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TRIGGER FOR DEMOCRACY — A NEW OPTION IN INDONESIA

Preparation outline of a report on contemporary Indonesia within the project "Problems of radical political struggle under the rule of a new capitalism: North and Southeast Asia in a comparative perspective and effects in Sweden".
STUGGLE FOR DEMOCRACY - A NEW OPTION IN INDONESIA?

Provisional outline of report on contemporary Indonesia within the project "Problems of radical political strategy under the rise of a new capitalism: South and Southeast Asia in a comparative perspective and effects in Sweden." 1)

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1. INTRODUCTION

In my book on the destruction of the PKI 2) (Partei Komunis Indonesia) I arrived at the general conclusion that the party strategies related to the state and industrialisation as well as state and agricultural development failed because PKI's analysis had not been able to disclose the way in which a post-colonial capitalism - agricultural as well as industrial - emerged. These invalid analyses were no more

1) This outline should be looked upon as a working paper in which I try to summarize my findings in an early stage of the project. But it is a working paper which has been written in English. The aim is rather to present a refined version of my main arguments for comments and as a basis for comparisons with contemporary India and the Philippines - before I return to the case of Indonesia during the final phase of the project and write a more substantial concluding report. 1) As I have already indicated, comments are most welcome! Please do not quote without mentioning the preliminary nature of the paper! Finally, I would like to thank all of you who helped me inside as well as outside Indonesia.

2) This project is supported by the Swedish Reintegration Foundation and the Swedish Council for Research in the Humanities and Social Sciences.
due mainly to weak theoretical instruments. Thus, many decisive factors and developments could not be taken into proper consideration.

Towards a theory of the emergence of post-colonial capitalism

Now, then, can we characterize the new post-colonial capitalism which was neither national nor neo-colonial, but emerged and under
mined the analyses and strategies of the Indonesian capitalists?

In my study of the PCI's strategic problems I have identified at least some of the contradictions and forms of subordination, explota
tion and resistance which the party was unable to take into account in its analyses, due to insufficient theoretical tools. Taking these disregarded factors as a point of departure in this, I think, possible to start building a revised theory of how post-colonial capitalism emerges in a society such as Indonesia:

After the definite achievement of political independence in 1945, production and trade were still dominated by foreign capitalists and domestic middlemen, particularly by Smith and to some extent US owners of capital and, domestically, by Chinese businessmen. The important plantation sector, however, fell behind as the new state was unable to subordinate labour and raw materials, including their land, as colonial state had done. Domestic businessmen had difficulties in making progress. Nor administrators and politicians with nationalistic aspirations could use the state apparatus to get any influence over the economy by use of import licenses, for example.

Feudal land concentration did not dominate within agriculture, and the limited commercial production of staple commodities was restrained when the representative colonial power was abolished. Instead, some village leaders were more powerful political and administrative positions.

The administrative and political nationalists and soon also military offiers began, however, to make use of extended state intervention within the economy to get a share of the surplus produced, in order to substitute for the lack of chances to advance within trade and production.

Three main methods were used. First, they followed a national-
istic and anti-imperialist political line in order to restrict foreign capitalists and domestic production for export. This was done to benefit domestic importers and to support plans for im-
port substitution. Finally most of the foreign companies were nationalised. Hence these nationalisers also got wide popular support and could, for example, allow strikes within companies and plantations still owned by foreigners.

Secondly, a state controlled guided economy was introduced. Licen-
ces and various concessions became more and more important. Certain nationalisers within the state gained access to important markets and even petty rice trading was drastically restricted. The national-
ised enterprises were not privatisation but controlled by certain indi-
viduals within the state apparatus, especially by military officers.

The exploitation of natural resources was also taken in connection by groupings within the state apparatus. And foreign aid passed of course through the hands of the state.

Thirdly, so called guided democracy was gradually enforced. General elections were postponed. A state of emergency helped the army to dominate the state apparatus and the economy. Strikes could now be even more restricted and labour could be better controlled by the military.

Within agriculture, this extra-economic power over the economy cor-
responded to the age-old tendency of the local lords to substitute for the lack of land concentration by centralising instead the surplus produced by formally independent peasants. This centraliza-
tion of surplus through patron-client relations was now further developed. It grew in importance - and became increasingly affected by ethnic and cultural divisions - as the patron had to mobilise voters and other sorts of political support among the villagers, who were essentially mobilised as clients.

The nationalists and their local followers supported anti-feudal measures against certain commercial activities - but they did not support measures threatening the patron's political and administrativa position, since these made the centralisation of surplus possible. The so called guided democracy secured this state of affairs and blocked the kommunis' efforts to make local assemblies and administra-
tion more democratic.
From the very beginning, political, administrative and military nationalizations annulled personal control at various parts of the growing state apparatus. The nationalized companies, the lineowns, cooperatives, market monopolies, foreign aid etc. But their control and power were not fulfilled. Certain politicians, workers and others were reluctant. These reluctant assertions were led by Suharto and the MRP with its mass organizations. Domestic private and often petty capitalists, who lacked profitable connections with the leaders of the state, were also demobilized, lacking support from foreign capitalists, diminishing western aid etc. also ceased wary. But at this time, such support could only be received in exchange for less state intervention, privatizing and other measures that would have diminished the power of the administrators, politicians and military leaders and thus their chances to appropriate substantial parts of the surplus produced.

Also the agricultural patrons lacked effective control of land and labour. Their chances to concentrate land but also to centralize substantial amount of surplus were still limited, among other things because they had to protect many clients in order to retain their support and also because of the strength of the peasant organizations. At the same time a traditional bourgeoisie land reform involving the distribution of large amounts of land was out of the question, as the principal contradiction was not between land concentrating landlords and peasants.

However, most of these administrators, military leaders, certain politicians and agricultural patrons could enforce their needs for more effective and tight control when the Suharto regime had been crushed and the communist eliminated.

With their consolidated extra-economic powers over the economy and labour - including the army who were not permanently employed - the administrators, military leaders and some capitalists could then cooperate with foreign capitalists, groups of creditors etc. without risking their own positions. Capital and expertise were thereby added to the now relatively favorable domestic conditions for trade and production. Market monopolies, adequate rights to land and other natural resources etc. and effectively subordinated labour were offered. Domestic bureaucracies, technocrats and private businessmen - especially the big Chinese capitalists - often became clients of administrative and military patrons with a growing class basis of their own.

Within agriculture these developments corresponded to the elimination of the peasant movements, while at the same time the peasants got their more disastrous powers secured by the state in general and the army in particular and then could, for example, get rid of economically unnecessary clients and add a substantial concentration of land to their centralization of surplus. The peasants' effective control of non and land was a decisive prerequisite for the capitalization of agriculture and the now emerging capitalist production. However, it was possible to introduce large scale agricultural imports and credits through the "green revolution" - just as it had been possible to receive extra contributions from outside to centralization when the new capitalists within the state had consolidated their positions. "Feudal remnants" within production and administration were combined with more capitalist methods, when the latter were more effective and more profitable.

Since then, this new post-colonial capitalism within trade and industry as well as agriculture has gradually developed. Several of the post-colonial capitalists and, for example, new village leaders have taken direct involvement in production and some pursuing of personally controlled state activities to their former extra-economic powers over the economy.

During the last few years the impressive rate of growth has decreased. The real increase of the gross national product has diminished from almost 10% in 1980 to almost none in 1992 and presently some 4%. But the expansion of capitalist relations of production and markets continue. This is the most important aspect from a political point of view. The crucial question is no longer whether capitalism expands or not but how - and with what political consequences.
For the new expansion of capitalism undermines prevalent analyses and expectations.

As I mentioned in the first paragraph of this paper, the development of post-colonial capitalism outlined above testifies to the undermined traditional analyses and strategies used by the PCI in Indonesia. It is, however, a different experience, the result of the following:

Traditional strategies related to power and industrialization are all negatively affected by the actual expansion of capitalism, as it emerges in a way that differs from what is "prescribed" in established theories about the idealized classical European development.

Theories on the possibility of compensation in a front with the "national bourgeoisie" are undermined, since the small bourgeoisie which in fact resembles the European ideal cannot become a powerful partner in alliance, partly because of the strength of imperialism and partly since it lacks sufficient political, administrative and military power. These "bourgeois democracy" will not be stable enough to protect the interests of foreign capitalists and their domestic partners will become a powerful threat. And workers will not gain new jobs nor higher standards of living, since no flourishing independent capitalism is created by the "national bourgeoisie".

According to theory, strategies for new-capitalist development may be successful if capitalism is blocked, the capitalists are weak and the state lacks a distinct class basis. Progressive forces which need certain democratic freedoms in order to get popular support, should then be able to use the state. But on the contrary, post-colonial capitalism emerged. And even though the theory correctly assesses the third world state as a barrier to development in general than the private bourgeoisie, post-colonial capitalism - not neo-capitalism - did in fact emerge from within a formally neo-capitalist and initially by class based state. Certain nationalism did more than become corrupt bureaucratia. Some of the left were able to make the economic basis of the state their personal belonging - without, for example, privatizing state owned companies, selling exclusively on the basis of foreign capitalists and their domestic partners. Furthermore, since these leaders were able to build their own "own hands and rely on that, they do not have to get the support of the workers and peasants or offering them some democratic liberties. On the contrary, they build their own capitalism with undemocratic, extra-economic means of power.

Even strategies that combine anti-imperialism and domestic class struggle are based on the assumption that "real" development of capitalism is blocked; since the "national bourgeoisie" does not succeed in enforcing its capitalism it has to merge with the neo-colonial capitalism of the imperialists and the compradores - particularly if and when countries start to stabilize the masses. To oppose imperialism in these terms, at the same time, to fight neo-colonial capitalists and their allies domestically. The state, Furthermore, has no particular autonomy. It is based instead on the force of imperialism and is truly deceptive at best.

But in sharp contrast to the main points of this type of strategy, post-colonial capitalism did emerge in Indonesia with a domestic basis and a strong state. The nationalists who started to build this new capitalism did not at first ally themselves with comprador and imperialism. And as long as the state and its possessors of power were not the obvious tools of the imperialists, it was very difficult for workers to start determined actions in state owned plantations and industries.

With the new expansion of capitalism it is likely that communists will not be able to combine nationalism and class struggle any more. Such a combination has been a basic theme in all successful revolutions in the third world, for example in China and Vietnam. Quite on the contrary, nationalism and anti-imperialism tends to strengthen the new capitalism during its early emergence. Later on post-colonial capitalists do cooperate with "progressive imperialists", but then they have a domestic class basis to rely on.

Finally, the decisive importance of extra-economic factors in general and the state in particular for the new post-colonial capitalism usually deprives the traditional strategic recommendations (originally from the Russian revolution) of fraternal attacks on a small, isolated and relatively powerless state of any relevance.
Traditional strategies oriented to agriculture and peasants are undermined, because the traditional anti-feudal routes to development are blocked and because of the way in which a new agrarian capitalism emerges instead.

Strategies stemming from the "national bourgeoisie" weak, since the bourgeoisie lacks enough power to implement land reforms and because its democracy is not stable enough to protect communists who try to mobilize peasants.

The nationalists who choose extra-economic instead of traditional bourgeois measures to implement a different agrarian capitalism are not anxious to give up their "feudal" positions of power but use several of them instead in order to capitalize agriculture.

Also radical strategies for peasant struggles, according to which communists themselves shall enforce bourgeois anti-feudal land reforms, may well have become irrelevant through the expansion of post-colonial capitalism. In the case of Indonesia a traditional bourgeois land reform was simply out of the question. As I have already mentioned, land in general and concentrated land in particular was scarce on Java. Instead patron-cliental surplus produced on poor peasant's place that were too small to ensure them economic independence. This was the basis of the strong patron-client system. When the communists gave the signal for militant struggle, they were confronted with internal fighting among the peasants about the little land that could be redistributed. Parallel to this, the patron-client relations were often stronger than class loyalties. In addition the peasants were not especially threatened, since most of them had not concentrated ownership.

In such cases "feudalism" can only be fought with agricultural development can only be processed through the concentration of land, either by the use of extra-economic measures against a vast number of small peasants - which happened - or via peasants' efforts to concentrate their own land to large enough to ensure independence of the patron, who can otherwise enforce the centralization of the peasants' surplus. Landholding peasants can then invest in auxiliary cooperative production where the landless may get jobs.

Problems of further developed analyses and strategies. Do non-alienation appear?

During the later phase of the project I will try to further develop and generalize the above summarized results based on the historical experiences of the PCI by making a comparison with causes of similar problems of strategy in India and a contrasting successful implementation of some similar strategies in former South Vietnam.

But, if the way in which post-colonial capitalism emerged undermines the old theories, analyses and strategies, we should also study contemporary problems. Various movements try to further develop new strategies and strategies. What problems do they experience under the ongoing expansion of post-colonial capitalism - and why? And if they are confronted with substantial problems - what alternative strategic options may follow from a more proper understanding of post-colonial capitalism? Finally, can we confirm such alternative strategic options by studying new trends in the political struggle?

Consequently there are two main tasks involved in this latter part of the project: (1) To further develop a more proper understanding of post-colonial capitalism, and thus to contribute to the development of a theory of the expansion of third world capitalism.

(2) To analyze the new strategic problems - and possible alternatives.

In order to try to do both at the same time I have formulated two sets of hypotheses (A and B) in which I argue that certain attempts to further develop the old political analysis and strategies are contradicted by the present development of post-colonial capitalism. The first set of hypotheses is related to the people involved in agriculture and the second deals with industrial conflicts. By studying if the actual development of post-colonial capitalism contradicts the selected political analyses and strategies, we will also have the chance to arrive at a better understanding of post-colonial capitalism and thus contribute to the generation of a theory.

Moreover, when we know more about the actual development of post-colonial capitalism, we may finally be able to suggest why
certain decisive contradictions might open up for alternative structural roles. Therefore we may infer if these propositions are confirmed or not by the ongoing attempts to go beyond the traditional cluster of radical political thinking.

The empirical cases to be compared are movements in India, the Philippines and Indonesia. This expert focus upon Indonesia and in particular Java during the late 1950's and early 60's.

There are special problems in studying radical political strategy in Indonesia. First, it is very difficult to get access to relevant materials. Thus of course, is due to the political situation. Consequently the empirical basis could be more solid. On the other hand, the political situation also implies that certain facts that I do know about cannot be spelt in detail for the sake of solidarity.

Secondly, the weak radical movements in Indonesia rarely have clearly formulated political analyses and strategies that are implemented in an organized way. Consequently I have to reconstruct scattered analyses and suggest strategies and confront their predictions about spontaneous developments of social forces rather than implemented strategies with what actually happens.

2. EMPIRICAL PROSPECTS AND STRATEGIES

Political analyses and strategies

There are two main attempts to take the effects of the destruction of the peasant movement in Indonesia and the enforced green revolution into consideration in order to further develop traditional radical analyses of class conflicts and strategic recommendations. I will give a brief summary.

Followers of the first tendency argue that there has been a substantial concentration of land and development of semi-feudal landlordism. Peasant land has been extensively appropriated. Thus, the absolute majority of rural population now consists of landless, or almost landless, tenants, often atomizers, working for landlords.

Consequently the general prognosis is that the main conflicts in the agricultural setting will be between unification threatened peasants and landlords. Any strategy must be based on this polarization.

This type of thinking is, for example, still dominant among those of the surviving communists who were and partly still are attached to Beijing. The analysis and strategical consequences were already hinted at in self-critical documents produced after the destruction of the PII and they were used in the underground guerrilla struggle in the Sitter area in the late 60's. Today representatives of this tendency stress that the analysis and strategy are critically discussed by the followers themselves, but that the general intention in the old document are still valid.

In situations of the second tendency stress that the green revolution has promoted capitalistization of Japanese agriculture. It is argued that semi-capitalist relatively big farmers are emerging through concentration of land, new land tenure agreements and technological investments. Peasants have lost most of their land and tenures and become rural semi-proletarians who get their main income from agricultural wage work. Moreover, a substantial part of the village lagers have been marginalized and forced to leave agriculture.

According to this type of analysis, the main contradiction is consequently between on the one hand a relatively unified semi-proletarian unit and on the other hand semi-capitalist farmers and other capitalist scientific exploiters in the rural setting. There were, and to my knowledge still are, rather many followers of this general view. We find them, for example, among the new radical students and scholars who are active also outside academies and institutes. 6

Evaluation of prospects

However, drawing on my contribution to a theory about the emergence of post-colonial agricultural capitalism I suggest that hypothesis 4

a conjunction of the above political prognoses with actual developments (i.e. an evaluation) will show that:
Social conflicts within agriculture are not characterized by a relatively unified semi-peasant or fighting landlords.
* Neither are the social conflicts characterized by a relatively unified semi-peasant or semi-capitalists in general and farmers in particular.
* Instead of a peasant or semi-peasant class conflict with either landlords or semi-capitalists it is rather the state that is fought in this struggle, in most cases led by propertyed peasants who manage to rally sections of the even more exploited people behind their demands.

Extensive rural protests during the late 70's
In July 1979 the farmers' association attached to the regime, BEJ (Bapenas, Nadi Komuniti Pelabuhan), had listed 423 cases of land disputes.15 In August the press reported 993 cases.16 Many people went to local and regional authorities and military commandos to protest. But relatively soon they found out that they had to bypass these local, regional and provincial authorities and go directly to the national parliament (to get publicity) and even to the commission of KEMAH (National Executive Command for the Destruction of Anarchy and Order). In April 1979 the latter claimed that 50% of the 1200 letters that he received each month concerned land disputes problems.17 In some cases there were violent clashes, for example in Sitiria in North Sumatra and in Jempang, Jambe, East Java. The government was seriously worried and the land disputes became one of the major topics.

Character of protests
According to some of my informants one should not exclude that some of the protests concerned conflicts between tenants and landlords or agricultural workers and farmers. (Strikes at the plantations will be dealt with under industrial conflicts later on.) But it is quite obvious that the main actor and target in the reported conflicts was the state.

There were three most important types of conflict. First (and most common), state owned or supported estates appropriated or redistributed land earlier taken by or given to peasants. In other cases peasants were "only" forced to grow certain products.10 Recently there have been new conflicts over the introduction of so-called Nuclear Irrigation.17 In most cases it is the propertyed peasants who revolt against the state, because they are about to be subordinated, or even proletarianized.

Secondly, there are a lot of cases where the state supports expropriation (or destruction) of land for "development purposes". Land may be needed for the construction of roads, factories, parking areas, new irrigation systems (including the building of dams so that large zones will be flooded). There are also examples where factory discharge has poisoned paddy-fields. In these cases entire villages may be threatened, or, for example in the case of the building of a tourist spot close to the Bondowoso temple. It is of course the propertyed peasants who are most badly hurt - if they are not punished at all. Thus they take the lead in fighting the local organs of the state. The poor and landless often rally behind since they run the risk of losing their jobs and do not even get the generally low compensation promised to the landowners.110

Third, there are some cases of protests against the introduction, distribution and use of state subsidies to "modern" agricultural production and fishing. Poor and landless peasants sometimes oppose commercialization, more efficient harvest methods etc. and petty fisher- men protest against the introduction of modern trawlers.111 Thus, however, is, in one again, mainly petty propertyed peasants' protests against the state promoted and enforced capitalistization of agriculture - not conflicts between labourers and semi-capitalists within production.

Evaluation of analyses
How can we explain the obvious contradiction between the political progreeses and the conflicts that actually take place? Why is it that the main clashes within agriculture are not between tenants and landlords on agricultural workers and farmers but between the state and petty propertyed peasants, who rally some of their workmen, tenants and others behind? In order to answer these questions I propose that we examine the analytical premises of the obviously faulty progreeses. I suspect that a confirmation of the above briefly summarized analyses...
(Interspersing either semi-feudal landlordism or semi-capitalist village agriculture) with the actual development of classes in the village economy will show that the analyses are invalid. Furthermore, drawing on my preliminary contribution to a theory about the rise of post-colonial agricultural capitalism, I suggest (hypothesis 2) that such an evaluation of the analyses will indicate that the destruction of the peasant movement and the state enforced green revolution have contributed to the creation of the following main classes, types of accumulation, subordination and exploitation underlining the type of conflicts disclosed above:

* The decisive trend is neither the development of landlords nor relatively big semi-capitalist farmers. Instead at least 20 - 30% of the rural households benefit from the enforced capitalization of agriculture. Many of them become relatively well-off farmers, a kind of *bulake*, whereas the ruling minority may be called state backed patrons.

- The *bulake* are not independent private farmers but heavily dependent on state subsidies and extra-economic protection against the non-benefitting classes. The *bulake* concentrate some land and make some improvements of the forces of production. But they are mainly investing in, first, the displacing of, for example, tenants and harvesters in order to get a larger share of the surplus produced and, secondly, in intensifying the production by the introduction of better varieties, fertilizers, the growing of several crops per year etc. When the *bulake* need extra labour they use mainly members of their family, relatives who have to get additional income on top of what they can produce on their own small plots of land and in peak seasons perhaps some additional agricultural workers.

- Neither do the state backed patrons invest mainly in the *accumulation of land* and the development of the forces of production but strive for control of the local organs of the state, that is the land allotted to them instead of salary (*tarah bangho*), development programmes and political, administrative and to some extent even repressive powers. On top of their production on their own land plus the *tarah bangho* land they are not only able to corrupt some of the state funds but more important, to centralize substantial parts of the surplus produced by the *bulake* and others who are dependent on their economic and political patronage.

In order to be able to recognize the local organs of the state, the state backed patrons have to control not only the *bulake* but even more the "huge mass of people" that do not benefit from the capitalization of agriculture. Many of these people are displaced by patrons themselves and the *bulake* and are not able to get permanent jobs. Thus, they are not mainly subordinated within production.

On top of this the state backed patrons also invest in business outside agriculture. That is, not only in, for example, haulers but also in service and transport etc.

* Consequently no unified class of poor and landless peasants or semi-proletarian levies. Most of the agricultural wage work is carried out by petty farmers with ties to the *bulake* and patrons. Others have a variety of sources of income and are rarely permanently employed. Most often they complement petty commodity production related to agriculture, trade and services with temporary wage work, for example as harvesters in peak seasons. Thus they are not mainly exploited within production and therefore they do not have any visible class enemy to fight.

* Besides some seasonal agricultural labourers and more or less permanently employed workers within construction, trade and services, who are at least partly subordinated and exploited with the use of economic force, most of the subordination and exploitation is consequently carried out with the use of extra-economic power.

Family *bulake* and their subordinates

There has been a long discussion about the degree of concentration of land within Javaanse agriculture. In my book on the destruction of the PKI I maintained that the basis of the rural lords was rather centralization of surplus produced by peasants than concentration of their land. After the elimination of the peasant movement and under the enforcement of the green revolution there has, no doubt, been some concentration of land, especially during the late 60's and 70's. However, I think that the degree of concentration has been overestimated. Most of the studies tend to
focus more upon the distribution of land among the villagers — to stratify the population — than on measuring to what extent the unequal distribution of land is actually due to appropriation of land — a class analysis — or in mainly the effect of the increase of population, and thus varies with, for example the extent to which the inhabitants leave the village because there are jobs available in the urban areas.

An, however, attempts to look back and evaluate the developments since the late 70’s among scholars who have carried out intensive local studies during these years as well as preliminary data from the census project in figure 1 suggests support my earlier results that 30 - 35% — according to the new random even 30-40% — of the household benefit from the capitalization of agriculture and indicates that the concentration of land has not been substantial, particularly not since the late 70’s. The preliminary data from the censuses even suggest that the degree of absolute landlessness might have declined since 1976/77.

We add, this may mainly be due to the fact that, since the late 70’s, new jobs have been available outside many villages. But still at least some 30% of the households own land, according to Cullier et al. and some 75% of the households get income from farming and almost 90% can own some kind of land according to the censuses.

This, of course, means nothing about the degree of concentration among the landowners. There may be some few who control most of the land, whereas the majority only have very tiny plots. Generally it seems as if half of all households own only small plots of 0.5 ha or less, but they do still control as much as 1/3 of the total area — whereas only 8% of the farmers have more than 1 ha of land and control some 60% of the area. If we count both wet and dry land more than 60% are tiny farmers (less than 0.5 ha) and some 10% have more than 1 ha.

Thus, there are no big landowners who own or have totally monopolized land. Instead it is obvious that there are many petty peasants who have to get additional incomes besides their farming and who have to be controlled at least partly outside large units of production.

Now, how big are the relatively few large farmers? Are they landlords, semi-capitalist big farmers or merely smaller bulakas with relatively few labourers? First, there are figures on the distribution of ownership of all land (sanah = dry land). According to the censuses data only 0.2% of the households had more than 5 ha, 2.4% had 2-5 ha, 8.1% had 1-2 ha and 16.1% had 0.5-1 ha. We should also be aware of the fact that some landowners may rent in land in addition to their own, but it is perhaps even more interesting to examine the sources of income. Only some 2% of the households have rent as a major income. Furthermore, only some 13% had farm labour as their main income and 30% as their most important minor source — whereas farming was the only income for some 13%, the main income for more than 50% and most important minor source for some 20%. In addition farm labour as a main source of income decreased from 1976/77 till 1983 with as much as 31%.

I will not go into further details in this brief paper. But all indicators that I have access to reports and through interviews generally support my hypothesis that neither landlessness nor big capitalist farming in developing but rather relatively small bulakas. So far, thus, we can say that the bulakas are those of the beneficiaries of the state induced capitalization of agriculture who belong to the same 50% of the households which get their main income from agriculture and own more than 0.5 ha fertile land, i.e. now 25% of the households.

Furthermore it seems as if the bulakas — after having displaced unprofitable tenants, harvesters etc. — rely mainly on family labour. To this they add some labour in peak seasons — and these are mainly petty peasants or relatives, who have to get additional incomes. Some small family-bulakas may also need extra incomes besides their own farming. Exchange of services is not unusual, but in peak seasons most landowners have to work in their fields. There are of course also landless agricultural labourers working on bulak land. However, very few labourers are permanently employed, besides some few works less than 2% of the farmers used fully tied labour, according to the censuses.

However, the previously very common semi-tied relations, various intercropping agreements etc. are not as important as before. This is, of course, partly due to the fact that a whole lot of tenents have been displaced and that the bulakas are family bulakas. However, various tenancy agreements were also introduced to decrease harvesters. Such arrangements survive when necessary. And the fact that alternative jobs now
quite often are available outside agriculture also means that the hopes of labour may well be seen various agreements to other ease that he has some labour to peak season. Due to shortage of labour in these periods by many, however, have no other alternatives to use free labour and pay the workers much higher wages than before.\(^{22}\)

The substantial increase in real wages since the late 70's is of course related to the intensification of agriculture (several crops)\(^{23}\) and access to jobs outside agriculture, but it is probably also due to the fact that the job must be carried out faster and more efficiently now. Despite the relatively few investments in technology, there has also been some modest specialization and division of labour. This should make it easier for the workers to enforce somewhat better payment. However, since the workers are not permanently employed, the higher wages in peak seasons do not necessarily mean that their yearly incomes have increased.

State backed patrons and their subordinates

Neither historical nor contemporary figures on ownership of land disclose any substantial class of rural overlords. Still, any villager in rural Java experiences and is able to identify some real exploiters. Who are they? How do they enrich themselves and whom are they subordinating?\(^{24}\)

In my book on the RIK, I stressed the importance of analyzing the mode of exploitation in rural Java historically and in terms of centralization of surplus produced by dependent petty proprietors peasants rather than appropriation of peasants land, appropriation of land rent and/or exploitation of wage-workers. Also, I maintained that this mode of exploitation - the centralization - was the very basis for the strong patron-client relations and the dominant ideology in the rural areas.

Before 1965 the patrons needed the support of rather many clients in order to uphold their key positions in the local organs of the state and/or religious institutions - positions which were decisive for their centralization of surplus. Moreover, they could only use their "own" funds to pay for the patronage that was necessary in order to get the support of the clients.

After 1965, however, those of the patrons who were in favour of the new order and attached to the local organs of the state could, first, reduce the amount of patronage that had to be distributed in return for support (chiefly to direct central state support instead, often in the form of actual or likely material compensation). Secondly, during the late 60's and early 70's, a lack of a strong peasant movement, oil money and foreign aid made it possible for the central state to introduce the green revolution. Thus, the state backed patrons could add huge public subsidies to their "own" resources.

I will now come back to a closer look at the state backed patrons. But let me first stress that the central state intervention and green revolution caused a division among the rural lords. On the one hand, we find increasingly state dependent patrons related to the local administration. On the other hand there are more traditional petty patrons mainly related to the most often Muslim religious institutions. The latter often lack the backing of the state. But they are able to survive due to a relatively independent economy, political and at least ideological basis.\(^{25}\)

Generally, however, the traditional patrons are comparatively weak. They will merely get support outside their specific religious followers and their base of power within the old agricultural economy is gradually eroded by the ongoing capitalism. Even if the maulvi religious institutions are the only decisive independent ideological counterforce against the regime, the percentage of the total vote won by Islamic parties, for example, has decreased from 44% in 1955 to some 28 % in 1962.\(^{26}\)

As I have already indicated the important state backed patrons are to be found within or around the local organs of the state, not least on the village level. Most of the leaders are appointed. The highh council leaders' are de facto selected and since 1979 the village councils are even formally appointed.\(^{27}\)

One of the most important bases for the state backed patrons is the land allotted to the local administration instead of salay.\(^{28}\) According to one of the two promising studies on the subject that I have come across,\(^{29}\) the official land usually consists of the best land in the villages and covers as much as 15 - 20 % of the total area. There are rather many village officials
who have the right to bestow land, but generally most of them are related to the head. This family consensus covers 61 to 83% of the official land in the studied villages, that is between some 10 and 15% of the total land in the villages. Thus we can conclude that the head favors his relatives - adding to their private land some official fields as well.

But probably even more important is that the head and his "official" control most of the governmental development programmes. These include almost everything from agricultural development and labour reclassification to family planning. Some other important projects are controlled by the head at the district (kesatuan) and by the mayor at the sub-district (kecamatan) levels, for example education and health programmes. And parallel to this we find the local and regional military commanders, who supervise often command and function, generally without uniform, take up position as civil administrators or leaders.

The government development programmes have increased extensively with the rising oil revenue. First they are corrupted. According to the central government, some 56,000 officials and village leaders, for example, misappropriated credits in 1983. The missing credit amounted to Rp 10 billion, an increase since 1983 when the figure was Rp 7 billion (1 US$ is about Rp 800). In West Java 50% of the village apparatus were involved, corrupting more than half of the budget.

Probably even more important, however, are the channels to invest the state support in agricultural production related to one's own family or client hold. This can, for example, be done through the way in which irrigation credits are distributed and used. Other ways of investing control of state programmes in order to appropriate surplus produced by others include taking advantage of positions within various cooperative, for example, those trading agricultural products.

Naturally our peasants also make private investments, but perhaps not mainly in land and interestingly enough not so much in the development of the farm of production (e.g., for example, in bullies, pumps etc.) as in new and temporarily lucrative off farm businesses such as transport and trade.

The brief outline above thus indicates that the state-backed peasants strive mainly for the control of state powers and capital.

Thus they partly correct and partly invest the resources, particularly in production managed by clients but also in private businesses.

Consequently, neither the family hold nor the state-backed peasants regularly subordinate and repudiate the majority of the village population within various processes of production or as employees within trade, services etc. In order to get the support of the central government, he is able to stay in power and monopolize the local organs of the state the peasants therefore also have to "invest" in extra economic subordination of the majority of the rural population. This majority includes the many petty peasants, who still control some 1/3 of the land and only have to complement the income from their land with irregular wage work within or outside agriculture. Further, the peasants have sometimes still have to help the state to displace undesirable tenants and labourers. Moreover and more important they can subordinate the many landless who generally have irregular jobs and/or are self-employed. In addition very many of the villages are young people who are or run the risk of becoming unemployed. Some 1/3 of the population is under 20 years, and unemployment is worst among those who are 15-19 years. All of them cannot be controlled in schools, even if education and of course family planning, have been important "subordinating" as far.

It is thus the responsibility of the state backed peasants to support and sometimes administrate public works, see to it that the village - according to the law - are depoliticised, and that participation is channelized through and peoples' problems "solved" within corporate and top governed organizations (e.g., the organization for peasants, no matter if they are landless or hold). As long as the government can afford to "drop" projects, subsidies etc. to the villages this may be relatively easy to handle. Also, the peasants have to tackle religious institutions. For example buying off influential leaders by offering them lucrative positions as civil servants and then, after some time, demanding that they - like all other civil servants - have to join the state controlled corporation for state employees, KEMEN, whose members must be associated to the state controlled "party". Gilmar.

There have been some relatively dynamic years in rural Java since the late 70's. Good harvests, several crops per year and
many new jobs outside agriculture mostly, however, irregular and mainly in trade, services and construction. The rich have become much richer but the poor have not become poorer - but less poor - in absolute terms. In relative terms, however, the unequal distribution of wealth has worsen now. And with less oil money everywhere gets tighter. The state backed patrons get a more difficult job.

Conclusions

The above evaluation of the mainstream analyses and examination of microhypotesis (A') show that relatively few villagers are directly and permanently subordinated and exploited as tenants or labourers. Thus the main contradiction can be neither one between landlords and tenants nor between semi-capitalist farmers and agricultural workers. Consequently the attempts to further develop traditional radical analyses and strategical recommendations must be rejected. The only important clashes within agriculture are instead characterized by protests against the state from petty propertied villagers when they are threatened with proletarianization.

Why is this so? Why are so few villagers directly and permanently exploited and why are the conflicts mainly petty bourgeois protests against the expansion of capitalism?

The 
the 
are rather easy, small and they invest mainly in better varieties, several crops per year etc. and in tighter control of the surplus produced by the displacing of unpropertied tenants and labourers. Thus the 
are mainly on family labour and temporary work carried out by relatives among the petty-propertied peasants who need a lot of extra income.

The displaced tenants and labourers are no longer permanently exploited by the 
, but they may get extra payments during peak seasons. These temporary labourers may protest but are usually paid off since the 
have to get the job done and there may be shortage of labour. However, the family labour and the temporary petty peasant workers (often relatives) are less likely to revolt.

Neither do state backed patrons directly and permanently exploit a lot of villagers. They need some more agricultural labourers than the 
but not too many. And they employ some workers when they invest in off farm activities. But these labourers are also relatively few. Instead the patrons strive mainly for control of the local organs of the state including development programmes. These resources are then invested particularly in order to be able to centralize surplus produced by others - not least the 

Thus there is an obvious contradiction between state backed patrons and producing family 
. But the 
are very dependent on state subsidies monopolized by the patrons as well as their extra-economic protection against, for example, displaced tenants and labourers. Therefore the family 
may wish more freedom and decapitalization but have to restrict themselves to demands for more subsidies and protection.

The decisive role played by the patrons in the conflict between exploiters and labourers under the capitalization of agriculture is to control the majority of the villagers who are not directly and permanently subordinated within production, trade, transport, services etc. Among other things they have to handle petty peasants who are threatened by, for example, the effectivization of production on family 
land, expansion of plantations, buildings of factories, construction of dams etc.

This, of course, gives rise to protests from petty propertyed peasants. Sometimes the landless labourers rally behind, since they run the risk of losing their jobs and/or incomes from self employment. But they rarely protest against any direct exploiter, because they seldom have any permanent employment and thus neither a place within a collective of workers nor a visible main enemy.

What we are witnessing is in other words a state enforced and subsidized capitalization of agriculture under which state backed patrons monopolize, invest and profit from public powers and resources in the local setting, dependent family 
improve production and benefit, threatened petty peasants protest and most of the proletarianized villagers do not find any permanent jobs in production neither within nor outside agriculture but turn to self employment and temporary jobs - if outside agriculture usually within the expanding tertiary sector, rarely in manufacturing.
A new option?

Among Indonesianist observers it is often said that there is a kind of stalemate in rural Java. The peasant movement was eliminated in 1961/66. The trauma and fear of new massacres are still present. The regime's control is tight, not least in the villages. "The state dominates everything." The rich get richer, but the poor are also improving their standard of living, not relatively but in absolute terms. "With threats and some old money almost everyone can be bought".

Moreover, my studies show that the way in which rural capitalism expands undermines the common political analysis and strategic recommendations. It is already known that if the neoliberalists could not get massive support from the peasants - because the fear might enforce rural capitalism and thus eliminate the unity of the peasantry against feudalism - but had to fight directly for socialism supported only by the proletarians, then the revolution would have to be postponed for quite a while. Even more so in Indonesia, then, because in rural Java there is almost no coherent proletariat, and those who fight are not mainly labourers against rural capitalists but poor property villages who try to uphold petty commodity production against the state.

Common interest in democracy

However, it also follows from my studies that post-colonial agricultural optimism implies that the majority of the villagers have to be subordinated with the use of extra-economic force. Neither family ties nor state backed patrones monopolize land and means of production to the extent that the majority of the population have been "sufficiently" proletarianised. Furthermore, neither the petty peasants nor most of the landlords are permanently subordinated as workers within production, trade etc. but extra-

consequently, they may vary very different classes, fractions and modes of exploitation - including family labour and of course commodity producers - most people have one thing in common: they are to a large extent subordinated by extra-economic means. Consequently, they may have very different immediate socio-

economic interests, demands and certainly also ideologies. But almost everyone should have one interest: to remain - democratically - at the seat of the extra-economic force used against them.

Moreover, it is less likely that permanently employed workers within dynamic sectors of the rural economy take up the same demands for democracy, it may be more difficult to isolate them from the masses and keep them off with somewhat higher wages.

And if the poor property villages who fight the capitalist threat against petty commodity production take up the issue of democracy, they do not only have to rely on their own diminishing economic and political positions. On the contrary, they can then fight for and not only against something. And this something they have in common with the easy law enforcement, including the already proletarianized.

Finally, even the family tied, who are extra-economically subordinated by the state backed patrones, may rely behind some demands for democracy.

Different interests in democracy

However, democracy is essentially a means for different classes and social groups to promote their interests. But, the interest in democracy - its extension to various fields and activities and its forms - varies with the power of different classes and their bases - the way in which they control men, land and capital, produce and appropriate surplus, or are controlled and exploited.

The family tied, to begin with, certainly were more economic liberties against the patrones' monopolies and thus have a limited interest in democracy. But at some stage they are very dependent upon state subsidies and do not want them to be distributed to others as well. Moreover they need extra-economic production for their euro surplus and labour to be able to uphold their control over the surplus produced on their land.

Petty commodity producers are extremely extra-economically suppressed but one may doubt that they are interested in a democracy that restricts their private right to decide over their small
properties as well. In addition they are non-economic class and religious committees, not just civil or military ones but also, for example, traditional village groups (desa adat). Workers, on the other hand, may now be focused on democracy in the workplace, thereby lessening the community's general and the non-permanently employed in particular benefit.

Finally, various revolutionary leaders and organizations in rural areas have always been very much dependent upon the charisma and perception of their leaders (or reciprocity). Thus, of course, is essentially an effect of the predominant mode of exploitation, centralization of surplus through patron-client relation.

Consequently, I maintain, that only struggle for locally rooted and total democracy may unite most of the various extra-economically subordinated classes and social groups.

If democracy is not built from below, locally rooted, democratic classes and social groups will take over. If it is not total - i.e. as far as possible from various restrictions to protect certain class groups and interests - the most powerful groups and classes will take over and subordinate the struggle for democracy to their specific interests. If, for example, family building enforced their interests, the concept of people's rule will be restricted and hardly at all combined with people's power and people must have some power to have something to rule. Thus in such a situation the democracy will be a formality for most of the exploited and exploited.

On the contrary, if the struggle is about locally rooted total democracy, this may give the majority of the rural population an instrument whereby they themselves can increase the powers that they have to fight for and use in order to raise their standards of living, get new freedom, justice etc. Thus, locally rooted total democracy actually cannot be demanded from anyone but has to be created during the struggle against extra-economic repression and exploitation.

Extra-economic basis of the enemy

Not only are most people extra-economically subordinated and exploited, but the very basis of the ruling state backed patron-client relationships and power for example, their political, administrative and economic control is based on the local organs and members of the state. They invest these powers just as a pure capitalist invests his capital. And this has to be fought. Struggles for realisation of land in the villages, 233 for example, is no direct threat against the patron, since they do not mainly base their power on private ownership of land - but it is a threat against the relatively small family heads, who are hardly the main enemy.

Moreover, I feel that the post-colonial agrarian capitalist in general and the state backed patron in particular are based on the control and use of extra-economic powers imply that consequently struggles for locally rooted total democracy are based to be revolutionary, a threat against the system itself.

The importance of fighting the extra-economic basis of the patron does not, however, mean that one should give them a chance to use their economic power - including their arms. It means rather the opposite, i.e. to undermine their ability to use their powers. 233 Once again, this implies that one cannot fight for democracy "out all costs", but has to create a locally rooted and total democracy during the struggle. For it is impossible to fight state backed patron on their own arena, with the instruments of which they have much more and which they can use more skillfully. Thus one cannot take their powers from them, but must undermine them, basically by for example - creating independent cooperatives, fora for free discussion, consultation, education and, of course, make attempts to paralyse the state apparatus when an alternative democratic civil society has become viable for most people.

The ongoing struggle - is it for democracy?

Consequently, I suggest (hypothesis A) that current Indonesian attempts to go beyond traditional inside analyses and strategies related to the agricultural population are beginning to be characterized by struggles for the creation of locally rooted total democracy, and that the experience supports my argument that this may be a new opening for radical political change.
The non-governmental organizations (NGOs) now are new even as the old political organizations and mass movements have been gradually prohibited and the new ones are either carefully controlled or directly linked to the state. Furthermore, non-governmental political organizations and mass movements are allowed on the village level. The villagers should be a "floating mass." Thus, most of the old leaders have been isolated from the masses.

Then, during the 70's, when a new generation of concerned young and educated people desired technocratic ideas and positions and wanted to reach the villages, the "floating mass" doctrine forced them to form alternative and more informal organizations related to specific development problems of the villagers. Moreover, they also had to go beyond most of the old, extremely authoritarian and centralized organizational structures monopolized by some or less corrupted leaders. Due to the situation, these young and concerned persons - often graduate students - therefore formed a new set of non-governmental, formally apolitical development organizations (NGO).

By now there are hundreds of registered NGOs and thousands of unregistered local groups. However, rather many of these NGOs are, for example, old charity associations, religious organizations and institutions that often work in close cooperation with the government (more or less administratively). What they cannot be included among the new generation of activating groups.

In the formation of the new NGO's, the activists could refer, among other things, to established ideas about community development within reputed international aid and development agencies. Therefore - but of course also for political reasons - many of the new NGOs could initially be some extent rely on external funds. And in line with the community development ideas, the new NGO's could legitimize themselves as additional and complementary in relation to state development programmes. But the NGOs that carry out activities in the villages can also draw on an old Indonesian tradition of community organizations. And at least some of them were further developed by the commune during the 50's and 60's and made somewhat less authoritarian and vertical and instead more democratic and horizontal, class-based. Moreover, the new NGOs aim at reaching the poor. They reject modernization theories which give priority to growth and argue instead that what matters is the process of development, not high output etc. - i.e., that the poor themselves become engaged and have a say in their own attempts to raise their standard of living.

The NGO-activities cover almost everything from health, environmental benefits against the villages, programmes to help peasants and other petty commodity producers to raise their production and face cooperatives to legal aid to at least some of the very many who are repressed, deprived of their land, etc.

I am not trying to say that the NGOs are important in quantitative terms. Compared with all the governmental projects "dropped" in the village they are marginal. But they usually reach the poor. They begin to stand out as the - or at least a - civil alternative. They offer examples of how people can do things on their own. They educate and train cadres. And what is more, their importance is not limited to the projects but also include the activities - and consciousness - that they initiate.

Neither am I trying to say that the NGOs, with the exception of the increasingly important legal aid organisations, are mainly at the creation of a unfettered democracy. Their point of departure is usually development and social justice for specific sections of the rural poor. However, many of the NGOs have rather authoritarian structures. And some need, for example, to work in close contact with "brakes" in the central state apparatus to get protection from the feudal state, become legitimized in front of the (immediately threatened regional and local authorities and thereby, finally, reach out to the common villagers. But despite the fact that most of the young, concerned and well educated activists have a broad historical perspective and political experience, the situation in general and the limited space for action in particular have made many of them - and those who have been radicalized - more and more interested in locally rooted and non-constricting democracy in order or reach their developmental aims. Now they tend to solve specific development problems by initiating activities among the poor themselves which can sustain, spread and resist attempts from outside or state backed parties to take over, the work has to be carried out in
domestic force. This experience and protests against the rulers' use of coercive economic forces against their targets, appears to be increasingly unifying factors between various progressive NGOs and their specific projects.

Another way of indicating the importance of the NGOs is to examine the responses they get from the regime. Since long there have been a lot of rumours, attempts to take over, shut off, cause splits etc. Especially regional and local authorities have felt threatened. And at present the government has introduced a new law to increase state control over NGO members and activities and enforcing them to rally behind the state 'ideology'.

It remains to be seen how the NGOs adapt to the new situation and especially how much of independent self-maintaining activities and processes, with their own dynamics, the NGOs have been able to initiate so far.

New Muslim Trends

Many of the new generation of NGOs are Muslim. Critical ideas are also emerging within some of the religious schools (madrasahs). Just as during the anti-colonial struggle Muslim organisations and institutions are the strongest individual civil movement opposing the state with an economic basis of its own. Among the new development oriented NGOs, the question of religion and an Islamic state is less important than moral issues. "Is the person the pilgrimage is mentioned in one verse only, but social justice in twenty-three verses", says one of the new leaders. There are some influences from liberation theology in the Philippines and Latin America. And the aim is not to educate religious centres but moral cases. The New and the City are antibiotic and destroy traditional values, threaten the small peasants and other petty producers. In contrast this is a local oriented and self sustained development is proposed and sought for.

But the authoritarian structures are still very important, especially in the villages and in the provinces - even if many new Muslim NGOs are trying to tackle the problem. And the devoted Muslim communities in general and religious scholars and students in particular are still somewhat isolated from other villages, despite the attempts to take up development issues and projects.

This isolation also upheld the vertical structures and ideas as against examples of class and exploitation. Activists who seek protection and are allied within the radicalized Muslim communities are presumably aware of this in order not to find themselves in the same type of blind alley as did the PRI within another cultural tradition of vertical non-class based loyalties in rural areas (pqjkl Ngharen).

Communist without force

The new NGO and Muslim radicalism is related to a young generation of activists who partly experienced the 1970s period as growing up. The old progressive nationalists and communists are carefully controlled. Most of them are politically dead and passive or - as some few - still up with and analysed by invalid doctrines. These are, however, also persons with a unique integrity who continue the struggle for socialism but are prepared to reevaluate and to question old doctrines. Instead they try to find new roads together with young progressives in various NGOs. Their main aim so far is of course to contribute with their experience, make people more conscious and help them, for example, by forming small cooperatives. It is all very modest.

For many communists it is, however, not necessarily natural to fight for more democracy than what is needed in order to reestablish their own organizations and to mobilize people. With the words of one of the old, recalcitrant and active leaders: "Even if I personally agree with the argument that the struggle for democracy must be much more than tactics during the first phase of the struggle for socialism and rather the essence in a long term strategy, I would not dare to say among the comrades, as long as they also give priority to democracy and do not hinder my move far reaching we, I tend, therefore, to postpone the issue."
3. WORKING AND WORKING POPULATIONS

Political analysis and strategies

The most important results of attempts to take the effects of the destruction of the PRI and the rapidly spreading industrial capitalism in Indonesia into consideration in order to further develop traditional radical analyses of class contradictions and thus also strategic recommendations is a renewed emphasis on the conflict between capital and labour and consequently the importance of domestic class struggles in general and workers' struggle in particular.

First, it is argued that the Indonesian opposition against the New Order has been precipitated by factors such as corruption within the framework of the dependency theories. This has been gradually institutionalized, tied up with the students. The result is liberal middle class dissatisfaction and a more specified theory about a parasitic bureaucratic capitalist state blocking development in general and civil-private concern in particular. The recommendations have been technocratic - not political. And most important, the opposition, stimulated by this sort of agitation, has not paid any interest or all to how people actually are exploited. However, it is maintained that this tendency was totally bypassed by the many urban and rural labour protests, strikes etc. that came about in the late 1970's.

Secondly, it is argued that these labour protests were the result of the emergence of a new generation of young workers within the new new economic since the early 70's. The result of the rapid industrialization. Moreover the workers were hit by desperate cuts in real wages beginning with 50% devaluation in the rupiah in late 1978, which caused at growing industrial opposition through support on the world market. 11

Thus, this attempts to further develop old analyses and strategies by stressing the conflict between capital and labour during with the presently no popular rejection, among international radical scholars, of the old dependency paradigm. In against the old doctrine of blocked capitalist development in the third world, the importance of peasants' struggle and more or less (re)organization against imperialism with a so called (national) bourgeoisie it is now argued that capitalism is not blocked at all. On the contrary, there is a rapid process of industrialization promoted by the one hand international capital and on the other hand the local state, which in the case of Indonesia relies extensively on oil income. People are not only proletarianized but most often also becoming wage workers and members of an increasingly coherent working class.

Of course nobody denies that many proletarianised do not become full members of the new working class but are more or less marginalised. But it goes with the main argument that the workers are the decisive factor in the contemporary process of development. They are the only social force that can strike and sabotage production. And production is the very basis of the capitalists and the state. Marginalized workers, on the contrary, can easily be fought in the streets.

Further, nobody denies that the state is important. But the workers resist face the state in their daily job and during their regular protests against the capitalists, the forests etc. - but only when the stage big strikes.

Finally it is said that it may very well be that there are a lot of complacent ways of subordinating labour and that the capitalists sometimes succeed in dividing and ruling the workers. But the workers never in comes with each other than with the management, no matter whether they are permanently employed or not. And usually they understand this perfectly well. 12

This type of analysis thus means a compliance for various trade unionist strategies. The unionist issue has indeed become at least one rallying point both inside and outside Indonesia. Communists and socialists, Christians and Muslims and others can work together. But it also follows from the analysis - and the balance of power among the activists - that the old doctrine of imperialism as a primary of progressive capitalism returns to the surface. And it is brought to the fore by the fact that if capitalism develops, the option to write a majority of the population behind slopes against an underdeveloped imperialism disappears. Thus, capitalism has to be fought by the main exploited class - the workers - and finally, when it is not progressive anymore, to be replaced by socialists.
Turning to the level of what actions to carry out, one should first take note of the absence of already formulated strategies. Nobody denies the fact that the regime was involved in the formation of and still effectively controls the only approved unions within the private sector—coordinated by the coalition FMTU (Fronte Miringuao de Trabalhadores) and ICU (International Confederation of Free Trade Unions) and WCL (World Confederation of Labour). To this they add good relations—approved by the regime—with, for example, KFPI (Kongres Perjuangan Rakyat Indonesia), governed by the West German Social Democratic Party.

However, most of the progressive activists—such as those active within the framework of the FMTU, at least informally and on the grass root level—are usually from an independent local movement which is then screened, institutionalized and “adjusted” as a local branch of the FMTU. Any attempt to form alternative formal organizations would be like raising a banner telling the regime that “look, here we are, come and crack down on us.”

Furthermore all agree on the fact that very little if anything can be done among the state employed workers and civil servants. They are not even allowed to join a union but are forced to rally behind the cooperative organization for state employees, KBRIPI (Kongres Buruh Republik Indonesia), headed by the minister of interior.

Finally everyone knows of course that if the FMTU and the local management are not able to domesticate the workers, the management can just call upon the local organs of the state—or give a ring directly to the “minister of manpower” (bellow), former head of the KNPB (Komite Nasional Pembela Bangsa, the National Security Command) to “send the marines”, i.e. the police and appropriate army units. Strikes are no longer forbidden and the official doctrine is that the relations between the manager and his labourers should be like those between a father and his sons. Strikes one should not talk about workers (krukja) but use the term “employees” (karyawan).

According to this analysis, state is, thus, based on the capitalists’ power and can only be fought through the undermining of capitalist production.

When it comes to the question of how to tackle this tight situation there are, however, some different points of view. Obviously none of the formal and informal labour leaders who are not compel to belong to a new, young and historically inexperienced generation. In the other hand they are usually not removed by having tied up with old doctrines and leaders. Most of the labour protests—generally within the new and modern units—that started in the late 60’s were, truly locally rooted.

Of course this does not conclude that some of the young leaders looked for guidance among those of the old generation who uphold their integrity. Among the latter there are almost no former communists, or at least not within Indonesia. There are eliminated or assassinated but there are some leaders who were previously attached to the unions that were not prohibited directly after 1965 and which were related to the former socialism, christianism, animism and nationalistic parties. These unions and most of their leaders were decimated and copied during the late 60’s. In 1973 they were forced to join the FMTU. But some individuals are “outside”. Among these the former socialists voice the need for the training of cadre, the importance of planned actions as against “random spontaneous activities” etc. while others are more and more “opportunists.”

However, the former communists were active before the very many new industries were built and usually cannot rely on these old networks. Moreover, old leaders with integrity are extremely rare and most of the activists are new and young and work more or less on their own in the shop floor level, formally or informally. Many of them seem to be less antistatist than those who are related to old socialists. Thus, the former are prepared to work in cooperation with anyone who is not extreme. And even if they may be rather isolated, these are informal networks, for example mutual contact when they look for legal aid against the regime.

So, my knowledge almost all new leaders claim that they try to give priority to very concrete issues such as wages and other benefits. And during the present recession such energy is spent on trying to afford the jobs. The situation for the workers is so tight that they have to fight for their survival. Thus, it is argued, they cannot afford the luxury of giving top priority to the right to organize and even less to democracy.
the idea is that by taking up concrete and specific issues, the workers will realize that they also have to struggle for their right to equal pay. This is a rallying point. The CLAs are one possible line of attack, for there have to be set up in the factory level and then used to isolate workers within different units of production from each other. However, CLAs may easily be used to press down wages to an equal minimum level.61

Finally, the new activists generally seem to give priority to work within the new, modern and relatively large units where it is relatively easy to unite the workers despite different employment conditions, ethnic backgrounds etc. In larger and more profitable units it is also easier to come to terms with local managers, who want to prevent disturbances in the more modern process of production and do not necessarily call upon any intervention immediately. Moreover, most of the new leaders are rooted within these units and want to give priority to their own local struggle.62 We are fully occupied with our own problems and cannot give priority to contacts with others outside the gate. The best we can do is to disseminate good examples that others may follow.63

Reduction of struggles and strategies

The above chapter of political struggles and attempted strategies differ from the implications of my previous theoretical outline about the emergence of post-colonial industrial capitalism presented in the introduction of this paper. Having appeal to this theoretical outline I suggest therefore (hypothesis 5.3) that a confrontation of the political struggles and strategies with actual developments (i.e. an evaluation) will disprove that:

- Conflicts between labour and capital are not characterized by a relatively unified working class fighting capitalists. On the contrary, the workers are seriously divided among themselves.

Moreover, industrial labourers are isolated from the majority of the wage workers.

- When industrial labourers strike and in other ways try to disrupt production in order to reach their aims, they do not decisively paralyse and undermine the capitalists' main bases of power. It is, in the contrary, rather easy for the managers to handle labour protests and to continue business activities with the support of their partners within the state apparatus.

A wave of strikes and protests

In the Suharto Stregse trial - the main student leader during the so-called student affair on early 1974 - it was only briefly mentioned that some bus drivers and dock workers had been rallied behind discontent students, marines and officers in the latter's attempt to change the course of the new order regime: the only sectional threat so far.64 Labour protests were not decisive in the mid-70's. The reconstruction and further development of the industrial sector was only under way. And so against the economic crisis during Suharto's last years, there had been a remarkable economic recovery. Real wages "even" began to come close to the standards of the late colonial period.65 Thus, in 1976 the ILO reported only 6 labour disputes in Indonesia with 1 420 workers involved.66

But the industrial expansion that had just begun continued rapidly. And in an attempt to promote exports, the economy was, as I have already mentioned, devoluted by 50% in the end of 1979. Only by travelling around outside the gates in Jakarta's industrial areas during same few days in early 1979, when the effects of the devaluation had reached the workers, could I literally see how strikes for compensation erupted. At that time many intellectual dissidents privately suggested that the strikes that I had come across should be analyzed as part of the conflicts between leading generals. Some of them may have mobilized workers against other generals. But other men it was decisive that most of the strikes and protests were genuine and led by informal young leaders. And in 1980 the official figures were 198 strikes with 21 660 workers involved.67 This should be added that a strike in Indonesia was and is very serious and looked upon as a threat against the security of the state as a whole. Thus, other forms of collective protests were and are even more common. Most frequent - but
difficult to document - is of course the steady individual everyday resistance. But since the political manoeuvres and attempts to be evaluated stress collective and organized workers struggle I am concentrating on such "institutionalized" activities.)

The wave of strikes and protests continued for quite some time, but ran aground when the military made powerful interventions and when the effects of the economic recession in the oil industrial countries reached Indonesia. From 1982 and onwards there have been a lot of close downs and lay offs in badly hurt sectors such as textiles, clove and cigarettes, durable consumer goods (e.g. motorcycles) and construction.60 Hence, there was no new major resistance against the second Deceleration (27 D) in March 1981, despite the lack of compensation. In the very same month the commander of KEPAMANDAN (National Security Council), Admiral Sularto, was made Minister of "Decontrol" and the former head of BAKIN (the intelligence) Detajo Hameem became his secretary general.70

Of course collective protests and some strikes are still there. And it is easy to underestimate the amount of cloths since mass media have been "subdued" not to report on labour conflicts, but the negative trend from the workers' point of view is invisibly confirmed by all of my informants among activists, journalists and scholars - even if they add that the increasingly dangerous strikes sometimes have been replaced by slowdowns.71

Labour vs. capital - but where?

Obviously there were very few reported strikes and collective protests within small units (excluding the rubber sub contracting farms) where the absolute majority of the working class is employed.72

Neither were, of course, the employed and/or self employed within the informal sector involved. Here we find the absolute majority of the non agricultural labour force as a whole. (Some 80 % of the workers in the industrial field) worked in home industries in the late 70's, for example, and even in Jakarta some 50 - 60 % of the labour force are fixed within the informal sector.73 Thus, much of the discontent among the majority of the workers was presumably but unfortunately channeled through the extensive anti-government state that took place on Central and East Java in late 1980.74

Moreover there were very few actions within state owned units.75 Any kind of resistance is strictly prohibited within the state owned sector. Also, the civil servants were relatively well compensated for the sacrifices.76 When, despite this, the public hospital staff in Jakarta and some Gedeu airline pilots went on strike in 1980 they were, among other things, replaced by military drivers and air force pilots.77 And one of the few options for workers on state owned plantations seemed to be to refuse to take up any employment at all when the wage offered to them is too low.78 But very few can, of course, afford to stay outside the gates.

The employers' responses

Hence, only a tiny minority of the labourers were involved in the relatively extensive strikes and collective protests during the late 70's and early 80's, none of those working in private, relatively large and modern units. Now, then, did the capitalists within these units handle the resistance? How did they go about subordinating the workers?

The employers' responses had two main components which I will discuss: first, they created a level staff and a group of relatively few, privileged and well disciplined permanently employed workers as against an army of less disciplined, cheap and temporary workers who were easy to lay off. Second, they drew as much as possible on the capacity of primarily the state to subordinate labour outside the processes of production.

During the Babakan period many staff members were active union leaders who did not necessarily rally behind the employers.79 Now, however, they are usually prohibited to join a union. Moreover, staff personnel do of course also complain, but usually they do not seem to risk their important privileges, such as relatively good schools for the children, free medicine, good connections within Gedeu, etc. by confronting the employer.80

During the Babakan period the unions fought quite successfully against lay-offs and for the right of all workers to be permanently employed, however, under the new order, and especially the late 80's, the employers have made their utmost to mechanize production and thereby to get rid of many unprofitable workers. To take one example only, the labour force within the batik industry outside
Jakarta has decreased by about 80% since 1973. In addition, the real wages for factory workers have decreased by more than 75% since 1973.  

In addition, the employment rate has drastically decreased the rate of permanent workers and increased the amount of wage slaves who can be dismissed at any time.  

The permanently employed are carefully supervised and tested. They are usually skilled or strategically important within the increasing mechanized processes of production, where each job may be simple but is an necessary link in the chain. Moreover, the permanently employed and skilled are better paid than unskilled temporary workers. The difference may be as high as 20%. But even so, the workers still live on a low salary. The difference is relatively low, some 5% according to the World Bank.  

The non-permanently employed workers, on the other hand, are not a unified collective but professional, casual, seasonal, contract, sub-contract, river or family workers. The professional laborer is next to be a tenant with low salary for a short period of time. But these are cases where they have worked for the same capitalist for a long time. Many of the casual laborers are de facto permanent day laborers. But they cost less than the permanently employed and are easier to get rid of during a recession or when they protest, for example. Semi-official figures say that almost half of the dismissed between 1973 and 1981 were accused of union activities.  

And during the present recession the first to be dismissed are workers in general. Seasonal laborers and contract laborers are usually used on plantations etc. However, contract workers are also very common within construction and similar sectors. And they are even more frequent in areas where there is a shortage of labor, at least in peak periods. There are also more and more sub-contracted workers, i.e., workers employed for specific periods by a broker who then sells the workers on contract to a logging company or a plantation, for example, particularly in the outer islands where there is a constant lack of labor. These subcontracted workers are mostly de facto forced laborers. These are also non-wage employees, for example some beach persons who do not get paid wages but have to live from tips only. Finally it is quite common that plantation workers, for example, expect the children of the employed mother or father to assist them without special pay.  

The second main component in the employees resistance follows from the attempt to employ as few workers as possible. Therefore a lot of the substitution of the labor force has to be taken care of outside the process of production. To begin with, the employers obviously try to rely on domesticating ideologies and institutional arrangements in the community, Orla Nester has shown that the workers in the Tangerang district, west of Jakarta, staged such mass militant and collective actions as their counterparts in, among other places, the area between Jakarta and Bogor. Her explanation is that the workers in Tangerang were extra-economically very subordinated both within and outside the factory gate by, for example, contractors, informal supervisors in the surrounding villages and the martial ideology. It is also illustrative that more than half of the strikes in Jakarta itself took place within the tobacco and food trade area.  

So this should also be the frequent employment of young and unmarried women. Just as young men, these women do not have financial responsibility for a whole family. Also, many girls tend to look upon themselves as temporary workers, who do not have to fight for a better future as workers but as wives. And as women in a market world, it is easier to discipline female than male workers.  

But most important, the employers draw extensively on the capacity of the colonial organs of the state to control labor. On the one hand the state operates indirectly. As already mentioned, it has restricted the workers' right to organize and it has actively contributed to the creation of one single and completely demoralized organization of unions, the PIIK. Also, strikes and other forms of collective protests are, of course, de facto forbidden. Instead, so called Frozen Wage labour relations (frozen-wage) are enforced.
and propagated in various courses for union leaders and young
labourers (with financial support from, among others, the World
Bank and West German Social Democrats).  59

According to the "minister of manpower", strikes are "certainly
allowed by the law, (i.e. in "non-vital" factories, O.K.) but many
people do not read the full text of this law which, by the way,
is not yet operational, because the measures necessary for its
implementation have not been taken. Moreover, one must have
perception to strike. And for sure I will not give permission to
strike." 60 The state also helps keeping down the wage level.
In doing so it may even be too effective. The management in modern
units sometimes finds it difficult to buy off strategically
important labourers in order to keep production going; 61 but least
important, the state also prevents the workers in different units
of production from communicating with each other. And journalists
are "tabooed" not to report on labour conflicts. 62

On the other hand, various regimes of the state are constantly
prepared to intervene directly if the above more indirect measures
are not sufficient. There has been an increased militarization of
labour relations since 1979. 63 It is quite common that retired -
and sometimes even still active - officers take up positions as
personal managers, for example. In addition, soldiers and policemen
often work as guards and watchmen. 64 As soon as protecting
labourers cannot be effectively handled at the local level, the
manager calls the police and/or local army unit.

As head of SUPRMINS (the National Security Command) Admiral
Sulomo ordered direct military intervention in labour conflicts
and also enforced a so called early detection system, to detect
and prevent labour disputes. This was done in cooperation with
the "ministry of manpower", the Chamber of Commerce and Trade
(KAMEH) and the FREE. 65 66 In 1983, when Sulomo himself became
"minister of manpower" as already mentioned, he further developed
this system and established, among other things, a "manpower
crisis management centre" within the ministry "to resolve a conflict
of interest between management and labour before the conflict turns
into open crises; to localize the conflict and encourage both sides
to go to the negotiation table (...), and if it turns into a crisis,
to prevent it from spreading". There are two levels, the policy
making centre and the action force group. The task of the latter is
"to present a dispute form spreading and to cope with the dispute
at the spot". 67 Finally, Sulomo has ordered all local organs of
his ministry (the so called K晴ringi) to report local labour
problems to his office by telephone or letter. 68

After the appointment of Admiral Sulomo as "minister of manpower",
genuine leaders have, as I have already indicated, usually tried to
prevent the excessively repressive direct military interventions
by turning from strikes to slow downs, for example. 69 Frequently,
however, my informants say that the police and army tend to inter-duce these more passive actions also. And the management
frequently refuse to negotiate with the sometimes genuine labour
leaders at the local level. 70

The workers' response

The capitalists, then, met workers' resistance in private, relatively
large and modern units by employing as few workers as
possible - at least permanent ones - and relied mainly on extra-
economic subcontracting outside production. Now, then, did and do
the workers in general and their leaders in particular respond to
these measures? At large, they have not fought against the decisive
extra-economic subcontracting but retreated into an increasingly
narrow traditional trade unionism.

Besides general demands for higher wages, allowances etc. -
and actions in favour of dismissed leaders during the process of
conflict - many disputes were caused by temporary labourers wanting
to have similar benefits as the permanently employed. 71 These
cases divided among the labourers. But at least most of the
workers related to the companies in question were involved. However,
it is my impression 72 that the main effect of the capitalists' measures
is a tendency towards defence of primarily the more or
less permanent workers in relatively large scale and modern units.
This trend has, of course, become even more important due to the
recession in recent years with a lot of close downs, lay-offs etc.
Those who have had a chance to defend themselves are the skilled
workers - with some bargaining power in the labour market - and
key workers within modern processes of production - with some
bargaining power at the workplace. 73 "The workers are prepared
to do a lot of things" says a well informed scholar and former activist, "but they cannot afford to lose their jobs, and next to that they give priority to demands for better payment. Struggles for the right to organize, gains at formal unit among the working class etc. are left behind."

This is even more so since the PRI tends to concentrate on the more or less permanently employed workers. The genuine leaders at the local level on the other hand have no chance to form alternative unions. And when they mobilize workers, the local unions are usually taken over or at least carefully watched by the PRI, supported by the management and various organs of the state. The genuine leaders are, thus, caught by the system. And when they have to show that militant actions are worth while anyway they may have to give even more priority than the PRI-leaders to workers with some bargaining power of their own.

Thereby the already tiny minority of the working class -- not to talk about the total non agricultural labour force -- that can take up collective actions against their exploiters becomes even more narrow. Unions are present only within very few companinies. They are usually dismantled by neo-liberal strategies. And a recent study in two of Java's towns showed that 90% of the women workers had never even heard about the PFL. In this sense we should add that some 50% of the labour force are children between 10 and 14 years, who are even less likely to be represented by the unions.

Finally, and most important, the main way of subordinating labour -- the use of extra-economic powers -- are ended and fought even less than some years ago. Meanwhile, late nineties with repression and exploitation among the majority of the Indonesian labourers is channelled through non-class based religious, ethnic and regional movements. The recent September 1998 riots in Tanjungpinang, the old harbour district in Jakarta, when multination took the lead, is an example of likely effects.

**Evaluation of analysis**

How can we explain the above revealed contradictions between, on the one hand, the political progresses and preliminary strategies and, on the other hand, actual developments? Why is it, in other words, that the conflicts between labour and capital were not dramatized by a relatively unified working class that effectively began to undermine and paralyze the decisive basis of capitalist power through attempts at radical unionism? Why were -- on the contrary -- only some of the workers in private and relatively large and modern units involved -- i.e. a tiny minority of the working class as a whole? How could the employers successfully cut down the number of workers in those companies, except the staff, minimize and in relative terms favour the permanently employed and two most of the work force into an internally divided army of cheap temporary workers? And why could capitalists rely mainly on an extraneous subordination of labour outside production and successfully use that basis of power to neutralize threats against their traditional capitalist bases within production?

In order to try to answer these questions I suggest that we accentuates the analytical premise of the obviously faulty progress and imperfectual radical unionism. I suspect that a consideration of the basically summarised political analysis in the beginning of chapter 5 (assessing the conflict between workers and capitalists under rapid state promoted industrialization) with the actual development of industrial capitalism and the role of the state will show that the analysis is misleading.

Furthermore, drawing on my preliminary contribution to a theory of the rise of post-colonial capitalism, briefly presented in the introduction of this paper, I suggest (hypothesis 2) that the evaluation of the analysis will indicate that the following main factors, types of accumulation, subordination and exploitation characterize the expansion of industrial capitalism and explain the actual conflicts revealed above:

- The decisive contradiction under the rapidly expanding industrial capitalism is not between private capitalists served by the state and their workers but between, on the one hand, post-colonial capitalism working from within the state and their businesses partners and, on the other hand, the labour force as a whole.
- The post-colonial capitalists are the ruling fraction of the capitalist class and emerged from within the state apparatus.
They are not only corrupting public administration. Moreover, they turn their extraordinary political, administrative and military control over the economy in general and labour in particular into personally monopolized commodities. They turn these commodities into capital by either trading them to or investing them in state owned corporate companies or joint ventures with foreign as well as domestic "real" capitalists. In the former case, the post-colonial capitalists have their own managers. In the latter case, the business partners take care of the management.

The commodities that the post-colonial capitalists trade and/or invest include mainly production and market monopolies, concessions on land and natural resources, subsidies and credits (usually derived from oil income and international aid). Of special interest, however, is another commodity that is in a prerequisite for the whole system: In order to make as much profit as possible, the post-colonial capitalists must effectively subordinate the majority of the labourers as well as the marginalized part of the petty bourgeoisie by extra-economic means over the processes of production. This is because the dynamic state and private companies - to which the post-colonial capitalists will have in which they invest their products - only need a limited number of workers.

* In order to "provoke" their products, the post-colonial capitalists have a staff of, on the one hand, political and economic bureaucrats and, on the other hand, military and police officers.

Since this staff is not officially the senior servants only of the post-colonial capitalists but of society as a whole - or at least of all the powerful classes and fractions - and since it does not have an economic basis of its own (as do the post-colonial capitalists) - the staff personnel have an important degree of relative autonomy. In the final analysis, however, they will presumably prefer to support and draw on the class power of the masters who give them most revenues. If not, when they correct these revenues and invest them privately, they may be labelled bureaucratic capitalists - mainly bureaucrats but to some extent also private capitalists. 

Finally, the staff in its turn govern and discipline two sectors of society - the administrators and the soldiers.

Modern capitalism in most third world countries desperately need production and market monopolies, concessions, subsidies, credits and an effectively subordinated labour force. Since these factors of production are controlled, traded and/or invested and then turned into capital by the post-colonial capitalists, private "real" capitalists have to become their business partners. Together they tend to form oligarchic finance houses.

The foreign business partners include transnational corporations that invest themselves in production but also the increasingly important finance capitalists who prefer to lend out their capital. Essentially the Chinese so called "credit" (finance) are predominant, but there are also rather many "modern príncipes" (native businessmen), not least as subcontractors of the state and financial houses and within the rapidly expanding modern service and transport sectors.

Most companies are relatively modern. Their productivity may thus be diametric to old príncipes businesses engaged in traditional sectors and without protective cooperation with the post-colonial capitalists. However, besides new materials most investments in the modern sectors take place within the framework of import-substitution. Consequently the productivity is rarely internationally competitive and the companies need sustained protection.

The private capitalists take care of management and employ the workers. But traditional príncipes employees are threatened by the rapid expansion of advanced capitalism and increasingly driven out of business. And as I have pointed out before, the managers within the dynamic modern sectors only employ regularly, subordinates and directly exploit a minority of the labourers.

* Consequently the majority of the non agricultural labourers do not constitute a relatively coherent working class. Besides the lower civil servants and soldiers most of them survive within the urban informal sector. Since we find the petty production, trades and services that have not been eliminated by the rapid expansion of capitalism but flourish instead on its margin.
Many are self-employed, family or in other ways client labourers. Many are temporarily employed. Most of the temporary workers within the modern sectors of the economy have to rely on additional incomes within the informal sector.

Therefore most of the subordination of the non-agricultural labour force - frequently combining wage labour with petty bourgeois self-employment - has to be carried out outside the company gates in general and outside production in particular. This task cannot be handled by the "real" capitalists but has to be taken care of by the post-colonial capitalists who have access to the appropriate state apparatus.

Post-capitalism?

There is no independent, capitalist class or function in Indonesia. The capitalists all need state support or at least protection. Foreign capitalists need it, no matter how influential and powerful they may be. Even scholars stressing the predominance of appropriation and inequality in Indonesia's dependent position within the world economy agree. The Chinese Labour need it. Even scholars and activists arguing that the Chinese are the real rulers agree. The petit bourgeois need it. Scholars and activists who maintain that the petit bourgeois constitute a kind of progressive national bourgeoisie sometimes even argue that the weak petit bourgeois need special state support in order to survive. And no one, of course, disputes the fact that all the new subcontractors - within construction or consultancy, for example - are extremely dependent on state contracts, directly or indirectly. Ties between, connections, credits, contracts, permissions, protection and what not.

The main contradiction among various capitalists is not between, on the one hand, foreign capitalists, whose centre of accumulation and reproduction lies within another country, or transnational capitalists, who are truly international, and on the other hand a so-called national bourgeoisie, whose accumulation and reproduction are centred within Indonesia. There is almost no national bourgeoisie which resembles the European idealized model. On the contrary domestic capitalists (i.e. a wider concept) generally work in cooperation with foreign. Besides within the raw materials sector, the latter usually invest and produce for the local market within the framework of import substitution policies. Foreign capitalists may be just as interested in protected local markets as domestic capitalists. The effect of the severe critique of the multinational in late 1973 and early 1974 (including the multi-national) was mainly that the most prominent domestic business groups got more state support for their profitable cooperation with foreign capitalists - i.e. more local power within the framework of the increasingly international capitalist world economy. And this indeed continued. More and more labourers stay outside the direct conflicts between capital and labour.

The ratio of increase in employment in tertiary compared to the manufacturing sector is extremely high in Indonesia. More than 80% of the new employment for women created during the 70's, for example, was within trade and services. The growth of output within manufacturing was 3.8% per year between 1964 and 1971 and the employment elasticity 1.48. But when output was 12.3% between 1971 and 1980, employment elasticity was only 0.63. In 1964 we found 73.5% of the employed within agriculture, 5.8% within manufacturing and 16.7% within trade and services. In 1980 the figures were 58.5, 8.6 and 29 respectively. In 1977 about 65% of the labour force were self-employed or casual family labourers. And so I have stressed before, the number of permanently employed within the dynamic sectors decrease while the temporarily employed increases.

With the present type of accumulation there is a need for some 7 to 8% of yearly growth if the rate of unemployment shall not increase. The growth rate came close to zero in 1980, after several years of about 7%. Presently the World Bank hopes for some 4.5%. Taking into consideration that more and more women enter the labour market and the fact that some 30% of the population are under 10 years, the situation becomes even more serious. One authoritarian prognostic says that by the year 2000 the population density in Java will be greater than that of any West European city today. And among the "floating mass" of non-permanently employed labourers, the conflict between capital and labour is usually subordinated to kinship, neighborhood relations etc. Consequently
On the state must take care of the subordination of more and more labour to the use of extra-economic sources outside the company gates.

Hence, the importance of the state cannot be overstated. But what sort of state and whose state?

What state and whose?

There are, I suggest, three main ways of analyzing the state in Indonesia, leaving aside obvious misconceptions such as "caste states" (there is no firm ideology and no mass mobilization), the first approach stresses the priority of the large bureaucracy and/or military apparatus - the priority of the executive organs of the state. This is, of course, correct. But there is no firm analysis of the economic basis and economic importance of the state. 123

Therefore other scholars add an analysis of the economic foundation to notions such as "patrimonial", "bureaucratic-capitalist" or "bureaucratic-authoritarian" state. 124 The main idea is that bureaucrats, officers and other functionaries primarily serve as a service of the dominant classes in society - usually foreign but also domestic private capital, primarily the colonizers. However, the capitalists are relatively weak and extremely dependent upon a good coordinating service. Moreover, state resources have increased dramatically with the oil boom. Thus, the bureaucrats et al are able to monopolize and corrupt the huge state apparatus in order to enrich themselves and their clients. It is often estimated that between one fourth and one third of the state budget simply disappears. 125 Finally it is maintained that this huge superstructure may look strong but that it will survive only as long as it is needed by the state capitalists. When primitive accumulation has been fulfilled, when the prerequisites for more internal capital accumulation are there, we will see the privatization of the state apparatus and attempts to make it more efficient and less arbitrary. Perhaps there will even be room for some democracy.

Within this second approach we find one group of scholars and activists who stress and criticize abuse of power, corruption, domestic sources as well as external origins of the dehumanization of labour and capital in order to release the progressive aspects of capitalism - its ability to develop the forces of production. This is most often combined with a critique of foreign capitalists, who are said to uphold the position of bureaucrats and generals with no class basis of their own. 127

The followers of the analysis under review - stressing the contradiction between capitalists and workers - also subscribe to the idea of the state as the servant of capital. But they down-grade the importance of the state itself and give priority to its sacrificial basis within the dynamic modern economic sectors. Thus the state, according to this analysis, cannot be bought by the capitalists themselves and their bureaucrats. In the contrary it has to be undermined at its very roots. And the only social class that can do that job is the core of the working class. 123

In my view, however - and this may be called the third approach - it is more fruitful to regard the role of the state as having its own class basis. We should stop analyzing the state as a black box, as a coherent unit. Within the different states apparatuses there are many top bureaucrats and generals who are not only serve but also rule; 126 the post-colonial capitalist fraction. This is not merely because they corrupt and privately invest some state funds but because they trade and invest their political, administrative and military control with various companies - thus turning their control into capital. 126

This is, of course, extremely difficult to prove with hard facts. The empirical data brought to the fore by, in particular, Robinson and Lash reveal the argument. 127 But these data can obviously also be used to validate their own theories about bureaucratic capitalism and patronal business groups respectively.

Therefore we have to look for other indicators of the theoretical outline offering the most fruitful interpretation of data. I will discuss four such indicators.

First, from my study of the destruction of the MRP 130 it is evident that no one politically impressive, third largest communist party in the world was able to undermine the power of the so-called bureaucratic capitalists by isolating them from their sacrificial basis of power - foreign capitalists - and then fighting them on the political level. Instead, the new capitalists used "overdeveloped" post-colonial state apparatuses, 132 nationalizations
of foreign companies and radical anti-imperialist policies as general to extend and improve their control over the economy. The so-called bureaucratic capitalists were obviously neither bureaucrats relying on somebody else’s class power nor private capitalists, but presumably some kind of post-colonial capitalists with their own sources of power on the economic level. After the destruction of the PNI and the replacement of the Sukarno regime, their own powers have increased substantially in relation to, among others, foreign capitalists. Thus they now run the whole anti-imperialist to intensive cooperation on a more equal basis with foreign capitalists who adjust themselves to the new balance of power.

Second, the above evaluation of the radical workers struggle in the late 70’s and early 80’s indicates that neither could strikes and protests within modern private production undermine the decisive basis of power of state capital. Private capitalisation production on the dynamic modern sector was strengthened, i.e., the secured basis of power of the leading state “bureaucrats”, but despite this the “bureaucrats” obviously had no such power of check that they could substitute labor within as well as outside the company gates and thus save the employers.

Third, there are very few signs of any political and economic instability in Indonesia arising from attempts by powerful private modern capitalists to liberalize the economy, as suggested by the advocates of the second approach to the state. Indonesia has in fact one of the most stable governments in the third world. The ruling capitalist fraction as well as the regime, has been the same since the mid 60’s. It may be possible to argue that some of the forces involved in the complicated labor affair in early 77 achieved at liberalizing the state apparatus[130] but over the years, deregulation, industrialization, and other similar measures have been suggested mainly by the economic technocrats in order to improve economic growth and increase their revenues. And as we know, these technocrats have no substantial power of their own. Instead they usually draw on the power of international organs such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the InterGovernmental Group of Indonesia. But while these hands on the one hand criticize bureaucracy and state interventionism, they are, on the other hand, presumably aware of the fact that state control of labor, raw materials and markets is precisely what has made it an extremely profitable to invest in Indonesia. In addition, Indonesia has no problems in getting loans and paying back what the banks ask for the investment.[131]

The technocrats in general also have important personal vested interests to protect. The wages of the influential intermediates strata have increased by 1000% during the 70’s.[132] They have got modern houses, fine jobs, nice trips overseas—

Moreover, there is absolutely no decisive ministry or lower organs of the state that is not firmly controlled by the armed rulers. If the minister happens to be a civilian technocrat the secretary general is a military officer, for example.[133] The DandD had their governor generals and the Indonesians have their general governors, to quote one prominent saying current among dissidents. As far as the private capitalists themselves, they are no already indoctrinated very expeditious upon state support, or more precisely, on a tight partnership with the post-colonial capitalists. Also in addition, the economic basis of the most severe criticism, i.e., the traditional private businesses, are constantly undermined by the growth of large scale modern capitalism.[134] Thus they have to get support from their army in order to survive.

Furthermore, there are absolutely no signs at all suggesting that the private capitalists in general are more capable than before in subcontracting labor on their own, particularly not outside their own gates. We have seen how the recent workers’ strikes and protests were handled by the post-colonial capitalists and their armed state servants.

The private capitalists have no locally rooted organizations worth mentioning. The post-colonial capitalists, however, have the entire set of state apparatus in general and the army in particular, not least the security command BENDAH and the intelligence. [135] And, as if this were not enough, the generals have already proved that they are perfectly capable of initiating informal dashed squads—which are still in operation. Thus it is probably mainly a showcase; 5-1000 murdered petty criminals visualize what happens to those who oppose "law and order".[136] Despite this there are, however, relatively few crimes and vulgar Latin American type of military goonish harassing people, particularly the lower classes both men and women although terribly effective.
Peter Britton has effectively remarked that when the post-colonial peoples were described by the British as 'always friendly' smile while obeying orders, not losing their faces but masking their real nature and intentions, now they are armed again - this time with modern weapons and capitalism. But they keep on smiling.165

These means are, of course, used not only to protect business partners and interests. The powers are traded and invested and turned against those who do not subscribe to them. Commenting upon the terrible situation of the poor and claiming that the slightest consent could lead to social and economic problems of unprecedented consequences, often assuming a religious or ideological guise, the lieutenant-general Völgy Harsen, commander of Java and Malakao, recently stated that "... the dynamics that lead to security problems almost always originate from people in the lower strata of the middle class whose own economic circumstances are not bad but turn their attention to 'concrete matters' such as democracy, human rights, and freedom of speech and justice.166 And quite obviously the regime is aware that it is trapped within Samuel Huntington vicious circle, where low political participation may foster economic development but also, consequently, less socioeconomic equality and, then, the need from the regime's point of view, for even less political participation. If some participation is allowed it will be expensive.167 The main strategy so far has been to form corporate based organisations, to give them an ideological face like a wake up and to distribute patronage within them.168 This is meant to be an umbrella for these corporations. The regime obviously treats the viability of these institutions and makes an attempt to avoid a sudden 'participation explosion' by planning for individual membership within these.168

Fourth, several well informed sources stress that many so-called business executives are or are more and are linked to various companies and their specific interests.169 This, thus, supports my argument that the post-colonial capitalists do not only trade but also invest their "products". The most obvious trend is the attempt to define sectors and companies where the post-colonial capitalists are engaged. Some few examples only: to begin with the list of sectors where private foreign companies are welcome to invest do not only vary with the economic situation (whether it is easy or not to attract foreign investors; presently it is somewhat difficult"170) but also with where post-colonial capitalists have their business interests. There are also recommendations varying, for example, that military equipment should be bought from companies where retired generals have business interests. 171 Munitions, state support is almost never general. Mechanical production of boots and cigarettes, for example, is only supported within some congruence, depending on the vested interests.172 And most important, post-colonial capitalists with tight business interests are obviously fighting hard to protect and further develop "their" companies set up within the framework of export substitution schemas but more often in co-operation with foreign capitalists. At the same time everybody knows that more efficient production for export has to be promoted with preparedness, less protection.173 One source even claims that 91% of the manufactured goods on the local market are already produced within Indonesia and 65% of the intermediate capital goods.174 Moreover, the importance of oil exports - presently some 75% of all exports - and 60% of the state income - has to be decreased before it drives up.175

On the other hand, the post-colonial capitalists and their partners within protected business should have no reason to object to additional state subsidies to set up more competitive export industries - as long as their domestic monopolies are not threatened. And the importance of all incomes for the post-colonial capitalists is somewhat overstated, since oil money is visible in the state budget but not their resources within various companies. This, of course, is crucial for any understanding of the further dynamics and stability of the ruling class fraction and the regime.176

It is not only the post-colonial capitalists who want to invest in joint ventures with private domestic as well as foreign capitalists. Also the latter often prefer this arrangement, no matter whether it is more or less legally enforced or not. It is better to work with the real rulers of the state than against them. And the best way of avoiding the arbitrary nature of the state-commanded economy is to merge with the commandants themselves.177 This is nothing strange for modern private capitalists who have practiced some type of cooperation with banks and finance capitals during at least a century.
What made capitalism extremely progressive when it emerged in Europe was, of course, that capital and labour were more or less "liberated" during the anti-feudal struggle, thus forcing the relatively small and competing capitalists to invest and develop the forces of production in order to survive. But we should not mix this idea and idealized logic with the interests of the capitalists themselves. They prefer monopolies and protection, if it is to their own benefit. And what is more, they even demand it in order not to invest somewhere else and/or sustain production.

Consequently, the most likely way in which post-colonial capitalism will develop and be reconstituted is not through a revolt against a perviscious or bureaucratic capitalist state which has done the job of primitive accumulation, at the moment when private capitalists are strong enough to run businesses and take care of the subordination of labour themselves. On the contrary, the cooperation between investing post-colonial capitalists and their more influential domestic and foreign business partners will presumably develop into oligarchic financial houses.128

This implies that the financial houses in general and the post-colonial capitalists in particular will be strong enough to uphold their most important support from the state, including the control of the labour force as a whole, while they therefore, at the same time, can give more room for less powerful capitals and servants, support some deregulations of the economy and promotion of exports, attempts at making the state appearances more efficient and less arbitrary and promote some political participation among the dominating classes as a whole - at least institutionalized forms for the solving of conflicts between and among various financial groups and the less powerful citizens, bureaucrats and businesses.

Therefore the financial houses and particularly the post-colonial capitalists will probably also be able to gradually arrange the soon unavoidable generational shift among the leading generals. They are already busy trying. This includes the transfer of some powers in trusted "seven" as well as the paying off and supervision of more efficiently working state servants.129 It doubt the new generation of officers will try to prop up their old masters and establish their own contacts with private business, perhaps even rallying discontented masses behind them. But the old masters and the post-colonial capitalists have a clear basis of their own which has been formed and consolidated since around 1967, when the Dutch companies were nationalized and a state of emergency proclaimed. Also, the new generation will have less oil money to trade. Moreover, neither this generation nor the international capitalists and their political masters, in particular Washington, can afford political and economic disrupts but will presumably have to hang on to various financial houses about to emerge, looking for as many individual benefits as possible. They do not have any clear, stable and profitable alternative.

Conclusions

The rapidly expanding modern capitalism in Indonesia is obviously based on the fact that acting capitalists can rely on market and production monopolies, consols, subsidies, credits and an effectively subordinated labour force - partly the very few unemployed workers are mainly the majority of the labour force which is not profitable within most world modern capitals. This is decisive for all capitalist power. But it is even more crucial for the post-colonial capitalists, who trade and increasingly act as prerequisites for a profitable capitalism.

If we understand this, we can also answer our previous questions about why the conflicts between labour and capital in the late 70's and early 80's were not characterized by a relatively unified working class that effectively began to undermine and paralyze the decisive basis of capitalist power through attempts at radical unionism. The reason is that pure capitalist production and trade is only one part of the power basis of state and capital in Indonesia. Private capitalists are not seriously hurt as long as they can rely on support from the post-colonial capitalists. And the post-colonial capitalists have their own basis of power - state presence, trading and investing of necessary extra-economic prerequisites for modern capitalist production. Thus they cannot be fought by an attack against their business partners, neither the domestic nor the foreign ones.

Thus, the crucial contradiction under the rapidly expanding industrial capitalism is not between acting private capitalists and their workers but between, on the one hand, post-colonial...
capitalists and their business partners and, on the other hand, the labour force as a whole — which has to be subordinated in order for the dynamic industrial capitalism to survive and further develop. It is only when this capacity to subordinate labour in general is understood and paramount that the class basis of capital and state in Indonesia will emerge.

An urban opening?

Urban Indonesian dissidents tend to be increasingly pessimistic about the potential for radical political change in the not too distant future. The former radical neue-korporate have been eliminated. New ones are not allowed even to emerge. And the rapid economic growth has not given rise even to an independent bourgeoisie capable of challenging the generals and their close foreign and domestic business partners.

Already the experiences of the FEI revealed that the so called national bourgeoisie was not strong enough to carry out an independent economic development. And when the state took over, it became a buffer for a new armed fraction of the capitalist class. Moreover, it was obvious that the new capitalists had a basis of their own and did not exclusively rely on foreign capitalists. Thus, they were not seriously hurt by anti-imperialist measures. Class struggle and nationalism could not be successfully combined as, for example, in southern Vietnam.

But as if these were not enough — recent workers' struggles within the framework of rapid industrialization involved only a decided and tiny minority of the labourers. And these were relatively easy to domesticate by using extra-economic forces of subordination — which were not under attack. Instead, the latest document among the mass is tragically expressed through Muslim, anti-Chinese, and regional protests, riots and even revolts.

General interest in democracy

But is does not only follow from my study that the new post-colonial capitalism cannot be fruitfully examined and fought with the use of prevalent analyses and strategies. Two contradictions also emerge which may be politically exploited. Most important, the majority of the urban labour force as a whole have to be subordinated through the use of extra-economic forces — but as the rural villagers. Most of them are only partly subordinated, i.e. only partly separated from their means of production. And those who are, rarely belong to a unified working class.

Moreover, the post-colonial capitalists have to trade and invest their control over the economy in general and labour in particular in order to get a share of the surplus produced in companies run by state or private managers.

Hence, if there is only a tiny coherent working class subordinated to capitalists within production while the majority of the urban labour force must often stay outside the company gates, survive in the informal sector, are scattered and have very different incentives, they have all, nevertheless, one thing in common — they are, just as the rural masses, to a large extent subordinated by extra-economic means. Their immediate socio-economic interests, demands, virtues and religious loyalties may thus differ. But all of them should be interested in democratization to get rid of the extra-economic repression.

Moreover, if the goal of the working class gives priority to demands for democracy it may be less easy to isolate the workers from the majority of the labourers with similar interests in democracy by giving the former small favours.

And the urban "cleaning army" can be rallied behind the issues of democracy, their impressive political strength will not be wasted on destructive religious, ethnic and nationalist demands.

Finally, some of the discontent among private capitalists over the excessive protection that they either have to buy or are presented from buying may be channeled into at least limited demands for democracy. The case holds true for a lot of influential state employers as against powerful armed patrons.

Most important, however, is the fact that the incentives in democracy are general — i.e. not only something that the urban masses have in common but also the majority of the rural villagers, as I showed earlier in this paper.
Wart democracy?

However, all these different classes and social groups want, of course, to use democracy in order to promote their own particular interests. Thus, their demands for democracy will vary with what form they prefer and which fields and activities they want to include or save from democratization.

Most acting capitalists and many influential state employees will, to begin with, want more economic liberties against the monopolies of the post-colonial capitalists. For no one can manage without their protection. The state benefitting may want a democ- 
apolitanization. But they are usually the more dependent upon patronage. And those who possess the monopolies share them with the post-

colonial capitalists. Together, however, they may strive for more liberties for their common oligarchic business in order to emerge, covering their activities with certain democratic rights outside the fields which they monopolize.

Even the petty commodity producers within the urban "floating mass" may be reluctant to fight for a democracy that may interfere in their businesses. Their main fear is total proletarianization. Then, they look for protection among various authoritarian community organisations and patrons.

Workers, on the other hand, usually focus upon their own organizational rights and influence within the workplace and thus neglect the world outside the gates in general and the non-

regularly employed in particular.

Finally, there are hardly any existing community organizations and leaders not characterized by authoritarian leadership.

Consequently I argue - just as in the rural setting - that only struggle for locally rooted and total democracy may unite most of the various extra-economically subordinated classes and social groups.

If democracy is not built from below, locally rooted, authoritari-

an leaders, patronage and corporatism will take over. If it is not total - i.e. if it does not protect the bases of certain classes - the most powerful classes will take over and subordinate the struggle for democracy to their interests. The oligarchy about to emerge and their forces are an important example. In order to stay united the masses themselves must be able to govern the bases of power they have to fight for and use in order to raise their standard of living, get more freedom and justice etc.

Revolutionary democracy

Aroused as well as rural masses may also unite against the extra-
economical subordination and exploitation. But what is more, just as the state had been part of the social setting the post-colonial capitalists are also extra-economically based on their political, administrative and military control over the economy in general and labour in particular via the state apparatus. They trade andinsert this control and thus turn it into capital. Those who insert merge increasingly with their most powerful business partners.

Just as the state backed persons cannot be effectively fought through the redistribution of land in the villagers - since they are not primarily based on ownership of land - the post-colonial capitalists cannot be undermined by disturbing production only - since they rely mainly on their extra-economic bases. Struggles for locally rooted and total democracy, however, may undermine their foundations, their monopoly of political, administrative and military control, and is thus revolutionary.

Activities in favour of locally rooted and total democracy may also be used to prevent the usual post-colonial capitalists from using their terrifying power. As in the rural setting it is hopeless to fight the enemy in its own area. That would cause terror and require much more that the chance to build a locally rooted and total democracy would disappear. Instead of arrogating the enemies' power one must therefore undermine them and finally paralyze not only their production but also their control of the state apparatus. This implies a combination of activities in the local communities and neighborhoods as well as in the companies and on the shop floor level by initially, for example, promoting independent collectives for discussion, communication, education and organizational activities to tackle daily economic and social problems.

The role of democracy in contemporary political struggles

I suggest therefore (hypothesis 8) that contemporary Indonesian attempts to bypass invalid analyses and strategies in the urban setting will be characterized by attempts to create locally rooted total democracies and that experiences so far support my argument that this may be a new option for radical political change.
The old generation

Most of the surviving old commanders and left wing nationalists are politically isolated and neutralized also in urban areas. (The same is in fact true of many of the former activists exiled from Indonesia.) Discussions frequently focus on the need to "restore" democracy - i.e. to return to the relative political freedom enjoyed under Sukarno which would give the communists some room for manoeuvre. It is unclear whether they refer to the parliamentary democracy during the 50’s or to the "guided democracy" under Sukarno later years. A few have reached this tactical aim, they recovered a front with the old social forces that rallied behind Sukarno, including the masyarakat. But these do of course disregard such widespread thinking.141

On the other hand, the few who try to re-evaluate their old experiences and are prepared to go beyond their old doctrine together with the new young generation of neo-communist dissidents to which I will return below, usually work individually with no special idea about their own or a potential party’s leading role.141

Another tradition in Indonesian politics is the conflicts between military leaders and the emergence of the new order, but who have become increasingly critical over the years. Here are some socialists, several media religious and political leaders and not least some well respected officers. The previously mentioned politik affair is only 11% involved, among others, the then extremely influential general Slameto. Therefore easily prominent retired military men have joined the discontents.

These include, among others, the most senior officer, former commander of the armed forces, minister of defence and the chief founder of the present political and economic system, general Hartanto, the former popular Governor of Jakarta general Suharto and the previously celebrated commander of West Java and ABAK II’s first secretary-general Harsono. The most well known groupings during recent years are PBB, Forum Prodi dan Komunitas. For officers only, and the "joint western" - the group of 50 group - including old political as well as military leaders. Especially the latter is still active advocating a new open government, some economic equity and political participation and the eradication of corruption.162

However, these are old and politically as well as economically relatively isolated men163 with no serious to connect neither a realistic nor a military one. They have no explicit ideas about how to achieve their goals and they have not met small accounts with the foundation of either the old or the new order. Then, of course, also make their ideas about democracy - a strange mixture of influences from the early top-down parliamentary democracy and the popular, corporative and not least military influenced "guided democracy". Nevertheless, this does not exclude the possibility that the old leaders may function as prepared and relatively unorganized leaders for various local and nationalist dissidents - mostly young military - to whom I shall return below. The regime does not have ideas of some old leaders so much, but it is constantly insecure about the largest Muslim and anti-Chinese discontent that might break out and turn into riots and even riots. The "50 group" have recently accused of stimulating "extremist and terrorist activities".161

Another tradition in Indonesian politics is the conflicts between leaders in the centre and those in the province. The Aceh rebels (in the northern tip of Sumatra), for example, function within this tradition where democracy has almost no importance at all.

Incidentally, however, two new types of organizations have emerged which might be characterized as liberation movements - including their at least temporary need of some democracy to get massive popular support. The first is the OM of the native West Papuan people who are threatened by Indonesian colonizers in the provinces of Irian Jaya (New Guinea) and the second is BEMBIN on the occupied and horribly raped former Portuguese colony East Timor.

The colonial wars - one within the country and one outside - are not too successfully fought by the regime and have already caused divisions among the leading generals. However, they will not lead to similar radical changes in Jakarta as did the last war about the "treason in Borneo Atas" - so long as it is possible to successfully trade ideas of "national unity with all races" and the regime has a solid political and economic basis in the centre.
The new generation

It is important, I would argue, among the younger generation of initially student activists that we may find some dynamic attempts to form a new urban opposition.

The more experienced members of this generation were active in the protests against the authoritarian nature of Soeharto’s regime and even took part in the elimination of communists and left-wing nationalists. On the one hand they have, thus, settled accounts with the old order and are prepared to make a fresh start. But on the other hand they generally have a distorted view especially of the old PKI, presumably to be able to rationalize their own role in the horrible repression - which often prevent them from learning from the communists’ experiences.

Moreover, it was not until several of the students discovered that their teachers - the economic technocrats who emerged with the generals - were the servants of the ruling generals rather than the other way around that the first wave of new radical dissidents appeared.

It is mainly the lack of moral, the absence of power and corruption and the broadly and internationally dependent economic development as well as the lack of socio-economic equity and justice that has been stressed.

Demands for democracy have also been there but in the urban setting, mainly in order to allow the relatively technocratic dissidents to participate. Under the first years the new generation constituted thus a sort of loyal opposition that wanted to improve government policies. Increasingly frustrated, however, a second wave of dissidents looked for powerful allies within the regime as well as among middle class in order to change the course of events - but was essentially used by the former in the medan affair in early 1974. The third wave during the late 70’s wanted to stay outside the dirty game and was ideologically much radical but isolated from powerful allies as well as from the distorted economy.

Therefore, many of the dissidents realize now that they cannot rely only on powerful allies and demand democracy. They have also to create their own basis among the masses. It is in their search for means to reach this aim that the question is raised whether or not the initiation of a locally rooted and local democracy could be powerful. I will discuss the three most important combinations.

The first tendency corresponds to the non-governmental organizations and their work in the rural setting, which I analysed earlier in this paper. The NGOs are of course also active in urban areas. However, it is my impression that their urban activities are more restricted to the dissidents themselves and their intellectual exercise than those in the villages. The ways in which they reach out from this accessory and important level are characterized mainly by attempts to initiate programmes of interest for special groups, petty traders, house-dwellers and so on - not for the local communities and the neighbours as a whole. One argument is that the control of the regime is too tight. Therefore, when they attempt to approach the community through existing informal leaders the NGO people run the risk of being caught within special religious and ethnic loyalties, not least among Muslims with anti-Chinese feelings.

Moreover, may NGO-leaders seem to be created by the idealized version (and bourgeois ideology) of how democracy emerged in central Europe - i.e., as a result of the growth of a strong national bourgeois fighting feudal lords. Since there is no strong nationalist bourgeoisie in Indonesia there are according to this perspective, no objective conditions for democracy. Moreover, there is a need for certain economic and cultural improvements among the masses before one can start building democracy. Thus, of course, neglects the fact that it was the labour movement and Leftwing liberals in Europe that enforced and created most of the present democracy. Also overlooked are the temporarily successful attempts to create locally rooted democracy among, for example, even illiterate peasants in underdeveloped liberated areas in former Portuguese colonies or within urban slum communities, poliskenan in Latin America. If a national bourgeoisie is not capable of creating the prerequisites for peoples struggle for democracy, people have to and can do it themselves.

Finally, to my knowledge there are very few contacts between genuine labour leaders and NGO-activists in the community.

This prevents unified activities among the urban laboratories beyond
religious or anti-Chinese rallying points. The potential power of a unified struggle for locally rooted and local democracy is not yet realized.

Secondly, however, there is a type of MRO that might serve as a bridge - the increasingly important local and neighborhood struggles. People in various settings seek for help. Some get it and get in touch with each other. And using democratic rights to resist excessive repression is a task that is given priority.

Also, some skilled academics and cultural workers with integrity give an important type of "legal aid" by expressing and visualizing alternatives conceptualizations - especially when they do not isolate themselves but speak up and informally reach out to resisting people.

There are no secrets. The regime is well aware of the risks but presumably also knows that intellectuals with individual networks are prevented from creating their own mass basis as long as no formal political organizations can be built. Thus they have to look for alternatives, especially when the new law on MROs has to incorporate state control over their numbers and activities is enforced.

The problems of reaching out to the masses and to initiate progressive unifying demands and concrete actions give rise instead to various efforts to rally oppressed peoples from above and offer their support to influential political and military leaders in conflict with the regime. The regime is only afraid of riots, the impotent activists say. One could perhaps describe this as an attempt to a more successful repetition of the 1974 Mutia affair. Anti-Chinese feelings are always there and they are dangerous for the post-colonial capitalism in general and the regime in particular, since the big domestic business partners are Chinese so called kegions. Recently there has been several attempts against foreign property. During the Mutia affair allians attacked a proposed marriage law. A new issue which may mobilize mass movements in the proposed law on MROs, which forces even militant organizations to adopt the Pancasila principles as their main ideology. The September riots in the Tanjungpandan harbour district of Jakarta is a good example of the possibilities, even if one must remember that the devoted militants are a minority of the population. And at least the regime claims that prominent members of the "Petition of 50" group have functioned as catalysts.

I presume, however, that Sukarno will act just as skillfully as in 1974 when he finally withdrew the law and that prevented mass movements backing the main opponents of the regime.

This may be the predominant tendency today - at least on the spectacular political scene. It is, however, also obvious that at least some influential leaders have begun to realize that a new legal is only a short term solution if any. "Next time we need a better exploitation of our own to rely on" said, for example, the experienced leading activist half a year ago in Jakarta. But even then, he admitted, the radicles as well as the mobilized masses might well be trapped, ignored and perhaps crushed since the influential leading generals and mass leaders do not need these anymore - since people do not have sufficient democratic movements and institutions to defend themselves with and use as a basis for alternation.

4. CONCLUDING NOTE

Traditional radical political strategies were based on analyses indicating that the bourgeoisie in the third world was unable to enforce an independent capitalist development according to the model supposedly based on the historical experiences of Europe, North America and Japan. Therefore, when this became obvious to the masses, radical leaders will have a unique chance to take over the bourgeois historical mission as well as their popular support and to introduce socialism step by step. Thus, as once in Russia, such revolutionary processes would be possible. Although capitalism had not yet developed to the point where, according to Marx, time would be ripe for the logical transition to socialism.

These analyses and the strategies they gave rise to are, however, undercut by the dynamic expansion of capitalism in several third world countries, but more than that, the post-colonial capitalism differs, at least in Indonesia, from the classical model where the contradiction between capitalists and the working class were crucial. Thus, also traditional analyses and strategies focusing on this conflict are insufficient.
However, the new main contradiction is, to the one hand, post-colonial capitalists who trade and invent political, administrative and military control of the economy in general and labour in particular and their business partners as well as rural state backed patrons and landlords, and, on the other hand, the mainly extra-economically subordinated labour force as a whole gives rise to a new type of extended development. Economic development is no longer blocked - but democracy seems to be, especially if it is also meant to be locally rooted and total. This may become a progressive and even revolutionary rallying point - just as was anti-imperialism.

Worth these inferences from the Indonesian case are possible to generalize or not should, however, be further examined. The next step in my program is to take my historical analysis of the causes of the destruction of the PCI as well as the above preliminary study of contemporary developments and go to India. There I intend to make comparisons with problems of radical political strategy under the rule of another capitalism which at least superficially appears to be different.

Later on I will also include comparisons with contemporary Philippines and some historical experiences from the liberation of southern Vietnam.

Finally, it is important to examine how the solidarity and labour movements in the industrialized countries such as Sweden respond to the new problems and openings for radical politics in the third world. Are they, for example, prepared to support the struggles for a locally rooted and total democracy - which ought, among other things, destroy the profitable business opportunities for capitalism from the old industrialized countries, opportunities which are important for the financing of enlightened welfare policies introduced and defended by the sanitizing labour movements?

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3. See fn. 1.

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7. Annual Report on Fundamental Human Rights in Indonesia 1979/80. Jakarta and Malaysia, London, Human Rights Watch, Jakarta, 1979. p. 49 ff. 8. See e.g.: ibid., Behind the Silence of Indonesia’s Frontmen Students and Agricultural Workers in Java (no author mentioned) in Newsletter of International Labour Studies, special issue on Indonesia, no. 16, July 1984, Jakarta, January 21, 1984, van Stee, G. op. cit., p. 130 ff. For Eastern Economic Review, June 30, 1984, p. 46 ff. I also drew interviews with prof. Darpy, Bogor, Dr. Chas Mening and Dr. Gunawan Wicaksono, Bogor, Dr. Ir. Sumarmo, Jakarta, Dr. Ir. Diah Kartini, Surakarta, Dr. Ir. A. Supriyanto, Jakarta, Dr. Ir. Ahmad Bakar, Jakarta, Dr. Ir. Sukarto, Yogyakarta, Dr. Dr. Ir. Muhammad Sa’aduddin, Yogyakarta, Dr. Dr. Ir. Suyatno, Jakarta, for Jakarta and Ir. Meddina, senior graduate student doing research on the Ritar area, Cambodia - all in May 1984.


11. See fn. 8.

of this report are still working with these data and that the
report is preliminary. Moreover, the importance of
farmers' and village officials in our preliminary writings.
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with, among others, prof. Anggono, Bogor, Dr. Rupali Namgay,
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44. If we include the plantation situation is somewhat different. Cf. the current so-called National Estate programme. See, for example, the interviews with Janman Nurcito, Yogyakarta, May 1984.
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52. For the above after fn. 51, interviews with genuine union leaders, activists and scholars in Indonesia, May 1984, as well as scholars and activists in Holland and Australia, April and May 1984.
53. For an interesting analysis of this, see Indonesia Workers... 1982, op.cit.
54. See fn. 52.
55. Ibid. Some of the activists also show new possibilities of doing work with IDOC.
57. For example, the social union EMRI; the nationalists' KMS; the students' An-Nida Sula; the Nahdlatul Ulama's Unite MUI, the Muslim brothers.
58. The EMRI emerged partly within the ranks of Gusunko. See fn. 55.
59. Interviews with, among others, socialist oriented genuine union leaders in Indonesia, May 1984.
60. Interviews with genuine union leaders, activists and scholars in Poland and Indonesia, April and May 1984.
61. Ibid.
62. Ibid. It is my impression that the argument for CLACs is widely advocated by activists outside Indonesia.
63. See fn. 50.
64. Interview with genuine socialist oriented union leader, Jakarta, May 1984.
67. The figures are based on data from CUB Bulletin, op.cit. The figures must, of course, be very uncertain.
VI

60. Ibid. and Indonesian Workers..., 1981, op.cit.
61. See, e.g., Development Studies in Indonesia op. cit., p. 20, for the most recent discussions of this issue.
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66. See Nagas and Employment..., op.cit. p. 311.
67. See Nagas and Employment..., op.cit. p. 311.
68. See Nagas and Employment..., op.cit. pp. 118-9 and cf. also Nagas and Employment..., op.cit. p. 414, who refer to the vision of the employers inside modern plantation workers' philosophy, that it is better to mechanize. It takes 1-2 years to make a worker experienced.
69. Nagas and Employment..., op.cit. p. 40. See also Reddy, quoted from information on the North Sumatra in Kliman vol. no. 27, 1981. op.cit. p. 311.
71. For a survey of the events see van Dijk, H. C., Major Political Developments in Indonesia in the mid-seventies of 1980: Crise Prevention, Anti-Chinese riots and the KPK Party Congresses.
74. Interviews with scholars within INDCC, Ljubljana, May 1984. Please note that petty producers', exporters', veterinarians are not taken into consideration here but above, when I discussed the conflict in the villages.
75. Interviews with former SRIH-leaders, Holland, April 1984, as well as with former minister of labour under Slamet, Jakarta, May 1984.
126. Bower and Employment..., op. cit., pp. 131 and 133.


128. See, e.g., Events op. cit.


130. The contributions of Dr. Dick Robinson and Dr. Harold Crouch are most important; besides the works mentioned in this report, see, to begin with, the list of references to my book mentioned in # 2. I also draw on interviews with Crouch 1980 and 1986, as well as with, among others, prof. Bachrie, Canberra, May 3, 1980 and, among several Indonesians, Dr. Arie Wulandari, May 1980. For Eastern Economic review March 29, 1980, p. 27.

131. See, e.g., the White Book of the students... op. cit. This has also been a frequent theme in, among others, the journal, Prima, but in a much more cautious way.

132. See references given in the above presentation of the political analyses.

133. Cf., Roth's formulation in her The Marine in the Netherlands: Indonesian Experience in Indonesia: Changing Ideological Foundations, op. cit., p. 66. "The relative bureaucracy... It had, effectively the employees of the Netherlands, and we trained the officials who did not stand proudly with Dutch business interests or failed to administer in Dutch satisfaction. The Indonesian indigenous, however, never felt itself. It is (with its military component) both the dominant element in the ruling class and the agent of the ruling class; and there is no effective institutions outside it."

134. See fn. 130.

135. See the theoretical outline on the introduction of this paper and my book, fn. 2.

136. Rosa Alver's concept, see her The State as a Post-colonial Society: Pakistan and Bangladesh, New York Edition no. 74.

137. Cf., e.g., Crouch op. cit.

138. I have my own conclusions on the coming of various World Bank and Asian Development Bank experts as well as interviews with, among others, Dr. Gorak, prof. Bachrie and Mr. Natsir, Jakarta, 1980, as well as May 1984, and Dr. Anne Bock and Dr. Peter McGroddy, Canberra, May 1984.

139. See Robinson, manuscript, op. cit.


141. Cf. the surveys of the Krystk and Matik industrial sectors in Prima no. 7, 1983.

142. Cf. the analysis in Southeast and Philippines op. cit. The military units are a mixture in handling internal security problems but they are also well equipped and efficient enough to conduct war, e.g., cf., Anthamoste, U.C., East Indonesia in Indonesia: A New Scenario, Predictions, Asia Survey vol. XXI, no. 9, 1981 and Foster, A. in Asia-An乱trade in no. 8 and no. 5, 1981.

143. The killing may have lasted an attempt to, among other things, get rid of the late general Ali Arief's political power. The military took over the police, the military probably had an easier request for the killings. I am not sure on various accusations against the military in April 1984, with human rights activists and a number within army, as well as with local authorities, scholars (including the Human Rights) in Holland, April 1984 and in Java, May 1984.

144. Peter Britton, discussion in Jakarta, May 12, 1984. See also his Military Post-colonialism in Indonesia: Aneese and Western Military Traditions in Army Ideology in the 1950s. NK themes, Nias University, 1983.


148. Don Dick Robinson agrees this is his manuscript op. cit. I also draw on interviews with Dr. Michael von Leydenberg, Dr. A. Verbeek and Mr. Koos Hout, Sidney, April and May 1984, Dr. Bongardt Crouch, Jakarta, May 1980, Dr. Schumacher, prof. Schloers, prof. Badi, Nias, and a well-informed Chinese businessman, Jakarta, May 1984.


150. Interview with well-informed scholars, Jakarta, May 1984.

151. See, e.g., the survey of the Krystk industrial sector in Prima no. 7, 1983.


158. Nevertheless, very few - and especially not economists like Robertson who only deal with “hard facts” - seem to pay interest in studying this.

159. I drew on interviews with, among others, Dr. Rafi Hard, Jakarta, April 1986 and Dr. Sturm, Jakarta, 1986.

160. This is my own conclusion but I am indebted to various scholars for critical comments and suggestions, among others, prof. Djarbigni, Dr. Michael van Langenberg, Dr. David Craft, Dr. Gert Blanken, Dr. Bormans and others well informed Chinese businessmen in Jakarta.

161. This was even stated by the just mentioned well informed Chinese businessman, Jakarta, May 1986.

162. Interview with relevant leaders in Holland and Indonesia, April and May 1986.

163. Ibid., but also with somewhat younger activists.


165. Cf. with the interview with general Stady in Prisons op. cit., 1986. I also drew on my interview with members of the group of 80 in 1986 (unpublished with general).

166. To an knowledge the group of 80 has no important business contacts within the dynamic sectors of the economy but some within the traditional ones. Moreover, the workers' own business interests have been under serious attack from the regime.

167. See fn. 142 above.

168. For a historical survey, see e.g., Lams, Voice of Student in Indonesia op. cit. I also rely on interviews with leading members of the student opposition over the years, Jakarta 1980 and 1984.