Foreign Policy Opinion as a Function of International Position*

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The main thesis of this paper is that the world images and foreign policy attitudes of the leading foreign policy and opinion-making strata of a given national actor are a function of the position which that actor enjoys in the international system. This thesis is based on a structural-sociological approach to the functioning of the international system and the ways in which the images and attitudes of elites and other social strata are formed. It proposes a way of classifying national actors according to their position in the international structure along a center-periphery dimension. It emphasizes the importance of symmetry vs. asymmetry in the relationship between actors and the role of penetration and external dominance of national polities. The paper also discusses the potential influence of various factors in the formation of images and attitudes and shows how factors other than the external, 'systemic' one may play a role under certain conditions. It ends up with a discussion of where Norway fits into the model and makes certain propositions concerning images and attitudes held by Norwegian foreign policy elites, being 'centrist' and in certain respects of an 'over-centrist' type.

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I. INTRODUCTION

There is a large body of theory on what factors determine the foreign policy of national actors. Much may be adapted for our purpose of describing and evaluating what factors determine or shape the images and attitudes of our units of analysis. The basis for doing so we find in the assumption of a relatively strong positive correlation between the policy or behavior of a given national actor and the international images and foreign policy attitudes of the leading strata of that actor.

Images and attitudes, studied here as dependent variables, are used by many authors as determinants of policy and thus as independent variables of the type we shall now explore. This, however, should not confuse anyone as long as the choice we have made, which is quite legitimate theoretically and methodologically, is kept in mind by the reader and adhered to by the author.

The author carried out a survey on non-random samples representing what may be referred to as the foreign policy milieu of Norway: those who form public opinion and contribute to the decision-making on questions of world politics and foreign policy. An 'elite' sample consisting of close on 100 respondents was interviewed during spring 1967. At the same time some 130 persons representing a partly random sample of 'opinion-makers' responded to a mailed questionnaire. The two samples were asked to state their opinions on a large number of questions. Comparisons between them were, according to tests that were carried out, found possible.

The survey focused on issues such as the structure of the international system and great power politics; questions and causes of conflict; priorities for peace-making; less developed countries and the problems of development; international cooperation and alliance policies; the United Nations; disarmament and arms limitations, and others.

As a partial and preliminary test of the
theory which is developed below, comparisons with corresponding samples of foreign policy 'elites' in West European and other countries were carried out. Further, extensive comparative analyses were carried out on relations between elite, opinion makers and general public opinion as representative of different levels of the Norwegian opinion- and decision-making structure. These analyses were based on a set of hypotheses concerning variations in image and attitudes between different groups and categories of Norwegian society. They were concentrated on variables like party affiliation, age, institutional background (being an important criterion in the sampling process), center-periphery position, and others. The purpose of this part of the study was threefold: to see to what extent and in what respect there is deviation among the samples from the main line of thought stemming from the effects of the international position of the country; to explore into the form and the extent of consensus within and among the social groups under study; and to present new information on the Norwegian policy and the structure of decision-making.

The study is also future-oriented in the sense that it tries to explore what the likely future thinking on world issues and the attitudes of the coming Norwegian elites will be. At the end some methodological and statistical problems are analyzed, and the report gives detailed accounts of the techniques used in the study.

II. DETERMINANTS OF IMAGES AND ATTITUDES: THE RELATIVE INFLUENCE OF FACTORS

The 'level-of-analysis problem', in particular that raised by Singer, is a question of how many levels of foreign policy determining factors one should distinguish between. Singer roughly introduces two levels: the intra- (domestic) and the extra-national (or international, foreign); North et al. present six levels of analysis, ranging from the individual to the supranational; while Galtung employs an even more refined scheme. Others, putting less emphasis on the individual-to-international continuum, utilize a classification of determinants following other dimensions or no specific classification system at all.*

There are two inter-related problems to which different solutions have been offered. One is whether the list of causal variables should be 'inclusive' or all-encompassing (include a whole lot of possible variables on each level of each category, a detailed catalogue) or more 'exclusive' or selective. The other is which factors should be considered of greatest causal importance — one single group of variables, or a whole range of variables in a certain ranking order. This is the problem which will occupy us here. Let us, however, first state our preference for the exclusive approach: in our opinion the detailed list of Snyder et al. is quite inapplicable. The kind of research we are attempting needs a map of factors accurate and concise enough to guide the researcher to the important points, not a map overcrowded with details, unsystematic, and largely untheoretical.*

The problem of the relative influence of factors, however, is the most important. The map may very well be detailed as long as we know reasonably well what factors are important (causally) and which are not. Up to now theory has been extremely reluctant to take this challenge seriously, and we quite agree with Rosenau's criticism of this state of affairs.

We may analyze our problems in the light of a set of different variables, ranging from the idiosyncratic to the systemic level. Singer emphasizes the importance of integrating this whole set of variables in a single theoretical framework. We fully agree with the argument that no category or level of variables should be left out of consideration, neither in a general theory nor in the specific case study. Much of the research so far has not addressed this issue but instead advocated a single-level approach. In many cases such an advocacy is based on an evaluation of the importance or causal relevance of different categories or levels, and a choice of or preference for one specific category. In fact, such a choice is sometimes necessary; the question is on what basis it is made. We have the impression that very often preference for causal relationships are held on an intuitive basis, because of the research school or tradition of the individual researcher (psychologists take the idiosyncratic or personality approach to foreign policy attitudes, at least some political scientists the 'national interest' approach, etc.) or because of the personality or political preferences of the researcher.*

Several arguments can be raised against these research traditions. One is that they leave a number of possibly important variables out of discussion a priori. Another is that, as already indicated, there is really no theory behind the assumptions of causal relationships and the choice of variables. A third argument is that they do not discriminate.

By this we mean that there is no attempt to see the actors or units under study in the light of actual or possible differences between them. There is an a priori rule — a convention which has not been questioned or discussed according to empirical observations — that all actors may be studied using the same instruments, categories, and concepts. One of the few to criticize this state of affairs is Rosenau. While we share his critical observations, we shall have some objections against the research scheme he proposes. At the end we will present our own alternative scheme.

Rosenau's 'pre-theory' of foreign policy making distinguishes between influences at five levels of variables: the idiosyncratic, role, governmental, societal, and systemic.* He then constructs a tentative classificatory scheme for various types of national actors. This scheme is built on three — with an elaboration, four — dichotomies: great vs. small actors; developed vs. underdeveloped economies; open vs. closed policies; and penetrated vs. non-penetrated societies.

This scheme yields eight (sixteen) different types of actors. Rosenau goes on to present a number of hypotheses about the relative potency of each of the five categories of variables for each class of actor. Although the rationale behind these hypotheses is not elaborated very much, the hypotheses are relatively concrete and may be subjected to empirical testing. They are, briefly:

1. Systemic: more potent in less-developed economies than role variables

2. Governmental: more potent than societal variables in closed polities than in open ones (there is less need for the officials in the latter to heed non-governmental demands than in the former)

3. Role: more potent than idiosyncratic variables in developed economies (because the bureaucracy and the large-scale organizations impose more restraints in the developed than in the less-developed economies)

4. Idiosyncratic: more potent in less-developed economies than role variables (for the same reason as mentioned above)

Rosenau develops this list into a quite exhaustive list of hypotheses. While we believe that the list could be made more fruitful by more systematic reasoning and by some changes in the hypotheses proposed, there is no doubt that testing of the classificatory scheme and of the concrete hypotheses would be of considerable interest to foreign policy-making theory.*

On the other hand, the fruitfulness of such work could be much enlarged if some of the concepts employed and the exemplifi-
cations used, e.g., the cases chosen for study, were improved."  
The fourth dichotomy introduced by Rosenau is in many respects the most important: the penetrated vs. non-penetrated dichotomy. According to Rosenau a penetrated political system is one in which nonmembers of a national society participate directly and authoritatively, through action taken jointly with the society's members, in either the allocation of its values or the mobilization of support on behalf of its goals."

From this it should follow that systemic variables are particularly influential within penetrated, small, less-developed, and open 'systems. We return to this problem later on.

The concept of issue-area, important in Rosenau's theory, suggests that foreign policy behavior and policy-making structures are different from one issue-set to another and should be analyzed differently. While it seems well substantiated (although Rosenau and others use impressionistic data on this point) that some such differences do make themselves felt, we do not think that they deserve any prominent place in theory-building. In the first place, the issue-area approach is based very much on the findings of Dahl, and these should not be adapted uncritically to the global system. Secondly, even if there is a good point for the approach in general theory, in the case of a small, homogeneous national actor like Norway, the foreign policy elite or milieu is not that specialized and pluralistic.

Brecher et al. have employed Rosenau's issue-area approach in a content analysis study of elite images in situations of foreign policy decision-making. Employing only his developed vs. developing economies dichotomy for actor classification, they arrive at findings which, however interesting, will be of limited value to a broader theory construction; some of them will, however, be kept in mind throughout this report.

Following Rosenau's scheme, Norway would fall into the class of a small, developed, and open-policy actor. The relative potency of the five categories of variables will, according to the theory for this class, be: (1) role, (2) systemic, (3) societal, (4) governmental, and (5) idiosyncratic. Then the question is whether that actor constitutes a penetrated or non-penetrated system. If penetrated, the systemic variables move to the top of the ranking list and role variables to second place; if non-penetrated, the ranking remains the same. Rosenau himself gives no indications toward an exemplification of actors after this fourth dichotomy is introduced. We shall leave the question open in order to present an alternative, partial theory, which will include parts of the Rosenau pre-theory in modified form.

III. WORLD PERSPECTIVE: THE CASE FOR A CENTER-PERIPHERY THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

The world perspective of the foreign policy milieu is a combination of the fundamental images and attitudes, the main values or wants of the totality of the members of the milieu. It is a rough, single-concept description of how the foreign policy milieu of an actor relates itself, and consequently the national actor it represents, to the enviroring world.

This perspective is the focus of analysis. What makes, and what is the basis of the perspective, is largely the international social position of the national actor, the foreign policy milieu of which is under study.

The theory of foreign policy opinion as a function of social position is now well known from the study of national societies. It is based mainly on socio-economic and communication structure variables.

In the index constructed by Galtung, there are altogether eight variables. For our purpose, we have constructed an additive index comprising eight variables, a number of which may be said to correspond fairly closely with those employed in the 'national index'.

This procedure raises the very important question whether or to what extent one may assume isomorphism between the international, global and the national community (or between parts of them). Another question is the validity of the variables (or the whole index) we have chosen for the assignment of an actor's position in the community of nations.

The isomorphism question is particularly important in the cases where micro-sociological theory is used as a reservoir for the theory construction at the international system level. Many of the attempts in this direction should no doubt be subject to criticism. Some others evidently stand on safer ground, particularly as they have received backing from empirical data. Galtung, who has used small group theory as a basis for elaborations on international relations theory, stresses the importance of the former as a reservoir of fruitful hypotheses to be tested at the level of the latter. At the same time, he emphasizes the danger of making too easy inferences from one level to another.

While these questions are also relevant to our study, our problem in this context is not the same since we are not dealing with units (nations) interacting with each other, but with one unit (Norway represented by its foreign policy milieu) looking at other units and the relations between those units and itself, and with the different sub-units (groups, categories and individuals within the two milieu samples) in varying support of this 'looking at' other units. The problems mentioned certainly apply to our general line of attack. We are not presupposing to test it thoroughly here. The more thoroughgoing discussion may be left out. What we shall have to address ourselves to, however, is the validation of the index employed for assigning international social positions.

An obvious question in the construction of the index is to what extent the variables in the national social position index should be transferred to the international index. The national index consists of three types of variables; both 'ascriptive' and 'achievement' variables as to social background, and communication structure variables. We choose not to transform the variables used in this index directly, but to pick out variables representative of the three types at the international level.

The three types of variables in our context may be termed attributive — 'ascriptive', attributive — 'achievement', and relational or interactional variables. Obviously, international center or periphery are not only characterized by the latter type, which would more or less correspond to depicting positions only horizontally. Neither is international social position determined only in terms of the former two types, as it would if we had been investigating stratification or ranking systems within the world community. Studies of this latter type are now becoming quite numerous.

Another major problem is the relative weight to attach to these three types of variables. Our choice here parallels the one made in the case of the national index, as the three types mentioned above in the order they appear, are given the weight 3/8, 3/8 and 2/8, respectively. One may argue that this weighting is arbitrary: we must admit that we have no theoretical defense for it other than that given for the national index.

As to variables to be used as indicators in the index, power or size variables are obviously the best measure of the attributive 'ascriptive' cluster, while development level indicators would best indicate the attributive-achievement one. The variables selected are thus the following (with the national index variables to which they would most closely correspond listed in parentheses):
Objections may be made, e.g. as to the classification of variables; GDP is very much an 'achievement' indicator, whereas memberships in international organizations may be seen as indication of both ascriptive and achievement attributes, being highly correlated with rank or power. Distinctions between the variables in terms of proper classification should not be seen as particularly rigid.

Another — and in our opinion much stronger objection — is the one that dismisses statistical expressions of 'reality' such as GDP, GDP per capita, etc. as bad or even misleading indications of development. There is no other answer to such an objection that the type of analysis employed here seems to demand an indicator which is better than none; there are, e.g. no statistics for the whole of our universe on distribution of development patterns.

The index (cf. Appendix A) was validated by a variable indicative of the international behavior of national actors: their tendency to be absent from voting in the UN General Assembly, in 1962 and 1963. According to our theory, center actors would tend to be present, while those on the periphery would tend to be absent.

This measure offered a Spearman's rank correlation between rank on the international social position index and absence scores of 0.65 for the 1962 and 1963 data. This coefficient was obtained from index scores and absence data for 110 countries, i.e. the then member states of the world organization. That the index data and information on voting absence are not wholly synchonic should not make any great difference.

In three of the total 110 cases, international position and absence ranks differed widely: South Africa, Portugal (both high on the index, low on presence), and Mongolia (low on the index, but very high on presence). If these three 'odd' cases are excluded, rank correlation obtained for the remaining 107 cases is only 0.71. This means that some cases of low presence are due to factors other than international position; in the cases mentioned, the explanation seems obvious. On the whole, we find that the index has been given at least sufficient validation.

What then are the implications of the center-periphery structure of the international system to the system itself? What makes it relevant and not only a theoretical construct?

By this structural approach we focus on how the foreign policy milieu of national actors — the representatives of these actors — perceive, feel, or generally behave, as a function of the position of the national actor they represent in the international system.

This implies, for one thing, that what Rosenau calls systemic and idiosyncratic variables act together: the international position of the actor is consequential or influential insofar as it is cognitively present to the persons constituting the milieu, through their own perception or as it is perceived and taught by others (other milieus). However, this systemic-idiosyncratic combination is not the same for all actors under all circumstances. Its strength relative to other variables may vary, and the strength of either of the two variables relative to the other will change from one actor to another, both because of varying international position, and because of, e.g. variations in the stability of the values on the variables.

That Rosenau's concept of penetration is useful is true only with some important modifications. First of all, its usefulness lies in the strong attack it makes possible against the prevailing tradition of distinguishing sharply between the international and the national system. As Rosenau says, the two go very much over in each other. What he fails to emphasize is that this will most probably vary from one part of the system to another, and from one type of actor to another. More importantly, the content, direction of, and the consequence of the penetration or internationalization of national polities will vary from one set of actors to another. One important aspect of the internationalization is the built-in asymmetry in the relationship between two or more national actors. This asymmetry may exist between center and periphery, between the big power and the small power, between geographical neighbors, between dominant and dominated within specific groups of actors, etc. Domination is one aspect of the internationalization; one actor penetrates another, but not vice versa. Another aspect is what Russell calls responsiveness. A third factor would be whether and to what extent the internationalization is accepted or rejected — whether it is legitimate in the penetrated system.

Domination may be seen as legitimate for varying reasons: the dominated may, while losing policy-making sovereignty, benefit from the domination in other respects. And in the case of asymmetric responsiveness, one actor tends to respond favorably to demands or wishes from the other and thus lend himself to the other actor's penetration into his own policies. An actor may be responsive toward another for ideological, strategic, or economic reasons.

That internationalization or penetration may take different forms has great potential importance when influence stemming from the systemic level is considered. It is not enough to discriminate between penetrated and nonpenetrated, but between degrees and forms of penetration and nonpenetration. Indications of the form or the content of penetration are given by variables like state ideology ('communist' versus 'capitalist-liberal'), culture (language family.religion), military alliance, economic dependency (aid, investments).

The last theoretical problem we shall take up relates to the concept of rank disequilibrium. An actor who ranks high on some variables or sub-dimensions but low on others is rank-disequilibrated, while an actor who ranks almost equally high on most or all variables is said to be rank-equilibrated. The types of and the consequence of rank-disequilibrium are different. China is an example of the big (measured by power-criteria), but less-developed and not centrally located actor. Another example of the disequilibrated type of actor is Luxembourg: small but developed, and centrally located. These are extreme cases. Between them is a whole range of more or less disequilibrated actors.

IV. INTERNATIONAL POSITION AND THE IMAGES AND ATTITUDES OF THE MILIEU: A THEORETICAL MODEL

Our task is to present a model or a theoretical framework which integrates the dimensions presented and discussed in the foregoing: the international position or the center vs. periphery dimension; the penetrated vs. nonpenetrated dichotomy; the open vs. closed dichotomy; and the rank-disequilibrium factor.

Our general proposition is that the international position of an actor determines the main tendency in the world perspective of its milieu. Russet contends that
if we imagine a pair of curves for the distribution of political attitudes in a nation and in the entire international system, that for the world has both a wider range and a less pronounced central tendency — the curve is flatter.

In terms of our center vs. periphery dichotomy, explorations of the dichotomy within national societies seem to indicate that there are at least less pronounced central tendencies in the periphery than in the center; the range of images and attitudes found, on the other hand, will tend to be greater than in the periphery. These trends would probably be found even in the international community, between center and periphery nations.

Dimensions or factors mentioned other than international position provide variations on the main tendency created by international position. In some cases, however, such factors may even outweigh the international position factor in importance; in others, they will tend to modify its influence. Instead of presenting a complete and exhaustive theory at this stage, we shall attempt to specify how and why these different factors or dimensions relate to the influencing of the image-building and attitude-formation of different national actor milieus.

The penetration dimension has relevance as to whether the relationship between two actors is asymmetric or symmetric. In the relationship between two actors who are both center nations, the penetration — if any — will by definition be symmetric; this will generally also be true in a periphery relationship.1 There may, however, be rather strongly asymmetric penetration even in cases where one of the center (periphery) nations is big (in terms of size), while the other is small. However, asymmetry ceteris paribus should be greatest in the center (big) — periphery (small) relationship.

The center nation is comparatively better off than the periphery nation in avoiding strong asymmetric penetration. It is more centrally located in the communication structure and can make its voice better heard. It can interact more on an equal footing with other actors. At the same time, however, the center nations will penetrate each other (i.e. penetration takes place within the center category of nations) more than the periphery will generally, as its single units will be more isolated. But again the important question is the form and the content of the penetrative activity: is it legitimate or not, and to what extent is there consensus on fundamental values between the penetrator and the penetrated?

The center nation has more values to defend than the periphery nation. It is 'aware' of being a center nation, and this awareness creates a feeling of 'responsibility' as well as 'we-ness', a feeling of community with other center nations. This 'we-ness' may make the center nation view the periphery nations as an out-group, possibly a negative reference group. And it may make it especially responsive to other center nations.

Responsiveness may stem from other factors as well. Russett has shown for instance that extensive trade relations make traders (especially those whose trade amounts to an important part of their total economy, or GNP) more responsive toward each other.2 Furthermore, common culture, ideological links, geographical proximity, etc., may create greater responsiveness.

However, even when responsiveness is discussed, differences in international position, particularly on power, make for important distinctions between actors. In a relationship between two actors, the actions of the one toward the other will depend on the relative position and/or power between them, and on the degree of responsiveness. This is illustrated in Table I, which attempts to present a typology of penetration where the three dimensions discussed so far under this heading, are included. It may seem an unnecessary doubling of dimensions to include both symmetric vs. asymmetric and dominance versus non-dominance. But there may be asymmetric relationships between two actors which are penetrated into each other where there is no dominance by the one over the other.

The cases chosen to exemplify the different types of relationship are somewhat arbitrary and might be discussed. The types of reactions proposed could also be discussed or modified. Important, however, is that there is a basis in 'the real world' for a classification of relationships between different actors according to the principles introduced here.

To be responsive toward (the elite or milieu of) another national actor or a group of such actors means that one perceives this or these actors as a positive reference group. To be non-responsive does not necessarily mean that one is antagonistic and perceives the other as a negative reference group: one may also be more or less affectively neutral or indifferent.

Generally, we believe that the responsiveness is potentially higher among center actors than among periphery ones, and clearly higher between center actors than in a periphery actor toward the center one. There are exceptions, probably quite numerous (cf. Table I). At the same time, there is evidently a large amount of non-responsiveness among center actors where ideological and strategic differences come in. But in the concrete case of East-West relations we believe that responsiveness on the whole has increased on both sides toward the other in recent years, despite evident setbacks.3 And what has created this greater responsiveness is not only (in a negative sense) the détente itself, but the growing feeling on both sides of 'we-ness': that both East and West have power over the rest of the world (despite the fact that they also compete for dominance), that they are more developed, constituting the rich countries' club (despite quite clear differences in attitudes and approaches, for instance in UNCTAD), and that they are technologically superior, etc.

Table I. A typology of international penetration relationships; B's reactions to actor A.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Actor A:</th>
<th>Non-dominance</th>
<th>Dominance</th>
<th>Non-dominance</th>
<th>Dominance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Actor B:</td>
<td>Cooperative</td>
<td>Respectful (mutually)</td>
<td>Dependent: domination accepted out of expediency (UK toward USA)</td>
<td>Following: Respectful</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Denmark)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(Norway toward West Germany)</td>
<td>(Small/periphery allies toward USA; developing countries toward France, USA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>'Strictly formal' (mutual interests) or Antagonistic (CSSR toward USA; Yugo-</td>
<td>Retreating: trying to isolate from or cut off domination</td>
<td>Avoiding (non-aligned toward blocs) or Protesting Revolting Reacting or</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Antagonistic (USSR toward US in East-West relations) during the Cold War</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Antagonistic (Cuba toward USSR in early 60s; France toward USA in middle 60s)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tacitly adhering to (CSSR toward USSR)</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

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What then are the world perspectives characteristic of center and of periphery nations, respectively? A list of hypotheses on what constitutes the typical center and periphery perspectives is given in Table 2.

To a large extent, hypotheses are generally, and be more active in sending information (i.e. its perspective and policies) than the periphery nation. Now, the proposed differential or both-and way of evaluating questions seems incompatible with the indication made above that we should find a stronger tendency toward consensus in the center than in the periphery. However, the two hypotheses are not necessarily or logically incompatible, as the both-and approach may be working over several items or issues, not only one single: the milieus may pick one value on one item, another on the second, etc., and thus on each single item still maintain high consensus scores. This may in turn be incompatible with the hypothesis that the center shows more consistency in its perspective than the periphery, but not necessarily so.

On the perspective itself, the proposed differences in attitude towards existing world order and towards change, are due to the fact that the center nations are the 'have's' and that nations as well as individuals strive to preserve what they have. The center nation perspective is very much the modern conservative 'change in order to preserve' approach, while that of the periphery nation either stresses 'preserve' or issues, not only one single: the milieus may be working over several items or issues, not only one single: the milieus may pick one value on one item, another on the second, etc., and thus on each single item still maintain high consensus scores. This may in turn be incompatible with the hypothesis that the center shows more consistency in its perspective than the periphery, but not necessarily so.

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V. THE POTENCY OF TUNTRA-NATIONAL' FACTORS

The open-closed polity dimension as most commonly used, is conceived of as unproblematic: Western democracies or regimes defined by Western scholars as democratic are open polities; other polities (Communist states, certain 'radical' and/or socialist states in the 'Third World') are closed ones. These conceptions are not only scientifically incorrect and often politically misleading: they also fail to consider certain basic problems.
First of all, polity may be ‘open’ in the sense that there are working channels of communication and formal rights of free speech; it may still be ‘undemocratic’ in the sense that most communication goes one way, only from top and downwards; and that the right of speech is used by a small group only — those at the top: the elite and the milieu. The main question then is whether or not open channels of communication exist (in most present societies they do, to some extent) but the patterns of communication which exist and direct the content of the communication.

Oligarchic tendencies within the Western democracies have been stressed by several authors. They seem particularly predominant in the field of foreign policy, although recent developments may seem to indicate the contrary. To the extent that such a situation exists, however, the potency of societal factors is reduced, while the remaining classes of variables — role and governmental — are made, to the same extent, more potent.

The potency of societal factors on foreign policy-making — interest groups, public opinion generally, etc. — is very much determined by the extent to which society or public opinion is mobilized for foreign policy activity or activism. When this activity is relatively high, openness will become more open vertically (provided the activism does not lead to breakdown of the communication structure). When communication about foreign policy matters goes mainly or almost exclusively between the units within the milieu or the elite, polity is truly open only at the top level of the society: it is horizontal openness will become more open vertically (provided the activism does not lead to breakdown of the communication structure). When communication about foreign policy matters goes mainly or almost exclusively between the units within the milieu or the elite, polity is truly open only at the top level of the society: it is horizontal openness will become more open vertically (provided the activism does not lead to breakdown of the communication structure). When communication about foreign policy matters goes mainly or almost exclusively between the units within the milieu or the elite, polity is truly open only at the top level of the society: it is horizontal openness will become more open vertically (provided the activism does not lead to breakdown of the communication structure).
tion. Measured by scores on the additive index (top score 16), Norway has a total score of 13, placing it among four countries receiving international position rank of 23.5. As shown in Appendix A, it ranks in the same position as Argentina, Bulgaria, and Finland, while the positions of some of Norway’s closest associates is one step higher in the case of Denmark (14 on the index), two steps in the case of Sweden and the US (scoring 15), and three steps or positions higher in the case of Great Britain and Western Germany (scoring the top 16 score).”

From this we may hypothesize that the world perspective of the Norwegian foreign policy milieu is also of the moderately centrist type. We hesitate to do so because Norway is extremely rank-disequilibrated both when the index variables and particularly when many attribute variables are taken into consideration. From what has been said above on the possible consequences of rank disequilibrium, we assume that the question of compensations is relevant in the case of Norway. Although the Norwegian public ranks relatively high on degree of aggressiveness, in certain aspects of the concept, this has little relevance to our problem as Norway lacks the resources with which to act aggressively toward other nations.

More relevance should probably be attached to the fact that Norway may suffer from a certain ‘partial inferiority’ complex, the feeling of being a periphery nation within the center. Comparing her international position with that of her NATO colleagues, we see that she ranks lower than nine (out of fourteen), higher than only five. And these five are Iceland and Luxembourg (extremely low on size), and Greece, Portugal, and Turkey (all low on development). Norway then receives the lowest rank among the not too small and developed NATO countries.

What is left then is a basis for compensation. Three hypotheses may be put forth here. One is that the Norwegian milieu is playing down its lack of power — that it is a medium sized country — and playing up its high rank on development. The second hypothesis would be that Norway actively tries to intermix as much as possible with the actors with which she shares a number of high ranks (on e.g. development) or a higher total international position rank than Norway (e.g. the nine NATO countries). These countries may ‘lend’ some of their high-ranking status to Norway through a network of interaction which associates Norway to them."

The third and last hypothesis on this point will be simply that Norway because she receives a somewhat lower international position than her positive reference group, i.e. her closest associates, will tend to be ‘over-centrist’: she will be more centrist in her perspective than the objective center actors, at least on some issues being more Catholic than the Pope. The perspective of Norway’s foreign policy milieu is made more truly centrist as an effect of her rank disequilibrium.

The compensation-intermingling hypothesis also means that the Norwegian milieu will put a great value on international cooperation or organization as such, or as a means of achieving national goals. According to Terhune, this is exactly the definition of ‘internationalism’, one of the most confused concepts in international relations theory."

It seems necessary to distinguish between at least three different types of ‘internationalism’: supra-nationalism, cross-nationalism, and trans-nationalism. We shall relate these concepts to our data later on. Let us say here something of the dimension globalization vs. regionism, which is related to the concepts mentioned.

Globalistic attitudes are shown by a preference for cooperation at the global level and for a foreign policy in general; regionalistic attitudes are preferences for cooperation with or a foreign policy directed toward a limited number of national or multinational actors (limited primarily by geographical criteria). We would say that globalism means a willingness to tackle problems or phenomena at the global level, or in the (geographical or functional) areas outside the closest and ‘those most naturally preoccupying oneself, into one’s perspective, becoming internalized and essential to one’s attitudes on relevant issues and the policy one is making.

Generally, ‘internationalism’ means willingness to take the interests of other actors and their perspectives into account; and, in situations where the interests (perspectives) of one’s ‘own’ actor and those of others are in conflict, not necessarily and a priori place own interests before those of others. Moreover, the concept is related to making that perspective ‘own’.

Regionalism logically means a tendency to identify oneself first of all with those areas which are close. This raises one important question: in the case of a small or medium small actor with limited capacity in terms of resources, and capability in terms of power, does such an actor really have any choice? Whether it wants it or not — will it not simply have to limit itself to activities within and thus identification toward the closer areas, i.e. to regionalistic perspectives and policies?

This is the problem of domain vs. scope. And the problem posed for the small actor in particular is whether it can afford to participate as a full member of the society of national actors in both domain and scope. Instead of trying to match both these demands, it may be more rewarding to try to concentrate on one of them, thus maximizing one’s output and possibly one’s influence there. Or, the question may even be whether to choose both limited domain (regionalism) and limited scope (e.g. only functional cooperation).

Although we may find examples of small state influence in global politics (where great powers are involved), the general hypothesis would be that the small state will usually choose regional policies. This does not mean, however, that there may not be strong globalistic feeling within the foreign policy milieu or elite of that actor, or that it necessarily has to make this choice on the policy side. On scope, the small state — at least if it is a relatively centrist one, and not a ‘mini-state’ (like Andorra) — will in a sense have no real choice. Because the different fields of activity are so intermingled and overlapping, participation in one field leads to or pre-supposes participation in another or several others. There is a ‘partout’ ticket which all actors have to buy if they want to be an accepted member of the international society. Thus the small state has to divide its resources, its capacity on a number of different fields of activity.

In the case of Norway, however, at least one major factor might be expected to make the perspective and ‘internationalist’ of her milieu more globalistic: her global shipping business, which is considerable, both in absolute and in relative terms.”

This fact together with the ‘special’ Norwegian affiliations toward the UN point to a large degree of globalistic orientation within the milieu, although the practical policy — the behavioral side — is supposed to lean toward regionalism.

Going back to the center-periphery dimension, one might argue that an actor like Norway, which on the basis of scarce resources not only plays up the importance of development variables, but has also objectively maximized or ‘over-achieved’ on these variables will be most eager to maintain what it has, which means that it will demand stability, peace, and security from the international society.

At this point, we must distinguish between achievement in the past and achievement in the present. The former, the already achieved actor, will in particular tend to take the attitude just mentioned: it was upward mobile in the past; at present when its rates of growth are not particularly high, it finds it all wants to maintain what it has achieved.

The achieving actor will tend to take an attitude more favorable toward change, mobility, even toward taking risks. Its position is not settled yet, it is still on the move because of high rates of growth. Its attitude or acts may even take the form of aggression.

Another distinction which may be useful
when it comes to potential aggressiveness and risk-taking, is that between resourceful and non-resourceful actors. The former is believed to be more likely to take an aggressive attitude; it may be able to replace what it possibly loses from risk-taking by using its own resources. This holds for both the achieved and/or achieving as well as the non-achieved resourceful actor: the former may be able to recapture its losses in position relatively rapidly — post WW II Japan and Western Germany may well be examples of this; the latter may feel that it has little to lose from taking risks as what it may achieve is still potential. Now, measured by economic growth rates, Norway in the post-WWII period seems to take the position of a still ‘achieving achieved’: she has a higher growth rate than many of her center or moderate center companions, although the rate is not among the highest. It is probably correct to put most emphasis on the past or up-to-the-present performances which she has achieved.

Another example of the risk-taking achieved or achieving center actor may perhaps be found in the question of attitudes toward the nuclear non-proliferation treaty: some of the strongest opposition against it has come from states which are achieved and resourceful, while many of the strongest protagonists are the achieved but non-resourceful, e.g., Norway. Moreover, opponents are also found among the non-achieved, resourceful actors, e.g., China and India.

In this paper, we have presented the case for a structural approach to the study of images and attitudes among foreign policy elites. The thesis was put forward to show that these images and attitudes are a function of the international position of the actor which the foreign policy milieu members represent.

APPENDIX A

International position of nation-states

According to the international social position index.*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank position</th>
<th>Nation-state</th>
<th>Index score</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>2</td>
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* N = 141.

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<td>Ivory Coast</td>
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97 Kenya
97 Madagascar
97 Malaysia
97 Malta
97 Muscat and Oman
97 Senegal
97 Singapore
97 Tanzania
97 Uganda
108.5 Cambodia
108.5 Cameroon
108.5 Guinea
108.5 Mongolia
108.5 Paraguay
108.5 Qatar
108.5 Trinidad and Tobago
108.5 Trucial Oman
108.5 Western Samoa
108.5 Yemen
116.5 Bahrain
116.5 Bhutan
116.5 Laos
116.5 Liberia
116.5 Mauritius
116.5 Nepal
123.5 Congo-Brazzaville
123.5 Gabon
123.5 Gambia
123.5 Malawi
123.5 Maldives Islands
123.5 Mali
123.5 Niger
123.5 Upper Volta
134.5 Aden
134.5 Botswana
134.5 Burundi
134.5 Central African Republic
134.5 Chad
134.5 Dahomey
134.5 Guinea, Equatorial
134.5 Lesotho
134.5 Mauritania
134.5 Nauru
134.5 Rwanda
134.5 Sierra Leone
134.5 Somaliland
134.5 Togo
Rosenau seems to confuse Rosenau, ibid, distinguishes between four
Ibid., p.
As far as we know, a team of political
Michael Brecher, Blema Steinberg, and
Cf. p.
82
GDP per capita.
8.
Literacy level.
total GDP.
Growing out of the work of international relations scholars, as well
This leads to the conclusion that
Russett, 'Methodological and Theoretical Schools in International Relations' Monograph
pp. 87-105.
Rosenau, in Farrell (ed.), op. cit. calls his contribution to foreign policy-making: it is less than a fully fledged; it is tentative. Rosenau defines it — an early step towards explanation of specific empirical events, a point of view of philosophy about the way the world is. — Cf. note 41, p. 41.
On this point Rosenau seems to confuse two different axes or dimensions as one. The five levels he is proposing in fact are not found alone across single continua, but both logicians, e.g. theologians, and sociologists, e.g. philosophers, have found such levels across the context of at least two dimensions: the public vs. private, and the intra-national vs. inter-national. Thus, to use the concepts, i.e. policies tailored to the context of the study, the four-fold or an eight-fold table seems to offer a more correct presentation of the categories.
Ibid., p. 43. The idiosyncratic variables are particular to the countries they operate in (definitions, prior experiences, values); role variables are peculiar to the policy-maker's role; and societal and systemic variables are universalized perspectives (idiosyncratic and role variables on the major dimensions he has chosen although the dimensions he has chosen, although adequate, are not always the appropriate thing, as it would also escape the difficulty mentioned and as it would give the thesis that there are several issue-areas with distinctly separate processes of policy-making within the area of foreign policy.
We are particularly referring to his use of the dichotomy open vs. closed politics, which is not operationalized, but seems to follow a rather conventional use of the concepts i.e. Western, 'ideologized' one. To take two examples of the debatable consequences of this: Kenyan, where instead of igad (opposition, etc. existed) than Kenya.
A second weak point is the example of the Czechoslovakia. For one thing, subsequent events show that the closed one, was 'open under a cover of closedness': the January 1968 revolution in fact was a manifestation of the latent openness of the Czechoslovakian society. Another thing is that later events again have closed this society from the top through systemic influence, which showed that much more was going on than the superficial nonpenetration dichotomy leaves much to be explored. While the systemic influences clearly both prior to and after this period have played a paramount role.
Rosenau, ibid. distinguishes between four different issue-areas: the territorial, the status, the human resources and the nonhuman resources. This dichotomy encompasses the distinctive motives, actions, and interactions evoked by the clusters of values that are linked to the different issue-areas; the jurisdiction, the allocation of status within horizontal political systems or within non-political systems, the development and allocation of human resources, and the development and allocation of nonhuman resources' pp. 82–83.
Dahl in his community study found an overlap among 'leaders' and 'subleaders' in the three issue-areas involved in the study of only 3.5% of the other leaders in all three areas (Dahl, op. cit., p. 175). Similar findings have been reported by Miller and Stokes: they found statistically highly significant differences between the operation of representation processes in three major issue-areas: social welfare, foreign involvement and civil rights — among congressmen. (Warren E. Miller and Donald E. Stokes, 'Constituency Influence in the Congress: A Study in Political Ecology', World Politics XIV: 7 October 1962, pp. 75—101.)
Rosenau uses the Netherlands as an example of an actor falling into this class.
Our objections to his theory are both theoretical and methodological. First, we find that the dimensions he has chosen, although representing basic facts of the international system, are not adequate. Secondly, instead of the dichotomy, the non-dichotomized classes may be too small for empirical analysis. More important, instead of the use of dichotomies we think that an index would be the appropriate thing, as it would also escape the difficulty just mentioned, and as it would give a more reliable picture of the international system and its complexity. While we may have to dichotomize each single variable going into the index, we may arrive at a more refined classification by using an additive index for ranking, etc. By such an operation, we shall get a flexible measure of inter-actor effects, as expected, or of shades of properties characteristic of the different classes, not the clear-cut (and unrealistic) 0.1 classification of the method Rosenau employs.
Galtung, 'Foreign Policy Opinion as a Function of Social Position'. His index employed the following variables: Age; Income;
These problems are taken up in more detail in Nils P. Gleditsch and Helge Hveem, 'On an International Center-Periphery Index: Some Further Evidence', International Peace Research Institute, Oslo, 1970.


In this case there is little or no interaction between the two actors, or little action by the actor which can be identified as interaction (in terms of international position).

In this respect the impression formed by the observers of East-West relations in the 60s when they use the concept détente, it may even be related to United States — France relationship under Gaullism.

If we are interested in the foreign policy attitudes of a country, we of course have to treat the situation of a country as a whole.


Other categories of attitude sets along this dimension is nationalism, sub-nationalism, and extra-nationalism, in the latter case where an individual feels stronger loyalty to an actor outside his own country than to this country itself.

In 1968, Norway's shipping in terms of...
total size of her shipping fleet (in tons dead weight) was the third highest ranking in the world, only 'convenience flag' Liberia and Japan ranking higher. In the last years Norway has always been among the four or five largest shipping countries in the world.

For the period 1960—66, Norway had an average annual growth rate (for growth in GDP per capita, real GDP at market prices) of 4.2, while countries like the United States (3.5), Canada (3.7), and Sweden (3.9) scored lower. The highest achieving countries, on the other hand, are Japan (8.7), Greece (7.4), Trinidad and Tobago (7.3), and Taiwan (6.7). Source: *Yearbook of National Accounts Statistics*, 1967.

In the period 1946—49, e.g. Norway's average annual percentage growth rate (real GDP per capita) was 10.7%, which of course to a large extent is due to the 'necessary' strong achievements after a major war.

Schwartzmann and Mora y Araujo, op cit. report that Norwegian students, when evaluating criteria of international stratification of Latin America, stressed achieved development as of particular importance.

Among the achieved, resourceful opponents, Western Germany and France may be mentioned (at least pre-Brandtian Western Germany and Gaullist France). That opposition and support of this measure of course will be due to other factors as well, e.g. ideological, strategic, and technological-economic, is evident, but do not necessarily reject the value of our argument.