helsinki, for example, was to make a deal with senior GAM leaders on the ground. Indeed Kalla was most outspoken in blaming the Indonesian conflicts on premature freedoms and elections.

Yudhoyono and Kalla thus stand out as incarnations of a combination of the moderate leaders in a liberal oriented pact to craft ‘realistic’ democratic institutions and the enlightened autocrats who have been overtaken by ‘too early’ democratization and now try to constrain ‘excesses’ in favour of solid institutions and leader-regulated business opportunities.

**Civil society**

Civil society organizations (CSOs) propelled much of the early post-Suharto attempts at democratization and peace accords. They were also active in the post-tsunami relief and reconstruction efforts as well as playing an important part in the follow up to the Helsinki agreement. No doubt CSOs have thus built vital foundations for peace and democracy. But the pivotal CSOs have mainly been pro-active and strong advocates of freedoms, human rights and other elements of democratization. Thus, much of the institution first argument’s emphasis on moderate civic institutions ahead of broader freedoms and democracy is irrelevant. Yet this does not mean that the liberal argument is fully vindicated. Much of the early post-Suharto emphasis on liberal democratization and peace-building was unsuccessful. Also, a number of less liberal factors seem to have been critical for the importance of CSOs. For example, although radical organizations such as SIRA benefitted from the new freedoms, they did not trust in the fledgling Indonesian democracy and instead gathered momentum by emphasizing calls for a referendum and sustained struggle for independence along with GAM. It is true that the myriad of well-funded non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that contributed to the post-tsunami relief and reconstruction work often contained the
hegemonic impulses of the Indonesian military. But many were co-opted by depo-
licitized development work at the expense of citizen rights and democratization. 
This resembles the liberal development-oriented peace process in Sri Lanka. In 
Aceh it was instead thanks to the agreement in Helsinki on a democratic 
roadmap that many of the old citizen rights and political groups (and some of 
the new development organizations too) became crucial for a few years in demo-
cratic peace-building. In short, the special importance of rights and politico-
oriented CSOs with broad bases in the movement for a referendum and the 
implementation of self-government speaks in favour of the transformation 
thesis’ proposal for utilizing new liberties towards gradually improving the con-
ditions for more substantial democracy and peace-building.

Democracy and peace-building after the tsunami

The tsunami

Diplomats, aid workers and journalists often claim that the tsunami was an extraordi-

nary event that made everybody realize that peace, democracy and reconstruction 
must come first. The reputable International Crisis Group stated too that the disaster 
had ‘brought Aceh into the international spotlight, made it politically desirable for 
both sides to work toward a settlement, offered ways of linking the reconstruction 
effort and peace process, and ensured the availability of major donor funding 
outside the government budget’. Aceh would thus have become an exceptional 
case where none of the general arguments on peace-building by democratization 
would be valid. Yet a brief comparison with the negative outcome in similarly con-
flict-torn and tsunami-affected Sri Lanka indicates that the disaster itself can hardly 
have caused the positive developments in Aceh. The effects of the tsunami rarely 
added to, but worked through the factors and actors considered in the mainstream 
arguments about peace and democracy. Also, few of these factors and actors 
were so radically affected by the disaster as to explain the different outcomes. One 
exception is that the Indonesian military had to give way to international presence 
in Aceh. But in general conclusion, the tsunami was an albeit critical event that differ-
ent actors (with varied aims and strategies under diverse conditions) responded to in 
ways that strengthened or weakened the existing dynamics.

Regulating economic liberalism

A major contrast between the efforts to broker peace in Aceh after the tsunami and 
the similarly devastated Sri Lanka as well as the other disturbed areas in Indonesia 
relates to economic regulations. In Sri Lanka, liberal economic development was 
supposed to facilitate negotiations and peace-building yet caused popular dissatis-
faction coupled with political competition over resources such as the post-tsunami 
reconstruction funds. This served to sustain the conflict and was used to mobilize 
opinion against the peace process by way of ethnic and religious chauvinism. The 
peace accords in Central Sulawesi and the Moluccas were made in secret and were
largely based on the assumption that government support of profitable development for warring bosses, military officers and other leaders in the provinces would be a cheap way to put an end to violence.38 This logic proved feasible, but at the price of more democratic deficits and primitive accumulation of capital through coercive power and monopolized control of public economic and natural resources.39 In Aceh on the other hand, the tsunami was followed by internationally supported regulation of the liberal economic agenda for relief and reconstruction. The main institutions were the World Bank-coordinated Multi Donor Fund working in cooperation with the Indonesian Aceh-Nias Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Agency (BRR). The regulations and thus revision of the liberal peace agenda was neither part of the negotiations in Helsinki nor the doctrines of the foreign donors and national technocrats. The regulations were rather rooted in the post-tsunami fear that foreign donors and Indonesian aid workers would be restricted by the military and defrauded within the Indonesia’s infamous ‘KKN system’ of corruption, collusion and nepotism. Moreover, the international presence seems to have encouraged the new regime in Jakarta to clean up its act in order to attract foreign collaboration and investments. This resulted in concerted efforts to combine foreign post-tsunami support with technocratic central government supervision of reconstruction and development. It is true that the ‘second tsunami’ in the form of massive foreign aid to Aceh has been subject to criticism of corruption, insufficient co-ordination and more. But the foreign monitors, donors and experts working in tandem with domestic counterparts dismantled the ‘iron curtain’ around Aceh, made people less dependent on the military and most importantly contained, for a few years at least, the quite likely catastrophe of similar but (given the huge funds at stake) much more extensive abuses of public resources, coercive power and corruption as was the case in other disturbed provinces. Aceh today no doubt suffers from the same type of predatory practices as in other parts of Indonesia,40 which we will also return to. Yet the post-tsunami disaster was averted, and democratic peace-building was made possible.

These more positive economic regulations differ from the thesis that market liberalism contributes to peace and democracy. On the face of it, it is rather the second thesis about solid institutions ahead of not just rapid political but also economic liberalization that gains ground. But Jusuf Kalla’s business regulations in the Moluccas and Central Sulawesi stirred conflict and constrained democracy. And the better functioning Aceh regulations were not due to incumbent moderates but rather revised relations of power stemming from concerned international actors and ‘good governance’ oriented Indonesian counterparts. This speaks more in favour of the transformation argument.

**Inclusive negotiations towards political equality**

President Ahtisaari’s engagement was crucial to the attainment of peace in Aceh through democratization. The question is how the negotiations evolved and how this affects the validity of the major arguments.
It is useful to compare Ahtisaari’s role with the less successful Norwegian peace-building efforts in Sri Lanka. Both approaches were inspired by the liberal peace doctrine, but Katri Merikallio’s complimentary review of Ahtisaari’s mediation, Damien Kingsbury’s personal account from GAM’s backbenches, and the testimony of other participants in the process, compared with the view of insiders and experts involved in the Sri Lankan process, indicate that Ahtisaari took a different approach to that of Norwegians Erik Solheim and Jon Hanssen Bauer. Ahtisaari adopted the position of a comparatively assertive intervening mediator with some of his own ideas as to what might provide fruitful avenues to explore. In contrast, Solheim and Bauer facilitated structured dialogues on the diverse issues that the actors raised and which were thought might generate agreement. Ahtisaari’s relatively straightforward agenda was accompanied by a next to constitutionally-democratic approach towards a comprehensive agreement, to which were added the issues of justice and the reintegration of victims and combatants (but unfortunately not the Sharia law and the role of women). Solheim and Bauer on the other hand, focused more on analysing and understanding a complicated web of factors, conflicts and cultures within which development assistance and practices could promote joint initiatives. It is true, moreover, that avoiding in Aceh much of the negative effects of the neo-liberal agenda that contributed to the derailing of the Sri Lankan process was more thanks to the donors’ economic regulations than Ahtisaari’s contribution (which is also a reason why the latter may not have been successful in Sri Lanka). But the less exclusive Aceh peace process as compared to Sri Lanka was part of the Ahtisaari model. The main negotiating parties in the Helsinki process anchored their positions within a wider context of actors. GAM for example consulted with civil society groups and businessmen. Most importantly, the negotiating parties abstained from brokering a power sharing solution agreeing only on a limited number of major issues regarding the economy, amnesty, security, demilitarization, monitoring and reintegration. The main focus was instead on developing a strategy towards democratic self-government; a strategy within which all other actors would have a chance to contribute and decide on the future of Aceh on the basis of the principle of political equality. Thus the agreement even opened up the possibility of the democratic transformation of conflict by providing a space for those who wanted to advance their aims and interests within the new democratic framework. By contrast, the more elitist and less inclusive Sri Lankan process, which was in accordance with the standards of the liberal crafting of peace and democracy, caused opposition among the excluded Sri Lankan parties. And in combination with the critique of the neo-liberal development agenda the exclusion enabled the otherwise fragmented political opposition of the negotiations to gather widespread sympathies and even to render the joint post-tsunami relief mechanism between the government and the rebels unconstitutional. We will return to this, but first: how was the remarkable inclusion and democratization possible in the case of Aceh in the first place and what, if any, of the general arguments provides the best understanding of the dynamics?
The turning point came when the peace negotiations were about to break down in late February 2005. GAM persisted with its demand for independence. The Indonesian government was entrenched in its insistence on the special autonomy that had already been designated to Aceh. Ahtisaari was supportive of the latter position. He also ruled out a ceasefire behind which both parties could consolidate their position. GAM’s delegation was forced to search for alternatives that might enable similar outcomes to that of independence. Thus they listened carefully as their advisor was alerted by a local scholar that Ahtisaari’s Finnish expression for the administration of the Swedish-speaking archipelago of Åland within the framework of the Finnish state was that of ‘self-government’. Ahtisaari agreed to the adoption of the term in the negotiations and the Indonesians did not totally reject it. The term was never used in the final document but it nevertheless paved the way for the decisive discussions and wider consultation on what would characterize a de facto self-governed province.  

But how was it that GAM opted for democratization on the basis of political equality rather than a favourable power sharing agreement which Jakarta was more than willing to concede? This was not primarily a question of will and ideology. On article GAM had adopted democracy a few years earlier, but in reality, as a concerned observer put it as late as 2006, ‘GAM neither has nor ever had a functioning party apparatus. GAM’s leadership (…) has no political experience in democratic politics (…) and it) lacks any kind of political programme going beyond the demand for Aceh’s independence.’ The answer quite possibly lies in the fact that discussion on self-government rendered the democracy-oriented negotiators more influential because they were able to work out and formulate relevant proposals. These were the negotiators previously associated with the campaign for a referendum, human rights and international support for Aceh. They also had access to additional Indonesian and international networks beyond the limits of GAM’s structure. Ahtisaari supported the arguments on political equality. This implied providing opportunities for independent candidates in the first executive elections and for local political parties in legislative elections at the expense of power sharing arrangements and attempts to rely on NGOs. It was thus now rational for other GAM leaders too to strengthen their position within this framework. And since the new initiatives called for ongoing meetings with additional actors between the GAM delegation and Acehnese civil society groups, a wider section of stakeholders could support the development of democratic institutions.

Ahtisaari’s contribution and the Helsinki roadmap thus diverge from the liberal argument by being explicitly political, constitutional and inclusive. The strong emphasis on basic institutions such as independent candidates and local political parties ahead of the implementation of the agreement lends some support to the ‘institutions first’ thesis but was actually in order to promote more rather than less popular forces. In short the politics of crafting institutions in favour of popular participation is entirely congruous with the transformation argument.
Democratic opportunities and capacities

The agreement on self-government implied that GAM itself as well as its allies in civil society had to organize and mobilize support in order to win elections. Thus it was decided in October 2005 that GAM would be transformed into a democratic party. And although a number of conservative GAM leaders including its ‘prime minister’ Malik Mahmud first tried to block this move then came to dominate the new party, the reformists had the will and capacity to gain influence and power by mobilizing and organizing a majority of the population within the emerging democratic polity.49

These democratic steps called for supplementary political education, training and organization. The international community was preoccupied with post-tsunami relief and reconstruction and largely ignored democratization efforts, although a number of activists and scholars were able to provide limited yet critical support and training to reformist ex-combatants and civil society campaigners.50 Needless to say, these opportunities did not automatically render all the participants democratic; and much like those who fought Suharto in other parts of Indonesia, the Aceh reformists could not offer a firm political and development alternative, though they were much more capable of making use of the new political opportunities.

In addition to the pro-democratic orientation of some of the GAM and SIRA leaders, the first of three key factors behind this capacity to use new political opportunities was the potential for drawing on GAM’s old command structure, which had survived the enforced dismantling of the armed organization by taking on a civilian mantle in the form of the Aceh Transitional Committee (KPA) founded in December 2005. The KPA was intended to cater to the interests of the ex-combatants and their constituents. Thus local leaders gained control of an increasingly patronage-driven movement, which meant gaining votes in return. Secondly, the political activists in SIRA sustained their organizations from the campaign for a referendum and other issues by focusing on the implementation of the Helsinki agreement and the new law on governing Aceh (LoGA). Methods included extensive consultation and mass mobilization. Thirdly, most of the thus engaged reform-oriented GAM leaders, ex-combatants and activists abandoned the idea of cooperating with national political parties, with SIRA opting for combining work in civil society and organized politics. Jointly these campaigners collected enough signatures to ensure that their candidates were eligible to stand in the December 2006 elections for the governor and heads of districts and municipalities. This was the essence of their strategy for democratic self-government in Helsinki and they did not abandon it even in the face of senior GAM leaders such as Malik Mahmud’s advice to the contrary. In addition to the political conflicts, these exiled dignitaries were less able to mobilize people on the ground and opted instead for cooperation with sympathetic Acehnese leaders in the ‘national’ Muslim party with a strong local presence, the United Development Party (PPP). Similarly and much as elsewhere in Indonesia, civil
society activists outside SIRA retained their own specific organizations, prepared ideal-parties or linked up with liberal politicians within the existing political machines. Remarkably however, these power sharing arrangements were much less successful than the popular oriented alliance of GAM ex-combatants and the civil society activists in SIRA. The alliance proved politically resourceful enough to avoid the major mistake of the Indonesian democracy movement by utilizing and developing the new democratic space in order to enter into organized politics and, as it transpired, win elections in a majority of the districts, including these in areas beyond GAM’s traditional stronghold.  

This outcome came much to the surprise of the polling institutes and leading experts. Moreover, the dynamics were an almost perfect illustration of the transformation thesis by negating the concerns of broad popular political engagement beyond elitist pacts and the idea of politically independent civil societies in the liberal and institution first arguments.

Neglected governance

The reformist alliance was however more successful in winning than utilizing democratic power. Its executives became party to ingrained predatory practices including the provision of patronage to their clients. The predominance of politics in business and development was conspicuous. This need not be a problem. The most successful late development in the Global North (Germany and Scandinavia) as well the Global South (East Asia) was politically facilitated. But this was not, as is the case in Aceh, about symbiotic relations seeking easy, private gain through ‘good contacts’. All relevant indicators in early democracy surveys were depressing, especially those that refer to transparency and accountability. Well informed activists point to favourable treatment and corruption. Experts and scholars add examples of poor coordination and delayed and inappropriate project implementation. This applied to the regular administration as well as the BRR and the efforts by the Aceh Reintegration Body (BRA) and the elected governors and district and municipal executives to reintegrate former combatants. Improvements such as the fair recruitment of senior government officials in Banda Aceh did not alter the general picture. Meanwhile the design and implementation of the LoGA in accordance with the Helsinki agreement suffered too.

Fortunately, the reconstruction programmes as well as the insufficiently funded reintegration of ex-combatants and the victims of violence were relatively insulated from these problems of local politics and administration. As a consequence however, this also meant that programmes were unable to really engage with and support the new democratic leadership’s (vague) ambitions to reform administration, regulate the dominant market forces and use one of the largest international commitments since the Marshall plan to foster a democratic developmental state. Subsequently, when the role of the donors was reduced, when the infrastructure was reconstructed and expanded, and when Aceh’s new political executives at times engaged whatever possible investments to ‘deliver’ to their
supporters, the major tendency was instead the development of ‘normal’ Indonesian practices.

In the face of it, the problems of governance thus speak in favour of the second argument about the need for strong institutions ahead of popular participation and elections. Yet who would have built the institutions? Not even the massive foreign programmes engaged in sustainable institution building beyond temporary relief and reconstruction. It is also not clear to what extent the governance failure was as inevitable as the institution first thesis would suggest, or if it was due to poor politics. We shall proceed therefore to the political dynamics.

From political equality to power sharing

The critical features of the Helsinki agreement were political equality with full civil and political freedoms and the right to participate in elections with independent candidates and local parties. Empirical evidence indicates however that although basic rules and regulations to this effect were introduced (with some delay) and have not caused additional conflicts they have been insufficient to foster transition to democratic politics. Following the outstanding elections of political executives in late 2006, the hope was that the new local parties would begin to transform popular aspirations and interests into public policies, select responsive representatives and ensure accountability. Most elite actors as well as dissident activists and ex-combatants have however adapted their old organizations to the new system and retained them as vehicles for their specific constituencies. The dominant local party, the Aceh Party, was founded on the KPA, and according to former GAM leader and new head of the party, Muzakkir Manaf, ‘the main goal of the KPA is to see that former fighters get jobs’. Such problems have been less widespread in the more democracy-oriented parties, but self-critical leaders say their parties are affected by similar tendencies. Early surveys which pointed to a high degree of political interest in Aceh as compared to other parts of Indonesia were hopeful, but the indicators of equal civil and political citizenship remain negative. This suggests that most people are being incorporated into politics as subjects of already powerful leaders with access to resources rather than as citizens with their own organizations. Yet when asked to comment on the challenges, crucial local actors tended to dismiss them as ‘unavoidable problems of transition’ whilst being unable to identify the aims, potential and timeframe for the transition that had been agreed on in Helsinki.

More specifically, the reformist alliance of civil society activists and associated GAM leaders in the late 2006 elections could not be sustained. This alliance caught the people’s imagination and gained unexpected victories beyond GAM’s traditional stronghold. But the humiliated ‘old’ GAM leaders singled out their major adversaries in the alliance as traitors. And the reformists themselves stood out as indecisive by prioritizing reconciliation with the ‘old’ leaders rather than promoting the Helsinki principles that everyone should be able to organize politically. For example, the reformists abstained from forming a party of their own in
order not to cause further conflict. Thus reformist GAM leaders found few alternatives but to ‘return to the fold’ and join the old leadership’s Aceh Party leaving the civil society activists to form their own substantially weakened democratic vehicles.

In the face of poorly evolving political representation many people opted instead for approaching and developing ‘good contacts’ and patrons, or tried to lobby, use networks and exchange services which further undermined efforts at democratic representation based on political equality, clear mandates, responsiveness and accountability. Optimistic plans to utilize the electoral advances gained in 2006 to introduce participatory planning and budgeting were shelved. In order to avoid being entirely marginalized in the face of the 2009 elections, many pro-democrats also opted for ‘consolidating their constituencies’ by providing ‘access’ and favours, and by building relationships with the actors that had the best chance of winning. The obvious alternative strategy of engaging people in concrete work for building democratic mass organizations and fair public institutions was regarded as too demanding. Organizations such as SIRA and KPA have emerged in opposition to old forms of domination. Others have focused on specific problems such as corruption or human rights. Yet others are based on religious and ethnic communities. The aspirations of labourers, farmers, fisher folk, women, business interests and sustainable development have not been nourished and few of these movements were important in either the late 2006 elections or the following local party building. Rooted broad solidarities based on citizen’s interests and opinions of public affairs (rather than special interests) are rare. Recent attempts to form cultural, religious and interest organizations by the Aceh Party for example have been mainly top-down efforts to build a solid political constituency within the framework of leader dominated customary institutions.

The 2009 parliamentary and presidential elections provide further support to these conclusions. The return of predatory economics, weakened regulations and the lack of joint donor and local government efforts towards a democratic developmental state strategy were largely non-issues. The weakening of the reform oriented alliance between GAM leaders and related civil society activists, combined with the strengthening of the Aceh Party though not always altogether democratic means, resulted instead in a landslide victory of the Aceh Party in partnership with its new allies in Jakarta, President Yudhoyono and his Democracy Party. The winners operated thus within the ‘normal’ Indonesian politics of strongman clientelism, culturally-based populism and party-politicization of related groups and movements. Moreover, the SIRA party (with roots in the student groups, civil society organizations and reformist GAM leaders) and the PRA party (trying to broaden its radical student and civil society constituencies) were both labelled as immature dissidents undermining the necessary unity behind what was often identified as the only legitimate local party. It is true that the massive defeat of the citizen-action driven parties was also due to the fact that they had limited affinity with traditional political culture, a viable alternative programme and an organized constituency beyond their own activists. But the way in which they were marginalized
comes at the expense of the basic agreement in Helsinki on political equality and a fair chance for all to participate with local parties.

As a consequence, the non-GAM local parties of leading reformists and pro-democrats are now without any representation on the provincial level and the picture is much the same in the district parliaments. Ironically, crucial aspects of Jakarta’s idea that it could share power with GAM, but which was rejected in Helsinki, have thus returned to the forefront albeit in the framework of shallow electoral democracy. Similarly, the hope of many Indonesian democrats that the space for local parties in Aceh would serve as a model on how to build genuine representation has all but faded away.

The process continues, however. Some of the remarkable successes of the KPA and SIRA-backed independent gubernatorial candidates beyond the GAM strongholds in the 2006 direct elections could not be repeated by the Aceh Party alone, in spite of the endorsement of the Aceh Party by Governor Irwandi himself. More generally, the leaders who have now gained political hegemony can no longer blame others for the continued problems of governance and development. Evolving critique may also generate frustration over the undermining of democratic representation and the chances to form a meaningful opposition. Fortunately a recent (December 2010) constitutional court decision will allow independent candidates to stand in the forthcoming elections of political executives. Thus GAM’s Aceh Party and the Jakarta based national parties will not be able to monopolise these elections. Just as in 2006, dissenting reformists may thus stand a chance in spite of having been turned down by their autocratic leaders. But will ordinary people and citizen organisations be able to influence the elitist political vendettas? And there is still no supplementary citizen and interest and issue group representation. Similarly, Acehnese political representation at central Indonesia level remains unresolved. Local parties can only contest local elections. In order that those local parties that are not affiliated to existing ‘national’ parties do not lose out or have to form a pragmatic alliance (as in the case of the Aceh Party with President Yudhoyono), democratic all-Indonesia alliances will be necessary.

The problems of the democracy building strategy that focuses on elections, independent candidates and political parties and sets aside interest and issue organizations weakens the liberal argument. Yet it hardly lends support to the institutions first thesis either, as this has nothing to say about how such organizations might have been feasible in Aceh ahead of the democratic breakthrough. Rather, it is the transformation thesis that is vindicated, given its emphasis on the need for democracy oriented groups and movements to frame the transition from armed to democratic conflict resolution through wider participation in public governance. This, however, is what even the reformists in Aceh were unable to apply.

Conclusion

None of the general arguments are completely refuted or confirmed in the context of Aceh, but some tendencies are clear. The liberal emphasis on early freedoms,
elections and an open party system is vindicated. The dismantling of the autocratic regime, the decentralization of politics and the wider space for critique and positive initiatives by reformists, media, citizen groups and the international community fostered peace. The problems of abuses of power have returned to the fore, but ethnic, religious and other conflicts have not. Over time however, various additional factors either helped to make liberalization productive or fostered peace by constraining or expanding democracy.

The institution first thesis is vindicated by three factors. Although Yudhoyono and Kalla constrained the swift democratization after Suharto that had enabled decentralization and anti-corruption regulations in the first place, political liberalization did not prove productive for Aceh until it became more institutionalized under their politics of peace through economic and political ‘stability’ and territorial military control. Similarly, the rebels’ construction of an Acehnese political identity had nothing to do with the citizenship and the rule of law that the proponents of the institution first thesis focus on but it did contain ethnic and religious solidarities. In addition, the widely expected massive corruption and abuses of power after the tsunami was countered by regulations rather than neo-liberalism; and the then increasing predatory practices were related to reduced donor regulations and electoral victories of former rebels.

Yet it is the transformation argument about improvement of the conditions by expanding democracy that best fits the positive developments in Aceh. It was not a liberal oriented civil society in general but mainly the more political-oriented groups that made a difference. The Helsinki negotiations and especially the open-ended agreement on democratic governance of Aceh were more inclusive and political oriented than the elitist and ‘economic carrot driven’ negotiations held in other parts of Indonesia and in Sri Lanka. And the initially successful implementation of the democratic roadmap to peace was largely thanks to the democratic faction of GAM’s top leaders in tandem with the political capacity of ex-combatants and civil society activists on the ground to engage in organized politics and win elections. This is in sharp contrast to the liberal crafting of democracy and experiences in other parts of Indonesia.

The major problem for the transformation argument is the deterioration of governance and democratic politics since the remarkable elections in late 2006. If this process was inevitable because of poor conditions, then the institutions first thesis gains some credibility. If on the other hand the undermining of the reformist project rests more with politics, the transformation thesis points to democratic alternatives. The latter argument is that most efforts at democratization in Aceh were vested in the institutions agreed upon in Helsinki: the independent candidates in the first elections and then the local political parties. Thus old command structures and activist groups were geared up to benefit from these channels of influence. Moreover, the election of political executives was not used to improve governance and to foster additional channels of citizen participation and interest and issue representation in line with the transformation argument. There was simply too little interest in this in Aceh and internationally. Thus the essence of the Indonesian
government’s politics of sharing power with the former rebels that was abandoned in Helsinki to the benefit of inclusionary democracy has returned to the fore. It remains to be seen if the reformist leaders with incumbent governor Irwandi in the forefront who will now run as independents in the forth coming elections of local political executive (as they have again been pushed aside by their old not so democratic GAM leaders) will this time formulate a clear agenda in order to not just win but also transform politics and development in Aceh.

Notes
1. For summaries of the latter, see for example Paris, At War’s End; and Jarstad and Sisk, From War to Democracy.
2. Cf. the argument in George and Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences.
3. This article grows out of broader work supported by the Norwegian Research Council and accounted for in Törnquist, Prasetyo and Birks, Aceh: The Role of Democracy for Peace and Reconstruction, on the historical background, the quality and importance of democracy, the role of capital, the transformation of GAM, the regional elections in late 2006, the new local parties, the character of the transition and the recent parliamentary elections. Surveys were conducted in 2006 and 2007; additional information was collected and interviews were conducted from late 2006 until late 2009; some of the details are in footnotes 42, 46 and 53. I am most thankful to the innumerable colleagues and well informed activists who have contributed. Thanks also to the comments from the anonymous reviewers. I remain of course responsible for all lasting mistakes.
6. For example Paris, At War’s End, 44–51.
13. The correlation of violence and freedoms and elections are mainly within the framework of struggles for control of a territory or population, which almost by definition must be settled before rule of law and democracy can be developed (Carothers, ‘Misunderstanding Gradualism’, 21). The major exception is that agreements on rule of law and democracy for what should be applied in the future may be vital in negotiations over territorial disputes before peace accords have been signed and implemented. (Jarstad and Sisk, From War to Democracy, Ch. 1 and 241f.)
17. For a concise analysis, see Nordholt, ‘Decentralisation in Indonesia’.
18. For example Aspinall, The Helsinki Agreement.
21. For example, Aspinall, *The Helsinki Agreement*.
27. Ibid.
28. Including the British Indonesia Human Rights Campaign (TAPOL) and Indonesian scholars such as George Aditjondro.
30. ICG, *Aceh: A New Chance for Peace*; and Husain, *To See the Unseen*.
31. For example, Aspinall, *Islam and Nation*; Miller, *Rebellion and Reform in Indonesia*.
33. For recent statements, see *Jakarta Post*, April 8, 2007 (‘Peaceful Solution to Conflict Cheaper: Kalla’); January 17, 2008 (‘Prosperity the Goal, Not Democracy’); June 16, 2008 (‘Kalla Slams Inefficient Poll System’); September 2, 2008 (‘Vice President Pushes for Simplified Political System’).
34. Stokke and Uyangoda, *Liberal Peace in Question*.
36. One exception was that widespread support in Indonesia for military measures in Aceh disappeared with the tsunami. Billon and Waizenegger, ‘Peace in the Wake of Disaster?’, 419.
37. Stokke, Sindre, and Törnquist, ‘Conflict Resolution and Democratization in the Aftermath of the 2004 Tsunami’, for the general argument and references.
38. See notes 32 and 33.
39. See for example, Prasetyo and Aditjondro, ‘Profitable Peace’.
40. For example, Aspinall, ‘Combatants to Contractors’.
42. Husain, *To See the Unseen*; and conversations with Bakhtiar Abdullah, Juha Christensen, M. Nur Djuli and Shadia Marhavan.
43. I draw on the facilitators’ self reflections in seminar discussions and the insights communicated by Professors Jayadeva Uyangoda and Kristian Stokke.
46. The course of events discussed in this sub-section are covered in Aspinall, *The Helsinki Agreement*; Aspinall, *Islam and Nation*; ICG, *A New Chance for Peace*; ICG, *Aceh’s Local Elections*; ICG, *Indonesia: How GAM Won in Aceh*; Kingsbury, *Peace in Aceh*; Merikallio, *Making Peace*; and Mietzner, ‘Local Elections and Autonomy in Papua and Aceh’. The analysis has benefitted from my notebooks on attempts to promote the pro-democrats in Aceh at the time and conversations with a number of the actors involved (some of whom are mentioned in note 42; others include in particular, Taufiq Abda. Aguswandi, Akhiruddin, Damien Kingsbury (and mail December 4, 2006), Juanda Djamal, Jan Hodann, Munawar Liza, Muhammad Nazar, Erwin Schweissheim, Otto Syamsuddin.
48. They were assisted in this regard by Damien Kingsbury. Cf. *Jakarta Post*, January 24, 2005. This caused irritation in the Indonesian delegation which rather tried to develop
trust with major GAM leaders Malik Mahmud and Zaini Abdullah. Husain, To See the
Unseen, Chs 16 and 17.
49. For a recent account of the divisions in GAM, see Kingsbury, ‘Political Reconstruc-
tion in Aceh’.
50. The crucial pioneers included Jan Hodann of the Olof Palme International Centre.
51. For the details, see ISAI, ‘Regional Election in Aceh’.
52. Törnquist, ‘Democracy in Aceh: Diagnosis and Prognosis’.
53. Interviews with well informed activists, leaders, experts and scholars, Banda Aceh:
January and December 2007, March and November 2008, February, June and
54. Aspinall, Islam and Nation; Aspinall, ‘Combatants to Contractors’, 2009; Barron and
Burke, Supporting Peace in Aceh, Frödin, ‘The Challenges of Reintegration in Aceh’;
and Large, ‘The Challenge of Hidden Economies and Predation for Profit’, and
interviews with relief and development workers who must remain anonymous.
55. See note 53.
56. ICG, Aceh’s Local Elections, 3.
57. See note 53.
58. Including the Governor of Aceh, his deputy, the head of the Aceh-Nias Rehabilitation
and Reconstruction Agency (BRR) and political party leaders, civil society leaders
and popular organizations; APRT, ‘Frameless Transition?’.
59. For the remaining part of the paragraph, see note 53.
60. For detailed figures and analysis, see Uning et al., ‘Lost in Transition, Lost in
Election’.

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