DEMOCRACY-BUILDING ON THE SAND
Advances and Setbacks in Indonesia

Executive and Summary Report
from the 2nd National Expert-Survey
on Problems and Options of Indonesian Democracy

Research Team
Asmara Nababan (director); Olle Törnquist (academic director)
Willy Purna Samadhi (deputy director of research)
Syafa’atun Kariadi (co-ordinator)
Attia Nur, Sofyan M. Asgart, A.E Priyono, Nur Iman Subono
33 key-informants in the provinces, 148 local assistants and 903 expert-informants
With contributions from
Antonio Pradjasto, Melanie Tampubolon, Ami Priwardhani,
Christina Dwi Susanti, Inggrid Silitonga, Laksmi Pratiwi

In co-operation with
Department of Political Science, University of Oslo
The International Research Programme on Power, Conflict and Democracy,
Universitas Gadjah Mada, Yogyakarta

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FOREWORD

This is the second National Survey (2007-2008) Demos conducted. The aim is to observe the ongoing and already occurred political changes; exploring options and problems of democratization in Indonesia based on the comparison of the recent and the previous National Survey’s (2003-2004) results. The latter actually had been published into a book, both in Bahasa Indonesia and in English. The Bahasa version is titled *Menjadikan Demokrasi Bermakna: masalah dan Pilihan di Indonesia*, while the English version *Making Democracy meaningful: Problems and Options in Indonesia*.

The resurvey attempted to gather comprehensive data on the condition of democratization process in Indonesia. The data may serve as the basis to reform the agendas of democracy movement to deepen and promote democratization in Indonesia. Indeed, since it was firstly founded, Demos had promoted and conducted its researches, as well as advocacy activities on action-oriented basis. Thus, as the previous survey did, the recent also suggests some recommendations that are expected to address various problems, challenges and options faced by democracy movements.

The launching of the Executive Report of the Resurvey to the public coincides with the celebration of a decade of *Reformasi*. Since Soeharto fell from his throne as the result of reform movement with students at the core, there has been one grand agenda put as priority: democratization. Democracy is expected to enable mistakes and errors made in the past are corrected, and in turn, political system is reformed, and economy and social problems are fairly settled. The main foundation of all those attempts is People Sovereignty. Up to this point, we might ask an always and will be posed question: “After ten years, has the process of our democracy met the ideal and expectation of reformasi?”

Several ideas emerge to respond the question. We have often heard two: first, democracy has failed to fulfill the ordinary people’s hope. Democracy has made life even more difficult, referring to the futile provision of people’s basic needs. Some people even argued that the New Order era is even better. Such a criticism to democracy is not launched by ordinary people but also by some of political elites. The second idea, on the contrary, believes that democracy has been well functioned and successful. General elections have been conducted twice (1999 and 2004) in relatively fair and peaceful situation. Presidents and vice-president have been directly elected since 2004. Local head elections to elect governor, mayor and city-mayor have been conducted more than 300 times since 2005. The state operates according to the principle of check and balance. If some flaws in the process of democratization indeed exist, they are assumed to be settled when the time comes.

In the midst of two confronting ideas, this executive report attempts to offer a comprehensive answer on the condition of democratization process in Indonesia ten years after reformasi. The answer is based on the assessment of 903 expert informants that work in 13 frontlines of democracy in all of Indonesia’s provinces, from Sabang to Merauke. The informants were asked to assess 32 instruments of democracy in terms of their performance, scope, and their relation with pro-democracy actors. All of those works were supported by 33 key-informants and 148 research assistants. Therefore, we humbly and determinately believe that, if there is any assessment on the process of democratization in Indonesia, this resurvey is undoubtedly one among others ones need to consider.

We are specially grateful to the informants that had provided their precious time to answer 265 questions; which we realize quite stressful and exhaustive.
This survey is impossible without the cooperation with The Department of Political Science, University of Oslo (UiO), particularly the intensive involvement of Prof. Olle Tornquist, who acted as the co-director of this survey.

It is also important to note the valuable contribution of the Consortium of Gadjah Mada University (UGM) for Politics, Conflict, and Democracy from the revision of questionnaire to the analysis of data. The completion of the survey’s final report will be conducted by a team comprising of UGM and Demos; which is expected to finish by the end of 2008.

We would also express our gratitude to The Norwegian Ministry of foreign Affairs and The Swedish Agency for International Development Cooperation (SIDA) that have consistently respected our integrity and independence.

Asmara Nababan
Executive Director
Introduction and Executive Summary – Advances, Setbacks and Options

Olle Törnquist

Ten years ago, Suharto’s ‘New Order’ began to be replaced by the world’s largest ‘New Democracy’. It is time to evaluate advances and setbacks, and identify options for the future. By 2003-04, Demos (with this author) and leading sections of the democracy movement, developed and applied a framework for comprehensive country-wide assessment ‘from below’. This is the introduction and executive briefing of the resurvey, four years later.

The re-survey is to identify and facilitate discussion of setbacks and advances over-time. The Summary Report is based on early and general results. It will be supplemented later this year by more comprehensive analysis of the full data, in view of additional case-studies and other available research. A comprehensive and critical review of Demos’ model, as well as the full questionnaire, is available on Demos web site www.demosindonesia.org. The lead sponsor is the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, with Sida and other partners. Their commitment and support but also policy of non-interventionism in academic matters has been crucial to the success.

In brief, the re-survey reveals that in-between 2003/04 and 2007 Indonesia has developed into a consolidated elite democracy. The standard of governance-related instruments of democracy (such as rule-of law, anti-corruption and accountability) has improved – though from very low levels. A country-wide political community is evolving as a substitute for the crumbling nation-state – though the new polity is constrained by elitist and localised identity politics and economic globalisation. The military is on the retreat from politics, and a majority of the widened and localised establishment make use of formally democratic rules of the game – though clearly to their own benefit. Much of the successful democracy-building is thus on the sand. Most of the relatively impressive freedoms and rights are stagnating and backsliding. The sections of the elite that can’t win elections seem to be interested in ‘politics of order’. For most people, organised politics is exclusionary. In spite of attempts by pro-democrats to the contrary, there is a lack of representation by people themselves and of basic issues and interests related to middle classes, women, labour, peasants and fisher-folks, urban poor and indigenous populations. While voting is free, running in elections is only for the well endowed and powerful. Since the party system is closed, there is a need for social movements and popular and civic organisations to form Democratic Political Blocks behind basic platforms on local and central levels, to thus foster and control ‘least worst candidates’.

Design versus structure

The generally accepted meaning of democracy is popular control of public affairs on the basis of political equality. How far has Indonesia moved towards this ideal? And how much further will it now

2 The more comprehensive analysis will be produced in co-operation with a consortium of democracy scholars at the Universitas Gadjah Mada, led by Professors Mohar Masoed and Pratikno, and doctors Aris Mundayat and Nico Warouw. The co-operation is within the framework of a joint international research and post-graduate programme on Power, Conflict and Democracy, involving additional colleagues at the University of Oslo and at the University of Colombo, Sri Lanka.
4 Sida is the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency.
go? Put differently: how much of the old Suharto-era oligarchy remains in place, still governing, but doing so via formally democratic elections? What if any are the chances to advance towards more meaningful democracy, in terms of sufficiently favourable means and capacities of ordinary people to really control, public affairs?

There are two predominant and rather extreme kinds of answers to these questions. The first comes from the ‘designers’. Beginning in the global third wave of democracy, from the late 1970s onwards, some concerned scholars and practitioners placed their faith in the design of a limited number of institutions. Get the institutions rights, such people argued, and democracy will flourish. They are the institutions dealing with civil and political liberties, the rule of law, free and fair elections, and ‘good governance’. At present, much of these ideas are applied in international agencies for democracy building such as the National Democratic Institute and International IDEA. In this view and by international standards among new but often poorly advancing democracies, Indonesia is doing alright, especially given the traumatic history of the elimination of the popular movements in 1965-66, and the more than thirty years of militarised capitalism that followed. Admittedly, the achievements which have been made testify to what is possible even under harsh conditions.

It is true that the designers acknowledge that the system poorly represents the real needs of ordinary people, but they believe that this problem too can be improved through better institutional design. The measures they propose include more direct elections of government executives, and ‘simplifying’ the political party system. The latter step would result in a few major parties that, although still elitist, would at least be able to develop policies, ‘pick up’ demands from society, recruit people for government jobs and supervise the executive. The designers think that popular representation from below is unrealistic. In their view, ‘deepening democracy’ is instead limited to direct participation by ‘responsible citizens’ in civil society, unfortunately excluding ‘the masses’.

The second answer comes from ‘structuralists’ on both the left and the right of the political spectrum. The ‘structuralists’ use a similarly narrow definition of democracy but are much more pessimistic. They say that the structural conditions do not permit decent democracy. As a result, the oligarchs have retained their power and ordinary people their poverty. According to some structuralists, freedoms and elections have even generated worse identity politics, conflicts and corruption, and less economic growth.

Thus, there is a new emerging international thesis: that enlightened groups should ‘sequence democracy’. While major parts of the left focus on fighting global neo-liberalism, saying it blocks real democracy, the right wants to build solid institutions, ‘good governance’, growth alliances and organisations of ‘responsible citizens’, before entrusting the masses with full freedoms. This position is gaining ground in for instance many ministries for foreign affairs, conservative think tanks and development bodies such as the World Bank.

Alternative focus on universal factors in contextual processes
Both these arguments are theoretically and politically dubious. The first assumes that once the elites have agreed to the establishment of a few democratic institutions, democracy has been

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5 The introductory text in Indonesia was *Crafting Indonesian Democracy*, edited by Bill Liddle, Bandung: Mizan Pustaka, 2001
7 For a review of the argument, see the Thomas Carothers’ article in *Journal of Democracy* vol.18, no.1, 2007.
achieved. This is of course as naïve as stating that basic capitalist or socialist institutions always generate prosperity. Yet, most designers have at least held on to their belief in democracy.

That is not always the case with the structuralists. They insist that rather narrowly defined democracy is meaningful only if certain prerequisites have already been met: for the conventional left, this usually means greater social and economic equality, workers or the poor having strong bargaining power, and the like; for the right, it means strong institutions, good governance, associations of ‘responsible’ citizens and economic growth. As a result, the structuralists by definition exclude the possibility of creating such conditions through improved democracy. Instead, they become pessimistic about the promise of democracy, or argue that it should be limited or even postponed.

In between the two extremes (both applying a narrow definition of democracy but one engineering elite institutions, the other waiting for massive social change) democracy can be understood as a contextual process were universal dimensions can only be analysed in view of contending actors' democratic will and their political capacity to relate to the relations of power over time. A framework for such an analysis has been developed and applied in two national surveys of Indonesia's democracy, the first in 2003-04, the second in 2007, by Demos, in co-operation with leading actors in the democracy movement and the Oslo and more recently Gadjah Mada Universities. Demos twice asked some 900 senior campaigners-cum-experts on democratisation in all provinces about the extent to which the actors and existing means of democracy in Indonesia really support the universally accepted aims. The first focus was on the performance, spread and scope of the 32 intrinsic instruments to promote and apply democracy (including major dimensions of equal citizenship, international law and human rights conventions, rule of law and justice, civil and political rights, economic and social rights, free and fair elections, good political representation, democratic and accountable government, freedom of media, press and academic freedoms, additional civic participation, direct participation). Second, questions were asked about the extent to which actors actually promoted, used or abused and even avoided these instruments of democracy. Third, attention was directed at the capacity of the actors to promote and use the instruments; (by being included in politics at large, having relevant sources of power, ability to transform them into authority and legitimacy, capacity to politicise main issues and interests, organise and mobilise collective action, as well as to approach decision making and executive institutions of governance, directly and/or by means of representation). The combined results from both surveys, which are being outlined in this report, make it clear that the extreme institutionalist and structuralist arguments are not just theoretically but also empirically mistaken.

**Eight major conclusions**

(1) **Deteriorating freedom**

For the full list of the 32 instruments, see Ch. 1 Box 1.1 and Table 1.1.

For a comprehensive discussion, see Priyono, A.E, Samadhi, W. P, Törnquist, O, et. al., op.cit. and Törnquist, O, 2008, op.cit.
A first conclusion from these surveys is that while surprisingly many civil and political rights are being upheld, the advances have somewhat deteriorated since 2003-04. Informants say that in addition to major problems of the "freedom to form parties on the national or local level (or teams of independent candidates) that can recruit members, and participate in elections" – to which we shall return –, the 'freedoms of religion, belief, language and culture', 'freedom of speech, assembly and organisation', 'freedom of the press, art and academic world', 'citizens' participation in extensive independent civil associations' and 'public access to and the reflection of different views within media, art and the academic world' have also backslid.

(2) Improved governance

The second conclusion is that there has been a general improvement since 2003-04 in top-down efforts by government institutions to improve the miserable performance of the rule of law, particularly the control of corruption. These improvements are particularly noticeable with regard to the 'subordination of the government and public officials to the rule of law', 'the equality before the law', 'the transparency and accountability of elected government and the executive', 'government's independence from strong interest groups and capacity to eliminate corruption and abuse of power', and the capacity of the government to combat paramilitary groups, hoodlums and organised crime'. It is true that the improvements are from very low levels, but they remain commendable.

(3) Country-wide political community

Third, the disintegration of the centralistic New Order has not led to balkanisation, characterised by separatism and ethnic and religious cleansing. What has developed instead is a unitary political (rather than ethno-nationalist) community with extensive space for local politics. It is true that this space imply huge inequalities among the provinces and regions, and that it has often been occupied by powerful groups. The attempts to develop democratic politics on the basis of real issues and interests on the ground are under the threat by elitist and localised identity politics and economic globalisation. But in Aceh, where foreign donors have so far contained the military and big business and where separatists have been able to substitute political participation for armed struggle, decentralisation also paved the way for peace and potentially fruitful democracy; we shall return to the challenges.

(4) The relative stability of democracy rests with elitist inclusion of people

At the same time, politics in general continue to be dominated by the elite. Yet, the elite groups are more broadly-based, more localised and less militarised than under Suharto. Remarkably, most of them have adjusted to the new, supposedly democratic, institutions. This is not to say there are no abuses, but decentralisation and elections have enabled more diverse sections of Indonesia's elite to mobilise popular support. Of course, elites often mobilise such support by making use of their clientelistic networks, their privileged control of public resources and their alliances with business and communal leaders. Yet, the interest of such elite groups in elections is both a crucial basis of the actually existing democracy and its major drawback. Without elite support, Indonesian democracy would not survive; with elite support, it becomes the domain of 'rotten politicians' who prosper and entrench themselves through corruption. (The research programs "Renegotiating Boundaries" and "In Search of Middle Indonesia" at the KITLV institute in the Netherlands (www.kitlv.nl) are providing comprehensive case studies in this area.) In short, beyond a number of freedoms, democratic institutions and people's capacities remain weak. Yet, much of the required infrastructure is now in place. And in spite of their weaknesses and biases, Indonesia's institutions are solid enough to accommodate powerful actors and at least partially alternative actors as well.

11 For the details, see Ch. 1, table 1.1.
Theoretically, this is the bottom line. It is the reason why Indonesia may be called an emerging democracy. In all these respects, Indonesia may thus begin to resemble India, the most stable democracy in the global South.

(5) Monopolisation of representation

So what would it take to make the most of this democratic potential? The major problem as compared to India is that Indonesia’s system of representation and elections is not even open enough for the possible inclusion of major interests among the people at large and also erects high barriers to participation by independent players. Civic and popular organisations are prevented from getting into organised politics. Moreover, these groups remain hampered by their own fragmentation and weak mass organisation. In this respect Indonesia still seriously lags behind. This is both in terms of what people and what issues and interests that are excluded.

First, the survey reveals that the powerful actors in society dominate politics and the political economy. Politics (including the executive) and ‘good contacts’ are their primary sources of power; ‘pure’ economic bases are less crucial. Alliances are mainly within the elite. Legitimacy is related to the ability to connect people and gain authoritative positions. The major issues on the agenda include hard issues of governance and economic development. Ordinary people are brought into politics primarily through clientelism and populism. Media is getting increasingly important as compared to comprehensive organisation.

Second, the ever-resourceful elites prevent ordinary people and their small parties from entering politics. Independent local parties are only allowed and functional in Aceh. Participation in elections in other parts of the country (even of local parliaments) calls for ‘national presence’ with branch offices virtually all over the country. Hence, it almost impossible to build more representative parties from below without having access to huge funds. (For those with such funds, however, it is rather easy to set up an eligible party and get represented, thus causing problems of efficient governance among squabbling elite politicians with special vested interests.) Further, only big parties or extensive coalitions may nominate candidates for elections of governors, mayors and regents. Aside from the elections of individual representatives from the provinces to an insignificant national assembly (DPD), independent candidates have been prohibited − and the newly announced ‘openings’ call again for huge resources on part of the candidates. In addition, candidates to various positions must have comparatively advanced formal schooling, thus excluding leaders from the labouring classes. Those running in village elections usually even have to share the substantial administrative costs. Similarly, there are no efficient measures to counter vested interests and private political financing or to promote internal party democracy. And the guidelines to foster equal gender representation have generated little result.

Third, there are no substantive efforts to foster direct democratic representation in public governance through local representatives and popular organisations based on interest and special knowledge such as trade unions and environmental movements – only privileged contacts and top-down selection of figures and groups. Hardly anywhere in Indonesia can we see substantive representation of crucial interests and ideas of the liberal middle classes, workers, peasants, the urban poor, women, or human rights and environmental activists.

(6) The risk: return to ‘politics of order’

The defunct representation is not only bad for democracy as such. It also undermines ordinary people’s chances to use it to foster their views and interests – and the possibilities to alter the unequal division of power that prevent socially and environmentally responsible development. In addition, the monopolisation of representation nourishes a general lack of trust in democracy. Most
worrying, upper and middle class groups who do not manage to win elections may well use this discontent with elite democracy to gain wide support for alternatives to democracy and to promote ‘better preconditions’ through ‘politics of order’. Supporters of ‘middle class coups’ typically say that they aim to prevent disruptive populist rule and to build stronger preconditions for democracy. Their views find an echo in some of the previously mentioned international support for proper ‘sequencing’ of democracy. Indonesia has been down this path once before, in the 1960s, and it gave rise to Suharto’s New Order regime; and similar dynamics has more recently been at work in Thailand. In contemporary Indonesia, Vice President Jusuf Kalla’s statements on Poso and similarly disturbed areas are cases in point. The message was that too early democratic elections were behind the conflicts and that profitable business-driven development would be the best to handle them. Other illustrations include the quest for presidentialism and stronger executives, the ‘streamlining’ of the party system towards a majoritarian two-party system, and general admiration for Singapore and China’s attempts to introduce promote stability and economic growth ahead of ‘excessive’ democracy. Meanwhile religious activists argue for the need to reduce the public sphere, but this time in favour of religious values, communities and leaders.

(7) The potential: popular representation
It is imperative, therefore, that civic and popular organisations are able to scale up their ideas and alliances. By connecting communities and workplaces, and local and central levels, they can challenge elite control over politics. Demos’ survey and case studies suggest, however, that the scaling up into organised politics is not only hampered by elitist monopolisation of politics but also by civic groups and political activists themselves.

First, the survey reveals that even if many alternative actors now try to enter into politics to not just be confined to civil society activity, many challenges remain ahead. One is the poor presence within state, politics and business as well as in related workplaces. Another is that the sources of power and the ways of gaining authority and legitimacy remain focused on knowledge and public discourse at the expense of organisation, attempts to gain public mandates and win elections. Moreover, the issues that are put on the agenda typically focus on specific rights and complaints, neglecting broader perspectives of how to promote better governance, development and public welfare. Finally and in spite of advances, civic groups remain poorly connected to social movements and popular organisations (and vice versa); collective action is mainly based on individual networking, popular leaders or alternative patronage as against broad and representative organisation; and attempts to approach elections, parliaments and the executive remain primarily by way of media, NGOs and pressure and lobby groups.

Second, comparative case studies show that the problems in these respects are typically addressed instead by either bringing together people on the grass-roots level or by top-down organising — or by attempts to facilitate issue-specific direct connections between people and the executive or leading politicians. In many instances, these efforts are quite impressive and stimulating. To mention but one, the local peasants’ organisations in Batang in Central Java, have rallied behind broader agendas and won a number of village elections. They now wish to scale up to the regional level. But so far the only major opening has been in Aceh, thanks to the unique possibility of building parties from below and of launching independent candidates after the peace treaty.

Moreover, the results point to a number of problems. Unity from below has proved difficult because of the myriad of specific issues, approaches and contending projects and leaders. Politics aiming at majorities behind common platforms calls for ways of combining different specialisations and interests, such as among peasants and plantation laborers. There must be convincing agendas for
necessary alliances and equal-citizen-based governance. Loose networking and polycentric action – the methods favoured by most Indonesia’s NGOs and pro-democracy activists – are not enough.

However, attempts to compensate for this by way of socialist or other ideologies, centrally co-ordinated new or established organisations (some with charismatic figures at the helm), or simply the creation of a joint political vehicle or individual candidates offering support in return for popular votes, tend to preserve top-down structures and generate divisions among social movements and popular and civic organisations.

The alternative attempts to by-pass ‘dirty politics’ by facilitating direct linkages between ‘people’ and the executives (inspired by for instance participatory budgeting) are no doubt important supplements but have little to say on how to co-ordinate different sections of ‘the people’, scale up the operation beyond the local and facilitate fair representation. Elsewhere, in fact, the latter has called for top-down measures through for instance the office of a governor or mayor.

(8) The recommendation: Democratic Political Blocks
Hence, there are two major lessons: First, basic popular and civic groups must co-ordinate instead on an intermediate political level, between the specific grass-roots issues and the top-level perspectives. This is in order to define joint platforms, wide support and alliances, and control genuine politicians – rather than being the victim of fragmentation and dominated by various parties or political actors. Second, this may also be the level on which it is possible to combine parliamentary and extra parliamentary activity, as well as representative and direct participation. Demos’ recommendation is thus that democratic social movements, popular and civic associations wishing to engage in politics should build co-ordinated Democratic Political Blocks on local and central levels.

Such political blocks call for leadership and commitment to the building of democracy through popular mandates and accountability, both within and between organisations and in relation to elections. Unfortunately, many democracy activists are unlikely to become involved in democratic representation and electoral politics so long as it easier for them to lobby and network. Organising constituencies and winning majorities in elections takes hard work. Further, party-political activists need to realise that there will never be one party only among pro-democrats. Hence they need to avoid dominating and dividing basic social movements and popular organisations. (Politicians may well participate in building Political Blocks, but as members of the movements and associations, not as party-leaders and candidates.)

Yet, such efforts are not impossible. The Acehnese even proved that progress is feasible in-spite of very poor preconditions – if the party system is de-monopolised to allow for local parties and independent candidates, and if civic and political organisations are willing and sufficiently well-organised to win votes and thus take advantage of the democratic openings. It is true that Aceh at present are up against the lack of firmly and democratically organised interest and issue based movements that can put vital problems on the agenda and keep parties and leaders accountable. There is a risk, therefore, that clientelist and populist means of political inclusion (and associated favouritism and corruption) will dominate, as elsewhere in Indonesia. This must be countered by creating broad demands from below for political facilitation by the newly elected leaders (and supportive donors) of participatory democratic institutions.

Moreover, it is also true that the situation beyond Aceh is even less favourable. The chances of building political representation from below have been almost totally blocked. According to the recent legislation, participation in elections in other parts of the country (even of local parliaments)
calls for ‘national presence’ with branch offices in 60% of the provinces, 50% of the regencies and municipalities, and 25% of the sub-districts. Even the heroic attempt by social and political activists in PPR (Partai Perserikatan Rakyat) to measure up to the demands has failed. Similarly, the demands on the mobilisation of signatures of independent candidates in direct elections are so high that one needs to be a local equivalent of Italy’s Berlusconi to stand a chance. Women, moreover, still tend to be subordinated. And no ordinary workers, peasants and fisher folks can run in even village elections because of lack of supposedly ‘sufficient’ formal education and demands to pay for the basic administrative costs.

In short, it is true that all people are allowed to vote, but women (who are not well connected) and poor and subordinated people are de-facto prevented from standing as candidates and trying to develop popular representation. Hence, the immediate need to develop well organised and non-party-dominated Political Blocks – to foster independent popular influence within organised politics in-spite of elitist monopolisation.
Chapter 1
A DECADE OF REFORMASI:
UNSTEADY DEMOCRATISATION

Demos’ first survey (2003-2004) on Problems and Options of Democratization in Indonesia suggested democracy deficit in Indonesia, as indicated by the wide gap between comparatively impressive civil-political freedoms and the poor condition of other operational instruments.12

Does the condition of democracy undergo any change? The most recent Demos’ survey13 indicated that the standard of the rules and regulations that are supposed to promote democracy in Indonesia have improved, particularly in regard to the operational instruments of governance. Some instruments of democracy related to this matter, such as eradication of corruption, subordination of government and public officials to the rule of law, as well as equality before the law, show a remarkably significant progress – even though the improvements are from very low levels, so the standard remain insufficient. yet, the democratic political framework seems to function better. Further, most actors seem to have accepted democracy as the ‘major game in town’. And most remarkably, the authoritarian attempts during the new order to build a national community from top down has not been replaced by further separatism and ethnic and religious conflicts but by a country-wide, quite localised political community with important elements of democracy.

The progress does not nevertheless automatically change the democratic situation into a better one. First, the proportionally quite impressive improvements of several of the operational instruments of democracy are from quite low levels. Hence their standard remains insufficient. Second, while the gap between good freedoms and poor instruments of democracy has decreased, this is not only because the latter has improved but because the quality of some of the most fundamental freedoms have decreased. This is quite worrying. Third, as we shall see, the standard of civic-interest based- and political representation has largely stagnated and the most drastic deterioration of the quality of democracy relates to the freedom to form parties and participate in elections on all levels. Fourth, politics remain elite dominated. Fifth, politicisation of issues and interests, organisation and mobilisation remain top-down driven and extensively characterised by clientelism and populism. Sixth, while pro-democrats try much more to engage not only in civil society but also in organised politics, they continue to be poorly organised and fragmented and to be marginalised from for instance electoral participation, thus making them increasingly cynical of representative democracy and opting primarily for various forms of direct participation. In conclusion, the impressive democratic advances seem to be built on the sand. The foundations remain poor. We shall return to the details in the following chapters.

Although democracy has now been accepted as national political framework and system, representation becomes the most acute problem. No substantial progress occurred in the three dimensions of representation: party-based political representation, civil association and social movement based interest representation, and direct participation. Democracy remain the plaything

12 For more detailed explanation on democracy deficit, including other results of the 2003-04 survey, see Priyono, AE., Willy Purna Samadhi, Olle Tornquist, et.al., Making Meaningful Democracy: Problems and Options in Indonesia (Jakarta: Demos, 2007). Also available in Bahasa Indonesia, Menjadikan Demokrasi Bermakna: Masalah dan Pilihan di Indonesia, revised edition (Jakarta-Yogyakarta: Demos dan PCD Press, 2007)
13 Data collection was conducted in July-October 2007. The survey is aimed to verify the main findings of the previous survey (2003-2004). Other than that, the findings are expected to be the basis to formulate recommendations for the pro-democracy activists and movements in anticipating the forthcoming 2009 general election.
of oligarchic elites, as long as agenda of democratization fail to cover the three dimensions. This phenomenon is clearly protuberant within the recent party system in Indonesia.

Having failed to defend the advances regarding basic freedoms of speech, assembly and organisation, religion, belief, language and culture, trade union activity, freedom and access to media, art and the academe as well as civic participation and especially the freedom to form parties and participate in elections as all level as well as to strengthen other aspects of representation, Indonesia’s democratization also deals with additional problems. These include the stagnation and at times deterioration of the lack of access and participation of all social groups including marginalised groups in public life, the problems of gender equality and the persistent low standard of especially the transparency and accountability of the military and police to elected government and the public and the government independence from foreign intervention.

After a decade, Indonesia’s democratisation has undergone progress and at the same time, deteriorating and stagnancy. As a national political framework, democracy does work and as compared to most other new democracies it is not backsliding. But democracy is built on the sand.

The state and dynamics of democracy: How do we assess it?
Before presenting the result of our recent survey and comparing it with those of our previous one, we will discuss the method used.

The survey is conducted by asking the assessment of our informants in all provinces in Indonesia. There were 798 informants in the first survey, while 903 in the second. Our informants are senior activists that have good track record as the promoters of democracy. They directly work in democracy movements in certain frontlines:

1. Movement for peasant and fisherman
2. Labour Movement
3. Movements for urban poor society
4. Human Right upholding and protection
5. Anti corruption and good governance
6. Democratization of the political party system
7. Pluralism and conflict reconciliation
8. Democratization of education
9. Improvements of professionalism
10. Freedom of Press and Journalism
11. Gender equality
12. Alternative representation at local level
13. Sustainable development

After the field activities held in July-October 2007 from which we gained the assessments from 876 informants, we realized that the composition of informant in West Java and North Sumatera was not proportional. Therefore, we decided to add the number of informants in those provinces. The overall informants, thus, numbers 903. This report is based on the assessment of 876 informants, but the most recent data we got from the rest of the informant shows similar assessment. The complete analysis and report based on the assessment of all informants will be produced by Demos, cooperating with UGM, Yogyakarta, and will be published in 2008.

There is certain difference in frontline categorization in the first and second survey. The frontline of “Democratization of the political party System” is the combination of attempts to democratise the party system and attempts to form representative political parties, while the frontline of “Alternative Representation at Local level” is the combination of the improvement of alternative representation at local level and attempts at promoting interest-based mass organisations. In addition, in the second survey we added another frontline, i.e. Sustainable Development.
In order to determine informants from each frontline, we conducted intensive discussion with key-informants and research assistants in each province. The composition of informant in each province can be seen in Table A-1 in the Attachment.

Both the previous and recent survey of democracy situation assessment based on the assessments of our informants on three aspects. First is assessment on performance and scope of the means of democracy. The identification and the assessment of the performance of the intrinsic rules and regulations was based on the approach conducted by David Beetham, with the adjustments we deemed necessary. A major further development was that we added the territorial and substantive scope of the means of democracy to their performance. We will come back to these three ways of assessing the means of democracy, after the following paragraphs discussing the second and the third aspects, namely main actor’s capacity to promote and use the means of democracy and the extent to which they actually do so.

The second aspect is thus the capacity of main actors to foster and utilise the means of democracy for their purposes, negative or positive. We consider this aspect important, as we realize that democratization does not occur in vacuum. It is the main actors that, according to their own capacities, conduct manoeuvres, leading democracy into certain situation. By investigating the capacity of main actors involving in the process of democratization, we will not only understand the development of democracy easily, but also scrutinize the strength and weaknesses of the main actors. The result of the survey will in turn provide insights that can form the basis for recommendation to activists promoting democracy.

Beside assessing the main actors capacity, we also study whether and how they actually relate to the means of democracy. Do they both promote and use them or only consume them? Do they even abuse and perhaps rather avoid them, trying to influence politics and society in other way? Further, what are the basic attitudes of people in general to politics and democracy? This is the third aspect, which is important in the sense that democracy is in essence an opened opportunity for members of any communities that are politically equal to control public matter. By putting our effort to observe the third aspect, we expect to know whether democratization and the actual situation of democracy is indeed meaningful for the people in common or, otherwise, limit public role and fail to accommodate demos.

Now we will return to the first aspect: the performance and scope of the instruments of democracy. The previous survey was conducted in the two rounds. As compared to the previous extensive lists in assessments stimulated by the work of Beetham et.al, we firstly identified only 35 (rather than about 80) intrinsic means of democracy. Then, we decided to break down some instruments and to get as clear answers as possible, so that we ended up with 40 instruments on the list. For the recent survey, however, we reduced the list again, without lessening the substance of the instruments, by combining them until we got a list of 32 instruments of democracy at hand, as featured in Box 1.1 below. The main reasons were that the specifications did not really produce more clear results and it was necessary to make the interviews with the informants less time-consuming.

Box 1.1. The Instruments of Democracy

1. Citizenship (Equal state-citizenship; The rights of minorities, migrants and refugees, Reconciliation of horizontal conflicts)
2. Government support of international law and UN human rights
3. Subordination of the government and public officials to the rule of law
4. The equality before the law (Equal and secure access to justice; The integrity and independence of the judiciary)
5. Freedom from physical violence and the fear of it
6. Freedom of speech, assembly and organization
7. Freedom to carry out trade union activity
8. Freedom of religion, belief, language and culture
9. Gender equality and emancipation
10. The rights of children
11. The right to employment, social security and other basic needs
12. The right to basic education, including citizen’s rights and duties
13. Good corporate governance
14. Free and fair general elections (Free and fair general elections at central, regional and local level; Free and fair separate elections of e.g. governors, mayors and village heads)
15. Freedom to form parties on the national or local level (or teams of independent candidates) that can recruit members, and participate in elections
16. Reflection of vital issues and interests among people by political parties and or candidates
17. Abstention from abusing religious or ethnic sentiments, symbols and doctrines by political parties and or candidates.
18. Independence of money politics and powerful vested interests by political parties and or candidates
19. Membership-based control of parties, and responsiveness and accountability of parties and or political candidates to their constituencies
20. Parties and or candidates ability to form and run government
21. Democratic decentralisation of government of all matters that do not need to be handled on central levels.
22. The transparency and accountability of elected government, the executive, (bureaucracies), at all levels
23. The transparency and accountability of the military and police to elected government and the public
24. The capacity of the government to combat paramilitary groups, hoodlums and organised crime
25. Government independence from foreign intervention (except UN conventions and applicable international law)
26. Government’s independence from strong interest groups and capacity to eliminate corruption and abuse of power
27. Freedom of the press, art and academic world
28. Public access to and the reflection of different views within media, art and the academic world
29. Citizens’ participation in extensive independent civil associations
30. Transparency, accountability and democracy within civil organisations
31. All social groups – including marginalised groups – extensive access to and participation in public life
32. Direct participation (People’s direct access and contact with the public services and government’s consultation of people and when possible facilitation of direct participation in policy making and the execution of public decisions)

What we do to the 32 instruments of democracy is asking our informants to make assessment on the performance and scope of the instruments in question, at first hand in their own specific regional context. Having asked if institutionalised rules and regulations exist at all, we turn to the performance of the instruments of democracy that are at hand. This is to investigate the extent to which the existing rules and regulations are supportive enough (or not supportive) in generating the intended output. To what extent are the rules and regulations that are supposed to foster freedom of speech, assembly and organization, for instance, really doing so? Further, in order to identify the scope of the instruments of democracy, we asked the informants to assess it in two dimensions. First, how wide the instruments are applied (spread) geographically, and second, how much of the substance of for instance freedom of speech, assembly and organisation that are covered – only some limited freedoms or quite extensive ones? The ideal situation by all means describes well-performed, well-spread and substantive instruments.

Different from what we did in the previous survey, we categorize now the instruments of democracy into formal rules and regulations and informal arrangements. Formal rules and regulations refer to all forms of formal regulations issued by the state, while informal arrangements include custom, adat, norms and values, including conventions that are applied in many generations. The formal-informal categorization did not exist in the previous survey and was then decided upon three considerations. First, to create easier method for our informants in assessing each instrument of
democracy. Second, a more substantial reason, to know how both formal rules and regulations as well as informal arrangements worked. During the first survey we had no idea whether it was formal rules and regulations or informal arrangements that influenced the process of democratization more. Third, the information on formal rules and regulations as well as informal arrangements is important to investigate how far the state has adapted to democracy and how ready the people to respond the process of democratization.

As a result, the recent survey served different data from the previous one. While the survey in 2003-04 focused on the outcome of the instruments of democracy, the recent on the output of the instruments. Hence, the assessment is based only on the instruments that exist. This might generate more positive assessments than in the first survey. Separately however, we also ask the extent to which formal instruments of democracy are in place.

With that in mind, we then attempted to develop a method to compare the two different data. The result is an index system drawn from our informants’ assessment on each instrument of democracy in each survey. The index values ranged from 0 (poor) to 100 (good). Within the index the relative importance of performance and territorial and substantive scope was deemed to be 50%, 25% and 25% respectively. Further, in the second survey, where formal and informal institutions were separated, the relative importance were deemed to be 70% 30% respective. Finally the value of the formal institutions is reduced with the proportion of informants saying not formal institutions existed at all. This is necessary to consider the negative factors of informants stating no formal institutions existed. Based on this index, we compare the result of the previous survey and that of the recent. The following Table 1.1 features the comparison of the index for each instrument of democracy.
Table 1.1. The index of instruments of democracy: 2003/2004 and 2007 results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NO</th>
<th>INSTRUMENTS OF DEMOCRACY</th>
<th>INDEX 2003/04</th>
<th>INDEX 2007</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Legal instruments and Rights</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Citizenship (Equal state-citizenship; The rights of minorities, migrants and refugees, Reconciliation of horizontal conflicts)</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Government support of international law and UN human rights</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Subordination of the government and public officials to the rule of law</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>The equality before the law (Equal and secure access to justice; The integrity and independence of the judiciary)</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Freedom from physical violence and the fear of it</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Freedom of speech, assembly and organization</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Freedom to carry out trade union activity</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Freedom of religion, belief, language and culture</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Gender equality and emancipation</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>The rights of children</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>The right to employment, social security and other basic needs</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>The right to basic education, including citizen’s rights and duties</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Good corporate governance</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Political Representation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Free and fair general elections (Free and fair general elections at central, regional and local level; Free and fair separate elections of e.g. governors, mayors and village heads)</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Freedom to form parties on the national or local level (or teams of independent candidates) that can recruit members, and participate in elections</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Reflection of vital issues and interests among people by political parties and or candidates</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Abstention from abusing religious or ethnic sentiments, symbols and doctrines by political parties and or candidates.</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Independence of money politics and powerful vested interests by political parties and or candidates</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Membership-based control of parties, and responsiveness and accountability of parties and or political candidates to their constituencies</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Parties and or candidates ability to form and run government</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Democratic and Accountable Government</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Democratic decentralisation of government of all matters that do not need to be handled on central levels.</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>The transparency and accountability of elected government, the executive, (bureaucracies), at all levels</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>The transparency and accountability of the military and police to elected government and the public</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>The capacity of the government to combat paramilitary groups, hoodlums and organised crime</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>Government independence from foreign intervention (except UN conventions and applicable international law)</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>Government’s independence from strong interest groups and capacity to eliminate corruption and abuse of power</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>Civic Engagement and Participation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Freedom of the press, art and academic world</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>Public access to and the reflection of different views within media, art and the academic world</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>Citizens’ participation in extensive independent civil associations</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>Transparency, accountability and democracy within civil organisations</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>All social groups – including marginalised groups – extensive access to and participation in public life</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>Direct participation (People’s direct access and contact with the public services and government’s consultation of people and when possible facilitation of direct participation in policy making and the execution of public decisions)</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INDEX SCORE AVERAGE</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>46</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Now, it is the time to explore what changes occurred in the situation of Indonesian democracy in the last four years, between the time where the previous survey was conducted (2003/2004) and that of the recent (2007). As a back ground, however, we shall first present our findings on the situation of the society in regard to democratic and political processes before we discuss the data related to the instruments of democracy in detail. This is aimed to provide context when we come back to the findings on instruments of democracy and the capacity of actors later.
Public cynicism to pro-elite politics

Our data indicates on public cynicism to politics. Such cynicism is clearly revealed from our informants’ answer to the question of how, according to them, the people understand politics. A considerably number of our informants assessed that the people understood politics as something taken care of by elites (12%) or elitist manipulation (17%). If the number of the two categories is summed up, the overall quantity is relatively beyond the number of informants assessing that the people deemed politics as people’s control over public matters (14%). The data clearly shows that politics is not familiar to the public and bears the connotation of elitism.

More, 54% of the informants believed that the people considered politics as a struggle for power. This statement bears double meanings. We can interpret it as positive expression; that the informants perceived politics as opportunity for the public to struggle for their needs and interest. On the other hand, the statement may also be the expression of the informants’ cynicism to the elitist character of politics. Observing the trend in the assessments of our informants and the poor image of political party – as the formal political institution – we argued that the opinion of politics as a struggle for power bore the second meaning.

Our other data also revealed that the people are actually quite interested in politics. At least 60% of our informants stated that the people are interested or even very interested in politics.

Aceh provides different picture, however. Our separate survey in Aceh, which was conducted in 2006-2007, reveals a more positive result. The result shows that 36% of our informants in Aceh understood politics as control over public matters. This number clearly went far beyond the 14% that we got in the national survey. In addition, 23% of our informants in Aceh believed that the people considered politics as something taken care of by elites, which shows lower tendency of political elitism as compared to 29% in Indonesia at large.

In line with that, 85% our informants in Aceh believed that the people in Aceh were interested or even very interested in politics, which is in contrast to 70% of the national survey. Similarly, our informants in Aceh also assessed women’s interest in politics in a more positive way, rather than our informants in national survey. Their assessment shows a more positive situation regarding women’s interest to politics in Aceh. See Table 1.2 and 1.3.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 1.2. People’s interest to politics: Comparison between 2007 national survey and 2006/07 Aceh survey</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^1\) Number of informants 798.
\(^2\) Number of informants 199; Source: [http://www.demosindonesia.org/aceh](http://www.demosindonesia.org/aceh)

The data on this part is mainly based on those of the recent survey. We did not pose this question in the previous survey. In 2006-2007, Demos conducted a similar survey in Aceh, of which result is used to compare the national data.

See Table B1 in Appendix of this report.

See Table B2 in Appendix of this report.

Table 1.3. Women's interest to politics: Comparison between 2007 national survey and 2006/07 Aceh survey

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>Women's interest towards politics</th>
<th>National survey&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt; (% of informants)</th>
<th>Aceh Survey&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt; (% of informants)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Highly interested (have awareness and actively involved in making and achieving democracy)</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Interested (participate in political process)</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Not interested (floating/passive without the awareness to achieve change)</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>a</sup> Number of informants 798.

What may be temporarily concluded from the comparison of both survey findings? The data primarily shows that the people are more optimistic with regard to the political situation and democracy in Aceh in Indonesia in general. Noting that the survey in Aceh was conducted in post-Helsinki agreement’s democratic era, we may conclude that the situation in Aceh in question is a positive implication of democratization that was quickly implemented after the peace treaty between GAM and Indonesia government. Law No.11/2006 on Aceh Government regulated, among other things, the existence of local parties and independent candidates in local election; which can be considered as more opened democratic spaces in local level that do not exist in other regions in Indonesia. In addition, the data also indicate that democratization and political openness in Aceh have so far not lead to the growing potential of separatism, as many people were anxious about. Quite the contrary, it might even become a model to promote democracy from below, from local level. We will discuss this in detail in Chapter 2.

### Impressively advances: governance related aspects

Since the fall of New Order, formal rules and regulations as well as informal arrangements are getting supportive to democracy. Democracy began to be widely accepted as a way of governing the people. The political language of power does not cite authoritarian vocabularies anymore.

In short, since 1998, democracy has functioned comparatively well as a country-wide political framework, replacing authoritarian political system. At this point, we are in the middle of point of no return situation, where democracy moves ahead, little by little, toward progress. According to the most optimistic scenario, after dramatic improvement of civil and political rights occurred in the first years of democratization, another follows: some democratic instruments related to the managerial aspects of governance also improved.

As shown in Table 1.1 above, the average index of all instruments of democracy improved 25%, from 37 to 46. Some instruments underwent quite dramatic index score increase. The index score for subordination of the government and public officials to the rule of law increased, from 16 to 45, so does the equality before the law, from 18 to 44. A significant score increase also happened to government’s independence from strong interest groups and its capacity to eliminate corruption and abuse of power. Although not so significant, the score index for independence of money politics and powerful vested interests by political parties and or candidates also increased (from 20 to 40).

It also happened to instruments related to the capacity of the government to combat paramilitary groups, hoodlums and organised crime (20 to 39), rights of children (27 to 53), good corporate governance (21 to 40), the right to employment, social security and other basic needs (22 to 45), and the transparency and accountability of elected government, the executive (bureaucracies), at all levels (23 to 43).

<sup>21</sup> Our previous survey (2003-2005) revealed that similar democratic situation occurred in various regions in Indonesia. This indicated that the national approach or framework of democratization had been widely accepted in Indonesia.
To make further observation, five of the instruments of which indexes increase significantly, except rights of children, good corporate governance, the right to employment, social security and other basic needs, are related to what one may call the judicial and executive capacity of governance. The indexes of three other instruments related to governance, which are democratic decentralisation and accountability of the military and police to elected government and the public, and government’s independence from foreign intervention increase as well, though not so dramatic as others. In average, the indexes of seven instruments related to managerial aspects of governance increase almost 100% (from 22 to 42; see Table 1.3 below). It is possible that the increasing index of these instruments is caused by, among others, the agenda of SBY-JK government at this time that emphasizes on the reform of those aspects. Further one must note that the high figures for increases are due to partly the low initial levels. The increase may also describe the actual situation in local level after the implementation of regional autonomy.

Table 1.4. Index of instruments of democracy related to managerial aspects of governance: 2003/04 and 2007 result

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>No of Instruments</th>
<th>Instruments related to managerial aspects</th>
<th>Index and Rank (1)</th>
<th>Increase of Index (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2003/04</td>
<td>2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Subordination of the government and public officials to the rule of law</td>
<td>16 (32)</td>
<td>45(15)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>The equality before the law (Equal and secure access to justice; The integrity and independence of the judiciary)</td>
<td>18(30)</td>
<td>44(16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>Democratic decentralisation of government of all matters that do not need to be handled on central levels.</td>
<td>33(14)</td>
<td>43(20)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>The transparency and accountability of elected government, the executive (bureaucracies), at all levels</td>
<td>23(24)</td>
<td>43(18)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>The transparency and accountability of the military and police to elected government and the public</td>
<td>23(23)</td>
<td>35(32)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>The capacity of the government to combat paramilitary groups, hoodlums and organised crime</td>
<td>20(28)</td>
<td>39(26)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>Government’s independence from foreign intervention</td>
<td>24(20)</td>
<td>36(30)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>Government’s independence from strong interest groups and capacity to eliminate corruption and abuse of power</td>
<td>18(31)</td>
<td>43(19)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

AVERAGE INDEX 22 41 97

(1) numbers in bracket shows rank

Still, it is important to give critical response to the advancing managerial aspects of governance. First, the fact that more corruption cases are covered and brought to court does not only show government’ commitment to eradicate corruption, but also mark the ongoing corruption phenomenon. The caught of the member of parliament, Al Amin nasution and the former governor of the Bank of Indonesia Burhanuddin Abdullah mark, at one hand, serious attempt to eradicate corruption, and the remaining existence of corruption and bribery on the other hand.

According to the chairman of Commission for Corruption eradication (KPK), Antasari Azhar, the arrest of Al Amin is in regard to the case of the shifting of the function of protected forest in Bintan Buyu, Riau to be an urban human settlement. In order to make the shift successful, a recommendation from parliament is required. Al Amin was suspected to assist the issuance of the recommendation by receiving 3 trillion rupiah as a pay back, as the vice chairman of KPK, M. yasin stated. Ironically, this case involved nine other parliament members and the Secretary General of Bintan municipality. According to the Honorary Body of House of Representative, the nine members of parliaments was on the place where Al Amin was arrested. Al Amin was arrested

22 Koran TEMPO, 13 April 2008
in Ritz Carlton Hotl, mega Kuningan, South Jakarta. The Secretary of Bintan Municipality, Azarwan, was among those arrested.\textsuperscript{23}

The caught of the prosecutor heading a team that was established by General Attorney to investigate a Bank Indonesia Liquidity Assistance (Bantuan Likuiditas Bank Indonesia, BLBI) debtor’s case, who accepted a bribe of 6 billion rupiah, proves at least two points: that eradication of corruption is at least at times conducted by a corrupted law institution, and that such a project may produce new practices of corruption within the recent government.\textsuperscript{24} A report launched by \textit{Transparency International} also indicates that eradication of corruption attempted by the Indonesian government decreased, indicating worse, than that of the previous year.\textsuperscript{25}

Second, impressive increase of index for the governance-related instruments of democracy does not automatically reflect that the government’s performance is now in good situation. The 1.4 table shows that the index score of the governance related instruments of democracy is small and the rank of the respective instruments is commonly low. When compared to the score of other instruments, that of governance related instruments clearly have low rank, as seen in Table 1.1. Subordination of the government and public officials to the rule of law, which has the highest index score (45) among the instruments related to governance is ranked in the 15\textsuperscript{th} position among 32. Government’s independence from strong interest groups and capacity to eliminate corruption and abuse of power that was previously on the rank of 31\textsuperscript{st}, now on the 19\textsuperscript{th}. Other instruments, such as transparency and accountability of elected government, the executive (bureaucracies), at all levels, of which rank increases from the 24\textsuperscript{th} to 18\textsuperscript{th}, undergoes slow progress. The transparency and accountability of the military and police to elected government and the public that was previously in the 23\textsuperscript{rd}, is now shrinking on the bottom, or 32\textsuperscript{nd}. In other words, three of governance-related instruments of democracy are on the instruments with the worst score index (≤40). See Table 1.5

\textsuperscript{23} KORAN Tempo, ibid.
\textsuperscript{24} Such a critical response was launched by J Kristiadi “Korupsi Atas Nama Pemberantasan Korupsi (Corruption in the name of Eradication of Corruption),” \textit{Kompas}, 11 March 2008.
\textsuperscript{25} According to \textit{Transparency International}, Indonesia’s Corruption Perception Index in 2007 is 2.3 compared to 2.4 in 2006. Indonesia is in 143\textsuperscript{rd} position of 180 countries surveyed. To read the detailed report, look \url{http://www.ti.or.id}. 

21
## Fundamentals of democracy are threatened

1. **Freedoms not sustained**

   As in the previous survey, we note that the instruments related to civil and political rights are among the best group. Yet, as compared with the result of the previous survey, the recent indicates deterioration of the instruments in question.

   Freedom of religion, belief, language and culture, which was previously on the top of the list, is now still the best instrument. Freedom of speech, assembly and organization also included in the list of the best, despite its position has shifted from the second to the third. Free and fair general elections even increases from the fourth to the second best. In addition, freedom from physical violence and the fear of it also increases from the 16th to the 10th.

   The index of the instruments related to freedom as well as civil and political rights are relatively better compared to those of other instruments. As seen in the following Table 1.6, 6 of 11 instruments of democracy that have index scores above those of the average (>46) are those related to freedom and civil and political rights.

### Table 1.5. The Instruments of Democracy with Index Score ≤ 40

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NO</th>
<th>No of Instruments</th>
<th>INSTRUMENTS OF DEMOCRACY(1)</th>
<th>INDEX</th>
<th>RANK</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>The transparency and accountability of the military and police to elected government and the public</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>Reflection of vital issues and interests among people by political parties and or candidates</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>Government independence from foreign intervention (except UN conventions and applicable international law)</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>Membership-based control of parties, and responsiveness and accountability of parties and or political candidates to their constituencies</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>All social groups – including marginalised groups – extensive access to and participation in public life</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>Parties and or candidates ability to form and run government</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>The capacity of the government to combat paramilitary groups, hoodlums and organised crime</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>Direct participation (People’s direct access and contact with the public services and government’s consultation of people and when possible facilitation of direct participation in policy making and the execution of public decisions)</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>Independence of money politics and powerful vested interests by political parties and or candidates</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>Good corporate governance</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>Freedom to form parties on the national or local level (or teams of independent candidates) that can recruit members, and participate in elections</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(1) The instruments related to governance are in italics.
Table 1.6. The Instruments of Democracy with Index above Average Index Score (>46)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NO</th>
<th>No of Instrument</th>
<th>INSTRUMENTS OF DEMOCRACY(1)</th>
<th>INDEX(2)</th>
<th>RANK(3)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Freedom of religion, belief, language and culture</td>
<td>66 (74)</td>
<td>1 (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>Free and fair general elections (Free and fair general elections at central, regional and local level; Free and fair separate elections of e.g. governors, mayors and village heads)</td>
<td>64 (63)</td>
<td>2 (4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Freedom of speech, assembly and organization</td>
<td>60 (74)</td>
<td>3 (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>The right to basic education, including citizen’s rights and duties</td>
<td>59 (37)</td>
<td>4 (13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>Freedom of the press, art and academic world</td>
<td>59 (60)</td>
<td>5 (6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>Citizens’ participation in extensive independent civil associations</td>
<td>54 (62)</td>
<td>6 (5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>The rights of children</td>
<td>53 (27)</td>
<td>7 (18)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Freedom to carry out trade union activity</td>
<td>51 (57)</td>
<td>8 (8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>Transparency, accountability and democracy within civil organisations</td>
<td>48 (42)</td>
<td>9 (11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Freedom from physical violence and the fear of it</td>
<td>47 (28)</td>
<td>10 (16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>Public access to and the reflection of different views within media, art and the academic world</td>
<td>47 (57)</td>
<td>11 (7)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(1) The instruments in italics are related to freedom and civil and political rights
(2) The numbers in bracket indicate the result of 2004/04 survey

Although listed in the best ranks, most fundamental instruments of democracy – which are related to freedom and civil and political rights – actually experience deterioration or stagnancy. The instruments related to freedom of religion, belief, language and culture that was previously ranked on the top with index score of 74, now has index score of 66. The index of the freedom of speech, assembly and organization was previously 74, now 60. The index of the instrument related to freedom to carry out trade union activity decreases from 57 to 51. While the gender equality and emancipation, although its index slightly decreases from 47 to 46, is now ranked in 13th.

Table 1.7. The Instruments of Democracy related to freedoms and civil and political rights of which indexes decrease: Comparison of 2003/04 and 2007 survey result.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NO</th>
<th>NO of Instrument</th>
<th>INSTRUMENTS OF DEMOCRACY</th>
<th>INDEX 2003/04</th>
<th>INDEX 2007</th>
<th>CHANGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Freedom of speech, assembly and organization</td>
<td>74 (60)</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>-19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Freedom to carry out trade union activity</td>
<td>57 (51)</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>-11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Freedom of religion, belief, language and culture</td>
<td>74 (66)</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>-11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>Gender equality and emancipation</td>
<td>47 (46)</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>-2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>Freedom of the press, art and academic world</td>
<td>60 (59)</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>-2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>Public access to and the reflection of different views within media, art and the academic world</td>
<td>57 (47)</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>-18%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Average index score

62 55 -15%

The decline of civil and political rights is reflected, for examples, by the emergence of destruction to Ahmadiyah mosques and of attack to other Moslem groups that applied what-considered-athematical teaching by fundamental Moslems. Several time we witnessed church destruction without any legal sanction to the destructors. Majelis Ulama Indonesia even issued controversial fatwa (instruction) that banish the idea of pluralism, liberalism, and tolerance. It seems that SBY-JK provides more political spaces for Moslem-fundamentalists in running their religious political policies. This can be caused by their fear of being pressured or by their intention to be more 'populist' to gain support for the next 2009 election. As a result, amidst the improvement of the government’s managerial performance to be more democratic, the government itself has failed to defend the people’s civil and political rights, which are particularly related to religious issues.26

Despite the fact that in general democracy had functioned as a national political framework, such a success actually still bear some chronic weaknesses in practical level. It is true that civil and political rights have been guaranteed in legal-constitutional regulations. The amendment of constitution (UU D 1945) had changed the political system in Indonesia to be more human-rights oriented – included in the change was the withdrawal of several hatzai articles inherited from colonial law system that existed in the Criminal Code (Kitab Undang-undang Hukum Pidana, KUHP). Still we witness the government turn blind eye toward intolerance practices, which restrict freedom of religion among the minority. It is in this context that we can understand why civil and political rights are declining.

2. Representation clearly the worst problem and freedom of participation deteriorates sharply

Other fundamental aspect of democracy, political representation and independence of government, which were previously bad, now are stagnant. The index of freedom to form parties on the national or local level (or teams of independent candidates) that can recruit members and participate in elections, even rapidly decreases from 71 to 40, throwing it in the rank of 22 among the 32 instruments. The following Table 1.8 shows the index of the instruments related to the aspect of political representation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>No of Instruments</th>
<th>Instruments related to political representation</th>
<th>Index 2007(1)</th>
<th>Rank(1)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>Free and fair general elections (Free and fair general elections at central, regional and local level; Free and fair separate elections of e.g. governors, mayors and village heads)</td>
<td>64 (63)</td>
<td>2 (4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>Freedom to form parties on the national or local level (or teams of independent candidates) that can recruit members, and participate in elections</td>
<td>40 (71)</td>
<td>22 (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>Reflection of vital issues and interests among people by political parties and or candidates</td>
<td>36 (24)</td>
<td>31 (22)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>Abstention from abusing religious or ethnic sentiments, symbols and doctrines by political parties and or candidates</td>
<td>44 (38)</td>
<td>17 (12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>Independence of money politics and powerful vested interests by political parties and or candidates</td>
<td>40 (20)</td>
<td>24 (29)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>Membership-based control of parties, and responsiveness and accountability of parties and or political candidates to their constituencies</td>
<td>38 (23)</td>
<td>29 (25)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>Parties and or candidates ability to form and run government</td>
<td>38 (24)</td>
<td>27 (21)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>Direct participation (People’s direct access and contact with the public services; Government’s consultation of people and when possible facilitation of direct participation in policy making and the execution of public decisions)</td>
<td>40 (25)</td>
<td>25 (19)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**INDEX SCORE AVERAGE** 43 (36)

(1) The number in brackets shows the result of 2003/04 survey.

As seen in the table, the instruments of democracy related to the aspects of political representation do not significantly improve. In average the score indexes of the instruments related to the aspects of political representation are not that high (43), only increases 18% from that in 2003/04 survey, which was 36. In addition, we can even see that the rank of the 6 of the 8 instruments related to the aspects of representation decline, marking the neglect of the aspects of political representation.

We note two important points here. First, the instrument related to free and fair general election is the only one among other eight related to representation that has relatively high and consistent index score. Both according to 2003/04 and 2007 survey, the score index for this is above the average index score. This indicates the tendency to place the institutionalisation of free and fair general election as the main mechanism to promote representation. Yet, as the data reveals, the increasing performance of instruments related to free and fair general election does not
automatically improve political representation. If we do not include the instruments related to
general election, the average score index for all instruments is 39.

Second, the poor representation is marked by the decline of index of instruments related to
freedom to form parties and participate in election from 71 to 40. The data clearly indicates that the
ongoing process of democratization barely provides enough spaces for broadening participation
in order to promote representation. The situation can be even worse when the new ratified law on
political party clearly hinder the establishment of new parties. The failure of several parties to pass
the verification of the Ministry of law and Human Rights is a clear indication. Among 115 new
parties registering to the Ministry, only 24 pass the verification to be ratified as political party
according to the law no.2/2008. The success, however, is not a free pass to run in 2009 election, as
the parties in questions must be verified once again by The Commission of General Election
(KPU)²⁷.

The poor representation is also indicated by the fact that seven instruments of democracy related
to representation have lower or similar index score with the average score for 32 instruments.

3. Additional setbacks
As mentioned previously, other fundamentals of democracy, the government independence from
foreign intervention, was also in trouble. Our data clearly indicates it. As our previous survey result
suggested, this instrument is one of the worst among others. It is true, that in the recent survey, the
index of the instrument increases rapidly. Yet, as the index of the instrument in the previous survey
was very low (24), such a rapid increase does not contribute much, as the index remains low, 36. If
the instrument was ranked in 22nd position in the previous survey, now it is in the 31st.

Other fundamental aspect of democracy is social, economy, and cultural rights. The instruments
related to these aspects are the right to basic education, including citizen’s rights and duties; the
rights of children; and the right to employment, social security and other basic needs, and good
corporate governance. The indexes of instruments of social, economy, and cultural rights, are
increasing. These results may be somewhat surprising, at least from a Jakarta point of view without
proper knowledge on local improvements in parts of the country. The situation seems to be quite
uneven, with particularly harsh problems in East Indonesia and incapacity to sustain universal
rights within the country at large. Also it is worth mentioning that the assessments by the
informants were made well before the recent news on even cases of starvation in certain parts of
the country.

The average index score for the aspects of economy, social and cultural rights is nevertheless low,
46. Compared to the index of the aspect in the previous research, which was 37, it does not
increase impressively, only around 20%. As media or even our everyday experience suggest, the
social-economic condition of the people in general is poor. Most people are unable to fulfil their
basic needs, not only because the price soars constantly, but some basic needs materials scarcely
exist. The soaring price of fuel also had shaken most small industries.

Initial conclusions
Up to this point, we may draw four temporary conclusions. First, some progresses do generally
occur to instruments of democracy. Second, the gap among the instruments of democracy are
getting narrower. Third, however, this does not automatically suggest that all instruments improve.
Instruments related to basic freedoms and party-political participation which previously had good

²⁷ More detailed explanation on the verification can be read at www.polкам.go.id/polcam/berita.asp?nwid=234
indexes are now declining. The improvement of governance may at worst be at the expense of the declining situation of freedoms. Fourth, as the situation of freedoms deteriorate or stagnate, that of other fundamentals of democracy, namely political representation and the independence of government, is not getting better either. In fact, aside from elections, the instruments to promote political participation are not very clearly the worst of all the means of democracy. Finally, the situation of economy, social, and cultural rights seem to have improved in certain parts of the country but it is clear that the situation is quite uneven and recent news after the survey point to quite disturbing tendencies, including isolated cases of starvation. The combination of the four conclusions reveals a potentially very serious picture: that while the deficit has gradually minimized, the fundamental aspects of democracy is silently threatened. Hence democracy is clearly built on lose foundations.

**Formal democracy not completed yet**

It is a common opinion that Indonesia had completely adopted and implemented all most formal rules and regulations that are necessary to democratization process, and that the only task left it to get the actors to really follow them. According to our informants, such an opinion is not correct. Rather, democracy has not been completely institutionalized.

In average as many as 35% of our informants stated that there is no formal rules and regulation that regulate 32 democratic instruments. Around 35% or more of our informants stated that 17 instruments are not regulated by formal rules and regulations.28

Some of the instruments are extensively formalised, such as free and fair general elections Eighty one percent of our informants stated that formal rules already exist. Other instruments that are assessed to have regulated by formal rules by more than 70% of our informants are mainly related to freedom of speech, assembly and organization (78%); the right to basic education (78%); freedom of religion, belief, language, and culture (77%); freedom of the press, art and academic world (74%); and freedom to carry out trade union activities (72%).

On the other hand, the instruments deemed not yet formalized are the transparency and accountability of the military and police to elected government and the public (according to 53% informants); reflection of vital issues and interests among people by political parties and or candidates (51%); parties and or candidates ability to form and run government (49%); the capacity of the government to combat paramilitary groups, hoodlums and organised crime (49%); government independence from foreign intervention (49%); membership-based control of parties, and responsiveness and accountability of parties and or political candidates to their constituencies (48%); and all social groups’ – including marginalised groups – extensive access to and participation in public life (47%).

Furthermore, our recent survey also suggests that the performance of informal arrangements – customs, norms, value, adat – in supporting the infrastructure of democracy is relatively good.29 In average, 64% of our informants stated that informal arrangements are supportive enough to the infrastructure of democracy.30 Hence, the informants seems to reject the common disbelief that it would not be possible to combine elements of local culture and democracy.

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28 Complete data on informants’ assessment on formal regulations can be seen in Table D1 in Attachment.
29 We admit that this survey cannot provide clear and complete description on the influence of informal arrangements – culture, adat istiadat, norms, values – toward democracy. We definitely need another research to study the matters.
30 See Complete Data, Table D2, Attachment
It is unfortunate that we do not have any comparative data to trace the change that had happened in the recent four years, but the available data clearly indicate that the infrastructures of democracy in Indonesia is far from sufficient and also quite fluid in nature.

Then, it is time for us to discuss the one behind the dynamics: the actors.

**Actors’ relation to the instruments of democracy**

The previous discussion has suggested that several democratic instruments develop dynamically. It makes sense if now we look on the relation between the main actors and the instruments of democracy.

We categorized main actors in two groups: powerful actors and alternative actors. Powerful actors are those who have actual, powerful political power, while alternative actors are those that are potential to challenge the power of dominant actors.

In the previous survey, we asked the informants only to identify powerful (dominant) actors. We did not ask them to identify alternative or pro-democracy actors, as we considered the informants themselves pro-democracy actors. In order to get fair, unbiased data on alternative actors, we revised the survey instrument and included questions on the identification of alternative actors. The following Table 1.9 and 1.10 reveal the background from where most powerful and alternative actors come from.

**Table 1.9. The most five powerful actors according to their backgrounds based on the result of 2007 survey and its comparison with the result of 2003/04 survey**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NO</th>
<th>POWERFUL ACTORS</th>
<th>POWERFUL/ DOMINAN ACTORS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Government/Bureaucracy</td>
<td>46 (N=1.890)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Political parties and parliament members (central+local)</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Religious or ethnic groups and adat councils</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Police and military; Underworld and militia</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Business</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

All the numbers suggest the percentage of actors, which is counted according to the numbers of actors in each survey.

**Table 1.10. The most five alternative actors according to their backgrounds based on the result of 2007 survey and its comparison with the result of 2003/04 survey**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NO</th>
<th>ALTERNATIVE ACTORS</th>
<th>ALTERNATIVE/ PRO-DEMOCRACY ACTORS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>NGOs + Class and Non-class based mass organisations</td>
<td>31 (N=1.590)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Academicians, the judiciary/law firms, media</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Political parties and parliament members (central+local)</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Religious or ethnic groups and adat councils; Informal leaders</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Government/Bureaucracy</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

All the numbers suggest the percentage of actors, which is counted according to the numbers of actors in each survey.

Both of the tables show that actors with government/bureaucracy as well as politician background are those with biggest role, both as powerful and alternative actors. The data of our recent survey (2007) shows that actors with government/bureaucracy background number the most (54%; 46% for powerful actors and 8% for alternative actors). The data also clearly shows that the proportion of politicians and parliament members increases significantly. This is quite interesting. One the one hand it signals that private sources of power independent of politics and the state remain quite

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31 We called them dominant actors and pro-democratic actors in the previous survey.
weak. On the other hand it also point to the growing importance of organised politics and the
democratic system, especially among the alternatives actors. It is true that actors with NGO and
mass organisations background numbers the most in the category of alternative actors. Yet, it is
also among the alternative actors that there is a significant increase of the number of politicians and
informal leaders. Finally it is interesting to make not of the diminishing importance of the military
and religious and ethnic groups among the powerful actors, while informal leaders are on the rise
among the alternative actors, possible because of poor political organisation.

**Actor’s adherence to democracy**

How do the two group of actors relate to the instruments of democracy? First, we argue that
powerful actors are now more integrated to the democratic political system. Their relation to the
existing instruments of democracy is far much better rather than that we found in the previous
survey. If the previous survey suggests that only 50% of the dominant actors that promote and/or
use the instruments, our recent survey shows that the number increases significantly. According to
our informant, 36% of powerful actors tend to use the instruments, and other 35% even promote
them – altogether 76%.

Similarly, alternative actors also perform a higher tendency to promote democracy. More than 90%
of alternative actors identified by our informants are assumed to promote and/or use the existing
instruments of democracy (66% and 27%). This number is clearly far higher rather than that we
found in the previous survey, which was 44% and 22%.

The comparison of average tendency of the relation between both groups of main actors groups
and the instruments of democracy is depicted in the following table 1.11.

**Table 1.11. The average tendency of actors’ relation with the instruments of democracy: Comparison between 2003/04 and 2008 survey**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>Main actors</th>
<th>Use and Promote 2003/04</th>
<th>(%) of actors</th>
<th>Use and Promote 2007</th>
<th>(%) of actors</th>
<th>Use and Manipulate 2003/04</th>
<th>(%) of actors</th>
<th>Use and Manipulate 2007</th>
<th>(%) of actors</th>
<th>Avoid and Opt for Alternatives 2003/04</th>
<th>(%) of actors</th>
<th>Avoid and Opt for Alternatives 2007</th>
<th>(%) of actors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Dominant/ Powerful actors</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Pro-democracy/ Alternative actors</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

All the numbers suggest the percentage of actors; which is counted according to the numbers of actors in each category.

The fact that the relation between main actors and the instruments of democracy are now
improving indicates that democracy has now been accepted as political framework. Powerful
actors whose previous attitude were ambivalent with tendencies both to use and promote as well as
manipulate and by-pass democratic institutions, now pose a more positive relation with the existing
instruments. Alternative actors even make the democracy as the only option. Therefore, it is easy to
understand why the index of instruments of democracy increase in general.

**Insufficient capacity of main actors**

Then why such a better relation between actors and democracy failed to improve the situation of
representation? We have proposed the answer before, that the formalization of democracy have
not yet fully completed. As a result, the interpretation of the substance of each instrument depends
on the power of the dominant, beside on other existing informal factors. The actors’ attitude,
therefore, is based on their interest and existing opportunities according to the trend of political
setting, rather than on democratic principles such as public control and participation. Second, it is also clear that the chances of improving representation is seriously undermined by the deterioration of basic freedoms such as of speech, assembly and organisation and especially of the freedom to form parties on the national and local level (or teams of independent candidates) that can recruit members and participate in elections.

In addition, the fact that main actors and democracy really try to use and at times also promote the instruments of democracy does not automatically guarantee that they are utilised in the best possible way. To begin with, this rests with the capacity of the actors. Our other data suggests on the imbalance between the capacity of powerful actors and alternative actors.

Again, we will return to a more close discussion of the dynamics of the situation and the implication of main actors’ capacity and activities in Chapter 3 and 4. As an introductory information, we will present the general description of the capacity of the actors, both powerful and alternative ones.

Spheres of Activity

Compared to the result of the previous survey, the 2007 one indicates the shift of activity arenas of alternative actors. In 2003/04, we found that the actors in question were mostly absent within the arena of the state. Nonetheless, in the recent survey, the presence of the alternative actors in the state is quite significant. They do not only begin to enter and influence the executive and legislative, but also political parties. On the one hand, this may suggest a positive development. As we explained in the previous survey, the absence of alternative actors in the state had caused them to be marginalized and insignificant. Now, the potential of alternative actors to influence political process will increase, as their presence in the arena increases as well. On the other hand, the phenomenon is in essence more like a shift rather than an attempt to broaden their spheres of movement. As a result, along with the escalating activities of alternative actors within the state and political parties, the presence of the actors in civil society decreases. This mitigates the positive effect of alternative actors’ engagement in the state and political parties, as their activities are not accompanied by a strong mandate bond between themselves and the basis of civil society they previously established.

In the meantime, the powerful actors do not show any significant change regarding their options of various spheres of movements. The assessment of our informants clearly shows that the powerful actors still dominate the state and organised politics. The significant change occurs to their less intensive activity within the military and police.

Sources of power and the actors’ way to gain legitimacy

Beside having actual political power, the powerful actors are also supported by economic resources and established political machine. On the other hand, alternative actors still rely on their intellectual capability and unorganized mass power. The attempts to change the status-quo conducted by alternative actors do not fully affect powerful actors. With unlimited financial support, powerful actors can easily manage and finance campaign through media and involve themselves in as many public issues as possible, including “democratic” issues, intervene decision making process and finally win it for their own interests. The monopoly of dominant elites does not only become stronger but also sustainable in democratic ways. Their monopoly does not only apply to the relation of power, but also to democracy.

The assessment of our informants clearly reveals the tendency of powerful actors to conduct “democratic” ways to legitimate their power. The result of the previous survey (2003/04) indicated
coercive and corruptive ways of powerful actors to legitimate their power. Now, such ways are getting out of date, replaced by dialogue, lobby to politicians and government officers, interpersonal contacts, network establishment and getting elected.

**Politication of Issue and Interest**

It is interesting to observe the issues and interest the actors, both powerful and alternative ones, struggle for. Our data reveals that the issues and interests both actors opt for are similar at certain degree. First, the powerful actors seem begin to employ the issues and interest that was previously campaigned by alternative actors, for example, the issue of human rights, democracy development, including the fulfillment of civil and political rights, as well as freedom. The powerful actors tend to treat the issues as general discourse, while the alternative ones focus on more specific ones. Second, along with the improvement of the democratic instruments related to governance, the relevant issues, such as good governance and anti-corruption, are often campaigned both by alternative and powerful actors. Third, both actors seem to put less focus to issues and interest related to public's basic needs, including public service.

In addition, it is also interesting to note that the powerful actors employ the macro issue of economic development rather than the alternative actors do. This may partly become the indication of powerful actors' being more aware on the connection between their interests and the policies of macro economy. The alternative actors seem pay less attention to this matter.

**Ways of organising and mobilising support**

Furthermore, alternative actors are trapped by short-term goals they set, namely to obtain political position. This action is not wrong, but will further create problem as it is conducted in non-democratic ways. The attempt to obtain political position is commonly done by individuals that use the support of basis groups. Such attempts, then, are not a collective effort supported by strict organizational mechanism, which at the same time will secure political accountability. It is possible that this is resulted by alternative actors' impatience. Yet, the impacts worsen the situation of representation. Organisation's basis is actually made up to serve temporary needs, sometimes it is even resulted from the agreement between a number of popular figures. At the same time, some alternative actors rise as new charismatic figures. Eventually, they have failed to de-monopolize the dominant elites.

On the contrary, powerful actors pick more varied ways to mobilise the people. In 2003/04 survey, the actors in question seem to depend on organisational power and political machine to mobilise mass, beside using patron-client relation. According to our recent survey, the powerful actors' ways of mobilisation are varied. The patron-client relationship is sustained as the primary way of mobilisation. The powerful actors also conduct actions to establish populism or popular leadership and strengthen network among themselves. Although more variative compared to their ways of mobilisation in the previous survey and to those employed by alternative actors, the powerful actors' way of mobilisation found in the recent survey show that the actors in question tend to leave organisational method. The clear example of this is the decreasing role of several youth organisations – such as AMPI and Pemuda Pancasila – that become the under bow organisations of dominant parties in the New Order.

**Strategy**

The phenomenon of the decreasing use of organisations as the basis of support mobilisation can be related to the strategies of main actors, both alternative and powerful ones. There is a clear tendency that both groups prefer direct participation rather than use both political and non-political mediating institutions. Among alternative actors, 29% prefer to conduct direct participation, while
among powerful actors, the figure is even higher, 35%. It means, both groups of actors opt for short
cuts rather than use several democratic mediating institutions.

Worse, among the available mediating institutions, the alternative actors tend to pick lobby groups
and favourable contacts with experts rather than use democratic mediating institutions, such as
political party. The powerful actors also perform similar tendency, but their focus to political party is
more intense than alternative actors’.

Although this data reflects the pragmatism and short term strategy of the two groups of actors, it
may be the early indications of the limited democratic political capacity of the actors. Yet, whatever
the answer is, both possibilities are serious problems for the future democratisation process.

Conclusions
The conclusions of this chapter are:
1. Our informants assessed that democratization still proceeds and not yet stop. Our most recent
data shows that the index of instruments of democracy generally improve, some of them even
increase sharply, even if from low levels. Therefore, the common opinion stating democracy in
Indonesia has completely failed is not right. Yet, these improvements are on loose ground.
2. Despite the fact that the index of instruments of democracy improve, such an improvement
does not happen evenly to all instruments. The managerial aspects of governance clearly
improves; but it does not automatically mark good performance of government. The condition
of social, economical and cultural rights also slightly improves, but it does not suggest a really
good condition on the aspect in question. On the other hands, the fundamentals of democracy
such as representation, state independence, and in particular basic freedoms such as of
freedom of speech, assembly and organisation, religion, belief, language and culture, and worst
of all, party-political participation are stagnant or even decreasing. In fact, the various aspects
of representation even more clearly than before constitute the major problem of democracy.
3. At the same time, the people are also quite sceptical and cynical toward politics. This is likely
because political processes are mostly elitist in nature. Public does not have chances to
participate. Yet, the experience of Aceh provides us lesson that opened political system
prevent the people from being cynic and indifferent to politics. The people in Aceh post-conflict
have higher interest and more appreciative to politics then.
4. Hence, besides improving the performance of the managerial aspects of governance, the
government must also let the space of political freedom open wide. That is the only way to
improve the poor political representation.
5. The process of establishing the infrastructures of democracy is not yet finished. The
formalization of democracy has not yet touches all aspects, while informal arrangements –
customs, adat, values, norms – are far from always against democratization. Therefore, rather
than saying that democracy has been failed and unsuitable for Indonesia, we believe that the
ongoing process must be sustained.
6. The main actors, both powerful and pro-democracy actors seem to be more accommodative
and adaptive to democracy and to the process of democratization. It is unfortunate that their
democratic capacities are insufficient. The powerful actors employ their political and
economical strength, while alternative actors have not yet succeeded to become democratic
alternative forces. They even tend to individually and opportunistically pick a short-cut to gain
political power, rather than organize basis as their democratic political source of power.
Interestingly, powerful actors are also interested to use popular figure rather than building
strong organisation to mobilise support. In addition, both alternative and powerful actors tend to
have a short cut through lobby, inter-personal contacts, or even individual actions to reach their
goals.
7. In short, there are important advances regarding the management of democracy and most actors adhere to the formal rules of the game, but the good freedoms are not being properly sustained, the party-political participation is constrained, the elite continue to monopolise organised politics and the alternative actors remain weak. We shall return to the details of the dynamics, but it is clear that Indonesia's democracy-building is on the sand.

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Chapter 2
FROM NATIONALCOUNTRY WIDE COMMUNITY TO POLITICAL SOCIETY

Concluding the previous survey in 2003-2004, we suggested that nationstate project had underwent some crisis. Our data showed that 40% of our informant believed that Indonesian citizen was people’s main identity regarding public matters at that time. The number stood out among others indicating the proportion of informants assessing origins (11%), ethnicity (20%), or religion (12%) as the main identification.

There are two reasons why the data indicates a crisis. First, if the proportions of the last three identification are bundled and categorised as a non-national based identity, and then is put face to face with the proportion of the 40% informants arguing on the identification as Indonesian citizen, then the former will number more than the latter. The situation will even become more dramatic if we include the assessment of 12% informants on the tendency of the people to identify themselves as residents of municipality/city/province in the category of non-national based identity. After pilkada (local election) has become a common political phenomenon since 2005, it is not without reasons that we categorize the sentiments of being residents of certain city or province as non-national sentiment. In almost all pilkada, the issue of ‘putra daerah’ has become prominent. Second, in the context of developing democracy project, the data indicates a heavy burden ahead, since democracy requires citizenship politics as its basis, not religion/ethnicity-based politics or communitarian entities that turn into demos.\(^\text{32}\)

The recent survey unfortunately also suggested that similar situation still existed. Regional, religious, and even more, ethnicity sentiments have stronger influence in politics, rather than the feeling of being citizens of Indonesia. This situation is of course serious, as Indonesia do not have strong basis either as ethnic-state or religion-state. There is no single ethnic group that stood out as dominant group, in terms of quantity and political power. Although most Indonesian are Moslem, it is hard to think Indonesia will stand as Moslem country. Even during the New Order era, when there was extreme centralisation and when Javanese culture was getting political support to be dominant, Indonesia never became a ‘Javanese state’. With the fall of the Soeharto regime, moreover, centralism has been dismantled and the domination of Javanese culture is withering away. Therefore, Indonesia now is a country that fully depend on whether and how multi-ethnic and religion sentiments can be combined with democratic citizenship including political equality.

Such situation often rises a speculation that Indonesia has the potential of Balkanisation or of facing a heavy crisis as the result of nourishing too many different cultures and religions. Therefore, amidst this situation, it is possible that there will be widespread support for the return of an ethno-nationalist project at the central level that would dominate the political process in local levels.

We perceive the situation differently. In view of our informants, the problem is not too much decentralisation and space for various local sentiments that is a problem but too little space for genuine improvement of democracy from below. It is true our data indeed suggests the emergence of religion and ethnicity based division within the society. Yet, as the process of democratization has evolved and there has been space for more local politics, while some of the principles of

human rights are continued to be celebrated, a country-wide political rather than ethni-national community has emerged.

The national elections seems to have been quite successful in fostering identifications as citizens of Indonesia. Moreover, both our previous and recent surveys indicate clearly that the problems and available options of democracy were relatively similar in various regions. It is true that the data of our previous survey showed that Papua and Aceh were slightly different from other regions. Now, the situation in Aceh is almost similar with that of others; in some aspects Aceh is even ahead of the democratic development in Indonesia at large. On the one hand this emerging country wide democratic political framework was a crucial preconditions for the possibilities for peace negotiators, post-tsunami donors, civic groups as well as the contention political forces to agree on trying to transform the conflicts from the battlefield to a fledgling democracy. On the other hand, this would never have been possible if the local political system had not been opened up for more genuine political participation by giving people the right to form their own parties from below, within the local framework, and also launch independent candidates in the direct local elections. Further, it was crucial that the presence of foreign negotiators and actors contained, at least temporarily, the military and big business to take advantage of the situations, as have been the case in many other disturbed areas in Indonesia such as Poso. Finally it was imperative that many diissident groups and Aceh nationalist were well organized enough to take advantage of the democratic openings and even to win elections.\textsuperscript{33}

In other words, it was the decentralised and fledgling Indonesian political community and the granting of more chances for local political participation and involvement that paved the way for the peace and democratic development in Aceh, and prevented the abuse of the sensitive situation by powerful vested interest and ethnic and religious militanets – not attempts to enforce a nation state from the centre, top down.

This point to the importance of opening up and promote further democratisation of the country-wide and quite decentralised political community.

**Country wide political framework has worked**

Our previous survey indicated that situation of democracy in many regions were not significantly different. Dividing Indonesia into five regions – Sumatera, Java and Bali, Sulawesi and Eastern Indonesia – we concluded that pro-democracy actors in the regions faced almost similar problems, options, and situation. The data on Aceh and Papua, however, indicated very different situation. In general, we concluded that Indonesian democracy is nourished within a country-wide political framework.

Our most recent data also points to a similar tendency, although each region continues to reveal different situation. The average index of the instruments of democracy in Java and Bali stands out as the most prominent, indicating better democratic situation in the regions rather than in other regions. The average indexes of the instruments of democracy in Sumatera, Kalimantan, and even Eastern Indonesia are relatively the same. The index for Sulawesi, however, numbers less than the others, which may partly reflect the tense situation in parts of the province. The average index for all

\textsuperscript{33} Much of these insights are from Demos' special Aceh survey and a number of special studies on the role of democracy in Aceh that are being conducted by a special team directed by Stanley Adi Prasetyo in partnership between Demos and a separate project directed by Professors Kristian Stokke and Olle Törnquist, University of Oslo and supported by the Norwegian Research Council on the politics of peace and reconstruction in post-tsunami Sri Lanka and Aceh,
regions in the recent survey, as Table 2.1 shows, are relatively better than that in the previous survey. There is also an indication that democratisation occurs within a similar setting in each region.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NO</th>
<th>REGION</th>
<th>AVERAGE INDEX 2003/04</th>
<th>AVERAGE INDEX 2007</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Sumatera</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Jawa dan Bali</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Kalimantan</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Sulawesi</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Indonesia Timur</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Nasional</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The political development in Aceh post-Helsinki seems to be directed into the existing national political system and democratic framework. The freedom to establish local parties in Aceh does not make Aceh separated from Indonesia. It has been proven that the distinct feature of the local election system applied in the region – which allowed the participation of independent candidate and the election itself was won by this candidate - ‘merely’ produced governor and vice governor that had similar position to those in other provinces in Indonesia. This fact indicated the existence of country-wide political framework. In addition, Aceh case shows that democratic political organisation in local level does not bring any disadvantage to Indonesian political framework. On the other hand, it is indeed a positive contribution to country-wide democracy process.

The case of Aceh also proves that the existing political system is a reliable instrument, as it has successfully become a strong basis to transform armed conflict into a more democratic political struggle. The basic instrument to promote this was demonopolisation of politics in Aceh, allowing the existence of special autonomy, independent candidates and local parties. The settlement of Poso and Maluku conflicts have been less successful as that of Aceh’s. It is true that the identity of being Acehnese serves as territorial political identity rather than as ethnic or religious identity that probably nourishes the spirit of separatism. Therefore the conditions for conflict settlements proposed afterwards were not based by the spirit of ethnicity or religious exclusivity. The major differences however are that there have been less possibilities for local democrats in Poso and Maluku to organise politically and engage in institutionalised politics which has rather continued to be dominated by centralistic parties and the powerful elite, in close cooperation with big business and the military. The peace negotiations and the follow-up co-operation were less transparent and less open for various parties, including civic organisations, to than in Aceh.

If the emerging country-wide political system is further developed and made more participatory as in Aceh, there are good reasons to be optimistic for the future of Indonesia at large. The idea to give special autonomy for Aceh, including the establishment of a special governance system – which allowed the participation of local parties and independent candidates in pilkada – was well accepted by Indonesian people and government in general, as well as the Acehnese. Therefore, in our opinion, a country-wide political framework actually does exist and can be even more functional but opening up for local democratisation.³⁴ This is not just to the benefit of the people in the various provinces but also for Jakarta and the country at large.

³⁴ A more clear argument on this matter will be discussed in the forthcoming anthology on the result of Demos’ research and those of other researches on democratization in Aceh.
Political community, not nationhood

The existence of country wide political framework is supported by the existence of common and increasingly civic political community. Our data from the last year survey has revealed strong tendency among the society to identify themselves as residents of Indonesia in national election. Other prominent identification basis in election are party orientation and class. The tendency of the people to associate themselves with certain religion or ethnic group is not as high compared to association to other identification basis.

As shown in Table 2.2, some 34% of informants believed that people identify themselves the most as residents of Indonesia in the national election. The other 24% of informants argued that people identify themselves at first according to their party orientation, while 8% believed that class based identification is what most people associate themselves with in election. The asessment of 66% of the informants clearly indicates the existence of poltical community, very contrast to only around 30% informants that believed that the people tend to identify themselves as member of certain religious or ethnic community.

The following data, however, will make our discussion interesting. Responding to local political activities, our informants assessed a quite different situation. The role of religion, ethnicity, indigenous people expression become really important in local politics.

In pilkada, 40% of informants argue that people identify themselves at first as residents of their city/municipality/province, while 23% as members of their ethnic community. Ethnic based identity becomes important in the context of local conflict (according to 36% informants). Similarly, in terms of administrative division, most people identify themselves as member of ethnic group and residents of village and hamlet. See Table 2.3.

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There are two important points drawn from this data. First, the system of local election that had been applied since 2005 actually had risen the spirit of localism. The issue of 'putra daerah' stood out as the most prominent issue in the elections. Every political party would look at the 'origin' of the candidates before supporting them. The data in Table 2.3 affirmed this, as 40% of our informants believed that the people would mainly identify themselves as residents of city/municipality/province in pilkada. In many cases we can also see that the expression of 'putra daerah' is reflected through ethnic sentiment. If we put the percentage of the two identifications together, then the overall number will be 53%. Yet, it is necessary to note that by stating this argument, we do not intend to say that pilkada is a wrong idea.

A Demos's research conducted in 2006-2007 that attempted to reflect the experience of some pro-democracy actors' running in Pilkada35 revealed that direct election had opened opportunities for alternative actors to take political positions in local level. In 2005 Pilkada of Serdang Bedagai municipality, the candidate with pro-democracy activist background had succeeded to gain support from the basis of social movement through peasant and labour network. Pilkada in East Belitung municipality, Bangka Belitung, in the same year also won by alternative actor that campaigned for the fulfillment of the real needs of the people in the region, rather than on abstract ones. In Manggarai, NTT, alternative actor had also been successful to win 2005 pilkada by conducting ‘door-to-door’ campaign. Unfortunately, behind all of those success stories, we still heard of fragmentation among the social movement themselves. Therefore, the research also recommends the need to organise the basis of social movements into a joint platform to challenge the dominant-elite’s political monopolisation.

Second, surprisingly, religion based identity is not too prominent compared to ethnicity based identity. Even in the context of conflict, ethnic identity seems more protuberant than religious identity (12 percent). Thus, we may assume that conflicts in Poso or Ambon are artificially wrapped as religious conflict. Our data reveals that social class plays more important role than religion in such a conflict, which leads us to conclude that Poso and Ambon conflict is possibly caused by accumulation of resentment between ethnic groups and social classess in the region. Unfortunately, ethnic group and social class division in the region is coincided with religious grouping.

Then, it is clear that Indonesia is now a political society tied themselves to a commonly agreed country wide political framework. Therefore, the framework has a very significant role to keep Indonesian political society integrated. Political parties and several organisations in local level may keep on using jargons or symbols employing the issues of ethnicity or religion. Yet, as long as their demands are based on the equality of civil and political rights within the country wide political framework, then ethnic or religion conflicts can be averted. To compare this case with other international case, this can be a lesson for other societies with multi-ethnic and religion background. The Indian state of Kerala is an example where democracy and human rights are successfully celebrated among diverse ethnic and religion background. In fact, this is to a large extent based on the fact that most socio-religious reform movements (which were also the roots of the dynamic civic society in the state) since long back in the history of struggle against high caste dominance and colonial racism framed their demands in terms of equal civic and political rights rather than special favours for their own community or even dominance. 36

With this in mind, we have to realize that the best available way within democratic political framework is opening of democratic political spheres in the local level. Yet, it does not mean that there are no obstacles around. First, our data shows that 40% of our informants believe that people are not too interested in politics. It means, the opened political space in local level may be dominated by dominant elite. However, the experience of Aceh shows when the local political system is demonopolised and the political space is opened, people tend to have higher interest in democratic politics. Our separate survey in Aceh, which was conducted in the end of 2006, indicated that only 15% of the informants believed that people had lower interest to politics.

Second, most of our informants (83%) also argues that the people tend to consider politics as struggle to take over the power, manipulate the power, as well as elite’s business. Only 14% of our informants believed that the people consider politics as a form of control over public matter. This indicates that most people will take elite’s monopoly for granted. Therefore, it is important to urge the decision makers to issues local policies that are rooted on popular needs and interests.

It is important to consider the two previous points when deciding to open political spheres in local level. Besides promoting ‘go politics’ program to pro-democracy actors in order to prevent elite’s monopoly and proceeding NGO’s ‘traditional’ activities to strengthen civil society, it is also important to improve citizen’s awareness, without which civil society associations will be easily trapped to sectarian interests established by dominant elite for their own political interest.

The recent situation in post-Helsinki Aceh indicates the importance of political spaces provision in local level. Our data of 2006 Aceh survey implied that most Acehnese tend to identify themselves as residents of municipality/city/province, as village resident and as supporters of certain political parties. Both ethnic and religious based identifications seem insignificant compared to party based identification. It is also important that the sentiments of ‘son of the soil’ is less prominent compared to association to political party. This fact actually becomes the main argument to counter the common assumption on the possibility of separatism after the permission to establish local party in the region is issued. See Table 2.4.
Table 2.4. Acehnese' identification in pilkada

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NO</th>
<th>Acehnese' Identification in Pilkada</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>As residents of their city/municipality/province</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>As residents of their village and hamlet (dusun)</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>As members of their ethnic community</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>As members of their religious community</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>As Acehnese or non-Acehnese</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>As members/supporters of 'their' political party</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>As members of their social class</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Others (As residents of Indonesia)</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>No Answer</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Percentages based on number of informants. (N=131)

Source: Aceh Survey (Demos, 2006). http://www.demosindonesia.org/aceh/

Once again, Aceh experience proves that providing wider freedom for the people to participate in political organisation in local level, either through the establishment of local party or non-party political organisation, is an effective way to settle communal segregation and banish ethnicity and religious sentiments. Moreover, Aceh experience has revealed that the existence of local party does not disturb national regional election system. This is not to say that there are no problems in Aceh. For the remarkable success to continue, there is now a need to form additional democratic political linkages between the newly elected politicians, the old corruption ridden administration and the people, among which there is a lack of broad interest organisations and the predominance of for instance clientelism, extendend family loyalities (including because of the many years of violence and national conflicts). But the more open political system than elsewhere in the country improves the chances in Aceh of moving in this democratic direction rather than backsliding into the more normal Indonesian problems of elit monopolised local politics.

Conclusions

What conclusions we may draw from the discussion presented previously?

- First, the remaining strong sentiment of ethnicity (than religion) and of son of the soil/putra daerah continues to indicate that Indonesia now is not a country based on nationhood. If such condition persists, there might be a risk that it will disintegrate into ethnically and religiously and putra daerah based political communities. The potential conflicts caused by ethnicity and religious sentiments as well as the feeling of regionalism are indication of serious problem in the matter of nationhood.

- Second, the expression of being citizens of Indonesia is prominent during election, which strongly indicates the existence of a functioned political community. Yet, this does not automatically indicate good situation of citizenship.

- Third, the existence of a nation-wide political community is strongly indicated by its crucial importance in the process of peace in Aceh.

- Fourth, the organisation of democracy in local level has positively contributed to the country-wide political framework, as what local parties and democratic political forces had done in Aceh. On the contrary, the settlement of conflicts in Maluku and Poso was not so successful as that in Aceh because of the absence of democratic transpartency, demonopolisation of the political system and thus the chances to build democratic local political power. The ‘central’ oriented approach applied to the settlement of the conflicts in Poso and Maluku may even creates other problems, such as corruption, violence and intimidation committed by local businessmen and factions within military. As the experience of Aceh suggested, it is necessary to open local and democratic political spaces.

- Fifth, the strictly closed local political spaces, on the other hand, makes people are easily trapped in the sentiments of religion and ethnicity, as well as the feeling of regionalism. Such a
condition will cause conflicts to happen. The case of Poso and Maluku is one of the examples. It is true, that sociologically the people in Poso and Maluku are more diverse rather than those in Aceh, and, therefore, people think that the conflict settlements in the region will become a difficult task. Yet, we perceive that the main problem lie on the absence of attempts to open local and democratic political spaces in the regions. The case of Aceh has proven that the opened political spaces enable the Indonesian government and the nationalist movement in Aceh (including GAM but also other organisations) to link their interests and opt for transforming the armed conflict into a democratic political framework. Therefore, the opening of local political spaces will also make the interests of ethnic groups and religion groups coincide; which then will lessen the potential of conflicts.

Problems to solve
Pointing to conclusions presented previously, we consider three urgent problems to solve:

1. **Ethnic, son-of the soil (and religious) sentiments are prominent in political practice, particularly in local level.** In order to solve this problem, we must promote appreciation toward the idea of citizen and citizenship equality, as well as establish more democratic political framework in local level. This is important to reduce the misuse of the sentiment. The pro-democracy activist to establish civil society is clearly not enough. The most important lesson drawn from our survey is that pro-democracy activist also must focus to attempts to establish citizenship. This does not mean that it is impossible to combine democratic work with that of defending the rights of for instance indigenous communities or ethnic and religious minorities. While equal citizenship and political equality are basic to democracy, and while civic rights rather than special communal rights are thus a must, communal social and cultural rights and efforts to defend for instance the environment are different matters that may well be combined with human right based democracy democracy.

2. **The existence of democratic political organisation in local level is limited.** Conflicts in many regions in Indonesia indicate the limited channels to aspire public needs and interest. There are many organisations that are established on the basis of religious affiliation and ethnicity, which is neither positive to promote equality, or effective to moderate sharp differences among ethnic groups. Thus, we must promote the establishment of democratic spaces to enable the growth of organisations that are able to channel public aspiration and lessen potential conflicts among ethnic groups in local level.

3. **The absence of local party and democratic organisations in local level.** The experience of Aceh has clearly indicated that more opened and democratic political system in local level – for example by allowing the establishment of local party- is not a threat to national political community. Local democracy, on the other hand, may serve as important basis to broaden democratisation. Presumably, we cannot plan and work on democratisation agendas from national level only.

4. **Opening the blockage of central interest in local level.** As long as the arena of local politics are blocked by the interests of monopolistic and centralistic parties; which then resulted on the ban of independent candidate to participate in Pilkada, it is necessary then to organise a joint action between as many as possible pro-democratic oriented people organisation to claim for political reform and the fulfillment of economic and social rights. This step will generate more strength, and probably attract the attention of symphatetic politicians. As long as local political parties are blocked by the centralistic political elite, there is a need to consider alternative forms of political coalitions between pro-democratic civic organisations, popular movements and pro-democratic politicians.

***
Chapter 3
CONSOLIDATION OF ELITES DEMOCRACY

Chapter 1 has portrayed the change of democratic situation based on our recent survey in the comparison of the 2003-2004 one. What changes that actually occur within our democratic situation? In general we can say that the condition of instruments of democracy tend to improve, particularly those related to the managerial aspects of governance. However, there is an indication of threat towards the fundamental aspects of democracy, i.e. civil and political rights, state independence from foreign intervention, and representation. As compared to 2003/004, the freedoms are still the best but several crucial dimensions have deteriorated. Further, aside from free elections, the various dimensions of political representation belong now the worst of all the means of democracy. Further, the freedom to form parties or clusters of independent candidates and run in elections is the single means of democracy that has suffered from the worst deterioration since 2003/04. The instruments of democracy related to social, economy and cultural rights improve, but are actually still in the poor condition. It is fortunate that, we still see that the process of democratization in Indonesia still proceeds. To certain degree, the actual situation proves that democracy works.

The existence of democracy is also indicated by the successful conflict settlement in Aceh. The peace building process was conducted based on democratic principles. With democracy peace grows. Not any single issue rising during the peace process referred to anti-democratic issues, not even syaria and communalism. The agreement to end the conflicts was based on the acceptance of democratic political framework, such as the accommodation of local party and non-party individual candidates to compete in local head election (pilkada). Neither GAM nor the Indonesian government and the people in general refused such ideas. The most important essence of democracy is effort to democratically change the relation of power; and promote the process of political institutionalization and better economic development. It is hard to have peace in Aceh without acceptance to democracy.

Chapter 1 has discussed the integration of actors that have significant role in the process of democratization with various existing instruments of democracy. Powerful actors, those who were identified by our informants as people that have actual political power, now tend to use and promote the instruments of democracy more than before. While our previous survey suggested that only 50% among the powerful actors tend to use and promote the instruments of democracy, our recent one shows that the number increases significantly. According to our informants, 36% of dominant actors tend to use the instruments of democracy, and other 35% use and promote them.

At the same time, alternative actors, those who are considered to have potential power to compete the powerful actors, are also assumed to have better relation with various existing instruments of democracy. This is different from the result of the previous survey, which indicated the weak position of pro-democracy actors toward the instruments of democracy. The alternative or pro-democracy actors now have better capacity and more of them are now engaged in formal politics, despite of their weaknesses. The assessments of our informants even give us impression that both the alternative and powerful actors use and promote the instruments of democracy. More detailed explanation on the work of the alternative actors or pro-democracy actors and their relation with the democratic instruments will be discussed in Chapter 4. Yet, as we shall see, the alternative actors remain quite marginal politically and without will organised constituencies. As the previous survey indicates, the recent survey also suggests on the actors’ low capacity to use opened political
opportunities democratically. Further, the alternative actors face problems on the lack of ability to mobilize economic resources. All together this has implication on their methods of power transformation and of political communication. The alternative actors also tend to quickly attain their political purposes without considering the risk of broken chain of mandate that connect them with their constituents, eliminating the principle of accountability. The alternative actors also tend to conduct direct representation and limit their attention to the needs to improve the capacity of institutions of formal political representation. Therefore, the alternative actors have not yet successful to demonopolise the political system.

How shall we understand this complex dynamics? Most of the democratic rights and freedoms remain in place. Many of the operational dimensions of democratic governance have improved, even if from very low levels. Several of the other indices remain roughly the same level as 2003/04, the high standard of free and fair elections are still there. Most of the main actors, not just the alternative but also the dominant, seem to adhere to the basic formal (but not unimportant) rules of the game. While the attempts to build a ethnically based nation state has crumbled, a country wide political framework has evolved, with extensive space for local politics. Yet, in-spite of all these remarkable achievements, we have learnt from Ch 1 that several of the basic freedoms have deteriorated, the achievements of the operational instruments of justice and governance are from quite low levels, the improvements of the other means of democracy are insignificant or marginal, aside from elections, all the indices of representations are among the worst of the means of democracy and the deterioration of Freedom to form parties on the national or local level (or teams of independent candidates) that can recruit members, and participate in elections is the worst of all (from 71 to 40, or 44%). In the public discourse three are even strong opinions against democracy, claiming it is reducing economic growth, causing more corruption and conflicts.

The explanation on the general description on the condition of democracy will be discussed in detail in several sub-chapters. We will observe various aspects related to the capacity of dominant actors in regard to the ongoing process of democratization.

Our data point to five major characteristics. First, there is a continuous consolidation of the powerful actors and their monopolisation of organised politics, especially the system of representation. Second, the elite has become much larger beyond the centralized and super-powerful groups that survived Suharto; a majority of the powerful elite are now identified by our informants in the local contexts where these actors largely make their way through of electoral politics, even to the extent that businessmen have turned politicians. Third, these local politically oriented powerful actors make extensive abuse of thus acquired public resources. Fourth, there is a similarly extensive spread of cynicism and lack of trust in actually existing democracy on part of not just people in general but also the liberal and educated middle classes and upper elite that are both unable to win elections, Fifth, therefore, there is a widening fancy for the idea of ‘sequencing democracy’, i.e to get solid institutions (in terms of rules and regulations) in place before letting the masses in.

How would we substantiate this? What are the salient features of the powerful actors in the contexts of democratization?

Colonising democracy
As explained in the beginning of this chapter, the dominant actors seem to have integrated themselves with the system of democracy, indicated by their relation to the instruments of democracy. The dominant actors do not neglect one of 11 clusters of instruments of democracy. Our informants assessed that most powerful actors tend to use and even to promote the
instrument. It means, the dominant actors show a positive indication toward the existing rule of the game.

This picture is clearly in contrast to the result of our previous survey (2003/04). Although there was quite considerable number of dominant actors who use the instruments of democracy, most of them tend to manipulate or by pass the instruments. The following Table 3.1 reveals the shift of the relation of powerful actors with instruments of democracy.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NO</th>
<th>CATEGORY OF INSTRUMENTS OF DEMOCRACY</th>
<th>USE AND PROMOTE 2003/04(1)</th>
<th>USE 2007(2)</th>
<th>USE AND MANIPULATE 2003/04(1)</th>
<th>USE 2007(2)</th>
<th>AVOID OR OPT FOR ALTERNATIVES 2003/04(1)</th>
<th>AVOID OR OPT FOR ALTERNATIVES 2007(2)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Equal citizenship</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>International law and UN HR instruments</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Rule of law and justice</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Civil and political rights</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Economic and social rights</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Free and fair elections</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Good representation</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Democratic and accountable Government</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Freedom of media, press and academic freedoms</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Additional civil political Participation</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Direct participation</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rata-rata</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In general, the number of powerful actors who tend to manipulate and bypass the instruments of democracy is significantly different from the number of those who in general opt to use and promote the instruments. The tendency of the latter is very prominent (35 and 36%, or 71% of all powerful actors). With such a picture, it is not even suitable to say that the dominant elites hinder democracy or even set pose anti-democracy attitude, which they commonly did in the New Order era and in the beginning of Reformasi. Yet, we have to be really careful to interpret the data, let alone making it as the basis to assume that democracy has gained its victory! At this point, we just conclude that democracy has become an option or common interest.

Although the table above clearly shows a general positive development, we need to consider four points. First, the data shows that the instruments of democracy related to good representation are less promoted (only conducted by 29% of dominant actors), compared to other instruments. Similar phenomenon was also prominent in the previous survey (7%). Both the previous and recent surveys indicate that the powerful actors tend to use these instruments rather than to promote them. Second, the instruments related to representation are the most manipulated and neglected by main actors (21 and 11%, or 32% over all). If compared to the data of the previous survey the tendency of powerful actor to manipulate and bypass representation increases. Third, the powerful actors tend to get interested in direct participation. Interestingly, the powerful actors seem to promote the forms of direct representation, as shown by their relation with the instruments related to good representation. This tendency also escalate, compared to that found in the previous survey. The phenomenon shows that powerful actors prefer to employ less organised representation rather than promoting more organised political representation. Yet, our informants assessed that the
condition of representation remained poor. Direct representation is in the rank of 25th. (See Table 1.1 in Chapter 1).

Fourth, the average proportion of dominant actors who tend to manipulate and bypass the instruments of democracy is quite big (19 and 10%, or 29% overall). The proportion of dominant actors who seek for alternatives outside the instruments of democracy does not rapidly decrease compared to the result of the previous survey, which is from 15 to 10%. This, probably indicates the dominant existence of old dominant elites within powerful actors. It is, however, necessary to add that there has been an analysis stating the grim picture of democratization in Indonesia as elite disunity occurs. Some experts also conclude that old elites, either bureaucrats, politicians and businessmen, have striven back to dominate the politics in Indonesia through some adjustments or re-positioning of their roles and position. Different from those analysis, we believe on the phenomenon of political monopolization conducted by the oligarchic, both in the national and local level. A research conducted by Gerry van Klinken observed that democratization had caused the rise of elites in local level – the new elites in Indonesia. These research expand on and support much of Demos’ results.

At the same time, politics in general continue to be monopolised by the elite. But the elite groups are more broadly-based, more localised and less militarised than under Suharto. Remarkably, most of them have adjusted to the new, supposedly democratic, institutions. This is not to say there are no abuses, but decentralisation and elections have enabled more diverse sections of Indonesia’s elite to mobilise popular support. Of course, elites often mobilise such support by making use of their clientelistic networks, their privileged control of public resources and their alliances with business and communal leaders. Yet, the interest of such elite groups in elections is both a crucial basis of the actually existing democracy and its major drawback. Without elite support, Indonesian democracy would not survive; with elite support, it becomes the domain of ‘rotten politicians’ who prosper and entrench themselves through corruption. In all these respects, Indonesia may thus begin to resemble India, the most stable democracy in the global South. One big difference, however, is that Indonesia’s monopolistic party and election system is not inclusive of major interests among the people at large and also erects high barriers to participation by independent players, and thus still stops civic and popular organisations from getting into organised politics. In this respect Indonesia still seriously lags behind. Moreover, these groups remain hampered by their own fragmentation and weak mass organisation.

Composition and presence of the extended democratic elite

It is possible that the reason why the efforts to improve representation are stagnant lies on the fourth point, that the old characters of dominant – elites are quite dominant still. It means, the situation within powerful ctors does not significantly change, although some shift in composition probably do happen, as indicated by the data on the composition of powerful actors.

40 See, for example Vedi R. Hadiz, “Reorganizing political power in Indonesia: a reconsideration of so-called ‘democratic transitions’”, The Pacific Review, Vol. 16, No. 4, 2003, hal. 591-611.
41 See Gerry van Klinken, “Indonesia’s New Ethnic Elites”, in Henk Schulte Nordholt and Irwan Abdullah (eds), Indonesia in Search of Transition (Yogyakarta: Pustaka Pelajar, 2002), pp. 67-105; Gerry van Klinken, “Patronage democracy in provincial Indonesia” in Olle Törnquist et. al, Rethinking Popular Representation (forthcoming). Therefore, according to van Klinken, it is also important to observe how politics work for the people in Indonesia in general, beside the elites’ behavior in national level. It means, it is not enough to observe those who have power in national level, but also those in local level, where most Indonesian people live and work.
42 See a short article written by Olle Tornquist in Inside Indonesia, 26-4-2008
Based on the identification of our informants, actors with state and organised politics background, such as bureaucrats and government, politicians and members of parliament, constitute the biggest proportion of the powerful actors, 70% of all powerful actors. The number increases quite rapidly, compared to the previous composition found in the previous survey, which was less than 60%. See Table 3.2.

Table 3.2. The Composition of powerful actors based on the 2007 and 2003-04 surveys\(^{(1)}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NO</th>
<th>POWERFUL/DOMINANT ACTORS</th>
<th>2003/04 (N=1.795)</th>
<th>2007 (N=1.890)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Government/Bureaucracy</td>
<td>40 percent</td>
<td>46 percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Political parties and parliament members (central+local)</td>
<td>17 percent</td>
<td>23 percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Religious or ethnic groups and adat councils</td>
<td>12 percent</td>
<td>9 percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Police and military. Underworld and militia</td>
<td>16 percent</td>
<td>7 percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Business</td>
<td>12 percent</td>
<td>6 percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Professionals</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5 percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Others</td>
<td>2 percent</td>
<td>5 percent</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{(1)}\) In both of the surveys we asked the informants to identify 1-3 actors that are considered to have actual and influential political power. All of the numbers show the percentage based on the number of actors in each survey.

Beside confirming the existence of actors with state and organised politics background within the dominant actors, the table also reveals at least two shifts in the composition of the actors. First, compared to the result of the survey, coercive actors (police and military, as well as militias) are not assessed as influential and powerful actors in the political process. The proportion of actors from these background was 16% in the previous survey. Now, the number decreases into 7%. This phenomenon may be a relief, as ideally this condition is very potential to guarantee that the process of democratization run based on the principles of civil and political freedom.

Yet, as previously explained in the beginning of this chapter, the aspects of civil and political freedom as one of the fundamentals of democracy are in trouble. In average, the score index for the instruments related to civil and political rights decreases from 56 to 54. One of the instruments is even ranked in the lowest list of the instruments of democracy.

Moreover, some of the instruments in question is the transparency and accountability of the military and police to elected government and the public! Therefore, it is necessary to interpret the data that we mentioned earlier on the decreased percentage of actors with military, police, and hoodlums background with utmost care, as they may still be curcual and not very pro-democratic even if their proportion of the powerful actors are reduced. In fact, the influence and roles of this group is still significant, is indicated, for instance, by the negligence toward the instruments related to military and police transparancy toward elected government and public.

The second shift of the composition of powerful actors is the decreased proportion of actors with business background. As seen in Table 3.2, the percentage of actors with business background decreases from 12 to 6% of all powerful actors identified by our informants. We do not have other adequate data to control their full reliability reliable. To begin with the extension of the powerful groups and the fact that increasingly many of them work through elections and the executive gives a reduced space for the businessmen in our data. Yet business may be extremely powerful Moreover, there is an increasing dependency of business toward political practices that are dominated by actors with government and bureaucracy, as well as politician background. Second, actors with business background has infiltrated or transformed themselves as the practitioners of politics.
Third, the assessment of our informants in various regions shows similar composition of powerful actors. In each region, they are not too militaristic, compared to their characteristics during the New Order era. The dominant elites exist both in local and national level, triggered by the implementation of decentralisation, including administrative division, and local head election as the only political practice in local level.

Slightly different from the previous survey, in the recent one we found that the oligarchic character does not grow in the middle of perfect monopoly. During the New Order, there was no slightly open space within politics that can be infiltrated by other party, except the dominant elites. Our recent data shows that the alternative actors have infiltrated the arenas where the dominant elites usually monopolise, such as in the parliament and government bureaucracy. As discussed in the beginning of this chapter, the alternative actors has recently striven to make democracy as the only option. In doing so, they conduct various political actions that have the characteristics of direct representation. Although direct representation in less democratic (less organised, short-cul in nature) – discussed in chapter 4 – the alternative actors had succeeded to have taken over some positions in parliament and executives.

Yet, the political monopoly of powerful actors remains prominent, as concluded from the informants' assessments on the existence of powerful actors in various spheres and arena within the political landscape. According to our informant, the powerful actors are present – stronger than alternative actors – in almost all spheres and arenas within the political landscape: political party, bureaucracy, government, business and military/police. Only in the spheres and arena of lobby groups and interest organizations their domination less prominent than alternative actor's; yet it does not mean that the powerful actors completely abandon these spheres and arenas.

The monopolization of powerful actors can be proven by comparing the result of the recent and the previous surveys. The activity of powerful actors gets more prominent in political parties (including parliament) and the government. At the same time, the alternative actors also show similar high interest to get into. Therefore, political parties (including parliament) and the government are considered as the most strategic for both powerful and alternative actors. On the contrary, the activities of powerful actors are less intense in non-profit organizations, and in the military and police. This data is consistent with that revealing the decrease of actors with non-political organization and military background within the powerful actors. The following Table 3.3 shows the comparison of the result of the recent and previous survey on the spheres where the powerful actors are present and influential.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NO</th>
<th>SPHERES WHERE THE POWERFUL ACTORS ARE ACTIVE</th>
<th>2003/04(1) (%)</th>
<th>2007(2) (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Business and industry (incl. small business)</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Self-managed non-profit units</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Lobby groups</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Interest organizations</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Political parties(3)</td>
<td>12(4)</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Elected government</td>
<td>12(4)</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>The bureaucracy</td>
<td>12(4)</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>The judiciary</td>
<td>9(4)</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Military and police</td>
<td>9(4)</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(1)Every informants are asked to assessed two most important spheres and arenas for each powerful actors.
(2)In the previous survey, we used slightly different category
(3)In the previous survey, we used the category of "parliament"

43 According to our informants, lobby group – as assessed by 21% of the informants - and interest organization – according to 28% of our informants - are the most important political spheres and arena for alternative actors.
In the previous survey, we used the category of “other state institutions” outside “military” and “parliament”. All of percentages are based on the number of response provided by informants. In 2007 survey, informants are asked to pick two most important spheres where powerful actors are active, while in the previous survey three.

The data, once again, emphasis that the powerful actors still strive to dominate politics. The escalation of their presence in the parliament and government may be a response toward the efforts of alternative actors to get into the two institutions. It is possible, that in the competition, the powerful actors ‘allow’ alternative actors to use lobby groups and interest organization, which, institutionally, are less strategic than the former two. Yet, as Table 3.3 shows, the powerful actors do not consider the lobby groups and interest organization less important. Therefore, it is interesting to follow the dynamics.

The sources of power and how they are made legitimate

We had long identified that the power of powerful actors is underlain by connection or network, economic resources, and mass power, including the use of coercion. With the resource of interpersonal network, they establish strong intra-elite alliances, including with business, to exclude other parties in politics. The dependency of the sector of business to politics and the vast access to the source of public fund create unlimited fund for their political maneuvers. That is the reason why the powerful actors can easily establish various organizations to gather mass and mobilize them to support their political goals. Out of three pillars of their power, the powerful actors do not neglect other important factor: the power of information, including access towards intelligent information and control over mass media.

The data of the previous survey had clearly indicated on the domination of the powerful actors (in the previous survey we called it dominant actors) over four sources of power mentioned previously. According to the assessment of our informants at that time, the domination of the powerful actors is evenly distributed in the four sources of power with a slight emphasis on the power over personal network.

Our recent survey also indicates similar phenomenon, that the distribution of the domination of powerful actors is quite even in the four sources of power. The difference lies in the fact that powerful actors tend to rely on mass and political power, including coercion. As many as 28% of our informants provide such answer when asked to assess the main source of power the powerful actors employ at the first hand. In the previous survey, the number only reached 22%. The percentage of the network and inter-personal contact resources decreased from 38% to 28%. In addition, the proportion for economic and information resources is relatively stagnant; 25% and 14% in the recent survey and 23 and 17% in the previous one.44

The data is useful to explain several points. First, the even distribution of the powerful actors' domination in various kinds of sources of power reflects huge potential of monopoly and oligarchic practices in democratic political institutions that they dominate. Second, the threat towards civil and political freedom may be closely related to the tendency of powerful actors to depend on political and mass power resources, including coercion, at the first hand. Third, although the establishment of various organizations to gather mass is one of the methods to build political power, it seems that powerful actors only use such a method on the purpose of mobilization rather than of establishing basis to democratically organize politics. Therefore, the data may explain why the instruments related to political representation are stagnant.

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44 The data of the recent survey on the sources of power employed by powerful actors can be seen in Table E.5, in the Attachment of this report. For the data of 2003-04, see Priyono, et al, Op. Cit.
In addition, we conclude that the powerful actors has shifted their approach to dominate political process. Now, they employ a more – formally – democratic methods. Our data on their method to gain power indicates that the powerful actors use their capacity to have contact and dialogue, both with politicians and government in various levels as well as with other figures, and getting elected. The findings of our recent survey indicates that these methods are employed more rather than in the previous one.45

The data on the sources of power the alternative actors utilize at the first hand is not only unable to decline the three points explained before, but confirm them. The alternative actors, both according to the previous and the recent survey, tend to depend on the information and knowledge resources. Of all sources of power the alternative actors employ, the knowledge and information number 37% of them, while 36% in the previous survey. On the contrary, based on the assessment of our informants, the alternative actors tend to exclude the need to gain economic resource. In our recent survey, the economic resource only number 10% of all sources of power they use. Chapter 4 will discuss this.

What about the transformation of power conducted by the powerful actors. We realize that sources of power are potentials, and in order to be actual must be transformed. The following table illustrates the methods often employed by powerful actors to transform the sources of power:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NO</th>
<th>Ways of Transformation</th>
<th>2007 (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>By providing discursive activities within the public sphere through seminars, discussion, hearings</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>By providing contacts and dialogue with politicians and administrators at various levels</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>By providing and building networks and co-ordination for joint activity</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>By creating contacts and partnership with influential figures and experts</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>By being able to demonstrate collective and mass-based strength</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>By generating economic self-sufficiency, self-help activities, co-operatives, etc i</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>By gaining legitimacy through DPR, DPRD, the judicial system and/or the formal executive organs the state</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>By making use of various means of forceful official authority, coercion, demonstration of power and force as well as the generation of fear</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>By using state and government budgets other resources and regulations to the benefit of pro-market policies and various actors on the market</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>By providing patronage in various forms (including favourable treatment, loans, aid and charity) to for instant social groups, communities, civil society organisations (including NGOs) as well as to businessmen, relatives and other individuals</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>By organising support within communities</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>By organising support within communities</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Angka persentase berdasarkan jumlah respon informan. Percentage is based on the number of informants’ response

Based on the table, as well as referring to the three dominant resources, the powerful actors often use lobby, contact and networks (48%) to transform their sources of power. In addition, they also employ more formal ways such as using election and legitimacy through state institutions (18%). Here we see that the elites are more ‘civilized’ in doing their political moves, confirming the better relation between them and the instruments of democracy. On the contrary, they begin to leave non-democratic ways, such as coercion and show of force (8%), though some certainly still exist.

Politics of Image
We have so far identified that the dominant actors had in general changed their methods and ‘behavior’. They formally adapt to democracy, concentrate to dominate government and organized politics, escalating dialogues and establishing networks with various groups. They also utilize

45 See Table E.6 in Attachment of this report. For comparison, see Priyono, et al, op cit.
organizations' basis. These shifts occur while they still monopolise politics and sustain their oligarchic characteristics.

These democratic oriented changes also shift their style of political communication. They begin to promote their issues and interests, using similar languages and terms commonly used by pro-democracy activists. The powerful actors now often rise issues related to human rights, democracy and good governance. Yet, the actors in question have not yet adequately struggled for such issues, as the alternative actors have. Our data indicates that the issue of human rights only takes 3% of all issues the powerful actors struggle for. On the other hand, the proportion of human rights issue struggled by alternative actors is 11%. The issues of democracy, civil and political rights takes 11% of all issues struggled by powerful actors. Yet, the number is far lower than the composition of such issue struggled for by the alternative actors; which is 20%. The issue of good governance and anti-corruption takes the proportion of 12% of all issues struggled by powerful actors and of 15% by alternative actors.

It is, however, reasonable for the powerful actors to accommodate such issues, as they need to broaden their basis of political monopoly to the public spaces. Fully depended on various sources of power is not a suitable anymore when they have committed to use democracy as rule of the game. Then, the more democratic themes they deliver to public, the more possible they get the image of being democratic.

Thus, for the powerful actors, democratization is the era of politics of image. Not just merely a politics of image, but opportunistic politics of image. They deliberately pick this method as they realize that they need to take over public spaces and defend their oligarchic power and monopoly. Our informants assessed that, although the powerful actors promote some democratic themes, they are reluctant to rise specific issues. As many as 41% of all issues on human rights employed by the powerful actors only cover general themes, while only 19% cover the specific issues of human rights violation. In general, they tend to struggle for combination of various issues and interests. In the project of creating certain image, this does not matter at all, as catching public attention is the most important thing to do.

Table 3.5. The type of issues and interests fought for by main actors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NO</th>
<th>CONTENT OF INTERESTS, ISSUES, PLATFORMS AND/OR POLICIES</th>
<th>TYPE OF ISSUES/INTERESTS/POLICIES(2)</th>
<th>RESPONSE(1)</th>
<th>SPECIFIC ISSUES OR INTERESTS</th>
<th>COMBINATION OF SEVERAL ISSUES/INTERESTS</th>
<th>GENERAL CONCEPTS OR IDEAS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(%)</td>
<td>(%)</td>
<td>(%)</td>
<td>(%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Economic development oriented</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>30</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Good governance, anti-corruption, rule of law</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>28</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Democracy and civil-political rights (and gender issues)(3)</td>
<td>11 (1)</td>
<td>28 (61)</td>
<td>40 (21)</td>
<td>32 (18)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Religious and ethnic values, morality, conflict and conflict reconciliation</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>27</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Decentralisation and local autonomy</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>28</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Public services, basic needs, social security</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>27</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Nationalism, integration, national security</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>32</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Sustainable development, environment</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>21</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Human rights</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>41</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>29</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(1) Indicate the proportion of issues the powerful actors struggle for. The percentage is based on the whole number of answer provided by the informants.

(2) Indicate the proportion of type of issues the powerful actors struggle for. The percentage refers to the number of informants picking for the issues in questions.

(3) The number in brackets refers to gender issue.
The Table 3.5 also reveals the tendency of the dominant actors to bring up the issues of economic development. In addition, the issues of good governance, rule of law, and democracy are the most promoted by the powerful actors, though not so intense as what alternative actors do. This provides us impression that the powerful actors attempt to show themselves as the main elements of democratization process.

Although the powerful actors put their attention to issues of economic development, they do not intensely struggle for the more actual public issues and interest, namely public services and the provision of sembako (basic foods such as rice, sugar, palm oil, etc.). This is possibly the reason why our findings suggest on the slight improvement of social-economical aspects. The options of powerful actors to struggle for economic development may have improved the macro economy indicators, both in national and local level. In local level, by the implementation of decentralization and regional autonomy as well as the spirit of good governance, several local governments attempt to produce formal rules and regulation that aim to improve public services, particularly to provide free education and health services. Yet, some efforts only cease after the formal rules and regulation are formulated. It is in this context that we can understand the findings discussed in Chapter 1, that various instruments of democracy related to social, economy and cultural rights improve, in one hand, and on the other hand, we can see that the actual condition of those aspects is visibly poor.46

Our data on how the powerful actors communicating their issues and interests even confirm the politics of image they are working on. According to the assessment of our informants, making appearances in media is the method the actors in question apply at the first hand. We do not have any comparative data to observe whether the usage of media by powerful actors become more intense or not. Yet, our informants assessed that the instruments related to public access to and the reflection of different views within media, art and the academic world work poorly.47 It may be serve as the indication for the increase of media usage by powerful actors.

**Mobilisation and organisation**

Other important method is using various organization forum. This method is not only effective to build certain images, but also to mobilize organizational support. The organization based- method of communication is employed more by powerful actors than alternative actors. It is likely that in the project of politics of image, the powerful actors tend to use organizations to mobilize support rather than establish a solid integrated organizations as the basis of political power.

Our informants also assessed that the powerful actors often creating contact and partnership with charismatic figures and establishing patron-client relationship to mobilize power, rather than building an organization that integrates various popular organizations. Compared to the findings of the previous survey, that of the recent shows that the dominant actors considered the establishment of strong organizations important to mobilize support. The 2003/04 survey clearly indicates that the dominant actors applied less organizational method to mobilize support. The 2003/04 survey clearly indicates that the dominant actors considered the establishment of strong organizations important to mobilize support. According to our informants of the previous survey, of all methods of mobilizing power conducted by powerful actors, 33% refers to organizational method. In the recent survey, however, the number decreases into 11%. On the contrary, mobilization method that depends on charismatic and popular figures increases, from 14% in the previous survey to 30% in the recent one.

46 As explained in Chapter 1, the average index for instruments of democracy related to social, economy and cultural rights increases from 37 to 46.

47 The score index for the instruments of Public access to and the reflection of different views within media, art and the academic world decreases from 57 to 47. See Table 1.1 in Chapter 1.
The following table illustrates the method of mobilization conducted by powerful actors:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>Method of Mobilisation</th>
<th>2003/04 (%)</th>
<th>2007 (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Popular and charismatic leaders</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Clientilism</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Alternative patronage</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Networks between independent actors</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Integration from below of popular organisations*</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Percentage is based on the number of informants’ response. Every informant is allowed to pick two options at the most.

* In 2003/04 survey the method of integration from below of popular organization into more general organizations was categorized into three, (a) non-programmatic political machines (16), (b) federative networks (7), and (c) comprehensive organization unifying similar perspectives (10).

As reflection, we’d like to present our findings on the attempts of powerful actors to organize the people. Our data suggests that the powerful actors tend to use hierarchical connecting levels and apply ethnicity and religion based approaches. In addition, they also connect the people with similar vision, professional background, as well as descriptive groups (youth organizations, women organizations). This data indicates that the powerful actors, which are dominated by actors in government and organized politics, use the structure of government administration to organize the mass. As we know that the powerful actors tend to exclude the establishment of integrated organization recently, then the only remaining hierarchical relationship is government structure.

The strong tendency of powerful actors to apply ethnicity and religion based approach shows the lack of their organizational capacity. Both organizational methods depend on the existing people segregation, and do not require high organizational skill. It is also important to note that approach to youth and women organization is not new method, as it has been commonly employed in all levels of government administration. Similar approach has been conducted to various ethnic and religious groups.

**Elite Consolidation but No Representation**

The following paragraphs will discuss other aspects of powerful actors’ capacity, describing their almost complete consolidation as assessed by our informants.

The first aspect concerns with the alliance of powerful actors. We got the impression that the powerful actors keep excluding other actors to get involved in their alliance. The alliance in question is built among themselves. According to the assessments of our informants, 28% of the whole allies of powerful actors are politicians and parliaments (both in local and central level). Other important allies are the government and bureaucracy, as assessed by 21% of our informants.

The following Table 3.7 depicts the actors with whom powerful actors build their alliances.

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48 The data is served in the Table E.10 in the Attachment of this report.
Tabel 3.7. The powerful actors' alliances

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>Actors with whom powerful actors build alliances</th>
<th>Response(1)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Political parties and Parliament (central and local)</td>
<td>28(%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Government/Bureaucracy (incl semi-state bodies)</td>
<td>21(%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Religious or ethnic groups; Adat councils etc.</td>
<td>13(%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>NGOs and mass organizations</td>
<td>12(%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Business</td>
<td>10(%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Academicians, the judiciary/law firms, media</td>
<td>9(%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Police and military; Underworld and militia</td>
<td>6(%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(1) All of the percentages based on the number of responses given by the informants. Each informant was asked to mention three alliances at the most for each powerful actor.

It is clear, that beside with actors from the government, bureaucracy and parliament or political party, the powerful actors also build alliance with various business, professional groups and ethnic, religious, and adat communities. This shows that the oligarchic system sustained by the powerful actors is supported by business and communitarian institutions; exactly similar to what we have suspected when we analyze the composition of sources of power the powerful actors have. Business, communitarian groups and the powerful actors have symbiotic relationship, exchanging interests among themselves.

It is quite interesting to observe the assessment of our informants that suggests the lack of possibility for the powerful actors to have alliance with military and police, including with hoodlums. Only 6% of our informants assessed the possibility. Yet, as already analysed in the composition of powerful actors, the data does not always lead to the fact that the actors in question had declined their coercive practices in politics.

The second aspects concerns with the relation of powerful actors with the existing political organizations, which support their monopolistic practices. The assessment of our informants indicated that the actors in question tend to have intensive relation with big, established political parties. Among those parties, as our informants assessed, are Golkar (37%), PDIP (16%), various Islam based parties, out of PKS (12%), and Demokrat (6%). In addition, powerful actors build alliances with various mass organizations (7%), several smaller parties (6%), and PKS (3%).

The data shows us that the monopolization actually involves big, established political parties. Communitarian elements, represented by religion-oriented parties, both firmly declare themselves as religion based party or not, are also involved. The actors also build relation with non-party organization, particularly with mass organizations. Yet, as previously discussed, the relation with mass organization does not always indicate organizational relation, but more opportunistic in nature. The actors need the organizations to mobilise the mass.

Our informants also provided us information on the ways these parties and political organizations finance their activities. This information is very useful to observe the structure of power that supports the monopoly of the powerful actors. The actors in question tend to build intensive relation with political parties and organizations that are financially supported by the government and with those depending on the contribution of own functionaries and cadres, as well as with those supported by sponsors within business. It is quite surprising that the political party ad organizations do not deeply depend on the contribution of candidates in various election.

49 See Table E.12, in the Attachment of this report.
50 See Table E.13 in Attachment of this report.
Observing the data, once again, we have clear picture on the circle of power that is dominated by solid, dominant-elite groups. They monopolise the political system through thorough domination in various aspects. That the political parties are less dependent to the contribution of candidates is probably because the contribution is not continuous and only given during the election. Yet, from another perspective, the data may indicates that the power of candidates is less significant than that of political parties. This may indicate that oligarchy will not develop into autocracy. The powerful actors within oligarchic group seem to feel comfortable with the sharing of power within themselves, while keeping the symbiotic relationship between themselves and business and communitarian groups work. Above all, despite their adamant efforts to defend themselves as oligarchic, they still possibly work in democratic framework through the practices they have practiced so far.

The capacity and strategy to approach the institutions of governance
The last aspect concerns with powerful actors' interpretation on the function of political representation in democracy. In order to gain information on this matter, we asked the informants to assess the manoeuvres of powerful actors in the total system of government, including private sector, to reach their political goals. We also attempted to observe this aspect in the previous survey with different question formulation. Therefore, here we will only present our recent findings.

According to our informants, the powerful actors tend to use executives institutions, parliament and bureaucracy to reach their political goals. Other institutions within the system, namely judiciary, state auxiliary bodies, civil organizations, business, and military are less employed. Once again, we observe unbreakable chains of political organization, the government and bureaucracy. Monopoly happens under the control of the three political power. See Table 3.8.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>Governance institutions to where powerful actors go</th>
<th>Responses (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>The political executive – (the government)</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>The legislative (e.g. DPRD)</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>The bureaucracy</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>The judiciary (incl the police)</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Institutions for private management (e.g. the market, the family)</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Auxiliary bodies and institution for sub-contracted public governance</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>The military</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Institutions for self-management (e.g. cooperative)</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(1) All percentages based on the number of response provided by the informants. Each informant was asked to mention two institutions at the most for each powerful actor.

Our data on methods employed by powerful actors to use the institutions shows a more interesting phenomenon. According to 35% of our informants, the powerful actors directly use the institutions without involving mediating institutions. The data clearly reveal that the domination of actors with political organization and government backgrounds within powerful actors provides them a special ‘privilege’ to use the institutions to reach their political goals. The powerful actors still use various mediating institutions, and political party is the mediating institutions they pick at the first place, as indicated by 16% of our informants. Other institutions are lobby groups, interest organizations, and mass media, according to 9-11% of our informants. Considering the fact that actors with political party and parliament backgrounds are dominant in the composition of powerful actors, then the findings on the most employed mediating institutions confirms their domination.

There is no other interpretation given to this data, except that these are the proofs of the existence of crisis of representation. Democracy works under the domination of oligarchic groups that
monopolize the politics. Therefore, as we have already stated since 2003-2004 survey, promoting representation is the most urgent agenda. Chapter 1 has discussed the condition of representation is still poor, while the beginning of this chapter has indicated that the condition is caused by, among others, the neglect of its important aspects. Next, we also find out that political organizational works less intensely, even among the powerful actors. Public is treated as merely mass, and considered useful only when the powerful actors need support. Public needs become political commodity. As the people get more interested in politics, the crisis of representation becomes more prominent. Criticisms to democracy emerge. Most of the people begin to blame democracy as the cause of social-economy crisis, of mass riot in some of the pilkada. Some people are even got trapped in the romanticism of New Order stability. Then, the powerful actors quickly react: Yes, democracy needs some repair, and let us handle it.

It is true that the powerful actors that transform themselves into oligarch and monopolise the instruments of democracy are able to do anything to the instruments that they have dominated.

The politics of order: The next scenario?
The powerful actors are definitely in command of organized politics. As we explained previously, they dominate the political sphere, as well strike alliance between each other. As an illustration, the data of the recent survey shows that 22% of powerful actors and 14% of alternative actors worked in political party, while the number of powerful actors working in government is 39%, and that of alternative actors is 23%. If we compare this proportion with that of the previous survey, then it is clear that the number of powerful actors working in political party increases 10% (in the previous research was 12%) and that in government 13% (9% in the previous survey). We can conclude that the powerful actors has dominated and scale up their activities in political party and government. What about their alliances? Parliament, both in central and regional levels, political party or politicians (28%), and government with state-auxilliary institutions (23%) are those with whom powerful actors tend to make alliances. Quite differently, only 17% of alternative actors work in parliament and political party, and 16% in government. This data affirms the position of powerful actors, which is more dominant than alternative ones.51

Worst, the political system of representation is clearly monopolized. Except in Aceh, parties without previous organisation inherited from the Suharto period and/or great wealth stand almost no chance to even get into elections. Moreover, most if the issues and interests that are given voice to by numerous but quite powerless civic and popular organisations, such as among professionals, liberal middle classes, urban poor, labourers, farm nets, fisherfolks , women and so are almost excluded from the organised sphere aside from by way of privileged personal contacts and lobbying, which surves to further undermine democracy, foster corruption, clientelism, nepotism and other special services.

Are all the sections of the elite happy and satisfied with the situation? Those who have been able to expand into politics, win elections, strike favourable deals with various business, military, executive leaders and the crucial ethnic and religious groups are of course happy. But there is also distress among other parts of the elite, particularly those who (a) are unable to win election. They can be government officials, businessman, or civil organization leaders, both NGO and people organization; and (b) some of middle class within the elites that are not able to win major votes in elections. Meanwhile, we also heard the disappointment of the people to the ongoing political process within our democratic process.

51 In the previous survey, there was no data on alliances.
Therefore, it is quite reasonable that the discourses on democracy recently emerging are dominated by the argumentations of the not so satisfied part of the dominant-elite. For example, the idea that democracy is not a purpose but an instrument and that democracy must be executed in efficient ways. Such an idea had been explicitly stated by Vice President Jusuf Kalla in many occasions, and surya Paloh, the Chairman of Golkar Advisory Board. We cited their statements as follows:

“Democracy is merely a way, an instrument, or process and not a purpose, so that it can be put in the second place.” (as stated by Jusuf Kalla in his political speech in the closing ceremony of Golkar’s Rapimnas (National Leaders Meeting) in Jakarta, 25 November 2007)\(^{52}\)

“Democracy is not a purpose, but merely an instrument to achieve people welfare. Democracy is useless if welfare doesn’t exist.” (as stated during the National Meeting of Golkar dan PDI-P” in Medan, 20 June 2007)\(^{53}\)

The ideas clearly oppose democracy with people’s welfare also emerged. Democracy is accused as the reason of the stumbling economic condition. The people in general still concentrate on how to put food on their table, and not yet to do democracy.\(^{54}\) Such ideas (though not exactly the same) have ever gained their supremacy during the era of New Order with its slogan of economic Development and national Stability. The support of some academicians and intellectuals to the ideas proves the domination of the ideas.\(^{55}\)

The portrait of general conditions of democracy as we presented previously fits to the actual situation of democracy. The new Law on Party, for example, gives us impression on the adamant efforts to sustain the monopoly of the dominant-elite. The content of the law does not explicitly avert fair political competition, but it banishes the possibility for alternative actors to use political party as one of the opened channels in the frame of democracy.

The explanation on the general description on the condition of democracy will be discussed in detail in several sub-chapters. We will observe various aspects related to the capacity of dominant actors in regard to the ongoing process of democratization.

At this stage we can see three worrying strategies that are now developing behind the ideas of Politics of Order. First, this idea will in turn limit and hinder pro-democracy movements’ and actors’ advances. At the same time, the idea also have protected the dominant elites or those who have privileges that are commonly based in Jakarta, big, established mass-based political parties (as implied by the new law on Politics). Second, the idea will also limit democracy against patronage democracy (as well as masses). We need to fabricate good governance, economic growth, rule of law before promoting ‘real’ democracy. This leads to the third problems; who will we identify as driving forces to execute all of these preconditions before finally establish democracy. It is clear that Indonesia is far from 18\(^{th}\) and 19\(^{th}\) century Europe that already had long history in promoting liberal democracy. Nor Indonesia is among the developmental states that are so powerful in promoting development. Indonesia does not have so far a strong and independent development oriented bourgeois. It is possible that Indonesia foster a growth alliance as Malaysia does, but that was at the cost of authoritarianism with ethnic, religion basis.

\(^{52}\) Kompas, 26 November 2007.

\(^{53}\) Kompas, 21 June 2007.

\(^{54}\) This idea was stated by, among others, Hasyim Mujadi, The Chairman of Nadhatul Ulama. The politics of democracy practiced in Pilkada, so he said, is not in balance with people’s understanding and knowledge on democracy. According to Mujadi, “People are now thinking on how to be able to eat. People only think on how to get nine basic materials. They do not think on how to do ‘right’ democracy.” See NU online, www.nu.or.id, “Hasyim Ungkap 4 Alasan Pilkada Langsung Dihapuskan”, 13 March 2008.

\(^{55}\) See, for example the writings of Amir Santoso in Pelita, 6 December 2007 and Radhar Panca Dahana in Seputart Indonesia, 19 December 2007.
On the one hand the first part of the elite using democracy for its advances may definitely sustain it, thus being a solid base for rudimentary democracy; on the other hand it’s way of banning and abusing the rules are undermining the wider trust in democracy among not only the elite that can win but also many middle class groups and wide sections of the population that say not to rotten politicians.

This is way we can say that the modest yet good advance in Indonesia’s democracy-building is on the sand – it’s lacking firm ground and it may even erode quite quickly.

It’s imperative therefore that the pro-democracy groups of various kinds can put up an alternative. We shall discuss this in chapter 4!

***
Chapter 4
POPULIST SHORTCUTS TO PROGRESS?

Our research in 2003-2004 revealed that pro-democracy actors were politically marginalized and floating. Yet, the research also indicated the existence of potentials that would be possible to develop amidst the growing democracy environment in Indonesia. While dominant elites consolidated themselves to monopolize and abuse democratic instruments, pro-democracy actors – with their limited capacities, particularly, in their attempts to strengthen mass in their basis and to take over some important political spheres – were marginalized.

The marginalization of pro-democracy actors was reflected by the fact that the actors tended to work in civil society rather than in state or business arena. In addition, the actors had a lack of sources of power within the last two spheres mentioned previously. Other than that, the marginalization was also indicated by the tendencies of pro-democracy actors to work on specific, single issues rather than the comprehensive one, to primarily employ public discourse as a way to gain legitimacy and political authority rather than to gain people’s mandate by serving as institution that has public authority, to employ populist, clientelistic and other traditional methods in mobilizing support, to give priority to direct democracy and neglect attempts to strengthen representation, as well as to exclude women perspective in their agenda to broaden their basis. What have been the development of these and related matters during the recent years? What is the situation today and the prospects for the future?

The release of political plug since ‘reformasi’ era in 1999 had caused people’s enthusiasm to politics risen up. By now our informants assess that people have continued to have quite high interest to engage in politics (46%). Women also had such enthusiasm to politics, indicated by their perspective that politics is no longer something taken care of by the elites/public figures, but an instrument to gain power.

Our other studies also discussed the experiments of civil society organizations to engage in politics, not only acting as institutions that advocated or increase their capacity in the spheres of civil society. These experiments can be one of the potentials to promote democracy.

Compared to the result of our previous research (2003-2004), we noted that the condition of pro-democracy actors has changed. If they are previously marginalized and floating, they now change

56 The reluctance of pro-democracy actors to use economic source of power and to engage in politics is one of the reasons why the capacity of the actors in question remains weak. This weakness then takes effect on their option of strategy; which is relying on their activities in civil society. The discussion on the floating and marginalised pro-democracy actors can be read in Priyono, AE., Willy Purna Samadhi, Olle Törnquist, et al., Op.Cit. particularly in Chapter V and VIII.

57 In regard to women interest to politics, our informants also noted on the important attempts to promote women participation in politics. Besides struggling for quota for women in political institutions and increasing the awareness and capacity of women, our informants suggested that it was also important to broaden political agendas to be inclusive for women vital issues.

58 One of Demos’ thematic researches studies the transformation of various kinds of civil activities and social movements into political actions, or their reconnection with political movements, institutions or organizations in the sphere of formal politics in some regions in Indonesia. The result of this study can be read in the report of “link Project” research; AE. Priyono, dkk., (2008) “Kajian tentang Aksi Sipil dan Gerakan Sosial Menjadi Tindakan Politik”. While the study on the transformation of socio-political movements can be read in The Integrated Report of Demos’ Topical researches (2007), http://demosindonesia.org/downloads/1199781729_Laporan_Eksekutive_Riset_2007.pdf, or Olle Tornquist (2007), “Problems and Options of Scaling-up and Building Democratic Representation”, and Olle Törnquist, Kristian Stokke and Neil Webster (ed.), (2008), “Rethinking Popular Representation”...
their strategy. In addition, the capacity of pro-democracy actors also increased. They who previously do not have strong position against democratic instruments now start to have better relation with it. They also begin to go politics, while some weaknesses do exist; which will be discussed in the following parts.

In general, we drew two conclusions regarding the movements of pro-democracy actors; first, the pro-democracy actors are now more active to work in political arenas, second, the actors tend to opt for what we shall call a populist shortcut, basically in terms of avoiding representation in favour ‘direct’ relations between individual leaders and their contacts within the elite on the one hand and the people on the other. The following paragraphs will discuss the two points in detail.

**When Politics Gets More Interesting to Opt for**

As a country with young democracy, Indonesia should provide myriad options for its actors to settle socio-political problems they face. Pro-democracy actors, thus, serve as balancing power to powerful actors (dominant elites).

Chapter 3 of this report discusses the actions of dominant elites who are consolidated to monopolise politics. Amidst the situation, the role of alternative actors that struggle for a more equal division of power is very important. Such a role can also be taken by pro-democracy actors. Then, what is the capacity of pro-democracy actors as alternative actors?

Our recent study has shown that the alternative actors have achieved some progress; which is indicated by their more intensive engagement in organised politics. Amidst the debate on whether civil society organizations need to be faithful to their role in civil society or to be involved in politics, pro-democracy actors now also show passion for politics, just like most people during ‘reformasi’ era did. There are many among them who begin to involve in the sphere of formal politics. Besides the individuals who attempted to compete in both executives and legislatives election, some civil society organizations also to transform themselves into political organizations.

Our data show that although dominated by NGO, informal figures, or professionals, the composition of pro-democracy actors that take role as alternative actors also include members of legislative institutions and political party as well as government and bureaucracy. Table 4.1 provides the clear illustration.

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59 Their active involvement in organised politics is conducted through several ways (1) electoral competition, by competing in Pilkada, (2) non-electoral method, by establishing alliance between civil society organizations to strengthen their political power, (3) the employment of formal processes, by giving pressure to DPR or executives, (4) informal process, by lobbying politicians. See the Executive reports of demos’ Topical Researches (2007), op.cit.

60 See, for example, the case of POR in West Kalimantan, KP3R in South East Sulawesi and other parties established by some civil society groups, PPR. AE Priyono, et al in the report of “Link Project” (2008), op.cit.

61 The identification of the background of alternative actors is based on our informants’ assessment on actors who have important roles in struggling for more equal power relations and on those who have most dominant influence. Although we had done much effort to minimize the domination of NGO activists in the informants’ assessment, it seems impossible to avoid the bias caused by informants’ backgrounds as activists.
Similarly, the alternative actors also broaden their spheres of work. Compared to the result of our previous research, the actors are now more active in both government institutions and political party. For institutions like political parties, elected government, bureaucracy and judicial institutions, the level of the participation of alternative actors increases almost 100% (see table 4. 2). Yet, the presence of alternative actors continue to be remarkably poor within workplaces in business sectors and well as within government. This is of course in sharp contrast to countries where the state have been used to expand collective services, welfare etc.

Table 4. 2. Sphere where the alternative actors are active at first hand: comparison of 2003-04 and 2007 data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>Spheres</th>
<th>2003/04 (%)</th>
<th>2007 (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Business and industry</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Small business</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Self-managed non-profit units, Lobby groups &amp; Interest organizations</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Political parties &amp; Elected government</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>The bureaucracy &amp; The judiciary</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Military and police</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(1) percentage is based on the number of informants’ response. Each informant is allowed to pick 5 options
(2) percentage is based on the number of informants’ response. Each informant is allowed to pick 3 options

Such condition is also confirmed by the map of alliance built by pro-democracy actors to influence and have power over political dynamics. Beside with NGO and some figures (informal leaders and professionals) – which hit the biggest number in the list – pro-democracy actors also build alliance with members of government institution, bureaucracy, politicians and members of parliament. In addition, the alliance is also built with informal figures and professionals such as academicians, lawyers and media (see table 4. 3). We do not have comparative figures for this from 2003-04, but it fits into the general pattern among alternative actors of having increase their interest in organised politics.

Table 4. 3. Alliance of Alternative Actors 2007

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>Alliance of Alternative Actor</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Government/Bureaucracy</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Police and military</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Politician and Parliament</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Business</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Informal Leaders (Religious, ethnic, adat leaders, academicians, lawyers, etc)</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Professionals (academician, lawyers, journalists, etc)</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Percentage is based on the number of answers given by the informants.

The option to become active in politics seems to connect with the improvement of the capacity of alternative actors as well as the shift of their position toward the instruments of democracy. Among those instruments with which the alternative actors are well connected are related to free and fair
elections, good representation, direct participation and additional civil political participation. We found that the capacity of alternative actors has strengthened their positions in relation to the means of democracy as compared to the previous research indicated. In addition, they also have better relation with the instruments in term of a larger proportion of actors who really both promote and use the instruments.

Table 4.4. The relation and position of Alternative actors in using and promoting the instruments of democracy.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>CATEGORY OF RULES AND REGULATIONS</th>
<th>Actors’ Relation Use and promote (%</th>
<th>Actors’ Position Strong (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Free and fair elections</td>
<td>52 63</td>
<td>57 66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Good representation</td>
<td>35 57</td>
<td>36 64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>civil political participation</td>
<td>57 64</td>
<td>57 73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Direct participation</td>
<td>43 63</td>
<td>43 71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Average</td>
<td>46 66</td>
<td>44 68</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(1) Percentage is based on the number of answers provided by informants
(2) In 2003-04 survey, the questions on relation and positions were related to 40 instruments of democracy, while for the recent survey 11.

The better relations and position of alternative actors to the instruments of democracy may actually become the strength of the actors in question to engage in politics. The strength of alternative actors’ relation to the instrument is not less compared to those of dominant actors'; which was discussed in chapter 3. Considering the various channels people may employ when intending to go politics, such a good relation can be well utilized. To the question of channels to be used when someone attempts to engage in politics, our informants opted for various options, such as congregate a non-party block or joining political party both in established and big parties and small political party that is eligible to run in elections, or establishing a new locally rooted political party.

Table 4.5. Informant’s assessment of the most appropriate channel to be used to engage in political process

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NO</th>
<th>CHANNEL TO BE USED TO ENGAGE IN POLITICAL PROCESS</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Join a big national political party</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Join a small political party that is eligible to run in elections</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Establish a new locally rooted political party</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Congregate a non-party political block</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Percentage is based on the number of informants (N=876)

The varied options the informants opted; from establishing political block or new locally rooted party shows the commitment of alternative actors to not only act in the marginal line of political dynamics. As explained in the beginning of this chapter, other study conducted by Demos observes attempts conducted by pro-democracy actors to get involved and engage in politics and the strategies they

---

62 The instruments related to political participation of civil society are (1) citizens' participation in extensive independent civil associations; (2) transparency, accountability and democracy within civil associations; (3) all social groups' -- including marginalised groups --extensive access to and participation in public life. The instruments related to direct participation are: people's direct access and contact with the public services, government's consultation of people, and direct participation in policy making and the execution of public decisions.

63 The options provided to answer the question on the relation of actors with the instruments of democracy are; to use and promote, to use, to use and abuse, to abuse and looking for other alternatives. While the table below only presents the data for the options of 'to use and promote'. In regard to the question on the position of actors toward the instruments of democracy, we provided 'strong' and 'weak' as the options provided to answer the question. The table, however, only presents the data for 'strong' answer.
employed. Some of the strategies are putting the priority to popular organization and focusing to additional political channels.

The fact that the alternative actors have better relation with the instrument of democracy and that some of the actors had conducted experiments to go politics are seemingly good news to the political shift now occurring. Is it true? Are alternative actors really able to be a balancing power to the dominant power of dominant elites? Let us take a look to some data we present below.

**...But Opting for Direct Methods and Neglecting Representation**

The fact that alternative actors have managed to improve is probably good news, despite the fact that it is still necessary to improve actors’ political capacity and will. The capacity and will are basically related to; (1) sources of power and (2) their transformation to gain legitimacy and political authority, (3) issues and interests the actors opted to struggle for, (4) the method of communication used, (5) the ability to mobilise and organise the people, and (6) the method of organising, (7) political party and organisations with which the actors are related, and (8) strategies opted by the actors in the political system.

In regard to the political capacity of the alternative actors, our data shows that the actors often opt for populist shortcut in the political system. This option actually rises other problems on representation; which we will discuss in the following parts.

(1) **Depend on Social Forces without Adequate Economic resources**

Important element related with the capacity of actors to promote meaningful democracy is their sources of power. In this case, our recent, as well as our previous research indicates that pro-democracy actors recently tend to rely on knowledge and information, social strength and favourable contacts (Table 4.6). Their efforts to make use economic resources or mass mobilization are limited. Compared to that shown in our previous research, the number of pro-democrats utilizing those sources of power in this research decreases. Both sources are essential to strengthen organization, particularly for political organization that does not only require network and knowledge, but also sufficient financial support and reliable mass support.

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**Table 4.6. The sources of Power of alternative Actors in 2003/04 and 2007**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Alternative Actors’ Source of Power</th>
<th>2003/04 (%)</th>
<th>2007 (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Economic resources</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Mass power/Political/Military coercion</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Social strength and favorable contacts</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Knowledge, information</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(1) In 2003-04 survey, the answers were categorised into 26 options. Each informant was allowed to pick 5. Percentage is based on the number of informants’ response.

(2) Each informant is allowed to pick 3 answers. Percentage is based on the number of informants’ response.

---

64In regard to the improvement of the ability of alternative actors and of the relation of the actors in question with the instruments of democracy, our “Link project” study suggests that pro-democracy actors and socio-political organizations commonly employ five strategies in politics; (1) sustaining their roles as pressure groups, as conducted by INSAN in Kota Baru, South kalimantan and Forum Warga in central Java, (2) participating in the process of legislation, by urging members of organization to be the members of parliament in various levels, (3) utilizing political party, (4) establishing alternative party, such as PPR and Papernas, and (5) attempting to take power by competing to win executive positions in various levels. See “link project” (2008), op.cit and the execxutive summary of Demos thematic researches (2007).

65An exception goes to the case of some institutions such as POR and Gemawan in West Kalimantan; which are the metamorph of institutions that are intended to strengthen their economical basis. POR is the sub-organization of Yayasan puncur Kasih that develop Credit Union. The complete profile of this organization, see report of “Link Project” (2008).
The alternative still rely on seminar and discussion forum to gain legitimacy and authority. Almost as important is the provision of networks and contacts with influential people. Alternative actors are also gaining legitimacy by community organising. By contrast, they do not put attempts to be economically independent as priority (4%). It seems that this is closely related to the background of the actors, which is rarely from that of business. Yet, if business is considered beyond their reach, there has been little awareness among the actors to transform alternative resources into main economical one. In addition, the ability of alternative actors to demonstrate mass based collective power is still inadequate (7%).

### Table 4.7 Ways of Alternative Actors to Transform Sources of Power

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>ALTERNATIVE ACTORS’S WAYS OF LEGITIMATING POWERS</th>
<th>(%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>By providing discursive activities within the public sphere through seminars, discussion, hearings</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>By providing contacts and dialogue with politicians and administrators at various levels</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>By providing and building networks and co-ordination for joint activity</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>By creating contacts and partnership with influential figures and experts</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>By being able to demonstrate collective and mass-based strength</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>By generating economic self-sufficiency, self-help activities, co-operatives, etc.</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>By gaining legitimacy through DPR, DPRD, the judicial system and/or the formal executive organs the state</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>By making use of various means of forceful official authority, coercion, demonstration of power and force as well as the generation of fear</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>By using state and government budgets other resources and regulations to the benefit of pro-market policies and various actors on the market</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>By providing patronage in various forms (including favourable treatment, loans, aid and charity) to for instance social groups, communities, civil society organizations (including NGOs) as well as to businessmen, relatives and other individuals</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>By organizing support within communities</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>By gaining a popular mandate or getting elected</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>By influencing public opinion via mass media</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Percentage is based on the number of informants' response. Each informant is allowed to provide 3 answers for each actor.

It is likely that the alternative actors do not see economic development as issue they will strive for. The capacity of alternative actors to employ issues is less progressive than that of the dominant elites. The latter seem to be a way ahead; as they start to combine issues they struggle for. (See the following table 4.8)

#### (2) Opting for Less Strategic Issues

In regard to issues the actors struggle for, we notice that there are some improvements made by pro-democracy actors by not concentrate themselves to a single and specific issue. However, they still tend to focus on the issue of democracy and civil-political rights (20%), good governance and anti-corruption (15%) and human rights (11%). There is little emphasis on issues related to bread and butter, economic development etc. The latter is in sharp contrast to the dominant actors who really focus on such matters while also addressing governance issues (but being less interested, of course in human rights, democracy etc) it is also unfortunate that many of pro-democracy actors are not able to employ issues that are more local and directly touch the need and interest of the people, such as those related to public service, basic needs, social security, environment, sustainable development, local autonomy and decentralization (the number of each point is 4-6%).
Table 4.8. Issues and Interests Actors Struggled For 2007

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Content Of Interests, Issues, Platforms and/or Policies</th>
<th>Powerful Actors (%)</th>
<th>Alternative Actors (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Response Specific Issue</td>
<td>Combinatio n Issue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Public services, basic needs, social security</td>
<td>9 26 46 27</td>
<td>6 35 31 33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Religious and ethnic values, morality, conflict and conflict reconciliation</td>
<td>11 27 46 27</td>
<td>12 40 29 31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Democracy and civil-political rights</td>
<td>11 28 40 32</td>
<td>20 28 36 36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Economic development oriented</td>
<td>32 22 48 30</td>
<td>17 32 35 33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Sustainable development, environment</td>
<td>3 35 44 21</td>
<td>4 39 41 20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Good governance, anti-corruption, rule of law</td>
<td>12 28 44 28</td>
<td>15 27 41 32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Human rights</td>
<td>3 19 40 41</td>
<td>11 35 38 27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Nationalism, integration, national security</td>
<td>6 26 42 32</td>
<td>2 30 33 36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>Decentralisation and local autonomy</td>
<td>11 27 45 28</td>
<td>5 38 46 16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>Gender issues</td>
<td>1 61 21 18</td>
<td>7 35 29 16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100 26 45 29</td>
<td>100 34 36 30</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Percentage is based on the number of informants’ response.

The issues in question actually can be employed as alternative ways for pro-democracy actors in challenging powerful dominant actors. The lack of focus in issues they employ and the type of communication methods – the pro-democracy actors tend to opt for academic activities, such as reading books and articles, and organizing seminar, (table 4.9) – may be the reasons why alternative actors had less contact with various organizations and media rather than the dominant elites.

Table 4.9. The Method of Communication Alternative Actors 2007

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>Method Of Communication</th>
<th>Powerful Actors (%)</th>
<th>Alternative Actors (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Writing books and articles</td>
<td>6 18</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Performing in the media</td>
<td>29 19</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Attending and giving speeches in public seminars/ meetings</td>
<td>19 23</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Through personal contacts and networks</td>
<td>19 18</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Through organizations and their meetings and contacts</td>
<td>26 22</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Percentage is based on the number of informants’ response. Each informant is allowed to provide 2 answers for each actor.

(3) Limited Organisational method

Meanwhile, we also recall the methods of alternative actors to transform their sources of power which was discussed above (see table 4.7). In this regard we can see that in order to cover their lack of capacity, alternative actors tend to employ populist method in the general meaning of direct contacts between individual leaders and their small organisations and favourable contacts and the institutions they are related to on the one hand and the people. For example, in order to broaden their agenda, alternative actors tend to lobby and contact government officers and politician, as well as influential figures (each 14% and 12%). This is troublesome, as the alternative actors seem to have less interest towards efforts to gain people’s mandate through general election and to gain legitimacy through government institutions (each 3-4%), although they really struggle to establish network and joint coordination as well as to organize the mass.

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66 Populism here does not refer to the strategies of the actors to broaden their involvement with the people, but the ways alternative actors employ to use direct participation in political system. Included in this way are directly contacting powerful figures and government institutions and claiming themselves as the representation of the people. See Olle (2008) Rethinking Popular Representation.
The fact that alternative actors tend to use populist method is likely related to the actors' capacity to use the means of democracy. It is true that the actor's capacity to mobilize and organize people had increased, compare to what our previous research indicated. That capacity seems getting along with methods that are usually applied by the populists, such as using popular and charismatic leaders, alternative patronage, and building networks between independent actors (see table 4.10).

Table 4.10. The Mobilization methods of Alternative Actors in 2003/04 and 2007

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Way to Mobilize and Organize The Alternative Actors</th>
<th>2003/04 (%)</th>
<th>2007 (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Popular and charismatic leaders</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Clientilism</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Alternative patronage</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Networks between independent actors</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Integration from below of popular organizations into more general organisational</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(1) Percentage is based on the number of informants' response
In the 2003-04 survey, the answers comprised of seven options. Yet, each informant is only allowed to pick 3 of them. In 2007 survey, the informants are allowed to pick 2 among 5 options provided for each actor.

Yet, the improving capacity does not mean much when it fails to unite various organizations in basis level. This shows that the pro-democrats have the lack of ability to organize the mass, as they tend to unite people with similar interest (35%) and religious/ethnic group background (17%) rather than those with similar profession or interest (12%) or different rank and structure (9%) and similar origin and domicily (5%)


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Organisational Methods</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Descriptive</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Ethnicity, religion, family, etc.</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Origin and residence (son of the soil identity)</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Hierarchical connecting levels</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Sector, profession</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Visions, ideas, interests</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Personal network</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Percentage is based on the number of informants' response

The weak capacity of alternative actors to organize politics is also reflected by their method to connect with political organizations they considered important. They also prefer to tread save road by joining big national parties that often co opting their constituents rather than establishing alternative local party in basis level or integrating various organizations to support them.67

Our research also indicates that alternative actors tend to pick big, established political party (Golkar 15%, PDIP 9%, PAN, PPP, PKB 12%) when they decide to build alliance with political party. Only some (5%) decides to pick small, alternative parties. This is probably only a matter of strategy to build tactical alliance, similar to their options to join big, national parties (32%) rather than joining small party (15%) or establishing new local parties (13%), when asked about the most effective channel for those who are interested to engage in politics. (See table 4.5. above)

67 This can be seen through the fact that most pro-democracy actors competing in Pilkada-to mention one example-failed, since they did not have sufficient source of power and had not prepared their organizations as political machine and reliable support basis. See, for example our study in Pilkada in Serdang Bedagai, manggarai and East Belitung municipalities, Anton Pradjasto, et.all. (2007). Also, Demos’ Topical researches 2007, op.cit.
Table 4. 13. The major political parties for alternative actors 2007

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Political Parties</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Golkar</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>PDIP</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Hanura, PPRN</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Demokrat</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>PKS</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Major Islamic-based parties (PAN, PPP, PKB)</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Small parties</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Alternatif parties (PPR, PRD, Papernas)</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Percentage is based on the number of informants’ response

The tendency of alternative actors to pick populist method in politics – which shows their weak organisational method – is confirmed by our data on strategy opted by alternative actors in politics. To what governance institutions each actor tend to have contact with in when engaging themselves to politics? Our data shows that most alternative actors contacted the legislatives and the executives (each 28%), then the judiciaries, state-auxiliary bodies, and self-manage unit (each 10%) and bureaucracy (7%).

This may of course is done by way of representation, but a crucial problem occurred when we raised the question on how the pro-democracy actors contacted the governance institutions. Our data shows that most actors directly contact the institutions (28%). Some used NGO, experts, and lobby groups as mediating institutions (11-14%). It becomes a problem when the actors rarely used political party (7%) and interest organization (5%) as alternatives. When the actors needed to contact the legislatives, they tend to exclude the usage of political party (9%).

———

68 What we meant by the governance institution here are certain institutions that manage public matters. Included in these institutions are executives, legislatives, bureaucracy, judiciary, state auxiliary bodies such as Komnas HAM and KPU, cooperatives, and self-help organizations.
Table 4.15. The strategies of alternative actors in the political system and related forms of representation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Governance Institutions</th>
<th>Direct</th>
<th>Mediating Institutions%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>NGOs</td>
<td>People’s Org.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>The judiciary (incl the police)</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>The political executive – (the government)</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>The legislative (e.g. DPRD)</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>The bureaucracy</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>The military</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Auxiliary bodies and institution for subcontracted public governance</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Institutions for self-management (e.g. cooperative)</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(1) Percentage is based on the number of response from informants.
(2) Informants are allowed to pick mostly two options of governance institutions, three ways to contact the institutions both directly and through mediating institutions.

The data shows that although pro-democracy actors have opted to go politics, they prefer to use direct method and put political party and interest organizations aside. The direct method is probably quite often executed individually and informally; which will bring another problem to the future democracy and attempt to promote representation. This can be seen through the fact that the condition of democratic instruments related to direct participation – such as people’s contact and access to public service; government consultation to public and facilitation of direct participation in the making and execution of public policy – remains critical, as we have explained earlier in this chapter. 69.

It is likely that the option of alternative actors to employ direct method in politics reflects their frustration in dealing with the monopolization of the dominant elites. Yet, such a method does not settle problems but create a new one. By opting for direct method via individual leaders, lobby groups etc and good contacts, the alternative actors do not provide solutions for the problem of representation, which is actually the root of all recent problems of democratization.

The data shows that the problems of representation are the biggest problems pro-democracy actors face. Instead of providing alternative options to the running democracy process that had been dominated by dominant elites as we discuss in the previous chapters, the pro-democracy actors seem to drift in the current mainstream. Relying on social and information resources and possessing weakness to link the interests of mass based popular organizations with that of civil

69 See chapter I "a decade of Reformasi: A Wobbling Democracy. It is unfortunate that we do not have any detailed data on the forms of direct representation that are related with various public executive institutions such as democratic institutions for participatory budgeting.
society organizations, pro-democracy actors are helpless. In addition, they also tend to immerse in the top-down situation of their institutions, which rely on clientelism and becoming populist actors that preferred to apply direct method in politics to create a shortcut in settling the problems of representation.\textsuperscript{70}

Our data also indicates the crisis in representation. Along with the emergence of enthusiasm to politics, we attempt to see what institutions people usually go to address their complaint on public matters\textsuperscript{71}. Most people would like to go to media and pressure/lobby groups (32\%), then NGO and informal leaders (28\%) and executive officer/bureaucrats and law enforcement institutions (16\%). As important political institution, political party and members of parliament seem to gain less trust from the people (14\%). It is important to note that interest groups in basis level, which can be part of representative institution, is in the lowest part of the list (only 4\%).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Institutions</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Media, Pressure and Lobby Groups.</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>NGO, Informal Leaders</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Government Officers, bureaucracy, law enforcement institutions</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Political Parties, politicians, parliament</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>State-Auxiliary Bodies (Komnas HAM, KPK, Ombudsman, etc)</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Interest Groups</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Percentage is based on the number of informants’ response*

This phenomenon is actually a picture of acute representation crisis. People – at least the people that our informants know of -- trust NGO, communal groups, and informal leaders more than significant representative institutions, such as interest organization at the basis, political parties legislatives and executives...The low reliance to representative institutions goes to more critical degree rather than what happened in India and Brazil.\textsuperscript{72} In those countries, where democracy still grows, some alternative attempts to increase people’s political participation are still conducted\textsuperscript{73}. Is there any possible solution for this problem of representation?

\textsuperscript{70} The reasons why pro-democracy actors still face similar problems on representation are actually the same. The fragmented mass organizations according to their issues and interest (including donor’s interest) makes the popular organizations fragmented too. In addition, civil society organizations are floating and baseless. To make things worse, pro-democracy actors have a lack of economic and political sources of power. (Executive Report Demos 2004). Also see Olle Tornquist op.cit.

\textsuperscript{71} The data was drawn from the assessment of our informants on public institutions to which the people address their complaints. We did not identify and classify the people in question, like what had been conducted by John Harris (2005 & 2008) that classified the society into middle and lower class in his research on the participation and representation of urban poor in India.

\textsuperscript{72} See, for example John Harris (2005), *Political Participation, Representation, and The Urban Poor, Findings From Research in Delhi*. Also IDS working paper (2007), Peter P. Houzager, et.all, *Associations and The Exercise of Citizenship in New Democracies Evidence From Sao Paulo and Mexico City*.

\textsuperscript{73} In India, particularly in New Delhi, political parties and society figures played important roles to be the media where people may say their complaint – particularly people of the lower class. The members of the lower class usually do not have any capacity to directly face the government. On the other hands, the middle class preferred to directly contact the government or to go to the judiciaries. Such a direct method is also applied by the people in Sao Paulo, Brazil, but it provided alternatives for the establishment of additional representation institutions such as participatory budgeting, special agency for health, etc. See John Harris (2008), "Compromised Democracy: Observation on Popular Democratic Representation from Urban India", in Olle et.al. (2008) Rethinking Popular Representation, op.cit.
The Potential for Improving the Institutions of representation

The crisis of reliance toward representative institutions – which is possibly caused by the less optimum performance of political party and other representation related instruments – actually makes the establishment of independent organization in Indonesia necessary. No matter how critical political parties are, we cannot neglect them. Together with lobby and interest organizations, political parties play important role and function in politics. Thus, it is necessary to reform these institutions or build new, the question is how..

It is true that political participation can be conducted both through direct ways and institutions of representations. The latter is probably not effective given that all people wanted to address their aspiration directly. In addition, it may marginalize the people who are not able to say their aspiration. In this case, it is necessary to establish the institution of representation that functions as media for those who have a lack of capacity to conduct direct participation. In addition, political institutions serve as channels connecting state institutions with the people. Direct participation will cut the relation of these two entities. Even in direct representation it is necessary to establish institutions that facilitates the addressing of people aspiration to political institutions. Such institutions may for instance relate to participatory budgeting or representation of trade unions in advisory boards to the government. There is no direct participation beyond self-representation.74

As agent of change, pro-democracy actors should not neglect problems on representation. As democracy is a political system that requires people’s control over public matters that are based on political equality, then the existence of institutions of representation that are able to run the function of control is badly needed.

Moreover, it is important to strive to establish and strengthen the institutions of representation. Some efforts had been conducted, as shown by our studies on movements conducted by pro-democracy actors to improve popular representation75. We will discuss this attempt in the next chapter.

Conclusion and Some Remaining Problems

Concluding the previous discussion, we identify several options for pro-democracy actors:

- The situation of democratization is better. One indication is that people’s (including women’s) continue to be interested in politics. Moreover, in spite of more cynicism in Indonesia at large than in Aceh, when the political system is more open, (cf. Ch 1 and 2) politics is not primarily understood as something taken care of by elites but at least as a way to gain power.
- As alternative actors that struggle for political equality, pro-democracy actors begin to go politics. They also give priority to democratic instruments, including those related to organised politics, which, thus, shows that they are not marginalized anymore, as the previous research indicated.

Some problems, however, needs to solve:

74 The discussion on the forms of representation and criticisms to them, including the discussion on direct participation, see Ollie (2008), op.cit.
75 Some examples of attempt to link popular organizations and civil society association to political activities are shown by the movement conducted by Forum of Batang Peasants and Fishermen Unity (FP2NB) in Batang, Central Java, Consortium of Broadening People political Participation (KP3R) in Kendari, Muna, and South Konawe, South-East Sulawesi, BP3OPK-Walhi, and other organizations. For further discussion on these attempts to improve popular representation, see The Executive Report of Demos’ Topical Researches (2007) and link project, op.cit.
• For legal and other reasons it remains very difficult for pro-democrats to enter into organised politics. As noticed in previous chapters, the party system in particular is next to fully monopolised by the dominant actors.

• In doing their go politics project, pro democracy actors tend thus to employ direct method; which is more individual and informal. They utilize representative institutions such as political party and interest organisation less. At the same time, our data shows that the condition of direct participation (people's contact and access to public service; government consultation to public and facilitation of direct participation in the making and execution of public policy) remains critical. This shows that there is still problem in pro-democracy actors' strategy. Instead of promoting representation, they prefer to take populist shortcuts.

• The opted strategy (populist shortcut) seems to connect with pro-democracy actors' limited capacity. Our data on the matter implies that it is necessary to improve pro-democracy actors' capacity, particularly on political organizing (including managing economic resources and strengthening mass at the basis).

• The weak method of mass organizing and mobilisation, marked by the reliance on organizing people with similar vision and interests, as well as ethnicity and religious background; and the incapability to build mass basis reveal the floating characteristic of alternative actors and their incapability to aggregate people's broader interests.

• The way of direct method employed by pro-democracy actors should be accompanied by attempts to promote representative institution. It is true that political parties and some other representative institutions had not yet functioned well; which creates options and challenge for pro-democracy actors to improve democracy in Indonesia.

• Regarding the emergence of enthusiasm to politics and public's low reliance to representative institutions, better political organizing is clearly needed. In addition, this is also opportunities for democratic movement in Indonesia to establish true organizations.

* * *
Chapter 5
CRAFTING REPRESENTATION?

The result of the 1st Demos’ National Survey (2003-2004) and the 2nd (2007) reveals that the situation of political representation in the process of democracy in Indonesia remains problematic. Our informants in both of the survey strongly affirmed this situation through their assessments to several instruments of democracy. The instruments related to representation are included in the 11 worst instruments, as seen in the following Table 5.1.

Several instruments of democracy in favour of political representation are related with the performance of party, such as membership-based control of parties, and responsiveness and accountability of parties and political candidates to their constituencies, reflection of vital issues and interests among people by political parties and or candidates, parties and candidates’ ability to form and run government, independence of money politics and powerful vested interest by political parties and or candidates, and freedom to form parties on the national or local levels (or teams of independent candidates) that can recruit members, and participate in elections. The following instruments are also related to representation: all social groups’ – including marginalised groups – extensive access to and participation in public life, and direct participation (People’s direct access and contact with the public service and government’s consultation of people and when possible facilitation of direct participation in policy making and the execution of public decision).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>RIGHTS AND INSTITUTIONS (1)</th>
<th>Index 2007</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>The transparency and accountability of the military and police to elected government and the public</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Reflection of vital issues and interests among people by political parties and or candidates</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Government independence from foreign intervention (except UN conventions and applicable international law)</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Membership-based control of parties, and responsiveness and accountability of parties and or political candidates to their constituencies</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>All social groups’ – including marginalised groups – extensive access to and participation in public life</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Parties and or candidates ability to form and run government</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>The capacity of the government to combat paramilitary groups, hoodlums and organised crime</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Direct participation (People’s direct access and contact with the public services and government’s consultation of people and when possible facilitation of direct participation in policy making and the execution of public decisions)</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Independence of money politics and powerful vested interests by political parties and or candidates</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Good corporate governance</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Freedom to form parties on the national or local levels (or teams of independent candidates) that can recruit members, and participate in elections.</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(1) The instruments in italic are those that are related to representation.

We may perceive this situation as the result of the monopoly of political system by powerful actors that dominate political parties, interest groups and lobby groups. In the meantime most alternative actors focused themselves to direct participation and employed populist shortcut rather than building democratic representation through organizing politics. Therefore, although the distance between alternative actors and political system is getting closer, this is not automatically improving the situation of representation.

Out of the data we collected and analysed in this survey, we also identified some phenomena reflecting the attempts of democrats to improve representation. There are three most prominent attempts, which some of them have become the subject of other separated research conducted by
Demos. The first group employed institutional or elitist crafting to improve or strengthen democratic institutions such as parliament, party system and election system. Among this group are NDI, NIMD and International IDEA through party assistance and comparative studies between parties from different countries.

The second group attempts to reform party both by doing it from within and from top to down – establishing alternative parties. In doing the latter, some activists combine it with popular mass organising, by way of populist measures or alternatives work, like what Budiman Sudjatmiko in PDI-P, Papernas, and PPR do.

The third group establishes direct representative institutions that are connected to certain organs or commissions in government institutions, for example through participatory budgeting. Included in this group are the activists of civil organisation that conduct self representation through peasant organisations, labour unions, and establish political contract and/or dialog with local government.

### Improving, or just Polishing?

It is undoubtedly true that law reform is important to improve political system, including party system. Law reform surely has significant impact, as indicated by the implementation of multi-party system following the ratification of Law No.2/1999. The system was expected to reduce the domination of old dominant elite, the left legacy of the New Order, in political party and election, as well as in political system as a whole.

Ironically, parties emerging afterwards looked like institutions running industries, in which strong people that have resources (access to economic and non-economic resources) have power over parties' 'stock market' and adapt to system change. This is ironic, as multiparty system was formerly striven for by democracy activist, but could not be used to build a more meaningful democracy. Why does this happen?

This proves that it is actually not enough to rely only on crafting democratic institutions. There is one important thing but remained neglected in attempts to reform the system: that improving both election and party system does not merely concern with some technical things, such as party number or election mechanism. Furthermore, improving such systems means improving power relation that have been so far imbalance and dominated by certain powerful groups.

We should realise that some institutions and actors have the capacity to use and promote or avoid and bend the rules and regulations that are supposed to promote democracy. Because the institutions have the lack of capacity and the people itself are not capable to use and promote the instruments of democracy, then the elites monopolise the instruments. This is to say that it is important to craft institutions, but far more important to improve the capacity of some institutions and the people to establish better popular representation.

We should also realize that the “crafting” business will primarily involve parliament and government and the experts that they call on, as well as the most resourceful lobbyists, which are dominated by powerful actors. In some cases, some experts involving in the reform become the part of the actors' lobby and legitimacy power. The institutions having authority to ratify “the change of the system” also have interest in the content of the crafting. Therefore, “drafting” and “proposing” (law reform)

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The researches are Link Project that studies activist attempts to link social movement with political process, and Olle Tornquist's research that studies how various organizations and democratic movements strive to scale up their movements in three dimensions, namely issues, constituent/basis and geographical scope.
are clearly not enough, without other supporting efforts, such as strategy to mobilise important alternative actors and emphasis power relation reform as the substantial matter of the reform, especially to de-monopolise system and providing spaces for more alternative political power.

The local party policy implemented in Aceh should provide lesson on the possibility of organizing democratic politics in local level. The experience of Aceh has not so far generated negative effect such as separatism or devastating ethnich and religious conflicts. On the contrary, local democratic political organizing can supports peace process and the establishment of country wide political community, as discussed in chapter 2.

Therefore, rather than spending so much energy to debate on the numbers of party, we consider that local party may serve as one of many alternatives, although further discussion on some matters related is necessary. In fact, institutional crafting supporters had not considered this. They act differently, not to mention inconsistently, by lessening, limiting or ‘rationalising’ the number of allowed political party through strict party establishment requirement and electoral threshold, while perfecting the existing party.

Limiting the number of party means hindering the emergence of alternative political power. It is clear that big, powerful parties are the most advantaged ones in the matter of party number limitation. They want to push aside their competitors and prevent the emergence of new competitors. The main idea is to establish ‘the politics of order’, a more stable, simple, and demanding less finance politics, as discussed in chapter 3. Surprisingly, this idea is actually supported by some activists and academician who fed up with the performance of the parties. Their argument is actually confirmed by the research result of TI (Indonesia Transparency) that shows people’s decreased trust to political party.

The attempt to improve the performance of the existing party - without considering new party as alternative power - became more prominent when those believing on the importance of institutional crafting organised trainings for politicians and political parties. The trainings aimed to improve the effectiveness of political party in executing their functions. Without undermining the importance of the improvement of party’s performance, we argue that this approach is more managerial in nature and excluding the attempt to strengthen the party in grass root level. It is true, that none among those supporting the idea of institutional crafting supported the domination of certain figure in the political system. Yet, they commonly did not emphasize their attempts on popular control, but on elitist ways by delegating the improvement of party’s performance to the actors within the party.

In addition, the attempts to implement pure presidentialism, among others through direct election have not yet performed its success to promote representation. In addition, direct election, which has been conducted since 2005 and aimed to elect president to local heads has not been able to de-monopolise elite domination either, as shown by the following indications. First, the current political parties that monopolise the system still become important actors dominating the process of nomination; second, only certain people –clearly those with power and access to several political

77 The new soon to be ratified Law suggest strict requirement of party establishment. A party should have regional chapters in 60% of the number of provinces in Indonesia, 50% of the number of municipality in the province in question, and 25% of the number of sub districts in the municipality in question. It is hard for alternative parties to fill this requirement, as they have limited fund and facilities.

78 Up to the presidency of Megawati, the president was elected by MPR. While Yudhoyono and Kalla were elected through direct election, so that president is not under the power of parliament anymore, and thus, has stronger legitimacy. The parliament cannot impeach the president before his period ends. The implementation of the presidential system is expected to create political stabilisation, as the part of the spirit of “politics of order” discussed in Chapter 3.
and economic resources – that are able to be candidates. Ideally, direct election should actually be able to open more opportunities for the emergence of alternative actors and broadened people participation.

Third, the requirement of 3% to 6.5% support from the number of population for individual candidates to be able to nominate himself/herself. As an attempt to mitigate the domination of party in Pilkada, the decision of Constitutional Court is quite positive. Such a requirement is not realistic enough to support the emergence of alternative leaders from below. The numbers are too big and the period when it is possible to mobilise signatories is too short. Only the already resource and powerful can manage.

As a consequence, the system will also require much energy and time of the KPUDs to conduct candidate verification. Other countries applying similar system even do not set the requirement this high. Although the formulation of the requirements of individual candidates still proceeds, we may conclude that this method is not sufficient enough to promote representation.

Fourth, the direct election is not accompanied by clear presentation of program and interest by candidates. This suggests the practice of shallow politics, which has certain form, but actually vulnerable inside. The direct election initially aimed to cut the distance between candidates and voters as well as constituents. In fact, the method had intensified the practice of local patronage politics, as occurred in Makassar and Ternate.

This chapter, however, will not condemn the attempt of institutional crafting. We only want to emphasize that our main duty is not polishing party system, or reforming election system, but opening broader opportunities and improving the capacity of politically marginalised people, so that

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79 The simple and clear example is the fact that figures dominating the Presidential election and DPD member election in 2004 were commonly military retirees (Agum Gumelar, Wiranto, SBY) and figures of the New Order (Jusuf Kalla, Hamzah Haz, Siswono Yudohusodo). In addition, 30% of candidates in 2005-2006 Pilkada was incumbents.

80 Kompas, 6 March 2008.

81 There are two terms to describe individual candidate. First, “calon perseorangan” (individual candidate) and second, “calon independen” (independent candidate). The basic difference between the two lied in the perspective. Although both terms refer to the candidates that are not nominated by political party, individual candidate clearly refers to those with any background. While the independent candidate clearly refers to non-party background. We prefer to use individual candidate, since many criticism that emerged after the issue of independent candidate became popular led to a question whether it would automatically open the space for alternative actors to get in. The dominant elites might also use the opportunity both in national and local level. Moreover, the activists struggling for democratization and the people in general had not been able to improve their capacity to make use the opportunity.

82 In some countries such as Albania, England (London) and Bulagary, the number of support for ones running in city mayor election is around 150, 330, and 550, or one third of the whole number of voters. In order to be able to run in governor election in the state of Illinois, Alabama, and Missouri in United States, ones need to gather support from 1 to 5% of the number of voters, not of population. In Canada and South Africa, ones even only requires 50-100 voters’ signatures in each electoral area. In Aceh, ones only require 3% support from the whole number of population in 50% of the level of administrative region the candidate nominate himself/herself. Source: Data of Cetro’s Research and Development.

83 Based on our general observation to the Pilkada since the middle of 2006 to now, we conclude that almost no candidates presented concrete program in their campaigns. Most of them brought the issue of ‘putra daerah’, ethnicity, religion even kinship as rationale to vote for them.

84 The conflicts happened in the regions are caused by conflicted Gubernatorial Pilkada, in this case, the election of governor and vice governor in South Sulawesi and Northern Maluku. The conflict began when one candidate was disappointed of his lost. The mass who supported the lost candidate forced both Central and Local Commission of elections to issue certain decision that they wanted. Yet, the problems even get more complicated as it involved Supreme Court (Mahkamah Agung) and The Ministry of Internal Affair. Until this article was written, the conflict of election in Northern Maluku had not yet settled. The supporting mass came to Jakarta and there was a possibility that this conflict will be settled in the presidential level.
they will be able to organise themselves and participate in political process. Once again, the experience of Aceh can be the examples that popular organising and interest based organisation must come first, so that the direct election can be optimally used.

**Joining, Taking Over and Reforming Party**

Attempts to reform party – both from within by joining and establishing alternative party – is underlain by the need to conduct political organization. The political organizing is aimed to facilitate issue and interest aggregation as well as establish broader cooperation among various social groups. Going beyond from institutional crafting supporters, the ones in this category have perspective on the change of power relation.

They realize that it is necessary to establish a majority power to win election. Then we also found that each activist applied his/her own method. For example, Budiman Sudjatmiko preferred to join PDIP, an effort executed by other civil associations and social organizations as ‘diaspora action’. Other example is an experiment by POR Pancur Kasih to take over PNBK official body in local level. In addition, Papernas also attempts to utilize ‘leftist ideology’ and national (rather than scattered localised) organisation to unite some groups and people, as well as organize critical mass. Last but not least, PPR established a party based on their affiliated agrarian based social organisation, including several popular oriented NGOs. PPR aims to facilitate more rooted political participation, in which people organisations and NGOs are able to participate in formulating party’s policies, including nominate their candidates.

Each experience provides us lessons to learn. *First*, all attempts mentioned previously failed to prevent political fragmentation, particularly when it came to the matter of gaining votes. It often happens that one party’s support basis is coincided with others’. What mostly occurred then is basis claiming. For activists who conduct diasporic action, most fragmentation happened when other pro-democracy organizations/activists are suspicious on the activist’s motive in joining political party. They particularly feared of being intervened by party. The party they joined with also become suspicious and considers him/her outsider.

The experiences of the Philippines and India revealed that fragmentation happened among CSOs, NGOs and people organizations produced disunity and weakness. In the Philippines, the fragmentation among Maoist even changed into violent conflicts. In some cases, such fragmentation is unavoidable. Yet, we hope that it will not happen in Indonesia.

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85 The priority of the organizing process also covers the improvement of the quality and representativeness of the organisation. We do not decline the fact that interest organisation such as Labour Union can be trapped in elitism, where the leaders of organisation dominate the process of decision making, and personal contacts are supreme than membership.

86 Diaspora action is conducted by activists we study in Link Project Research. Activists of 98 movement (those who had worked since 1990s and actively involve in anti-Soeharto movement) also commonly conduct this attempt.

87 POR Pancur Kasih in West Kalimantan has taken over the leadership of its Sekadau chapter.

88 What we mean by leftist ideology is the one close to marxism. Papernas continues the struggle of Popor (Partai Oposisi Rakjat/People’s Opposition Party), new party that was established to counter the stigma of communist directed to PRD. Yet, Papernas recently face similar stigma. Therefore, they established new party, PPBI (Partai Persatuan Bangsa Indonesia/Indonesian Unity Party) with Dominggus as its leader. Yet both did not pass the verification conducted by The Ministry of Law and Human Rights.

89 For example in pilkada in Serdang Bedagai there is a conflict over support basis between ORI (the supporters of Sukirman who also had conflict with BITRA, Sukirman’s organization) and PP (the supporters of Purba). Both are organizations that are well rooted in the grass root. In fact, Chapter 4 shows that the number of mass power utilized by alternative actors as one of sources of power is limited. Then, it will become worse when it had to be broken into several organizations/political parties.
Second, there is a tendency that some activists only focus their attention to their own group, instead of reaching broader issues and interests as political party. For example, Papernas is dominated by PRD activists, while PPR concerns most to agrarian issues. In order to survive within national oriented party system, the activists must be able to mobilize support from many social groups, which is not limited to their groups, who already have high level awareness of political participation. They have to broaden their constituent basis and include marginal people outside their group.

Third, the risk to get lost or trapped in elite political culture. Such a risk is commonly faced by activists who conduct diasporic action, because they do not have sufficient bargaining position. In addition, they often face choices of whether they have to be faithful to their party or to their original basis. To solve this problem, it is probably necessary to establish a clear responsibility mechanism between cadres/activists working within dominant actors’ parties and their original basis/organisations. Of course, this does not apply only to the diasporists, but also to alternative parties. Thus, this matter shows the importance of mature/settled political organising.

Fourth, still related to political organising, the experience of Papernas and PPR has revealed the weakness in strategies to generate financial support and manage effective political machine. This is probably the reason why some groups conducted diasporic action. But those who attempt to take over parties in local level nevertheless face similar obstacle. To make things worse, they have to deal with the intervention from the central level-party leaders which are dominated by dominant elites. Taking over parties in local level clearly does not require as much as fund as to establish new party. Yet, they still face some obstacles to fund party’s activities and the fact that the political machine they take over is not yet well established.

Fifth, among all of those attempts presented previously, there has not been a blueprint or strategy to solve the problems of representation, such as how to combine political works with advocacy activities, institutionalisation of direct participation, drawing party’s framework from general principles by considering class based interest, and involving the women, rather than merely nominating and supporting certain popular figures.

History shows that the attempt to produce popular leader eventually went bankrupt, as happened to the case of Estrada in the Philippines or may happen with Hugo Chavez in Venezuela (they are subordinated by strong popular leaders and by their own interest). There are actually few signs that activists attempt to learn from this lesson. Actually, there is a long tradition in Indonesia since the war of liberation, that local strongmen – including among radical youth – act as spearheading popular leaders with their own followers rather than as leaders of organisations within which members at least to some extent keep their leaders accountable in accordance with jointly decided rules. Interestingly, this was also the tradition that the few elitist communist leaders who attempted at changing the relations of power through the September 30 movement in 1965.

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90 The fact that PPR concerns with agrarian issue does not automatically reveals the party’s ideology. On the contrary, they seem to search it. PPR deliberately make themselves ideologically and organisationally floating to handle the work of coordination, administration and alternative political machine building for CSO, social movement and people organisation. PPR is particularly supported by people organisations. Thus, PPR struggles for more specific, local issues. They actually have not yet formulated broader agenda.

91 As what happened when PKI leaders become the subordination of Soekarno by establishing The Board of Revolution (Dewan Revolusi). See John Roosa, Pretext for mass Murder. The September 30th Movement and Suharto's Coup D'Etat in Indonesia, Wiaconsin: the University of Wisconsin Press 2006.
Direct participation: cutting out procedure, but not automatically democratic

Other possible attempt to promote popular representation is establishing representative institution that enables the people to directly interfere government institutions or part of government institution, rather than establishing political party or other political organisation. Such attempt can be embodied in the form of participatory budgeting, political contract and dialogue. FAKTA, Forum Warga, ATMA and UPC are those who practice this method. They do not focus on political organising, but facilitating mechanism or procedure of formal communication between the government and the people on more specific issues.

This method has several advantages. Grassroots have access to direct participation, local spaces are utilized, the institution is open, non-partisan, plural and liberal. Such an institution is also established on the basis of more concrete issues, such as the performance of local government, issues of corruption, collusion and nepotism. The method to establish such institution is expected to prevent representation distortion and to involve non-party organizations as well. Thus, marginalized people, including women, will be more interested to participate.

The efforts, however, failed to improve the quality of the means of representation in general and specific data on direct participation shows poor picture (the index is 40). Moreover, there is a lack of concern on how to mobilize and involve the people. In addition, the efforts also neglect the issue of power relation, as the institutions were commonly established under the ‘top’s initiative, not by people participation.92

As the institutions emphasize on individual roles, then it is possible that it is dominated by certain group’s or community interest. As what happened to Forum Warga, which is dominated by the Moslem community of NU, or Baileo that focuses on adat community. It does not fully refer to negative connotation. When the institutions are dominated by Human Rights activists, then non-human rights issues will be neglected. If the majority of the people are moslem, then there is a risk of non-moslem’s interests neglection – at least as long as in this case the Muslims are not asking for equal civic right but rather favourable communal treatment. This also shows that direct representative institutions do not automatically support pluralism in its ultimate meaning, that all the people, despite of their background and status, are able to use the institution.

Out of direct representative institutions mentioned before, some people organizations also attempt to channel their aspiration directly, for example labour union, peasant organizations, religious community. Like other direct representative institutions that tend to limit their issues, these organizations also have the risk to be isolated from other movements in the society.

Nothing is wrong with direct representation of various interests and concerned groups or experts and others, but for a democracy to develop this direct forms have to be institutionalised to guarantee clearly defined demos with equal rights, accountability etc. according to the general principles of democracy. And the direct forms as such have to be combined and compromised with universal popular sovereignty, not just by special groups and interests – all of which calls for representation

92 It is true that most democratic forms of alternative direct representation have been introduced from above, such as by the mayor’s office in Porto Alegre or the State Planning Board in Kerala – but this is the result of long and extensive popular organising to get genuine representatives election to then introduce such measures in a consistent way. It happens differently in Indonesia, where the initiatives come from NGO activists without popular organising from below. Ironically, the indication of top-down initiatives is strengthened by the execution of direct representation as a part of deliberative politics proposed by donors such as Ford Foundation o World Bank. See also Politicising Democracy.
Another form of direct representation is direct intervention through political contract with members of parliament or government. Adat or religious communities usually apply this method, and commonly demanded more specific rights such as land rights or enactment of syaria. Such a method is also conducted by activists who do not work for adat community or religious community before local election.

Beside the tendency to struggle on specific issue, other direct intervention’s main weakness is great dependency to dominant actors, such as certain candidate, politician or government, rather than to organisations that offer political contract. Therefore, it is possible for one actor to make various kinds of political contracts with some people organizations, either they are pro-democratic or not. This implies that both CSOs and social organizations have not yet had high bargaining position. With the lack of bargaining position and weak representation institutionalization, it is absolutely difficult to watch the execution of political contract.

Discussing the various forms of direct representation, we believe that it is necessary to bond all of attempts and efforts into a broader democratic political framework. Some improvements are clearly necessary to politically facilitate representative institutions, as it is not enough only to establish communication system between the people and the government or to limit the scope of social movement in community level. Representation has broader agenda that embraces more people and interests, so that it will be possible to establish major political power. By applying this method we expected on the emergence of alternative political power.

Conclusions and Recommendations
Although the situation of representation remains poor, we are happy to report that some progress does occur. Several democrats have attempted on: 1) crafting rules and regulation; 2) reforming party, and 3) trying to institutionalise direct representation. However, those attempts are not accompanied by efforts to build the capacity of ordinary people and to develop popular sovereignty, so that it seems that this attempt leave constituents alone.

The main weakness of elitist crafting lies on its elitist approach. It tends to put any attempt to generate changes to the elites’ hands, including party elites that often become the part of the problems. In addition, this method excludes the perspective on the power relation and interest, so that has a lack of purpose to demonopolise the elites. As a result, institutional crafting tends to merely polish the existing system or institutions, and increase the capacity of actors that are also dominant elites, rather than increase the political capacity of the people.

They also monopolise the political system, particularly party politics. In doing so, they lobby and approach various interest groups, and even cooperate with international institutions. Unfortunately, what often considered as solution to this is fixing the existing democratic institution, particularly political party. There has not been any consideration to elite’s monopoly to the institutions in question.

Aside from that, the weaknesses of party reform are: 1) the ability of this method to prevent fragmentation among pro-democracy activist is questionable an doubtful, 2) there is no clear mandate between cadres/party activists with their constituents, or between party and its supporting organisations, 3) the political organising is not effective, which particularly related to recruitment of member, financing of the party, the extension of basis and the creation of party as effective political

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93 As what happened in Pilkada Jakarta, where UPC and Fakta had political contracts with different candidates.
machine in election. With such weakness, the new alternative parties are not yet capable to compete with dominant ones.

Lastly, the attempt to institutionalise direct participation also has basic weaknesses. Those who has contract with the elites tend to take the existing power relation for granted. In addition, the deliberative process and individual participation have not yet generated clear democratic form within the forum. Nothing is wrong with direct representation of various interests and concerned groups or experts and others, but for a democracy to develop this direct forms have to be institutionalised to guarantee clearly defined demos with equal rights, accountability etc. according to the general principles of democracy. And the direct forms as such have to be combined and compromised with universal popular sovereignty, not just by special groups and interests – all of which calls for representation.

Although all forms of attempts to promote participations had attained their own achievements, we have to admit that they are not sufficient to solve the main problems of representation, i.e. how to demonopolise the elites. The promotion of representation will be fruitful when the power relation is changed, when the monopoly of dominant elite in political system is deconstructed first. It is also necessary to facilitate democratic popular control with new creativity and innovation to cover the weaknesses of the experiments, or else, democracy will stumble.

Therefore, we recommend some important points based on various experiments conducted by pro-democracy actors to promote representation.

1) It is important to consider framework about power relation, that efforts to improve representation must aim to reform power relation that is dominated by elite (elite demonopolisation).
2) Putting clear mandate between activist/cadre with constituent or organisation basis, so that the former will not leave the latter alone.
3) Formulating strategies to manage self-financial support and to conduct strong political organising.
4) Attempting to embrace interests of more people, including marginalized people, out of organisation’s constituents through applying more general, broader issue that cover broader interest, particularly the formulation of empirical ideology as party’s basic statue.

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Chapter 6
SUMMARY

A Decade of Reformasi: Unsteady Democratization

It has been a decade of democratization since the fall of Soeharto in 1998. How do we assess the journey? In what aspects do progress, stagnancy and deterioration exist?

The recent findings of Demos’ survey (2007) indicates on the improvement in the situation of democracy, as the democratic system had worked as country wide political framework. The general picture has clearly shown that the democratization in Indonesia in the resent decade had successfully produced formal regulations and various norms and informal arrangements that are supportive to democratic political system. Democracy has been considered as a common system, and political language does not use authoritarian lexicon anymore. Democracy has also been widely accepted in public life.

In short, democracy has functioned quite well as a country wide political framework, replacing authoritarian political system. At this point the optimist view is that we are in the middle of point of no return situation, where democracy moves ahead, little by little, toward progress. After dramatic improvement of civil and political rights occurred in the first years of democratization, another follows: some democratic instruments related to governance also improved. Around 900 of our informants noted that such improvement included eradication of corruption, government’s transparency and accountability, the subordination of government officials before the law, the enactment of rule of law, and the capacity to combat organized crime. It is important to note that the improvement of those aspects is significant, compared to the result of our previous survey (2003-2004, and 2004-2005) that suggested on the poor performance of those instruments. Now, as the instruments have better performance, the deficit gap is not as wide as five or four years ago. Yet, is it true that the deficit has indeed ended?

In fact, the situation is not that perfect. Our research in 2007 also shows another story that the project of reform in Indonesia through democratization still faces many obstacles, some are even fundamental. The following points describe the situation in detail.

First, democratization had ever emerged a hope that change might be generated through broad political participation. After ten years, it is unfortunate the people in general, as assessed by our informants, tend to perceive politics cynically. There is a sense of cynicism when politics is understood as practice to take over elitist power, a world of manipulation, or merely a career path to get faster vertical mobilization to get more power. The number of those who understand politics in negative sense is very high, around 80%, compared to those who perceive politics in positive way, as public control over power (14%). Such a response is probably related to the fact that elites have dominated politics in Indonesia; and that the practice of elitist politics never becomes the concern of common people. In other words, the people seem to expect politics that are relevant to their real, daily life.

Second, at this point, pro-democracy actors have to work harder to fulfill the public expectation. This is related to the fact that the attempts to promote the instruments of democracy in favor of the fulfillment of social and economical rights – the instruments that are assumed to have high relevance with people’s real problems – are not yet sufficient. There are some proofs indicating the existence of efforts to improve the instruments; particularly in regard to rights of the children, rights to employment, social security and basic needs, and right to basic education. Yet, these
improvements are not yet significant and after the survey that have been several reports of malnutrition and even cases of starvation. In other words, to make democracy more meaningful is to make it functional for people to improve their economic conditions. It must be admitted that this will invite more complicated problem. Not only because Indonesia undergoes ‘the second series of economical crisis’, which most economists deem as more acute rather than monetary crisis in 1997, but also because most economic policies are neo-liberal oriented that serve the interest of market and capital, but not the people.

Third, the development of the infrastructure of democracy had not yet completed. The institutionalization of democracy has not yet covered all aspects, while informal arrangements – customs, values, norms – actually are not necessarily against democracy. Therefore, rather than saying that democracy has failed, and not suitable for Indonesia, it is better to continue the process of democratization. The situation nevertheless becomes paradoxical, as the dominant elite is doing “the consolidation of oligarchic democracy”, a phenomenon that is marked by the practice of politics of order and the blocking of formal democracy to popular representation.

Fourth, although democracy has now been accepted as a country wide political framework and system, representation becomes the most acute problem. No substantial progress occurred in the three dimensions of representation: party based political representation, civil association and social movement based interest representation and direct participation. Democracy will remain the playground of oligarchic elites, as long as agenda of democratization fail to cover the three dimensions. This phenomenon is clearly protuberant within the recent party system in Indonesia.

Fifth, the threat to the fundamental aspects of democracy is not only indicated by the deterioration of various civil freedoms, such as freedom of religion and freedom of speech and organisation. Remarkably, the index for freedom to form parties both in national and local level rapidly even decreases from 71 to 40, putting it in the rank of 22nd from the 3rd. Other aspect that is not less fundamental are related to the independency of the state from foreign intervention. The condition of this instrument, which was worse, is now stagnant. This is quite frustrating, as the intervention of global capital goes deeper up to the local level.

Sixth, it is true that powerful actors are now more integrated to the system of democracy. Their roles to use and promote the instruments of democracy are getting significant. Their movements are supported by party political machine and strong economical resources – the fruit of the nexus of economy and political relation inherited from the previous regime. On the other hand, the capacity of alternative actors is not adequate to decolonize and demonopolise political system from the domination of oligarchic elites. They tend to rely on scattered mass, without sufficient economic resources, fragmented and politically marginalised.

After a decade, there are some progresses, as well as deterioration and stagnancy in the democratization in Indonesia. Some fundamentals of democracy are in acute condition, neglected, and that is why without progress. One of them are instruments related to representation. In addition, there are many agendas of democracy institutionalization that are not yet fully executed, putting them into as informality and uncertainty. On the other hand, pro-democracy actors had not yet succeeded to increase their capacity to demonopolise the oligarchy, amidst the more intensive integration of powerful actors in political system. To generally conclude, although Indonesia’s democracy has worked and function, it is wobbling and uneasy.
Country Wide Political Community: Under the Shadow of Local Communalism?

Our data suggests that a country wide political framework for democratization in Indonesia has actually been available. It has also worked quite well. The framework has even succeeded in generating effective solution for the conflicts in Aceh, so that this region stays as the integral part of Indonesia. On the other hand, democracy is useful to settle acute separatist conflict, such as one in Aceh. Although democracy has not yet proven to be similarly effective for the conflicts in Ambon and Poso, it is unfair to say that democracy has failed. Our data indicates that democracy is not much employed to settle some recent cases.

The country wide political framework for democracy can be found in the people’s self identification when participating in national election. There are three identifications that gained high number of percentage, namely as the residents of Indonesia (34%), as members of political party (24%), and members of social class (8%). This shows the existence of the basis of national identity for democratic political communities in Indonesia.

Yet, an important note is necessary to make. When the informants are asked to assess how the people identify themselves in some contexts of local politics, we found that the shadow of local communalism lurked from behind. In a special local situation like pilkada (local election), for example, 51% of the informants assessed that the people tend to identify themselves as local residences, 23% as members of ethnic community. Ethnic-based identification is getting stronger in the situation of local conflict, as 36% of our informants assessed. Similarly, responding to the issue of administrative division, 26% of our informants also believe that most people will pick similar identification.

Identification as members of religious community tend to become stronger in the framework of local conflicts\textsuperscript{94}, as 12% of our informants assessed. This is more than in relation to local elections (pilkada) (only 4%) and in responding to the issue of administrative division\textsuperscript{95}. Yet, in the context of local conflict, the religion-based identification is less lower than ethnic-based identification (36%) or even class based identification (22%).

The sentiments of local communalism, which is particularly based on ethnic difference that coincided with religion and class differences, are likely to shadow the democratic political network in local level. Moreover, amidst the weak local civil power, as indicated by some studies on local politics (Nordholt, 2004; Sidel, 2004; Klinken, 2006), local political communities, including political parties, often fall into various practice of patronage politics and closed, exclusionary patrimonialism.

This is the structural reason on the importance of the opening of new democratic political spaces with national political framework in local level. Once again, learning from the lesson from Aceh, a national democratic political framework is the only way to settle local conflicts. Blocking the democratic national intervention to local conflicts will only trigger the emergence of communalism that is based on the politics of identity.

\textsuperscript{94} Conflicts over land or access of economy between people groups, kampung residents fight, conflicts between devotees of certain political patron with others, conflict between peasants and businessmen in the case of land confiscation are examples of the local conflicts.

\textsuperscript{95} What we mean by administrative division here is division of region, in the level of municipality or province, of which residents demand to have their own administrative arrangements.
What remained as problem is the lack of local political organisations with democratic, opened orientation, which work across ethnic, religion and class boundary. The numbers of institutions that function to channels people’s aspiration in local level are limited. The high number of civil organizations that are based on ethnic groups and religions clearly is not sufficient to defend the equality of rights. Therefore, there must be a way to promote and open broader space for the emergence of democratic political organizations. These organizations are then expected to be able to channel people’s aspiration and reduce ethnic and religious conflicts in local level.

Above all, we have to realize that local politics is getting important in the aftermath of decentralisation and regional autonomy implementation. Yet, this process actually goes along with the raid of globalisation to Indonesia. In this context, this is the time to test the democratic political framework in the level of sub-state, with the new setting of ‘localisation of politics’; which is when politics become globally/locally constructed.

Under globalisation and the emergence of what so called as "new politics", local politics becomes an arena opened for competition between global economic forces and socio-political forces that are based on local identity and the politics of identity. The capital often cooperated with communal interests that are based on the politics of identity. Neoliberal globalisation is only interested in expanding their global economic interest in local level. It also makes local politics goes hand in hand with the agenda of privatisation; which resulted on the destruction of public spheres.

In both of the contexts, how is it then possible to intensify democratization in local level? How is it possible to promote local democratization that is based on citizenship-politics when the nationhood and national citizenship seems irrelevant under the emergence of political localisation and economic globalisation? These are new challenges that, unfortunately, have not been mapped in this research.

**The Consolidation of Oligarchic Democracy – Towards Politics of Order?**

As mentioned in the beginning of this chapter, one of vulnerable fundamentals of democracy in Indonesia is political representation. Why does it happen? Our data indicates that instruments of political representation, particularly political parties, are being used more by powerful actors rather than by alternative actors. If this data is related to other stating that political parties do not truly reflect the aspiration of the people, and that competition to gain power through political parties is dominated by money politics, we may conclude that the poor z

The standard of the system of political representation is closely related to the colonisation of organised politics by powerful actors.

The fact that the system of political representation is in critical condition is confirmed by people’s opinion – as our informants had assessed – that politics is something taken care by the elites (29%), and aimed to gain power (54). Thus, we may understand why legislative institutions generated from the election are often considered as the arena for the elites to compete rather than as representative institution. How does this happen? What happen with the system of political representation in Indonesia?

To understand this phenomenon, our data provides bigger pictures of related factors. *First*, the instruments of representation are mostly neglected by pro-democracy actors. Instead of promoting them, the actors in question prefer to make a shortcut as alternative. *Second*, although both alternative and powerful actors at least use the instruments of representation, especially the latter are not good at promoting them. This must be part of the explanation for why among 11 instruments of democracy that perform worst, 7 are related to the aspects of representation – i.e.
all indicators of representation minus the abstention from abusing religion and ethnicity by parties and candidates and elections as such, which are ranked 17th and 2nd respectively.

Third, poor representation is both a product of elite dominance and a system sustaining and even enhancing it into oligarchic power. It is true that the current powerful elites are not limited to the old centralised oligarchs that have survived the fall of Suharto. Our data clearly point to the localisation and widening of the elite – and to the fact that it increases its dependence on politics. The latter dependence on politics indicates that substantial parts of the more extensive new elite relies on elections. This in turn explains why according to the informants many of the powerful actors in Indonesia cannot be categorised as anti-democratic in clear cut manner. Rather, a substantial part of the broader new elite emerge from the system of democracy, adapt to it, and slickly utilise it to promote their own interests.

On the one hand this as good news for democracy – important elements of it make sense for large parts of the elite, not just for alternative actors who want to alter the relations of power. However, the extended elites tend to monopolise the political system! That is why we talk of oligarchic democracy, in-spite of the fact that the oligarchy is extended. Moreover, and worse: the monopolisation of organised politics and the growing cynicism over ‘rotten politics’ and representation in particular, including among middle class groups and parts of the elite that have lost its hegemonic position and can not win elections, tend to breed ideas that democracy is expensive, promote corruption, identity politics and conflicts among other bad things in life. Partly this is true, but only because democracy is monopolised. Unfortunately, these are perspectives that have many time given rise to quests for ‘politics of order’ – i.e. for ‘strong institutions’ ahead of popular sovereignty.

Some prominent trends has clearly indicated that oligarchic elites are actually preparing to make democracy even more closed from popular participation and instruments to serve their own interests.

(1) The oligarchic dominant elites consolidates themselves through the production of various regulations to limit political competition from outside the system. The newly ratified package of Law on Politics proves this tendency.

(2) Powerful elites that are part of this monopolisation, avoid to integrate themselves with popular organisations as a method to mobilise support. The number of powerful elites employed this method to mobilise support is getting less and less, 33% in 2003/2004 and 11% in 2007. They now prefer to use the support of charismatic figures through populism (unmediated links between leaders and people in general) and clientelism.

(3) They also prefer to make alliance with the elites of bureaucracy and government – this is intra-state-elites consolidation.

(4) It seems that one has to at least partly interpret the data on the less rigor participation of business elites in the other way around. It is true that a larger part of the extended elite make their way by being skilled at mobilising votes, but there are ample of evidence from case studies to suggest that many businessmen also transform themselves into dominant political actors.

The tendency towards politics is by a number of such processes. The dominant elites hamper popular participation to immerse in the system of representation. At worst, those sections of the elite that cannot win elections even with privileges to the current politicians and political parties and restrictions against genuine popular participation may even opt for outright ‘sequencing of democracy’ as did those behind the most recent coup in Thailand and as did the middle classes.
that rallied behind Suharto in the 60s. In doing so, they opted for executing democracy in sequencing steps through institution reform, good governance, and political stabilisation.

Even if less drastic, the fundamental agreement that is already implemented is to run a closed door political system. If political system is directed to open to broad popular support, the elites are afraid that democracy will give birth to what they call a chaotic situation, against ‘political stability’. The political system will become inefficient, expensive and uneasy. Therefore, it is necessary to shut the door for independent popular participation from below. The basic assumption is enacting rules of law and guarding political order with stable and solid political system before really opening the door for popular participation as wide as possible. Yet, this is exactly the Huntington-argument that was used in the mid 60s – and it did take quite some time until the system was opened up, and it was not thanks to the ‘solid institutions’ that were created under Suharto.

**Alternative Actors Trapped in Populist Escapism**

After discussing the political practice of powerful actors and concluding that the actors in question tend to reveal their old characters as oligarchic dominant elites and to execute a political practice that shut its door from popular representation, now we will discuss the political practice of alternative actors. The discussion will begin with the comparison of the capacity of both alternative and powerful actors.

The powerful actors, who traditionally concentrate in the arena of the state, start to work in the arena of civil society – the main domain of pro-democracy actors. The powerful actors also dominate organised politics, supported by their strong economic resources, and grab almost all media for political communication in their hands. Alternative actors only depend on the support of scattered mass and almost have no economic resource. The actors in question only communicate their political view among themselves in limited forums.

The alternative actors are commonly NGO/CSO activists that make alliance with local informal leaders, mass media activists and law practitioners (overall reached the number of 61%). Their organisational method is commonly the combination of mobilisation through popular/charismatic leaders, clientelism. As well as alternative patronage (50% overall), rather than through networks between independent actors (35%) and Integration from below of popular organisations into more general organisations (15%). As the previous survey also concluded, with such a character, the actors in question are only able to serve as lobby groups and mediated institutions between the people and political institutions or to get co-opted by the powerful elitist parties.

The situation has now relatively changed. As the people begin to get interested in politics, the alternative actors also start to realize the importance of working on agendas on politics, involving in the domain of the state, and transforming their civil activities into politically meaningful ones. In addition, the actors also see the need to establish political basis among the people. In other words, they do not fully concentrate in civil activism anymore, but begin to realize the importance of getting involved in politics in the basis of social movement.

Once again, the data shows that the alternative actors become more political than before, or in other words, they attempt to work on more political projects. What is the result?

Considering the map of the situation the alternative actors now deal with, we perceive that they actually are trapped in populist method, a politics of taking the sake of the people to get into decision-making institutions and neglecting the channels of political representation. The populist way is conducted by utilising the support of charismatic informal leaders, supported through the
system of patronage. The tendency to employ this method has become more intensive in the recent years. Instead of working on agenda to promote representation by establishing broad popular basis for their movement, the alternative actors take a shortcut to directly press the decision-making institutions on the behalf of people's needs and interest. What cause this to happen?

It is likely that we have to look through the structural causes. First, the alternative actors still depend on knowledge and information as their source of power, with higher intensity than that we found in the previous research. They tend to have a lack of interest in promoting economic and mass power resources and seems less and less interested compared to what we found in the previous research. Second, regarding to the issue they concentrate on, the alternative actors tend to promote general and abstract ideas that becomes general discourse in civil society organisations, such as those on human rights, democracy, economic development, good governance, and anti-corruption. Specific, local issues that directly touch the people's actual problems are not sufficiently promoted and brought up as concrete agenda to build social power. Such issues actually have more potential political appeal to gain more support. This is related to the capability of alternative actors to mobilise and organise the movement.

Third, regarding to the mobilisation, the alternative actors have not yet had sufficient ability to establish broad mass basis. Even though their organisational methods are often to connect people that have similar vision and interest which may well be unproblematic, some of the actors gather the people with similar ethnic and religious background. Only a few actors concentrates on building their social basis based on sectoral or inter-sectoral interest and to connect people, from local to central levels. All of these characteristics reveals their exclusionary traits, and inability to bring up and broaden people's interests.

Fourth, in regard to channels the alternative actors used in some advocacy activities, legislatives and executives are the channels most alternative actors frequently use. Then, how do they contact with the two institutions? They are not interested to use political party, and put their trust to non-party mediating institutions, such as NGO, experts, or lobby group. The absence of political party as well as interest organisations as their channels to address their aspiration to legislative and executive institutions indicates alternative actors' preference to direct participation rather than tp representation. This phenomenon does not only show their distrust to political parties, but also, once, again the general crisis of representation.

It seems that the alternative actors avoid to settle the crisis. Instead, they use popular figures or lobbyist, rather building their organisational capacity to strengthen their bargaining power. In other words, the direct participation they are executing is not based on the promotion of representation in the basis of strong interest organisation. Depending on mediating contacts and lobbyists, the alternative actors actually employ individual and informal direct participation – which leads to populist way, as discussed previously.

Various Craft to Promote Representation: An Evaluation

Attempts to promote representation have been conducted in many ways. We at least identify three of them, which have or have been executed by various pro-democracy oriented actors.

First, elitist crafting. The first attempt concentrates on attempts to improve the performance of political party and party system. The effort to reform laws on political parties to be more adoptive to multi-party system, such as these sponsored by NDI, are one of them. In fact, the change of party system through institutional crafting and legal reform, as well as through the most recent legislations method, is not sufficient. The multi party system that has been successfully created is
actually being utilised by dominant elite. This craft does not bring any significant change to the pattern of power relation.

It is true that the emergence of the multiparty system is accompanied by broad political liberalisation and pluralism. Yet, the pro-democracy actors have not yet fully used the change, as they have a lack of organisational capacity and human resources. In other words, the reform of party system by craft does not have significant contribution to the rise of agenda to demonopolise elites and change the power relation underlying it. Such a reform, we can say, is not sufficient enough to strengthen pro-democracy actors to be able to dominate the political system.

Similarly, pilkada, another effort to promote representation, merely triggers the rise of local bosses and communal forces to fight for power. Pilkada is crafted by excluding the importance of efforts to strengthen democratic political organisations in local level. Pilkada will only make local politics filled by anti-democratic forces.

Second, joining political party and reforming from within or establishing new party with new crafted constituent basis. The attempts of pro-democracy actors that have been working in CSO/NGO or of social movement to join big parties are the examples of the first method. The remaining question will be whether they have succeeded to reform from within? Are the parties conducive enough to make internal reform happen? Or do the activists have sufficient resources to run the reform with the support of their traditional constituents? We found that instead bringing significant change in the party they engaged in, pro-democracy activists immerse deeper to the oligarchic mechanism. Even worse, the activists are the subjects of suspicion of party elites and colleague activists that prefer to stay out of any political parties. Here, the fragmentation among pro-democracy activists rises again. Suspicion and conflict becomes even more acute.

The fragmentation hinders the efforts of promoting representation by establishing new parties. This effort faces internal problem on the lack of resources and the organised popular basis. When the new parties are really established, they have to deal with the competition of constituent basis claim. The conflict happen between the new party with civil society organisations of which constituent basis are taken by the new parties.

Third, other effort to promote representation is by establishing representative institutions that enable specific direct participation to government institutions. Different from other two methods presented previously, the third is less political, which means not oriented to political organising. In other words, this effort attempt to establish non-political representation to struggle for people’s specific interests. In many cases, the media of direct participation is appealing to lower class people as it accommodates more concrete, opened and politically non-partisan issues. Yet, as also proven in other cases, this media actually does not employ clear frame of representation and have potentials to sustain the existing power relation.

We have so far identified some problems emerging from various efforts to promote representation – institutional crafting and elitist legislation, party reform and establishment, as well as the institutionalisation of people’s direct participation in the form of non-politics people forum. All of those efforts face common problems of the lack of support from popular organisation, fragmentation among civil society and pro-democratic organisations, and exclusion of agenda to change the existing power relation.

Is there any possibility to escape from this dead end? If there are any scenario to develop the experiments to promote alternative representation, then how will it be institutionalized? In the next Chapter 7 we will discuss this problem in order to generate some recommendations. ***
Chapter 7
Recommendation

The Establishment of Democratic Political Blocks

After a decade, the political process of democratization in Indonesia actually has created its paradoxes! Why does it happen? What actually happen? How can the paradoxes be solved? Is the situation already so dark, without hope? Indeed, it is not easy to answer it. Emerging from a reform movement that succeeded to force the Authoritarian regime of Soeharto step down from their power, Indonesia had become the biggest ‘new democracy’ state in the world. Yet, different from what had originally been visioned, the political system of Indonesia has been almost completely dominated by oligarchic segments of elites. They have immersed in the local level, consolidating elitist democracy, closing the system of representation from popular participation, and running what so called “politics of order”.

It is true that the standard of governance-related instruments of democracy increases, although from the very low level. At the same time, we witness that the instruments related to civil and political rights that in the previous five years improved, now deteriorate, and are thus under threat. It is also true that several instruments of democracy related to the promotion of social and economic rights perform better, but this happens in the middle of rapid deterioration of macro economics and in the subordination of the state by free market and neoliberal economic globalisation.

The hope for meaningful democracy still exist. The chance is even there. During the recent five years the people have higher interest in politics. Considering their being a floating mass that had been ignored and deceived for three decades, the people’s higher interest to politics is surely a good sign of the emergence of broad supporting basis for political reform. The people learn so fast, meticulously note everyday political activities, and become so critical towards political practices – by stating that politics is dominated by elites.

The high interest in politics, along with critical attitude to it are clearly the fruit of public awareness on civil and political rights. The public now have the freedom and want to use it. Unfortunately, they distrust political parties, which are considered to practice money politics, fail to reflect popular aspiration and to defend public vital need, as well as not accountable enough to their constituents.

In short, a new political mass is waiting. Several pro-democracy actors attempt to use this new opportunity to build their social and political basis. Some NGO and civil society organisations conduct experiments to go politics, to link civil with political actions that are based on social movements.

We also witness their experiments in the process of electoral politics, for example through competing in pilkada. In the last experiment, they directly touch with the politics of party in local level. Not less significant is another experiment to transform themselves into alternative party, both in national and local level. In short, the pro-democracy actors have conducted some experiments to make civil actions and social movement enable to create meaningful political effects, particularly to change the structure of power relation.

It nevertheless requires to say that these experiments have not yet produced significant impacts, as they occur in various issues and not yet broadly consolidated. They also face a complicated
internal problem. They, for example, are not able to organise themselves as unified movement. They are scattered in various issue basis; fragmented among themselves; and hampered by some technical difficulties in consolidating their power in the geographically vast country (with insufficient infrastructure) – that spread as large as Southern to Northern Europe.

Only with strong local basis and broad country wide linkage, we will put the right direction for the development of democratization in Indonesia, making it more meaningful and useful for more people, and claiming back from the monopoly of oligarchic elites. The project of democratization in Indonesia should be directed to such an agenda. Now we put faith to the promotion of popular representation as the means to strengthen democracy in Indonesia in the second decade after reformasi. The promotion of popular representation covers three aspects: party based political representation, civil action and social movement based interest representation, and citizenship community based direct participation. Yet such attempt must be based on its two main basis: the democratic political community in country wide level and local political movement to promote popular issue and interest based representation.

Amidst the lack of initiative to conduct concrete experiments, it is important to build real force in the intermediary level to vertically bridge popular movement with organised politics, and horizontally connect social movement with civil political movement, as well as link local forces with national ones. Hence, we recommend the establishment of democratic political blocks. The idea is specifically based on the following arguments:

**Challenges and threats**

1. The system of political representation fail to work correctly as the institutions of democracy are dominated by dominant elites.
   - Therefore, it is necessary to reform the system of political representation and to demonopolise the political system from the domination of dominant elites.

2. The currently ratified package of Laws on Politics, particularly Law on Political Party and Law on General Election, has once again, revealed various efforts of political elites in parliament to hinder the establishment of new parties by inquiring discriminative, unreasonable requirements.
   - It is necessary to conduct judicial review toward the package of laws on politics, and to publicly uncover the motives of the existing party elites to sustain their monopoly and oligopoly on the political system of democracy.

3. The populist shortcut taken by pro-democratic oriented alternative actors are not relevant to promote popular representation.
   - Therefore, pro-democracy actors must set their orientation to avoid taking the short cut and return to their basis to promote representation in civil and social movements.
   - This approach requires concrete field work to map the political potentials of each civil association and local social movements as the organisational basis for promoting representation. Research based mapping is integrated part of advocacy works to promote representation. The **advocacy works cannot improvise well without any basis of empirical studies conducted through research**.

4. The efforts to promote representation so far have not yet included agenda to change power relation.
   - It is necessary to conduct direct participation by involving broad political calculation to reform the structure of domination and subordination.
   - As already recommended, this also requires research based mapping on the political constellation of local power in every location of direct participation movement. **Once again, it is**
impossible to conduct advocacy to change the power relation in local level without research based knowledge.

Options
Despite some hard challenges ahead, there are still options for movements to promote popular representation to build broad social basis. If this opportunity is taken, then the movements may get potential vast social supports from various elements of the society that have high interest in politics, but very critical towards the actual political practices, the elitist political practices.

- We need to identify the social sectors that already come to the level of such ‘politzation’, and classify them according to the three forms of representation: political representation, interest representation, and civic representation.
- The new political mass that is eagerly waiting really needs strong, opened, solid and participative organisational methods

Obstacles
The biggest obstacle comes from the internal situation of pro-democracy movement. It can be defined as: fragmented, not consolidated, not able to find a point where they can build a joint movement.

- For a long-term plan, the agenda to promote popular representation must be nonetheless directed to build democratic political community in national level, through three scaling up scenarios: the scaling up of issue, interest groups, and geographical (local-supralocal) based movements.

In such a context, we found two most problematic aspects: (1) independent and self-reliance financial support for democratisation political movement from below; (2) legal obstacles that surely emerge when the movement attempts to transform itself into political party, both local and national party.

Lesson from Some Experiences
The democratic solution for the settlements of conflicts in Aceh does not only prove that democracy functions as a instruments of peace settlement – making Aceh as integral part of Indonesia – but also open for broader civil participation in political landscape and local government. The experience of aceh has proven that Indonesia had already had a model of local democratisation and of democracy decentralisation.

Beside by the experience of Aceh, the idea of establishing democratic political blocks is also underlain by the reflection on the experiences of various civil organizations and social movements in various regions, such as Bali, Batang, Central Sulawesi and West Kalimantan.

The experiences clearly generate a lot of lessons on how the blocks are practiced, their purpose as well as their institutionalized forms, which are summarized as follow:

1. non-party political alliance on intermediary level: specific issue employed by social movement and general policies struggled for by parties.
2. an alliance between people organisations, social movements, NGOs and individual figures.
3. a task force from above, but established from below, from village, municipality/city or provincial level, representing different movements up to national levels.
4. an alliance of which decision making system is based on the principles of deliberative democracy, based on 2/3 majority votes.
5. an alliance that collect membership fee and additional donation, particularly to cover organisation’s operational expenses.
6. an alliance that is based on joint platform generated by figures or parties to demand other parties that have authority to issue public policies for rights and certain policies, or non-public institutions such as companies, business corporation, militias, ethnic or religious groups for joint vital issues for democracy – for example gender equality, or land-reform.

7. an alliance that is based on minimum platform for specific demands – particularly related to most important concrete policies to monitor democracy, for example the establishment of independent public commissions; public service monitoring institutions; and the promotion of other marginalised issues.

8. an alliance that is based on political contracts with independent candidates or political parties that are ready to run the platform explained in point 6.

9. Political blocks do not run in election or nominate its candidate, but support platform and engage in non-party political cooperation with the government or executives.

10. Democratic Political Block is engaged in joint political education and trainings, as well as in monitoring political activities, cultural events, guarding public policies, through cooperation with interest organisations, mass media, and devotee groups and others.

Eventhough there are many options for institutionalisation of democratic political blocks, we at least can imagine some of concrete roles, i.e:

1. To influence the local head elections based on their priorities in the form of minimum platform, rather than the agendas of candidates or parties.

2. To promote sectoral interests in political, such as land reform or labour rights. The groups or individuals would have realized that they have to broaden their concerns into other issues in order to attract sympathetic figures or political parties.

3. Similar to the second, democratic political block is proposed by groups or individuals that attempt to promote:
   a. participatory planning/budgeting; and/or
   b. eradication of corruption;
   c. sustainable development;
   d. enactment of Human Rights and conflict resolution.

In doing so, they realize that they need political facilitation, and therefore require broader alliance.

The establishment of Democratic Political Blocks: The Agenda of Democratization in Indonesia in the Second Decade of Reformasi

There are five inherent agendas regarding to the establishment of Democratic Political Block. First, democratic political blocks are aimed to protect human rights based democratization – including equal civil and political rights and forms of more democratic political representation – against elite’s scenario to establish politics of order through their oligarchic democracy consolidation.

Second, democratic political blocks are aimed to promote participatory local government, including participatory budgeting and participatory sustainable planning.

Third, democratic political blocks are aimed to promote women participation and include women perspective and issue in political matters.

Fourth, democratic political blocks are aimed to promote various forms of social pacts, particularly:

(i) To combat symbiotic relationship between state, business forces and communalism.
(ii) To promote economic development which is socially responsible and environmentally sustainable.

(iii) To create a way to the emergence of bottom-up representation system that is based on people interest, to combat top-down corporatism agendas.

Fifth, the establishment of democratic political blocks are particularly also serves as concrete step to demonopolise the system of representation and party that become strictly closed.

(i) To create the system of popular representation – as an alternative toward the elitist representation commonly practiced recently.

(ii) To scale up the possibility to build local party from below, from local context.

(iii) To open broader possibility for the social (movement) based interest representation.

(iv) To open broader participation for women and accommodate women perspective within politics.

(v) To promote social, economy and social rights.

(vi) To promote social pacts to guarantee the fulfillment of rights to employment, social security, environmental protection and economic development.

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