Printed in Analysis of Current Events, vol. 9, no. 11 (November 1997), pp. 1 & 3-4.

Only a few years ago the answer to the above question would clearly be negative. Even if nation-building in most former Soviet republics draws heavily on the symbols, culture, and language of the titular ethnic group, it was widely believed that ethnocentric nation-building simply could not work in Kazakstan. Kazakstan is the only successor state to the Soviet Union where the titular nationality is in a minority - less than 40% in the 1989 census. Taken together, the Russian-speaking, European population - Russians, Ukrainians, Belarusians, Germans, Poles, etc. - is more numerous. Official Kazakstani nation-building doctrine took heed of this situation. President Nazarbaev emphasized the equal rights of all ethnic groups in the Kazakstani state and soft-pedalled on cultural kazakification.

Several new trends suggest that the answer to our question is no longer so simple. However, in order to address it in a meaningful way, we must first determine which social arenas we are talking about. 'Ethnification' or 'nativization' may have many different aspects, and Kazakification may proceed slowly in some areas while making great strides forward in others. We will distinguish between four aspects: Demography, personnel policy, state doctrine, and linguistic policy, and concentrate on the latter.

In terms of ethno-demographic composition Kazakstan is clearly becoming more Kazak. According to official statistics, the share of the Kazak group increased from 39.7% in 1989 to 46% in January 1995. Over the same period, the share of the Russians dropped from 37.7% to 34.8%; of the Germans, from 5.8% to 3.1%. A Kazak demographic dominance is predicted to be in place by the first decade of the next century. There are two main reasons for this trend: the higher birth-rates of the (especially rural) Kazaks, and an increased outmigration of Europeans (especially Germans) which is not offset by a similar in-migration, as was the case in the Soviet period.

Also in the state bureaucracies there is a strong tendency of kazakification. The overrepresentation of ethnic Kazaks in top administrative and political positions started as early as under First secretary Kunaev in the 1970s, but has picked up considerable speed since independence. A semi-official Kazakstani research report computed the ethnic composition of first and second echelon executives in the Cabinet of Ministers and the presidential apparatus in 1994. They found 22.9% Slavs, 74.3% Kazaks, and 3.1% minorities. The share of these three groups in the total population in the same year was 43%, 44.3%, and 12.7%, respectively. Only one year earlier the share of ethnic Kazaks in these structures had been 2-3 percentage points lower. The Kazak researchers explained the increased Kazak presence in the corridors of power as a reflection of demographic trends, but this is certainly disingenuous. After all, not infants but adults serve in the state apparatus. The dynamics of ethnic representation are anticipating rather than resulting from the ethno-demographic development.

As concerns state ideology the new constitution that was adopted in 1995 seems to strengthen the civic understand of the Kazakstani nation. The phrase defining Kazakstan as 'the form of statehood of the selfdetermining Kazak nation' was deleted, as was the special rights of the Kazak diaspora to hold dual citizenship. Russian was elevated to a status as an ‘official’ language ‘to be used on a par with the state language in state organs and in organs of local administration’. However, a new official ‘Concept for the Forming of a State Identity of the Republic of Kazakstan’, published in May 1996 (Kazakhstanskaia pravda 29 May 1996), represented a partial reversal to a more ethnocentric idea of the nation.

There is clearly an inner tension in the Kazakstani state concept. While the Nazarbaev regime is still ostensibly committed to a program of non-ethnic (multiethnic rather than supraethnic) the nationbuilding also emphasizes the special position of the Kazak nation in this state. These contradictions are revealed also in the new language law which was promulgated on 11 July this year. The Kazak cultural intelligentsia had been pushing hard for the adoption of this law, since, as they claimed, the previous law was 'not working'. That law, dating from 1989, proclaimed Kazak as the sole state language but contained no concrete mechanisms for its promotion.

Generally speaking, the new law is no less declaratory than the one it replaces. It states that it is the duty of every citizen of Kazakstan to master the state (Kazak) language 'which is an all-important factor in the consolidation of the people of Kazakstan'. The government is instructed to ensure by all possible means the development of the state language and raise its international prestige. However, these lofty goals are negated in the next paragraph which states that Russian may be used in an official capacity in the state organs and in the organs of local government. In a similar manner the teeth are drawn out of most of the other paragraphs as well. 'Plus ca change, plus ce la meme chose.'

In the draft version of the new law ethnic Kazaks were required to learn the state language by January 2001 and the Russian-speaking population had to know Kazak by January 2006. However, by the time the final version was adopted this clause had disappeared. While the government is instructed to work out a state programme for a gradual transition to Kazak in public administration, no such action programme is really enforceable. Both the material and the mental prerequisites are lacking. Among the non-Kazaks no more than approximately 2% are fluent in Kazak while roughly 10% claim to be able to read a Kazak text with the help of a dictionary. In addition, a significant minority also among the Kazaks are unable to read their putative mother tongue. Most estimates put the Kazak literacy among ethnic Kazaks to somewhere in the range of 60% to 75%. Especially urban and northern Kazaks have a poor command of 'the state language'.

Even with the best of will there are not enough teachers, textbooks, or other necessary means to facilitate a large-scale Kazak teaching programme. To be sure, ever more Russian schools are being converted into Kazak schools. In these cases pupils that are unable or unwilling to follow education in Kazak are transferred to a Russian school. As a result, the Russian schools are becoming increasingly crowded. Some prestigious university courses are now monolingually Kazak. These include the courses in international relations at the Kazakstan State university which prepare personnel for the diplomatic services. Most Russians, however, just shrug their shoulders: they reason that they would not have been let into the diplomatic corps in any case.

A survey we organized in September 1996 among thousand respondents in ten oblasts revealed the following trends:

While more Kazaks are sending their children to Kazak schools today than one generation ago there is hardly any generational change in the Russian group. Significantly, among the non-Russian non-Kazaks there is a clear and growing preference for Russian schools. This stands in sharp contrast to the situation in Latvia, another country with a very large Russophone population. In Latvia, according to our survey, more than 18% of the Russian pupils and 22% of the non-Russian non-Latvians attend Latvian schools today (as against only 2,7% and 15.7%, respectively, one generation ago).

To be sure, Kazak language is taught as a compulsory subject in Russian schools in Kazakstan, but in most cases this is simply for the sake of appearances. The students leave the school with almost as low proficiency in Kazak as they had when they entered.

This is not to say that the new language law will have no effects whatsoever. It will be accompanied by a list of professions in which a command of the state language at a particular level is required. This list will be discussed by the parliament in mid-November this year and at the moment of writing it remains uncertain which professions it will include. However, there is every reason to believe that such a list, no matter how comprehensive it turns out to be, will be enforced very selectively. Most employees will be allowed to retain their jobs, even when they blatantly fail the language requirement (no formal language tests are envisaged). However, they will know that they owe their continued income to the magnanimity of the authorities. The law will be hanging over their head as a sword of Damocles. While this may be more a windfall of the law than a major motivation behind its adoption, it will tend to enforce tranquillity on the labour market. The current performance of the Kazak economy is appallingly bad, and living standards are falling among all ethnic groups. The authorities are at the present more concerned about economically motivated social unrest than about Russophone political mobilization on ethno-linguistic grounds.

The paragraph in the language law which requires all TV and radio stations to devote no less air time to Kazak than to all other languages combined may serve a similar purpose of intimidation. Since Kazak language programs will attract very few listeners and viewers private stations, that depend economically upon incomes from advertisement, will simply ignore this requirement. The authorities for their part in most cases will pretend to ignore their non-compliance. However, if a TV station makes any false step, such as indulging in critical, investigating journalism or giving too much air time to the opposition, this proviso of the language law may be pulled out of the sleeve.

Russian is likely to remain the dominant language in this Central Asian state in the foreseeable future. In two other respects - demographically and politically - Kazakstan seems to become more kazakified However, while the political preponderance of the Kazaks seems to be on the rise, there are certain signs that demographic kazakification is slowing down somewhat. Economic hardships lead to fewer births and higher infant mortality among rural Kazaks while the outmigration of Europeans seems to be abating. Even so, the political dominance of the Kazaks seems to be secure.