EXECUTIVE REPORT
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1st ROUND STUDY OF
THE PROBLEMS AND OPTIONS
OF INDONESIAN DEMOCRATISATION

Research team
AE Priyono, Donni Edwin, Willy Purna Samadhi,
Antonio Pradjasto, Debbie Prabawati, Syafa’atun Kariadi,
Otto Adi Yulianto, Agung Wijaya
Olle Törnquist [Supervisor]

DEMOS
The Indonesian Centre for Democracy and Human Rights Studies
Jl. Borobudur No 4, Jakarta, 10320, Indonesia
<office@demos.or.id>

In Cooperation with
the Local Politics and Democratisation Network, University of Oslo,
ISAI, KontraS and Interfidei

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INTRODUCTION

In 1999, Indonesia became the world’s third largest (fledgling) democracy. Should it stabilise and develop, it would be an historical victory for democracy and of vital importance beyond the boundaries of the country itself. Should it deteriorate and at worst collapse, this would be the fourth time, taken from the 1959 clamp down of the parliamentary democracy with roots in the liberation movement, the 1965/66 political and physical elimination of popular mass movements and the institutionalisation of political violence, and the 1971 collapse of efforts to liberalise the early New Order regime. At present, there is almost general agreement that much of the post-1998 attempts at democratisation have also failed. In face of the upcoming elections, one of the parties eligible to run has already declared taking the country ‘back to the basics’ of the Soeharto regime, with his daughter 'Tutut' (Siti Hardiyanti Rukmana) as president, as its aim.

It is true that the more than thirty years of 'liberal despotism' came to an end due mainly to its own internal contradictions and because of changing external conditions. But the democracy movement was also vital, most visibly in the overthrow of Soeharto. And democracy was widely regarded as the only way out of the crisis. The roadmap since 1998 has also been dominated by internationally promoted attempts at crafting negotiated pacts within the elite at the expense of broader involvement of the popular oriented democracy movement, which has been deemed a potential risk should it engage in the question of state power. In the face of the 1999 elections, this movement was largely sidetracked and confined its activities to working with civil society. Some believed it would thus be able to regroup and consolidate until the next elections. In the face of the upcoming 2004 elections however, very few political parties - and hardly any significant ones - include any organised representation from the democracy movement.

Why has the democracy movement lost momentum?

Why is this? Perhaps the movement barely existed, beyond some high profile intellectuals in Jakarta and a few other cities in addition to the temporarily mobilised students. And even if it did exist, why has it been so weak and unable to make a difference? The mainstream 'democratic consolidation' thesis of crafting 'good' institutions and, quite separately from that, de-politicising civil society, strengthening it
against the state and avoiding conflicts, is short of good answers. The institutions are in shambles, political corruption is increasing and decentralisation has in many cases contributed to the rise in local-boss rule, in addition to semi-privatised violence. The pro-democratic forces have largely followed the standard recommendations, but have failed to unify the pro-

reformasi forces and to become politically significant. Yet, the advocates of the consolidation thesis have little to offer but more of the same.

The results of our research on democratic actors and their constituencies (that commenced in the mid-90s and were carried out on and with the democracy movement) point in another direction. On the one hand, surveys and case studies reveal that the movement still exists and that many of the genuine activists are alive and kicking. On the other hand, it is clear that the movement has not only been marginalised by the mainstream elitist politics of democratisation. It also continues to reflect Soeharto's 'floating mass' politics by being fragmented, poorly organised and rather isolated from ordinary people. It has not focussed on altering power relations – which have thus undermined its efforts at building new institutions and associations. It largely continues along the same anti-statist line as during the struggle against the authoritarian regime. Its efforts at affecting politics remain confined to lobbying and to the exertion of pressure on the one hand, and to self-management and 'direct democracy' on the other. Those who have occasionally tried to switch to outright politics and, for instance, join political parties, have lacked an organised constituency as well as strategy – thus almost immediately being co-opted and silenced, or found themselves isolated in the wilderness.

Meanwhile people are increasingly disappointed with democracy. For ordinary people who were looking for an alternative way of building a better society, democracy, thus far, makes little sense. Many look to strong leaders instead and remember Soeharto's regime with nostalgia. For radicals, there is a need for drastic changes to the power relations by way of social movements and mass organising before rights and institutions may be deemed to carry any meaning. Among the middle classes, many are utterly cynical, regard corrupt politicians and judges as the major problem and thus, ironically, pave the way for 'enlightened' authoritarian solutions. As against the predominant perspective and in face of growing disinterest in democracy therefore, the results of the study call for a repoliticisation of civil society in order to alter power relations and for the development of a new popular politics of democratisation based on improved links between civic and political action.

**The need for a renewed agenda**

There are no blueprints for this. The 'political deficit of substantial democratisation' is a universal phenomenon that also causes problems in show-cases such as Porto Alegre and Kerala. The Indonesian situation is worse and the challenges are enormous. There is an obvious need for renewed priorities and an improved democratic agenda to regain the
initiative. As no political vehicle or concept seems to represent a good solution, there is a need for both a focussed and open-ended framework – for further analysis and deliberation based on the primacy of the argument rather than the dominance of certain actors, assumptions and hypotheses.

This is the background to the founding of the Demos (Centre for Democracy and Human Rights Studies) association and for the present three year programme to assess the problems and options of democratisation, as a modest contribution to a new pro-democratic agenda.

A framework for studies and deliberation

A framework for fruitful analysis and deliberation on the problems and options of democratisation help us consider five fundamental aspects: Firstly, that one cannot take it for granted (as is often done in mainstream discourse) that certain rights and institutions equal democracy. This calls for a separation between the universal aims of democracy (equal popular control of public affairs) and the more contextually designed means (such as freedom of speech, elections and organised interests) and then studies of how effective they are. Secondly, one needs to disaggregate the common generalisations made about democracy and consider instead the problems and options of its various key aspects at different levels. Thirdly, the wheels of democracy do not move by themselves. To proceed beyond the static measuring of institutional standards and consider instead the dynamics of democracy and democratisation, we must be able to analyse if and how actors try to abuse or use and perhaps even promote them. Fourthly, we must be able to consider the problematic separation between civic and political action (including direct vs. representative democracy, and self-management vs. professional public administration) as well as attempts to combine them. This calls for a framework that transcend the dualism between the elitist studies of rights and institutions and the sociopolitical studies of civic and social movements. Fifthly, we need an alternative framework that is not rooted in assumptions about the superiority of elite-led democratic changes, and related sources and metropolitan experts, but build on the key role of popular efforts to foster substantial democratisation and therefore also the prime importance of knowledge and experience by reflective pro-democrats on the ground.

Combining institutions and popular capacities

What would such a framework look like? What basic questions would we need to ask to thus analyse and deliberate the priorities for substantial democratisation? We have developed a tentative model and have now tested it during the first round of our three-step studies. The six salient points of the model are as follows.

(1) While Beetham may be right that there is little dispute about the universal meaning of
democracy – in terms of equal popular control of public affairs on the basis of participation, authorisation, representation, accountability, transparency, responsiveness and solidarity – there are different views on what means are necessary to reach these aims. Liberal democrats, for instance, assume that the autonomy of the people (demos) and the individual calls for privacy, private property rights and capitalist modernisation. Critical Marxists argue that collective organisation and cooperation are necessary to guarantee the individual freedom of all people, not just the privileged, whilst communitarians emphasise the strength of 'social capital' and communities. What most scholars seem to agree on however, is that substantial democracy must be based on human rights. In this tradition, the so far most widely accepted democratic assessment scheme identifies and measures the quality of 85 rights and institutions that are deemed necessary to promote democracy. In our alternative framework, we have aggregated them, made some revisions and arrived at 1 plus 35. The first relates to how the people (demos) that are supposed to decide equally about public affairs actually identify themselves. The following 35 relate to the standard of (a) law and judiciary, citizenship and human rights, (b) government and public administration, representation and accountability, and (c) civil society (including instances of direct democracy and self-management).

(2) In mainstream audits, the standard of such rights and institutions are estimated in terms of their strength and effectiveness (quality). In the alternative framework, we ask also about their scope: their geographical spread and scale as well as how many important issues that are covered, i.e. how wide the public space is.

(3) The equally essential means of substantial democracy in terms of people's capacity to make use of the aforementioned rights and institutions are also neglected in ordinary audits. In our alternative framework, we consider the three most vital capacities: the capacity to (a) be present and link activities in different parts of the political terrain, (b) politicise public issues, interests and values, and (c) mobilise support for policies with regard to such issues, interests, and values.

(4) To move from static measuring to analysis of the dynamics of democracy and democratisation, our alternative framework asks if and how vital actors relate to the instruments of democracy when favouring their own ideas and interests. What specific rights and institutions do they abuse, use and, at best, promote? In relation to what rights and institutions are they strong or weak and what pathway do they follow within the more or less democratic system?

(5) In addition to the factors that are intrinsic to democracy, the alternative framework also includes the most important conditions for people's capacity to promote and use democratic rights and institutions. These factors include (a) the more or less favourable opportunity structure, (b) the sources of power that the actors relate to, (c) if and how they manage to transform them into legitimate authority, prestige and honour, and (d)
what values and perspectives they are guided by.
The alternative analytical framework for politics of democratisation may be summarised in the following figure.

<table>
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<th>Actor's Instrumental Aims</th>
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The Actors

Credible local experts

(6) Finally, there is a lack of relevant and reliable written sources in contexts like Indonesia. The standard solution within elitist assessments of democratisation is to rely on interviews with top leaders and metropolitan experts. Within our alternative framework, by contrast, grounded, experienced, credible and reflective democracy activists around the country are considered the primary experts. Our studies, therefore, are based on long interviews with these informants by local assistants on the basis of an extensive questionnaire (with some 560 questions, 20 of which were open-ended), supplemented by regional and national assessment councils that involve scholars and leaders. In addition, the informants' own opinion may also be significant, given their capacity as strategic actors in substantial democratisation.
These informants must be able to reflect critically upon their experiences within the main issue-areas of the democracy movement and within the context of the regions as well as the centre. There are three rounds of interviews, two including experts within the different issue-areas and one re-evaluation of the most strategic problems. The main issue-areas for the first round of studies are: (a) land/agrarian issues, (b) labour issues, (c) problems of urban poor,(d) human rights abuses, (e) anti-corruption, (f) attempts to democratise parties, and (g) religious conflict. During the second round, the following will be studied: (g) freedom and abuse of media, (h) gender, (i) democratic education, (j) professionalism/work ethics, and (k) open issues to be decided after the first round. The third round is for a re-evaluation of the most strategic issues or clusters of the same. These issues are studied in 29 provinces of the country. The central team consists of eight researchers, including the director A.E. Priyono, assisted by a secretariat. The selection of informants, issue-areas and localities was done by the research team in cooperation with local key-informants, based on previous case-studies undertaken in conjunction with and focusing on the democracy movement itself, guided by a faculty of scholars and activists in addition to a senior academic supervisor, Olle Törnquist.

The key-informants also help in the selection of the some 100 local assistants, who must be committed and who have been trained by the central team. To handle the entire operation and follow up the results including the dissemination of the results, advocacy, the production of study materials, as well as further research in cooperation with concerned academics and students (within as well as outside the country), Demos has been constituted with the support of leading pro-democratic organisations and scholars, with Asmara Nababan as its executive director.

The decision to develop this alternative framework and carry out the study was taken by activists and scholars at a conference held in early 2002 on the problems of democratisation. After a year of preparation and of fundraising, the project was launched in January 2003. The interview process was carried out simultaneously in 29 provinces between June and August 2003. More than 500 informants were identified for the first round of the study but we only expected some 400 to be completed due to the pioneering and time-consuming nature of the questionnaire, problems related to key informants, errors made by local assistants, and problems of reaching some informants, including in areas where conditions are difficult (Aceh and Papua). Thanks to our checks and balances during the processing of the data, we were also able to locate and remove some 20 faked interviews from Lampung; thus leaving us with 363 fully valid questionnaires in the first round and incomplete representation from nine provinces. (The overall results, however, as well as the results from the other regions, seem to be remarkably stable. Preliminary analysis on the basis of 237 valid questionnaires generated results which did not differ significantly from the final results.) After the national assessment council, more detailed analyses will be carried out in cooperation with scholars and students within the academe.
We shall also present the conclusions in other forms, in media, to regional assessment councils and, hopefully, in the form of advocacy and study materials.

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_Demos_, the new Centre for Democracy and Human Rights Studies, has coordinated all the work. Aside from the team, staff, and the faculty of advisors, the major patrons of _Demos_ are ISAI, KontraS, and Interfidei. Additional financial support comes from Norad, (the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation), as well as Sida, (the Swedish Development Cooperation Agency), Ford Foundation and the TIFA Foundation. Vital parts of the assessment study have been handled by the key-informants and the field assistants who have done a great job. We thank them sincerely! Most of all, however, we like to thank all informants who have spent hours to patiently and consistently respond to our very extensive and not yet well enough contextualised questionnaire. Thanks to you, we will hopefully also be able to improve it in face of round two of the assessment programme. _Demos_ is a membership-based organisation. If you share our ideas and aims, you are most welcome aboard!

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On the next page is a map indicating the number of informants in each of the provinces where interviews have been carried out. Thereafter we may turn to the 13 general conclusions from the first round assessment study.
CONCLUSIONS

The following are the 13 major points and conclusions drawn from the answers given by the informants

People often refer to ‘Indonesian democracy’ in a generalised way, neglecting to break down and examine the concept in terms of its ‘constituent parts.’ To do so is misleading. There is a need to be more specific about its constituent parts. For example, not all rights and institutions are deemed to be poor. Those related to freedoms and civil society are viewed positively. Moreover, the main issues that dominate the discourse on Indonesian democracy, such as the rule of law, justice and corruption, are only part of the problem. Socio-economic rights for example are equally poor. Worst of all, representation is not only inadequate, but also neglected. Indonesia's fledgling democracy is delegative, not representative.

- Twenty-five percent of the 35 rights and institutions (R&I) are deemed adequate. They are mainly rights that relate to various freedoms and civil society-activities.
- Fifty percent of R&I, however, are deemed to be inadequate or worse. They are mainly related to the rule of law and justice, socio-economic rights, control of the armed forces/violence, as well as corruption, governance and representation.
- The problem of representation relates primarily to the opportunity to participate in elections by establishing and building up alternative politic parties and/or independent candidates, the existing parties' dependence on money politics, ethnicity and religion, weak reflection of public opinion and interests, poor ability to form and run government, and lack of accountability even to party members themselves.
- The gap between good freedoms and bad tools is more distinct when it comes to the quality (strength and efficiency) as compared to the scope (territorial spread and inclusion of vital public issues) of the R&I. That the gap with regard to scope is less distinct is probably due to remaining presence the large but undemocratic public realm under Soeharto. R&I to the public realm, however, have been undermined and/or privatised, not democratised.
- Informants from or working with mass movements (particularly on land, labour and some urban poor issues) tend to place more emphasis on bad representation than the other experts do.
- Informants with experience of land, labour, human rights and corruption issues tend to be more critical, while informants working with political parties and religious conflict are less so. Furthermore, the standard of R&I is deemed least bad in the centre/Jakarta and particularly poor, with regard to quality, in Sulawesi and, with regard to scope, in Sumatra.
Central-level experts often say that democratisation has collapsed. Experienced local
democracy experts make more balanced judgements.

The general quality and scope of democratic rights and institutions (R&I) is poor or very
poor. However, 25 percent of the R&I are deemed to be adequate. Seventy-five percent of
the experts say that 'only' 50 percent of the R&I are poor or worse.

The pro-democrats themselves have not given up. More than 60 percent of the local
experts claim that they both use and are able to improve upon 60 percent of the R&I.
Only 14 percent of the experts say that 28 percent of the R&I are not meaningful.

However, while we are not yet on the brink and while democratisation is not a lost cause,
the overall trend is clear, that we are heading towards a serious crisis. This is because,
according to the local democracy-experts, the gap between good freedoms and bad tools
has increased since 1999. (Informants working on anti-corruption, labour issues and
human rights are more pessimistic about some R&I, while those working with political
parties and on religious reconciliation are the most positive. In addition, the situation in
Sumatra may have improved in some respects, while the right to work in particular at the
centre/Jakarta seems to have deteriorated.)

This widening of the gap between freedoms and tools, moreover, is particularly serious
with regard to the major tools for improving conditions in a democratic way – the means
to good representation for equitable popular control. The danger is that this may pave the
way for top-down non-democratic solutions (or direct action from civil society or 'uncivil'
society).

Discussion on what rights and institutions (R&I) are deemed particularly inadequate and
ineffective is unsystematic and inconclusive. Local democracy-experts, however, have
identified the following:

**The worst:**
R&I with poor quality and scope that are not always meaningful to the activities of the
democratic actors
- parties’ reliance on issues of ethnicity & religion
- parties’ ability to form and run government
- parties’ ability to represent public opinion and interests
- members’ voice within and ability to control political parties
- control of militia
- independence from external dominance
- subordination of the military to elected government and the public
- good corporate governance and public regulation of business

_The very bad:_
additional R&I with poor quality and scope
- subordination of government and public administration to the rule of law
- equal access to justice
- accountability of public administrators
- accountability of elected politicians
- right to work, social security, food, shelter, clean water, health

_The bad:_
additional R&I with poor scope
- respect for international HR law
- minority rights and reconciliation
- children’s rights
- gender equality
- equal citizenship
- decentralisation
- individual freedom from violence

How does the democracy movement relate to strategic R&I? And what can it do? What is its position in relation to the R&I institutions in question?

Pro-democrats mainly use and improve the good R&I – freedoms and civil society – in relation to which they are relatively strong.

On the other hand, pro-democrats are clearly less engaged in using and improving other R&I that are deemed to have poor scope and quality, where they are in a weak position – especially with regards to R&I that relate to representation.

They also try to use and improve R&I that are related to poor justice, violence and corruption, presumably based on principle and/or necessity, irrespective of whether the activists are in a strong or weak position.

Some qualifications may be made for specific issue areas. Pro-democrats working within land rights issues/agrarian reform seem to relate less to the media, equal access to justice, freedom of religion, language and culture, free and fair elections, political parties’ independence of religious and ethnic interests, as well as their ability to rule. These informants, moreover, indicate also a more common inclination that average to find alternatives outside the scope of the poor R&I. Similarly, activists within the labour sector tend to relate less positively to a number of R&I and to look for other alternatives
to the bad ones. The latter applies to those working on religious reconciliation as well. On the other hand, anti-corruption campaigners and the pro-democratic politicians seem to work more intensively with certain R&I and to be less inclined to look for other alternatives.

What possibilities does the democracy movement have to fight the problems of government and representation in particular? There are different ideals and visions, but the ways of working within the democratic system are remarkably similar.

The most frequently followed path to democratisation is that of direct democracy in society as a whole by way of civil society activities, with 69 percent of informants adopting this model. Thirteen percent of informants follow the civil society plus political system path, whilst only 6 percent follow the civil society plus the legal system path, and only 4 percent use the legal system only. The comprehensive pathway (civil society plus legal and political systems) is also only used by 4 percent of informants.

The situation turns somewhat less extreme if we consider what pathways are given first and second priority to. Forty-seven percent give first hand priority to ‘direct democracy in civil society’; 17 percent to ‘civil society plus the political system’ followed by ‘civil society plus the legal system’ and ‘the legal system only’ at 10 percent each, with ‘the legal plus political system’ 6 percent and the ‘comprehensive pathway’ at 5 percent. Yet, the lack of balance is outstanding and serious.

These tendencies seem to be remarkably similar within the different issue-areas and regions.

These tendencies and problems are further aggravated if one also considers the locus of pro-democratic efforts within the political terrain as a whole. There is a strong focus on activities carried out in self-managed units (34%) and the public sphere (31%) – within which popular activities in relation to the business sector such as trade unionism, however, only contribute 5 percent – while presence in relation to the state (including legislature) is only 22 percent and business even less, at 12 percent. Further, since most of the informants are based in the regions, it is only natural that most activities referred to are carried out at local level. It is interesting to note however, that many examples given by the informants also relate to the links between the centre and the regions. Central level activities are focused in the main on parliament and civil-political associations, while efforts relating to the bureaucracy are prioritised at local level.

The capacity to fight the problems of government and representation in particular is
closely related to the nature of the issues and perspectives that the democratic groups work on.

Here are the general tendencies:

- Specific issues and interests (36%)
- General issues and interests (33%)
- General ideas and values (31%)

The focus on specific issues and interests is overwhelming. This paves the way for direct democracy plus pressure and lobbying. The tendency is particularly strong among pro-democrats that work on land rights/agrarian issues, political parties and religious conflict. Within the regions there are no significant differences, except in the case of Sulawesi that scores higher on general ideas and values than average. However, since our data on policies is based on the examples given rather than the number of informants, it is the analysis of these examples within the three broad categories that proves most interesting.

Each of the general issues and interests mainly sum up several isolated cases of the same type, such as various attempts to support evicted farmers or retrenched workers (or the bringing together of specific cases under concepts introduced from above, such as ‘good governance’). It is true that common agendas, such as for land reform and pro-labour policies may develop within such specialised sectors, but there are few bridges between them and other actors.

One interesting exception seems to be those individual cases that relate to, for example, land rights issues, indigenous rights, social and economic rights, environmental problems and associated cases of human rights abuses that come close to a renewed interest in sustainable and participatory development. These include self-management of economic and social life, collective/community resource management as well as demands for improved public services against privatisation and isolated ideas of participatory budgeting. This, perhaps, may serve as a basis for a common green, left-of-centre agenda. There is no similar tendency associated to a broader labour movement agenda, with or without links to liberal middle class concerns.

Currently, the international movement against capital-based globalisation does not yet seem to have gained much ground in Indonesia. This is evidenced by the miniscule number of informants (2 out of 280) that pay attention to the issue of overseas debt, neoliberal policies or other issues concerning globalisation. On the other hand, demilitarisation still stands out as a vital issue.

There are additional problems of moving from common interests and issues, in turn, to general perspectives and agendas for alternative governance of villages, districts or the state. There is a lack of ideologies for how various interests and issues might be
aggregated in order to affect priorities for policies and governance the society as a whole (as opposed to ideologies about given truths). Rather, there are general ideas and values that bring clusters of issues and interests to a philosophical level, such as on human rights and rule of law, or that emphasise principles, such as democracy or pluralism and the struggle against authoritarian state-led development.

Finally, there is a division between community agendas rooted in human rights-based democracy and more communitarian perspectives related to joint values, customs, religion and ethnic belonging, whilst also stressing pluralism.

In respect of general ideas that are rooted in normative religious values, most informants demonstrated inclusive and moderate tendencies, for example in the support of tolerance, pluralism and peace (35 out of 264). Only an insignificant number demonstrated exclusive and sectarian tendencies.

While our informants express strong concern over continuous state authoritarianism and associated conflicts around the country, they also indicate a similarly strong wish for and trust in the potential of pluralism. This point to the deterioration of the nation state project born out of the liberation struggle. Further, it signals a reaction against the authoritarian regimes that have captured and turned the historical project to their own interests. However, beyond the wish for pluralism there are few signs of emerging alternatives.

Given that an alternative to a more or less authoritarian centralist project on the basis of pluralism is preferred, and the idea of republicanism (rather than ethnic and religious unity) as a basis for government of common public issues is sustained, history, as well as our additional data indicate that a federal alternative is not likely to be a productive solution, given the sharp conflict with the unitarianists. If instead pro-democrats in favour of pluralism and strong minority rights and representation are interested in decentralisation and some version of the kind of consociational arrangements that are frequently recommended under such circumstances, additional considerations need to be made.

Firstly, consociational arrangements (broad negotiated representation, coalitions, compromise, and strong minority rights) call for proportional elections. Ideas held by sections of the democracy movement of direct majority elections in one-person
constituencies have to be given up. Rather, the party system must be democratised, including by stressing accountability and representation and by allowing parties to emerge and run in local elections before trying to enter the national level. Consociationalism, moreover, tends to conserve the predominance of existing identities such as ethnicity and religion. Hence, the democracy movement might not wish to support it without countervailing policies that generate alternative solidarities based on bridging ideas such as human rights, and common interests such as those of farmers and labourers.

Secondly, in view of our informants, decentralisation has not thus far generated strong identities and pro-democratic work in relation to the major unit for decentralisation, the kabupaten (districts). Rather, as we shall return to, our data also indicates that decentralisation has not only been positive but has also paved the way for corruption, collusion and nepotism as well as boss-rule on local level. This calls for strong policies to alter the balance of power at that level.

The more open political system, divisions between opponents and possibilities for alliance-building have been a mixed blessing for the democracy movement. Aside from the new possibilities, there is also a lack of a clear enemy, decreasing critical awareness and the problems of gaining popular support. The movement has not yet been able to take much advantage of the new opportunities.

In addition, potential sources of power by way of mass following in relation to production and services and government remained untapped as compared to sources of powers such as good contacts and knowledge and information, which usually relate to advocacy, lobbying, and specific action. Interestingly for example, non-economic sources, including mass action, are not highest within the labour sector (but related to human rights), and the potential for the leverage of power by obstructing economic activities in an organised way is not frequent.

With new, confusing opportunities and the dominance of mass politics, the capacity to transform such powers into politically favourable authority, prestige, and respect may also be limited. This in turn may call for various substitutes such as those that relate to popular figures and leaders in the vicinity of the movement, or attempts to enter into mass organisations and parties without a clear constituency and strategy of one’s own.
The capacity to fight the problems of democratisation rests largely with how pro-democrats mobilise and organise popular support. These are the general tendencies of mobilisation and organisational practices in terms of number of responses (each actor may use several methods):

(a) by way of popular leaders 19%
(b) support and rewards 19%
(c) alternative patronage in addition to (a), (b), (c) or (d) 16%
(d) networking 24%
(d) comprehensive organisation 22%

In addition, some qualifications by issue-areas and regions need to be made. Comprehensive organisation is least unusual according to informants working on land rights/agrarian (32%), labour (31%) and urban poor (29%) issues, while 'support-reward' is most frequent according to experts within political parties (37%) and those working on religious reconciliation (53%). Meanwhile, networking scores particularly high according to informants engaged in anti-corruption work (40%), popular leaders seem to be most popular at central level (30%) and 'support and awards' is most frequent in Kalimantan.

It is true that popular leaders are not just traditional and charismatic – in fact only about half seem to be – but are also products of the democracy movement. Providing of services in exchange for support, moreover, may not always be equal to patron-clientism. And 'alternative patronage' might well provide room for manoeuvre for oppressed people. Yet these methods as such are hardly democratic in terms of equal popular control of common affairs. Hence, it is remarkable that the democracy movement relies on them primarily.

Networks, moreover, may well promote equality amongst participants, but often relate to single issues and are characterised by problems of controlling common ventures due to poorly defined membership (demos), responsibilities, accountability and representation. In addition, the contrasting category of comprehensive organising does not only include membership-based democratic organisations with clear policies and purposes. For instance, almost 30 percent of these seem to be simply 'machines' for their member's own pragmatic purposes. Yet it important to note that this potentially more democratic type of mobilisation is most frequent where mass mobilisation is more common than elsewhere (in relation to land reform/agrarian, labour and urban poor issues) and where people themselves may be more eager to promote equal control over their common affairs.

In conclusion, however, the pro-democrats still seem not to have been particularly successful in developing alternative ways out of Soeharto's 'floating mass' politics, which turned them almost equivalently into 'floating democrats' who have had to find not
always democratic shortcuts in order to gain popular support.

The fragmentation of the democracy movement may not be the end of the story. The answers to open questions such as ‘what speaks for and against using various rights and institutions?’ and ‘what values, perspectives, and experiences guide the actors’, do not only reflect divisiveness, specific issue and interest orientation and a lack of connection to broad collective interests in the society at large. It is often possible to combine the aspirations and policies with regard to separate issues and in relation to the specific rights and institutions. Indeed, there is some common understanding within the democracy movement as to the state of affairs and what should be done.

This is not the same as a strategy and an integrated programme for the twin aim of a more reduced ‘floating’ democracy movement and substantial democratisation in Indonesia. Many of the problems seem to be purely organisational. But in terms of a broad common agenda, it is way beyond what most of the leading actors and candidates in the coming elections have been able to produce. One may add the previously noted linkages between campaigners related to various aspects of sustainable and participatory development, which seem to indicate the possible emergence of a left-of-centre green platform.

It is true, as was noted earlier, that there is no similar sign of a broader labour movement agenda, with or without links to liberal middle class concerns. Moreover, the democracy movement is clearly dominated by activists who are propelled by idealistic values or bad experiences (42% of statements) and a willingness to empower and service others (17%), as compared to those who mainly try to promote democracy in order to thus favour their own interests and constituencies. But these values, on the other hand, are also an asset in terms of potential popular respectability – something that, once again, measures quite favourably as compared to most of those who are eligible for election in April 2004.

It is common to speak of a still not completed transition to democracy in Indonesia. Much of the discussion is focused on how it may be sustained and improved through the crafting of better rights and institutions, based on a negotiated pact between reform-oriented sections of the elite and international support, while the pro-democrats build civil society and lobby and put forward demands for ‘good governance,’ rule of law and human rights. Our interviews with experts around the country on the problems and options of democratisation suggest otherwise. One could argue that there is still some scope for improving the checks and balances by way of pressure from civil society, but overall the elite has captured the momentum of transition to democracy. This is also associated with the declining international support for democratisation while giving priority to the struggle against terrorism.
According to the pro-democratic informants, the genuinely dominant actors in society at large (i.e. minus those being influential within the movement for further democratisation) rarely systematically bypass rights and institutions. Rather, they 'use only' or both 'use and abuse' them (56% and 44% respectively). In fact, according to the pro-democratic informants, the latter even include militia and paramilitary groups. Within the political terrain, moreover, they are evenly spread and dominate not only business but also state and government as well as the judiciary, both at local and central level. The pro-democrats, by contrast, mainly congregate in self-management units and as lobbyists and activists in civil society. In other words, the dominant actors have adjusted and taken over control most of the vital rights and institutions, and have made democracy their own. They speak the appropriate language, they have altered their way of legitimising their actions, and they use government and administration to protect and promote their common interests. The momentum of transition to a more substantial democracy is over.

What are the main features then, of the 'actually existing democracy', as seen from below, by experienced pro-democrats? Six categories of genuinely dominant actors stand out: (a) the president and central government, (b) the local government, (c) the legislatives and the political parties, (d) the powerful religious and ethnic organisations, (e) the state structures, rules and regulations, including the judiciary, and (f) the police, military (g) capital (state and private), IMF/World Bank, and (h) militias. None of these categories only bypass and abuse democracy. The first four mainly use the R&I; the others both use and abuse, 56 percent and 44 percent respectively. Of course, they also bypass the R&I. As pointed out in responses to an open question, for instance, businesspersons may prefer to avoid corrupt politicians and bureaucrats by turning to the military, who will then help them to bypass the former, both at central and local level. Many informants, moreover, speak of lip service and opportunism. But at the same time it is emphasised that the political and administrative institutions remain crucial and powerful – in terms of resources and licences as well as by providing the dominant actors with arenas for negotiation, ‘cooperation’ and authorisation.

To begin with, the dominant actors are solidly present within all corners of the wider political terrain, in business, state, self-managed units as well as in the public space in between. The links, moreover, between the sectors and the levels are tight. The democracy movement may give priority to the public sphere and self-managed units, but they are obviously not alone in these fields.

How then, do the dominant actors navigate the 'actually existing' democratic system? In contrast to the pro-democrats' focus on civil society, the dominant actors also make their way through the legal as well as parliamentary and executive parts of the system. They travel all the pathways; there are no major imbalances. In addition, they are not only
confined to the top level as they also have roots in society. ‘Civil society combined with the parliamentary and executive’ score highest at 31 percent followed by 'civil society only' at 19 percent.

The remnants from the New Order elite, as indicated by the informants, no longer only try to dominate central and local parliament from powerful positions within the bureaucracy and the military, as well as business. While much of their sources of power seem to remain intact, military sources are now more balanced by economic and especially by good connections. The old actors have now also joined new dominant actors from the enlarged elite in gaining control of the significant political parties and getting themselves elected to parliament and top level executive positions – not least at local level.

Just like the pro-democrats however, the dominant actors focus much more on specific and general issues and interests as compared to general ideas and values. Moreover, their way of mobilising support is in no way confined to comprehensive political machines etc. (comprehensive organising scores 20%) but also to networking (22%) in addition, of course, to various forms of clientelism (34%) and the use of popular leaders (24%). So given that the dominant actors' abundant sources of power are sustained and remain a basis for money politics, this is a clear signal that they should also be capable of dominating more personality oriented elections in one-person constituencies.

In conclusion, the informants frequently speak of close connections and collusion between the dominant actors. This however, does not mean that the New Order regime has survived, minus Soeharto. While the previous symbiosis continues, it is now inclusive of the elite as a whole and embedded in elected parliaments and various decentralised, informalised and privatised units of the previously so centralised state.

Indonesia's has a fledgling democracy but the momentum of transition is over. The dominant actors are in firm control and retain their symbiotic relationships, not least locally. Meanwhile, the democracy movement is largely confined to self-management, participation, lobbying, advocacy, empowerment and rather isolated attempts at interest based organising in civil society. The movement may still be present in the public space, including in seminars and transparent research like this and that is important. But vital parts of the democratic system, including state and local government, have been set aside by the movement – and firmly occupied by the dominant forces.
Endnotes