Whither Studies of Asian Democratisation?

Olle Tornquist

While new popular forces are quite successful as single issue pressure groups, or in deepening civil society and generating social capital within various groups, and sometimes even communities as a whole, at the grass roots level, there is little convergence and little generation of broader issues, perspectives and organisation which may produce wider politics of democratisation in the society at large.

NOT so long ago our conferences were on development and control of resources. Now it is democracy and democratisation. The new buzzwords of the 1990s. The discourse within which everyone has to legitimate his special interests and struggle over hegemony – even authoritarian Asian rulers. Not to talk of entrepreneurial students and researchers.

So there is a good deal of confusion and a great need for reflection. Reflection to get some perspective; to develop fruitful approaches; and to go ahead with both scientific and political integrity. And since we can only reflect on the basis of our own different points of view, I guess I owe the reader a brief confession before going ahead.

My experiences from research in this field originate in the mid-1970s. That is, when many of the present powerful human rights and democracy proponents still did their best to prevent huge third world popular movements from even creating the most basic prerequisites for democratisation – economically and politically reasonably independent nations and citizens. A time when, therefore, at least to me, the study of such popular efforts was more relevant than problems of what is now labelled good governance or the deepening of civil society. A time when it was more natural to enter via theoretically guided comparative studies of politics and development, where there were at least some progress and free space, rather than through overly cautious and often introvert area studies. Especially in a country like Sweden where there were very few concerned scholars of south and southeast Asia in the first place. But even if I never became an Indonesianist or Indologist, or expert on Kerala or the Philippines (I do not even master Bahasa, Tagalog, Hindi, Bengali or Malayalam) I would like to think that there is instead something to thematic comparisons, if they are based on reasonably solid empirical research. And even if I am a child of the Marxian approaches to the problems of development, I also grew up among mainstream political scientists, where I continue to approach fundamental socio-economic conditions via studies of popular organisations as rational actors; that is, in everything but a structural Marxian way.

So from these experiences and perspectives – with all their pros and cons – what do the current studies of Asian democratisation look like? Whither the studies of Asian democratisation?

UNIVERSAL MINIMUM DEFINITION OF DEMOCRACY

To begin with, and just like mainstream students of politics, I find it scientifically unfruitful and politically dubious to start off with wide or culturally relativist definitions of democracy. Definitions which tend to include explanatory factors and are wide open to partisan characteristics – western or Asian, bourgeois or popular. Definitions which make it easy to mix perceptions of democracy with democratic packages (or concepts) and analytical definitions – and not compare like with like. To me the essence of modern democracy in terms of its meaning is nothing more – and definitely nothing less – than sovereignty of the people in accordance with the principle of constitutionally guaranteed political equality among citizens or members, who are independent enough to express their own will. Or, if we put it in operational and minimum-procedural terms, government according to rule on the basis of majority decisions among adult citizens or members with one vote each and freedom of expression and organisation.

And as far as I can see, this is the common denominator among most scholars of democracy as well as political actors, no matter if they are bourgeois liberals or non-authoritarian socialists, or if they are rooted in the north or in the south.

Firstly, however, such a position does not, of course, prevent us from studying countries and actors who do not measure up to the minimum definition but yet label themselves democratic (like many Asian leaders), or internalise and alter certain democratic rights (like the Hindu chauvinist Shiv Sena movement). However, the fact that they are not democratic and do not contribute to democratisation must be clearly established. And if we are interested in so-called discursive studies of democracy, the non-democratic arguments must then, of course, be situated within the discourse as a whole. A discourse within which their proponents strive for legitimation and hegemony – by advancing an ‘Asian model of democracy’ as well as by distorting the actual meaning of democracy and marginalising those who really promote it.

A genuine democracy and democratisation which, by the way, is no less ‘Asian’ and no more ‘western’ than the authoritarian leader’s Potemkin village.

Secondly, moreover, the fact that the essential meaning of democracy and the accompanying minimum definition are universal does not imply that all the associated factors are equally general. Quite on the contrary, of course – they do differ. They differ between cultures, and between levels and characters of socio-economic development, just as between theorists and actors. The forms of democracy may vary, for instance, between direct or indirect popular control. The extension of democracy may vary from the governing of narrow political institutions to almost everything people have in common, including factories and associations in civil society. The content of democracy (in terms of what is decided and implemented) may vary from attempts to promote social and economic equality to structural adjustment – as long as the above stated essence of democracy or minimum procedures are not undermined. Similarly, democratisation may be carried out in and promote different forms, with different scope, and with different content.

Consequently, if we give priority to the study of democracy and democratisation rather than to the ways in which resourceful rulers and associated movements legitimate authoritarianism; if we hold on to the essence and minimum definition of democracy; and if we allow for all the variations in terms of forms, extension and content; if we do all this, I do not think there is a need for serious disagreement of what democracy is about. We know what we mean, and we know what we have to explain.

So then we can start to disagree. Disagree over the preconditions for democracies with various forms, extension and content. Disagree over how such democracies may emerge in different societies, in different cultures and even in different villages. And then the main question is how we arrive at the most relevant and fruitful ways to study and explain democratisation.
Modernisation – Towards Democratic or Authoritarian Rule?

It is precisely at this point, I think, that we really need to sit down and look back to be able to discuss where we stand today and how we shall go ahead tomorrow. When I myself entered the field, the main theses about preconditions for democracy in Asia (as in the third world in general) were still related to the need for capitalist expansion and thus modernisation, in accordance with an idealised western pattern. A modernisation which would in turn generate political development and democracy. Marxists as well as non-Marxists produced society-centred analyses. But while those inspired by conventional Marxism (including Barrington-Moore) emphasised the socio-economic structure, and spoke of the need for a national bourgeoisie (which would produce a nation-state and overpower remnants of feudalism with popular support), the non-Marxists spoke of modern (versus traditional) values among groups and individuals, and stressed the importance of the middle class as the bearer of those values.

Soon enough, of course, others refined this perspective. Capitalist expansion and social and economic modernisation, they said, did not automatically generate so-called political development, including democracy. According to non-Marxists like Samuel Huntington, modernisation generated instead new social and political conflicts. These led to disruption, since the old political institutions could not handle all the demands and movements. Hence there was a need for ‘political order’ through the building of stable and modern institutions. To channelise some middle class participation and prevent popular upsurge. At worst by drawing on the military, as in Indonesia.

Similarly, east European Marxists noted that modernisation rarely produced a ‘national bourgeoisie’ and a working class strong enough to introduce functioning liberal democracy. Hence it was both possible and necessary to bet instead on progressive politicians and administrators within the state, at worst even officers. To build ‘non-capitalism’ within ‘national democracies’. To withstand imperialism. And to introduce land reforms and industrialisation, which in turn could generate stronger popular forces.

Dependency theorists, on the other hand, turned the picture upside-down. Capitalism and modernisation, they said, could not generate democracy, only dictatorship. The countries were not really sovereign. The rulers depended more on foreign capital than on their own resources and subordinates. A kind of permanent state of emergency was inevitable. So in any case people had to

mobilise and organise politically in order to challenge their rulers – and at worst take up arms.

It is true that Marxist class analysts soon put nuance into this picture by stressing the balance of forces and the different ways in which organised interests tried to affect and make use of the state. And it is equally true that some of them also spoke of an ‘overdeveloped’ third world state that had inherited strong colonial apparatuses and become relatively autonomous, as no class was able to really dominate. But even if this made it possible, thus, to explain why at least elitist democracies could emerge in a few countries like India, the Marxists primarily contributed more detailed and dynamic analysis of the rise of authoritarianism in all the great majority of third world countries.

Finally, many scholars said that the lack of democracy was more because of the state, and the social forces within its institutions, than because of the classes in civil society. Neo-classics maintained that politicians and bureaucrats were selfish rent-seekers, benefiting from the monopolisation of huge state apparatuses and regulations. Many neo-institutionalists claimed that developmental states presupposed autonomous, efficient, and authoritarian governance. The erosion of democratic governance in countries like India was due to the lack of universalistic administration and solid political institutions. Post-Marxists on their side maintained that third world capitalism often emerged from within the state, through privileged control and usage of its own resources and regulative powers, which, again, required authoritarian rule, or at least state-corporatism, or a combination of populism and cacique democracy.

Mainstream Current Approaches

So here we were, then – in the late 1970s and early 1980s – when, despite everything, some democratisation began to occur. That is, here we were with a lot of exciting analyses and explanations of more or less authoritarian rule – which simply did not make much sense when we also had to understand democratisation.

On the one hand, therefore, much of the modernisation perspectives got a new lease on life. Actual developments indicated, many said, that the good old theses proved right.

To begin with, non-Marxist modernists emphasised that socio-economic modernisation in general, and the rise of stronger middle classes in particular, really generated democracy. For instance, a huge new US project was initiated in the mid-1980s by Larry Diamond, Juan Linz and Seymour Martin Lipset. The relationship between capitalism and democracy, and the key role of the rising middle classes, were still taken for granted, even though different patterns were now allowed for and the key role of effective and democratically committed leadership was given special emphasis. Samuel Huntington, of course, put forward similar arguments in his celebrated ‘The Third Wave: Democratisation in the Late Twentieth Century’, though adding, as usual, the importance of stable political institutions.

For similar reasons, much of the modernist Marxian ideas that capitalist development would pave the way for some democratisation also returned to the forefront. Some argue that political monopolies, arbitrary and complicated administration, and exclusionary practices obstruct the forceful expansion of capital. This may thus necessitate negotiations and liberalisation which in turn may lead to some democratisation. At any rate, they say, the contradictions and structures generated by capitalism drive democratic reform. Others, and most convincingly Rueschemeyer and the Stephens, focus more on the social forces at play within such a framework and emphasise the primary role of the working class – in contrast to the conventional modernists’ preoccupation with the middle class and national bourgeoisie respectively.

On the other hand, many of those who grew up with dependency-oriented analyses of capitalism generating authoritarian rule did not really abandon but set aside their long-term structural perspectives. Guillermo O’Donnell et al analysed thus the actual transitions from authoritarian rule as an open ended process of liberalisation and struggles between hard-lineers and soft-lineers during political conjunctures characterised by economic and ideological crisis and institutional decay. Their explanations in terms of actors’ rational action (with often unintended consequences), and the negotiation on the elite level of pacts and institutional rearrangements, vary, thus, from country to country. But a common framework is, “that the bourgeoisie, or at least important segments of it, regard the authoritarian regime as ‘dispensable’...either because it has laid the foundation for further capitalist development or because it has demonstrated its incompetence for doing so”, and that there is some “resurrection of the civil society.”

Similarly, those inspired by neo-classical perspectives held on to the thesis about selfish political rent-seekers who nourished ‘over-politicisation’ and futile ‘political short cuts’. Hence, they say, democratisation presupposes the dismantling of the state, minus law and order, the promotion of capitalist market economy, and the deepening of civil society – including on the international level. And finally, of course, such efforts, like structural adjustment, are also employed to explain democratisation.
This, however, was also the time when less sterile institutionalist perspectives returned to the fore. Many political scientists brought "the state back in". A state which not only catered to the interests of the dominant classes but also had its own functions and interests, for instance in political stability and favourable positions *vis-a-vis* other states. And this in turn called for extensive resources and some popular support — which might open up for liberalisation and democratisation.

Other analysts were more interested in institutions as rules of the game, which then in turn affect human action. Hence, the many studies of how, for instance, institutional arrangements affect negotiations during transitions from authoritarian rule and how different electoral systems may then contribute to consolidation of democracy. In parallel fashion, many researchers focus on the significance of constitutional governance, stable institutions and organisations, and effective rule, especially now that the main theme has become "consolidation of democracy". And India’s severe problems of democracy are often explained in terms of over-politicisation on the one hand, and weak political and administrative institutions to handle demands and implement policies on the other. The primary recipe here, of course, is the World Bank sponsored ideas of ‘good governance’. But we should not forget the widespread appreciation — also in the west — of the efficient and stable institutions in some east Asian developmental states and their attempts at political incorporation of significant groups by way of co-optation and corporatist practices.

Finally, yet other institutionalists concentrate more on how culture and institutions in the society at large affect government and administration. For instance, Robert Putnam and his followers say that social capital, in terms of trust and co-operation, promotes democratic performance.

**How Do Mainstream Approaches Fare in Asian Context?**

So, how relevant and fruitful are these predominant explanatory frameworks for our attempts to analyse Asian democratisation?

Let me discuss this with reference to the three very different countries and settings that I know a bit about — that is India in general and the state of Kerala in particular, the Philippines, and Indonesia.

India and Kerala may represent the cases where nation-state-led development and centralised democratic governance are in serious problem. The Philippines, on the other hand, stand out as a good example of the many third world countries where authoritarianism first replaced limited democratic forms of rule but then went aground and experienced a kind of middle-class resurrection of civil society and elitist democracy. And Indonesia, finally, may represent the highest-cost authoritarian governance which has contributed to rapid socio-economic development and where, at least according to the dominant groups, democratisation may undermine all this.

Firstly, the non-Marxist thesis that socio-economic modernisation and stronger middle classes generate democracy. Of course there is something to this.

In India, however, these processes and forces are also behind much of the current problems of democracy. Parts of the economic and political deregulation may be inevitable, but it certainly adds to the earlier problems of de-institutionalisation. In the Philippines, moreover, the widely esteemed middle-class democratisation continues to resemble much of the old ‘cacique democracy’, even though the old socio-economic basis of political clans and clientelism is dwindling. Hence, there is still no new solid foundation for further democratisation, including reasonably clear-cut representation of different interests and ideas of societal change. In Indonesia, finally, the politically and administratively dominated expansion of capitalism means that there is a lack of even the comparatively independent business and middle class forces which gave resonance to much of the transition from authoritarianism in the Philippines.

On the other hand, the real importance of some new-middle class professionals in the process of democratisation is rarely considered within the conventional modernisation framework. That is when they form independent organisations to protect their own rights and integrity as professionals, or be able to do serious development work, and simultaneously link up with broader popular demands and efforts.

Secondly, the modernist Marxian ideas of capitalism undermining political monopolies and arbitrary rule, creating some free space and giving birth to a working class which will enforce democratic change. This carries, of course, also important insights.

However, it is difficult to generalise the experiences from Europe and Latin America to Asia, with its more politically engineered expansion of capitalism. Even though deregulation, privatisation and efforts at more efficient state administration have been on the agenda in the Philippines since the fall of Marcos, and more recently in Indonesia and India as well, surviving rulers and executives usually manage to reorganise their old ‘fiefdoms’ and networks. The division of labour, the subordination of people, and the appropriation of surplus are extremely complex and contradictory. We are far from a classical idea of industrial and cultural transformation in general and the emergence of a large and comparatively homogeneous working class in particular. So even if workers are likely to be of utmost importance, for instance in Indonesia, we must find out what differs from the historical cases behind the general models of capitalism and democracy — in order to thereafter, perhaps, be able to adjust and make use of similar generalisations.

Thirdly, the studies of actors’ rational action and negotiations on the elite level — or the study of crafted instant democratisation. This, for obvious reasons, makes a lot of sense in the Philippines. Elitist horse-trading characterised much of the actual transition from Marcos to Aquino, especially during and after the so-called people power revolution at EDSA. However, the elitist perspective neglects most of the long and widespread struggles which paved the way for and conditioned the transition and negotiations. Moreover, we are unable to understand why it was that most of this popular opposition could neither participate and make an impact in the very transition, nor play a decisive role in thereafter consolidating and deepening democracy. Partially this applies to India and Kerala as well. Here most of the important efforts at rebuilding and deepening democracy are going on among popular grass roots organisations which are not fully integrated, or are unable to make an impact, within the political system. And in Indonesia, where the most likely scenario really is negotiated pacts between post-Suharto elites, we must also recall the lack of both the bourgeois and middle class forces and the reasonably independent civil society which elsewhere have given resonance to most of the elitist resurgence of democracy.

Fourthly, the liberal thesis about civil society against the state. Of course, nobody denies that free citizens and associations are part of or necessary prerequisites for democracy. However, theories suggesting that the deepening of civil society in itself promote democratisation are hardly fruitful. In the Philippines, privatisation and the resurrection of civil society have primarily given way to political bossism on the local level and personality oriented populism on the national level. In India, so-called liberalisation basically nourishes clientelism, group-specific organisation, and populist mobilisation on the basis of religious and cultural identities. And in Indonesia, privatisation and deregulation, as already mentioned, usually imply that politicians, bureaucrats and officers re-organise their ‘fiefdoms’ and are able to legalise private ownership of formally public resources which they have already laid their hands on. Thus the separation between state and civil society remains comparatively blurred.

There is also an international dimension to the thesis about civil society against the...
state. Globalisation and international support of human rights, many say, tend to undermine authoritarian rule and promote democracy—especially when geared through so-called civil society organisations at both ends. On the one hand it is not difficult to agree, especially from the point of view of repressed pro-democracy groups in countries like Indonesia. But on the other hand it is worthwhile remembering that a necessary prerequisite for democracy is a clearly defined demos—citizens or members having the right to govern themselves. And at least I am not aware of any reasonably genuine process of democratisation that has not been related to a nation-state, or a relatively autonomous region or commune within its framework.13

Fifthly, the neo-institutionalists and the much wished ‘good governance’—which should be credited for having at least convinced some people of the fact that not only socio-economic factors but also political institutions have a bearing on more or less democratic forms of rule. However, while nobody would object to the need for clean and efficient government, the main problem is to find out under what conditions it may emerge. And this is very rarely done. Instead, ‘good governance’, along with the crafting of instant democracy, are often traded just like IMF-economists sell neo-liberal market solutions around the globe.

Moreover, the comparatively few neo-institutionalists who look for causes and reasons behind good or bad governance tend to apply a top-down perspective a la Samuel Huntington. Hence, popular dissidence from below is seen as dysfunctional. The efficient east Asian governing of the markets is usually explained in terms of state autonomy vis-à-vis societal force. Robert Wade even concludes his book by recommending that “effective institutions of political authority (should be developed) before, (and) corporatist institutions as or before, the system is democratised”14. The inefficient Indian state governments are usually related to over-politicisation and weak political and administrative institutions to handle demands and implement policies, as we have already seen in the writings of Atul Kohli.

Sixthly, the renewed interest in civic virtues, trust and co-operation—now labelled social capital. This, clearly, is an important dimension of the forms of democracy which seem to have a bearing on the content or outcome of democracy.

That a democratic culture promotes democracy is, of course, almost tautological. Many of the proponents, however, say they rather refer to the performance of an already existing democracy than to democratisation as a process. But then the rise of social capital itself remains to be explained more convincingly than with reference to historical continuity or ‘path dependence’. At any rate, if social capital is seen as a precondition for ‘good democracy’ (which is plausible) the current social capital school—just like the old Marxian capital-logic school—is likely to face problems of explaining politics and policies in an essentially reductionist way, without considering interest groups, political movements and organisations, strategic calculation and so on. For instance, my own ongoing comparative case studies from the Philippines, Kerala, and Indonesia indicate, that while the actions and development-work really deepen the civil society and really generate social capital—and while this is necessary for further democratisation—it is far from sufficient. Actions, movements and organisations do not ‘automatically’ converge and produce the broader issues and perspectives which may generate extended politics of democratisation, and thereafter good democratic policies.15 The best example is probably Kerala, with the most vibrant civil society and the highest degree of social capital one can think of—and yet with very different outcome in terms of both democratisation and democratic performance over the years. It is true that the degree of social capital varies between being related to special communities and being more genuinely societal. But the main point is that, at least since the mid-1950s, everything from the generation of societal (and not only group-specific) social capital, and broader forms of further democratisation, to efficient democratic performance varies instead primarily with the achievements and problems of genuinely popular and socialist oriented movement and organisation.16

ESSENTIAL THEMES FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

Therefore, given the serious limits of the mainstream approaches to democratisation in Asia, there are 11 factors and relations that we should explore and give priority to.

First, what are the conditions and possibilities for the deepening and consolidation of middle-class democratisation? Even the Philippine showcase, as we know, continues to resemble much of the old cacique democracy.

Second, what will happen when there is even a lack of comparatively independent middle classes, like in Indonesia?

Third, what is the character and importance of organisation among new-middle class professionals and their linking up with broader popular movements?

Fourth, what are the conditions for workers under politically engineered expansive capitalism to play an equally important role in democratisation as did workers in Europe and Latin America?

Fifth, how does widespread popular struggle pave the way for and how does it condition elitist negotiation over transition from authoritarian rule and further democratisation?

Sixth, why and how is it that popular forces rarely can neither make a direct impact in these negotiations and transitions, nor play a decisive role in thereafter consolidating and deepening democracy? What are the conditions for the integration of popular forces into politics as opposed to the predominant incorporation of them through either clientelism and populism or co-optation and corporatist measures?

Seventh, what are the conditions for the emergence of a reasonably autonomous civil society under politically engineered capitalism? And how does, then, the deepening of this civil society affect democratisation?

Eighth, what is the impact of globalisation and international support of human rights and democratisation on the necessary formation of a clearly defined demos in order to build democracy—something which so far has been related to nation-states and relatively autonomous regions and communes within its framework?

Ninth, under what conditions may so-called good governance emerge? And what is, then, the relation between top-down efforts at efficient institutionalisation on the one hand, and popular dissidence, movement and organisation from below on the other?

Tenth, when and how does social capital develop—within and between various groups and communities?

Eleventh, and at least to me the most important, what, besides social capital, are the conditions when, and the perceptions and visions with which, popular movements and organisations may converge and produce the broader issues and perspectives which generate extended politics of democratisation and efficient policies?

APPROACHING THE FOUNDATIONS OF DEMOCRATISATION

These vital but comparatively neglected problems within the scholarly discourse on democracy have, thus, one thing in common—they all call for a closer look at the deeper dimensions or real foundations of democratisation.

The most fruitful way of approaching this, I think — against the background of capitalist expansion in general—is to focus on the importance of politics on the one hand, and the partly new and complicated social and economic conflicts on the other. This is in order thereafter to be able to concentrate on how it all affects, and is perceived by, the popular forces able to potentially take democratisation beyond the simple elitist playground, within nation-states and their relatively autonomous regions or communes. Could it be, for instance, that the current issues and conflicts carry the seed of a new
generation of radical popular demands, movements and organisations with democratisation in the forefront? How will this, then, become part of restructured political systems during a process of globalisation? And how will it relate to more or less reform-oriented old movements and organisations which once emerged on the basis of different issues and conflicts, such as anti-imperialism and land reform?

To my knowledge, there is not much research done within this field. Those who do enter have usually come from three different directions. One is from rather general studies of how people are integrated or incorporated into mainstream politics. Another direction is from the predominantly sociological and anthropological studies of the rise and character of social movements (including discursive analysis). Yet another results from queries into more issue-oriented interest-based organisations such as action groups and unions, and eventually, of course, political parties.

These, I think, are the same tracks which we should now continue along – in order to develop new insights and more fruitful questions and approaches.

For instance, the results that come out of my own studies of popular movement and organisation in development and democratisation clearly suggest, as already indicated, that while the new popular forces are quite successful as single issue pressure groups, or in deepening civil society and generating social capital within various groups, and sometimes even communities as a whole, at the grass roots level, there is little convergence and little generation of broader issues, perspectives and organisation which may produce wider politics of democratisation in the society at large.

In other words, in this sense I think there is a special need to focus on the problems of politicking civil society and so-called social capital.

In which case analytical tools are needed. Allow me to conclude with a brief attempt at specifying some such tools. Politicisation means that certain questions, institutions and activities become the object of common societal deliberation. Three aspects are, I believe, are most important to consider here: the bases, the forms and the contents. We can trace the bases of politicisation to the interests and ideas that lead people to come together. Let us distinguish between common action on the basis of specific questions or self-interest – and such action on the basis of questions linked to ideology or on the basis of individual interests connected to common class and societal interests. The forms of politicisation are always related to societal organs like a state or local government. The forms vary, however, with whether one ‘only’ demands that certain policies should be carried out by these organs or also really engages in promoting similar ends through self-management, for instance by way of co-operatives. The contents of democratisation have to do with how disparate movements articulate democratic values like liberty and equality in various contexts. Even organisations of an ethnically and religiously chauvinist character, after all, can express and legitimate their methods and goals by reference to the rights and freedoms of their members seen in relation to other groups.

The bases and forms of politicisation can be elucidated with a simple matrix; the resulting picture can then be complemented with the contents of politicisation.

**FIGURE:** THE BASES AND FORMS OF POLITICISATION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Forms of Politicisation</th>
<th>Bases of Politicisation</th>
<th>Base as state/local</th>
<th>Also via self-government only management</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Single issues or special interests</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideology or collective interests</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

We can distinguish four basic cases thereby. In square one we find the sort of pluralism in which many different pressure groups, single-issue movements and interest organisations try to influence state and local government politics. In square two, self-managing pluralism is found – in which groups and organisations of a similar sort run their own affairs besides. In square three, we see the kind of broad organisations and corporations (with which we are familiar in northern Europe especially) which try to affect and to conduct state/municipal politics on the basis of common interests and/or ideas. In square four, finally, we find a situation in which organisations of this latter sort to a great extent run common affairs as well. We can also, of course, locate various kinds of political movements in these four squares, and discuss shifts from one square to another over time.

**Notes**

1 The authoritarian ideas and practices are rooted in the feudal-like Asian heritage, which was further developed by colonisers, pushed back by the nationalists (who tried instead to combine the ideals of the French revolution and progressive aspects of their own culture), and then resurrected and restructured by new oligarchies and western promoters of Samuel Huntington's 'politics of order'.


5 Ibid, p 27 and 48 ff respectively.


13 Plus, of course, democratization within associations with a clearly defined membership.


15 See the separately distributed supplement to this paper *Popular Movement and Organisation in Development and Democratization: Tentative Conclusions from the Philippines, Kerala, Indonesia*.


---

**Economic and Political Weekly** January 17, 1998