The Making of Czechoslovakism in the First Czechoslovak Republic

Elisabeth Bakke
Department of Political Science
University of Oslo
P.O. Box 1097 Blindern
NO-0317 Oslo

Published in:
Czechoslovakism, the official state ideology of the First Czechoslovak Republic, had at least two meanings. It meant that Czechs and Slovaks together comprised a Czechoslovak nation with two “tribes”, Czechs and Slovaks – or also that the Slovaks were actually Czechs, only less developed. Czechoslovakism as a political program for the unification of this nation in one state was formulated during the First World War by the independence movement abroad, while the idea that the Czechs and Slovaks were one nation had a longer pedigree.¹

Czechoslovakia was established in the heyday of the principle of national self-determination, which held that each nation should have its own state, and the purpose of official Czechoslovakism was to legitimize Czechoslovakia as a nation-state. The national minorities were explicitly excluded from the Czechoslovak nation, as well as from any state-forming status. Czechoslovakism was opposed by a part of the Slovak elite, who insisted that the Slovaks were a separate nation and by virtue of this entitled to autonomy. The latter was a persistent claim in Slovak political history, dating back to 1861. The Slovak People’s Party (Slovenská ľudová strana) was the chief political representative of the Slovak autonomists, while the Czech and Czechoslovak parties were more or less Czechoslovakist, the exception being the Communist party (Komunistická strana Československa) from 1924.

The struggle between the two camps linked the identity question with the matter of state form and power distribution, in the sense that the Czechoslovakists were in favor of a unitary, centralized state, while the

Slovak autonomists wanted a dual federation. This was, however, not a matter of loyalty to the Czechoslovak state, simply because the autonomists did not draw the ultimate conclusion of their claim that the Slovaks were a separate nation with the right to national self-determination: They never filed for independence. On the contrary, they always insisted that Czechoslovakia was their state too, and pledged loyalty to it. Both sides thus conceived of Czechoslovakia as a nation-state, but the Slovak autonomists regarded her as the nation-state of two separate, state-forming nations, the Czechs and the Slovaks. This also illustrates the difference between national loyalties and loyalty towards the state.

The focus of this article is, however, on the construction of identity. Firstly, the purpose is to examine the ideological contents of official Czechoslovakism. Secondly, I will try to assess to what extent Czechoslovakism succeeded in creating a subjective Czechoslovak identity. Finally, I will analyze why the attempts at constructing a Czechoslovak nation failed.

*Czechoslovakism in wartime propaganda*

Czechoslovakism was formulated during the First World War by the independence movement abroad, as part of the propaganda effort to convince the allies that a Czechoslovak state should be established. Historical state rights were used to justify independence for the Czech lands, while the principle of national self-determination was invoked to justify the inclusion of Slovakia, based on the premise that the Slovaks were a part of the Czech nation and their language an (archaic) Czech dialect. According to Tomáš G. Masaryk, Slovakia was the core of Great Moravia, the first shared state, from which the Slovaks had been “torn away by the Magyars in the 10th century.”

The making of Czechoslovakism

The Czechoslovak National Committee (Československý národní výbor) in Prague. The Slovak political leaders were largely silenced during the war, yet in two official declarations from 1918, they referred to their nation as the Hungarian or the Slovak branch of the Czechoslovak tribe or nation.

There is every reason to believe that the Czechoslovakism of the independence movement abroad as well as of the home front was tactically motivated. The underlying rationale was a "strength-through-unity" idea, which was explicitly expressed e. g. by Masaryk. The Czech national leaders wanted to include Slovakia in order to be numerically stronger against the large German minority in the historical Czech lands, and the Slovak national leaders preferred a Czechoslovak state to the alternative, which was to remain under Hungarian rule.3

The ideological contents of official Czechoslovakism

Right after independence, the Czechoslovak rhetoric was less pronounced, but by 1920 it was well on the way to become the official state doctrine.⁴ This can be observed in various official documents, from the Constitution, via laws and government decrees, to official statistics and school textbooks. Czechoslovakism also permeated speeches in the Parliament, scholarly works and the Press. A concerted effort was made to rewrite history in order to fit the conception of a Czechoslovak nation with two tribes.

What were the ideological contents of official Czechoslovakism? In order to address this, we will first take a look at the Czechoslovak Constitution. Constitutions are especially interesting in terms of identity, because they are powerful symbols of belonging and recognition. The 1920 Constitution was a liberal constitution, modeled on the French and American constitutions. It also preserved parts of the 1867 Austrian Constitution, and included parts of the peace treaties.⁵ Unlike the American and French models, the 1920 Constitution was adopted on behalf of "We, the Czechoslovak nation", rather than "the people" or the citizens. The

---

3 In 1921, Czechs comprised 50.8 percent, Slovaks 14.7 percent, Germans 23.4 percent, Magyars 5.6 percent, Ruthenians 3.5 percent, Jews 1.4 percent, and Poles 0.6 percent of the population in Czechoslovakia as a whole. See Sčítání lidu v republice československé ze dne 15. února 1921 [Census in the Czechoslovak Republic of 15th February 1921]. Part I. Edited by Státní úřad statistický. Praha 1924, 60, 66.

4 Bakke: Doomed to failure 192-195, 277-279 (cf. footnote 1).

Czechoslovak nation was, however, not mentioned in the constitution as such.

The Preamble reads, in extenso:

We, the Czechoslovak nation, desiring to consolidate the perfect unity of our nation, to establish the reign of justice in the Republic, to assure the peaceful development of our Czechoslovak homeland, to contribute to the common welfare of all citizens of this state and to secure the blessings of freedom to coming generations, have in our National assembly on February 29th, 1920 adopted the following Constitution for the Czechoslovak republic. In doing so, we, the Czechoslovak nation, declare that we will endeavor to carry out this constitution as well as all the laws of our country in the spirit of our history as well as in the spirit of the modern principles embodied in the slogan of self-determination; for we want to take our place in the community of nations as a cultivated, peace-loving, democratic and progressive member.6

It has quite correctly been argued that the first part of the preamble is an obvious parallel to the American preamble.7 The claim that “We, the Czechoslovak nation” must therefore be interpreted in terms of a political nation is, however, less convincing. First, a civic nation concept was not very common at the time. Second, when the entire population is implied, the Constitution refers to citizens or inhabitants. Third, the reference to a “Czechoslovak language” in § 131 and in the separate Language Act points to a cultural conception of nationhood, and this is confirmed by the parliamentary debate.8 Finally, a cultural conception is consistent with the wartime propaganda and makes more sense also in light of the reference to the slogan of self-determination, which hardly applied to the citizens of the newly-formed state. The only way in which the Czechoslovak nation (comprising the Czechs and Slovaks) can be regarded as a political nation is thus in the sense of a state-forming nation.

Czechoslovakism was most consistently applied in statistics. The Czechs and Slovaks were habitually presented as one nation in statistics pertaining to nationality during the entire First Republic. This applies to statistical handbooks, yearbooks, and even the population censuses. In these handbooks and yearbooks, the Czechoslovak category was used without any specification of what a “Czechoslovak nationality” meant in

---

6 Sbírka zákonů a nařízení statu československého (1918–1920) [Code of laws and decrees of the Czechoslovak state]. Praha 1920, 255.
8 See e.g. Antonín Svehla’s and Isidor Zahradník’s speeches in the Constitutional Committee, quoted in Broklová, Eva: Československá ústava [The Czechoslovak Constitution]. Prague 1992, 72-73.
practical terms. Here, the guidelines for the gathering of population census data are of particular interest: Two full censuses were carried out during the First Republic. In 1921, a subjective definition of nationality was applied; only if a person indicated two nationalities or no nationality at all could nationality be determined on the basis of mother tongue. The 1930 census was a retreat to a more objective definition; now nationality as a rule was registered according to mother tongue. The 1921 guidelines listed “Czechoslovak (Czech or Slovak)” among the alternatives in the column for nationality, adding that “by nationality should be understood tribal affiliation, the main external mark of which is usually mother tongue.” The contradiction between two languages and one nation was solved by defining Czech and Slovak as two literary forms of the same language. In both censuses, virtually all statistics regarding nationality registered people of Czech or Slovak origin as “Czechoslovaks”, no matter what they actually answered. When this was criticized in Parliament, the government referred to the Constitution.

Although a concerted effort was made to rewrite history in order to fit the conception of a Czechoslovak nation with two tribes, this was not consistently advocated in school textbooks in history. I surveyed a representative sample of school textbooks in my dissertation, and surprisingly, many of the books did not convey a Czechoslovak identity at all. Perhaps even more surprisingly, Czech and Slovak textbooks (especially those for the primary school) differed in terms of Czechoslovakist tendency. Slovak textbooks for the primary school were the most Czechoslovakist. Moreover, even in the most Czechoslovakist of the books, the main focus was inevitably on the separate histories of the Czechs and Slovaks, and the terms “Czech” and “Slovak” were found to occur far more often than “Czechoslovak”.

All the Czech textbooks I surveyed emerged as very Czech-centered. Slovak history was seen as little more than an appendix or a parenthesis.


10 See Tisk 173 (interpellation) and Tisk 255 (answer). In: Tisky k těsnopiseckým zprávám o schůzích poslanecké sněmovny, Národního shromáždění republiky československé [Supplement to the stenographic reports of the sessions of the Parliament of the National Assembly]. Vol. II. Praha 1930.

Here “Czech” and “Czechoslovak” often amounted to the same, and the Slovaks were, like their history, treated as a mere extension of the Czech nation. Strikingly, not a single Slovak book conveyed a strong Slovak identity. In the Slovak books, the Czechoslovakist rhetoric reflected the idea of a Czechoslovak nation with two tribes, and not that the Slovaks were part of the Czech nation. The Czech and Slovak secondary-school textbooks were more alike, but closer to the Czech than the Slovak tradition.

What did Czechoslovak nationhood consist in, according to these textbooks? The features that were seen as uniting were kinship or blood relation, language and culture, and spirit – or what we might term “national character”, although that term was used only by one author. The Czechoslovak nation was thus conceived as a cultural-linguistic community based on the closeness of the two languages, and/or a kinship community based on blood relation. The shared Slav origin underlay all this, even though it was not always explicitly mentioned.

Constructing a historical narrative that could serve to unite the Czechs and the Slovaks was obviously no easy task. After the demise of Great Moravia in 907, the Czechs and Slovaks had belonged to different states (and after 1526 to different parts of the Habsburg empire). There was thus little shared political history, so the Czechoslovak “nation-builders” had to use Czecho-Slovak contacts throughout the centuries for what they were worth – which they did.

The historical events that were emphasized were the shared Slav forefathers, Great Moravia as the first Czechoslovak state (most common in Slovak books), Czecho-Slovak contacts resulting from Hussism and the Reformation, but especially the national revivals and the founding of the Czechoslovak republic. A “strength-through-unity” message was quite common, especially in Slovak primary-school textbooks: It was argued that the Czechs and Slovaks needed to stand together against their enemies, the Germans and Magyars. The primary-school books were generally anti-German and/or anti-Magyar, while

13 Hussism was a Czech religious movement, named after Jan Hus (the martyr who died at the stake in Constance in 1415). It has often been regarded as a forerunner of Protestantism. The Catholic Church regarded Hussism as a heresy, and several crusades were organized against the Czech lands because of this, e.g. by Sigismund, king of Hungary (and thus of Slovakia). See Bakke: Doomed to failure 89-93 (cf. footnote 1).
the textbooks for secondary school were, on the whole, far more balanced.

Scholarly works advocating Czechoslovakism shared many of the features of the school textbooks, but were more elaborate and included some extra elements: Here, Czechoslovak unity was also served by the reign of the Czech Přemyslid kings in Slovakia in the 10th century, the early conversion to Christianity, and the Western influences stemming from German colonization in the Middle ages. The establishment of Charles University (Univerzita Karlova) in 1348 and the emigration of Czech Protestants to Slovakia after 1620 were considered as important contributions to the use of Czech in Slovakia. The positive evaluation of the German colonization differs perhaps the most from the presentation in the schoolbooks.

In conclusion, the ideological contents of the Czechoslovakism that was conveyed in the scholarly works, as well as in the official documents mentioned here, were clearly rooted in the cultural, linguistic and ethnic affinity of the Czechs and Slovaks. Apart from the philosopher Emanuel Rádl, who was critical to Czechoslovak unity, nobody advocated a purely political nation concept, i.e. comprising all Czechoslovak citizens regardless of cultural backgrounds. Some of the scholars admittedly emphasized spiritual unity, but even in these cases membership in the Czechoslovak nation was clearly confined to the Czechs and Slovaks.

How successful was the Czechoslovak nation project?

There is no way of knowing just how successful official Czechoslovakism was in terms of creating Czechoslovak subjective identity during the First Republic. We cannot even assess identity changes on aggregate level, since the census reports of 1921 and 1930 fail to distinguish be-

---

14 Rádl, Emanuel: Válka Čechů s Němci [The war of Czechs against Germans]. Praha 1928, 140-44.

between Czech, Slovak and Czechoslovak nationality. Information on what people actually answered has never been published. Moreover, due to the reversal of this policy after the war, the category “Czechoslovak nationality” was missing in all the communist censuses.16

We thus cannot say anything about the development of subjective identifications during or after the First Republic. What we do know, is that the number of “Czechoslovaks” at the end of communism was very low indeed. In the first post-communist census (1991) “Czechoslovak nationality” was reintroduced as a category, but subsumed under “others”. In the Czech lands, 3464 persons subscribed to Czechoslovak nationality. In Slovakia the corresponding figure was 59. Neither is very impressive, considering that there were a total of 307004 mixed marriages, nearly two thirds of which were marriages between Czechs and Slovaks.17 The offspring of these alliances had a dual Czech-Slovak

---


The making of Czechoslovakism

heritage, but obviously did not identify with it. How high the number of “Czechoslovaks” would have been if official Czechoslovakism had not been abandoned after the war, is hard to tell.

There are reasons to believe that the number of convinced Czechoslovaks was rather low also during the First Republic, especially in Slovakia. Ružomberok (Rosenberg), the home town of Andrej Hlinka, the leader of the Slovak People’s Party, and an autonomist stronghold, is hardly representative, but it may nevertheless serve as an illustration. According to Slovák (The Slovak), the newspaper of the Slovak People’s Party, the 1930 population census reported that there were 11965 Slovaks, 1736 Czechs and 139 Czechoslovaks in Ružomberok.\(^\text{18}\) Assuming that all 139 were former Slovaks (which is not likely) and that all had converted from Slovak to Czechoslovak identity after 1918, the turn-over would be a little over 1 percent in ten years – which is close to a complete failure.

Czechoslovakism seems to have been more of a success on the Czech side. According to an opinion poll from 1946 (see Table 1), a large majority of the respondents regarded the Czechs and the Slovaks as two branches of the same nation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Czech and Slovak character is</th>
<th>Czechs and Slovaks are</th>
<th>Abroad I would present myself as</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Different The same Don’t know</td>
<td>Two branches of the same nation Two nations Don’t know</td>
<td>Czech Czechoslovak Don’t know</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>66</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


This is, however, not very surprising, since it seems to have been quite common to regard the Slovaks as a part of the Czech nation also before 1918. The change from Czech to Czechoslovak may thus merely be a change of labels. Also, a majority of the Czechs still had a primary

Czech subjective identity, although as many as 45 percent of the Czechs would present themselves as Czechoslovaks abroad. As noted by the survey report, it is not likely that this would be the case at home.

Unfortunately, no such opinion poll was ever made in Slovakia, as far as I am aware, and I strongly doubt that the result would have been the same among the Slovaks, although the share who would present themselves as Czechoslovaks may well have been higher than the one percent noted in Ružomberok. And whether the Slovaks subscribed to the notion of a Czechoslovak nation or not, there was no doubt of their loyalty to the Czechoslovak state.

Why did the Czechoslovak nation project fail?

Although we lack precise data about the identifications of the Czechs and Slovaks at the end of the First Republic, I think we can safely assume that the attempt at constructing a Czechoslovak nation failed. Furthermore, also judging from the opposition it produced, it is quite obvious that Czechoslovakism was more of a failure among the Slovaks than among the Czechs. There was in fact very little Czech opposition to Czechoslovakism, while it was vehemently opposed by the Slovak autonomists. The failure of Czechoslovakism may be explained in terms of causes internal to the Czechoslovakist ideology, and in terms of other factors that led to increased national conflicts. The former may be addressed by going into the scholarly and political debate about Czechoslovakism, focusing on the controversial issues.

The scholarly debate shows how different interpretations of the same historical events can be – and were – used to support two different nation projects, respectively the Czechoslovak and the Slovak nation projects. The Czechoslovakist point of departure was the idea of Czechoslovak national unity as the original and, by implication, natural situation. In contrast, the Slovak autonomists regarded Czechoslovak unity as a long gone tribal unity. There were two critical junctures in the Czechoslovakist interpretation of history: The demise of Great Moravia (in 907) represented a political separation, and the codification of the Slovak language (in the 18th and 19th centuries) signified a linguistic separation of the two “branches of the Czechoslovak nation”. What were then the major points of dispute?

In wartime propaganda, an independent Czechoslovak state had been presented as the re-establishment of the historical Czech kingdom, with the addition of Slovakia. This was the predominant view on the Czech
side, whereas Great Moravia was secondary in importance. In contrast, the Slovak Czechoslovakists regarded Great Moravia as the first Czechoslovak state, and thus as the historical predecessor of the Czechoslovak republic, while the Czech autonomists saw Great Moravia as a predominantly Slovak state, arguing that a Czech state had existed alongside it most of the time. They also blamed the Czechs for its breakdown.\(^{19}\)

On the Czechoslovakist side, all contacts between the Czechs and Slovaks were cited as proof that a Czechoslovak unity had been preserved over the centuries. The Hussite period played an especially important part in these projections; Hussism allegedly brought the Slovaks into direct and lively contact with the Czechs, and led to the diffusion of Czech culture and language. Contacts that led to the use of Czech in Slovakia were seen as advantageous; most important were Slovak students at Charles University and the Czech Protestant exiles. Czech scholars consistently placed the Slovaks in the receiving end, while some of the Slovak scholars (chiefly the politician Milan Hodža) emphasized reciprocity in Czecho-Slovak relations.\(^{20}\)

From a Slovak autonomist point of view it was objected, first, that the Czechoslovakist interpretation of history did not distinguish between Czecho-Slovak contacts in general and those that may have served to unite the Czechs and the Slovaks, and second, that the things that set the Czechs and Slovaks apart were neglected. The autonomists also evaluated certain contacts differently; for instance, contacts that admittedly contributed to the use of Czech in Slovakia were seen as detrimental to literary Slovak. Likewise, the Slovak autonomists disputed that Christianity and German colonization served Czechoslovak unity, and gave the visits of the Hussites and Protestants a religious rather than a national meaning. It was argued that instead of uniting the Czechs and Slovaks, Hussism probably served to separate them, due to the many wars it caused.\(^{21}\) In the conception of the (Catholic) Slovak

---

19 Bakke: Doomed to failure 197-198, 246-247 (cf. footnote 1). — The view that Great Moravia was a Slovak or Slovak-Moravian state is also shared by some contemporary Slovak historians. See Marsina, Richard/Čičaj, Viliam/Koráč, Dušan/Liptáš, L’ubomír: Slovenské dejiny [Slovak history]. Martin 1992, 33. — Labels like Slovak, Moravian and Czechoslovak are of course imposed afterwards; at the time, it was a Slav state.


People’s Party, the Hussites were plunderers who burned and looted, while Jan Hus himself was a heretic.

Even the Czechoslovakists admitted that there were differences between the Czechs and Slovaks due to their long separation, but they regarded the differences as temporal, while the Slovak autonomists saw them as permanent and national. Czech scholars interpreted the difference in terms of cultural level and attributed Slovak cultural backwardness to the broken link to Czech culture and the negative influences of the Magyar (“barbarian”) culture. This was also Masaryk’s view. In Hodža’s opinion, it was the Czechs who had been influenced (“contaminated”) by the Germans, while Slovak culture and language was more original but lagged behind, due to its isolation. In contrast, the Slovak autonomists insisted that it was the Slovaks who had influenced – or civilized – the Magyars, not the other way around. They also downplayed the importance of the demise of Great Moravia; in their view, the real trouble started later.

The second critical juncture in the Czechoslovakist interpretation of history was the codification of the Slovak language, which all the Czechoslovakists regarded as a linguistic schism. In Czech literary history, there was a long pre-war tradition of interpreting the codification of Slovak as a separation. This view was also expressed in some of the school textbooks. This is perhaps not surprising, in light of the dominant cultural and linguistic nation concept.

From a Czechoslovakist point of view, the problem was the traditional linkage between language and nationhood, according to which one nation could not have more than one language. One strategy was to downplay the importance of language and emphasize how the national unity had survived despite linguistic separation. Another strategy was to portray the linguistic separation as artificial, initiated by someone for some extralinguistic reason. The point of departure was (again) an original and “natural” Czechoslovak linguistic unity, which was based on the claim that

An interview he gave to Le Petit Parisien in 1921 is quite illustrating: “There is no Slovak nation, said Masaryk, this is an invention of Magyar propaganda. The Czechs and Slovaks are brothers. […] They understand each other perfectly. All that separates them is the cultural level – the Czechs are more developed than the Slovaks, because the Magyars kept them in the dark. […] In one generation there will be no difference between the two branches of our national family.” Masaryk, Tomáš G.: Cesta demokracie II [The path of Democracy]. Praha 1934, 78-79.

the differences between the spoken idioms were negligible. It should be noted that neither strategy implied linguistic assimilation of the Slovaks.

The interpretation of the motives behind the codification of Slovak differed within the Czechoslovakist camp. Some presented it as a reaction to the Magyarization pressure. Others argued that the “awakeners” did it for political reasons or else were motivated by Pan-Slavism. The line of argument that caused most opposition from the Slovak autonomist side was, however, the insinuation that those responsible were under Hungarian or Magyar influence. Again, the Protestants were hailed for preserving Czechoslovak unity through the use of “biblical Czech”.

In contrast, the Slovak autonomists argued that the codification of Slovak was only the final step in a natural (national) development, and that the Slovak national revival had actually served to bring the Slovaks closer to the Czechs, by installing a Czechoslovak reciprocity that had not existed before the revival. Their view was that the “awakeners” were motivated by a wish to save the Slovaks from annihilation – in Jozef Škultéty’s words, they seized literary Slovak in a hurry in 1843 so the very roof would not burn down over their heads.

The Czechoslovakist reinterpretation of history thus proved to be chiefly a reinterpretation of Slovak history. For a large part of the Slovak elite, official Czechoslovakism ran contrary to Slovak national identity, and it contradicted the traditional Slovak interpretation of history on important points. In contrast, Czech history was narrated basically the same way as before, with an additional sentence or two about Slovakia or the Slovaks. For the Czechs, the new identity was thus complementary; Czech and Czechoslovak amounted to the same.

The most striking difference between the scholarly and the political debate was that the latter was more instrumental. The main autonomist arguments were that the Czechoslovak nation was a fiction; a threat to the existence of the Slovak nation; and contrary to Slovak interests. The “strength-through-unity” argument dominated Czechoslovakist rhetoric, besides they argued that Czechoslovak unity had a long pedigree, and accused the autonomists of being Magyarones. A conspicuous feature of the political debate was indeed the mutual accusations of treason to the Slovak, respectively the Czechoslovak nation.

There were two main problems with the Czechoslovakist ideology: For one thing, the projected Czechoslovak national unity was based on the same constituting features (shared history and language) as the exist-

---

Elisabeth Bakke

36

ing Czech and Slovak identities. The latter obviously had an advantage over Czechoslovakism, both because of their head start and because the features that were said to unite the Slovaks (respectively the Czechs) in fact did; the Slovaks (Czechs) did share a history and a literary language. A considerable amount of construction, or even invention, was needed in order to make these features appear as uniting the Czechs and Slovaks. This was no easy task, as the discussion above showed.

The second problem was the strong Czech bias, which took several forms. Not only were Slovak autonomists accused of being renegades and (covert) Magyarones, but the Czechoslovakist ideology also placed the Slovaks in the role of mainly passive receivers of Czech (positive) and Magyar (negative) cultural impulses. The role of Hussism was exaggerated totally out of proportion, and it was presented as an ideal, while Catholicism – the religion of the Slovak majority – was judged negatively, in line with Hungarism and Magyarism. Everything Slovak was said to be the result of Magyar influences, and seen as a deviation from the Czech standard. This created strong reactions, and must have been counterproductive to the formation of an overarching Czechoslovak identity among the Slovaks. Part of the reason why the Czechoslovak nation project failed thus lies in the ideology itself.

Nationally relevant conflicts and their causes

The other part of the explanation of why Czechoslovakism failed is associated with the rising conflict level between Czechs and Slovaks after 1918. While they were still under Austrian-Hungarian rule, the Czechs and Slovaks shared the same fate, in that both were oppressed – by the Germans and the Magyars, respectively. Moreover, since the Czechs and Slovaks belonged to different parts of the Habsburg empire, the large differences between the Czech lands and Slovakia did not constitute nationally relevant conflicts between Czechs and Slovaks. For the same reason, national grievances were directed at their respective ruling nations.²⁵

Once the political center of gravitation shifted from Vienna and Budapest to Prague after 1918, however, this changed. The Czechs became in practice the ruling nation of the new state, and the cordial elite relations between the Czechs and Slovaks deteriorated. Three factors contributed

²⁵ The term “nationally relevant conflict” signifies a situation where conflicts of interest correspond to national dividing lines. This correspondence allows conflicts of interest to be transformed into national conflicts. See Hroch, Miroslav: Social preconditions of national revival in Europe. London 1985, 188.
The making of Czechoslovakism

37
to this: First, the transition to independent statehood in combination with the heritage of Austria-Hungary provided the material basis for many of the national conflict issues. Second, the post-war economic crisis in 1921–1923 and the worldwide economic crisis in the 1930s severely restricted the government’s freedom of action. Third, the government made some mistakes, and was also more directly responsible for some conflicts.26

After the Ausgleich of 1867, the gap in democratic development between the two parts of the Austrian-Hungarian empire widened. The Austrian part developed in a constitutional direction, and suffrage was gradually extended, while political participation remained more nationally and socially restricted in Hungary. Hence, the Czechs developed a differentiated party system with experienced politicians already around the turn of the century, while the Slovaks lacked both. Economically, the Czech lands were the most industrialized in the whole empire, while Slovakia remained agrarian and also had an old-fashioned agriculture. Economic ties and infrastructure were orientated towards Vienna and Budapest, respectively, while east-west connections were inadequate, especially in Slovakia. The legal system, taxes and tariffs differed. Culturally, Czech society made great progress from the mid-19th century, and by 1918 the Czechs had a large and well-educated intelligentsia. In contrast, education meant Magyarization in Hungary, and the Slovak intelligentsia was thus very small.

This Magyarization policy also left an unfortunate psychological legacy: Part of the reason why Czechoslovakism was perceived as threatening, was probably that what had started as an Hungarian political nation, after 1867 took on the ambition of assimilating all non-Magyars.

Nationally relevant conflicts can be addressed by going into the political debate in the Parliament, looking for conflicts that were expressed in national terms. It turned out that most of the national demands during the First Republic were raised on behalf of the Slovaks (and of course on behalf of the national minorities, but I will not go into those grievances here, since the national minorities were explicitly excluded from the Czechoslovak nation project).

The demand for recognition of Slovaks as a separate nation was implicit in most of the argumentation of the Slovak People’s Party and the Slovak National Party (Slovenská národná strana), but it was also occasionally explicitly voiced in Parliament. Other demands of a symbolic nature were, for instance, the recognition of the Slovaks as a separate category in the population censuses, and the claim that the name of the state

26 See Bakke: Doomed to failure, Conclusion (cf. footnote 1) for a fuller picture of this.
should be spelled with a hyphen (i.e. the Czecho-Slovak Republic), in order to recognize the individuality of the Slovak nation. The latter demand was raised twice in the 1920s and implemented through the 1938 Constitutional amendment, which inaugurated the short-lived Second Czecho-Slovak Republic. Conflicts related to the recognition of the Slovaks as a separate nation were directly caused by official Czechoslovakism.

The few demands that were made on behalf of the Czechs were “left-overs” from the Austrian period, and concerned the establishment of a second Czech university and Czech schools for Czech minorities in the German-speaking border areas. The Slovak cultural demands can be divided in four categories: religious demands, demands for the expansion of the educational system, demands for a Slovak “spirit” in the schools (including complaints about Czechoslovakist schoolbooks), and linguistic demands. Of these, the two latter were most closely related to official Czechoslovakism, while demands for the expansion of the educational system and linguistic demands were by far the most prevalent. Complaints about the lack of Slovak spirit in the schools were surprisingly few, and were nearly always associated with linguistic grievances.

Religious grievances were mostly confined to the early 1920s, and the only recurring issue was preservation of the Slovak confessional schools. A conflict with strong symbolic overtones was the 1925 controversy about the Law of Public Holidays. The major point of dispute was the institution of a Jan Hus Day, which the Slovak People’s Party opposed on the ground that to the Catholic majority in Slovakia, he was a heretic, not a national hero. This must also be seen in the context of the strong emphasis Czechoslovakism placed on Hus.

The most important cultural demands concerned implementation of linguistic rights. The language policy of the First Republic was regulated by the special Language Act in pursuance of § 129 of the Constitution,

See Bakke: Doomed to failure 279-83, 473 (cf. footnote 1). — The “hyphen-war” of 1990 is an interesting parallel. It was triggered by president Václav Havel’s proposal to remove the word “socialist” from the name of the Czecho-slovak Socialist Republic. Like in the inter-war period, the Slovak deputies regarded the hyphen as a symbol of Slovak national individuality and equality, and it was even argued that it was necessary to remove all remnants of Czechoslovakism and show the world that the Slovak nation existed. See Stein, Eric: Czecho/Slovakia. Ethnic conflict, constitutional fissure, negotiated breakup. Ann Arbor 1997, 57-59. — Bakke, Elisabeth: The principle of national self-determination in Czechoslovak constitutions 1920–1992. In: Central European Political Science Review 3 (2002) no. 10, 173-198.

A large majority of schools in Slovakia were run by the Church, and the (Catholic) Slovak People’s Party wanted to keep it that way. For details see Bakke: Doomed to failure 324-327, 355-359 (cf. footnote 1).
which gave the “Czechoslovak” state language a privileged status. From a Slovak point of view, the problem was that the Language Act guaranteed the rights of the Slovaks vis-à-vis the national minorities, but not vis-à-vis the Czechs. Article 4 admittedly stated that “as a rule” Czech should be used in the Czech lands and Slovak in Slovakia, but the same article allowed Czech officials to answer Slovaks in Czech and vice versa. This formal parity worked to the advantage of the Czechs. By virtue of their size and cultural level, the Czechs dominated the central administration in Prague, and they also made up a significant share (around 23 percent) of the state-employed intelligentsia in Slovakia.29

An overwhelming majority of the Slovak linguistic grievances concerned the use of Czech in public institutions in Slovakia; especially the administration, the schools, the Comenius university (Univerzita Komenského), the military, the postal service and the railways. The autonomists repeatedly demanded stricter language regulations and “Slovak in Slovakia”. Judging by the number of complaints, the situation improved towards the end of the 1920s, except at the university. A linguistic grievance with symbolic overtones concerned the text on banknotes. The first banknote issued by the newly-founded Czechoslovak National Bank (Československá národní banka) in 1926 was a 20-crown note with Czech text and a portrait of the Slovak co-founder of the state, Milan Rastislav Štefánik. Later emissions of banknotes always excluded either Czech or Slovak, while the minority languages were present. This practice was probably meant to symbolize the idea of one Czechoslovak language with two versions, and was thus an expression of Czechoslovakism.

The demands for the expansion of the educational system were directly associated with the Hungarian past – specifically with the Magyarization policy of the former regime. The number of schools with Slovak language of instruction had been gradually reduced, down to 140 out of a total of 3521 in 1918. By 1920, there were 2400 Slovak schools in Slovakia, increasing to 3250 in 1931.30 A tremendous effort was thus made to build up a Slovak educational system almost from scratch, but higher education evidently did not have the same priority. Comenius University in Bratis-

---

29 Due to the initial lack of reliable personnel that was also proficient in Slovak, large numbers of Czechs were recruited after 1918. The number of Czechs in Slovakia increased from 7,947 in the 1910 census to 71,733 in the 1921 census and 120,926 in the 1930 census. Of these, 18,815 and 21,739 were public employees, respectively. See Bobač, Antonín: Češi na Slovensku [Czechs in Slovakia]. In: Statistický obzor [Statistical horizon]. Edited by Státní úřad statistický. Praha 1935, 183-190, (esp. 183-84 and 188-90).

30 See Table 13 in Bakke: Doomed to failure 327 (cf. footnote 1).
slava was established in 1919, but the longed-for natural science faculty did not open until 1941, and the demand for a Slovak Polytechnic in Košice (Kaschau) was met only in the fall of 1938, in part due to budgetary restraints and lack of qualified teachers.

Economic demands were of two types: Demands of a spatial or regional character, which were presented on behalf of Slovakia, and demands of a more national character, which were filed on behalf of the Slovak nation. The most important demands of the former category involved infrastructure and unification of laws and taxes, chiefly the construction of railways and roads and equalization of railway tariffs, but also state orders for Slovak industry. The main demand of a national nature was “Slovak bread” – public employment for the Slovak intelligentsia. This was especially salient in the 1930s. In the eyes of the Slovak autonomists, what served Slovakia, served the Slovaks and vice versa. The Slovak Czechoslovakists joined the autonomists, and even fought harder than they did to remove Slovakia’s economic disadvantages, but their motive was Czechoslovak integration, not Slovak national interests.

During the 1920s, very little was done to bridge the gap in industrialization and economic development between the Czech lands and Slovakia, although construction plans for railways and roads had been adopted already in 1920. Especially in the early 1920s, there was insufficient funding to finance investments in industry and infrastructure, and at the same time reduce foreign ownership and support the Czechoslovak currency. It seems that, in this situation, top priority was given to becoming independent of the former Austrian and Hungarian economic centers and ensuring Czech ownership of commerce and industry (domestication). By the late 1920s, the challenges associated with the economic restructuring process had been dealt with, and the problems of Slovakia were taken more seriously. Ironically, more was done to bridge the gap and improve the infrastructure in Slovakia during the crisis years in the 1930s, than during the growth period in the late 1920s.

The economic crisis of the 1930s also worked as a restraint on government hiring policy. Despite Slovak autonomist claims to the contrary, Czechs were undoubtedly needed in order to run the Slovak schools and administration, especially in the early 1920s. Once the Slovak intelligentsia became large enough to run Slovak affairs in the late 1920s, however, the jobs were blocked by more experienced Czechs, and the economic crisis led to cut-backs in personnel. In this situation, the only way of employing more Slovaks in public jobs in Slovakia was to kick out Czechs, which was politically impossible for two reasons: First, it would certainly have led to strong reactions from the Czech side, since the cri-
sis was even more severe in the Czech lands than in Slovakia. Second, to introduce employment quotas for Slovaks was contrary to an employment policy based on merit, and would imply recognizing them as a separate nation – which was contrary to official Czechoslovakism.

Politically, the two main demands of the Slovak autonomists were the demands for a Slovak krajina (region), and political autonomy for this region. The former demand was met through the establishment of four lands (země) in 1928: Bohemia, Moravia-Silesia, Slovakia and Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia. The demand for political autonomy was the credo of the Slovak People’s Party and the Slovak National Party, voiced repeatedly in Parliament and in the autonomist press. Yet, only three autonomy proposals were submitted to the Parliament as constitutional amendments, in 1922, 1930 and 1938. All were more or less federal, and granted Slovakia her own parliament, her own administration and her own courts. In addition, two of the proposals called for a Slovak government. The last of these autonomy proposals became the basis of the 1938 Constitutional amendment, which ended the First Czechoslovak Republic.

There was a clear internal connection between these demands, both in the sense that the demand for autonomy was intimately associated with the demand for recognition of the Slovaks as a separate nation, and in the sense that political autonomy was presented as a remedy for cultural and economic grievances. It was argued that the Slovaks were entitled to political autonomy, both by virtue of being a nation (with a natural right to self-determination) and by virtue of various wartime “contracts” (chiefly the notorious Pittsburgh agreement).

What was the government’s responsibility?

The government was only partly responsible for the spatial economic conflicts, mainly through sins of omission. Economic constraints partly explain why little was done about the infrastructure in the early 1920s,

31 All official economic data showed that Slovakia was less affected by the crisis than the Czech lands – e.g. in terms of registered average unemployment. However, the unregistered unemployment was higher, Slovakia had more “semi-employed” seasonal workers, and the income level was lower. See Ibidem 400-404.

32 For details see Ibidem 477-510. — The Pittsburgh agreement which “granted” Slovakia autonomy, was signed on May 30th, 1918 by representatives of the Slovak league (Slovenská liga), the Czech National Alliance (České národní sdružení), and the Alliance of Czech Catholics (Svaz českých katolíků) in the United States, and most importantly by Tomáš G. Masaryk, the chairman of the Czechoslovak National Council (Československá národní rada) in Paris. The text of the agreement is printed in The Slovaks and the Pittsburgh pact. Chicago 1934, 27.
but this is no excuse for the delay in the harmonization of laws, tax levels and railway tariffs. The neglect of Slovakia’s economic needs in the early 1920s also stands in stark contrast to the effort that was put into building up a Slovak educational system.

These priorities may have something to do with the fact that the Slovaks in the government gravitated towards ministries that were important from a national, cultural point of view (like the Ministry of Education and national Enlightenment/Ministerstvo školství a národní osvěty), while they were almost absent in ministries of economic importance. The Minister Plenipotentiary of Slovakia, Vavro Šrobár, also focused on Slovak education. On the other hand, although all the Ministers of Unification of Laws in the 1920s were Slovaks, little was done, so perhaps it would not have made any difference.

The government (or rather its servants) made some early mistakes that served to antagonize an important part of the Slovak elite. First, Šrobár made two mistakes in selecting people to the Slovak Club of the Revolutionary Parliament. Šrobár picked Czechs to represent the Slovaks, and he gave preference to the Protestant and Czechoslovak-oriented wing of the Slovaks. This gave the Protestant elite (who was from the outset closer to the Czechs) a stake in the state, while alienating the Catholic majority. Part of the reason for Šrobár’s choice was probably that he wanted people he could trust; and, as a central figure in Czechoslovak-oriented circles before 1918, it was not unnatural for him to choose his acquaintances from there. Furthermore, Protestants were over-represented among the Slovak elite known to be nationally aware.

Second, the recruitment policy in Slovakia was ill-advised. Although the Czechs were sorely needed in order to run the administration and schools, they were simply too many – especially in the postal service and the railways, where they could and should have been replaced by Slovaks. Finally, although the majority of the Czechs who arrived in Slovakia meant well and did a good job, they did not pay enough attention to Slovak religious sensitivities, and some refused to learn the Slovak language. Considering that the clergy was strongly represented in the Slovak nationally conscious elite, and that the Slovak battle cry had been “for that our Slovak language”, such behavior served to alienate the Slovaks more.

Finally, some conflict issues were more directly caused by government policy. This applies, for instance, to the introduction of Jan Hus Day, the attempt to abolish the confessional schools, Czechoslovakism in school textbooks, and the reluctance to change the language regulations in favor of Slovak in Slovakia. This was related to official Czechoslovakism, specifically the pretension that Czech and Slovak
The making of Czechoslovakism

43

were two literary forms of the same language. However, nobody urged the Slovaks to give up their literary language.

Conclusion

Official Czechoslovakism was temporarily abandoned through the promulgation of the Constitutional amendment of 1938, and finally buried after the war. It was quite obvious already by the mid-1930s that Czechoslovakism had failed. Part of the reason why it was not abandoned earlier, was probably the interdependence between the Czechoslovak state and national unity. In the first place, official Czechoslovakism helped legitimize Czechoslovakia as a nation-state, and as such superior to the old Austrian “prison of nations”. Second, it made the Czechs and Slovaks appear stronger against the Germans and Magyars, respectively.

During communism, Czechoslovakism was usually interpreted as a cultural doctrine, and more often than not, in the Czech pejorative sense. After the velvet revolution there has been a tendency, especially on the Czech side, to present the Czechoslovak nation project as a political (i.e. civic) nation project, and to pretend that Masaryk had a political conception of Czechoslovak nationhood. My own research clearly demonstrates that the idea of a Czechoslovak nation was based primarily on the cultural, linguistic and ethnic affinity of the Czechs and Slovaks. An (alleged) feeling of belonging together was also an important part of the conception, but this was based on Czecho-Slovak cultural contacts

---


throughout history rather than political ones. The motivation for Czecho-
slovakism may have been – and most likely was – political, but the pro-
posed contents of the identity were nevertheless cultural.