What is Jakarta’s Popular Politics a Case of?

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**Introduction**

Anyone following Indonesian news from 2012 and a few years ahead must have been overwhelmed by the hype around Joko ‘Jokowi’ Widodo’s successful campaign for the position as governor of Jakarta and then renewed governance of the region, followed by his engagement in the presidential race. There were almost daily reports about so called *blusukans* – unannounced and unpretentious visits in the field – to demonstrate that here was a man of the people who listened to the people. And this was followed up then by immediate measures on (some of) the complaints and ideas from the grassroots. The general message of Jokowi and his partner for the position as Vice Mayor, Basuki Tjahaja ‘Ahok’ Purnama, was that they would reform the chaotic city, and that this would be possible in spite of powerful vested interests, frequently operating in tandem with fixers and gangsters (Wilson 2015), by cooperating with both non-corrupt business and ordinary people, including the urban poor.

The major priorities were to improve public governance and fight corruption as well as the regular flooding of the city; to upgrade the miserable public transportation system; and to increase minimum wages while also swiftly implementing and improving on the recently legislated national health scheme. Significantly: when infrastructural improvements and beautification required that the poor had to abandon their residences and stalls, there would be negotiations with them and their organisations; and decent alternatives would be provided.

Much of this was fresh and inspiring, but it was not unique. Rather, it was an exciting case of a broader trend; a case which therefore also allows for discussions of wider problems and options.¹

**Electable country boys**

¹ I shall draw primarily on the results from the democracy studies and assessments that I have been involved in since the mid-1990s in cooperation with concerned Indonesian scholars and knowledgeable and reflective activists, reported on in, primarily, Budiman and Törnquist (2001), Priyono et al (2007), Samadhi and Warouw (2009), Törnquist et al. (2010-11), Törnquist (2013), Savirani et al. (2015) and, for this chapter most importantly, Djani et al. (2016). In these works there are also further references. I am also drawing on wider comparative analyses of similar progressive policies in the Global South, reported on in the anthologies by Harriss et al. (2004), Törnquist et al. (2009), Stokke and Törnquist (2013), and Törnquist and Harriss (2016).
Jokowi as well as Ahok were country boys from rather modest circumstances, in sharp contrast to the metropolitan political elite. Ahok, a former ethnic Chinese businessman turned reformist regent of Belitung, the mining island off Sumatra’s east coast, had been elected to the House of Representatives (DPR) in Jakarta, from where he also supported the campaign for the national public health scheme and tried but failed to run as an independent candidate in the governor elections. His blunt managerial style attracted sceptics of the inefficient administration and served like a bad cop to the good cop-cum-media darling Jokowi with the unique ability to combine pragmatic business skills with charm and populist charisma, in-spite of poor rhetorical capacity. Most interestingly, however, Jokowi’s attraction was not just fashioned but also based on his outstanding reputation as the mayor since 2005 of the Central Java town of Solo. During his leadership, Solo had changed from chaos and conflicts to relative prosperity and social cooperation. This royal but run down country and business town became an ‘innovation site’ that combined cultural events and novel governance, and attracted donors and activists as well as media and reformers. Jokowi received numerous awards, became internationally famous and was re-elected in 2010 with more than 90 percent of the votes.

Yet, neither Ahok nor Jokowi were brought to Jakarta on the basis of strong popular movements. The less glamorous truth is that party bosses and oligarchs in both Sukarno’s daughter Megawati’s Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P) and Suharto’s previous son in law and former general Prabowo’s Great Indonesia Movement party (Gerindra) needed him to put up a fight against the incumbent Governor of Jakarta, Fauzi ‘Foky’ Bowo. As Foky was supported by most of the other parties plus major businessmen and the ethnic Batawi groups of fixers-cum-gangsters, Megawati and Prabowo had to join hands and pick particularly appealing candidates. Ahok, then, did not just have a good track record but also an ethnic Chinese background that was attractive to Prabowo, who as an aspiring candidate for the presidency had to show that he had changed since 1998 when instigating anti-Chinese riots to confuse the opposition against Suharto. And the main message to Megawati by Jokowi’s intellectual friends was that he was an unusually clean PDI-P associate that had proved to be the country’s prime vote-getter.

Yet, there was more than credibility and electability to Jokowi. His popularity had a solid base in the remarkable achievements in Solo. So in order to understand the case of Jokowi in Jakarta, it is fundamental to understand what these previous developments were about, how
they related to other cases and to the problems of carrying them along to the big city and the national level.

Civil society going politics

The case of Solo was a breakthrough in Indonesia for civil society and movement activists who had so far failed to make a difference within organised politics after Suharto, in spite of having undermined his regime. The weakness of the progressive groups in the country had, of course, deep roots in the repression in the mid-1960s against the then largest reform-oriented popular movement in the world, followed by thirty years of authoritarian rule. But the drawback of the pro-democrats rested also with the internationally supported elite-pacts in the aftermath of Suharto’s debacle. These pacts held back alternative mass organising and electoral participation of new parties. Moreover, the dissidents themselves were unable to come together and to challenge this. Numerous attempts were made, but the early focus on separate specific issues (such as human rights and gender equality, land reform and the workers’ plights, anti-corruption and environmental concerns) persisted. The same applied to the emphasis on the victims rather than what they had in common with broader sections of the population. In structural terms the fragmentation of the progressive groups reflected the scattered interests among ordinary people in the context of uneven economic development as well as the lack of unifying ideological perspectives. But the divisiveness of the democracy movement was also because it made more sense to middle class based leaders in particular to focus on special groups, campaigns and lobbying in addition to special agreements with mainstream politicians in order to gain funding and reach short term results, than to try to alter the elitist character of the new democracy before being able to stand a decent chance to, for example, run in election with an alternative party. (Prasetyo et al. 2003, A.E. Priyono et al. 2007, Samadhi et al. 2009, Nur et al. 2009; Törnquist et al. 2009; Törnquist 2013) So by the early 2000, the many different groups that tried to link up with people with grievances were simply in great need of both alternative rallying points and of getting into organised politics – and in Solo there seemed to be an opening for both.

New local politicians in need of extra parliamentary support

Moreover, Solo was the prime Indonesian case for Indonesia’s new populist politics. This may be characterised in terms of what James Manor (2013) has, in increasingly similar Indian

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Comment [OT2]: I know that some of you suggest that the Solo story can be reduced, but I’m not convinced. Rather, I think it’s was a matter of breaking up the previous long section called Solo, and to thus make it more clear why it is so important to account for the previous successes and problems in order to understand the case of Jokowi in Jakarta. Also, a lot of what was under the title of the previous section on Solo was actually about the wider background and international cases, which you also indicated should get some more attention.
contexts, named post-clientelism. His notion refers to the number of measures which many politicians must now add to clientelism to win elections, given that the old personalised linkages between patrons and clients have been undermined by economic and social change. The common supplementary measures include, of course, strong-men practices and personality oriented politics, but also populist ideas and means of mobilisation, sometimes combined with understandings with civil society leaders and unions to gain sympathies among workers and the educated middle classes too.

In Indonesia, various brands of post-clientelist pattern became particularly apparent in the context of decentralisation and (after 2004) the new direct local elections of political executives in districts, cities and provinces. The direct elections meant that machine politics became even more crucial and that political activists turned professional in conducting intensive manoeuvring and applying various campaign techniques including through media. Moreover, personalities and popularity were fundamental; and surveys about the ‘public opinion’ rather than the development of strategic reforms were in the forefront.

One of the pioneering cases was the initial phase of post-conflict democratisation in Aceh after the tsunami and the peace negotiations. By 2006, the reformist oriented commanders in the former Free Aceh Movement GAM linked up with the civil society groups in SIRA (the former Aceh Referendum Information Centre) and won surprising victories in the gubernatorial and district elections. Unfortunately, however, the advances were not followed up by close and innovative enough cooperation between the two groupings. And later on the conservative GAM-leaders could return to the fore by bending the democratic rules of the game; ironically this time supported by their former enemies in Jakarta and the consent of the supposedly pro-democratic international community (Törnquist et al. 2010-11).

The case of Solo, by contrast, was initially less spectacular but the first in a series of more successful local regimes, the character and outcomes of which we cannot address here. As in Aceh there was a history of resistance and mass mobilisation. In their pioneering study of the

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3 Recent examples include the Mayor of Surabaya since 2010, Mrs Tri Rismaharini, and the Mayor of Bandung since 2013, Mr Mochamad Ridwan Kamil, but there are also additional experiments such as in the regency of Batang in north Java and attempts by relatively progressive leaders to become governors (such as the not so successful campaign by anti-corruption crusader and Jokowi’s current chief of staff Teten Masduki and glamorous labour related social activist and PDI-P politician Rieke Dia Pitaloka in West Java) and for the position as regents or mayors (such as the, at the time of writing, ongoing attempt by senior labour leader Obon Tabroni to run as an independent in the industrial regency of Bekasi, next to Jakarta.)
Solo case, Pratikno and Cornelius Lay (2013) – Jokowi’s current state secretary of Jokowi and Megawati’s previous main advisor respectively – emphasise the legacy of popular struggles during and after the colonial rule. Also, in the 1950s and early 1960s Solo was in one of the foremost local strongholds of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI), thereafter suffering badly from the repression. Many years later, though, towards the end of Suharto’s regime, it became again a centre of activism; this time in the form of a campaign against his Golkar party (Budiman and Törnquist 2001). And just after the fall of the dictatorship in Jakarta, Sukarno’s daughter Megawati’s PDI-P party won the first elections to the local parliament. However, the strong local leader who aimed at being appointed by the local parliament, Slamet Suryanto, failed to get sufficient backing within the party and opted instead for negotiating with a wide array of other politicians to get into office. And since his thus unreliable base in parliament meant that he had to add external support to get things done, he nourished support among strategic sections of business and the bureaucracy, including among those focussing on planning, *plus* certain civil society organisations and sectoral interest groups. This chance to negotiate with the mayor meant more space for activists and popular groups.

**Local mobilisation**

The activists were able to use this wider space thanks to two supportive factors. One was the support by enthusiastic foreign donors as part of the international hype around decentralisation, direct democracy and the participatory experiments such as in Porto Alegre (Brazil), the Indian state of Kerala and the Philippines (Cf. Öjendal and Dellnäs 2013; Antlov and Wetterberg 2013). It is true that the political and ideological basis for these celebrated experiments tended to be neglected in the enthusiasm around civil society groups. For example, Solo had nothing like the Workers Party and the extensive unions and social movements in *Brazil*, and the same applied to Kerala’s decades of left oriented politics and mass based civic People’s Science Movement. Moreover, even the moost serious problems in the showcases such as of combining citizenship and interest based action as well as direct-and representative democracy were set aside too. (Harriss et al. 2004; Törnquist et al. 2009) Yet, funds and enthusiasm was there, so quite a few activists persisted in their attempts.

Second, Indonesia’s own evolving territorially organised so-called participatory budgeting (*musrenbang*) was top-down driven and insufficient for cooperation with sectoral groups, from hawkers to sex workers. However, this was also fortunate in the sense that politicians
and activists had to find other ways of including more or less organised popular interests. These were often facilitated by civil society activists – but for good and for bad the sectoral groups themselves might also, at times, link up with more muscular task forces, *Satgas*, typically related to the PDI-P. While in reality the *musrembang* was thus quite dominated by the bureaucracy and already powerful actors, the sectoral groups were not marginalised but navigated pragmatically between various facilitators from civic activists and *satgas*. Hence there was a possibility at times to combine local participatory citizenship and collective interest representation.

**The political economy**

Finally, however, the bottom line was the negative effects of the Asian economic crisis. Funds to make up for the depression were certainly transferred from foreign donors as well as from Jakarta in the context of the country’s radical decentralisation. And these new resources were certainly crucial for the cooperation between the local government and sectoral and citizen groups. Yet, many people had problems of making ends meet and must squat open places and riversides plus turn to petty trade in the streets. Moreover local businessmen complained about the negative effects of disorder and the middle classes were unhappy too. In the new era of democracy, however, authoritarian ways of cleaning up the city and making it attractive for business and visitors were politically impossible, so what should be done? This was the context in which the new system of local direct elections provided space for populism, and Solo was the prime case.

**Jokowi and the Solo model**

In Solo, the incumbent governor Suryanto was accused of corruption and remained rebuffed by the PDI-P. The party rallied instead around an ambitious and educated local businessman with fresh ideas, Joko ‘Jokowi’ Widodo, as its main candidate, with the foremost party organiser with strong roots in its coercive task forces, F.X. Hadi ‘Rudy’ Rudyatmo, as his deputy. However, the team was only elected with a slim margin of about one third of the votes. So as pointed out by Pratikno and Cornelis Lay (2013), the implication was that even though the PDI-P was in control of the parliament, Jokowi and Rudy must enhance their own authority and legitimacy to get anything done. Once again, this called for extra-parliamentary support – just as in the case of the former mayor. This time, however, a larger dose of populism was added in terms of projecting Jokowi in particular as a Sukarnoist mouthpiece of ordinary people’s ideas and ambitions and of establishing direct links with popular and civic partners.
in society. The outcome was that Jokowi and Rudy got the extra-parliamentary support that they needed; their partners among popular groups and citizen activists could get together behind populist policies as well as strengthening their political capacity thanks to their direct access to influence governance; and all parties to the cooperation could bypass some of the old party bosses and clientelistic networks.

Yet, this sunny side of the social contract was only the front page of the Solo model. As emphasised by Djani et al. (2016), the model would not have materialised in difficult times without sufficiently strong popular groups and civil society leaders. In Solo, as we know, some of that strength rested with historical reasons and some had been built during the previous mayor. This is what happened: Jokowi cared for ordinary people but he was not a social democrat. His main focus was to curb corruption, clean up the chaotic city and bringing back ‘the spirit of Java’ – to make it liveable for the middle classes and most other people too, foster investments, and even turn it into a tourist destination. Hence there was a need to get rid of the squatters along the riverbanks and the hawkers in public places. The only obstacle was that, by now, the urban poor had gained some organisational strength. So they flatly refused Jokowi’s instructions to pull out. Given that repressive solutions were politically unviable, Jokowi and Rudy had to therefore negotiate decent solutions for the poor. In the end, moreover, this deal proved remarkably successful for Jokowi too, and for business. It was still labelled ‘the Solo Model’. Investments peaked; Jokowi gained the reputation of a good popular leader and administrator; and in the next elections Jokowi and Rudy got 90% of the votes. But the crucial importance of strong popular groups for the model to materialise was conveniently forgotten, of course.

**Major drawbacks**

There were three major weaknesses of the model. One, that the importance of a less unequal balance of power between leaders and popular and civic groups was thus swept under the carpet in the attempts at generalising and scaling up the model. Two, that the consultations with the mayor and his administration remained next to feudal in the form of separate dialogues between the ‘ruler’ and his different subjects-cum-followers, one by one. Three, as also pointed to by Pratikno and Lay (2013), that the cooperation was never properly institutionalised but rested with the good will of the ruler. So when Jokowi shifted to Jakarta in 2012 and Rudy became mayor, much of the populist flavour and practices faded away, and
it proved difficult to carry along the model to the capital. In a recent extensive analysis, Törnquist and Djani et al. (2016) name the practice ‘populist transactionalism’.

**Sharing the international problems of localism and scaling up**

The challenges of the new local politics of democratisation in Solo were not unique. They were well known, even from the international showcases. Local contexts are far from neutral playing fields where it is easy to foster equal and active citizenship, direct democracy and to promote equitable development (Harriss et al. 2004; Törnquist et al 2009a; Stokke and Törnquist 2013). The experiences from several sites in Indonesia (e.g. Sambodho 2015 and White 2016), as well as from neighbouring countries such as the Philippines and Thailand, suggest that villages and town-districts are contested arenas where social groups have been entrenched for decades and where external linkages and dependency relations are increasingly important. This means that in many cases the issue of representation of various interests and how alliances can be fostered must not be avoided.

Similarly, there is a need to build democratic linkages with other important levels beyond the local and to scale up the practices. One illustration would be that a municipality that is dominated by farming may well take care of its own costs to provide education and healthcare; but when increasingly many members of the community begin to work in a factories in a neighbouring town and some lose their jobs and need social security, the farming households are less interested in taking care, so welfare programmes must be developed on a larger scale. And when the local economy becomes increasingly dependent on distant markets, those issues must also be handled in a wider context. This is why for example the Scandinavian welfare state and national interest organisations with local chapters, which participated in public governance, were so crucial in scaling up early local citizenship and self-government in the process of industrialisation. (Sandvik 2016 and Svensson 2016)

These challenges are now increasingly difficult to handle in the process of uneven development in the Global South. Even the powerful Chinese Communist Party could not overcome what Vivian Shue (1994) called cellularisation in workplaces, party cells, people’s communes, and so on, but almost inevitably embraced Deng Xiaoping’s markets. And in-spite of the fact that the by contrast very democratic People’s Planning Campaign in the Indian state of Kerala (in the context of radical decentralisation based on as much as one-third of the planning budget) benefitted from firm guidance of the state planning board under progressive leadership as well as supplementary facilitators from the vibrant People’s Science Movement,
it faced similar problems of localism and problems of scaling up. Several of the objectives could not be achieved. Major reasons included problems of combining, one, welfare measures and production, both of which cannot be handled on the local level only; two, liberal representative democracy, popular participation and interest representation on local and intermediary levels; three, the aspirations of the locals and the middle classes, whose jobs and engagements are beyond the local level; and four, the concerns of the activists and the special interests of the politicians in processes where the local activists did not stand a chance against centralist party organisations. (Törnquist et al. 2009 (b); Harriss and Törnquist 2016)

Similarly, it is true that much of the populist policies and democratic deliberative processes in Brazil developed in the framework of decentralisation and direct elections. But it is also obvious that a number of barriers have undermined the previously so impressive collective work. The broad alliances that were built in the context of local participatory schemes have been difficult to scale up to handle the increasingly may issues that cannot be dealt with locally, plus to consider interests based organising in addition to citizen rights based activism. (Baiocchi et. al. 2009, 2013) The basic problem seems to be that the challenges of democratic representation have not been fully addressed (Törnquist 2009). Hence it has been difficult to even contain old practices of special favours and corruption, finally undermining the new policies of the Labour Party.

Insufficiently strong civil society and popular organisations in Jakarta

Most importantly, however, the wider application of the Solo model was up against stumbling blocks in Jakarta. These challenges were far from limited to the huge differences between a fairly compact country town with about half a million people and a mega city with big business actors relying on capacities beyond the city itself, with land speculation, miserable infrastructure, and with some ten million inhabitants, including, proportionally, many more middle class professionals as well as poor people who have to live inside the city to earn their living, and fewer workers inside the city proper than in industrial areas in Greater Jakarta with some 30 million inhabitants.

More importantly, according to Djani et al. (2016), the negotiations and cooperation with civil society organisations and sectoral groups in Solo could rarely be applied in Jakarta. First, many of the actually existing civil society organisations had already linked up with another candidate for governor, progressive middle class oriented economist Faisal Basri. Second, even when Basri had lost out in the first round of the elections, the fact remained that many...
civil society organisations in Jakarta focused on affecting central level politics through campaigns and lobbying and were of little help in local popular mobilisation. Third, and most basic, there was little in Jakarta that resembled the dynamics in Solo that had helped the civil society and popular organisations to gain some clout because some of the elitist leaders that competed each other were interested in extra-parliamentary support. It is true that young people in particular were fascinated by Barack Obama’s campaign for ‘change’. Many were active in social media, some joined the campaign machine as volunteers, and civil society organisations formed a loose coalition in East Jakarta called Volunteers for a New Jakarta (RPJB) coordinated by noted scholarly activist Hilmar Farid. But quite often Jokowi’s main advisor with regard to cooperation with civics and popular groups, Eko Sulistyo, who was brought over from Solo to Jakarta, must in lieu of sufficiently strong partners in society apply quick solutions in unchartered waters with the support of scattered civil society activists and community facilitators. (Djani et al. 2016) In this process, some local fixers and clientelistic practices gained new ground too. (c.f. Suaedy 2014) Worst, while Jokowi and his team had to opt for transactional populism in terms of quick fixes and media hype to gain as much support as possible, there were few attempts to help popular organisations and related civil society groups to gain ground in the same way as they had done in Solo, to thus make the model work. (Djani et al. 2016)

Hence there was much less capacity in Jakarta than in Solo to stand up against less benevolent policies and new rulers. One illustration is the treatment of squatters after it was decided that Jokowi would run as president and Ahok had become the governor. Ahok’s priority was to remove squatters to ‘clean up the city’ in order to foster economic development and gain the support of the middle classes. But unlike the early days in Solo when Jokowi had a similar focus, the sectoral groups and citizen organisations in Jakarta were not strong enough to negotiate deals – and to thus make the Solo model functional in Jakarta too. (Djani et al. 2016)

One implication – which is now also subject to middle class criticism (Jakarta Post 20.02.2016) – is that inhabitants who are not citizens of Jakarta have to leave; and those who are provided with public housing are largely left on their own to pay substantial rents.

Unresolved relations with sectoral groups and unions

In addition, the composition and loyalties of the labour organisations in and around Jakarta were much more complicated than in Solo where PDI-P had a major influence. Some of their major leaders in greater Jakarta, including Said Iqbal of the best organised union, the metal workers in FSPMI (Federation of Indonesian Metal Workers Union), expressed their
sympathies for Jokowi, but there were no attempts at specific agreements and organised cooperation. Once in office, moreover, Jokowi and Ahok initially supported unions’ demands for substantially increased minimum wages, but as emphasised by Djani et al. (2016) there were no institutionalised tripartite negotiations and cooperation between governments, employers and unions about other policies such as with regard to transportation and welfare that would improve the lot of labourers and foster inclusive development. Jokowi and his close aides certainly indicated that they wanted inclusive economic development based on more efficient infrastructure and institutions, appropriate welfare schemes and increased productivity rather than extractive growth with roots in natural resources and/or cheap labour. But there have been few signs to include organised labour and not just business in deciding and implementing policies to these effects. Hence, many of the unions resorted to their own specific issues and to quite devastating transactional politics with the highest bidder in face of the presidential race, including Prabowo. (Djani et al. 2016)

Similarly, Jokowi and Ahok certainly supported the successful campaign for the national health programme that was decided in parliament in 2012 much thanks to the pioneering broad alliance KAJS (the Action Committee for Social Security Reforms) of progressive politicians, various sectoral and civil society groups as well as leading unions realising that informalisation of employment relations meant that they had to link up with many other groups and engage in several other issues than their own wages to sustain their bargaining power. (Cole 2012; Caraway and Ford 2014; Tjandra 2016) And Jokowi and Ahok immediately implemented various local health and education cards. Uniquely, these measures attracted the imagination of the middle classes too – which was remarkable given the limited trust in public institutions and that those who can tend to opt for private solutions. Strategically, however, as shown by Djani et al. (2016) there were no real attempts on part of Jokowi and his followers to strengthen and follow up on the unique broad alliance (KAJS) that were so crucial in enforcing the national health programme. So when KAJS lost momentum, Jokowi and Ahok in turn lost the chance to foster a genuinely Jakarta-based alliance with partners in society that might have further developed the same kind of cooperation that made the original Solo model functional.

An additional major problem was that although Jokowi and Ahok gave prime importance to efficient and non-corrupt governance, and although there was cooperation with organisations such as the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) and the citizen based initiatives in the Indonesian Corruption Watch and Transparency International, there was no forceful effort to
foster a broad movement for impartial and efficient implementation of citizen rights and welfare programmes on the ground. Rather, it seems, the populist leaders were relying on smart cards and other net-based methods such as Ahok’s e-government and e-budgeting, making it more feasible and easier to obtain public services, licences and permits in a non-corrupt way. But much of the problem of active citizenship and of collective organising to demand and negotiate change remained unresolved. So, for example, ordinary people must still navigate the jungle of various potential rights and benefits, which often made them vulnerable to exploitation by fixers reinventing clientelism. (Hanani 2015)

**Not inevitable: the case of New Delhi**

Yet, these problems are not impossible to address. As shown by Harriss (2016) and argued by Djani et al (2016) the almost parallel developments in New Delhi are encouraging and instructive. Here the transformation of the main parts of an anti-corruption movement into a party that managed to build a very broad front and win the elections in the capital in 2013, a few months after Jokowi and Ahok came to power in Jakarta, and then following up with a landslide in 2015, was remarkable. The immediate background was the India Against Corruption movement that evolved in the late 2000. Major attention was given to grand scale abuse of public resources and to politically facilitated accumulation by dispossession of poor people. This attracted extensive media attention too. A major demand was for a politically independent anti-corruption ombudsman (Lokpal). When some concessions were given by the politicians, and when there was valid critique against activists trying to impose decisions on the elected parliament, the movement began to lose steam. However, the response of the activists proved historical. About the time when Jokowi’s and Ahok’s campaign in Jakarta was successful by mid-late 2012, most of the activists in Delhi decided to continue the struggle by ‘going politics’ and transforming the movement into a party, the Common Man’s Party, (Aam Aadmi Party, AAP), and by participating in the local election a few months ahead. The main focus was simple: to curb corruption and put an end to dirty politics through participatory democracy. The claims for more democracy were also related to the growing concerns among the young generation in particular over gender rights (even problems of rape) generating a new wave of movements with regard to these and other human rights issues. Remarkably, the AAP activists managed to bypass vote banks based on party favours and ethnic and religious networks-cum-clientelism by relating some of the most immediate

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problems for so many people in Delhi of public provisioning of basic services to corruption, including water and electricity. Also, the activists engaged in immediate voluntary assistance to citizens on how to claim their rights as well as in enrolling them in selecting candidates and in drawing up the party’s main action program.

Corruption in itself is certainly not the roots of the problems in India, and APP does not even have a policy with regard to problems of labour such as jobs and employment conditions in addition to so many other issues that cannot be handled on the local level and by participation in neighbourhood and town hall meetings. But for a start APP’s focus related to immediate basic needs of very many people, poor as well as middle classes; and the way of addressing them through democratisation facilitated active citizenship and collective political action. There was immediate success in the elections in 2013, mainly at the expense of Congress Party. It is true that a number of mistakes by the then AAP-led local government (which was short of an agenda for how to really implement many of its promises) were followed by presidential rule and total failure in the national elections in 2014. This indicated that AAP was not primarily a single issue phenomenon on the back of media hype but a movement on the ground which was organised in Delhi only. Hence the party made an outstanding come back in early 2015 by winning 67 of 70 seats. Within a week, however, the movement-cum-party that claimed to be more democratic than others could not even handle its own internal problems but suffered from a serious crisis and stud out as a conventional top-down driven populist party. Yet, the attempts to foster non-corrupt service provisioning continue and it remains to be seen if the problems of organisation and strategy can be addressed.

Conclusion

Jakarta’s populism is thus a recent case of efforts in many contexts to reproduce and scale up local participatory democratisation and social contracts. In spite of previous experiences it was difficult to learn from Solo as well as the more paradigmatic examples in Brazil and Kerala, and also from the parallel developments in New Delhi.

The Solo model and the attempt to scale it up to Jakarta differed in some ways with classic international experiences. Decentralisation and space for new local politics combined with a history of popular struggles was a common denominator, but forty years after the purging of the reformist communists Solo was short of radical ideology and strong organisation. Hence, the decisive initial factor was rather the few figures in the political elite who required extra-parliamentary support in the context of Indonesia’s new local governance and its post-
clientelist oriented direct elections of political executives. This provided some more room of manoeuvre and a rallying point for popular aspirations and the progressive leaders who facilitated them. Yet, the social contract was not functional until the civil society actors and sectoral popular groups were strong enough to not only provide support to populist leaders and get a few favours in return but were also able to put down their feet and enforce serious negotiations, such as in the cases of evictions. The relative shortage of this bargaining power in Jakarta as compared to Solo was a fundamental reason for the problems of reproducing and scaling up the model, often generating unviable quick fixes. Equally problematic, there was no strategy to improve the bargaining power of the civic and popular groups. The pioneering broad alliance behind the public health scheme could not be sustained and further developed. And there was no effort to initiate tripartite cooperation on issues of economic development and welfare between government, business and union (and other sectoral groups). So Jokowi and Ahok did not get sufficient extra-parliamentary backing to implement their ideas; and the civics and popular groups were not really able to push for more progressive polices. In addition to this, attempts were certainly made to foster corruption-free public administration. But most efforts in Jakarta were on the grand scale, with a focus on the big fishes in the police and judiciary plus business tycoons like Tomy Winata rather than on ordinary people’s everyday problems of claiming their social rights and getting access to their rightful public services – again reducing the chances of building forceful popular based movements for progressive change, as most recently in New Delhi.

In finally searching for answers to why advances in these respects have been so difficult, previous studies of the challenges of Indonesia’s democratisation in international perspective and in cooperation between scholars and reflective activists, point to the populist equivalent of Indonesia’s transactional politics (Savirani and Törnquist 2015 and Törnquist 2016 for summaries and further references). Populist transactionalism was certainly in Solo too, in the form of informal and individual negotiations (and exchange of services) between crucial actors, one by one. This undermines stability, democratic representation and trust – and thus the chance to strategise transformative reforms, which is particularly important when scaling up as from Solo to Jakarta. One may certainly wonder whether and how actors like Jokowi as well as civil society and popular movement leaders enjoying the benefits of informal contacts with the elite, would be interested in coming to terms with populist transactionalism. This is a crucial field for further research. But there is no doubt that most of the problems identified in this chapter grew worse in the additional attempt, then, to move up the ladder from not just
Solo to Jakarta but also to the presidency. This is another story, but while Jokowi won the elections, and while voluntary groups played an important role, the appointment of his government and the decisions it has made have certainly been constrained by transactional politics, elitist and populist. One possible opening (Djani et al. 2016) may be that President Jokowi obviously realises now that there is a need to improve the quality of his extra-parliamentary popular support to handle resistance from political and economic elites as well as sections of the military and police in order to implement his basic promises and stand a chance to make it in the next elections (2019) – and that electronic clicking as well as allocation of funds to villages without firm institutionalisation of participatory governance is insufficient.

References


18


